Will Satan Be Saved? Reconsidering Origen’s Theory of Volition in *Peri Archon*

Lisa R. Holliday
Appalachian State University, 1089 Old Belk Library, Department of History, Boone, NC 28608, USA
hollidaylr@appstate.edu

Abstract
Though the list of Origen’s mistakes varies among authors, perhaps one of the most notorious accusations is that he proposed salvation for the devil, despite his protestations to the contrary. Though in *PArch* his discussion of Satan is secondary to his larger aims, Origen does provide evidence that validates his claim that the devil could not be saved, especially in his exploration of volition. By considering the devil within Origen’s stance on volition and the nature of the soul, it is clear that while the devil technically retained the possibility of salvation, he did not wish to attain it, due to the degree to which he pursued his own desires.

Keywords
Origen, salvation, *apokatastasis*, free will, volition, nature, Satan

I. Introduction
Origen’s works were controversial, even during his own lifetime, and perhaps none more so than his work *Peri Archon*. Here, Origen offered his views on topics about which the church did not have clearly established doctrines. Working within these parameters, Origen speculated about such things as bodily resurrection, the fall, and methods of biblical interpretation.¹ His aims were not to provide definitive answers, but to offer alternatives and possibilities. To this end, Origen roamed freely over a variety of topics and often did not linger to clarify his use of terminology or to

explain himself in more depth. As a result, his critics found ample ground to question him and accuse him of heretical teachings. In addition, the nature of *PArch* made it difficult for his supporters to defend him, and Origen himself wrote several letters contending his orthodoxy. Ultimately, he was unable to refute the accusations successfully, and they persisted until well after his death, becoming distorted with Origenism.

Though the list of Origen’s mistakes varies among authors, perhaps one of the most notorious accusations is that he proposed salvation for the devil. This claim appears shortly following the publication of *PArch* in the lost *Dialogus cum Candido*, which purported to be an account of a debate that took place between Origen and Candidus. In Jerome’s summary of the debate, it is clear that Candidus sought to trap Origen into misspeaking about the question of the devil’s nature: *Adserit Candidus diabolum pessimae esse naturae et quae salvari numquam possit.* According to Jerome, Origen’s response typifies the technical roots of the debate, the devil’s choice, not his substance, was the cause of his fall: *Contra hoc recte Origenes respondit non eum periturae esse substantiae, sed voluntate propria corruisse et posse salvari.*

Despite Origen’s protestations, salvation for the devil was a natural conclusion for many, both then and now. His own eschatological schema as

---


5) Ibid. “Against this, Origen rightly responds he is not of perishable substance, but because of his own desire, he fell and can be saved.”

6) Henri de Lubac contends in his introduction to Butterworth’s translation of *PArch* that Origen did claim the devil would be saved in the final restoration, though he would not be
outlined in *PArch* supported the interpretation that the devil could be saved because of two principles: 1.) at the end of successive cycles of reincarnation, God will be ‘all in all;’ 7 2.) and though the devil could choose goodness, he did not desire it. 8 The confusion that ensued over Origen’s theories stems from several issues. As Origen himself notes in the preface, *PArch* is a work about unanswered questions, but it is not intended necessarily to supply answers. Secondly, in keeping with this, Origen’s references to the devil are not intended to be thorough. 9 He mentions the devil mostly in passing, with little elaboration. In addition, his discussion is dispersed throughout *PArch* and not confined to one section. Lastly, returning to the aims of *PArch*, it is grounded in the intellectual discussions of the second and third centuries, particularly those at Alexandria. As such, it is difficult to understand outside of this framework.

However, there can be no question about whether or not Origen intended to propose salvation for the devil: he himself said that such a claim was madness. 10 A better and more accurate question would be, did he inadvertently suggest it? Though in *PArch* his discussion of Satan is secondary to his larger aims, Origen does provide evidence that validates his claim that the devil could not be saved, especially in his exploration of volition and nature. It is here that Origen’s views on the devil should be evaluated. By considering the devil within Origen’s stance on volition and the nature of the soul, it is clear that while the devil technically retained the possibility of salvation, he did not wish to attain it, due to the degree to which he pursued his own desires.

---

8) *PArch* 1,8,3 (SC 252), Jerome, *Con Ruf* 2,6-7 (SC 303), and Rufinus, *Adult* 16 (SC 464).
9) See Crouzel, *Origen* (167) for a discussion of Origen’s technique in *PArch*.
10) Rufinus, *Adult* 6,8-14 (SC 464).
II. Rufinus’ Translation and Context

Any analysis of *PArch* is complicated by the state of the extant source, which exists partly in Rufinus’ Latin translation and in the Greek *Philokalia* of Basil and Gregory. Rufinus’ is the only full translation, and he admittedly altered the text, arguing that it had been interpolated. Secondly, in his attention to capturing the spirit of what Origen said (or intended to say), Rufinus overlooked the technical terminology that Origen employed and made many subtle changes. Rufinus is limited to a degree by his lack of knowledge of third century philosophy, and his substitutions, paraphrases, and elaborations disregard what are sometimes key points. Whether this was a deliberate act or a mistranslation, Rufinus is a dubious source at times.

While Origen’s often unqualified use of philosophical vocabulary does not always clarify his point, turning to a broader philosophical context for the meanings of his terms may well help to illuminate some of the murkier aspects and potential inconsistencies of *PArch*. However, the issue of technical or philosophical terminology raises other problems. Tracing Origen’s use of philosophical vocabulary is a daunting endeavor. Origen seldom mentions philosophers by name, with the exception of Celsus. In addition, as Gregory Thaumaturgus noted, Origen encouraged his students to study all philosophies (except Epicureanism) and to use them to the extent that they aided in exegesis. Origen himself followed his own advice; he does

---

11) In addition, Jerome preserves several lengthy quotes, as does Justinian in his Ep. ad Men- nam. However, the latter is questionable in its accuracy. The fragments preserved in Jerome support those in the Philokalia. For a fuller discussion and comparative charts, see Gustav Bardy, *Recherches sur l’histoire du texte et des versions latines du De Principiis d’Origène* (Paris: Édouard Champion: 1923).
12) See Rufinus’ Prologue to *PArch*, (SC 268), Adult (SC 464), the Apol of Pamphilus (SC 464), and Jerome, Con Ruf (SC 303).
15) Gregory Thaumaturgus, Pan 10, 3 (SC 148).
not adhere to any one philosophical school, but blends views from many traditions.

