‘ARISTOTELIAN’ AND ‘PLATONIC’ DUALISM IN HELLENISTIC AND EARLY CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY AND IN Gnosticism

by

ABRAHAM P. BOS

Introduction

‘Platonic dualism’ is a much-used concept and usually seems to signpost a well-defined content: Plato was the first to make a sharp distinction between visible, corporeal reality and an intelligible, incorporeal world of Ideas. It was he, too, who argued that every human being has a visible, corporeal, and perishable body and an incorporeal, invisible soul. Curiously enough, however, various thinkers in the Hellenistic and early Christian era are called ‘Platonists’, though they do not support this lucid ‘Platonic dualism’.1 This might seem due to ‘brand degradation’, a lack of mental power, or a less developed taste for clarity and internal consistency. In this article I propose a different diagnosis: we must distinguish between ‘Aristotelian dualism’ and ‘Platonic dualism’.

I will start with some examples of acknowledged ‘Platonist’ authors who do not endorse the strict ‘Platonic dualism’ sketched above. Philo of Alexandria believes that the distinction between intelligible and sensible reality is fundamental, but he locates this intelligible reality in the divine Logos, which is immanently active and creative in the cosmos. In this conception

the boundary between intelligible and corporeal reality seems vague and obscure.\textsuperscript{2}

Plutarch of Chaeronea and the author of treatise X of the Hermetic Corpus state that it is desirable and necessary for the soul to be liberated from the visible body. But even more important to them is the liberation of the intellect from the obstructive shell formed by the soul, and in this process the soul seems to be left behind in the material cosmos. In these conceptions the boundary between soul and body has been blurred.

Justin Martyr, generally recognized as a man of Middle Platonism, is at pains to destroy Plato’s theory of soul and says that he does not give a fig for it.\textsuperscript{3}

Irenaeus of Lyons talks about a soul-body.\textsuperscript{4} And Origen is familiar with a pneumatic, luciform soul-substance, which is also called ochêma.\textsuperscript{5} Gregory of Nyssa explained the text of Genesis 3:21 on ‘the garments of skin’ as intending a corporeal covering of a pure noetic principle.\textsuperscript{6}

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3 Justin. \textit{Dial.} 4-6 with the conclusion in 6, 1: Οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ, ἐφη, μέλει Πλάτωνος οὐδὲ Πυθαγόρου οὐδὲ ἀπλὸς οὐδενὸς οἷος τοιαύτα δοξάζοντος. Cf. J.C.M. van Winden, \textit{An early Christian philosopher. Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho, chapters one to nine} (Leiden 1971) 103-106.


5 Cf. Orig. \textit{Cels.} II 60; \textit{In Mt.} XVII 30 and H. Crouzel, ‘Le thème platonicien du “véhicule de l’âme” chez Origène’, \textit{Didaskalia} 7 (1977) 225-238. H.S. Schibli, ‘Origen, Didymus, and the vehicle of the soul’, R.J. Daly (ed.), \textit{Origeniana Quinta} (Louvain 1992) 381-391 remarks on p. 381: ‘For the Christian Platonists of Alexandria the vehicle or luminous body was the product of God’s handiwork’. See also L.R. Hennessy, ‘A philosophical issue in Origen’s eschatology: the three senses of incorporeality’, R.J. Daly (ed.), \textit{Origeniana Quinta} (Louvain 1992) 373-380. The doctrine of the soul-vehicle is also found in Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Hierocles, Augustine, Boethius, Philoponus,Macrobius, and Synesius, and yet they are called ‘Platonists’. The theme of the ‘soul-vehicle’ is in fact closely related to the question of ‘dualism’ which we are discussing here. Though Plotinus does not yet the term ‘ochêma’ in this sense, he is just as convinced that souls in the heavenly region are clothed with ‘bodies’—cf. \textit{Enn.} IV 4 [28] 5, 17.

Plotinus, too, was greatly exercised by the question of dualism. From his first writing activities he studied the problem of the soul. His second treatise deals with ‘The soul’s immortality’ (Enneads IV 7); the sixth treatise talks about ‘The soul’s descent into bodies’ (Enneads IV 8). To introduce the problem there he offers a survey of contributions to the discussion since the pre-Socratic period. He goes on to show that Plato’s work contains several attestations suggesting that the master contradicted himself and that he himself had failed to draw sharp and crisp lines. Perhaps, indeed, Plotinus is using here a critical study of Plato’s views by an earlier author.

