FESTUGIERE REVISITED:
ARISTOTLE IN THE GREEK PATRES*

BY

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1. Festugiére’s essay

It is only five years ago this month that Father André-Jean Festugiére departed from our midst, yet, to this relatively young scholar at least, it seems a very long time ago that he wrote the first of his 73 books.1 In 1932 he published L'idéal religieux des Grecs et l'Évangile.2 It was in one of the appendices to this study that he turned his attention to the subject of this paper, the reception that Aristotôle and his philosophy received at the hands of the Church Fathers who wrote in Greek.3

Festugiére does not tell his reader explicitly why he did this research and included the results as an Appendix. The chief theme of the book—heavily marked by the experience of conversion undergone nine years earlier—is that both the philosophical and the religious aspects of Greek culture, if subjected to penetrating analysis, reveal the yearning for the salvation offered by the Christian gospel, but that both Greek philosophy and Greek religion could not satisfy that yearning from their own resources. In the first half of the book, which deals sequentially with the Greek philosophers, a chapter is devoted to Aristotle. Technically Aristotle might seem to represent an advance, for at least he regards God as a person. But at the same time he denies the possibility of a relation between God and man. In fact, compared with the deep spirituality of Plato a regress has taken place. One can understand, he concludes, why Christian theology could only accept Aristotle's philosophy after a long period of preparation and elaboration.

A footnote at the end of the chapter refers the reader to the Appendix on Aristotle in the Church Fathers, but the connections are not spelled out.4 These become clearer, I suggest, if we look at other subjects that were capturing the author’s interest at this time. Noteworthy are the articles, published in the New Scholasticism and elsewhere, on the rela-
tion between Greek philosophy and Scholastic thought, especially as formulated by Thomas Aquinas. I am not sure of the extent to which the young priest was attracted to the movement of Neoscholasticism which was gaining momentum during that period. Festugière was not given to autobiographical reminiscence, and H. D. Saffrey in his ‘portrait’ in the Memorial volume says nothing on the subject. In later writings, at any rate, such affiliations are no longer obvious to any degree. There is no doubt, however, about the chief question that motivates the Appendix. It has to be worded in terms that in part presume on its conclusions: how could it have happened that the Patres so decisively rejected a philosophy which later was to form the foundation of the most successful and influential Christian philosophy ever devised?

The result of Festugière’s investigations was a fine essay, still very much worth reading after five and a half decades. The essay already employs the method that was to become the author’s trade-mark in many future studies, namely the method of precise translation of selected texts followed by incisive comments which place them in a secure framework of reference. It is true that the learning lies more on the surface than would later be the case. This is hardly surprising. What impresses above all is the judiciousness of tone and remark, only occasionally marred by a certain impatience, when the Fathers fail to meet the exacting standards of their modern analyst.

The chief results of Festugière’s enquiry can be summarized as follows. At the very beginning, in the second century apologists Tatian and Athenagoras, the twin tendencies of the Patres’ treatment of Aristotle are clearly visible: most often he is taken to task for propounding views contrary to the Christian creed; on occasion he is commended for anticipating true doctrines that Christians have learnt through the prophets and the scriptures. Repetitiously the complaints against Aristotle focus on three subjects: Providence, the nature of the soul, the goods that contribute to perfect ευδαιμονία. But there is little evidence to suggest that the Fathers, from Tatian to Eusebius and Theodoret, took the trouble to make an in-depth study of Aristotelian teaching. A close reading of the most interesting material furnished by extant Patristic texts—this in Festugière’s view was the doxographical material utilized by Hippolytus against Basilides in his Refutatio—suggests the contrary. Aristotle could only become acceptable when pagan Greek philosophy was no longer a threat. And in order to absorb
what was useful, Christian thinkers had to go back to school and read him professionally. This was done by John Philoponus and Boethius, who usher in a new era.

I have already praised the essay; such praise is also applicable to its conclusions. There is nothing in what I have just summarized that demands outright rejection. Much, however, could do with modification or qualification, or needs to be treated with more precision. A detailed critique would show up at least the following four areas where such supplementation is desirable.

(1) The treatment of authors and texts is too impressionistic. Festugière emphasizes at the outset that exhaustiveness is not the aim. But insufficient indication is given of whether a body of selected texts is adequately representative for an author, a period or a theme. The author done the gravest injustice is Clement of Alexandria, who is dealt with in less than a page.

(2) Festugière’s general approach is heavily slanted towards the examination of doctrine, especially as related to philosophical questioning. This is very much determined by the (implicitly formulated) question he is attempting to answer. As a result, however, not enough attention is paid to the contexts in which the Fathers refer to Aristotle and the sources on which they draw when doing so. More specifically, though he is writing a decade after the appearance of Jaeger’s epoch-making book on Aristotle’s development, the Aristotle he looks for is exclusively that of the Andronican corpus. Questions concerning the general accessibility of that corpus and the possibility that certain unexpected reports might be derived from the lost Aristotle are simply not asked.

(3) The range of Aristotelian doctrine in which Festugière declares the Fathers to be interested in is too restricted. The three themes he concentrates on are certainly the most common, but there are many others, notably also in the area of logic and dialectic. And if other doctrines remain unexamined when these are close to Patristic concerns, one would like to know why.

(4) Lastly not enough attention is paid in Festugière’s account to the repeated association of Aristotelian dialectic with the origin and practice of heresy.

One more observation has to be made before we move on. It is of a methodological nature and is quite crucial to what I am trying to achieve in this paper. Father Festugière, although once again he did not make
any explicit pronouncements on the matter, clearly selected his texts on
the basis of named reference to Aristotle and his school. I have thought
it prudent to follow him in this method. There is a restrictive element
here, the implications of which have to be carefully thought through.
By collecting and listing only named references we confine our subject
to situations and texts in which the Patres deliberately draw attention
to the fact that they are utilizing or critically reflecting on the work of
Aristotle. There are, needless to say, numerous other passages in which
conscious or even sub-conscious use is made of Aristotle’s thought.
There are occasions when such usage might be deliberately concealed
rather than overtly advertised. One would need to take all such situa-
tions and texts into account if the subject was Aristotelianism in the
Greek Fathers, a much broader and more complex theme than that
broached by Festugière and myself. Such a method was employed, for
instance, by Clark in her informative monograph on Clement’s
Aristotelianism. Waszink’s highly useful survey of the subject seems
to waver to some degree between the Father’s Aristotle and their
Aristotelianism, but the emphasis would appear to be chiefly on the
latter.

It must immediately be said that the methodology I am adopting is
not without its problems. Even if it is conceded that there is an impor-
tant difference between the Patres’ Aristotle and their Aristotelianism,
it may still seem rather arbitrary to focus in on named references only.
For example a problem occurs, as we shall see, when one encounters
anonymous references that obviously have our philosopher in mind. To
be entirely candid, there are two additional reasons why the method
outlined suits my purposes. Firstly, as will emerge directly, it greatly
facilitates the quest for a reasonably exhaustive treatment of the sub-
ject. Secondly the specific point of departure for this paper has been
research I am carrying out on Aristotle in the ancient doxographical
tradition. Doxography, the reporting of philosophers’ views by means
of summaries, necessarily proceeds by means of named reference.

2. A list of references

Let us now turn to the evidence. As the nucleus of my paper I have
prepared a list of all the references to Aristotle and his school in the
Greek Fathers which I have been able to locate. The list has been
presented in an approximately chronological order, taking Chalcedon as
cut-off point. To each reference the briefest description of its contents has been added. In the first citation of a work a reference is given to the text used. My aim has been to try to make the list as complete as possible, so I have made extensive use of scholarly instruments such as indices and lexica. Not all the Fathers have been well served by these, however, and it will not be until the TLG database is complete that we may have some confidence in the exhaustiveness of the list. I have indicated with an obelisk those authors whom I have not been able to search as thoroughly as I would have liked. The asterisks, on the other hand, indicate use of doxographical material, as will be explained in greater detail below. If a particular reference is discussed or alluded to by Festugière, the appropriate reference is indicated in brackets after the description of contents (F264 refers to page 264 of his essay). For the sake of brevity Aristotle is abbreviated to A, Aristotelian to Ar, Peripetatic to Pp. In an Appendix at the end of my article the reader will find an index which will allow him or her to gain some kind of an overview of the various subjects and themes involved.

ARISTOTLE IN THE GREEK PATRES: A LIST OF REFERENCES

ARISTIDES: no extant references

JUSTIN:
1. Dial 2.3 Goodspeed. Pp teacher, who thinks he is δριμως (= F233)

MELITO: no extant references

TATIAN:
1. Oratio ad Graecos 2.1-2 Whittaker. attack on A's life and doctrines, esp. ethics and views on Providence* (F224)
2. Oratio ad Graecos 25.2 dissensio philosophorum, including A (F225)

ATHENAGORAS:
1. Legatio 6.3 Schoedel. cosmic theology* (F232)
2. Legatio 16.3 Pp cosmic theology (cf. previous passage)
3. Legatio 25.2 fallen angels cause evil in this world, hence A's mistaken doctrine of Providence (F233)

THEOPHILUS OF ANTIOCH: no extant references

IRENAEUS:
1. Adv. Haer. 1.25.6 Rousseau-Doutreleau. Carpocratians have images of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle as well as Jesus
2. Adv. Haer. 2.14.5 Valentinians use A's λεπτολογια against the faith (F233)
Clement of Alexandria:

1. Protr. 28.3 Stählin-Treu. A's listing of the five Apollos (not in Rose)
2. Protr. 66.4 attack on philosophical δόξα includes A's cosmic theology* (F252)
3. Paed. 2.18.3 on a fish with its heart in its stomach (= Rose fr.326)
4. Paed. 3.84.1 on behaviour in front of slaves (= Rose fr.183)
5. Str. 1.39.2 Plato and A condemn σοφίστική τέχνη (cf. also 1.87.2)
6. Str. 1.60.3, 61.2 A on the seven sages (= Rose fr.3-4)
7. Str. 1.63.4 A in the philosophical διάδοχαι
8. Str. 1.77.1 on Atossa as inventor of the letter (not in Rose)
9. Str. 1.113.4 on Execestus tyrant of Phocis (= Rose fr.599)
10. Str. 1.170.3 on the Greek lawgivers (= Rose fr.535, 548)
11. Str. 1.176.2 on theology as metaphysics
12. Str. 2.15.5 faith as the judgment consequent upon knowledge
13. Str. 2.34.1 divine law commands avoidance of real evils, not so-called evils of the civic laws and Pp philosophers
14. Str. 2.128.3-5 A's τέλος as part of larger ethical doxography* (F252)
15. Str. 2.138.5 marriage and children a good according to Peripatos
16. Str. 4.23.1 A quoting Simonides on health as ἄριστον (cf. 1394b13) (F253n.)
17. Str. 4.166.1 on body and correct attitude to three Pp goods
18. Str. 5.6.1 on faith and enquiry, not every question needs proof (cf. 105a3-9)
19. Str. 5.58.3 on two kinds of writings, esoteric and exoteric
20. Str. 5.59.2 two kinds of knowledge according to Pp, reputable (ἐνδοξον) and scientific (cf. 100b19)
21. Str. 5.86.1-3 criticism of A's distinction between ποιητικός and πράξις
22. Str. 5.88.1 Pythagoras, Plato and A agree that νοῦς reaches men through θεῖα μοίρα
23. Str. 5.89.5, 90.3 in doctrine of matter and Providence A faltering follows Scripture (F252)
24. Str. 5.97.7 Aristobulus showed that Pp philosophy dependent on Moses and prophets
25. Str. 6.27.3 Platonists write books saying A stole most important doctrines from Plato
26. Str. 6.53.2-3 Isidore son of Basilides on A's demonology (= Rose fr.193?)
27. Str. 6.139.1 in praise of hexad, embryo fully formed after six months (= Rose fr.282)
28. *Str.* 6.167.2 Greek philosophers only persuade own pupils (in A's case Theophrastus), unlike our teacher (cf. also 6.57.3)

29. *Str.* 7.101.4 if you listen to A you become a φυσικός

30. *Str.* 8.9.6-11.1 are plants ζωα or not? Plato yes, A no.

31. *Str.* 8.26.4 αἰτία reckoned to the προσηγορία:

**HERMIAS**

1. *Irrisio* 11-12 Diels. A envies Plato's ἀρματοποιία, his two ἀρχαί*

**HIPPOLYTUS:**

1. Ref. 1.5.1 Marcovich. in διαδοχαί A begins διαλεκτικὴ φιλοσοφία
2. Ref. 1.20.1-7 summary of Aristotle's doctrines* (F234)
3. Ref. 6.9.6 Simon Magus' theory of double nature of fire compared with A's potency and actuality
4. Ref. 7.14-25 Basilides' doctrines are of A, not of Christ, as lengthy exposition (including much doxographical reportage*) makes clear (F236ff.)
5. Ref. 10.7.4 doxography on the five elements as ἀρχαί* (from Sex. Emp. Adv. Math. 10.310-318)
6. *ap.* Eus. *HE* 5.28.14 Schwarz. heretics led by Theodotus turn Scripture into dialectic and admire A and Theophrastus*

**ORIGEN:**

1. *C. Cels.* 1.10 Koetschau. people chose to become Pps because of their humane ethics (F255)
2. *C. Cels.* 1.13 Pps attack Platonic ideas as τερετίαματα (83a33) (F253)
3. *C. Cels.* 1.21 doctrine of Providence baleful* (F254)
4. *C. Cels.* 1.24 according to A names given θέσει, not φύσει (cf. also 5.45) (F253)
5. *C. Cels.* 2.12 Judas betrays Jesus, compare A and Plato (cf. also 1.65, 3.13) (F253)
6. *C. Cels.* 2.13 Pps should be arraigned for impious doctrine of inefficacy of prayer (cf. also 7.66) (F254)
7. *C. Cels.* 3.75 a service to turn people away from philosophers such as Pps with doctrine of Providence (F254)
8. *C. Cels.* 4.56 would Celsus join A and doctrine of fifth element (F254)
9. *C. Cels.* 7.3 can cite A and Pps against oracles (cf. also 8.45) (F254)
10. *Sel. in Psalmos*, PG 12.1053A definition of τέλος
11. *Sel. in Psalmos*, PG 12.1316A sublunary world without Providence

**DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA:** no extant references

**PETER OF ALEXANDRIA:** no extant references†
PSEUDO-JUSTIN A:
1. *Coh. ad Gent.* 5-6 Otto. on the disagreements between Plato and A*
2. *Coh. ad Gent.* 36 on fifth element and A’s death in frustration at not
   knowing
GREGORY THAUMATURGUS: no extant references†
PS. CLEMENTINA:
1. *Recognitiones* 8.15 Rehm-Paschke. doxography on ἄφρατι, including
   A’s fifth element*
METHODIUS:
1. *De res.* 1.9 Bonwetsch. argument against bodily resurrection appeals
   to A on processes of bodily change
EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA:
1. *PE* 4.2.13, 3.14 Mras. admires position of Aristotelians on oracles
   (F255)
2. *PE* 11.4.1 comparison Jewish ethics with A’s doctrine of 3 goods
3. *PE* 14.2.2 programme, recount dissension Platonists and Aristotelians
4. *PE* 14.16.8 dissensions in theology* (copied from Ps.Plutarch) (F258)
5. *PE* 15.1-13 account of Aristotle’s philosophy by means of introd-
   uctory remarks and cited documents (mainly Atticus)—corrective
   biographica, doctrine of goods, Providence and theology, eternity of
   cosmos, fifth element, nature of soul, world soul, ideas (F257f.)
6. *PE* 15.22-51 δόξα from Ps.Plutarch include 11 references to A*
7. *HE* 5.28.14 see above Hippolytus 6
8. *HE* 7.32.6 proficiency of Anatolius bishop of Laodicea in Ar studies
EUSTATHIUS OF ANTIOCH: no extant references†
MARCELLUS OF ANCYRA:
1. *De sancta ecclesia* 7, 16 Mercati. heretics derive impiety from
   Hermes, Plato and A
ATHANASIUS: no extant references
PS. ATHANASIUS:
1. *Dial. c. Maced.* 2, PG 28.1336D exchange on definitions of
   substances of homonyms—both claim not to follow A.
SERAPION OF THMUIS: no extant references†
TITUS OF BOSTRA: no extant references†
ALEXANDER OF LYCOPOLIS: no extant references
APOLLINARIS OF LAODICEA: no extant references†
BASIL OF CAESAREA:
1. *C. Eun.* 1.5.43 Sesboué. no need of the syllogisms of Aristotle or
   Chrysippus to learn that ἄγέννητος οὗ γεγένηται.
2. *C. Eun.* 1.9.8 A's categories worldly wisdom used by Eunomius

**Gregory of Nazianzus:**
1. *Or.* 4.72 PG 35 Julian's admiration for A and other philosophers misguided
2. *Or.* 7.20 A part of reading of departed brother Caesarius
3. *Or.* 23.12 Christian doctrine as expressed ἀλευτικῶς ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀριστοτέλικῶς
4. *Or.* 27.10 direct your attack at misguided doctrines of A (Providence, dialectic, ethics, soul) and others (F260)
5. *Or.* 32.25 topos against philosophy, including A's ἀκατεχνή
6. *Ep.* 32.5-7 doctrine of Stoa on εὐδαιμονία superior to A's
7. *Ep.* 234 on sending back copy of letters of Aristotle
8. *Carm. theol. mor.* 10.49 PG 37.684 what use are labyrinthine arguments of A (& Pyrrhonians), when the soul's task is to be united to God
9. *Carm. de vita sua* 12.304 PG 37.1188 simplicity of faith, not sophistication of philosophers (including A)

**Gregory of Nyssa:**
1. *C. Eun.* 1.46 Jaeger. Aetius practising Ar dialectic even in medical school
2. *C. Eun.* 1.55 Aetius' ἀδεξία as ἡ 'Αριστοτέλους κακατεχνή
3. *C. Eun.* 2.410-1 attack on the knowledge Eunomius vaunts of A, esp. on doctrine of Providence
4. *C. Eun.* 2.620 examination of Ar argument used by Eunomius
5. *C. Eun.* 3.5.6 use of A in Pauline exegesis by Eunomius does not work
6. *C. Eun.* 3.7.15 Eunomius abandons A and uses an ordinary argument
7. *C. Eun.* 3.10.50 Eunomius using categories to destroy Christian doctrine
8. *Dial. de anima et resurrectione* PG 46.52 the philosopher coming after Plato declares the soul mortal

**Nemesius of Emesa:**
1. *De nat. hom.* 1, 1.15 Morani. on the difference between νοεῖ and ψυχή
2. 2, 17.4-10 on the nature of the soul
3. 2, 26.10-29.18 exposition and criticism of A's doctrine of soul's actuality
4. 2, 30.18-32.2 Eunomius' views influenced by Ar doctrine
5. 3, 44.3 errors in Eunomian christology through A's influence
6. 4, 45.7 bodies of animals consist of blood
7. 4, 46.21 for differentiation between animals see A’s Hist. Anim.
8. 5, 49.23 mixture and dissolution of compounds in the body
9. 5, 52.20 A adds fifth element to other four for the heavens
10. 7, 58.10 doxography on mechanism of sight*
11. 15, 72.12 on the division of the soul*
12. 16, 73.7 on the relation of the rational to the irrational part
13. 18, 79.8 on the definition of pleasure
14. 25, 86.19 on the role of women in procreation
15. 39, 113.17 A’s fine saying illustrating that the exercise of excellence
   is ἐφ’ ἡμῖν
16. 44, 126.6 A attributes genesis to sun and zodiacal circle (cf. Met. Α)
17. 44, 127.13-128.3 according A no divine Providence of τὰ κατὰ μέρος,
   which is man’s task.