Any analysis of volition in *PArch* should be read with these limitations in mind. To mitigate Rufinus’ influence on the translation, the best starting point is book III of *PArch*, preserved in Greek, which contains Origen’s discussion of volition. Also, establishing the context of Origen’s arguments in philosophical discussions of the second and third centuries will aid in understanding his use of terminology.

**III. Freedom and Volition**

As noted above, the question of the devil’s salvation is confounded by two assertions of Origen: first, that the devil could choose good, but does not desire it; and second, that at the final restoration, God will be ‘all in all.’ Both address the ability of the devil to admit or choose goodness. The fundamental issue is volition: the ability of the devil to choose, his desire to choose, and what he can choose. Thus, in order to explore Origen’s assertion that the devil could choose goodness, but did not desire it, one must begin with the origin of this statement, which is not with the birth of evil, but with the powers of the soul. For Origen, the ability of the soul to choose its own course is an inherent property of souls.

In book III of *PArch*, Origen begins his discussion by stating that his intention is to explore αὐτεξούσιον, in particular by defining it, and its role in volition. He begins with a discussion of movement through φαντασίαι, a type of instinct which, for instance, would guide a spider to produce a web or a bird a nest and can be incited by external causes.¹⁶ In animals that are rational, there is a reasoning faculty that judges the φαντασίαι and incites action according to whether the action is virtuous or not. While these φαντασίαι are not occasioned by man, man is able to respond to them. Also, they do not produce motion in and of themselves, but movement is a result of the rational choice. However, φαντασίαι and external causes can result in action only if the reason assents.¹⁷ Thus, when

---


¹⁷) *PArch*, 3,1,1-4 (SC 268). Origen’s initial discussion in book III of *PArch* often is taken as a Stoic explication of man’s freedom. Indeed, Epictetus wrote a treatise on ἐφ’ ἡμῖν;
man is presented with φαντασίαι, there is deliberation before action in order to determine if the impulse (ὁρμή) to act is for good or evil.

According to Origen, desire is itself influenced by a type of inborn longing (ineffabili desiderio) inherent to man to know the causes of the world.18

To this end, man’s actions reflect his intellectual pursuit of God. However, this longing does not determine man’s actions because man can choose to contemplate things other than God. The initial fall of man was a result of this: souls became weary of contemplation and fell accordingly.19 However, once one has chosen evil (in this sense, to pursue something other than contemplation of God), not only has one become susceptible to influence from Satan and demons, but, one is more likely to act in that manner.

There are two types of desire in Origen’s works: a generic desire (τὸ θέλειν)20 and a desire to know the cause of things (ἐπιθυμία).21 To will or desire (τὸ θέλειν) is a general ability granted to all souls, and is directed towards neither good nor evil.22 It is a property or an ability of the soul, however, as a Stoic, his use of the term is in concert with developments in later Stoicism that emphasized the need for man’s responsibility in some of his own actions (as opposed to all actions being determined by nature). Origen, though familiar with Epictetus’ anthropological structure, denies that man acts as a result of nature (PArch 3,1,5-6). See Jackson, “Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom” Church History 35 (1996): 20. In contrast, Gould notes that Origen’s summary of assent is Stoicizing. (“The Stoic Concept of Fate” Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1978): 22.) However, it should be noted that the Stoics were one of several groups which supported various types of determinism. See also, R. W. Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato: Some Parallels” The Classical Quarterly, New Series 28 (1978): 243-266 and Carlo Natali, “Responsability and Determinism in Aristotelian ethics” in Le Style de la Pensée: Recueil de texts en hommage à Jacques Brunschwig, Ed. Monique Canto-Sperber and Pierre Pellegrin (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002): 267-295.

18) PArch 2,1,11,4 (SC 252).
20) PArch 3,1,20 (SC 268).
22) PArch 3,1,20 (SC 268). Τὸ θέλειν frequently is translate simply as ‘will’ or ‘the will,’ rather than the more general ‘desire’. There is a plethora of modern definitions of the will, and within the scope of antiquity, the problem is compounded by vague terminology or lack thereof and the question of whether there was a concept of will. In searching for a fully articulated view of will as an independent and discrete psychological construct, Dihle is correct in noting that one does not exist in Origen (Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press,): 113). However, this is not the only conception of the will, which in a more general way can be viewed as a
while ἐπιθυμία is an extension of this ability directed towards an end. However, the latter cannot be overwhelming and so may be defined as a weak desire, because man can pursue other than knowledge of God. ἐπιθυμία further is qualified relative to the end to which it is directed. Inferior desire is directed towards evil and by inference, superior desire is directed towards God. Inferior desires can open man up to influence from evil, making man a son of the devil, while superior desires can make man a son of God. The direction of desire is tied to the judgment of φαντασίαι, which is done through reason.

