THE LETTER OF EUGNOSTOS AND THE ORIGINS OF GNOSTICISM

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There has come to be a broad consensus that Gnosticism emerged in some relationship with Judaism, perhaps on its 'fringes'. One question, however, vexes this hypothesis. Quispel puts the question this way: "It seems to me that the real issue is this: most Gnostics were against the Jewish God who created the world and gave the Law. Is it possible that this doctrine is of Jewish origin?" Scholars have responded to this concern in various ways. Many speak of Gnosticism as a revolt against Judaism. In something of this vein, Segal discusses the historical development of the idea of the evil demiurge. Layton softens this position, seeing the beginnings of Gnosticism as a revision of Judaism rather than a revolt. The other basic approach is to see Gnosticism as a revolt against the cosmos. Jonas, Robinson, and Tröger hold this view.

Stroumsa may also belong here and the recent work of Henry Green on the social environment of Roman Egypt lends support to this view.

Both of these camps acknowledge that the radical rejection of Jewish tradition and the Jewish God developed over time. But the question of how this development began remains unanswered. Many of the works considered quite early (e.g. the Apocryphon of John and Sophia Jesus Christ), already contain a fairly radical inversion of Jewish tradition. So while these are early in relation to most writings of the Nag Hammadi library, they represent a time when the revolt had a good deal of momentum.

This paper asserts that the Letter of Eugnostos (Eug) belongs to the period when Gnosticism was first emerging. We will contend that Eug shows how Gnosticism could and did originate on the fringes of Judaism. Eug shows us Gnostic ideology in the making, at a time before its radicalization took place. Eug's relationship to the Sophia of Jesus Christ (SJC) also allows us to see how more radical Gnostics could adopt and adapt these less radical views.

While the connections between Eug and Jewish traditions are not as obvious as they are in some texts, most agree that they are pres-

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There is a general consensus that Eug is early.

Eug’s use of Adam (81, 12) clearly points to familiarity with and use of Jewish traditions. The way Eug uses its Jewish sources is what is significant here. Parrott asserts that Gen. 5:1-3 stands behind Eug 76, 13-85, 19 and that Gen. 1-3 stands behind Eug 85, 19-90, 3. Parrott’s way of referring to this relationship is telling. He finds “correspondences” between these Genesis passages and Eug’s cosmological speculations. Eug uses these passages as the basis for its speculations. This use of Genesis is not unlike what we find in Philo. Philo’s allegorical interpretations often lead him into cosmological speculations (see e.g. Conf. 34-36). This use does not imply a rejection of Jewish traditions or scripture on his part. Similarly, Eug is not rejecting or inverting these traditions. Rather, they function as the basis of Eug’s speculation. Thus, the view taken toward Jewish traditions is different in Eug from that in most Gnostic works. There is no revolt against them in Eug, even though, as Parrott puts it, Eug has freed itself of “Judaism’s particularistic tradition.” Indeed, Philo moves in that direction with his interpretation of scripture.


12 All references to the text of Eug will be from Codex III of the Nag Hammadi library unless otherwise noted. Even though the version in codex V is older, its fragmentary state makes it difficult to cite consistently. If there are significant differences between codex III and V in the passages cited, that will be noted. On the priority of the version in codex V see Douglas Parrott, “Evidence of Religious Syncretism in Gnostic Texts from Nag Hammadi,” in *Religious Syncretism in Antiquity*, ed. Birger Pearson (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1975), p. 180; Deirdre J. Good, *Reconstructing the Tradition of Sophia in Gnostic Literature*, SBL Monograph Series, no. 32 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1987), pp. xvii f.


16 Parrott, “Gnostic and Orthodox,” p. 200. Bentley Layton comments on the
Another point worth noting is that there are few appellations for God taken from the Hebrew Scriptures. The only example of such a borrowing seems to be "King of kings" (78, 2-3). This title is used of "Self-Father Man" who is not the highest God, but an emanation of "Immortal Man". It is difficult to know what to make of the use of this title at this level (except that it is a fitting description of this being, given those beings who come from him). But it is significant that there is no explicit denigration of him. This stands in contrast to other, later Gnostic works which denigrate the demiurges given biblical names for God, including SJC. SJC uses the names Almighty (107, 3, 9; 119, 9) and Yaldabaoth (119, 15) for a low "arrogant" demiurge. Clearly, Eug does not revolt against the Jewish God in the way (or at least to the extent) that SJC and other Gnostic works do.