DIODORUS OF TARSUS:
1. Suda 1149 2.103 Adler. Diodorus wrote a work entitled κατὰ
   Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ σῶματος ωὐράνιον

DIDYMUS THE BLIND:
1. In Ps. 77.8 Gronewald. on friends and enemies being just (116a31-35)
2. In Ps. 276.11 illustration of relativity from Categories (5b21-22)
3. In Eccl. 80.2ff. paraphrase 23a20ff.¹³
4. In Eccl. 226.23 Krebber. heathen philosopher on sophistic (17a37)
5. In Eccl. 232.24-27 two quotations from Organon (16b21, 3a29)
6. De trin. 2.3.30, PG 39.477D should not use Ἀριστοτελικὴ διενώτης like
   Eunomius
7. De trin. 3.1 PG 39.776B cites opening words of Met. Α
8. De trin. 3.5 PG 39.840BC on the definition of ἠφή, as in Met. Δ

EPIPHANIUS:
1. Panar. 1.4 Holl. sixth pagan sect Pythagoreans or Peripatetics,
   divided on account of Aristotelians (?) (cf. Anaceph 1.5.1) (F260‘)
2. Panar. 27.6.10 Carpocratians have images of Pythagoras, Plato, A
3. Panar. 69.71.3 Arians use unproductive dialectic of A in talking
   about father and son
4. Panar. 76.2.1 Aetius could only talk in Ar σχῆματα
5. Panar. 76.23.4 using Ἀριστοτελικὰ ζητήματα means abandoning pure
   teaching of the spirit
6. Panar. 76.26.17 Aetius must stop bringing κενὰς καὶ Ἀριστοτελικὰς
   λέξεις against us
7. Panar. 76.37.16 another diatribe against Ar syllogisms, contrast A
   and fishermen
8. *De fide* 9.36 doxographic summary of Ar philosophy* (F261)  
**JOHN CHRYSOSTOM:*"15  
1. *De s. Bab. c. Iul. et gent.* 9 PG 50.546 how useful is it to taste human seed, as A did (!)?  
2. *In acta Apost. homil.* 4.4 PG 60.47 apostles bare-bodied against doctrines of rotting Pps  
3. *In Ep. ad Rom. homil.* 3.3 PG 60.414 dissension between Plato and A  
**SEVERIANUS GABALENSIS:*"16  
1. *De spir. sanct.* 9 PG 52.824 heretics putting forward Aristotelica and Platonica  
2. *In Joh. 1.1* 2 PG 63.547 St. Paul should ask heretics where they get their Aristotelica from  
3. *In Joh. 1.1* 3 PG 63.548 for Eunomius and the impious the teachings of A triumph  
**THEOPHILUS OF ALEXANDRIA:* no extant references†  
**SYNESIUS OF CYRENE:*  
1. *De regno* 8 Terzaghi. external goods can serve excellence or vice according to A and Plato  
2. *De insomniis* 18 on Ar epistemology from *Met.* A 1  
3. *Enc. calv.* 22 proverbs as remnants of ancient wisdom according to A (= Rose fr.13)  
4. * Dion* 8 on μαθεῖν and παρθεῖν (= Rose fr.15)  
**CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA:*  
1. *In Ps. 35:6* PG 69.917 against A’s doctrine of Providence  
2. *Thes.* 11 PG 75.145-8 misuse of categories by Eunomians  
3. *C. Jul. I* PG 76.545B A’s theology (from Ps. Plutarch)*  
4. *C. Jul. II* PG 76.572B A on the cosmos and Providence (from Ps. Plut.)*  
5. *C. Jul. II* PG 76.572C whether cosmos φθαρτός or not* (from Ps. Plut.)*  
6. *C. Jul. II* PG 76.573A on disagreements Plato and A on diverse subjects (cf. IV 676B)*  
**ISIDORE OF PELUSIUM:*  
1. *Ep.* 2.3 PG 78. A against Plato as example of philosophers’ strife  
2. *Ep.* 4.55 dissension between 'Αριστοτέλειοι, Platonists, Stoics  
3. *Ep.* 4.76 'Αριστοτέλειοι abandon their wisdom and obey gospel  
4. *Ep.* 4.91 A’s many writings oppose Plato, while Stoa in turn opposes A  
5. *Ep.* 4.205 great thinkers cannot always persuade their charges, so take note of A’s words at 101b7-10 (quoted)
Ps. Justin B:
1. *Confutatio dogmatum quorundam Aristotelicorum* Otto III, 1 *passim*. on the contradictions of A’s doctrines in the *Physics* and *De caelo*

Theodoret of Cyrrhus:
1. *CAG* 1.90 Canivet. faith as criterion of knowledge according to A
2. *CAG* 4.11 doxography on άφθατος (from Aëtius)*
3. *CAG* 4.13 doxography on matter (from Aëtius)*
4. *CAG* 4.15 doxography on unicity of cosmos (from Aëtius)*
5. *CAG* 4.18 doxography on composition of stars (from Aëtius)*
6. *CAG* 4.21 doxography on nature of sun and moon (from Aëtius)*
7. *CAG* 4.46 according to Plato and A God and matter coexist
8. *CAG* 5.17 doxography on nature of soul (from Aëtius)*
9. *CAG* 5.20 doxography on divisions of soul (from Aëtius)*
10. *CAG* 5.22 doxography on location of θυγεμονικόν (from Aëtius)*
11. *CAG* 5.24 on whether soul destructible or indestructible*
12. *CAG* 5.24 dispute between Plato and A on whether plants are ζώον
13. *CAG* 5.28 on the nature of νοσσ*  
14. *CAG* 5.46-7 disagreements between Plato and pupil A (F261)
15. *CAG* 6.7 on Providence and fate* (F261)
16. *CAG* 6.15 doxography on τύχη* (from Aëtius)
17. *CAG* 11.13-4 disagreement between Plato and A on flourishing (F262)
18. *HE* 4.29.3 Parmentier. Didymus’ education includes A’s syllogistic

Socrates Scholasticus:
1. *HE* 2.35, PG 67.297 Aetius amazes through reliance on A’s categories, which A had in fact written to exercise minds of pupils
2. *HE* 3.23, PG 67.445 appeal to A’s Peplos to indicate absurdity of pagan theology

Sozomen:
1. *HE* 3.15.8 Bidez. Aetius went to Alexandria to discuss with Aristotelians
2. *HE* 7.16.2 Theophrontius, pupil of Eunomius, acquainted with A’s doctrines, composed an introductory work on Eunomian syllogisms called Περὶ γυμνασμάτων νοσσ

So much for our list of references. It goes without saying that an adequate discussion of the texts contained in the above list, restricted though its contents may be, must go beyond the confines of a single arti-
cle and could easily be the subject of an entire book. What I want to do in the remainder of this paper is to pose and give some response to four questions that arise out of Festugère’s essay and the above list of references. These questions are:

1. what can be said about the extensiveness of the list?
2. what was the nature of the Fathers’ sources?
3. what doctrines did the Fathers attribute to Aristotle and were these sufficiently unsuitable to justify their rejection of Aristotle’s philosophy?
4. how important was Aristotle’s association with heretical thought?

I will then conclude by summarizing what the factors were that were required for a more positive appreciation of Aristotle and his philosophy.

3. The extensiveness of the list

We start therefore with our first question: what can be said about the extensiveness of the list?

It is immediately clear that the number of references dealt with in Festugère’s essay has been considerably expanded (I must in fairness emphasize once again that he was not aiming to be complete). Quite a few authors have been added whom he left out of consideration entirely: one thinks of Hermias, Pseudo-Justin, Methodius, Nemesius, Didymus, and various other fourth and fifth century writers. Other authors have had their list considerably expanded, the most striking example being Clement, whose references are increased from 4 to 31.

Nevertheless the very fact that such a list could be so compactly compiled and presented is an indication that the preoccupation of Patristic thinkers with Aristotle and his philosophy was quite limited. Making such a list of references to Plato would be an exhausting business; similar lists for Epicurus, the Stoa, and Pythagoras would also, I suspect, be longer. The basic question posed by Festugère is thus still well worth asking.

One important observation needs to be made at this point. The briefest glance at our list will show that the location of the references to Aristotle and his philosophy is very one-sided. If we divide the writings of the Fathers into exegetical, homiletical, theological, apologetic and historical works, we find that the majority of our passages are in fact found in apologetic writings. The early works of the
Apologists, Clement's *Stromateis*, Origen's *Contra Celsum*, Eusebius' *Praeparatio*, Theodoret's *Curatio*—all these works deal specifically with the relation between Pagan and Christian thought. Most of the other passages are found in theological (or anti-heretical) works with a strongly polemical intent, such as Hippolytus' *Refutatio*, Gregory of Nyssa's *Contra Eunomium*, Epiphanius' *Panarion*. Works like Nemesius' *De natura hominis* and Ps.-Justin's *Confutatio*, which deal with scientific and philosophical topics in a relatively neutral way are exceedingly rare in the Patristic corpus. There are, almost without exception, no references to Aristotle in the exegetical, homiletical and non-polemical theological works which form the bulk of the Patres' writings. Let me illustrate this selectivity of location with a few interesting examples.

(a) Methodius of Olympus, writing a dialogue on the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, draws on Aristotle's physical and biological works on a number of occasions in order to gain scientific evidence for the subject at hand. But it is perhaps no coincidence that on the single occasion that he explicitly names Aristotle, he places the reference in the mouth of the doctor Aglaophon who is defending the Origenistic position that the dialogue is aiming to controvert.

(b) Basil of Caesarea, while delivering his sermons on the Hexaemeron, could hardly fail to relate the scriptural text to Greek philosophical and cosmological theories (a long tradition going back to Philo of Alexandria), even if we allow for the homiletical context. Indeed the discerning reader will find much originally Aristotelian material incorporated in the exegesis. A striking example is found in the first homily on the subject of the nature of the heaven. Basil contrasts the Platonic and the Aristotelian view, giving in the process a well-informed summary of the doctrine of the fifth element. But the views are presented with studious anonymity (οἱ μέν... οἱ δὲ) and a certain contempt. If we should try to deal with them in any depth, Basil affirms, we would fall into the same garrulousness practised by the philosophers. Specifically anonymous reports such as these posed quite a problem for me in composing my list. Should they be included since it is meant to be quite obvious, also to the educated reader, whom the author has in mind? I decided with some reluctance that I should be consistent in my methodology, and have thus excluded such anonymous references from my list.