The judgment of φαντασίαι is up to us (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) and within our power (αὐτεξούσιον). Though he proposes to do so, Origen does not articulate clearly the distinction between these two concepts, which had long been used in philosophical circles by his time. Both are part of larger discussions about determinism, the voluntary, and choice, appearing with βούλησις, προαιρέσεως and ἐξουσία. However, there are two broad categories through which these terms developed; the first is within Stoicism and discussions about determinism. The second is Aristotelian, appearing pro-attitude towards an action. Indeed, within Origen’s view of action, desire contributes to an act. See Lorenzo Perrone, “Libero Arbitrio” in Origene Dizionario: la cultura, il pensiero, le opere ed. Adele Monaci Castagno (Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, 2000): 237-243 and Il cuore indurito del Faraone. Origene e il problema del libero arbitrio (Genova, Marietti: 1992), particularly A. Castagano, “L’interpretazione Origeniana di Mc4, 10-12: aspetti e problemi della difesa del libero arbitrio,” 85-104. For other definitions of will in ancient philosophy, see also A.A. Long, “Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action” in Problems in Stoicism ed. A. A. Long. (London: the Athlone Press, 1971): 192; Brad Inwood, “The Will in Seneca the Younger” Classical Philology, 95: 45-60; Charles Kahn, “Discovering the Will: From Aristote to Augustine” in The Question of Eclecticism. ed. John Dillon and A.A. Long. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988): 235; A. Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

23) ComIn 20,23, 188-9 and 20,23, 192 (SC 290).
24) Ibid., 20,13, 106 (SC 290).
25) PArch 3,1,1 (SC 268). These terms are not interchangeable within Origen’s thought. For a contrary view, see Perrone, “Libero”, 239.
26) The latter is tied to the Stoic notion of freedom. See also Susanne Bobzein, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998): 342. Bobzein notes that a connection between ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and ἐλευθερία appears in the thought of Epictetus; however, in later usage, the term ἐλευθερία is not associated with the technical sense of the word, but is attributed to all humans, not just the sage (345). She also notes that in later Stoic usage ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν becomes interchangeable with αὐτεξούσιον (355).
27) In keeping with Origen’s own methodology, it must be noted that his larger doctrine of freedom was highly influenced by the Platonic tradition, including Middle Platonism.
in Aristotle’s discussion of the voluntary in the *Ethica Nichomachea* and culminating in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *De Fato*.  

ἘΦ ἩΜÎΝ

In the *EN*, Aristotle provides a detailed discussion of what constitutes voluntary (ἐκουσίοις) movement in rational beings as it relates to ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.  

Aristotle defines two types of actions, compulsory and voluntary. Compulsory actions have the genesis of their movement imposed from without, whereas voluntary actions are not inhibited in any way and are therefore within man’s power. Voluntary actions have moral connotations and are connected to προαιρέσεως. Choice is found in rational animals and is distinct from desire, which is found in both rational and irrational creatures. Choice is inherently rational because in contrast to desire, choice is attainable, whereas what man desires is not always possible.

There are two aspects of choice: first, the ability to choose and second, the exercise of choice for a good end in a concord with rational desire. In this sense, choice has moral connotations. Aristotle describes it as being good or bad, depending on whether man chooses to pursue the good or
It is the ability to choose in this sense that Aristotle defines as ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. This is a precursor to the exercise of choice and part of deliberation; what is up to man is to direct his choice towards virtue or vice (the good or the apparent good) and it is this aspect that is subject to praise or censure. Alexander of Aphrodisias reiterates this point in De Fato; the voluntary and what depends on us are two separate things. Assenting without coercion to an impression is voluntary but assent with reason and judgment is ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.

ΑΥΤΕΞΟΥΣΙΟΝ

Within later writers, ἔξονσία was used to denote the power to act and was connected to ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. As a derivative of this, αὐτεξούσιον retains its early connection with action, and it is often used interchangeably with ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, both indicating the ability to choose freely. Ἐφ’ ἡμῖν indicates the ability to make a voluntary, moral judgment, and from that, the responsibility to choose accordingly. However, the duty to act virtuously, while up to man, is the second part of a two-fold process. The ability to move voluntarily precedes that of choosing.

Αὐτεξούσιον first appears in philosophical thought initially in Stoic circles. Bobzein, Determinism, 350. It is used for the most part in later Stoicism and middle Platonism interchangeably with ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to denote the power to choose or to assent. In Epictetus’ Dissertationes, he uses αὐτεξούσιον to denote what is within our power: Δοκεῖ δέ σοι ἡ ἐλευθερία αὐτεξούσιον τι εἶναι καὶ αὐτόνομον; Πῶς γὰρ οὖν; Ὅντινα οὖν ἔπ’ ἄλλῳ κωλύσαι ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκάσαι, θαρρῶν λέγε μη ἐῖναι ἐλεύθερον. This ability is contrasted with the power of someone over oneself and is tied to the Stoic notion of freedom. It is necessary to know what is in our power to ensure that man desires only those things that are within his power to acquire.
Authors such as Josephus use αὐτεξούσιον to denote power in a general way, not associated with moral judgments or assent. Philo, also, uses the term in this sense, though he does connect it to the power of God in a few instances. However, it is in the usage of Alexander of Aphrodisias that αὐτεξούσιον is defined as separate from ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.

From the third century, writing contemporaneously with Origen, Alexander of Aphrodisias produced an elegant rebuttal to determinism in his Aristotelian commentary, De Fato, which, among other aspects, challenged the view that Aristotle was a determinist. Alexander provides a clear articulation of the relationship between ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and αὐτεξούσιον. Beginning with the nature argument, which holds that man’s nature determines his actions, Alexander questions its implications, namely that virtues or vices (and their acquisition) are a result of nature. For Alexander, saying man is either good or bad because of necessity removes responsibility from individuals and places it with nature. The conclusion is that nature therefore is responsible for good and evil: πῶς οὐχ ὁμολογήσουσιν κάκιστον γεγονέναι τῶν ζῴων ἀπάντων ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως τὸν ἄνθρωπον? Continuing from this, the nature argument contends that those things that are in man’s power—namely assent—are based on nature and causality. Alexander argues proponents of this theory must conclude that man is not responsible for his actions. For the Stoics, the answer rested in assenting correctly to impressions (ὁρμαί). However this is insufficient for Alexander who contends the nature argument takes away from man’s culpability. As noted by Aristotle in the EN, man would not deliberate about things that he had no control over but only those things he could change. Therefore, something of the action must be up to man, namely the power or ability to act and judge actions. Alexander points out that the Stoics are discussing two concepts