Eug's attitude toward the cosmos also points to an early stage of Gnosticism. It is much less radical in its rejection of the world than other Gnostic works. This is very clear in 74,7-20 and 83,21-84,12. In these passages the world is patterned after and truly reflects the upper aeons. The year, months, and hours are based on the "Heavens" and the number of beings in the aeon just above the world in 83,20-84,11 and 84,11-85,9. Eug says explicitly that each of these time divisions exists "as a type" of the various powers. It says further, "our aeon came to be as a type in relation to Immortal Man" (83,20-22). SJC deletes Eug 83,20-84,11 and 84,17b-85,6a. Good asserts that SJC deletes these passages because they are based on the lunar calender which was obsolete at the time of SJC. But more may be involved. SJC does not see the world as a place that

tension present in The Hypostasis of the Archons as it both inverts the meaning of passages in the Hebrew Scriptures and is deeply dependent on them ("The Hypostasis of the Archons," Harvard Theological Review 67 (1974): 273).

17 Eug's "negative theology" in relation to the highest God may contribute to this phenomenon.

18 In the same passage Eug uses the title, "god of Gods," using NOYTE rather than JOEIC. The tendency of the author of Eug seems to be to prefer predicate adjectives rather than names to describe the highest being; see 71,14-72,1. In the parallel passage in SJC (94,5-22) a name seems to be given to the highest being. The impression that one receives when reading Eug is that in comparison with other Gnostic works, this author is reluctant to give a name to God. This may point to close contact with and respect for the Jewish custom of not using the name of God.

19 Good, Reconstructing, p. 22.
reflects the divine order. So the cosmogonical remarks of these passages conflict with SJC's view of the world.

Eug 74,7-20 is an especially revealing passage when compared with its parallel in SJC (98,13-20). According to Eug 74 the invisible things can be known from the visible world. This is only possible if the world truly reflects the divine. If the world were the creation of a demiurge who failed in copying the upper realms (of which he was fairly ignorant), the divine could not be known from the visible world. The parallel in SJC alters this passage so that the invisible world is revealed, not in the world, but in the Gnostics themselves, in “those that belong to the Unbegotten Father.” SJC includes various other expressions not found in Eug which show its more radical rejection of the world. For example, SJC speaks of the world as “the poverty of the robbers” and refers to sexual intercourse as the “unclean rubbing.”

Thus, we have a considerably higher view of the world in Eug than in SJC and most Gnostic texts. The world does have an order which reflects the divine. This understanding of the world is one that Philo and Plotinus could accept. Plotinus’s complaint that the Gnostics drain the world of its order and beauty is without point for Eug’s view of the world.

A most important feature of Eug which points to less radical rejection of the world is the absence of a Fall within the divine realm. The only hint that Eug may know of this myth is the

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20 Parrott also gives this interpretation of the passage (“The Significance of the Letter of Eugnostos,” pp. 401-402). Good remarks, “Without recourse to soteriology, Eugnostos presented a positive teaching about the origins of the world from the one true God” (Reconstructing, p. xvii).


22 Pheme Perkins remarks that SJC recognizes the goodness of God in creation only in the Pleroma (The Gnostic Dialogue; The Early Church and the Crisis of Gnosticism [New York: Paulist Press, 1980], p. 95. Cf. Ibid., p. 98).


24 Good (Reconstructing) argues convincingly that there is no Fall of Sophia in Eug.
expression, "the defect in the female" (85,8-9). Some see this as an oblique reference to the Fall of Sophia.25 However, Good and Williams have recently argued, on different grounds, against this interpretation of the phrase. Noting that a Fall of Sophia contradicts the other comments about her in Eug, Good argues that the deficiency has to do with the lunar month. The lunar month is spoken of as incomplete in the second Pseudo-Clementine Homily (23,2), and Jubilees and 1 Enoch each discuss the 360 day year in comparison with other calendars.26 Thus, Eug accepts this criticism of the lunar month.

Williams understands this deficiency to refer to movement, as opposed to being at rest. In the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition, he argues, immovability was seen as superior to movement. The former was associated with maleness, the latter with femaleness.27 If Good is correct that Sophia "initiates the creation of everything"28 and that she "is the means whereby the multiplicity of creation is derived from a God whose first generative act simply mirrors himself,29 then Williams's argument may be very fitting.

In any case, good alternatives for understanding the "deficiency" passage are available and seem to fit the outlook of Eug and the position of Sophia in Eug better than finding a reference to a Fall here. The defect may indeed point to the creation of the world.30 But this does not necessitate the myth of a Fall or a break within the emanation scheme.

