Encyclopedia of China
Encyclopedia of China

Modern and Historic Views of the World’s Newest and Oldest Global Power

中华全书

跨越历史和现代，审视最新和最古老的全球大国

VOLUME 1

Berkshire Publishing Group
Great Barrington, Massachusetts
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List of Contributors

Aervitz, Irina  George Mason University
Industrialization
Northeastern Region, Revival of

Allan, Sarah  Dartmouth College
Erlitou Culture

Amer, Ramses  Center for Pacific Asia Studies
Indochina-China Relations
Vietnam-China Relations

Anderson, E. N.  University of California, Riverside
Cuisines
Health, Nutrition, and Food

Anderson, Wendell  Berkshire Publishing Group
Auto Industry
Banking, Modern (co-author: Eldridge, Scott, II)
Chengdu (co-author: Nielsen, Bent)
Chongqing (co-author: Nielsen, Bent)
Magazines (co-author: Shao Peiren)

Wen Jiabao
World Expo 2010–Shanghai
Yangzi (Chang) River (co-author: Leitich, Keith)

Andressen, Curtis  National Chengchi University
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
Southeast Asian Financial Crisis of 1997
World Trade Organization

Aneja, Urvashi  Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Pakistan-China Relations

Arkush, David  University of Iowa
Fei Xiaotong

Augustin-Jean, Louis  Illinois Institute of Technology
Fujian Province
Guangdong Province
Township and Village Enterprises

Baensch, Robert  New York University
Publishing Industry

Bai, Di  Drew University
Caoyun System
Harbin
Heilongjiang Province
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Jilin Province
 Liaoning Province
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region

Banister, Judith  The Conference Board
Marriage and Family

Bartlett, Beatrice  Yale University
Ming-Qing Archives
Qing Grand Council
Yung Wing

Bartlett, Thomas  La Trobe University
Song Dynasty
Baumler, Alan  Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Boxer Rebellion
Extraterritoriality
Opium War, First
Treaty of Tianjin
Twenty-One Demands

Belkin, Ira  Ford Foundation
Criminal Justice System

Bell, Daniel  Tsinghua University
Confucianism—Revival

Benn, Charles  University of Hawaii
Sui Dynasty
Sui Wendi
Sui Yangdi

Bian, Morris  Auburn University
Danwei
National Resources Commission
Weng Wenhao

Bian, Yanjie  University of Minnesota
Sociology

Blair, John  Beijing Foreign Studies University
Divination (co-author: McCormack, Jerusha)
Governance Principles (co-author: McCormack, Jerusha)
Governance System, Dual (co-author: McCormack, Jerusha)
Proverbs and Sayings (co-author: McCormack, Jerusha)
Sunzi (co-author: McCormack, Jerusha)

Blum, Susan  University of Notre Dame
Autonomous Areas
Social Values

Bodman, Richard  St. Olaf College
River Elegy (Heshang) (co-author: Wan, Pin P.)

Brown, Kerry  Chatham House, London
Beijing Consensus
Communist Youth League
Cultural Revolution
Currency Valuation
Daging
Deng Xiaoping
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour
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Social Harmony
United Kingdom–China Relations

Buck, David  University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Chinese Nationalist Party
Lee Teng-hui
Shandong Province
Soong Ziwen
Wang Jingwei
Xi’an Incident

Buell, Paul  Western Washington University
Ginseng
Jurchen Jin Dynasty
Khubilai Khan
Lifan Yuan
Polo, Marco
Tea and Tea Culture
Tofu
Xixia

Campbell, Joel  Kansai Gaidai University
Chen Yun
Li Peng

Campi, Alicia  U.S.–Mongolia Advisory Group
Cashmere Industry
Tibetans (Zang)
Yao
Zhuang

Cao, Qing  Liverpool John Moores University
Perspectives on China—Western

Caprio, Mark  Rikkyo University
United Front Strategy

Cen, Yuhao  Indiana University
Fudan University (co-author: Ross, Heidi)
St. John’s University (co-author: Ross, Heidi)

Chai, Winberg  University of Wyoming
Chen Cheng
Chen Shui-bian
Chiang Ching-kuo
Chiang Kai-shek
Democratic Progress Party
February 28th Incident
Ma Ying-jeou
92 Consensus
Soong Mei-ling
Taiwan (Republic of China)
Taiwan Strait (Cross-Strait Relations)
Taiwan-China Relations

Chan, Kam-wing  University of Washington
Migration, Interregional Urban Geography

Chan, Timothy  Hong Kong Baptist University
Bo Juyi
Chuci
Li Bai
Quan Tangshi
Sima Xiangru
Wang Wei

Chan, Wellington  Occidental College
Hong Merchants

Chang Jui-te  Academia Sinica
Academia Sinica
National Taiwan University
Chang, Teh-Kuang  Ball State University
Hangzhou
Peking University
Qinghua University
Shanghai

Chao, Anne  Rice University
Chen Duxiu
New Culture Movement

Chen Bao-xing  China Academy of Traditional Chinese Medicine
Acupuncture (co-author: LeCompte, Garé)
Massage (co-author: LeCompte, Garé)
Medicine, Traditional (co-author: LeCompte, Garé)
Moxibustion (co-author: LeCompte, Garé)

Chen, Huaiyu  Arizona State University
Buddhism, Tibetan
Daoism—Religion
Dazangjing
Nestorians

Chen, Matthew  Rice University
Jardine Matheson Group
Lenovo

Chen Shiwei  Lake Forest College
Cixi, Empress Dowager
Yuan Shikai
Zuo Zongtang

Chen, Xu  BOP Consulting
Creative Economy (co-author: Howkins, John)

Chen, Yixin  University of North Carolina, Wilmington
Yi

Chen, Zhihong  Cornell University
Borodin, Mikhail

Cheng, Linsun  University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth
Banking, History

Cheng Shengkui  Institute of Geographic Sciences & Natural Resources Research
Energy, Renewable (co-authors: Shen Lei and Xu Zengrang)

Chiou-Peng, TzeHuey  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Dayan Pagoda
Dazu Rock Carvings
Forbidden City
Shenyang Imperial Palace
Summer Palace of Yi Heyuan

Chou, Diana  Case Western Reserve University
Chen Yifei
Painting—Folk
Painting—Landscape

Christensen, Karen  Berkshire Publishing Group
Internet Use (co-author: Guo Liang)
Ping-Pong Diplomacy
Social Networking, Online (co-author: Li, Jonathan Qiang)

Chung, Stephanie  Hong Kong Baptist University
Hundred Flowers Campaign
Long March
Three and Five Antis Campaign

Cliver, Robert  Humboldt State University
Third Front Policy

Conrad, Bjoern  Global Public Policy Institute
Sports Training System

Cook, Constance  Lehigh University
Zhou Dynasty

Cox, Howard  University of Worcester
British American Tobacco Company

Crozier, Ralph  University of Victoria
Revolutions

Cunha, Stephen  Humboldt State University
Tarim Basin
Three Gorges Dam
Tian Shan

Dai, Yingcong  William Paterson University
Taiping Rebellion

Dass, Nirmal  Ryerson University
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Wang Yangming School
Wen Tingyun
Xu Zhimo
Xunzi
Zhong Yong (Doctrine of the Mean)
Zuglakang Monastery

Davis, Michael  Northern Missouri State University
Tai Chi
de Bary, William Theodore  
*Columbia University*
Neo-Confucianism

Deibert, Ronald  
*University of Toronto*
Internet Content Filtering

DeMarco, Michael  
*Journal of the Asian Martial Arts*
Martial Arts (Wushu) (co-author: Muchmore, Nicole)

Deng, Kent  
*London School of Economics*
Exploration, Maritime

Ding, Peiyi  
*University of Queensland*
Tourism (co-author: Scott, Noel)

Ditmanson, Peter  
*Colby College*
Hai Rui
Ming Dynasty
Tongdian
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Dobbs, Charles  
*Iowa State University*
Hundred Days Reform
Lin Biao (co-author: Muchmore, Nicole)
Self-Strengthening Movement

Dolan, Thomas  
*Columbus State University*
Artifact Preservation
Civil War (1945–1949)
Korea-China Relations
Ming Maritime Expeditions
Missionary Education
People's Courts
Stilwell, Joseph
World War II in Asia

Dott, Brian R.  
*Whitman College*
Mount Tai (Taishan)

Du Junfei  
*Nanjing University*
Internet Industry

Eldridge, Scott, II  
*Berkshire Publishing Group*
Banking, Modern (co-author: Anderson, Wendell)
Export Controls, U.S.
Intellectual Property Rights
Sports Sponsorship

Ellis, Linden  
*China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson Center*
Aquaculture (co-author: Turner, Jennifer)
Food Safety (co-author: Turner, Jennifer)

Elman, Benjamin  
*Princeton University*
Civil Service Examinations
Eight-Legged Essay

Endicott, Elizabeth  
*Middlebury College*
Yuan Dynasty

Eng, Robert  
*University of Redlands*
Chen Kaige
Fishing Industry
Foot-binding
Machinery and Equipment Industry
Textile and Clothing Industry
Toy Industry

Fan, C. Cindy  
*University of California, Los Angeles*
Jiangsu Province
Migrant Workers
Urbanization

Fan Hong  
*University College Cork*
Olympic Games—History

Field, Andrew  
*University of New South Wales*
Changling Mausoleum
Grand Canal
Great Wall

Field, Stephen  
*Trinity University*
Feng Shui
Five Elements
Qi
Yin and Yang

Forage, Paul  
*Florida Atlantic University*
Junk
Magnetism
Papermaking and Printing
Science, Traditional
Silk

Foret, Philippe  
*University of Nottingham*
Bishu Shanzhuang
Yuanming Yuan, Ruins of

Freeman, Carla  
*Johns Hopkins University*
Africa-China Relations

Fu Jinhe  
*International Network for Bamboo and Rattan*
Bamboo

Gale, Robert  
*University of New South Wales*
Energy Industry

Gaubatz, Piper  
*University of Massachusetts*
Grasslands

Georg, Stefan  
*University of Leiden*
Sino-Tibetan Languages

Gerber, Lydia  
*Washington State University*
Martin, William Alexander Parsons
Ricci, Matteo
Schall von Bell, Johann Adam
Society of Jesus
Gerth, Karl  University of Oxford
Boycotts and Economic Nationalism
Consumerism

Gladney, Dru  Pomona College
Ethnic Relations

Goldin, Paul Rakita  University of Pennsylvania
Warring States Period

Golkin-Kadonaga, Arline  Los Angeles Pierce College
Famine

Grasso, June  Boston University
Chinatowns
Debt, Foreign
Lansing-Ishii Agreement
Potsdam Conference
Shanghai Communique
Sino-American Commercial Treaty
United Nations–China Relations
United States–China Relations

Greene, Megan  University of Kansas
Calligraphy
Hong Kong

Groot, Gerry  University of Adelaide
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

Gullett, Warwick  University of Wollongong
Fishing Industry—Taiwan
Transportation Systems

Gunn, Edward  Cornell University
Literature

Gunn, Geoffrey  Nagasaki University
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Macao Special Administrative Region

Guo Ke  Shanghai International Studies University
Communications, External

Guo Liang  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Internet Use (co-author: Christensen, Karen)

Guttmann, Allen  Amherst College
Sports

Harcourt, Tim  Australian Trade Commission
Australia-China Relations

Harper, Katherine Anne  Loyola Marymount University
Jade

Harris, Lane  University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Baojia
Green Gang
New Life Movement

Harris, Rachel  University of London
Music, Traditional
Twelve Muqam

Hawks, Shelley Drake  Boston University
Mao Zedong, Evaluation of Zhou Enlai

Hayford, Charles  Northwestern University
New Rural Reconstruction Movement
Rural Reconstruction Movement
Yen, Y. C. James

He Wenfa  Communication University of China
Blogs (co-author: Hong, Junhao)
Cyberspace (co-author: Hong, Junhao)

Super Girl (co-author: Hong, Junhao)
Video Games (co-author: Hong, Junhao)