41) See Natali, 267 and 291-4.
42) De Fato, R. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate (London: Duckworth, 1983): 199,12. “How will they not agree that man’s nature has made him the most evil of all living beings?”
43) De Fato, 181,7.
without realizing it. The first concept is ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, while the second is ἀυτεξούσιον: οἱ γὰρ ἢπαιτοῦντες αὐτούς, πῶς ὁίν τε πάντων ὄντων καθ᾽ εἰμαρμένην τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν σώζεσθαι, οὐκ ὄνομα μόνον τοῦ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τιθέντες τοῦτ᾽ ἢπαιτοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σημαινόμενον ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀυτεξούσιον. The two are intrinsically connected: ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν is a result of ἀυτεξούσιον. Αὐτεξούσιον still denotes the voluntary, but in Alexander’s usage, it is an essential precursor to ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν and action. Action and man’s responsibility rest on the ability to choose and make moral choices.

**Christian Usage**

This distinction does not appear in many early Christian authors’ discussions about action and choice, though the terms are used periodically. While he tends to use προαιρέσις in his discussions about volition, Clement of Alexandria occasionally mentions ἀυτεξούσιον and ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. In Clement, ἀυτεξούσιον is used to signify the power and ability of the mind to choose. It is frequently connected to arguments about the origin of evil: ο ὁ δὲ διάβολος αὐτεξούσιος ὡν καὶ μετανοῆσαι οἷς τε ἦν καὶ κλέψαι, καὶ ο αἶτος αὐτὸς τῆς κλοπῆς, οὐχ ὁ μὴ κοιλύσας κύριος. Clement is consistent with other writers in connecting ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν with a moral choice, reason and assent. He also distinguishes between types of voluntary actions, or rather the impetus for voluntary actions: Τὸ δ᾽ ἐκούσιον ἢ τὸ κατ᾽ ὀρεξίν ἢ τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ τὸ κατὰ προαιρέσιν ἢ τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν. All four result in different types of sin, and all three are liable to judgment. Sinning, or avoiding it, is something that Clement says is most definitely ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. Man comes to recognize the truth through the acquisition of knowledge of the truth, or through contemplation. Once he has acquired such knowledge, his reason controls his actions. Volition is placed under the control of reason.

---

45) De Fato, 182,20-25. “For those asking them, how is it possible that what is up to us is to be saved if all things are according to fate, do not demand this, setting forth only the name of what is up to us, but also that being signed, what is in our power.”


47) Strom, 1, 17, 83 (v2). “The devil, being in his own power, was able to repent and deceive, and he was the cause of deceit, not the Lord, who did not hinder him.” See also, Quis dives salvetur 14,4-5.

48) Strom, 2,15,69 (v2).

49) Strom, 2,15,62 (v2). “What is voluntary is either by desire, by choice or by intention.”
Of the connection between the two terms, Clement states in the *Strom* that αὐτεξούσιον depends on ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.⁵⁰ Given that, he constructs a reciprocal schema of intellectual advancement. Αὐτεξούσιον allows us to advance in knowledge of God, and the centrality of ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν as a moral judgment is clear. Both, however, are aspects of the soul and connected to salvation. While Clement’s construction differs from that of Alexander, it is significant that the two terms are not seen as interchangeable.⁵¹

Albeit the discussion in Clement is tertiary to his larger aims, and to a lesser degree the same be said of Alexander, the context is similar. In the pertinent passages from the *Strom*, Clement’s argument occurs within a larger discussion about nature and action. In a strikingly similar discussion to book III of *PArch*, Clement notes the roles of φαντασίαι in the movement of irrational beings and the way in which they can be used by evil powers to deceive and mark the soul.⁵² He specifically cites Basilides and Valentinus as ones who hold that the soul is a virtual slave to either φαντασίαι or nature. Likewise, Alexander is refuting determinism and the idea that action is imposed from without.

From this, we may conclude that the late second and early third centuries were witness to discussions about responsibility, evil and determinism. The need to address these dual problems became increasingly acute for Christians during this time. Certain groups, including Gnostics, claimed that some men were saved by nature. The reconciliation of a good creator with the fact of evil, while it has a long history in philosophical circles, appeared in attacks on Christian theology.

This assertion further is supported when we turn to Origen. In book III of *PArch*, Origen challenges the view that natures are determined and man is saved (or condemned) by virtue of his nature, not his actions. To do so, Origen constructs a new theory of volition. His use of αὐτεξούσιον and ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν is a unique combination of that found in prior usage. Origen distinguishes the two terms, holding they represent two connected, but separate concepts: ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν is an extension of αὐτεξούσιον. Both are central to Origen’s defense of man’s freedom to choose. For Origen, as for Clement, both are connected to the properties of the soul and therefore, salvation.

---

⁵⁰ *Strom*, 5,13, 83 (v2).


⁵² *Strom*, 2,20,110-111 (v2).
From God, man has αὐτεξούσιον, a power that is an imperfect reflection of God’s power. For example, in the case of Pharaoh, God did not make Pharaoh act, because to do this would take away his αὐτεξούσιον and thus make God responsible for evil. Rather, it was an instance of God’s foreknowledge regarding Pharaoh’s actions. If God makes man act in a certain way, then it is not up to man to avoid wickedness. The ability to act is inherent to man and other classes of rational creatures, including angels, stars, demons and the devil. Αὐτεξούσιον is the power of the soul to choose, or the power of the soul over voluntary movement. In the Homier Origen reiterates this, by saying that αὐτεξούσιον is freedom. It is a voluntary act that is neither determined nor restricted by God.