SJC does have a Fall of Sophia. This fits well with its radical rejection of the world and its deletion of the material of Eug that sees the world as a reflection of the divine aeons. Jonas and Perkins see the function of the multiplication of beings in the realm above

25 So MacRae, "Jewish Background," pp. 100-101. Dahl ("Arrogant Archon," p. 692, n. 2) gives this interpretation to the parallel in SJC. This interpretation is probably correct for SJC, as Good acknowledges (Reconstructing, p. 27).
26 See Good's discussion, Reconstructing, pp. 26-29.
27 Michael A. Williams, The Immovable Race; A Gnostic Designation and the Theme of Stability in Late Antiquity, Nag Hammadi Studies, no. 29 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), pp. 100-102, 157. The number speculation in Eug is probably to be traced to Neopythagorean number speculation. If this is correct, it strengthens Williams's position and may point to a link between Eug and Alexandrian Judaism.
28 Good, Reconstructing, pp. 15-16.
29 Ibid., p. 31. Good does overstate the case a bit since Sophia is part of an androgynous being whose male name is Genetor, to match her female name Genetress.
30 See below the discussion of Eug 76,13.
the world (like what we find in Eug) as a way to separate God and the world.\footnote{Jonas says this when speaking of Basilides's 365 heavens \textit{(Gnostic Religion}, p. 43). Perkins says, "The poetic effect of descending through the ranks of aeons as in Apocryphon or SJC or of journeying through heaven after heaven as in Zostra removes the divine \textit{as far as possible} from the world as we know it" \textit{(Gnostic Dialogues}, p. 169—emphasis mine). It is the "as far as possible" that we are taking issue with.} This is no doubt correct. However, having a Fall which creates a disjuncture between the upper and lower realms produces a much greater, one might say qualitatively different, distance between God and the world. Like Philo and Plotinus, Eug does not want God in direct contact with the world. But again like them, Eug does not separate God entirely from the structures and order of the world. Thus Eug’s cosmogony is significantly different from SJC (and most Gnostic writings) because it does not have a Fall of Sophia.\footnote{For a discussion of the functions of Sophia in Eug, see Good, \textit{Reconstructing}, pp. 1-31, esp. pp. 15-16, 57, 68-69. Cf. Perkins, \textit{Gnostic Dialogues}, pp. 95-97. Good comments,}

All of this is not to imply that Eug embraces the world. It is only that its rejection of the world is less radical than what we find in other Gnostic texts. Eug refers to the world as "the chaos" (85,20-21). This seems incongruous with seeing the world as a reflection of the divine realm, but it is not unique. Again we may look to Philo for a parallel. Philo sees the goodness of God in creation and yet speaks of bodily existence as being "imprisoned in that dwelling place of endless calamities."\footnote{Even in the present text of \textit{Eugnostos} the "denial theology" of the opening passage explicitly dissociates the Supreme Being from any human form \textit{(Gnostic Religion}, pp. 73.4-5). Yet the association of noetic powers with this Being, and the subsequent revelations of this figure in different forms endowed with similar noetic powers, tends to mitigate the isolation of the Unknown God \textit{(Reconstructing}, pp. 68-69).} As we mentioned above, the multiplication of beings between the contemplating, immovable highest God and the world does function to distance him from the world. So the view of the world in its relation to God is similar to that of Philo.

Another indication of the world denying aspect of Eug comes in 73,21-74,7 where it says that whatever comes from the perishable is perishable and that what is from the imperishable is itself imperishable. No direct reference to the world is made in either Eug or the parallel in SJC. But it is said that humans die because they do not know the difference between the perishable and the imperishable (74,4-6). So the world is certainly a place of ignorance.

Thus, it seems that there is some ambiguity about the world in Eug. On the one hand, it is a place of ignorance and is perishable. On the other hand, it is a reflection of the order of a higher aeon. This kind of ambiguity about the world is not unique, it is also found in Jewish apocalyptic.34

At this point we may wonder whether anything in Eug makes it a particularly Gnostic work. I believe so; there are elements in it which show that we are moving into Gnosticism. First, the multiplication of beings in the higher aeons is a necessary predecessor of the Sophia myth. The comment about the defect of the female may even have assisted the entrance of the Sophia myth into Gnosticism.