(c) Didymus the blind of Alexandria is especially praised by the
historians for the breadth and depth of his erudition, including dialectics and philosophy. Theodoret specifically mentions his aural learning of Aristotle’s syllogisms (which we may take as a general reference to Aristotelian logic). The remarkable discovery of many of his exegetical works at Tura allows these claims to be confirmed, for the papyri reveal a considerable number of references to philosophical doctrines that happen to be relevant to the text being given exegesis. But when we look more closely at the five texts from these exegetical works on our list, we find that twice nameless references are given (καί λέγω ἀπὸ τῶν Περὶ ἔρμηνείας, ἐν Κατηγορίαις), twice Aristotle is described by means of a periphrasis (ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔκεινος, καί ὁ ἐξω φιλόσοφος). Only once is the philosopher specifically named, as part of an allusion which the editor of the papyrus could not identify, but which can be seen to be to yet another of the works of the Organon, Tec. 116a31-35. It is evident that Didymus, who must of course have had a formidable memory, really knew Aristotle’s logical writings very well. It is striking that no less than three of the passages introducing Aristotelian citations begin with the phrase ἀμεῖλεν γοῦν. It is not easy to know how to interpret the phrase precisely, but it seems to me to indicate the conscious introduction of material not strictly necessary to the exegetical task immediately at hand. Didymus cannot resist bringing his philosophical training to bear on the task of interpreting the holy word, but is clearly hesitant to do it too overtly. The reason for the hesitation will become clearer a little later on.

(4) My final example involves virtually the single example of a reference to Aristotle being associated with the exegesis of a particular text. It is an interesting case of Patristic transmission. Clement, trying to prove the ‘theft of the philosophers’, argues that Aristotle’s doctrine of Providence is the result of a faulty understanding of Ps. 35:6. According to a fragment in the Catenae, Origen took over the idea in his commentary on the same text, specifying Aristotle as the chief representative of those misled. Didymus follows the line of interpretation but keeps it anonymous. Lastly Cyril virtually copies Origen word for word when dealing with the same text. It is evident that, for whatever reason, Origen has for once allowed an apologetic theme—how the philosophers, if they have any wisdom, derive it from Scripture—to break through into his normally anonymous exegesis.

We may conclude from these examples, I submit, that the almost complete silence on Aristotle in the exegetical, homiletical and to a
lesser extent theological literature is not necessarily an indication of a lack of interest or knowledge. It appears that there was a tacit understanding not to discuss 'outside wisdom' in an explicit way. But equally clearly there is nothing exclusive about Aristotelianism in this respect. The same applies to the other philosophers and their schools. We need to press on further to explain the relative neglect that Aristotle underwent.

4. The nature of the Fathers' sources

It is time now to broach our second question: what were the nature of the sources at the Fathers' disposal?

The reason we need to look at their sources is that we need to know how well informed the Fathers were on Aristotle and his philosophical views. Were they in fact in a position to make a sound judgment on the usefulness of Aristotelianism for the development of a Christian philosophy? In his essay Festugière showed a prime interest in determining whether the Patristic authors had any knowledge of Aristotle's writings at first hand. He was prepared to acknowledge this for but one or two, perhaps only Origen. Most of the material presented by them, he found, could be traced back to philosophical handbooks or doxographies, often of poor quality. Moreover by the fourth and fifth centuries much material is being handed down from the one author to another. The most notorious example is Theodoret, who in his *Curatio* systematically pillages the works of Clement and Eusebius. Another example is the exegesis of Ps. 35:6 just examined.

Quite often we must feel that Festugière's severity is not without justification. There is a truly exasperating chasm, for example, between the pious strictures Epiphanius directs against his heretical opponents and his almost complete ignorance of the doctrines of Greek philosophy which he thinks caused their heresy. He simply does not bother to study and summarize his doxographical material adequately. But the question needs, I think, to be looked at further.

We are looking at a period of at least three centuries, from about 150 to 450 A.D. The publication and dissemination of the Andronican corpus of Aristotle's writings had taken place well before the beginning of our period. But how much had really changed since the time of Cicero, who claimed to be one of the very few who knew anything about Aristotle (and that was certainly not very much)? As Festugière rightly
Aristotle's writings (i.e. the scholastic corpus) were studied in restricted circles of professional philosophers or connoisseurs. If one wanted to learn about Aristotle through a first-hand acquaintance it was best to live at or go to Athens or Alexandria—as the careers of Anato-
lius, Didymus and several of the heretics show—and not everybody was in a position to do that. Eusebius is a case in point. In writing the Praeparatio Evangelica he had the incomparable resources of the Episcopal library at Caesarea to draw on, but it is clear that there were no works of Aristotle in that library, for throughout the entire work he never quotes or alludes to them. When he wishes to deal with the Aristotelian system he relies entirely on the work written by Atticus against Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. A clever move, for exposition and critique could be combined, but it was surely done faute de mieux.

Even against this background of limited accessibility, it seems to me likely that Festugière underestimated the extent to which the Fathers had direct acquaintance with Aristotle's writings. Clement is a patent example, writing at a time when Aristotelianism had not yet gained its fully negative overtones in Church circles. It is, to my mind, extremely unlikely that all 31 references, as well as all the other less explicit discus-
sions of Aristotelian material, derive from reading at second hand. Clement—if we exclude Synesius, who is only just a Patristic author—is the only Church Father to make a substantial contribution to Rose's collection of the lost Aristotle (though this does not exhaust the relevance of the exoteric Aristotle to our subject, as will later emerge). We have already seen the penetrating knowledge that Didymus had of Aristotle's logical corpus. The Cappadocians too will have certainly known more than their writings may lead us to suppose. Gregory of Nazianzus tells us his lamented brother had studied Aristotle; this may, I think, have meant some direct reading. By the fifth century the rather mysterious author of the Ps. Justin Confutatio is quoting Aristotle at length from at least nine different books of two works in the Andronican corpus, the Physics and the De caelo.

But it is true: most Church Fathers turned to handbooks, risking Festugière's ire. It is worth spending just a moment to take a look at what the tradition of handbooks and doxographical literature was.

By the beginning of our period the doxographical tradition was a well-established tradition, with highly respectable roots going back beyond Aristotle and Theophrastus to the fifth century B.C. The
Sophists Hippias and Gorgias at the outset established the tradition's double tendency, the former aiming at comprehensive accounts of the philosophers' views, the latter stressing the strong διαφωνία or dissension between them. Both aspects appealed to the Patres. The first gave them a sense of having an overview of the most important doctrines put forward by philosophers, either in the form of a small portrait of a philosopher's main ideas, or as a series of opinions held by more than one thinker on a single topic. The second aspect appealed even more, for it made manifest how the philosophers, for all their fruitless wrangling, could not hit on the truth revealed to and by the prophets and apostles. That Hippolytus should have lifted a doxographical report straight out of Sextus Empiricus is from this angle entirely appropriate. It is a nice paradox that in their use of doxography the dogmatic Fathers have as allies the sceptical philosophers whom they held in such low regard.

Only a small amount of this rich literature has survived, but even that is enough to demonstrate its rather variable quality. A good example is an author such as Nemesius, who at times records some pretty dreary stuff, but at other times bases his account on excellent material, probably derived from professionals such as Galen and Porphyry. (Much remains to be done on these sources.) Indeed it is hard to know how wide one should cast the net in calling works on philosophical views doxography. One thing is certain: there was nothing in the ancient world that remotely resembled our genre of the history of philosophy. The Church Fathers did not have and could not have had works such as Father Coplestone's *A history of philosophy* on their shelves.

In one respect Festugière was too severe in his (mostly implicit) criticism of the doxographical tradition on Aristotle such as we find it in the reports of the Fathers. A number of times, especially in the area of theology, he compares doxographical accounts with what we find in the authentic Aristotle, i.e. the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The most striking example is the doctrine of Providence. According to the Fathers divine Providence in Aristotle's view ceases to operate at the moon, whereas in *Metaphysics* A all providential activity on the part of the highest god is precluded. The doctrine comes, in Festugière's view, from the teaching of the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* and from a certain way of regarding the universe that prevailed from the first century B.C. onwards.

Now Festugière might have been able to strengthen his case here if he had pointed out that Ps. Justin in the *Cohortatio ad Graecos* actually
appeals to the *De Mundo* as what he calls a 'concise definition' of Aristotle's philosophy. But there is no chance that this little work had the enormous influence attributed to it by the French scholar. This is the one area in which his study is really out-dated. A few years after he wrote Bignone and other Italian scholars postulated an alternative hypothesis. Much in their work was highly speculative and needs to be rethought through (supplemented if possible with extra evidence). But there can be no doubt that the reports on Aristotle in the doxographical tradition and in the Church Fathers conserve elements of a doctrine of cosmic theology presented by the early Aristotle, probably in the *De philosophia*, a doctrine that differs in important aspects from what we find in the treatises preserved today. We will return to the subject briefly in the next section. These reports do not, therefore, just indicate how garbled and incompetent the doxographies are—although there is much in them that does not cohere—, but are the result of the fact that they were put together in a period before the Andronicus corpus gained the ascendency. By the fourth century the situation has changed. It is not impossible that Gregory of Nyssa is being ironic at the expense of Eunomius when he quotes him recording the above-mentioned doctrine of Providence, precisely because he himself knows that this doctrine does not square with what is found in the extant treatises, and especially in *Met. A*.46

I have indicated on the list of references, by means of asterisks, those references that are or appear to be wholly dependent on doxographical collections. The practice of raiding the collections of *placita* is found at its baldest and most derivative in Eusebius, Cyril and Theodoret, the first two merely copying out Ps.Plutarch, the third Ps.Plutarch's source Aëtius. But elsewhere the asterisks are plentiful too, especially in the Fathers of the second and third century. The importance of the doxographical tradition for establishing what the Fathers knew about Aristotle's philosophy emerges clearly enough. It is time to take a closer look at the doctrines that the Fathers presented, in order to see whether what they had learnt was adequate to their needs.