Heberer, Thomas  Gerhard-Mercator University, Duisburg
Cadre System
Corruption
Guanxi
Political Participation
Social Associations

Hegel, Robert  Washington University
Poetry

Hill, Ronald  University of Hong Kong
Guizhou Province

Ho, Wan-li  Emory University
Judaism

Hong, Junhao  State University of New York at Buffalo
Blogs (co-author: He Wenfa)
Cyberspace (co-author: He Wenfa)
Super Girl (co-author: He Wenfa)
Television
Video Games (co-author: He Wenfa)

Horgan, John  Concordia University
Disasters

Houser, Trevor  Visiting Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Energy Policy (co-author: Rosen, Daniel)

Howkins, John  BOP Consulting
Creative Economy (co-author: Chen, Xu)
Hsieh, Ding-hwa Evelyn  
*Truman State University*
Buddhism
Buddhism, Chan
Buddhism, Pureland
Guanyin
Huineng
Xuanzang

Hsu, Cathy  
*Hong Kong School of Hotel and Tourism Management*
Gambling

Hsu Cho-yun  
*University of Pittsburgh*
Environmental History—Ancient

Hu, Xiaobo  
*Clemson University*
Economic System
Special Economic Zones

Huang Dan  
*Fudan University*
Newspaper Development

Huang, Ellen  
*University of California, San Diego*
Celadon
Jingdezhen

Huang He  
*York University*
Enterprise Income Tax (co-author: Li Jinyan)
Taxation and Taxes (co-author: Li Jinyan)

Huang, Shu-Min  
*Academia Sinica*
Chongyang Festival
Mid-Autumn Festival (Zhong Qiu)
New Year (Spring Festival) (co-author: Yuan, Haiwang)
Tiangan Dizhi

Hwa, Lily  
*University of St. Thomas, Minnesota*
Tang Taizong

Hyer, Eric  
*Brigham Young University*
Central Asia—China Relations

Hsia, Ching-Il  
*University of California, Los Angeles*
Mongolia, China, and Russia Relations
Russia-China Relations

Israeli, Raphael  
*University of Haifa*
Boxer Protocol (Xinchou Treaty)
Canton System
Islam

Jay, Jennifer  
*University of Alberta*
An Lushan Rebellion
Eunuchs
Fubing System
Wu Zetian

Ji, Zhaojin  
*Johns Hopkins University*
Banque de l’Indochine
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. (HSBC)
Pawnshops
Piaohao
Qianzhuang
Southern Three and Northern Four Banks
Yokohama Specie Bank

Jia, Wenshan  
*State University of New York, New Paltz*
Hu Jintao (co-author: Lynch, Cassie)

Jiang, Jing  
*Reed College*
Wound Literature

Jiang Yonglin  
*Oklahoma State University*
Qing Dynasty
Tang Dynasty

Jiang, Yu  
*Southern University at New Orleans*
Dong Qichang
Painting—Court
Painting—Flower and Bird
Paleolithic Era

Johnson, Matthew  
*University of California, San Diego*

Jones, William C.  (deceased, formerly of Washington University in St. Louis)
Legal System—History

Kagan, Richard  
*Hamline University, Emeritus*
Human Rights
Nanjing Massacre

Kenley, David  
*Elizabethtown College*
May Fourth Movement
Republican Revolution of 1911–1912

Klein, Thoralf  
*University of Erfurt*
Atheism

Klosterman Kidd, Laura  
*Southern Illinois University, Carbondale*
Clothing, Traditional
Clothing, Traditional—Tibet

Knapp, Keith  
*The Citadel*
Filial Piety
Three Fundamental Bonds and the Five Constant Virtues

Knapp, Ronald  
*State University of New York, New Paltz*
Courtyard Houses (Siheyuan)
Hutong
Monument to the People’s Heroes
Pingyao City
Shikumen
Yangzi (Chang) River Bridge
Zhaozhou Bridge
Kolb, Charles C.  Independent Scholar and National Endowment for the Humanities
Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period
Han Dynasty
Southern and Northern Dynasties
Xia Dynasty
Zheng He

Kowalewski, Michael The Old School, Bhutan
Lhasa
Potala Palace

Kuang, Wenbo Renmin University
Mobile Communications

Kwan Man Bun University of Cincinnati
Fan Xudong
Hou Debang
Tianjin
Zhou Xuexi

Lachman, Charles University of Oregon
Guohua (National-Style Painting)

Laliberté, André University of Ottawa
Buddhism, Four Sacred Sites of Buddhism, Persecution of Buddhist Association of China
Iron Rice Bowl

Larsen, Kirk George Washington University
Zhao Ziyang

Law Yuk-fun Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Blue Shirts Society
Feng Guifen
Five-Anti Campaign
Hu Yaobang
Kang Youwei
Kong Xiangxi
Li Dazhao

Lazich, Michael Buffalo State College
Bridgman, E. C.
Liang Qichao
Zhang Zhidong

Lebold Cohen, Joan Harvard University
Art, Contemporary

LeCompte, Garé (deceased, formerly of Hollins Communications Research Institute)
Acupuncture (co-author: Chen Bao-xing)
Massage (co-author: Chen Bao-xing)
Medicine, Traditional (co-author: Chen Bao-xing)
Moxibustion (co-author: Chen Bao-xing)

Lee, Wei-chin Wake Forest University
Defense Industry

Lei, Xiong Independent scholar, Beijing
Natural Resource Preservation
Soil Erosion
Sustainable Development
Water Resources

Leitich, Keith Independent scholar, Seattle, Washington
Guangzhou (Canton)
Henan Province
Huang (Yellow) River
Yangzi (Chang) River (co-author: Anderson, Wendell)
Zhu De

Leung, Chi Kin California State University, Fresno
Foreign Investment
Foreign Trade

Levine, Mark Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Climate Change—International Cooperation

Levinson, Danny ChinaCSR.com
Corporate Social Responsibility

Levy, Richard Salem State College
Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign
Little Red Book
Lushan Conference
Mao Zedong, Collected Works of

Lewis, James Center for Strategic and International Studies
Military Modernization

Lewis, Steven Rice University
Cosco Group

Li, Cheng Brookings Institute
Leadership—Ethnic Minority
Leadership—Future Scenarios

Li, Chris Wen-Chao San Francisco State University
Chinese, Classical Mandarin

Li, He Merrimack College
Latin America—China Relations

Li Jinyan York University
Enterprise Income Tax (co-author: Huang He)
Taxation and Taxes (co-author: Huang He)

Li, Jonathan Qiang Offerpal Media
Social Networking, Online (co-author: Christensen, Karen)

Li Yong Soochow University
Confucian Temples
Daoist Temples
Mosca, Matthew William  
*Harvard University*
Huai River
Pearl River

Mostern, Ruth  
*University of California, Merced*
Dujiangyan Irrigation System
Water Conservation

Muchmore, Nicole  
*Berkshire Publishing Group*
Tigers
Lin Biao (co-author: Dobbs, Charles)
Martial Arts (Wushu) (co-author: DeMarco, Michael)

Muldoon, James  
*Rutgers University*
Terrorism

Murray, Dian  
*University of Notre Dame*
Heaven and Earth Society

Myers, John  
*Bard College at Simon’s Rock*
Music, Contemporary
Musical Instruments
Pipa

Nappi, Carla  
*Montana State University*
Compendium of Materia Medica
Li Shizhen

Nielsen, Bent  
*University of Copenhagen*
Ami Harvest Festival
Cao Xueqin
Chengdu (co-author: Wendell Anderson)
Chongqing (co-author: Wendell Anderson)
Climate and Vegetation
East China Sea

Olesen, Alexa  
*Associated Press*
Cui Jian

Ooi Giok Ling  
*Nanyang Technological University*
Cantonese (Yue)
Hakka
Lacquerware
Porcelain
Wu
Xiang

Ordoñez, Margaret  
*University of Rhode Island*
Textiles

Osterhammel, Jürgen  
*University of Konstanz*
Trading Patterns, China Seas

Pagani, Catherine  
*University of Alabama*
Cloisonné
Dunhuang Caves
Longmen Grottos
Painting
Peace Reigns over the River
Terracotta Soldiers
Xu Beihong
Yungang Caves
Zhang Daqian

Perdue, Peter  
*Yale University*
Sauma, Rabban

Perrins, Robert  
*Acadia University*
Kangxi, Emperor
Macao—History
Manchu
Manchuria
Nanjing
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

Phillips, Steven  
*Towson University*
Burlingame, Anson
Open Door Policy
Spratly Islands Dispute
Treaty of Wangxia
Versailles Peace Conference
Yalta Agreement
Pike, Tyler  University of Sydney  
Li Shangyin  
Shijing  

Pollpeter, Kevin  Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis  
Space Program  

Polumbaum, Judy  University of Iowa  
Asian Games  
China Daily  
Journalism Reform  
Liu Xiang  
Olympic Games, Beijing  
Southern Weekend  
Xu Haileng  
Yao Ming  

Poon, Cecilia Siu-Wah  Western Washington University  
Snow, Edgar Parks (co-author: Richards, Craig)  

Postigilione, Gerard  University of Hong Kong  
Ethnic Minorities  

Pretes, Michael  University of North Alabama  
Mount Wudang (Wudangshan)  
Panda  
Wulingyuan Scenic Reserve  

Reinhart, Anne  Williams College  
Butterfield & Swire  

Reynolds, Douglas  Georgia State University  
Japan-China Relations  

Richards, Craig  Independent scholar, Bellingham, Washington  
Snow, Edgar Parks (co-author: Poon, Cecilia Siu-Wah)  

Richey, Jeffrey  Berea College  
Ancestor Worship  
Bureau of Religious Affairs  
Dong Zhongshu  

Ridgway, Benjamin  Valparaiso University  
Song Lyrics (Ci)  
Su Shi  
Xin Qiji  

Riley, Don  University of Maryland  
Chinese-American Networking Symposium  

Rioux, Yu Luo  University of Colorado at Boulder  
Guilin  
Huang Shan  
Natural Preserve Zones  
World Heritage Sites  

Ronggard, Jan  University of Nottingham  
Archaeology and Paleontology  
Peking Man  
Sino-Swedish Expedition  

Ropp, Paul  Clark University  
Dream of the Red Chamber  
Ming and Qing Novels  
Zhu Yuanzhang  

Rosen, Daniel  Visiting Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics  
Energy Policy (co-author: Houser, Trevor)  

Ross, Heidi  University of Indiana  
Education System, Contemporary  
Fudan University (co-author: Cen, Yuhao)  
St. John’s University (co-author: Cen, Yuhao)  

Russell, Terence  University of Manitoba  
Needham, Joseph  

Qi Baishi  
Religion, Folk  

Sankey, Margaret  Minnesota State University, Moorhead  
Abacus  
Red Guard Organizations  

Schafer, Elizabeth  Independent scholar, Loachapoka, Alabama  
Hongcun and Xidi  

Schroeder, Carole  Boise State University  
Suzhou  

Scott, Noel  University of Queensland  
Tourism (co-author: Ding, Peiyi)  

Seliger, Bernhard  Hankuk University of Foreign Studies  
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone  

Sellmann, James  University of Guam  
Analects  
Confucian Ethics  
Confucianism  
Confucius  
Dao (the Way)  
Daoism, Philosophy of  
Four Books and Five Classics of Confucianism  
Hundred Schools of Thought  
Laozi  
Mencius  
Mozzi  
Yang Zhu  
Yin–Yang Theory  

Shao Peiren  Zhejiang University  
Magazines (co-author: Anderson, Wendell)  

Shao, Xiaorong  Appalachian State University  
Dazhai
List of Contributors

She Xiaojie  Jinan University
Ding Ling

Shen, Kuaiyi  Ohio University
Wang Yiting
Wu Changshi

Shen Lei  Institute of Geographic Sciences & Natural Resources Research
Energy, Renewable (co-authors: Cheng Shengkui and Xu Zengrang)