The underestimation of Aristotle’s contribution

In my view, we should take another good look at all the classical texts put forward in the debate about ‘dualism’. A serious flaw in the discussion is that Aristotle’s role is all but disregarded. In what follows I will argue that ‘Platonic dualism’ existed as an unambiguous concept for only

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a very short time, and soon after Plato’s lifetime was supplanted by another dualism, which is better termed ‘Aristotelian dualism’. At its heart lies a division between theoretical intellect and soul. For ontology this led to the separation of a transcendent, theoretical Intellect from a demiurgic World Soul immanent in the cosmos. For anthropology it led to a postulation of the activity of nous as incorporeal, and to the proposition that the soul is ‘not without body’.

Revising the modern view of Aristotle

We have to make a different assessment of Aristotle’s contribution to the discussion on the “soul’s descent” compared with what was current until recently. For since W. Jaeger\textsuperscript{11} and F. Nuyens\textsuperscript{12} scholars were inclined to leave Aristotle’s dialogues out of consideration, because they were regarded as ‘Platonizing’. But a fundamental correction is necessary on this point.\textsuperscript{13} W. Jaeger led modern Aristotle studies in a wrong direction by assuming a sharp distinction between Aristotle’s lost dialogue \textit{Eudemus} and his surviving treatise \textit{De anima}. We shall have to abandon the Jaegerian paradigm

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\item \textsuperscript{11} W. Jaeger, \textit{Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung} (Berlin 1923). A French translation was published as late as 1997: \textit{Aristote. Fondements pour une histoire de son évolution}, traduit et présenté par O. Sedeyn (Combas 1997). For the sake of references I will use the English translation \textit{Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development} transl. by R. Robinson (Oxford 1934; \textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{2}}1948; repr. 1962).
\item \textsuperscript{12} F.J.C.J. Nuyens, \textit{Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles. Een historisch-philosophische studie} (Nijmegen/Utrecht 1939). A French edition of this work was published under the title \textit{L’évolution de la psychologie d’Aristote} par F. Nuyens; Préface de A. Mansion (Louvain 1948).
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and develop a unitary interpretation of Aristotle’s entire oeuvre. Even more consistently than O. Gigon has already done, we should assume that Aristotle’s lost works and his surviving biological writings and De anima did not propose two (or more) different psychological theories but one and the same. Because this one Aristotelian psychology was a non-Platonic but nevertheless a dualistic psychology, we have much more reason than could be recognized in the past to assume Aristotelian influence on this discussion.

On one essential point Aristotle disagreed with his teacher Plato, namely on the issue of the soul, more particularly the indissoluble bond of the soul with a body. Aristotle radically and consistently argued the distinction between nous and psychê. For Aristotle the nous-in-act is always wholly incorporeal. But he considered it characteristic of the soul that it cannot carry out its functions ‘without body’. Moreover, Aristotle specified the condition of the soul as being inextricably bound up with a somà physikon organikon.


16 This point is sharply formulated by E. Barbotin, La théorie aristotélicienne de l’Intellect d’après Théophraste (Louvain/Paris 1954) 220: ‘En somme, le schisme intérieur qui divisait le composé humain chez Platon subsiste chez son disciple, mais subit une transposition progressive: au lieu d’opposer le σῶμα à la ψυχή, celui-ci oppose finalement la ψυχή au νοῦς; dans la hiérarchie des principes constitutifs de l’homme, le dualisme s’est déplacé de bas en haut’. This Aristotelian position is best set out with reference to a passage in Plu. De facie in orbe lunar 28, 943A: νοοὺς γὰρ ψυχῆς ὑπὸ σωμάτων σφυκτῶν ἐστὶ καὶ θειότερον—‘the intellect is so much more excellent and divine than the soul as the soul is in relation to the body’; Alcinous, Didask. X 164, 18: ἐπεὶ δὲ ψυχῆς νοού σωματικόν, . . . Cf. A.P. Bos (2001) 57-70.