5. Aristotelian doctrines in the Patres

We have reached our third question: what doctrines did the Fathers attribute to Aristotle and were these sufficiently unsuitable to justify their rejection of his philosophy?
In the index to our list I have itemized those Patristic texts in which Aristotle is invoked as an expert on scientific matters. These texts are restricted in number, for the amount of science required by the Fathers for their purposes (excluding here of course authors such as Nemesius) was strictly limited, and most often (as in the case of Methodius discussed above) there was no need to name the source.

Generally, therefore, if views of Aristotle are recorded, they derive from the philosophical aspects of his corpus. In the index we find a broad range of topics touched upon, but once again a strong measure of concentration can be detected. There is an overwhelming emphasis on theological questions and on the subject of man in his relation to God.

Festugière concluded that the Fathers tended to confine their presentation of Aristotle’s doctrines to those whom they objected, namely the doctrines of Providence, the soul, and the three goods, and that the objections thus raised were banal commonplaces. Our list indicates, I submit, a broader range of doctrines touched upon than Festugière’s more limited approach might suggest. But let us move on and take a closer look at some of the actual doctrines themselves, starting with the ones that Festugière concentrated on.

(1) When Gregory of Nazianzus describes Aristotle’s thought as ‘humane’ (τὸ ἀνθρωπικόν τῶν δογμάτων), this is not meant as a compliment. Aristotelian ethics, as the Fathers saw them, maintains that excellence or virtue is not sufficient for a person to flourish in the full sense (i.e. be εὐδαιμόνευ); in addition he or she needs to enjoy goods of health, prosperity, friendship and so on, which are not wholly dependent on a person’s moral effort or condition, but are to some degree the result of fortune or fate. This is of course the standard Peripatetic doctrine; the objections against it are equally standard in the Platonic and Stoic traditions, as well as in the Fathers (hence Eusebius could appeal to Atticus’ polemic). But it should not be overlooked that this doctrine highlights a grave difference between the Aristotelian and the Christian approach to the moral or blessed life. There has been much recent discussion about the chief thrust of Aristotle’s ethical position, particularly in relation to the manifest differences between the Nicomachean and Eudemian versions thereof. The general agreement is that, in spite of the fulsome eulogy of the contemplative life in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is convinced that the complete life cannot be lived without a full participation in the world of practical affairs,
and that this necessarily involves a vulnerability to external factors beyond one's control. Transposed into Christian terms this is clearly going to be unacceptable, for that would mean that the flourishing or blessedness of a saved soul might be jeopardized by the vicissitudes of earthly life. Tatian, for all his unsavoury polemics, hits a nerve when he states that according to Aristotle there is no eudaimonia for those without beauty, wealth, bodily strength or noble birth.

(2) In the case of the doctrine of the soul it is not the Platonizing views of the Eudemus that entered the doxographic tradition but the doctrine of ἰντελέχεια as found in the De anima. Various aspects of the Aristotelian psychology are perfectly acceptable to the Fathers, notably the distinction between rational and irrational parts or powers shared with Plato. What is unacceptable is that the soul is not immortal. But is this fair? Aristotle speaks of the νοῦς θύρανεν or χωριστός, and the doctrine does not go unmentioned in the doxographical tradition. Should not the Fathers have taken more notice of this (it is mentioned explicitly by Clement and anonymously by Origen)? In fact Hippolytus in his second account is right to complain about the inscrutability of Aristotle's account of the soul. It is not even clear whether the separable mind is a human mind or the mind of the First unmoved mover, thus the same for all men and not a bearer of personal immortality and responsibility on the day of judgment.

(3) The doctrine of Providence has already been mentioned. Because the Fathers follow the doxographical tradition they limit divine providential activity in Aristotle's philosophy to the supra-lunary world, and do not have it abolished altogether, as occurs in the account of the First unmoved mover in Metaphysics Α. Although Hippolytus mentions that God's activity is a νόησις νοθέως, he does not reflect on what that might entail for his providential activity, but simply repeats the conventional doxographic view that the sublunar realm is ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἀκυβέρνητος. If the Fathers had known of the more radical view, they would no doubt have been even more critical.

(4) But Festugière errs, I believe, in placing all the emphasis on the doctrine of Providence to the exclusion of other theological themes. There are a limited number of positive remarks. Athenagoras uses Aristotle's theological views as support against the charge of Christian atheism; Clement compliments him for the equation of theology and metaphysics; Origen finds his scepticism good ammunition against the ancient oracles (but not when he and his followers inveigh against the
efficacy of prayer). But the general consensus on Aristotle’s theology is critical. The Fathers, because they are influenced by the cosmic theology presented as Aristotle’s in the doxographical tradition, find it too worldly and ‘diesseitig’. Clement is the most eloquent witness. He complains that Aristotle does not recognize the Father of the Universe. If both the cosmos and its soul are god, and god’s Providence ceases at the moon, then part of god will be devoid of god. The argument is a Christian adaptation of Epicurean theological polemic, similar traces of which are found in Cicero’s De natura deorum (which in turn is appropriated by Minucius Felix). What Clement misses is transcendence. Hence his remark, we may surmise, that if you follow Aristotle you become a ‘student of nature’, if you follow Plato, a ‘philosopher’ (and as climax, if you follow the Lord, veritably a ‘god walking around in the flesh’). 

(5) Or is it something else that Clement misses? The text is not entirely clear, for the word πατὴρ, introduced partly for playful purposes, in both the Christian and Platonic traditions indicates God’s role as creator. The most striking aspect of the Patristic treatment of Aristotle, in my opinion, is the fact that the Fathers pay surprisingly little attention to his doctrine of the eternity and non-createdness of the cosmos. It is only mentioned once or twice in bald doxographical summaries, and Eusebius cites a strong piece of Atticus’ polemic on the subject. Yet already in Philo this had been a source of great discomfort and a prime reason for preferring Plato. Hippolytus attacks the heretic Basilides for being influenced by Aristotle in his talk about being and non-being and sophistically equates the οὐκ ὄνθεός with Aristotle’s νόησις νομήσως, yet he fails to observe that the whole notion of speaking of God existing when nothing was is wholly foreign to Aristotelian though. Naturally it was known to the Fathers that certain philosophers held that the cosmos was eternal and/or uncreated—compare Basil’s remarks in his first sermon on the Hexaemeron,—and it may well be that Aristotle’s view is regarded as included in the general pagan position. Nevertheless it is strange that they neglect specifically to pin Aristotle down for it. An answer might be that the more cosmically orientated theology found in the doxographical tradition placed less emphasis on the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the cosmos. But this answer is not strong. The question remains somewhat of a puzzle, especially in the light of later developments.

We may conclude, I believe, that, although the Fathers were
undoubtedly a lot less well informed about Aristotle’s philosophy than we would like, the information they had was enough to allow them to determine that his views on the whole were not for them, and that in the intellectual context there was something to be said for their decision. But before we finish, something more has to be said about that intellectual context.

6. Aristotle’s association with heretical thought

We turn, therefore, to our fourth and final question: how important was Aristotle’s association with heretical thought?

Festugière only mentions this association briefly in connection with a single text of Irenaeus. This is insufficient in the light of the evidence of our list, which shows the frequency with which Aristotle is connected with the generation and propagation of heretical views. Indeed by the fourth century this is the aspect of Aristotelianism which tends to dominate the discussions. Orthodox thinkers appear to be of one mind that it is reliance on the over-subtlety (λεπτολογία, τεχνολογία, δεινότητι) of Aristotle’s dialectic and syllogistic that has led heretical thinkers to stray into unacceptable paths of thought. Above all it is the leaders of the Anomoeans, Aëtius and Eunomius, who are charged on this account. The historians emphasize their training in Aristotelian dialectic; their opponents—Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius, Didymus—delight in repeating how it has led them astray.

Allow me to give one little-known example of how Aristotle comes to be involved in the struggle between orthodoxy and opposing heretical opinions. It is recorded in the Pseudo-Athanansian dialogue held between a member of the Macedonian (heretical) party and an unnamed representative of orthodoxy. After a discussion on the incarnation the subject turns to the διοικήσιον or consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. Let us follow part of the debate.

Macedonian. But consubstantial entities have a being existing beforehand as substrate.
Orthodox. What you say is not true; for Adam and Eve were consubstantial, but in their case the substance pertaining to human beings did not exist beforehand.
M. But the earth they were made of did exist beforehand.
O. The fact that they were made out of earth is not the reason they are consubstantial, but rather that they receive the same formula of being.
M. I say that this is the reason they are consubstantial, that they were made from the same being, that is from earth.

O. Do you mean to say that dogs and snakes are consubstantial with human beings, and not only the irrational animals, but also plants and anything else consisting of earth? All these beings are homonymously called earthly, but they do not receive the same formula of being.

M. I for my part do not follow Aristotle.

O. Nor do I.

M. But Aristotle said the formula of being of homonymous entities was different (Cat. 1a1.2).

O. Do you say that the formula of being is the same for men and asses and cattle and horses and other animals?

M. Yes, I do.

O. Do you have the same formula of being as the irrational animals?

M. Yes, for we all come into being out of earth.

O. I follow not Aristotle but the very truth when I say that the formula of being of homonymous entities is not the same, nor are these rational beings the same as the irrational. Every heretic 'has been placed in comparison with mindless cattle and has become similar to them' (Ps. 48:26).

M. Don't bring insults into the argument.

O. I am not being insulting; it is your own voice that draws this conclusion.

The heretical opponent notices that the representative of orthodoxy appears to affirm a doctrine from Aristotle's Categories, even though this is not very germane to the discussion (which turns on the different meanings given to the word ὄντα). The latter jumps back from the accusation, no doubt because the discussion is coming dangerously near to the main point of dissension between in the Anomoeans and the Orthodox, namely the charge that the Father and the Son could not be of the same substance on the grounds that the Son was begotten whereas the Father was not. What we should note for our purposes is that both the disputants are most keen to dissociate themselves from any accusation of Aristotelianism in their thinking. In this case it is actually the orthodox spokesman who is momentarily thrown on the defensive. Generally, as our list of references shows, it was the other way around.