Shepherd, Eric Todd  University of South Florida
Qingke

Shieh, Shawn  Marist College
People's Liberation Army
Zhejiang Province

Shih, Chuan-kang  University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Miao
Moso
Tujia

Shu Ping  Nankai University
Canton Fair
Yangzi Delta Economic Region

Sieber, Patricia  Ohio State University
Butterfly Lovers
Peony Pavilion
Tang Xianzu
Yuan Drama

Siever, Bill  Berkshire Publishing Group
Legalist School (co-author: Yu Qiyu)

Silfverberg, Lotta  China-Britain Business Council
China-Britain Business Council

Simon, Scott  University of Ottawa
Taiwan
Taiwan Economic Miracle

Smith, Richard  Rice University
Cartography

Spagnoli, Cathy  Independent scholar, Vashon, Washington
Journey to the West
Storytelling

Stainton, Michael  York University
Indigenous Peoples—Taiwan

Stapleton, Kristin  University of New York, Buffalo
Humor
Sichuan Province

Stein, Gregory  University of Tennessee College of Law
Property Law

Steinhardt, Nancy  University of Pennsylvania
Architecture

Stockman, Norman  British Association for Chinese Studies
British Association for Chinese Studies

Suganuma, Unryu  J. F. Oberlin University
China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty
Historical Geography
Hunan Province
Liu Shaoqi
Qinling Range
Sixteen Kingdoms
Tangshan Earthquake, Great

Sun, Yan  Gettysburg College
Mausoleum of Shi Huang
Mawangdui Han Tomb
Sanxingdui
Yangshao Culture

Tam, King-Fai  The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Yan’an Rectification Campaign

Tan, Chee Beng  Chinese University of Hong Kong
Overseas Chinese

Tan, Tony Xing  University of South Florida
Adoption

Tapp, Nicholas  Australian National University
Hmong

The Editors  Berkshire Publishing Group
American Chamber of Commerce in China
Anhui Province
Australia China Friendship Society
Bank of China
Beijing
British Chamber of Commerce in China
Brookings Institution
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Hopkins-Nanjing Center
Jiuzaigou
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
Needham Research Institute
Poyang, Lake
SARS
Shangri-La
Stock Markets
U.S.-China Business Council
U.S.-China Education Trust
U.S.-China People’s Friendship Association
Zodiac

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Thompson, Drew  Center for Strategic and International Studies
HIV/AIDS

Tian, John  Connecticut College
Agricultural Cooperatives Movement
Household Responsibility System

Tiedemann, R. G.  King's College London
Christianity

Turner, Jennifer  China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson Center
Aquaculture (co-author: Ellis, Linden)
Food Safety (co-author: Ellis, Linden)

Tuttle, Gray  Harvard University
Huanglongsi

Upshur, Jiu-hwa Lo  Eastern Michigan University
Examinations, Imperial
Law, Imperial
Marriage, Imperial
Military, Imperial
Sun Yat-sen

Van Norden, Bryan  Vassar College
Zhu Xi

Vanderven, Elizabeth  Rutgers University, Camden
Shen Congwen

Veeck, Gregory  Western Michigan University
Dalian
Forest Resources
Mineral Resources

Vermeer, Eduard  University of Leiden
Environmental History—Modern

Wan, Pin P.  St. Olaf College
River Elegy (Heshang) (co-author: Bodman, Richard)

Wang Ying  University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Anyang
Bronzes of the Shang Dynasty
Oracle Bones
Yin Ruins (Yinxu)

Weber, Christopher  Carnegie Mellon University
Climate Change—Export Emissions

White, Tyrene  Swarthmore College
One-Child Policy

Wicks, James  University of California, San Diego
Cinema
Ruan Lingyu

Wills, John E., Jr.  University of Southern California
Tribute System
Wokou
Zheng Chenggong

Wilson Trower, Valerie  University of the Arts London
Clothing, Traditional—Hong Kong
Clothing, Traditional—Taiwan

Winter, Frank  National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, Retired
Gunpowder and Rocketry

Woods, Shelton  Boise State University
East Asia, Chinese Influence in Korean War
Southeast Asia–China Relations

Wu, Bin  University of Nottingham
Cunguan

Wu, Fatima  Loyola Marymount University
Liu Gongquan
Mi Fu
Wang Xianzhi
Wang Xizhi
Yan Zhenqing

Wu, Yunji  The University of Melbourne
Xiang Dialects

Xu, Yamin  Le Moyne College
Five-Yuan System
Gu Yanwu
Hanlin Academy (Hanlin Yuan)
Huang Zongxi
Supervisory System, Ancient
Wang Fuzhi

Xu Zengrang  Institute of Geographic Sciences & Natural Resources Research
Energy, Renewable (co-authors: Cheng Shengkui and Xu Zengrang)

Yan, Jean  U.S. Department of Education
Disability
Education, Adult
Education, Compulsory
Education, Special
Project Hope

Yan, Margaret Mian  Indiana University
Hungry Ghost Festival

Young, Nick  China Development Brief
Non-Governmental Organizations
Yow, Yit Seng  Huaren.org  
Naming System  
Word Radicals

Yu, Olivia  University of Texas, San Antonio  
Crimes and Punishments

Yu Qiyu  Independent scholar, Beijing  
Legalist School (co-author: Siever, Bill)

Yu, Shiao-ling  Oregon State University  
Eight Revolutionary Model Dramas  
Hong Shen  
Lu Xun  
Tian Han

Yu, Xuejian  Stonehill College  
China National Radio  
Chinese Central Television  
People's Daily  
Xinhua News Agency

Yuan, Haiwang  Western Kentucky University  
Bianzhong  
Cao Yu  
Chopsticks

Confucian Sites at Qufu  
Dragon Boat Festival  
Duilian  
Erhu  
Fireworks and Firecrackers  
Goldfish  
Guan Hanqing  
Lu Ban  
Mausoleum of Dr. Sun Yat-sen  
May First Labor Festival  
National Day  
New Year (Spring Festival) (co-author: Huang, Shu-Min)

Paper Cutting  
Qingming Festival  
Romance of Three Kingdoms  
Water Margin  
Wine Culture  
Xi'an City Wall  
Yu Boya and Zhong Ziqi

Zader, Amy  University of Colorado at Boulder  
Agriculture  
Agro-geography

Zha, Qiang  York University  
University Education

Zhang, Qiong  Wake Forest University  
Bian Que  
Huagdi Neijing

Zhang, Wenxian  Rollins College  
Baosteel Group  
Chinese Construction Bank  
Shenzhou Space Project

Zhang, Xing Quan  University of Hong Kong  
Development Zones

Zhou Guanqi  Yunnan University  
Bohai Economic Region  
Currency  
Great West Development Plan  
Haier  
Huawei  
Pudong New District  
Transfer Gas From West to East Program

Zhou, Jinghao  Hobart and William Smith Colleges  
Religious Practice, Contemporary  
Religious Practice, Historical

Zhou, Yu  Vassar College  
High Technology Sector

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As I sat down in early March 2009 to write an introduction to the Encyclopedia of China—the first edition of the first major work of its kind to be published in English—the world was facing unprecedented challenges. Around the globe, nations and their citizens were asking how we could rebuild broken economies, preserve evaporating and depleted natural resources, stabilize political upheavals, and protect human rights. Not since World War II had diplomatic relations between nations been so crucial to our common future. In a stroke of synchronicity, it was also in March 2009 that two nations—a relatively young nation that had established its power in modern times, and an ancient nation reemerging and regaining status as a player in international affairs—were celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the “normalization” of their diplomatic relations, as well as meeting to discuss climate change cooperation and strategies for global economic recovery.

The three decades during which friendship had developed between the United States and China (not always in forward motion, and not without tense moments) had been preceded by a more difficult thirty-year period, beginning in 1949 with the founding of the Communist Party–led People’s Republic of China. What lies ahead in the next thirty years? We don’t know. But we do agree—statesmen and citizens, teachers and students—that Americans, Europeans, and Westerners in general urgently need to know more about China. We need to look past our stereotypical (and often uninformed or lingering) perspectives—which have indeed wavered back and forth for the last three hundred years—and see China not as a threat but as a partner in building a better future. With this certainty, Berkshire Publishing Group conceived, produced, and now publishes the five-volume Encyclopedia of China.

About the Berkshire Encyclopedia of China

As the first multi-volume, multi-authored Encyclopedia of China to be published outside China itself, Berkshire’s 800-entry, five-volume set offers authoritative articles from well-known Chinese and Western scholars. We at Berkshire, committed to providing truly global perspectives that will empower twenty-first-century students, compiled the encyclopedia with strict guidelines about balance and objectivity. We felt strongly that the Encyclopedia of China should be an invaluable reference tool for general China studies, but that it be relevant outside the
classroom and for students planning careers in China-related business, communications and technology, and public service. We wanted its design and content to appeal to global citizens as well as to leaders in business and government. Students and professionals who need to improve or expand their knowledge of all things Chinese will find articles on arts, belief systems, business, communications, cuisines, demographics, education, law and politics, leadership, minority groups, natural disasters, natural resources, regional and international relations, social welfare, technology, and the changing roles of women.

Outside these categories we provide broad thematic essays that serve as anchors or touchstones for the work as a whole; on the other hand we recognize the need for short entries about people, events, concepts, and material goods—topics that add nuance to the nature of life in China. There are articles on important organizations and companies, as well as on sports, festivals, and aspects of popular culture. And while the encyclopedia brings readers right up to the present—with 2008 Olympic results, information on blogging, Internet use, human rights, and even updates about events such as the military confrontation in the South China Sea that occurred as we prepared to go to press—the Encyclopedia of China looks to the future with articles on renewable energy and the 2010 World’s Fair in Shanghai.

To comprehend China’s spectacular growth in recent decades—a phenomenon proudly broadcast to the world when Beijing hosted the 2008 Olympic Games—it is essential to understand and appreciate the history and culture of China, one of the world’s great civilizations. Accordingly, the Berkshire Encyclopedia of China offers numerous articles about China’s history, beginning five thousand years ago and even further into the past. We explore China’s place in the broad sweep of human history with a comprehensive article on “China in World History” by William H. McNeill, the eminent scholar who led the editorial board of the Berkshire Encyclopedia of World History, published in 2004, and who is now overseeing work on its second edition. Another long entry, “Confucianism—Revival” by Daniel A. Bell, examines how contemporary Chinese are reconnecting with one of the country’s most important ancient traditions, in a search for new inspiration and a philosophy to guide everyday life. This article also connects Berkshire past to present, as I met the author in Hong Kong in 2002 on one of my first trips to Asia. We had been introduced in the course of another project, the Encyclopedia of Community, my own area of research, published by Sage in 2004. Bell has since moved to mainland China and is the first Western scholar to take a regular post in political theory at a leading Chinese university, Tsinghua. We are delighted to include his work here, as he does represent an important bridge between China and the West, and is creating a path for others, in China and outside it.

Contributing authors come from many scholarly disciplines. They include political scientists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, geographers, historians, scientists, artists, educators, and specialists in other fields. They are based at major U.S., European, and Australian universities, and at specialist research centers including the China Policy Center at the University of Nottingham, the Worldwatch Institute, and the Wilson Center. Thanks to cooperation with and contributions from many Chinese scholars based in China, and Chinese scholars who divide their lives between Western universities and China, the encyclopedia is also the first major work to cover China from the Chinese point of view. In our editing, we have strived to let these perspectives remain clear.

During the three-year process of creating the Berkshire Encyclopedia of China—a project many people thought couldn’t be done—Joseph Needham’s breathtaking series Science and Civilisation in China remained for us a touchstone of sinology itself. It inspired us to present, as Needham did, little-known aspects of Chinese knowledge and innovation, and to go beyond the traditional teaching of Chinese history and literature to look at practical contributions—though in our case, we looked at the full range of human culture and industry.