18 Anim. II 1, 412a27-412b1; 412b4-6: εἰ δὴ τό κοινόν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δει λέγειν, εἰ τὸ ἐντελέχεια ἢ πρώτη σωμάτως φυσικὸν ὀργανικὸν.
However, the crucial question is: what body does Aristotle mean when he says that the soul cannot perform its specific activities ‘without body’? W. Jaeger and F. Nuyens were wholly convinced that Aristotle was referring to the visible, external body of a human being, animal, or plant. Hence they saw a yawning gap between Aristotle’s views in *De anima* and his position in the dialogue the *Eudemus*. In the *Eudemus* Aristotle had clearly argued that the soul can perform its own functions very well, indeed better, *without* the galling and oppressive visible body.\(^{19}\) But in *De anima* II 1, in his famous definition of ‘the soul’, Aristotle says that the soul is inextricably bound up with a ‘*sôma physikon organikon*’. Jaeger and Nuyens, following an almost unanimous tradition since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century AD, interpreted this sentence in the sense that the soul is the formal principle or entelechy of a ‘natural body *equipped with organs’*, i.e. the visible body of a plant, animal, or human being.\(^{20}\) This traditional interpretation must be rejected. For a ‘natural body’ in Aristotle is never the body of a living creature but always an ‘elementary body’ or a composition of elementary bodies. And in the whole of Aristotle’s oeuvre ‘*organikon*’ never means ‘equipped with organs’ but always ‘*serving as an instrument’*, ‘instrumental’.\(^{21}\)

That is to say, Aristotle emphasizes in his definition in *De anima* II 1 that the soul forms a composite substance with a ‘natural body’ which serves the soul as an instrument. Once this has been recognized, and the important role of *pneuma* in Aristotle’s biological writings has been acknowledged, it becomes clear that what Aristotle is saying in his definition is that the soul (as regards the realization of its typically psychic functions) is indissolubly linked with *pneuma*, which is the vehicle and instrument and shell of the soul\(^{22}\) (in human beings and blooded animals; for lower animals and plants Aristotle assumes that an ‘*analogon*’ forms the instrument of vegetative and animal souls). The soul is the entelechy of this ‘instrumental

\(^{19}\) Cf. Arist. *Eudem.*, fr. 1 Ross; 56 Gigon; fr. 6 Ross; 65 Gigon. See also *Protr.* fr. 10 b Ross; 73 and 823 Gigon (texts which it is also better to connect with the *Eudemus*).


body’ (which is already present in sperm and in fruits), just as, in the soul of a craftsman, the form of a product is the principle which keeps the hands and the instruments of the craftsman ‘oriented to their goal’.

Once the traditional explanation of Aristotle’s definition of the soul is seen to be untenable, it is surprising to discover that Antiquity offers clear traces of an earlier and historically more correct explanation in authors from the period before Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Someone who has abandoned the traditional paradigm of W. Jaeger will suddenly realize that Aristotle’s does not explicitly say in any place that the soul perishes as soon as the visible body starts to decompose. This is a conclusion which exegetes of Aristotle have drawn, but altogether wrongly.

The heart of Aristotle’s contribution was his assertion that a transmigration of souls from one living creature to another species of living creature is impossible because reproduction is confined to within the species: ‘a man begets a man’. And because for Aristotle the soul is inextricably bound up with an ‘instrumental body’, the level of life realized by a certain soul is necessarily correlative with the quality of ‘the soul’s instrumental body’. It is impossible to make music with a hammer, but a hammer can be used for carpentry work. It is, however, possible to make music with a flute. Aristotle inferred from this that a soul which is connected with a vegetative instrumental body will never be able to manifest anything other than vegetative life; but a soul with a sensitive instrumental body will be able to display animal life. Starting from this fundamentally
different approach to the problem of soul, Aristotle criticizes Plato and the Pythagoreans and accuses them of connecting the soul with a body without defining what kind of body this is. That is to say, Aristotle criticizes the doctrines of the philosophers before him because they speak only about a ‘descent’ of souls into mortal bodies, such that the consequence must be that the same souls are present in man and animal, and that transmigration, also through higher and lower levels of life, can be naturally assumed. Because Aristotle also attributes a soul to plants, the earlier tradition entails that animals, but also plants, possess a soul with, in principle, capacity for intellectuality. For Aristotle this is an entirely absurd consequence which he puts under the heading of ‘Pythagorean myths’ and rejects altogether. In his view, it is out of the question that just any soul takes up residence in just any body.

Aristotle thus rejects the notion of ‘upward’ or ‘downward’ mobility of souls through various levels of life. Justin Martyr’s criticism of the Platonic doctrine of transmigration is in fact strongly inspired by Aristotle.

In Aristotle’s anthropology only man’s soul possesses a ‘potency for intellect’. This potency is actualized when the intellectual function is ‘wakened’ by contact with the transcendent intellect, i.e. God.