This is not the place to examine the extent to which Eunomius and the other heretical thinkers were indebted to their training in Aristotelian logic for details of argumentation in their long series of discussions and altercations. It is clear that it was often as much their style of engaging in debate—dry, complicated, bordering on the sophistic—as the content of their ideas that caused them to be associated with Aristotle (and to a lesser degree Chrysippus). But in a general sense too there may well have been some affinity. I think here of the notorious remark of Eunomius quoted with pious horror by the historian Socrates: 'God
knows no more about his own being than we do, nor is what is better known to him less well known to us. But whatever we know about his being, that is precisely what he too knows; and on the other hand what he knows, this you will find without any difference in us. In spirit this is closer to Aristotle's metaphysics, with its emphasis on the knowability of the highest principles, than either Neoplatonism with its negative theology or the Christian faith with its impenetrable divine mysteries.

However this may be, I believe it has not been emphasized enough—also not by Festugière—how important the constant association of Aristotle's thought with heresy was for the reception of his philosophy in the Church Fathers. Simply to refer to his ideas or exploit them in the ingenuous manner of Athenagoras or Clement would have been running a considerable risk in the contentious atmosphere of the fourth century. This explains to a large degree, I believe, the lack of overt reference to Aristotle in the Cappadocians and Didymus the Blind. And here the paradox emerges, as was well emphasized many years ago by De Ghellinck, that these Fathers, in order to combat the devil, had to know what he knew. Didymus, in an exegesis of Ps. 21:27, reacts against the very Eunomian doctrine on the knowledge of God that we just mentioned, and is prepared to give a little didactic summary of the two kinds of syllogistic proof, of course not mentioning the Aristotelian source. Basil and Gregory condemn worldly wisdom at regular intervals, but have to engage in detailed dialectical argument in their refutations of heresy, not seldom hinting that they know their dialectic better than their opponents. What could be more illustrative of the situation than the way that Gregory of Nazianzus, when he had given a little summary of what he calls the 'great mystery' of the trinity, concludes with the following words which I cannot resist quoting in Greek?

taúta óws en báraçi:

doḿatikós, álλ' oúx ántiλogikós:

díleutikós, álλ' oúx áristotélikós:

πνεümatikós, álλ' oú kákoπρagmatikós:

ékklíriastikós, álλ' oúx ágoɾáíkos:

óφelímós, álλ' oúx épideúetikós:

(this by way of a summary, speaking dogmatically, but not polemically, in the way of fishermen, not of Aristotle, spiritually, and not with evil intent, befitting the church and not the marketplace, in a way that is of service and not merely for purpose of display).
The doctrine may or may not be that of the simple fishermen of Galilee, involving none of the artifices of Aristotelian dialectic. The way its expression is described here, however, is far from simple, involving the use of sophisticated rhetorical devices that are as much part of the same Hellenic culture as the dialectic to which Gregory objects. This does not alter the fact, however, that for Christian theologians such as Gregory, Aristotle symbolized an entirely wrong approach to the knowledge and doctrine most worth knowing. Small wonder that his presence in Patristic texts, as evidenced by our list, is so modest.

7. Conclusion

In the eyes of the Church Fathers the philosophy of Aristotle and his followers was too human, too worldly, too subtle. They may not have read him very carefully, but they knew what they were after, and they had good grounds for their rejection.

The Fathers had to go back to school before they could appreciate and exploit the rich body of thought that Aristotle had bequeathed to posterity. This was the verdict of Festugière, pointing to men such as Boethius and John Philoponus. There is truth in this, but at least two more things have to be said.

Before Aristotelianism could be used to lay the foundation of a Christian philosophy it had to be adapted, above all Neoplatonized. The tendency to synthesize the thought of Plato and Aristotle in later antiquity laid the groundwork. The theology of the Metaphysics was altered through the introduction of the circulatio motif; the being that proceeds forth from God reverts back to Him in creation's quest for the source.75 The eudaemonism of the ethical works underwent reinterpretation: man's end and highest calling becomes the contemplation of God.76 In psychology both active and passive mind came to be firmly regarded as human, so that the immortality of the soul could no longer be denied.77

But, even more importantly, a new attitude to non-Christian thought was required. It was not so much that the Fathers were afraid of pagan thought, as Festugière thought;78 rather they held it in contempt, for it was fatally cut off from the truth revealed through Christ and the prophets. Christianity was the true φιλοσοφία, sufficient unto itself. This antithetical position would need to be radically altered before Aristotle, whom the Fathers rejected, could become the cornerstone of Medieval scholastic philosophy.
Appendix

Index to List of References

The following is an alphabetized index of the subjects and themes in relation to which the Church Fathers refer to Aristotle. The names and numbers refer to the list of references given above in § 2 of the article.

biographica: Tatian 1, Hermias 1, Ps.Justin A 2, JChrys 1

Christianity opposed to philosophy (anti-philosophical rhetoric): GregNaz 1,3-5,9, Epiphanius 7, JChrys 2
dialectic/syllogistic: Justin 1, Clement 5, Hippolytus 2, Eusebius 9, Basil 1-3,
                   GregNaz 4,8, GregNyss 1-2, Theodoret 18, Socrates 1-2, Sozomen 1-2
difficulty of Aristotle's thought: Hippolytus 4
dissensio philosophorum: Tatian 2, Origen 2, Eusebius 4, Cyril 6, Theodoret passim, JChrys 3

doctrines

  body: Nemesius 6
  cosmology: Hippolytus 4, Nemesius, 16, Epiphanius 8, Ps.Justin B, Theodoret 5-6
cosmos, eternity of: Eusebius 5, Cyril 5-6
cosmos, nature of: Athenagoras 2, Hippolytus 4, Cyril 6
cosmos, unicity of: Theodoret 4
definitions: Origen 10, Didymus 7
demonology: Athenagoras 3, Clement 26
epistemology: Clement 12, 18, 19, 20, Ps.Justin A 2, Didymus 7, Synesius 1,3

ethics: Clement 4, 15, 21, Hippolytus 4, Origen 1, GregNaz 4, Nemesius 13, 15, Didymus 1

ειδαιμονια and doctrine of goods: Tatian 1, Clement 13, 17, Hippolytus 2,
                    Eusebius 2, 5, GregNaz 6, Synesius 1, Theodoret 17

fate: Theodoret 15

fifth element: Hippolytus 4-5, Origen 8, Ps.Justin A 1, Ps.Clementina 1,
               Eusebius 5, Nemesius 9, Diodorus of Tarsus 1, Cyril 6
logic: Clement 31, Hippolytus 2, 4, Origen 4, Didymus 2-5, Theodoret 2

matter: Clement 23, Theodoret 3

metaphysics: Clement 11, Hippolytus 2, 4

oracles and efficacy of prayer: Origen 6, 9, Eusebius 1
physics: Ps.Justin B

plants: Clement 30, Theodoret 12

Providence: Tatian 1, Athenagoras 3, Clement 23, Hippolytus 4, Origen 3, 11, Eusebius 5, GregNaz 4, GregNyss 3, Nemesius 17, Epiphanius 8,
               Cyril 1, 4, 6, Theodoret 15

soul/mind: Tatian 2, Clement 22, Hippolytus 2, 4, Ps.Justin A 1, Eusebius 4-5, GregNaz 4, GregNyss 9, Nemesius 1-3, 10-12, Epiphanius 8,
               Theodoret 8-11, 13
theology: Athenagoras 1-2, Clement 2, 11, Hippolytus 2, Ps.Justin A 1, Eusebius 4, Cyril 3, Theodoret 7
τέλος: Clement 14
τέχνη: Theodoret 16
exegesis, references in: Origen 10-11, Didymus 1-5, Cyril 1
heretics: Irenaeus 1-2, Clement 25, Hippolytus 3, 4, 6, Basil 1-2, GregNyss 1-7, Nemesius 4-5, Didymus 6, Epiphanius 2-7, Cyril 2, Severianus 1-3, Socrates 1, Sozomen 1-2
homilies, references in: JChrys 1-3, Severianus 1-3
philosophy and the διαδοχή: Clement 7, 28-9, Hippolytus 1, Epiphanius 1, Theodoret 14
Plato, relations with: Hermias 1, Clement 25, Hippolytus 2, Origen 5, Ps.Just. A 1, JChrys 3, Cyril 6
source of scientific knowledge: Clement 1, 3, 6, 8-10, 16, 27, 29, Methodius 1, Nemesius 6, 7, 14, Synesius 3, Socrates 2
theft of the philosophers: cf. Athenagoras 1-3, Clement 23-24
writings: Clement 19, Hippolytus 4, Ps.Just. A 1, Basil 3, GregNaz 2, 7, Socrates 1

NOTES
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1 Listed in E. Lucchesi and H. D. Saffrey (edd.), Mémorial André-Jean Festugière: antiquité païenne et chrétienne (Geneva 1984) xvii-xx.
2 Paris 1932; I have not managed to see the second edition with corrections, Paris 1981.
3 Ibid., 221-263.
4 Ibid., 58.
5 Cf. the list of articles in Mémorial André-Jean Festugière xxi-xxx.
9 By means of the name of the editor; for fuller details see M. Geerard, Clavis Patrum Graecorum vols. 1-2 (Tournhout 1974-84), or Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: canon of Greek authors and works (New York-Oxford 1986). Two texts used are too recent to be included in either of these works: M. Marcovich, Hippolytus Refutatio omnium haeresium (Berlin-New York 1986); M. Morani, Nemesius De natura hominis (Leipzig 1987).
Agreeing with J. Kindstrand VChr 34 (1980) 341-57 that the work is to be dated to the 2nd cent. A.D.

Whether this fragment from a work entitled according to Theodoret the Small Labyrinth is by Hippolytus is disputed; cf. CPG (n. 9) 1.275.

Cf. the impressive lists of treatises with theological and philosophical subjects (based on the Suda) given by J. Quasten, Patrology vol. 3 (Utrecht 1963) 400-1; some of these, in addition to the work which mentions Aristotle in the title, will surely have discussed Aristotelian doctrines (cf. the titles περί ψυχῆς κατὰ διαφόρων περὶ αὐτῆς αἰρέσεων, περὶ προνέας, περὶ θεοῦ καὶ ὑλῆς Ἑλληνικῆς πεπλησμένης, περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἂν μὲν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὦκι ἂν δὲ τὰ δημιουργήματα).