In the spirit of both scholarship and global cooperation, we encourage readers as well as our current roster of 296 authors, to review the content of this work critically and creatively. We welcome observations, corrections, and additions, and will be adding to this work—which could, quite easily, have been twice the length. We have begun compiling material for the second edition of this encyclopedia, and have started to work on the Berkshire Dictionary of Chinese Biography. Educational, professional, and language-learning publications are also on the planning board. All these Berkshire China titles are being designed with a simple goal: to enable the leaders
of today and the citizens of tomorrow to work together to build a brighter future.

“China just won’t stop happening,” said my daughter Rachel when I complained about how hard it was to bring these five volumes to a conclusion. But when I considered speeding things by reducing the work to only four volumes, my son Tom reminded me—hissing the word sì, which means “four”—that sì sounds like the Chinese word for “death” and is considered bad luck. (It was Tom who realized we could use the colors that represent the five “elements” in Chinese traditional thought to differentiate the volumes of the Encyclopedia of China.) In truth, we have not brought the encyclopedia to conclusion, but we have managed to bring it to press. These five volumes—knowledge polished and pressed—set out much of what we know, and need to know, about China at the beginning of a new phase of human history.

How Berkshire Came to China

The Berkshire Encyclopedia of China evolved from our landmark six-volume Encyclopedia of Modern Asia, begun in 1998 and published to much acclaim in 2002 with Scribners. It was a project of exceptional complexity, inspired by my lifelong curiosity about Asia and much facilitated by my experience in working with international networks of scholars, beginning with the Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and published by Oxford in 1997. During the course of work on the Encyclopedia of Modern Asia I made my first trip to China, landing in Beijing in April 2001, the week China was holding the U.S. Navy surveillance plane, the EP-3, which had collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet and then crash-landed on Hainan Island. I was immediately engrossed by China. I could feel the energy and determination of the whole population. I relished the conviviality and humor of the people I met, and the sense of possibility I felt in the air along with an intense focus on what lay ahead—it was all irresistible. As an environmental author, two of whose books have been translated into Chinese, I was acutely aware of the influence, for good or ill, that China would have on my own and my children’s future.

But I knew nothing, really, about China. I decided that I needed to learn, and that I had to find ways to help other Westerners, young and old, learn about China. I hoped that with more knowledge, more ways to understand and connect, they too would feel this excitement—and a sense of shared possibility rather than fear. Having stayed in touch with many of our Encyclopedia of Modern Asia authors, it was fortuitous that the China editor for that project, Linsun Cheng of the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, agreed to join this new effort. He turned to a variety of Chinese reference sources in putting together the original article list, which ranged widely across all periods and knowledge domains, and included many interesting aspects of traditional Chinese culture, such as towpaths and ancient libraries. Although we had to drop some of those topics because of space constraints and lack of recent research, we expect to weave them into online and future print editions as our scholarly network in China continues to grow.

“A GREAT CLOUD OF WITNESSES”

This Encyclopedia of China is not solely the creation of those whose names you see on its pages. It has been inspired and spurred by many others: “a great cloud of witnesses.” Trying to explain how this publication fits into the history of Western study of China, that phrase popped into my Western-literature-trained mind. It comes from the New Testament of the Bible, Letter to the Hebrews (12:1), and is addressed as a rallying cry to a group of converts thought to be in danger of reverting to Judaism: “Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses, let us throw off everything that hinders and... so easily entangles and let us run with perseverance the race marked out for us.” The author meant to reassure his readers that they were not alone; that even those who were not present with them constituted part of their community. The imagery, as translated from the Greek, suggests an athletic contest in a great amphitheater (“run with perseverance”). Many of those involved in the Encyclopedia of China are convinced that through scholarly cooperation—which, like running a race, can be as arduous as it is exhilarating—we can bridge differences, create new understanding, and build a better world and future for children in China, Western nations, and around the world.

My sense that there has been “a great cloud of witnesses” involved in this endeavor extends beyond that theme. There were scholars who did not say “yes” when invited to contribute to this encyclopedia, and some made
it plain that they did not believe that this work could be done. I am deeply grateful to those who joined our venture, but I am also grateful to those who said “no.” Their skepticism goaded me, and sometimes brought a laugh and renewed enthusiasm. One of my colleagues passed on the remark of a Chinese scholar who said that he hadn’t thought such a project was possible, “But somebody has the nerve to try. Best wishes to them.”

Encouragement came as word of the project spread (and as Berkshire began to publish other, smaller China-related books and a monthly newsletter, *Guanxi: The China Letter*). An e-mail from an eminent historian I kept before me during some of the most challenging months read, “Yours is a worthy cause. The world does need to know more about China. The Chinese are not all that good about telling foreigners about themselves, so an outside publisher is the best thing for them. All the best. Wang Gungwu.”

And a sense of cooperation was evident at the end, too, coming from some of China’s leading young social networking entrepreneurs. They worked with us to decide on the correct translation for the title and subtitle, *Berkshire Encyclopedia of China: Modern and Historic Views of the World’s Newest and Oldest Global Power* 宝库山中华全书: 跨越历史和现代, 审视最新和最古老的世界大国, and also helped to rename Berkshire itself (in Chinese) as 宝库山 (bāo kù shān), which means something like Treasure Mountain Reference Books. There were a dozen people, most of them in China, involved in this translation, including the volunteers at a company that translates English-language blogs into Chinese. In the course of the discussion, our friend Isaac Mao (who had recently visited us in Great Barrington, a small town nestled in the Berkshire Hills of western Massachusetts, and thus added the “mountain” to our company name) wrote that this was a great example of “crow wisdom.” He meant to type “crow,” but our American editor Mary Bagg thought at first that he was alluding to a Native American tradition—which wouldn’t have been surprising, given the rich diversity of our international exchanges.

**Special Challenges**

Publishing any multi-volume work poses a number of challenges, both logistical and theoretical/conceptual. For a “Western” publisher attempting a work on an “Eastern” subject, the difficulties take on a cross-cultural dimension, and require special attention at all levels of the process, from providing author guidelines that will be clear to scholars in many countries who work in diverse fields such as archeology, economics, politics, and zoology, to developing new editing manuals that included Chinese names, dates, and terms. Even something as straightforward and rule-bound as end-of-article citations proved complex, as we debated how to style Asian and Western names, dealt with transliterations and translations of article titles, and wrestled with differing ideas about what should be cited. Our aim has been to provide varied avenues for further reading, in English, Chinese, and a few other languages as well.

**Sensitivities**

Anyone who studies China knows that there are political and cultural sensitivities, and differences of viewpoint, to be taken into account. Our goal has been to present information about these viewpoints, and not to take sides, in the conviction that clear, accessible presentation will lead to greater understanding. Achieving clarity is not easy. Scholars can be influenced, sometimes unconsciously, by the prevailing philosophies within their disciplines—and all of us are culture bound. But a publisher can question assumptions and ask for clarification on points of fact or interpretation, an interaction that is necessary, intellectually fruitful, and often fascinating.

**Language Matters**

This is an English-language encyclopedia, but realizing that learning Chinese is part of learning about China, we’ve included many articles on language and linguistics, given every article an English and a Chinese title, and, whenever Chinese authors have provided it, included Chinese within the articles themselves. This is useful to Chinese readers and to students of Chinese, and will help the rest of us develop a greater comfort level with Chinese characters—the pictograms made by combining elements called “word radicals” (and a subject to which we devote an entire illustrated article)—and with transliteration, the presentation of the foreign word in a phonetic construction. (For our Chinese transliterations we
use pinyin, adopted after 1949, as opposed to the earlier Wade-Giles version.) This is a tricky thing, because transliterations are identical in all Western languages that use the Arabic alphabet. An Italian or Dane, for instance, has to interpret the sound of Beijing from the same string of letters as an English speaker.

But learning a language, of course, involves more than just recognizing and pronouncing words—and the way language is handled in a translated article shapes the content to some degree. Because many of our authors wrote originally in Chinese and, as is customary in Chinese universities, had their graduate students convert the articles into English, we have undoubtedly “lost in translation” certain nuances of meaning and expression. On the other hand, our American editors occasionally had to “translate” an English word in the submitted article—“cleavage,” for instance, when in context the author really intended “rift” or “split”—into an idiom more natural to the English-speaking ear. Knowing that even “literal” translation can be somewhat subjective, especially when writing about politically-charged topics, we also considered how Chinese readers might interpret our presentation of their native language. As Haiwang Yuan, one of our associate editors, put it: “As an encyclopedia, we are not to take a stand.” With that in mind he provided two translations for the article “Tibetan Uprising of 1959”: qıˇy ì $start_right_shift_1$ , meaning “uprising” from the exiled Tibetans’ point of view, and pànluàn 叛乱, or “insurgence,” as the Chinese would phrase it.

**DYNASTIES AND DATING DILEMMAS**

Readers often consider encyclopedias to be the ultimate authorities for defining dates throughout history—for everything from the three major eras of human development to China’s shortest dynasty. Exactitude is important, but it is often impossible. With ancient periods there are different calendars and ways of measuring time to consider, and the different experts encyclopedia editors themselves consult sometimes disagree. Sometimes events evolve rather than simply occur.

Nevertheless, to provide as much consistency as possible, we established an “Authority List” of dates. Many of our authors were agreeable to slight adjustments if their dates differed from ours. Others were helpful in revising their articles to make dating complexities, and inconsistencies that occur between Chinese and Western sources, clear to the lay reader. Charles C. Kolb provided the following explanation: “The highly complex period of the Southern and Northern dynasties has engendered lively scholarly debate about official and unofficial and regional/local dynasties whose names appear in the Chinese chronologies but are not always recognized as valid by Western scholars . . . [and even] China scholars acknowledge that there is disagreement on the year dates for this era. The dynastic subgroups referred to in this article may be best characterized as unofficial local dynastic units whose names appear in unofficial or altered official histories.”

Our custom of providing dates in parentheses in the text (for dynasties, political movements, and wars, for instance, as well as reign and life dates) puts events into historical context—as in “Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).” On occasion we needed to make decisions about dating that would allow us to be concise and appear consistent when events or governments overlapped. An example from the modern era involves dates for the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and Republican China (1912–1949). Although this might seem straightforward to the general reader we have been diligent, when these periods get more than a referential mention, to explain that while the Republic of China was founded in the last days of 1911, the Qing emperor refused to abdicate until February 1912. In a similar circumstance, if an author made a reference to China’s “opening” in 1978, we suggested amending the date to 1978–1979 to reflect that opening was a process involving lots of political “phasing in and outs” rather than a dramatic about face.

Names of events can pose dilemmas as well. The War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945), for example, is how the Chinese (and the Encyclopedia of China) refer to what the Western world calls the Second Sino-Japanese War. And although the Chinese were understandably focused first on Japan as their “personal” threat in those years, that war was eventually fought in the context of World War II in the Pacific. We’ve taken care to present these kinds of nuances so that our readers will have the benefit of several perspectives.

Another phenomenon that perplexed us was directional usage. Chinese people will often refer to a place,
such as Guizhou, as being in the southwest or to Shanghai as a southern city, where to a Westerner looking at China’s national borders it seems that Guizhou should be south-central China and Shanghai on the mid-east coast. The Chinese perspective, we learned, is not a geographical designation but one of population, thus Hebei and Hunan provinces, geographically mid-east, are considered central China. In our province and city articles, however, we have clung to the Western habit of orienting a place by its location on the map, and have provided a number of them throughout the encyclopedia as visual aids.

**Eight Encyclopedia of China Features**

1. Succinct, accessibly written (and many illustrated) articles, ranging from 500 to over 6,000 words, begin with a short summary or abstract and are arranged alphabetically in five volumes.

2. Articles fall into eight major categories (eight for good luck—it is no coincidence that the 2008 Olympics began on the eighth day of the eighth month, at 8:08 p.m.), with biographical entries a subcategory wherever relevant: Arts and Culture; Geography and Environment; Governance; Language and Learning; Organizations with a China Focus; Science, Technology, and Medicine; Society and Social Welfare; Values and Worldview.