We will have to pay attention to the fact that, in pre-Hellenistic times, the stories about the wandering Odysseus were already seen as an allegorical interpretation of the soul’s vicissitudes. In any case Aristotle, too, put his Eudemus in the context of ‘the return home’ and ‘nostalgia’. We should consider here that Pythagoreans and Platonists may have interpreted the stories about Odysseus as an argument for their view of the soul’s transmigration through various (or all) levels of life. In Aristotle we must presume that he saw man’s peregrinations in search of true happiness as represented in the songs about the great Odysseus. In this way the return to the Fatherland could also be easily combined with the motif of the reunion with the Beloved.

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31 This is suggested by, for instance, Arist. Anim. I 2, 404b5: οὐ φαίνεται δ’ ὁ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν όμοίος ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν.
No doubt Aristotle developed his discussion of the problem of the soul in the context of a broad criticism of Plato’s theory of the World Soul and his theory of individual souls, as outlined in the *Timaeus* in particular.\(^{33}\) Aristotle’s criticism related to Plato’s Demiurge, because this Demiurge has features both of an Intellect and a World Soul. For Aristotle it was clear that the Intellect is purely incorporeal and only theoretically active. But the soul is productive, though ‘not without body’.

Whereas the doxographical tradition as we usually discuss it goes back to Theophrastus’ great work on the opinions of the natural philosophers, we should recognize that there was also another independent tradition which ultimately goes back to Aristotle’s *Eudemus*. This tradition has passed on the view of the Greek philosophers on the soul and on the generation of living creatures, in a setting that presented generation (*genesis*) as the greatest evil that could befell an individual life-principle. But it also sketched a meta-cosmic, a meta-physical perspective.

I will now describe some features of Aristotelian dualism:

(a) The soul is incorporeal.

This position is essential to Aristotle’s psychology, as it is for Platonistic psychology. As a result, they both differ structurally from any form of materialistic psychology.

(b) The soul is inextricably bound up with a natural body which serves the soul as an instrument.\(^{34}\)

The soul is therefore not, as it is in Plato, the soul of a ‘living creature’ in general, but the soul of a special kind of living creature (plant, animal, man, or astral god).

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(c) The soul’s bond with the visible body is an ‘unnatural’ bond.

The soul can be called ‘imprisoned’, ‘chained’, in its relation to the visible body.\textsuperscript{35} The visible body in itself, apart from the ensouling effect of the soul, is frequently referred to as a ‘corpse’, as a ‘burden’ which is dragged along by the soul.\textsuperscript{36} On this point Aristotle’s psychology is doubtless similar to Plato’s. But in Aristotle the soul can only be connected with the visible body by mediation of the (fine-material) instrumental body, because the entire visible body must be produced by the soul with the aid of its ‘instrumental natural body’.

(d) Man’s soul\textsuperscript{37} needs to be ‘released’ from the visible body. This is a turning away from sensory activity with the concomitant emotions, and a concentration on itself.

(e) Aristotle must have talked about a ‘double’ liberation: after the soul has been released from the visible body, the intellect must free itself from the (fine-material) soul-body.\textsuperscript{38}

(f) A regular part of the human soul’s purification after it has cast off the earthly body is the journey through the seven celestial spheres, where it meets the Archons and casts off the irrational soul-powers.

(g) The intellect-in-act is not a part of the soul but ‘seems to be a different genus of soul’.\textsuperscript{39} The potency or \textit{dynamis} for intellectual activity is,


\textsuperscript{36} Cf. \textit{Corp. Herm.} X 8; 13; see also VII 2: τὸν τῆς φθορᾶς δεσμὸν, τὸν σκοτεινὸν περίβολον, τὸν ζῶντα θάνατον, τὸν αἰσθητὸν νεκρὸν, τὸν περιφόρητον τάφον, τὸν ἐνοικὸν ληστήν. Philo often uses the term νεκροφορεῖν: \textit{Leg.} III 22, 69-23, 74; I 33, 108; \textit{Gig.} 3, 15; \textit{Agr.} 5, 25; \textit{Migr.} 5, 21; \textit{Heres} 12, 58; 61, 309; \textit{Sonn.} II 36, 237; \textit{Q. Gen.} I 93; \textit{Orig. Cels.} VII 45. Cf. J. Pépin (1985) 390-391 with n. 10. Aristid. Quint., \textit{Mus.} II 17, p. 38, 4 calls the visible body the ὀστρεώδες ὄργανον.

\textsuperscript{37} This restriction to souls which have a potency for intellectual activity is indicated in e.g. \textit{C.H.} X 19: ψυχὴ δὲ ἀνθρωπινή, οὐ πᾶσα μέν, ἢ δὲ ἐὑσεβής . . . μετὰ τὸ ὑπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ σώματος . . . ὁλη νοῦς γίνεται.