The text of In Eccl. 65-144 has not yet been published (the fourth quaternion 49-64 is missing); the cited text is provided by Henrichs at In Hiob 103.28. According to W. A. Bienert, «Allegoria und anagoge» bei Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria (Berlin 1972) 22n. another quotation from Aristotle’s writings is found at 69.12ff.

I do not cite the three passages translated by Festugière 260-1 because their main thrust is Pythagorean, with perhaps some Peripatetic infiltration.

Based on P. R. Coleman-Norton, ‘Saint John Chrysostom and the Greek philosophers’, CPh 25 (1930) 309.

The following texts are Pseudo-Chrysostomica now attributed to Severianus; cf. CPG (n. 9) 2.469, 474.

References in Bonwetsch’s edition (GCS 27, 1917); cf. also Waszink art. cit. (n. 8) 660.

De res. 1.9 231.9ff. Bonwetsch; the text is only preserved in a partly corrupt Old Slavic version.

Cf. the notes to Giet’s edition (SC 26, 1949); also Waszink art. cit. 660ff.

Hom. in Hex. 1.11 130.10ff. Giet: καὶ οἱ μὲν σύνθετον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων εἴριξαν… οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ὡς ἀπὶ ἄφθαναν παρασώμενοι τὸν λόγον, πέμπτον τινα σώματος φύσιν εἰς οὐρανοῦ σύστασιν… ἐπεισάγαγον… περὶ ὅν ὣν ἐπιχειροῦντες, εἰς τὴν ὁμοίαν αὐτοῖς ἀδιπτηχθάνει ἐπισκοπόμεθα.

In Eccl. 80.2ff. (see above n. 13): καὶ λέγω ἀπὸ τῶν Περὶ ἐρμηνείας: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔστων (ἐκ ἑαυτός) πᾶν τὸ ἀληθεύοντα ἢ μὴ τὸν μάθοι τὸν μάθος, ἤτοι δὲ ἡ ὢν ἡ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχει (καὶ ἂν) τὸν ἀληθεύοντα ἢ τὸ μάθευσαι (De interp. 16a10ff.). οὐδὲ ἡ Παρέσκεψις τοῦ ὁμοῦ τοῦ γνώσεως: βέβαια γὰρ ἐστών τὸ προσφημαίον χρόνον (16b6), καὶ βέβαια ἐστών ἐν ὧν ἐστών ἀληθεύοντας ἢ μάθευσαι (cf. 17a1ff.).

In Ps. 276.9-10 Gronewald: τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ ὀμίχλη μικρότερα λεγόμενα τῶν πρὸς τί ἔστων. οὐκ ἔχει δὲ περισσομένων τοιούτῳ τοῖς μικροῖς ἀναφοράς γάρ τῇ τῶν μικρῶν λέγεται. λέγεται δὲ μεῖον ἑνότι τὸ παλαιότερον τοῦ ἑκατευθουσαὶ. ἀμέλεις γοῦν ἔχεις ἐν κατηγορίαις (5b21-22) μικρὸν ὅρος καὶ μεγάλην κίφτουν.

In Eccl. 232.22-26 Krellber: καὶ ἴδας γοῦν ἐνότις εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνέμφωρων ἔσεσθαι λέγοντες: ἃρα μή [το]ι τῶν ἔστων, μή ἔκεινο; τοῦτο δὲ μὴ νεονοικότος εἶναι. διὸ τοῦτο λέγεται: “ὁ ἀνοιχτός ἡμέρησιν” (De interp. 16b21). ἦταν μηράτει εἰς πολλὰ φέρεται, ἀλλὰ γοῦν ἔκειν, δὲ δηλοῦ ὁ ἀποστείλεσθαι, ἠμείς, οὐκάτως ταραττότε. ἀμέλεις γοῦν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔκειν τὴν ἀνοιχτίαν ταρακόντα λέγει: “μὴ ταραττότερον γὰρ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν σώματος” (Cat. 3a29).

In Eccl. 226.23-24 Krellber: καὶ ὁ λόγος μὰ καὶ περιποράν (Eccl. 7:25d), ἡ ἄρροφος καὶ ἀσέβεια καὶ ἁλητρία εἶναι· ἀμέλεις γοῦν καὶ ὁ ἐξω φιλόσοφος τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνθύλησις τεῖρεκεν (De interp. 17a37).

In Ps. 77.8-12 Gronewald: δὲ τόπος ἔκεινος ὁ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει πώς ποτὲ δοκεῖ πρὸς πολλίστατον καθὼς ἔχειν. λέγων περὶ προηγομένου καὶ ἐπομένου ἔλεγεν (Top. 116a31-35).
prophesymenos théloimen tois phílous dikaiou, einaí, xain máskrín òsw. kataý sumbêbíkhs de tois éghbrou théloimen einaí dikaiou, ína mèvbblátpsw, ùi eautou kai toû stoû théloimen. òi de ápóstoloi toû Xristou oû ína mèvbblátpsw autóû, éugononi peri autóû, allá ‘ouv ékeíno mèvbblátpswi.

24 Str. 5.90.3 Stählin: ‘Aristoteléi dé méchei seleínges éptplhe katakagwvèn thn próounan eiv toude toû faklou: ‘‘kúriei, ev toû oufiaró toû èleos sou kai ì álhtetia sou èos toûv nefiłwr, xeti (Ps. 35:6). ùntethen tuves òpatbíntes tâ ùpò thn seleínges òpanwnta òpferíngantos einaí: òn ëstai kai ò Aristoteléi. I see no reason to suspect this fragment; but the history of the transmission of the fragments of Origen's Commentary on the Psalms is complex and by no means yet fully understood; cf. G. Dorival, 'Origène dans les chaînes sur les Psalmes: deux séries inédites de fragments' in Origeniana = Quaderni di Vetera Christianorum 12 (Bari 1975) 199-213.

25 Sel. in Psalms, PG 12.1316A: xúríei, ev toû oufiaró toû èleos sou, kai ì álhtetia sou òos toûv nefiłwr, xeti (Ps. 35:6). ùntethen tuves òpatbíntes tâ ùpò thn seleínges òpanwnta òpferíngantos einaí: òn ëstai kai ò Aristoteléi. I see no reason to suspect this fragment; but the history of the transmission of the fragments of Origen's Commentary on the Psalms is complex and by no means yet fully understood; cf. G. Dorival, 'Origène dans les chaînes sur les Psalmes: deux séries inédites de fragments' in Origeniana = Quaderni di Vetera Christianorum 12 (Bari 1975) 199-213.

26 In Ps. 233.26-27 Gronewald: kai èos toûv nefiłwr, fiôi, ì álhtetia sou (Ps. 35:6). òi òprosektivei toûs aírophos thn próounan àpò ths ùsw kai légtouen autón periòrhoiáthai méchri thn seleínges ðrosw dia toû eipèin: ì álhtetia sou òos toûv nefiłwr. Further anonymous references given by Gronewald’s excursus ad loc.

27 In Ps. XXXV, PG 69.917: xúríei, ev toû oufiaró toû èleos sou, kai ì álhtetia sou òos toûv nefiłwr (Ps. 35:6). tuves de òkouvanvètes ‘‘ì álhtetia sou òos toûv nefiłwr’’ kai òpatbíntes ùntethen, òpanwnta tâ ùpò seleínges òpferíngantos òn ëstai kai ò Aristoteléi.

28 Note some scattered references in the homilies of John Chrysostom and Severianus of Gabala; see the list.

29 In the meantime carefully analysed by P. Canivet, both in his text and translation in SC 57 and in the monograph Histoire d’une entreprise apologetique du Ve siècle (Paris 1958).


31 Art. cit. 223; cf. now the nuanced conclusions of H. Gottschalk (which reached me after the paper was written), ‘Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD’, ANRW II 36.2 (Berlin 1987) 1079-1174, and esp. the conclusion on 1172: ‘The propagation of Aristotelianism in the first two centuries AD seems to have taken place at several levels. For the committed student there was the study and exposition of Aristotle’s school-treatises. Much sound and lasting work was done in this field, but it seems to have been confined to a fairly restricted circle... For a wider audience these were compilations and handbooks purveying Aristotle’s doctrines in a more accessible form and the ‘exoteric’ writings of Aristotle and his pupils, which continued to circulate in this period; the impression sometimes given that they were driven out of circulation as soon as Andronicus made the school-treatises available, is seriously misleading. Lastly there was an immense production of subphilosophical texts... which might include some Aristotelian ideas, but always diluted and heavily contaminated with others of a different origin.’ The first two levels are germane to our subject. One might query, however, if it is wise to place the ‘exoteric’ writings on the same level as handbooks, since these were obviously of a higher standard and not necessarily less serious than the school-treatises.
This would be all the more interesting if Origen's working library formed the basis of the Episcopal library; cf. T. D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambr. Mass. 1981) 93.

E. A. Clarke *op. cit.* (n. 7) 4 argues that at the very least there is one passage which suggests Clement had access to Aristotle's writings themselves (*Str.* 2.13-14, cf. *NE* 3.2 1116a6-18).

*Or.* 7.20.

The attribution to Diodorus of Tarsus attempted by Harnack did not meet with acceptance; cf. Quasten *op. cit.* (n. 12) 400-401, *CPG* 1.34-35; but cf. the impressive list of philosophical works cited above at n. 12.


*Coh. ad Gent.* 5: 'Aristotelēs dē, en tō prós Ἀλέξανδρον τοῦ Μακεδόνα λόγων σύντομον τινα τῆς ἀκτουφιλοσοφίας ἐκτεθέμενος ὄρον, παρόνη καὶ φανερος τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀναιρεῖ δέχαν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ πυρώδει οὐσίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι λέγων· ἄλλα, πίεσαν αἰθέριον τι καὶ ἀμετάβλητον ἀναπλάτων σώμα, ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι φανη. γέγραφε γούν οὕτως: οὐκ ὡς ἔνοι τῶν περὶ τὸ θεόν πλημμελοῦντων ἐν τῇ πυρώδει οὐσίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι φαν. The words that are being approximately cited are: *De mundo* 2, 392a6-8 οὕρανον δὲ καὶ ἄστρων οὐσίαν μὲν αἰθέρα καλόμενα, οὐχ, οἷς τινες, διὰ τὸ πυρώδθ' οὕσαν αἰθεθαν, πλημμελοῦντες περὶ τὴν πλείστον πυρὸς ἀπτηλαγμένην, ἄλλα διὰ τὸ ἄτι θεον κυκλοσφερμένην...