3. Each article begins on its own page so it can be copied or printed for individual or classroom use. Page margins make it easy to copy articles on U.S. letter-size and international A4 paper. (Up to ten copies of three articles for use in a single course or classroom can be made at no charge—for further copies, please make payments via Copyright Clearance Center, www.copyright.com)

4. Article titles appear in English, Chinese characters, and a pinyin transliteration with tone marks, and Chinese characters and transliterations are used throughout articles.

5. Each article ends with a “Further Reading” section, provided by the author, which includes additional sources for research in (where appropriate) books; journals, newspapers, and magazines (in print or online versions); and websites.

6. Over 1,200 unique photographs, many with captions either adapted from the text or drawn from other sources to provide additional insight, enhance the visual appeal.

7. Maps, timelines, tables, and primary-source sidebars provide context (both historical and modern) and encourage more specific study; dozens of traditional proverbs reflect Chinese wisdom and (often) humor.

8. The index uses volume as well as page numbers for convenience, and includes pinyin (transliteration of Chinese characters) article titles and Chinese terms, too.

**Acknowledgements**

The idea of *guanxi*, loosely translated as “relationships” or “connections,” is one that intrigued me long before beginning work on the *Encyclopedia of China*, but its power and complexity became clear as time passed. We needed our editors’ and authors’ networks, and we found that our own networks expanded—and that people who had worked with us on other publications, on World History, Community, Leadership, and even Religion & Society, were able to help. There were serendipitous introductions to people that made certain aspects of this project possible, and even better than we’d dreamed. One was with Joan Lebold Cohen, whose photograph collection and passion for all aspects of Chinese life and society have transformed this work visually; we devote a page to her contributions separately.

Being introduced to Haiwang Yuan of Western Kentucky University was another event of great importance. Haiwang’s knowledge of China and his insight into the nuances of expressing Chinese concepts, as well as his cheerful willingness to answer questions at evenings and on weekends, right up until the final moment, have been invaluable. Another breakthrough came when Gregory Veeck, a geographer at the University of Western Michigan, suggested I call him if I needed some help finding authors. This proved a breakthrough with our geography and environment coverage, and Greg’s understanding of just how complicated the project was gave us a crucial psychological boost, too.

Many people gave us essential help at the last minute, and while I mention only two of them here as examples, there are others who also have our warm thanks. A long-
time Berkshire author, Winberg CHAI, stepped in to expand our coverage of Taiwan with several additional articles and the extensive updating needed after the 2008 presidential election, which has led to considerable reduction of tensions and increased economic cooperation. And Tony TAN provided an excellent article on “Adoption” that provides a comprehensive look at an important way in which people throughout the United States have direct personal connection with China.

As mentioned earlier, we are indebted to Isaac MAO, LEI Zhang (founder of Yeeyan.com), and Haiwang YUAN for renaming the encyclopedia. (The family names of all our contributors and biographical subjects are in capital letters to reflect that although in Chinese tradition the family name comes first, some Chinese have chosen to follow the Western treatment, family name last, whether or not they have Western given names.) An important change was the switch to 奄 from 幼稚, for the word China. Our advisers told us that this is acceptable by both Chinese on the mainland and Taiwan, as well as throughout the world, and that奄 better suggests the flavor of our coverage and the full span of the 5,000 or so years of Chinese history.

Some people who did not contribute articles gave important advice. Kenneth Lieberthal was particularly helpful on environmental topics, and we had a lengthy exchange with Harry Harding about how and whether to cover the concept of “Greater China.” Both provided ideas for the second edition. Our long-time friend Lester Brown, president of the Earth Policy Institute and author of Who Will Feed China?, helped us plan environmental coverage, as did Jennifer Turner and her colleagues from the China Environment Forum at the Wilson Center, who were particularly attuned to cutting-edge topics such as food safety. We are also delighted to publish the work of energy experts Mark Levine, Trevor Houser, and Christopher Webber.

Two experts on education in China whom we’ve worked with before, Ruth Hayhoe of the University of Toronto and Heidi Ross of Indiana University, came through in a big way, ensuring that our coverage of education of all types—from special education to university education—was extensive, something we considered of great importance because education is so highly valued in Chinese culture and has major implications for China’s future.

In addition, Judy Polumbaum of the University of Iowa and June Grasso of Boston University helped with final checks of our coverage. Judy helped with both modern media and historical figures, modern publications, and provided considerable encouragement during the process.

Human rights are probably the most problematic area for many people in understanding China. The subject got huge amounts of Western media attention during the period we were working on the Encyclopedia of China because of the riots in Tibet, the Olympic torch relay, and the Beijing Games in general. Western reactions led to a nationalistic backlash in Chinese and amongst overseas Chinese, and we expect to be doing more to help build awareness and understanding about this subject. Our coverage provides valuable historical perspective, and we have had the advice of a number of experts, including Stephen Angle, Minky Worden, and Sharon Hom.

An encyclopedia derives from human networks in existence but creates them as well, and these webs stretch round the world. When I wrote to Chatham House about a China program taking place during the days when I would be in London, a welcome came back from the program director with word that his articles for the Encyclopedia of China were nearly finished. This fortuitous meeting with Kerry Brown has already led to the launch of another reference project, the Berkshire Dictionary of Chinese Biography (2010).

One of the best established networks in the field is that of the National Committee for United States–China Relations, and we have benefited from the guidance of its current leadership, Stephen Orlins and Jan Berris, and are grateful for permission to include many photographs from its extensive collection. Other organizations took the trouble to dig into old files for historical photographs, too, and many authors helped us locate the fascinating visual material seen here.

Before mentioning Berkshire’s small in-house staff, I must acknowledge our reliance on several professionals—Peggy Hollway, Martin Lubin, Steve Tiano, and Brad Walrod—who have been with us since our first independent imprint began, just over four years ago, and have become adept in handling Chinese characters, transliterations, and tone marks, and who take care not only with the design and layout but who sometimes send e-mails in the middle of the night to point out editing errors. (We like to think they just cannot resist reading the articles.)
Our copyeditors deserve recognition for their adaptability to and enthusiastic engagement in the plethora of new rules and standards involved in publishing a huge work about China, and for research contributions, too, as they worked to ensure that coverage would be accurate, up-to-date, and easy to understand.

Editor Mary Bagg stepped into a new role when I asked her if she could “pre-proof” the entire encyclopedia before composition. This is an extraordinary thing to take on. In general, large works are divided up between a group of editors and proofreaders. See, for instance, the entry “Yongle Dadian (Great Compendium of the Yongle Reign).” This 11,095-volume work, with 22,877 chapters and a sixty-chapter-long table of contents, was put together by a staff of compilers, editors, and scribes during a five-year period and completed in 1408. In an e-mail sent to project coordinator Bill Siever during the final push before publication, Mary wrote: “Check this out. The numbers have put our task into perspective.” The consistency between articles and graceful phrasing of even articles on technical, data-heavy topics are the result of her devoting several months to meticulous review, and review, of every article.

There have been quite a number of Berkshire staffers involved in the Encyclopedia of China during its three years’ development, and all contributed in different ways. Those who have been with the project during its final stressful months, none by education or background China specialists, deserve special mention here. Bill Siever landed in the Berkshires and at Berkshire Publishing in the summer of 2008 and was immediately plunged into China—an immersion that proved his mettle in a multitude of ways. It was Bill who would arrive at the office at 4 or 5 a.m. on snowy winter mornings, and who not only had to learn about style sheets and authority lists but pinyin and Wade-Giles. He handled considerable pressure from all directions with an aplomb that I could only marvel at, and be grateful for.

Tom Cotton Christensen has been fully immersed in the encyclopedia since graduating from Grinnell College in December 2007, but in a sense he and his sister Rachel grew up with this project, having first visited China in 2001 on a trip our family took during work on the Encyclopedia of Modern Asia. He then learned Chinese and has had several long stays in Shanghai and Beijing, as well as a couple of shorter jaunts. While he sometimes thinks that his mother set him on this China path, I often wonder if his interest in China and adeptness at speaking Chinese ignited my interest in making the Encyclopedia of China a primary publishing focus for Berkshire.

Anna Myers came to us as a graphic design intern after earning an MFA. Her sensitivity to Chinese motifs—she is half Chinese-American—and her ability to transform a variety of photos, illustrations, and design elements into cohesive themes, made her the perfect person to help shape the visual content of these volumes. Anna is the daughter of one of our contributors on Chinese music, John Myers, who teaches at the nearby Bard College at Simon’s Rock, where Anna and Tom were classmates. Ashley Winseck, another of Tom’s schoolmates (this time from Undermountain Elementary in Sheffield) proved an able editorial assistant, dealing earlier on with authors’ responses to queries and later gathering extracts (and inspiring ideas) for the sidebars to our articles.

Synchronicity, as I mentioned at the beginning, has characterized this project. Bill, Tom, and Ashley were all born in a year of the Ox, the Encyclopedia of China is being first published in 2009, another year of the Ox, and the People’s Republic of China, founded in 1949, also had its beginning in a year of the Ox. This year has already been an important one in global history, with unprecedented economic challenges and evolving new relationships amongst the world’s great nations. The PRC’s sixtieth anniversary in October 2009 will be yet another chance to take stock of China’s growing importance on the world stage.

Finally, my thanks to all those who have made this publication possible need to include the caveat that errors remaining are my responsibility—and now the responsibility of our readers, too, as we trust that everyone who uses this work will see that a project of this scale and importance needs their perceptions and knowledge. We welcome information—research results, reports, book recommendations, and of course offers to contribute further articles on the many topics we have not had space to include in this first edition of the Berkshire Encyclopedia of China.

Karen CHRISTENSEN 沈凯伦
Great Barrington, Massachusetts
Meeting Joan Lebold Cohen, an art historian who specializes in Chinese art and film, was a stroke of good fortune that has, as readers will see, immeasurably enriched the Berkshire Encyclopedia of China. Many of the photographs on these pages were taken by Joan beginning in 1972, soon after the momentous visit by Richard Nixon to China, when she and her husband Jerome Alan Cohen, an eminent expert on Chinese law, began extensive travels throughout the country. From those first days Joan recorded all she could with her camera—while exploring the landscape, touring factories or agricultural communes, wandering through markets, or attending official meetings. Joan documented the China she saw—which was already beginning a period of rapid change—from sophisticated Shanghai to the vast but sparsely populated terrain of Xinjiang.

As a student of China history and art—and later as a lecturer and teacher—Joan developed an astute sense of how the real and often rugged world she was experiencing connected to China’s past. She shot scenes of the mountains, from which mist rose when the early morning rain stopped, that evoke the work of Chinese master-painters through the ages. She could transform a mundane image into a work of exquisite beauty: In Rice Seedlings, a close-up of a water-logged paddy, she took advantage of shimmering, reflected light to conjure a painterly tradition akin to Monet and his water lilies. But Joan was just as likely to be captivated by the people she observed, met, and befriended in China. A photo of weary tourists huddling on a bench near the Forbidden City, for instance, serves as both a haunting group portrait and a study of individual isolation. Myriad candid photographs—of children and adults alike—show Joan’s ability to engage shy but impish smiles.

Joan and Jerome began to collect the work of Chinese artists in the early 1970s; they witnessed both the excessive restrictions of the late-Mao period and the gradually increasing freedom artists achieved during the post–Cultural Revolution years from 1979 to 1981. The Cohens recently gave their collection to the art museum at Smith College, Joan’s alma mater. Post-Mao Dreaming: Chinese Contemporary Art, the exhibit that celebrates the Cohen collection and other recent additions to the museum, provides a window into the era when Chinese artists, emerging from the constraints of thirty years of Maoist Communism (1949–1979), began to reclaim their individuality.