Because all souls possess αὐτεξούσιον, Pharaoh always possessed the power to choose virtue; when God ‘hardened’ Pharaoh’s heart, he was presenting Pharaoh with a learning opportunity. Pharaoh could have acted differently, but instead of learning, he turned his back on the chance. Pharaoh’s hard heart is a result of his own wickedness, stemming from his choices and not determined by God. Origen likens Pharaoh to a rock that has become buried in the earth. Seeds may well grow in the soil above it, but are unable to take a firm root. A man’s soul may likewise become so hardened that good things or opportunities fail to grow. God may extend his grace, but in conjunction with that, it is up to man to live virtuously. By this, Origen challenges the argument put forth by some groups that claim man cannot act other than by his nature. If natures are ruined,
there can be neither αὐτεξούσιον nor ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν; thus, those who apply this logic to Pharaoh imply that God is the author of evil.

While man has the power (αὐτεξούσιον) to choose, it is not according to this power that man is judged, but how he exercises this power, for virtue or vice: Ὅτι δὲ ἡμέτερον ἔργον τὸ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐστι.62 Ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν is the moral judgment of potential acts and is a precursor to action: οὐκοῦν ὁ λόγος δεικνύσιν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐξωθεὶν οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἢ ἐναντίως χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς τὸν λόγον κριτὴν παραλαβόντα καὶ ἔξετασθήν τού πώς δεῖ πρὸς τάδε τινὰ τῶν ἐξωθεὶν ἀπαντῆσαι, ἐργον ἐστίν ἡμέτερον.63 It is on this aspect of choice that man can be judged. Thus, Origen’s view of volition is a process: man has the power (αὐτεξούσιον) to choose actions based on whether they are virtuous or not and act accordingly (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν). If man did not have the power inherently, then he would not be responsible for his judgments.

IV. Previous Causes

Origen’s theory of volition has implications for his views on previous causes (πρεσβυτέρας αἰτίας), particularly as it relates to his reading of the biblical story of Jacob and Esau.64 For many, it seemed to suggest arbitrariness on behalf of God and the imposition of movement from without.65 However, for Origen, just as Pharaoh did not act as a result of his nature or God’s arbitrariness, neither were Jacob and Esau chosen randomly as vehicles for honor or dishonor.

While man can act for either good or evil, Origen held that man had an ineffable desire to know God.66 However, this desire for God is not overwhelming, in that man can (and will) choose evil. The actuality of man’s volition is the genesis of the fall of souls and their subsequent incarnation.

---

62) *PArch*, 3,1,6 (SC 268). “Because it is our work to live well.”
63) *PArch*, 3,1,5 (SC 268). “Therefore, reason shows that external things are not up to us, but to use them thus or otherwise, because we have received reason as a judge and examiner of how we ought to approach each external thing; that is our business.”
65) *PArch* 1,7,4 (SC 252).
The movement of souls towards (or away from) God is a result of their moral choices, which is ἐφʻ ἡμῖν. Given that all souls have the same abilities, all souls possess the same potential. Origen contends that souls, be they of man or of demons, can advance or regress in progress towards knowledge of God. Origen’s view is not clear in the PArch, in later works he connects πρεσβύτερας αἰτίας to God’s foreknowledge: man’s current state was determined by God based on his foreknowledge. Origen is quick to point out that man cannot accomplish this alone. Advancement is a combination of man’s choices and God’s grace. It is a process of learning from sins and being purified as a result.

Prior to its incarnation, the soul was termed an understanding. It had the ability to think freely; the object of its thought was not imposed from without by God. For this reason, good or evil are not essential qualities of understandings, but accidental ones. When, due to slothfulness, the understandings began to contemplate things other than God, they turned from goodness: Recedendi autem causa in eo erit, si non recte et probabiliter dirigatur motus animarum. Uoluntarios enim et liberos motus a se conditis mentibus creator indulsit, quo scilicet bonum in eis proprium fieret, cum id voluntate propria seruaretur. As a result, they became distanced from God, falling...
eventually into an embodied state. In proportion to their lack of contemplation, the understandings became angels, men or demons. However, God presents man with many opportunities to recognize his sin and learn from it; it is in this way that man can progress. Through God’s teaching and man’s contemplation of the lesson, man is made cognizant of his own sin.

Of the many varieties of incarnated beings, some fell further than others from God. Within this group are powers, demons and lastly, the devil. As with other beings, the latter arrived at their present state because of the choices they made, namely turning from God to a greater degree than other incarnated beings. None were created evil but choose to pursue evil. Evil, in and of itself, does not have a substantial reality in PArch, but rather has its genesis in the free choices of man; Origen defines it as the absence of good. Origen suggests that men who have fallen so far are on a continuous progress towards wickedness, being possessed by the desire for wickedness, which is an inability to learn and use reason. This does not, however, preclude hope of a return. Just as powers regressed to a state of wickedness, so too can they return to a state of blessedness.

become their own, since it was preserved by their own desire.” In the ComJn 1,16,91 (SC120), Origen states that when they were rational beings, souls only contemplated God. See Harl, “Recherches sur l’origénisme d’Origène,” 191-223; Henri Crouzel, “L’anthropologie d’Origène: de l’arché au telos,” in Arché e Telos: L’antropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa Analisi storico-religiosa. Ed.Vita E. Pensiero (Milan: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1981): 42-45.

74) It is thereby incarnated into the world of matter. Origen describes this as being cast forth from God.

75) Within the material world are the precursors to sin, the temptations that can lead man to sin, such as luxury. Through such immoderation, souls are led to sin and fall further from God. It is also in this manner that souls fall under the influence of the devil and demons, who are able to gain control over incarnated beings through their infatuation with the material world. As with good powers, evil powers can only present options to man; it is up to man whether or not he chooses to act according to this influence.