\textsuperscript{38} The motif of the ‘double death’ cannot be detached from the conception of the ‘double theology’ and ‘double psychology’. The theme of the ‘double death’ is found explicitly in Plu. \textit{Facie} 942D-943E. But it is also clearly the import of \textit{C.H.} X 16, Iren. \textit{Haer.} I 21, 5 and of \textit{Justin.} \textit{Dialog.} 6, 2.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Anim.} II 2, 413b24-27: Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νόον καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ’ ἐοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἔτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι,
in Aristotle’s view, a ‘potency’ or power of the soul. However, the *nous*-in-act does not have a bond with any material activity. (The only *metabasis eis allo genos* which Aristotle admitted in his philosophy is the *metabasis* of ‘*nous*-in-potency’ as potency of the soul, to ‘*nous*-in-act’, for ‘*nous*-in-act’ is of another genus.)

(h) The ‘liberation’ of the intellect from the (materially characterized) soul is a matter of the intellect being ‘wakened’.

(i) The soul is eternal but not imperishable. The soul survives after the death of the earthly human individual, but the astral soul-body gradually dissolves into the eternal ethereal sphere.

(j) The soul does not reincarnate, because what enters material reality is not the soul but the intellectual principle or something else of a transcendent origin, which is clothed with a psychic body.

(k) There is no question of transmigration of a human soul to the body of an animal or vice versa (because every soul has its own species-dependent instrumental body). ‘A man begets a man’ and a cat begets kittens. This basic position in Aristotle was directed against both Plato’s theory of Ideas and his doctrine of reincarnation and transmigration.

(l) The final goal of human existence is to ‘become godlike’. This ideal is embraced equally by Platonists and Aristotelians. But for Plato it means that the soul develops into perfect intellectuality, for Aristotle that man achieves actualization of his intellect and thus separation of the intellect from the instrumental body of the soul.

(m) For Aristotle this entails: arriving at perfect intellectual knowledge of natural reality. There can be no question of an ‘anamnesis’ in the Platonic sense. Aristotle lucidly characterizes ‘remembering’ as being based on perception and as a matter of the *anima sensitiva*. Contemplation of
the Ideas is not a form of sense perception but an activity of the mind.

(n) In the Aristotelian tradition the soul is presented as *enhylos*, because it forms a substantial unity with its instrumental body. Aristotle also presents the instrumental body as the vehicle of the *logos* or the *logoi* of the soul. The notion of *logoi spermatikoi* is therefore not a Stoic contribution to the philosophical discussion but an Aristotelian theme designed to overcome the problem of Platonism, the separateness of ‘form’, ‘Idea’, and ‘matter’.

On the basis of this distinction between the Aristotelian and Platonic varieties of dualism we shall have to reconsider the texts which played a role in the debate over the soul’s incarnation, in order to examine how far they possibly show the influence of Aristotle’s psychology, as presented in his famous dialogue *Eudemus or On the Soul*, but also held in his extant writings.

I now want to take two of these facets of ‘Aristotelian dualism’ (f. and h.) and use them to show the high probability of Aristotelian influence on the later discussions.

*The soul’s ascent through the heavenly spheres*

In its treatises I (‘Poimandres’) and X the Hermetic Corpus supplies clear examples of a ‘dualism’ that is significantly un-Platonic. In these accounts, the soul after death ascends through the spheres of the *Heimarmenè* and casts off a covering at every stage in this journey. The reason why the soul possesses these coverings is given in treatise I in the description of the ascent of the divine *Anthrôpos* through the spheres of the World Rulers, who give him ‘presents’ by which the divine *Anthrôpos* gets part of their nature. As a result, his essential identity with the transcendent God is veiled and hidden and disappears, as it were, behind a temporary new identity with the astral powers. Besides this conception of the soul-coverings, the ‘double theology’ of these Hermetic treatises is also typically un-Platonic and characteristically Aristotelian.

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The model for this representation can be found in the treatise *De mundo*, no matter how the authorship of the work is viewed. For even if it is not by Aristotle’s hand, there are good reasons for dating the work before 250 BC and not to the first century before or after Christ, as was often thought.\(^{46}\) Chapter 1 of this treatise, too, draws a picture of the soul which leaves its earthly body and rises, guided by its intellect, to heavenly spheres. The expressions and metaphors used in this chapter led P. Moraux at the time to characterize it as purely Platonic. He found ‘nothing typically Aristotelian’ in the chapter.\(^{47}\) In the fourth chapter of the same work, however, *pneuma* is said to be the ‘ensouled and fertilizing substance’ which pervades all living creatures.\(^{48}\) The rules of philology require us to presuppose the doctrinal unity of the work and to conclude that Platonic themes have here been given a different, namely Aristotelian, setting in this work.