Over the years Joan has written and provided the photographs for an impressive list of books. The New Chinese Painting, 1949–1986 introduced recent generations
of Chinese artists to the West; other titles include Yunnan School: A Renaissance in Chinese Painting; Angkor, Monuments of the God-Kings; and Buddha. She is co-author with her husband of China Today and Her Ancient Treasures (3rd edition, 1986). Joan served as curator for four exhibitions of contemporary Chinese art, as well as for the photographic exhibition New York: The City and Its People, which was shown in Beijing. Her photographs have been widely exhibited and published and are represented in public and private collections in the United States and Asia. She lectured at Tufts University/School of the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston for twenty-two years and is currently a research fellow at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies, an associate of the Columbia University Modern China Seminar, and a frequent contributor to ArtZineChina.com.

We at Berkshire are especially grateful to feature Joan Lebold Cohen’s work as an integral part of ours, especially because we believe, as did the sixteenth-century author Gaspar da Cruz, of the Portuguese Dominican Mission in Asia, that, “China is much more than it sounds, and the sight must be seen and not heard, because hearing it is nothing in comparison with seeing it.” (The quotation comes from the first Western book published about China, Tractado em que so cõtam muito por esteso as cousas da China [Treatise in which is told many things about China], published in 1569.)

More information (and a virtual gallery of Joan’s photographs) is available at www.joanleboldcohen.com
Abacus

Suàn pán 算盘

Considered to be the first computer, the abacus has been used since ancient times by a number of civilizations for basic arithmetical calculations. It is still used as a reliable reckoner (and one that does not require electricity or batteries) by merchants and businesspeople in parts of Asia and Africa.

The abacus, or counting plate (suan pan), is a manual computing device used since ancient times in China as well as in a number of ancient civilizations. The Latin word *abacus* has its roots in the Greek word *abax*, meaning slab, which itself might have originated in the Semitic term for sand. In its early Greek and Latin forms the abacus was said to be a flat surface covered with sand in which marks were made with a stylus and pebbles.

The Chinese abacus as we know it today evolved to become a frame holding thirteen vertical wires with seven beads on each wire. A horizontal divider separates the top two beads from the bottom five, sometimes referred to as the heaven and the earth beads. The beads served as markers representing quantity, and the beads’ position on the vertical wires represented value.

A skilled abacus user performs addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division quickly and easily, without having to depend on electricity to produce a readout; the “readout” itself cannot be lost or erased except manually.

Because of the traditional Chinese use of 16 as an important standard of measure, the Chinese abacus is particularly useful for calculations using a base number system of 2 and 16.

Chinese sources document wide use of abaci by 190 ce, with popularization during the Song dynasty (960–1279) and printed instructions for their use appearing in the 1300s during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). By the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Chinese abacus had taken on its modern form and had become an integral part of business and financial accounting. This basic counting machine spread by the 1600s to Japan and then to eastern Russia, with small modifications in the number of beads above and below the divider.

Among storekeepers and small businesses in China, the abacus remained a standard piece of office equipment.

The heaven and earth design of the abacus has remained unchanged for centuries.
An abacus sits on the countertop in a neighborhood grocery store. Small shops in China, like this one in the basement of an apartment block in the Eastern District of Beijing, still use the abacus to add sums. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

until the 1980s. A good-quality abacus is generally about 2 feet wide by 1 foot tall and made of sturdy brass with hardwood beads.

Margaret SANKEY

Further Reading


Academia Sinica is the leading academic institution of Taiwan and plays a major role in the field of Chinese studies. Its graduate program recruits students for its eleven PhD programs.

Academia Sinica, founded in Nanjing in 1928, is the most prominent academic institution in Taiwan (Republic of China). Although it is affiliated directly with the Presidential Office, Academia Sinica, located in the capital city, Taipei, enjoys independence in formulating its own research agenda. Its major tasks are to conduct academic research in sciences, humanities, and social sciences, as well as to provide guidance, coordination, and incentives to raise academic standards in Taiwan. In 2004 Academia Sinica established the Taiwan International Graduate Program to train scholars; it recruits five to ten graduate students every year for each of its eleven PhD programs.

Academia Sinica has made great progress in recent years. An increasing number of research papers written by its faculty members, which numbered 1,150 in 2001, are appearing in international journals. Some journals, published by Academia Sinica itself, such as Zoological Studies and Statistical Sinica, have received international recognition. Academia Sinica plays a major role in the field of Chinese studies. For example, the archaeological findings by researchers at the Institute of History and Philology have, in combination with written documents, led to a virtual rewriting of ancient Chinese history, pushing back the span of Chinese history by many centuries.

The president of Academia Sinica is Dr. Yuan-tseh Lee, a 1986 Nobel laureate in chemistry. The convocation (a ceremonial assembly of members of a college) consists of 199 members (academicians), including five ethnic Chinese Nobel laureates.

CHANG Jui-te

Further Reading
Acrobatics

Chinese acrobatics, called “variety art” (zaji) in Chinese, is one of the most widely viewed types of Chinese cultural performance. The acrobatic acts seen today are packaged for global consumption and are similar to the Western circus, but many of the acts have traditional roots and a long history unique to China.

The precise origin of acrobatics (zaji) in China is unknown, but historical records and ancient relics, such as relief carvings, show that acrobatics achieved imperial recognition no later than the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). In that era of constant warfare acrobatics that emphasized strength and agility developed in conjunction with the ruler’s encouragement of developing exceptional battle skills. Other acrobatic acts, such as walking on stilts and juggling, functioned as entertainment at village harvest celebrations. Other possible origins of acrobatics include shamanistic ritual, martial arts, and theater.

During the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) acrobatics that combined theatrical roles and athletic feats, often involving wrestling between men or with animals, was performed for the imperial court. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) acrobatics was an integral part of the “Hundred Entertainments,” a type of variety show that also included music, dance, martial arts, and magic.

Early Acts

The scholar and scientist Zhang Heng (78–139 CE) described in his “Ode to the Western Capital” an acrobatic theme show that was performed in the royal palace.
acts included balancing on a pole, walking on a rope, jumping through hoops, performing handstands, and performing the conjuring act “turning a fish into a dragon.” These acts are still performed today, although they have been modified for modern audiences.

Stone engravings that date back to the Han dynasty illustrate numerous types of acrobatic acts that showcased strength and agility, including juggling, handstands, and rope walking, and feats that involved poles, balls, barrels, carriages, and galloping horses. One relief shows an acrobat balancing on seven discs as three acrobats hang upside-down from a cross that is balanced on his head.

Due to the patronage of Han emperors, acrobatics was integrated into large-scale and extravagant performances, a tradition that lasted for years. The Silk Roads promoted cultural exchange with Persia (Iran) and the Roman Empire. Acrobatic shows were shown to foreign dignitaries and guests visiting China, and also performed for the Han court. In 108 BCE Emperor Wu Di hosted a royal show for visiting dignitaries, and a performer sent by the king of Parthia also performed for the emperor.

Acrobatic shows continued to be performed for the imperial court during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). Certain acts flourished, including acrobatic acts on horses, animal training, and pole climbing, in which an acrobat balances a pole on which many more acrobats are balanced. A poem written by Bai Juyi (772–846 CE) and a mural in the Dunhuang grottoes illustrate these performances.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279) acrobatic shows left the palace and entered the markets. Acrobatics was performed in town markets along with other types of performances, such as singing, storytelling, and drama. Juggling, in particular, flourished. Itinerant performers and professional acrobatics troupes and training schools also developed during this time.

The status of acrobatics decreased drastically during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1912). Acrobatics became a performance art that was learned almost entirely through apprenticeship or that was passed down as a family business through the generations. Family troupes performed at markets or made their living by touring fairs and performing at public theaters. Despite the dedication needed to succeed as an acrobat, people

Juggling a fiery baton is one of the Kaifeng Acrobatic Troupe’s most spectacular acts. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
who became acrobats, along with prostitutes and thieves, were classified as belonging to one of the nine unsavory professions.

In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Chinese acrobatics began gaining greater admiration from the West. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 the Chinese government paid more attention to acrobatics as a performance art and founded the China national Acrobatic Troupe in 1957.

Especially since the 1980s acrobatics have come to be viewed as representative of Chinese culture for people all over the world to admire. In October 1981 the China Acrobatic Arts Association was established. Formal training at academies has developed, and students begin their training at an early age. In an annual competition for the academies, acrobats representing troupes from all over China compete for medals. China now has over 120 acrobatic troupes and an estimated twelve thousand acrobats.

Road Show

Acrobatics has played an important role in cultural exchanges between China and other nations. In the past thirty-five years Chinese acrobatic troupes have toured more than one hundred countries throughout the world. Since the 1990s acrobatics has become packaged as a complete theme show, with greater attention to choreography, music, costumes, lighting, and special effects. The troupe Beijing Acrobats debuted overseas in 1986, and the Chinese State Circus began touring Europe in 1992. In addition to acrobatics, the shows often include performances of kung fu, Beijing opera, and variations on the traditional dragon dance and lion dance. Chinese acrobatics is now featured in Las Vegas shows and Hollywood films.

In its emphasis on strength, balance, and agility, Chinese acrobatics is similar to its Western counterpart. In general, focus is placed on the head, waist, and legs. However, the conceptual basis, training techniques, and acrobatic practice are also influenced by China’s tradition of martial arts. Acrobats strive to appear calm and steady on the tightrope and to maintain balance between the light and heavy in feet-balancing acts. Another unique characteristic is the use of farming tools or household items as props, seen in the commonly performed acts of balancing vats on the head, twirling cups or saucers, and diving through hoops, as derived from the grain sieves used by farmers. Balancing acts with tables, chairs, and cycles are relatively new. Many acts are also tied to Chinese folk practices, such as the performance of the Chinese yo-yo, or diabolo. Contortion, in which the human body is dramatically flexed, is not unique to China but is a featured act in most Chinese acrobatic shows.

Jonathan NOBLE

Further Reading


Acupuncture ▶
Acupuncture

Acupuncture is an ancient Chinese medical treatment that involves inserting needles at specific points in the body to release blocked qi (life energy), which results in healing. The practice is used today in China (as well as in the West) to treat diseases in nearly every branch of medicine, often in conjunction with the burning of medicinal substances and herbs.

The ancient medical treatment called acupuncture, which uses very fine needles inserted at specific points along the body to heal ailments and provide relief from pain, is still a viable part of traditional Chinese medicine and has gained popularity in Western medicine as well. The *Huángdì Neǐjīng* (Canon of Medicine), compiled between 475 BCE and 23 CE, is the oldest extant medical book that mentions acupuncture. One of its components, the *Líng Shū* (Canon of Acupuncture), describes nine instruments, some of which are still used. Techniques for making bamboo needles and for casting bronze needles for use in acupuncture developed during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). Acupuncture developed widely in China during the Song dynasty (960–1279), the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234), and the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). However, the treatment was banned for general use by decree during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) because it was perceived as being suitable for application only to the emperor.

A medical worker at a neighborhood clinic, located in the basement of an apartment block in the Eastern District of Beijing. Behind him are the charts that guide his application of acupuncture for the treatment of various ailments. PHOTO AND CAPTION BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

Despite its being banned, acupuncture continued to flourish in general use. In the United States, although it...
had been popular in the Chinese-American community for more than one hundred years, non-Chinese Americans became more aware of acupuncture after President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China.

An understanding of acupuncture requires an some knowledge of the concepts of channels and collaterals. In Chinese medicine channels are the main trunks that run lengthwise through the body, and collaterals are their connecting branches. Together they connect the superficial, interior, upper, and lower parts of the body. Qi (life energy) courses through the channels. The twelve regular channels include the three yin channels of each foot and hand and the three yang channels of each foot and hand. Yin and yang are the basic, complementary principles of which all phenomena partake. For example, introversion, wetness, and cold are yin characteristics. Extroversion, dryness, and heat are yang characteristics. The eight extra channels are du, ren, chong, dai, yinwei, yangwei, yinqiao, and yangqiao.

Acupuncture points (or acupoints) are distributed along the channels and collaterals; 361 channel points and 231 common points are named in Chinese and also are named using the Roman alphabetical and Western numerical systems. For example, the often-used acupoint zusanli, which is located along the channel connecting the stomach to the foot, is internationally named “S-36.” When a practitioner inserts acupuncture needles at the points, their stimulation releases blocked qi, which in turn results in healing.