76) PArch 3,1,17 (SC 268).

77) PArch 1,5,3 (SC 252).

78) Crouzel, Origen, 262. In later works, Origen struggles to reconcile the universality of the ἀποκατάστασις with the idea of eternal punishment. Crouzel holds that he reverses his position in PArch and suggests that demons may suffer eternally (Origen, 265).

79) PArch 1,8,4 (SC 252). See also PArch 3,6,2 (SC 268) and 1,5,5 (SC 252).

80) PArch 1,6,3 (SC 252).
V. Two Extremes: Satan and Christ

In the *PArch* there are two instances of souls that are unique in that they do not follow the cycle of progression and regression, but remain in a fixed position. The souls of Christ and Satan, though polar opposites, do not fit into the schema Origen establishes for all other beings.\(^{81}\) The soul of the devil began as any other soul, with the same powers and freedoms. As with other souls, the devil was not predetermined to be either good or evil; such would take away from individual accountability.\(^{82}\) The devil lost his place because he failed to acknowledge God’s grace and began to attribute his status to his own efforts: τοῦτο δὲ, οἴημα ἐμποιῆσαν καὶ φυσίωσιν, αἵτινες ἔσται κοταπτώσεις ὑπερ νομίζομεν καὶ περὶ τὸν διάβολον γεγονέναι, ἐχεῖ ἐμποιημένον ἀ εἰ ἐπετρέβη, ὅτε ἐμοίωμος ἦν.\(^{83}\) After his fall, the devil consistently choose to pursue evil: *Sicut ergo iste habuit quidem in se uel uirtutis recipiendae uel malitiae facultatem et a uirtute declinans tota se mente convertit ad malum: ita etiam ceterae creaturae cum utriusque habeant facultatem, pro arbitrii libertate refugientes malum, adhaerent bono.*\(^{84}\) However, Origen says that though the devil retains the ability (*αὐτεξούσιον*), he does not have the desire to choose good: *Secundum nos namque ne diabolus quidem ipse incapax fuit boni, non tamen idcirco quia potuit recipere bonum, etiam uoluit uel uirtuti operam dedit.*\(^{85}\) Origen must defend the devil’s freedom to choose, which leaves open the possibility that the devil could do otherwise. By attempting to give the devil the power to choose, but not the desire, Origen created a seeming contradiction that he did not attempt to address in *PArch*: in short, how does the devil possess the ability, but not the desire to choose the good, and

---

81) See Crouzel, 100 (SC 253, note 11).
82) *PArch* 1,5,5 (SC 252).
83) *PArch*, 3,1,12 (SC 268). “This, we think will be the reason for a fall; this produces conceit and arrogance which we recognized concerning the devil, attributing to himself the superiority he enjoyed when he was sinless.” See also *PArch* 1,7,5 (SC 252). In the *ComIn* 1,17,97 (SC 120), Origen says that the devil was the first soul to fall.
84) *PArch* 1,8,3 (SC 252). “So on account of this, having received in himself the capability of virtue or vice, and turning away from virtue, he turned his entire mind towards evil; in this way, other creatures, having the capability for both, because of free will, flee evil and adhere to good.”
85) *PArch* 1,8,3 (SC 252). “Next, in our opinion, not even the devil himself was incapable of good, but this does not entail that, because he could receive the good, he also wanted it or applied himself to virtue.”
if he has the ability, why doesn’t he exercise it? While Origen does not say explicitly, he does provide an analogy in the form of Christ’s soul, which similarly has the ability, but not the desire to choose evil.

The soul of Christ is unique; because Origen terms it as a soul, rather than an understanding, Origen suggests that it has fallen from its state of understanding, though he later holds that some understandings did not fall.86 The fact of Christ’s incarnation was problematic for many reasons, and Origen seems to be mostly concerned with a change in the nature of Christ by virtue of his incarnation. The soul of Christ loved Christ to a greater degree than any other soul: Quod autem dilectionis perfectio et meri affectus sinceritas hanc ei inseparabilem cum deo fecerit unitatem ita ut non fortuita fuerit aut cum personae acceptione animae eius assumptio, sed uirtutum suarum ei merito delata.87 By its superior virtue, the soul of Christ is chosen.88 This love was so exemplary and extreme, that the soul of Christ experienced a change of nature: ut quod in arbitrio erat positum longi usus affectu iam uersum sit in naturam.89 Thus it was impossible for Christ to choose vice because his nature would not allow it: ita et fuisse quidem in Christo humana et rationabilis anima credenda est, et nullum sensum vel possibilitatem eam putandum est habuisse peccati.90

Nature is a descriptive term that is used in a variety of ways.91 Origen holds that souls may choose to act for good or evil by virtue of their nature. This is not to say that souls act because of their nature, a claim Origen denies. Nature is not a controlling principle. To Origen, there is no such thing as a bad nature that makes a person choose to act for vice. Claiming

86) PArch 3,1,23 (SC 268). In the ComJn (20, 19, 162), Origen suggests that the soul of Christ was in God. Cadiou (Origen: His Life at Alexandria. Trans. John A. Southwell (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.,1944): 247-248) notes that the soul of Jesus is a soul like any other except it is first among souls, capable of choosing good or evil.
87) PArch 2,6,4 (SC 252). “However, because of its perfect love and the sincerity of its excessive affection, its taking up was neither chance nor the result of a personal preference, but was given by the merit of its virtues.”
88) PArch 2,6,4-5 (SC 252).
89) PArch 2,6,5 (SC 252). “What was dependent upon the will was changed by long experience into nature.” See also, Rowan Williams, “The Soul of Christ” Origeniana Tertia (Rome: Edizioni Dell’Atteneo, 1981): 133.
90) PArch 2,6,5 (SC 252). “We must believe there existed in Christ a human and rational soul, without supposing it had the susceptibility or possibility of sin.”
91) Origen composed a treatise on nature while at Alexandria which has been lost. Nautin holds that it refuted Gnostic theories of three natures (Origène, 370-1).
this denies man’s free choice and makes God the author of evil. Rather, nature is a result of action and more akin to habit or character. However, natures can become disposed towards good or evil, depending upon the choices one makes.