Second, the personalization of the divine powers is also a necessary step for Gnosticism to emerge.35 Eug takes up the mythologizing task which could have been accepted in Jewish circles, but which others might resist. Plotinus rejected such a move in arguing about the interpretation of the demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus.36 Perkins comments that Eug’s “personification of abstract terms for the aeons resembles oral personification. But unlike genuine stories, these abstractions have no personality.”37 In her view, this puts Eug typologically close to oral tradition. If this is correct, we may be seeing the transition to Gnosticism, as such speculations are written down.

34 Jewish apocalyptic holds out no hope for the structures of the world and sees the world as a place under the control of the Evil One. And yet, in some works from this tradition social ethics are important and the messianic kingdom is to be established on the earth.
37 Perkins, Gnostic Dialogues, p. 35.
Third, an interesting difference between the first and second levels of the Pleroma emerges in Eug’s emanation scheme. In the highest aeon, that of the “unbegotten” (75,20ff.), each being is “revealed” (OYONH EBOL). At 76,13 we move to a discussion of those who are “begotten”. Here the “First” “brings forth” (EINE) the first androgynous being. This is the first time in Eug that activity is predicated in the production of divine beings. While Eug still refers to various beings as revealed, the more active language is also used and seems to be more dominant (e.g. 76,16, “Self-Father Man” created [AFTAMIO]). Creation, then, is a process of divine decision, not simply a result of the nature of the various beings which create. Plotinus opposes this view, arguing that the world comes into existence without thought on the part of the divine. It simply emanates from the nature of the preceding being.

This difference in the mode of creating at the different levels of the Pleroma lends some credence to Williams’s focus on the difference between the movable and immovable, with the movable being inferior and female. For it is here, at the second level, where Eug begins using creation language, that we begin having androgynous beings. We are clearly in a process of devolution, as the decreasing power of beings at each level also shows (78,11-15; 75,10-13). So a bit less of the higher God is found in each descending level.

This account of the Pleroma prepares for V 8,6-12 where Eug states that the world was created by a being who was created. This cosmogonical remark betrays a devaluation of the world beyond what we expect outside of Gnosticism. This goes past anything Philo would allow. Philo can acknowledge that God sometimes used assistants in creation (Conf. 35), but God is still involved. That is not the case in Eug. The creation of the world by a creature shows a lower valuation of the world and moves us toward, if not into, the Gnostic ideology.

Eug, then, represents the initial stages of Gnostic cosmological/cosmogonical speculation. It creates the bridge for us (and perhaps its second and third century readers) between the cosmological/cosmogonical speculations found in the Hellenistic philosophical interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures and later

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38 This section of codex III is not extant.
Gnosticism. Eug seems to come from a time before the polemic against Gnosticism moved it toward the radicalized interpretation and inverting of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Eug also shows us Gnosticism's first steps in the direction of world denial. The world is not only distant from God, it is created by a being that is itself "created" (not even "revealed"). This increases the distance between God and the world, but does not sever the ties the way a fall of Sophia and creation by an evil demiurge does. The absence of a fall of Sophia points us to an early time, perhaps a time when alienation was not felt as acutely as it soon would be felt. Either that or the cosmological and cosmogonical speculations had simply not developed in that direction yet. But obviously, they were headed in that direction, as calling the world "the chaos" and identifying the creator of the world as a creature demonstrate.

The evidence of Eug seems to point us to a revolt against the cosmos as the primary motivator of earliest Gnostic speculation. We see a movement toward Gnostic cosmology, but it is not the result of problems with texts of the Hebrew Scriptures. Rather, these speculations "correspond" to the texts of Genesis. If speculations like those in Eug met opposition within Judaism, the radicalization of interpretation would have begun then. The situation of Roman Egypt as described by Green would be an appropriate setting for the speculations in Eug. There we find a Jewish context and increasing tension in the social and religious spheres. Eug manifests an attempt to come to terms with a world which is increasingly hostile by using and reinterpreting, not rejecting or inverting, the ancient traditions of Judaism.

In comparing Codex V and III of Eug and then SJC and the Apocryphon of John, Parrott comments, "What we have before us is the evidence of a faith in the process of being metamorphosed." This study supports this understanding of the relationship of Eug and SJC and attempts to push our vision of that process back one step. In Eug we see the emergence of the Gnostic perspective from the Hellenistic-philosophical interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures.

39 Similarly, Layton ("The Hypostasis of the Archons," p. 373) sees the later Hypostasis of the Archons as a union of popular Platonism and "'apocryphal' Judaism."