What is more, chapter 6 of *De mundo* offers the great theological comparison of the transcendent God to the Persian Great King in his royal palace in Susa or Ecbatana, surrounded by his royal guards, and shielded from the masses by the seven walls of his royal castle with their numerous gateways and watchposts, and thus develops the important example for all further descriptions of the soul’s fate after death.\(^{49}\)

The information on Aristotle’s lost works also forces us to attribute this ‘non-Platonic dualism’ to Aristotle. For it is certain that Aristotle’s *Eudemus* talked about the soul’s ‘return home’ after the death of the human individual. But Aristotle had also passed fundamental criticism on Plato’s theory of soul, in which the immaterial soul possesses a movement of its own and can even be a principle of self-movement.\(^{50}\) And Cicero says that Aristotle held the human soul to consist of the astral element.\(^{51}\)


\(^{48}\) *Mu.* 4, 394b10: Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐτέρῳς πνεύμα ἢ τε ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις (σώσα) καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἐμπυχόχι τε καὶ γόνιμος σῶσα. The addition (σώσα) was suggested by D. Holwerda, *Mnemosyne* 46 (1993) 50.

\(^{49}\) Cf. C.H. I 24-26, and the Archons of the system of the Ophites which Orig. *Cels.* VI 30-33; VII 40 describes; the *Song of the Pearl* in the *Acts of Thomas* 110-111; *Gospel of Mary* 15-17.

\(^{50}\) Arist. *Anim.* I 3, 405b31-407b11.

\(^{51}\) Cf. Arist. *Philos.* fr. 27 Ross; T. 18, 1; fr. 994; 995; 996 Gigon.
Anyone not blinded by the perspective of the traditional Aristotle interpretation must be prepared to consider that Aristotle already developed his alternative theory of soul in the *Eudemus*, a theory of a guiding immaterial soul-principle which uses a natural body as an instrument and as a vehicle.

*The intellect that is wakened*

The theme of ‘the sleeping (world) soul’ or of ‘the intellect that is wakened’ is highly suitable for showing, on the one hand, that modern scholars have encountered many problems here and, on the other, that these problems can perhaps be solved via a different approach.

Our starting-point is the text of Alcinous’ *The Handbook of Platonism*.\(^{52}\) This work was formerly attributed to Albinus. In any case it professes to be in the Platonistic tradition. In his doctrine of principles or theology Alcinous talks successively about ‘matter’, ‘the Ideas’, and ‘God’.\(^{53}\) In chapter 10 he describes God in a way which cannot be traced back to Plato’s own oeuvre. The ‘first God’ is called the Intellect, who always thinks all intelligibilia collectively in a pure fashion, free of and unmixed with any sensible reality. This supreme God is then said to be the cause of the eternal actualization of the World Intellect. And God, though himself unmoved, is cause just as the Sun is the cause of seeing and the object of desire the cause of desire.

Alcinous clarifies the way in which the transcendent Intellect is the cause of the World Intellect as follows: ‘By his own will he has filled all things with himself, rousing up the soul of the world and turning it towards himself, as being the cause of its intellect. It is this latter that, set in order by the Father, itself imposes order on all of nature in this world’.\(^{54}\) In chapter 14 the author adds the comment: ‘Also, God does not create the soul of the world, since it exists eternally, but he brings it to order, and to this extent he might be said to create it, by awakening and turning towards himself both its intellect and itself, as out of some deep coma or sleep, so


\(^{53}\) *Alcinous, Didask*. 8-10; p. 162, 24ff.

\(^{54}\) *Alcinous, Didask*. Χ 164, 42-165, 4: κατὰ γὰρ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν ἐμπέπληκε πάντα ἑαυτῷ, τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἑπεγείρας καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιστρέψας, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτῆς αἴτιος ὑπάρχον· ὃς κοσμηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διακοσμεῖ σύμπασαν φύσιν ἐν τῷ τῷ κόσμῳ.
that by looking towards the objects of intellection inherent in him it may receive the Forms and shapes, through striving to attain to his thoughts.\textsuperscript{55}