If nature does not dictate or control man’s actions, what is its role in choice? In his discussion of Christ, Origen notes that not only is nature connected to choice, but that choices influence nature. While Origen denied all souls act by nature in book III, it was on the grounds that this denied ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, which is tied to moral choices. However, to say this about Christ does not deny the presence of αὐτεξούσιον. Christ’s soul so perpetuated itself to choosing virtue, that while it remained a soul, retaining both αὐτεξούσιον and ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, consistently choosing virtue habituated Christ’s soul so as to make the choice of vice impossible.

Thus, it would seem that consistently choosing goodness can make the choice of evil impossible. However, the question as to how this is possible remains, given Origen’s emphasis on free choice. Crouzel holds that nature can be habituated to the point that it blocks the exercise of free will; in the ComJn, he notes that Origen “even coins the neologism πεφυσιωμένον, this person has thus ‘natured himself.’”

Crouzel takes this to mean that Origen implied that there were two natures inherent in man, and second nature could determine action. This interpretation depends on translating πεφυσιωμένον as actual nature, and thereby seeing nature as a distinct facet that can influence or even determine choice. In this passage of the ComJn, Origen is discussing the ambiguity of John 8:44 in response to Heracleon’s assertion that some men can be of the same essence as the devil. Origen contends that, contrary to Heracleon, the antichrist is not evil in his substance and to argue that aspect would remove responsibility for evil. Rather, using Ezekiel, he holds that through choice (προαιρέσεως) and change (μεταβολῆς) a person can dispose oneself or nature oneself to act for evil: καὶ τὸ περὶ τοῦ ψεύδος εἶναι τίνα οὐ τῇ ύπο-στάσει ἐκ κατασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ ἐκ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἰδίας προαιρέσεως τοιοῦτον γεγονόν, καὶ οὕτως, ἵνα καινῶς ὄνομασθε, πεφυσιωμένον.

Πεφυσιωμένον in this context is referring to nature in the sense that it is a habitual way of acting that originates through right choice and action. Though not a common term,

---

92 Crouzel, *Origen*, 262. See also, Crouzel, SC 253: 99.
93 *ComJn* 20,21,174 (SC 290). “And someone is of the lie not by his substance from creation, but by change and his choice, having become of such a kind, has thus, if I may use a new word, natured himself.”
it is used in the same way by Aristotle in the *Categoriae* to describe how a disposition can become a second nature (πεφυσιωμένον) or a habit, which is a long lasting tendency towards certain types of action.\(^94\) However, in both Aristotle and Origen’s use, πεφυσιωμένον does not determine action.\(^95\) The types of choices man makes—to act for good or evil—become habitual and in this sense, are parts of man’s nature.\(^96\) In other words, if a man consistently acts for ill, then sinning becomes like a second nature or a habit. Man is responsible for evaluating every action and desire he has in order to determine if it is good or evil.\(^97\) Habit may influence this choice, but it does not determine it.\(^98\)

Consistently choosing goodness is both a product and reflection of learning. The more one chooses goodness, it may be argued, the more one is able to recognize goodness. As man progresses in this knowledge, his capacity to choose evil diminishes. Origen uses the example of two men tempted by a beautiful woman. Both men seek to lead a virtuous life; however, one gives into temptation, whereas the other is able to resist because his reason controls his action. Though both men desire virtue, only the second man can resist vice.\(^99\) The contrary would be true: if man consistently chooses evil, he will be habituated to choosing evil.

Why do men seek goodness? In the *PArch*, Origen says that man has an innate longing to know God that is stimulated by a curiosity to understand the cause of the material world.\(^100\) He compares it to the need to the

---


\(^95\) For a fuller discussion, see Natali, 277-9. He contends that character or habit was not an arbitrary factor for action in Aristotle’s thought. Rather, it could influence the types of desires a man may have but man’s choices are not determined by character.

\(^96\) For a further discussion on the tradition of choice becoming habit or second nature in Greek thought, see Jean Bouffartigue, *L’Empereur Julien et la Culture de son Temps* (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1992): 280-281.

\(^97\) *ComIn*, 20,22,181 (SC 290), *PArch*, 3,1,3 (SC 268).

\(^98\) Throughout the *PArch*, Origen refers consistently to a key aspect of salvation: it is done neither through God’s grace or man’s efforts alone, but requires both. God’s grace is extended in the form of learning opportunities, as in the case of Pharaoh. God presents instances to man to learn what is good, and it is up to man to choose the good. When man does not, as in the case of Pharaoh, while God continues to extend opportunities to learn, choosing evil can have a punitive effect. See also, *HomJer*, 6,2-4 (SC 232).

\(^99\) *PArch* 3,1,4 (SC 268).