Note, however, that from the point of view of the reconstruction of the doxographical tradition Theodoret's contribution was of inestimable value; cf. Diels *op. cit.* (n. 36) 45-48.

See the appendix at the end of the article.

Cf. *art. cit.* 225, 259 and passim.

*Or.* 27.10. At 254, 260 Festugière emphasizes Origen's text at *C. Cels.* 1.10, where Aristotelian ethics are described as the most humane (*ἄριστη πιστικοτήτα*). There is a textual problem here; if one follows the text in Borret (*SChr* 132, 102.14ff.) and reads
instead of  ταπεινώτερον, then in this text Origen is not actually reproaching the Peripatetics as Festugière thought, but giving a reason why one might be attracted to the Peripatetic ārēsēs.


48 The most positive attitude would be that of Clement, who at Str. 5.166 argues that the true Gnostic should use the body and the three Peripatetic goods, but do so as a πάροικος (with reference to Gen. 23:4). Even if the ἄγαθα are recognized as such, and not as ἀδιάφορα, we are still a long way away from Aristotle.

49 Or. 2.2.

50 Excepting the puzzling remark in Hippolytus’ first doxographical account, 1.20.3-4 81.13 Marcovich: and στενά τὰ πλείστα τῶν Πλάτων σύμφωνα ἐστιν πλὴν τοῦ περὶ φυσικῆς δόγματος: ο μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων ἄθανατον, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπιδιομένειν (*); and μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ταύτην ἐναρπασμένη τῷ πάμπτω κύματι, ὃ ὑποτίθεται εἶναι [μετὰ] τῶν ἄλλων τεσσάρων... λεπτότερον, οὕνεκα. But the view that the substance of the soul is the fifth element does have echoes in Cicero TD 1.22, 41, 65 and other writers.

51 Clement Str. 5.88.1, Origen C. Cels. 3.80.

52 Ref. 7.19.5.

53 On this long-standing controversy see now V. Kal, On intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle (Leiden 1987) 91-109.

54 Ref. 7.19.7 (God’s activity), 7.19.2 (no Providence).

55 Athenagoras Leg. 6.3; Clement Str. 1.176.2; Origen C. Cels. 7.3, 2.13.

56 Clement Protr. 66.4: and γε τῆς αἰρέσεως [τοῦ Περιπάτου] πατέρα, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ νοήσας τὸν πατέρα, τὸν καλομένον ὑπόκοτον φυσική εἶναι τοῦ πάντος αὕτης: τούτῃ τοῦ κόσμου τῆς φυσικῆς θέου ὑπολαμβάναντος αὐτῆς αὐτῷ περιπέρεται. ὃ γὰρ τοῦ μέχρι τῆς συλλήψεως αὐτῆς διορίζεται τῆς προθάλασσας ἐπιστήμης περιτρέπεται, τὸν άμοιον τοῦ θεοῦ θεὸν δογματίζων. Festugière art. cit. 252n. regards the description ὑπόκοτον as a strong allusion to the De mundo; but cf. Pépin op. cit. (n. 41) 144, who points out the Xenocratean background. Moreover, where does the De mundo speak of a world soul in a manner comparable to Clement’s text? Note that it is misleading to extract from this text, as Waszink art. cit. (n. 8) 659 does, that Clement calls Aristotle ‘Vater der Häresie’.


58 Clement Str. 7.101.4: ὥς δὲ ἐὰν πρόσαχῃ τις Ἰσχυρὸν, τεχνῶν αὐτῶν ποιήσῃ,... καὶ Ὠμέρῳ ποιήσῃ, καὶ Πύρρον ἐριστικόν, καὶ Δημοσθένους ὑπήρωσ, καὶ Χριστιάνους διαλεκτικόν, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει μυστικόν, καὶ πλάσσον Πλάτων, οὕτως ὃ τοῦ κοιμῶν πειθόμενος καὶ τῆς δοξής δι’ αὐτοῦ καταχώρησα συνεργεία τελείως ἐκτελεῖται κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ δίδακλος ἐν σαρκὶ πεπιστῶν θεὸς.


60 Ref. 7.19.5, 21.1, 21.4 (οὕτως οἰκεῖ ὡς δὲ ὡς ὃς θεὸς ἐποίησε κόσμον οἷς ὄντας) ξέ οἷς οὖς οὖς; Osborne’s view (op. cit. (n. 6) 62) that Hippolytus realizes that both Aristotle and Basilides refuse to ascribe creatorship to their highest god is, to my mind, overly subtle.

61 Hex. 1.2-3.

62 Pépin op. cit. 493-512 has argued that the early Aristotle propounded some sort of ‘création réfléchie’, and that a residue of this position remains in the doxography at
Ambrose Hex. 1.1.1, in which Aristotle is credited with a third principle *operatorium* in addition to *materia* and *species*. This view is highly controversial. Contrast the position of J. Mansfeld, who argues that in the *De philosophia* Aristotle only spoke of a demiurgic god *ex hypothesi*; cf. ‘Providence and the destruction of the universe in early Stoic thought’, in M. J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Studies in Hellenistic religions* (Leiden 1979) 142.

Already in Philoponus *De aeternitate mundi*; later—notoriously—in medieval philosophy.

Art. cit. 233 on *Adv. Haer.* 2.14.5; on this text see now A. Le Boulluec, *La notion d’hérésie dans la littérature grecque IIe-IIIe siècles* (Paris 1985) 1.140, who points to the similar remark in Tertullian, *De praescr.* 7.2. The theme is thus already present in the second and early third centuries; but cf. n. 56 above.


A. Gunthör’s view (*Studia Anselmiana* 11, 1941) that all the dialogues including this one are by Didymus has not met with favour; cf. A. Heron *JTS* 24 (1973) 102.

 Диал. с. Масед. 2 PG 28.1336D: *МАКЕД.* ἀλλὰ τὰ ὁμοσώσα ἔχουσα προϋποκειμένην οὐσίαν. ὁ ὈΡΘ. οὐκ ἠλθὼς λέγεις; καὶ γὰρ ὁμοσώσα ἠστίν ἢ Ἐξα τῷ Ἀδὰμ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα προϋποκειμένην οὐσίαν ἀνθρώπων. ἡ ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆν ἔχουσα προϋποκειμένην. ὁ ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο εἶσιν ὁμοσώσαν, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς τῆς εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ ὑπ’ ὑπό τοῦτο ἴσων ὁμοσώσαν, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσὶν οὐσίας, ἐκ τῆς τῆς τῆς. ὁ ἔπει οὗ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους, καὶ τοὺς φύσεις, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ζώα, ὁμοσώσα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους: καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα ζώα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φυτά, καὶ εἰ τι ξέρεις ἐκεῖν ἐκ τῆς τῆς, ὁμοσώσας γὰρ πάντα γένεσιν καλοῦνται: ἀλλ’ οὗ τοῦ τοῦτο ἐπιδέχονται: λόγον τῆς οὐσίας. ὁ ἔγω οὐκ ἁκολουθεῖ Ἀριστοτέλει. ὁ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγω. ἡ ἀλλὰ Ἀριστοτέλεις εἶπε τῶν ὁμοσώσαν τὸν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας ἠστερὰ εἶναι. ὁ σὺ δὲ τῶν τοῦτο εἶσιν λόγον λέγειν τῆς οὐσίας ἀνθρώπων καὶ θωμαί, καὶ βοῶν, καὶ πτηνῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων: ἡ ναὶ. ὁ τοῦ αὐτὸν ἄρα λόγον ἔχεις τῆς οὐσίας τοὺς ἄλλους; ἡ ναὶ. εἰκ. ἐκ τῆς τῆς γὰρ ἐγνώρισθα πάντες. ὁ ἔγω μὲν οὐκ Ἀριστοτέλεις ἁκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀπερατία, τῶν ὁμοσώσαν τὸν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας οὐ τοῦ τοῦτο λέγοι, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ τοῦ ἄλλος λόγως τὸ λόγοικα. πάς δὲ αἰστετοισινὶ παρακανειλθήτη τοῖς κτήμει τοῖς ἀνωτέρως, καὶ ἀμοιβήσα αὐτοῖς’ (Ps. 48:13). ἡ μὴ ἢμερει διαλεγόμενος. ὁ ἔγω οὐκ ὑβρίζωμ ἀλλ’ ἡ σφωνι τούτῳ συνήγαται.

The most recent discussion in R. Mortley, *From word to silence* (Bonn 1986) 2.128-159.

Socrates *HE* 4.7, PG 67.475: ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοξάσωμεν λοιπόρας χαίρων τοῦτο λέγειν, αὐτῆς ἐπάκουσε τῆς Εὐνομίας φωνῆς, ὅσα σοφίζους περὶ Θεοῦ λέγειν τόλμηται. φησὶ γὰρ κατὰ λέξιν τάδε· ὁ Θεός περὶ τῆς ἐκατούρων οὐσίας οὐδεὶς πλέον ἠμῶν ἐπιτίθεται: οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτῇ μᾶλλον μὲν ἐκείνῳ, ἤτοι δὲ ἡμῖν γνωσκόμενον. ἀλλ’ διὸ ὅταν τοὺς ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῆς, τούτου πάντως κακεύσεως οὐδεὶς· δ’ αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ, τότε εὑρήσῃς ἀπαραλλάκτως ἐν ἡμῖν.

But with the qualifications expressed at *Met.* A 2 982b29ff., a 1 993a30ff.

De Ghellinck *art. cit.* (n. 65) 297ff.

In Ps. 51.4-52.25 Doutreleau-Gesché-Gronewald. This controverts the remark of De Ghellinck *art. cit.* 276 (who could not yet have had access to this text).

74 Or. 23.12; imitated by Epiphanius Panar. 76.37.16.
78 Art. cit. 263.

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