In his discussion of Alcinous’ theology of the transcendent supreme God, J. Dillon remarked: ‘It is in fact the Aristotelian Prime Mover of \textit{Metaphysics} XII. The description of God is to be seen neither as original to Albinus nor as, properly speaking, eclectic. As far as Albinus is concerned, Aristotle is simply in this case giving a true account of Platonic doctrine’.\textsuperscript{56} His discussion of Alcinous’ doctrine of the World Soul is unclear because Dillon seems to suggest that, according to Alcinous, ‘the irrational World Soul or the World Soul in its irrational or unorganized aspect’ needs to be wakened and organized.\textsuperscript{57} In his discussion of the same motif in Plutarch, Dillon had observed: ‘This image of the sleeping World Soul (the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ myth, one might call it) is rather mysterious in origin. It is not a Platonic image in this form, though the image of our life as a sleep or dream is an old and respectable one. It may simply be an imaginative development of the \textit{Politicus} myth, but the fact that it is found in both Plutarch and Albinus suggests that it is older than both.’\textsuperscript{58}

W. Deuse, too, paid attention to the texts of Alcinous cited above, grouping them under the heading ‘Seele und Nous’ and characterizing them as ‘Dualismus Gott-Seele’.\textsuperscript{59} For Deuse it is clear that Alcinous works with the conceptual pair δύναμις—ἐνέργεια, which derives from Aristotle. He also refers to Aristotelian texts which could be illuminating and which were already mentioned in this context by J. Mansfeld.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{55} Alcinous, \textit{Didask.} XIV 169, 36-41: καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἀεὶ οὕσαν τοῦ κόσμου οὐχὶ ποιεῖ ὁ θεὸς, ἀλλὰ κατακοσμεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ λέγει ὁ καὶ ποιεῖν, ἔγειρον καὶ ἑπιστρέφον πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν τε νῦν αὐτής καὶ αὐτὴν ὠσπέρ ἐκ κάρου τινὸς βαθέος ἢ ύπνου, ὡς ἀποβλέπουσα πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ αὐτῷ δέχηται τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰς μορφὰς, ἐρεμεμένη τοῦ ἐκείνου νοημάτων.


\textsuperscript{57} J. Dillon (1977) 284. Cf. id. (1993) 106 and xxxiii. But we will have to maintain that only the soul’s intellectual \textit{dynamis} can be wakened to intellectuality.

\textsuperscript{58} J. Dillon (1977) 296, with reference to Plu. \textit{Procr. anim.} 1026EF. See also his p. 287 and J. Whittaker (1990) 114 n. 267. We find the same doctrine in Aristid. \textit{Quint. Mus.} III 25, p. 128, 29: τὴν γὰρ δὴ ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τάδε ῥέψασαι ἄποβολή φρονήσεως οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀγνωσία καὶ λήθη διὰ τὸν σωματικὸν γινομένην κάρον.

\textsuperscript{59} W. Deuse, \textit{Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre} (Wiesbaden 1983) 82; cf. K. Alt (1993) 49. This author concludes on p. 50 that this theme is a ‘Paradoxon’ in Alcinous.

\textsuperscript{60} Arist. \textit{Metaph.} Α 9, 1074b17-18, where the theme of a ‘sleeping god’ is brought
However, Deuse here has missed the truly important text in Aristotle, *De anima* II 1. Essential to the Aristotelian theory of soul is the proposition: ‘With regard to the presence of soul a distinction can be made between (a state of) sleep and (a state of) waking. Waking is analogous to the study of science, while sleep is analogous to the possession of science without it being studied.’\(^6\) For Aristotle this implies that the soul is structurally susceptible to ‘change’ and so must have a somatic substrate. And all ‘parts’ or ‘powers’ of the soul can therefore be present ‘in potency’ and ‘in act’.\(^6\)

In this way Aristotle states, at the ‘bottom’ of the soul-functions, that a grain of corn and a beech-nut can be in a state of germinative rest, i.e. can be the germinative seeds of an ear of corn and a beech tree, even without displaying growth. In the same way Aristotle states that the embryo of an animal or human being is, in its initial state, only vegetatively ‘operative’, but does not realize sensitive or motory functions until a later stage. In this way he has also made clear, at the ‘top’ of the scale of soul-functions, that a human being may have realized all his specific psychic functions (of sensation, emotion, locomotion) without having achieved intellectual activity. However, what is specific to his theory of soul is that he presented the ‘potency for intellect’ as a ‘potency of the soul’. At the same time he presented the ‘nous-in-act’ as being ‘of another genus’ than the soul, because the ‘nous-in-act’ does not have a relation with any material activity. The consequence of Aristotle’s dualism of soul and intellect was, besides, that the transition from ‘nous-in-potency’ to ‘nous-in-act’ could not be regarded as a natural process, like teething or learning to walk. The intellect-of-the-soul only achieves realization because the soul turns away from material reality and is attracted by the reality of the *Noëta*.