\(^100\) *PArch* 2,11,4 (SC 252).
eye for light in order to see or the need of the body for nourishment. The search for causes, and therefore God, is what the mind does by virtue of its being a mind. In the HomGen, Origen says that through contemplation of God, man will become more like him.\textsuperscript{101} Contrarily, if man contemplates the devil (or evil), he will become like him, taking the form of evil.\textsuperscript{102}

As noted above, there are two types of desire: the ability of the soul to desire (τὸ θέλειν) and directed desire towards good or evil as a consequence of choice (ἐπιθυμία). Repeated direction of desire towards good or evil becomes habitual. Επιθυμία, though it proceeds from τὸ θέλειν, can influence choice depending on whether it is directed towards good or evil. If Satan has a soul like any other, it follows that Satan also must have the same ability to desire and to direct his desire. However, his desire is mitigated by two factors. Firstly, desire is not overwhelming in that it determines action. Secondly, as one does evil, one becomes, at least for the time in which one is either desiring or doing evil, a son of the devil; in short, the mind is like that which it is contemplating.\textsuperscript{103} For most men, this is a temporary state, reflected in the fact that men can sin and then do good. However, Satan is different in the degree by which he pursues evil: Origen says that the devil turned his whole mind towards evil.\textsuperscript{104} Other creatures such as demons have done something similar in that they have abandoned themselves to wickedness and so lack the desire, rather than the power, to return: \textit{Et est alter iste ordo rationabilis creaturae, qui se ita praeceps nequitiae dedit, ut reuocari nolit magis quam non posit, dum scelerum rabies iam libido est et delectat.}\textsuperscript{105} Their minds are consumed with all that is contrary to God.

Even though the devil has deceived himself, he is in no sense a victim and is culpable for his actions because he technically could still admit goodness.\textsuperscript{106} If Origen’s claims that he did not propose salvation for the devil are to be believed, I would argue that the soul of Satan is in a similar state to that of Christ: it retains its power to choose (αὐτεξούσιον), but

\textsuperscript{101}) \textit{HomGen} 1,13 (SC 7 \textit{bis}).
\textsuperscript{102}) \textit{ComJn} 20,13,106. (SC 290). See also, \textit{HomGen} 1, 13 (SC 7 \textit{bis}).
\textsuperscript{103}) Lekkas, 156 and 195.
\textsuperscript{104}) \textit{PArch}, 1,8,3 (SC 252).
\textsuperscript{105}) \textit{PArch}, 1,8,4 (SC 252). “Thus, there is the other order of rational creatures, who have completely dedicated themselves to wickedness so that they are unwilling, not unable, to return, so long as the madness of their wickedness is a desire and a pleasure.”
\textsuperscript{106}) \textit{PArch} 3,1,12 (SC 268). For the devil’s deception, see \textit{ComJn} 20,27,244 (SC 290).
because Satan has consistently chosen evil, and turned his whole mind towards this end, the moral choice (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) of good is impossible because his mind is consumed with evil. Thus, Satan does not possess the ἐπιθυμία for goodness, which incites a longing to know God, and cannot as long as Satan's mind is in this state.

In the final restoration, when God is ‘all in all’, where then does that leave the devil? Because he cannot choose the good, does this mean that he cannot admit goodness? When discussing the ἀποκατάστασις, Origen says it is at this time that the last enemy death shall be destroyed. Death is a personification of the devil; though Origen does not state this explicitly here, he does in the Hom Lev. The nature of the devil's destruction is twofold: he will cease to be a threat to man. Secondly, by not choosing the good, the devil is not participating in immortality. While Origen does not believe that souls are inherently immortal or mortal, they can partake of immortality through their participation in God. When the devil does not do this, he becomes mortal and is subject to death. Origen goes on to note that substance is not destroyed, only the soul. Souls have returned to their former state as rational beings and do not think of either the material world or the devil: they are filled with God.

However, Origen ultimately is neither clear nor consistent with this view of the ἀποκατάστασις, though he presents the above tentatively in

---

107) Origen’s theory of the ἀποκατάστασις caused no small amount of controversy. The origins of this theory are unclear, and given that Origen liked to borrow freely from a variety of philosophers without adhering to a single one, it probably is representative of an amalgam of views. Patrides notes that the concept of ἀποκατάστασις does not originate with Origen. The term appears in Acts 3:21, as well as in the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria. Maria-Barbara von Stritzky traces it to Platonic philosophy. Origen, along with Plotinus, built from the Platonic teachings of Ammonius Saccas. (“Die Bedeutung der Pahidrosinterpretation fur die Apokatastasislehre des Origenes” Vigiliae Christianae 31(1977): 282-297.) See also Rabinowitz, 321-322 and A. Mehat, “’Apocatastase’, Origène, Clément d’Alexandrie, act. 3,21” Vigiliae Christianae 10 (1956): 196-214. For the return of all things to God, see also Cant, Prologue and PArch 3,6,3 (SC 268).

108) PArch, 3,6,5 (SC 268).

109) HomLev 9,11, 25 (SC 287). See also, Crouzel, Origen, 262.

110) PArch 1,6 (SC 132). See also Cels 8,72 (SC 150) where Origen holds that the destruction of evil marks the end of all things.

Contrary to the theories proposed in the *PArch*, in *Cels* 6,44 Origen says that Satan became destruction (ἀπώλεια) and citing Ezekiel 28,19, holds that Satan will not exist for eternity. Along with this, Crouzel notes that Origen also wavers on the universality of the fall: some creatures did not fall, and thus, there is a question of a universal return. If the ἀποκατάστασις is universal, then the only way in which the devil would not be saved is if his substance was destroyed, a point Origen expressly denies. On the other hand, if the ἀποκατάστασις is not universal, as the fall was not, then the devil would not be saved.

VI. Conclusion

As it relates to the salvation of the devil, Origen created two problems in *PArch*: firstly by stating that the devil could choose goodness, but did not desire it, and secondly, by suggesting that the ἀποκατάστασις could be universal. Indeed, though the devil retained the ability (αὐτεξούσιον), his consistent choosing of evil (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) became habitual to the point where evil was the only viable choice. And, if the devil could not desire and therefore admit goodness, salvation was impossible.

However, Origen’s view of the ἀποκατάστασις presents a different problem because he is unclear as to whether it is universal or not. If the ἀποκατάστασις is not universal, the devil will not be saved. On the other hand, if it is, there is the possibility that Origen’s description of the ἀποκατάστασις could be different, that death could be defeated because the devil was restored to God. Ultimately, by his own speculations, Origen forces himself into a corner, and the views he presents on the salvation of Satan are contradictory.

---

113) (SC 147).