Acupuncture is used to treat diseases in nearly every branch of medicine in China, whether it is cardiology or obstetrics, dentistry, or infectious diseases. Acupuncture techniques also have embraced such new technologies as laser and electrical stimulation. In Chinese hospitals
where acupuncture is performed, the acupuncture section is called the “department of acupuncture and moxibustion” (moxibustion is the burning of medicinal substances, usually herbs, on the acupoints for therapeutic effect). Although the primary treatment in the department is acupuncture, moxibustion also plays an important role.

Even as Western medicine becomes more common in China in the twenty-first century, the practice of acupuncture continues, especially in hospitals that rely on traditional medicine and those that combine traditional and Western techniques.

CHEN Bao-xing and Garé LeCOMPTE

Further Reading


Choose the right medicine for each symptom.

对症下药

Dui zhèng xià yào
Adoption
Shōuyǎng 收养

Most abandoned or orphaned children in China are adopted by relatives, but an increasing number of orphaned children are being adopted by families in foreign countries, including the United States. The China Center for Adoption Affairs applies strict guidelines in approving adoptive families; the results are well-qualified adoptive parents and successful social and academic adjustment of the children.

Since the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China in 1979, exchange programs have brought together Chinese scholars, students, teachers, policy makers, and business people. These personal contacts have been an important part of developing better relations and new partnerships with other countries. But another type of exchange is having an impact, as a wide range of American couples, affluent and sometimes influential, have adopted Chinese children, most of them daughters. Since 1995, China has been the largest source of foreign-born children adopted in the United States. By the end of 2008, over 70,000 Chinese children had been adopted into American families.

Abandoned Children and Their Care

In 1979 China enacted what is commonly known as the one-child policy to limit most married couples to only one child (exceptions are made for ethnic minority groups). While the intention of the policy was to reduce population growth, one unexpected consequence of this policy was a drastic increase in the abandonment of female infants. Birth parents of these abandoned babies are mostly married peasants in rural China who have already had two or three daughters. Because child abandonment is against the law, parents usually leave their children with little identifying information, in public places at night or early in the morning to avoid legal trouble. Abandoned children whose parents cannot be located by police are considered legally orphaned.

The motive for abandoning a female infant is usually the parents’ inability to pay the fines for violating the one-child policy, often because they have already paid heavy fines for violating the policy once or twice before.

While there are no official statistics, it is estimated that at the end of 2002 there were about 300,000 to 400,000 orphans in rural China who were probably cared for by relatives (Shang Xiaoyuan et al. 2005). About 50,000 children (95 percent of whom were children abandoned by their parents) were cared for in state-run children’s welfare institutes or in collectively owned rural welfare institutions. Orphanage children range in age from newborn to late teens; they also range in physical condition from very healthy—the abandoned children’s prenatal experience in China has been considered better than that of many abandoned children in Russia and Eastern Europe because drinking, smoking, and teenage pregnancy among rural Chinese women are very rare—to severely disabled with conditions such as cerebral palsy, for example. Most abandoned boys have physical disabilities, some as minor
as a cleft palate, or mental disabilities. Most girls do not have a physical handicap, but have been abandoned as a result of the one-child policy and Chinese society’s preference for boys.

Orphanages (called Child Welfare Institutes or Social Welfare Institutes), usually located in or near a city, are typically gated and off-limits to locals and visitors. They often have a small clinic on site. The size of the orphanage can range from small (less than fifty children) to quite large (several hundred children). Operating budgets usually come from provincial and central government as part of the civil affairs budget. Most orphanages are inadequately equipped to care for and educate children.

In the orphanages, children are usually divided into different age groups. Older children are required, if capable, to help care for the younger ones. The children’s daily routines include scheduled feedings and/or meals, organized group learning, and other activities. Caregivers are usually women from local communities. The caregivers provide the best care they can, but due to a large caregiver to child ratio, one-on-one care is rare if not impossible. Orphanages have recently started utilizing local families to provide part-time or full-time foster care for some orphans.

As noted, most orphaned and abandoned children do not go to orphanages; some are brought up by relatives, but many may simply be unaccounted for. These children, especially those in rural areas, often live in poverty without access to social services. Government-funded subsistence allowances are available to orphaned/abandoned urban children and vary from region to region, but even the largest stipends are less than ordinary children’s living costs. Funds to provide the “five guarantees” (i.e., food, clothing, housing, medical care, and burial expenses) to orphaned and/or abandoned children in the countryside come from villages and towns. But the amounts of these funds are decreasing with agricultural taxation, putting more children at risk for inadequate care.

**Domestic and International Adoption**

Under the leadership of China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs, the China Center for Adoption Affairs (CCAA) in Beijing is the headquarters for domestic and international adoption: it governs policy and regulations. For international adoptions, the CCAA sets the quota, handles the paperwork, and matches children with potential foreign adoptive parents. By law, only an orphan under the age of fourteen is eligible for adoption. The orphanage must publish local newspaper ads regarding a child under its care and allow six months for birth parents to claim the child. The child is legally declared an orphan after that period and is thus allowed to be adopted. Open adoption
from the orphanage is almost never a possibility as the orphanage has no knowledge of the identity of the child’s birth parents.

Chinese citizens can adopt either from the orphanages or from other channels (e.g., private adoption, kinship adoption). There are no statistics regarding kinship and private adoption within China. For Chinese citizens to adopt a child from the orphanage, they must first register with the county-level civil affairs office where the child’s orphanage is located. In order to qualify for an adoption certificate, the applicants must be at least thirty years of age, infertile (with medical evidence), and medically and physically capable of caring for children. They also need to show proof of residence and marital status. A single male adopting a female child is additionally required to be at least forty years older than the child. Upon receiving the adoption certificate, the applicants are allowed to pick one child from three to four eligible children. Little is known about the development of domestically adopted Chinese children.

China first allowed a small number of children to be adopted by foreign families in 1985, when twenty children were adopted into the United States. (From 1985 to 1989, seventy children were adopted by American families.) In 1991, to relieve the heavy demands of a drastically increased number of abandoned children in the state-run child welfare institutes, China enacted adoption laws to permit a larger number of children to be adopted internationally. The United States adopts the most children. Since 1995 China has been of the largest source of transracial adoption in the United States, accounting for over 35 percent of the children involved in U.S. international adoptions. By the end of 2008, 71,753 Chinese children were adopted into American families (Families with Children from China, 2008). Chinese children have also been adopted into families in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. There are no statistics as to the number of children adopted into many of these countries.

The Good Earth

Pearl S. Buck, an eminent twentieth-century novelist who won both the Pulitzer and Nobel prizes, was an adoptive mother and early proponent of interracial and international adoption. Buck was born in China to missionary parents and spent the first half of her life there. Her best-known book, The Good Earth, contains much about the plight of Chinese girl children and the suffering of parents who sometimes sold them into slavery to avoid starvation.

O-lan had been rinsing the rice bowls with a little water and now she piled them in a corner of the hut and looked up at him from the spot where she squatted.

“There is nothing to sell except the girl,” she answered slowly.

Wang Lung’s breath caught.

“Now, I would not sell a child,” he said loudly.

“I was sold,” she answered very slowly. “I was sold to a great house so that my parents could return to their home.”

“And would you sell the child, therefore?”

“If it were only I, she would be killed before she was sold . . . the salve of slaves was I! But a dead girl brings nothing. I would sell this girl for you—to take you back to the land.”

“Never would I,” said Wang Lung stoutly, “not though I spent my life in this wilderness.”

But when he had gone out again the thought, which never alone would have come to him, tempted him against his will. He looked at the small girl, staggering persistently at the end of the loop her grandfather held. She had grown greatly on the food given her each day, and although she had as yet said no word at all, still she was plump as a child will be on slight care enough. Her lips that had been like an old woman’s were smiling and red, and as of old she grew merry when he looked at her and she smiled.

“I might have done it,” he mused, “if she had not lain in my bosom and smiled like that.”

Research shows that families in these countries have adopted children from over 530 Chinese orphanages in all twenty-three Chinese provinces (China considers Taiwan the twenty-third province), four of the five autonomous regions (no children have been adopted internationally from Tibet), and four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), while the leading sending provinces are Guangdong, Hunan and Guangxi (Tan 2006).

QUALIFICATION AND COST OF INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION FROM CHINA

Since it first permitted international adoption, the CCAA has modified its regulations several times. In December 2002, the agency reduced the quota of single parent adoption from 33 percent to no more than 5 percent. In May 2007, in response to a decrease in the number of children available for international adoption, the CCAA drastically changed its policy, allowing only married heterosexual couples aged between thirty and fifty-five to adopt from China. The couple must have been married for a minimum of two years if it is the first marriage, five years if it is a second or third marriage, and no more than two previous marriages are allowed for either spouse. There must be no more than four children living in the home. Additionally, in section III of the new CCAA regulations, couples may not adopt if they have one or more of the following conditions:

1. AIDS
2. Mental handicap
3. Infectious disease within infective stage
4. Binocular blindness, binocular parallax (problems with depth perception), or monocular blindness; no ocular prosthesis
5. Binaural hearing loss or language-function loss (adoption of special needs children who have identical conditions will be exempt from this limitation)
6. A function or dysfunction of limbs or trunk caused by impairment, incompleteness, numbness, or deformation; severe facial deformation
7. Severe disease that requires long-term treatment and affects life expectancy, such as malignant tumor, lupus erythematosus, nephrosis (kidney disease), epilepsy, etc.
8. Major organ transplant within the previous ten years
9. Schizophrenia
10. Medication for severe mental disorders, such as depression, mania, or anxiety neurosis, within the previous two years
11. Body mass index over forty (BMI = weight in kilograms/height in meters²)

Further CCAA regulations make the following stipulations:

IV. Either the husband or wife must hold a stable occupation. The family annual income reaches $10,000 for each family member, including the prospective adoptee; family net assets should equal $80,000. Family annual income does not include welfare income, such as relief fund, pension, unemployment insurance, or government subsidy.

V. Both the husband and wife have an education at or above the level of senior high school, or vocational skills training at the same level.

VI. There must be fewer than five children in the family under the age of eighteen years, and the youngest one should have reached the age of one year. Adoption of special needs children will be exempt from the restriction as to number of children under the age of eighteen.

VII. Neither the husband nor the wife can have a criminal conviction. Both behave honorably, have good moral character, and are law-abiding. Neither the husband nor wife the has any of the following:

VII a. A history of domestic violence, sexual abuse, abandonment or abuse of children (even if not arrested or convicted).

VII b. A history of taking narcotics like opium, morphine, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, or medication for mental diseases that may cause addiction among human beings.

VII c. A history of alcohol abuse or alcohol over-consumption within the previous ten years.

Adoption applications are given consideration on a case-by-case basis when either the husband...
or the wife has less than three criminal records of slight severity with no severe outcomes, the time from correction of the wrong has reached ten years, or has less than five records of traffic law violation with no severe outcomes.

VIII. The adoptive parents are able to understand adoption and expect to provide a warm family for the orphaned children (or children with handicap and disability) via adoption and to meet the needs of the children adopted and ensure their good development. They have a correct understanding of intercountry adoption as well, and are fully mentally prepared for the potential risks within intercountry adoption and for the situations of children adopted, such as potential diseases, developmental delay, post-placement maladjustment, etc.

IX. The adopters, in the adoption application letter, make clear promises of being able to accept post-placement follow-ups and offer post-placement reports as required.

The cost of adopting a Chinese child from an orphanage can range from US$20,000 to US$25,000. At the time of receiving the child, the adoptive parents are required to make a cash donation of US$5,000 to the child’s orphanage to help improve the living conditions of the children who remain in the orphanage.