This motif was given a mythological elaboration by Aristotle in his myth of the ‘dreaming god Kronos’ in the *Eudemus*.\(^5\) This myth constitutes his
alternative to the doctrine of the World Soul in Plato’s *Politicus* and the *Timaeus*.

Clearly Alcinous integrated this line of thought into his version of Plato’s philosophy because he was convinced that Aristotle was right to postulate that the soul is the principle of life in ensouled bodies and that the intellect is not a productive but an orientating and guiding principle. The World Soul, according to Alcinous too, is the entity which, immanent in the cosmos, is active demiurgically and productively, giving concrete shape to the forms after the example of the Intelligibilia in the transcendent Intellect. Alcinous’ text clearly shows a deep infusion with the essential ideas of Aristotelian philosophy. That is why we need to reject the hypothesis of J. Dillon that the Middle Platonist conception of the World Soul should be understood to follow from an acceptance by later Platonists of the Stoic doctrine of Logos.64

The same motif of the need for the intellect of the World Soul to be wakened is also present in the remarkable exegesis of Plato’s *Timaeus* provided by Plutarch in *De procreatione animae*.65 Plutarch follows the same tradition in the myth of *De facie in orbe lunae*, where he pictures the dreaming god Kronos as bound by Zeus in the chains of sleep, but also as the agent who, through his dream oracles, controls all that is realized in the cosmos.66

This line is also pursued in Hermetic *Corpus X 5*, where Ouranos and Kronos are presented as leaving their bodies in their sleep and participating in the most beautiful contemplation.67

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64 See J. Dillon (1977) 46: ‘another development characteristic of Middle Platonism, deriving not from the Old Academy but rather arising as a development from Stoicism, that is, the distinguishing of a first and second God. The distinction between a completely transcendental, self-intelligizing figure, and an active demiurgic one. The later Platonists adopted the Stoic Logos into their system as the active force of God in the world’. Cf. id. (1993) xxxiii. *contra* Dillon it can be argued that both the Stoic doctrine of Logos and the Middle Platonist doctrine of the World Soul resulted from Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s theory of soul.


67 C.H. X 5: ἢς οἱ δυνάμενοι πλέον τι ἀρύσσασθαι τῆς θέας κατακομιζόντων πολλάκις
In the same tradition Philo of Alexandria holds that first the transcendent Intellect brings forth the Logos and then the Logos vitalizes and produces the visible cosmos.\(^6\)

In this tradition we also find the Gnostic theme of the ‘conversion’ of the cosmic World Archons. This is frequently presented as a ‘making contact’ of transcendent Reality with the cosmic reality of the Archons. In spiritualizing conceptions of Christianizing Gnostics ‘the voice from heaven’ which speaks when Jesus is baptized in the Jordan by John the Baptist is often explained in the same way.\(^6\)

Entirely parallel with this theme on a macrocosmic scale we find passages which refer to the ‘wakening’ of an individual man’s intellect. Characteristically, Philo describes how Abraham is ‘wakened as from a deep sleep’ and then sees with ‘his soul’s eye’ the pure light instead of deep darkness. According to Philo, this happened when Abraham abjured the cosmic theology of the Chaldeans and received knowledge of the supreme, the truly transcendent God.\(^7\) For Abraham this was not a migration to a foreign country but a return to his Fatherland.\(^8\) The mistake of the Chaldeans was that they worshipped ‘the Powers’ of God instead of God himself.\(^9\)

The proclamation of the Hermetic apostle is: ‘cease your inebriation, intoxicated as you are by an irrational sleep’.\(^10\) The same motif is found in the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*.\(^11\)


\(^{6\text{a}}\) Philo, *Opif.* 16-25.


\(^{6\text{c}}\) Philo, *Abr.* 60-72.

\(^{6\text{d}}\) Philo, *Abr.* 62.


W. Foerster makes a good point when he argues that the ‘call to awaken’ forms the origin of Gnosticism.75 But we should consider here that this concept builds on the philosophical foundation laid by Aristotle when he distinguished between the presence of soul ‘as sleeping’ and ‘as wakened’.76

Vrije Universiteit, AMSTERDAM
E-mail: a.p.bos@ph.vu.nl