PROCEDURE FOR INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION FROM CHINA

According to Families with Children from China (FCC), adopting a child from China includes three phases: assembling application paperwork, waiting, and the trip to China to adopt the child. The application paperwork, generally known as the dossier, consists of ten or so documents that actually go to China and other documents required by local state, county, and adoption agency rules. After all of the documents are collected and authenticated, the entire package is sent by the adoption agency to the China Center of Adoption Affairs (CCAA) in Beijing. One of the major documents in the application is called a home study. This document, prepared by a licensed social worker employed by an agency with an approved China adoption program, describes the prospective family. A typical home study will involve three visits with the social worker, one at home and two at the social worker’s office. The family must have recommendation letters sent directly to the social worker. The final document, which usually runs to six pages or so, can be thought of as a short biography of the parents and an evaluation of whether they will be acceptable parents. It takes approximately thirty to thirty-six months from receipt of the completed dossier to referral of a child for adoption. Travel to China to pick up the child is normally scheduled three months after referral. Some of the major adoption agencies in the United States include Chinese Children’s Adoption International (CCAI), China Adoption With Love, Inc. (CAWL), and Alliance for Children.

The actual adoption usually occurs at a hotel near the orphanage. The adoptive parents first meet with the officials from the civil affairs offices and orphanage directors to complete the paperwork and make the cash donation. Following that, the child is handed to the parents. The transition time is usually brief. Parents are usually not permitted to visit the child’s orphanage.

Characteristics of Chinese Children at Adoption

The average age of a child at the time of adoption is about thirteen months. Most of the children have been reared in an orphanage since early infancy. Some have received foster care. Most children are girls, and about half of the children show some degree of developmental delay. While fetal alcohol syndrome, HIV, and prenatal drug exposure have not been reported, lead poisoning is common.

Children who were adopted through the special-needs program (called the Waiting Child Program) are usually older and/or have special needs due to physical conditions that can range from very minor (e.g., birthmarks, missing one finger), to moderately severe (e.g., cleft palate), to severe (e.g., cerebral palsy).

Post-Adoption Development

While initially, it is not uncommon for some Chinese children to show worrisome behavior such as sleep disturbances, eating problems, or attachment issues, research conducted in Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway,
and the United States has provided compelling evidence that Chinese children adjust remarkably well in the adoptive home. Their language acquisition, social and emotional adjustment, and later academic performance have all been reported as either similar to or more favorable than their non-adopted peers. Such a favorable adoption outcome has not been reported among children adopted from Eastern Europe or Latin America. Many researchers

Historical illustration of “A Baby Tower” from the 1885 book *Child Life in China*, written by Mrs. Bryson, a missionary from the London Mission in Wuchang. The author describes baby towers, infamously reputed to have been a means for disposing unwanted children, most often female, at the time of their birth. Although missionary reports of such methods of infanticide appeared in Western media, especially after the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, the author reviewing Mrs. Bryson’s book in *The China Review*, shortly after the book’s publication, comments on never having seen one during extensive travels in the southern part of the country. Bryson’s account resonates today when considering China’s one-child policy—of which an unexpected outcome was the dramatic increase in the number of abandoned baby girls.
speculate that the Chinese children’s favorable adjustment results from a combination of the birth mother’s reasonably good prenatal care, a fairly decent orphanage experience, and positive adoptive family environment (e.g., highly educated, high-income-earning parents). Chinese children adopted by single parents show similar adjustment to Chinese children adopted by married couples. Long-term outcomes (e.g., adjustment in later adulthood) are unknown. One aspect of concern in these children’s future development lies in their possible desire to search for birth parents. It is unlikely that most children will be able to locate their birth parents due to the complex circumstances surrounding child abandonment in China. So far, there is only one child who was adopted by a Dutch couple who successfully located the birth parents.

Probably due to their favorable adjustment, about 75 percent of the families that have adopted from China adopt additional children from China. Recently some post-adoption disruptions have been reported. This mainly occurs to children who were adopted at an older age. As most of the adopted Chinese children are girls, many scholars and policy makers are becoming increasingly concerned about the gender imbalance in China. In some provinces the ratio is now 114 males for every 100 females for children under the age of four.

To help foster a sense of pride about the adopted children’s cultural heritage, many adoptive parents actively involve their children in various Chinese cultural activities: language class, kung fu class, celebrating Chinese festivities. As the children get older, many parents go with their children to China to visit their orphanages and to learn about China. Major travel agencies have also been established to cater to heritage trips; one example is Lotus Travel, Inc.

Other online communities are also very active. Some of the organizations, such as Raising China Children, focus on Chinese adoptions in general. Other groups have a more specific focus, including groups for families of children adopted from certain regions of China and groups organized around specific developmental issues and topics, such as attachment, special needs, identity, and general post-adoption adjustment.

Adoptive families have also established charitable organizations to help improve the lives of children in the orphanages. One of the largest organizations is Half the Sky Foundation. Other foundations such as Our Chinese Daughters Foundation and China Care also play very active roles in improving children’s lives.

Tony Xing TAN

Further Reading


Chinese trade, investment, and aid contribute to growth in Africa, but China’s growing presence on the continent has caused rising international concern as observers debate China’s strategic motivations.

China’s presence in Africa is expanding, increasingly complex, and the object of growing controversy both among African nations and countries around the world. Chinese accounts of contemporary China-Africa relations often begin with stories of Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) explorer Du Huan, said to have visited Egypt, Sudan, and other areas of Africa, or the multiple voyages to eastern Africa by Ming dynasty (1368–1644) Admiral Zheng He, and end with the observation that China’s contacts with Africa from the earliest times have been friendly, mutually beneficial exchanges.

Although Chinese isolationism during the late Ming dynasty and Qing dynasty (1644–1912) brought an end to officially sponsored trade missions by China’s imperial government, beginning in the 1950s the People’s Republic of China pursued relations with the newly independent countries on the continent, frequently making commitments of foreign aid, such as financing for the massive Tanzania–Zambia railway project. Beijing’s African diplomacy had many aims at the time, including asserting solidarity with the Third World as its relationship with Moscow deteriorated and limiting the number of countries granting diplomatic recognition to the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government in Taipei, Taiwan. In addition, prior to the 1990s China provided material and organizational support, including arms and training programs, to revolutionary movements in Africa. As China’s liberalizing economic reforms took hold in the 1980s, the impetus and nature of Chinese ties with Africa began to change, and relations with the continent came to be seen by China in the context of safeguarding its economic security and related strategic goals of enhancing global influence and international prestige.

Expanding Chinese Presence

Today China is Africa’s second-most important trading partner after the United States, having recently surpassed France, and is poised to become its most important as early as 2010. Since the mid-1990s China’s trade with countries on the continent has expanded rapidly along with its rising demand for raw materials and imported oil, supported by the country’s official “go out” (zou chuqu) policy, which encourages Chinese firms to invest abroad and includes a commitment by China’s top leadership to use state resources to ensure the country’s energy security. In 2000 two-way trade between China and Africa stood at less than $1 billion a year; it had reached $73 billion by 2007, and China’s Customs Administration predicted that trade will have exceeded $100 billion by the end of 2008. African countries are importing increasing quantities of China-produced apparel and machinery, and imports from Africa have become increasingly important to China. For example, Angola became China’s greatest single source of foreign oil in 2006; Burkina-Faso...
and Mali now supply 20 percent of China’s cotton imports; and mineral-producing countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and South Africa are meeting a growing share of Chinese demand. Africa now accounts for around 30 percent of China’s oil imports, 80 percent of its cobalt imports, and 40 percent of its manganese imports. China’s most important trading partners on the continent are Angola (19 percent), South Africa (19 percent), Sudan (8 percent), Egypt (6 percent), and Nigeria (6 percent). In 2007, looked at in aggregate, African countries ran a small ($1.1 billion) trade surplus with China.

Along with trade, countries on the continent are seeing an unprecedented flow of Chinese investment dollars into their economies. In the early 1990s Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa was less than $10 million; estimates suggest it may have reached $6 billion by 2006. Chinese firms have seized opportunities where those of other countries have been deterred by perceptions of risk. For example, in the 1990s, when civil war held back other investors, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) developed oil fields in Sudan; after conflict broke out in Ivory Coast in 2002, and its traditional economic partners, such as France, distanced themselves, China increased its investment in its cocoa sector. Although Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa stands at only about 3 percent of total Chinese overseas investment, its share is expected to rise as it diversifies. In 2007 China’s Industrial & Commercial Bank took a 20 percent stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank, and China’s textile manufacturers, seeking both to lower costs and to find a way around U.S. and European quotas, are building factories in Africa.

Today Chinese businesses can be found in forty-nine African countries, with approximately eight hundred Chinese state companies operating on the continent. Increasing numbers of individual Chinese are also pursuing economic opportunities in Africa, with the overwhelming majority in South Africa, followed by Zambia, where one of three planned Chinese-developed special economic zones will be located. According to some estimates, Chinese nationals in Africa now total about 550,000—more than the number of U.S. (70,000) or French citizens (100,000). Chinese tourists to Africa have also been
growing by double digits in recent years. Increasing numbers of Africans also live in China as people from the forty-eight countries in Africa with which China has diplomatic relations, seeing opportunity in China’s growing exports to their countries, move to China. A reported ten thousand people from the continent now live in Guangzhou (Canton) alone, many engaged in buying low-end textiles and other finished goods for resale in Africa. Most African businesspeople come to China on short-term visas but find ways to extend their stays, with the result that cities like Guangzhou are developing African neighborhoods where representatives from the continent’s myriad cultures interact with the Chinese way of life. African merchants, mostly from Nigeria, Mali, and Ghana, have been arriving in such large numbers to do business in Guangzhou’s clothing and textile trade centers that in November 2008 Kenya Airways instituted mainland China’s first nonstop route from Africa, between Nairobi and Guangzhou. Some reports suggest that Chinese authorities have sought to limit migration from African nations to China by tightening already-restrictive visa requirements in early 2008, although others indicate that this development can be attributed to general changes in Chinese immigration requirements in preparation for the 2008 Olympics.

Alongside the expansion of Chinese commercial interests in Africa, many African nations have been the beneficiaries of Chinese foreign aid, both from the Chinese Export-Import Bank and from humanitarian projects. According to official Chinese figures, China had given $5.74 billion in aid to Africa by 2006, contributing to eight hundred projects, with many more in the pipeline. This aid figure does not include debt relief, which added up to nearly $1.4 billion to thirty-one heavily indebted and least-developed African countries. By official count, China had provided more than eighteen thousand scholarships to Africans and had sent more than fifteen thousand medical personnel to countries on the continent. China’s Export-Import Bank plans to spend $20 billion in Africa in the next three years—about the same expenditure planned by the World Bank during that period. A World Bank study estimated that through mid-2006, Export-Import Bank loans to Africa totaled over $12.5 billion in infrastructural development alone, directed at projects concentrated in Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

Complex Relationship

China’s relationship with Africa is becoming increasingly complex. Along with development assistance and growing commercial linkages to the continent, China has cultivated deeper political, military, and cultural relationships with African nations, aimed to support its economic interests but also aimed toward other international objectives. Having abandoned policies of the era of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong that championed revolutionary and national liberation movements in Africa, Beijing’s political relationships with African countries are conducted government to government. China’s adamant defense of the inviolability of the sovereignty of African states, going back to principles asserted at the 1955 Bandung conference of developing nations, has been rewarded by backing from African countries in international forums where China has been the object of Western-led international criticism. This support and the tendency by African states toward bloc voting in multilateral organizations have proved highly beneficial to China, resulting in the repeated defeat of human rights proposals directed against China at the United Nations and contributing critically to the International Olympic Committee’s decision to award the 2008 Olympics to Beijing, for example. China also expects to draw on support from countries on the continent for its positions on multilateral trade issues and revisions to international economic rules. In addition, expanding relationships with African countries have benefited China in its ongoing efforts to reduce Taiwan’s international space, not only by weakening the appeal of Taiwan’s attempts to court African states for diplomatic recognition but also by drawing on African support to keep Taiwan out of international organizations.

China has also made military cooperation and arms sales an important facet of its relationship with African countries. China has military-to-military contacts with more than forty countries on the continent. Fourteen of China’s military attaché offices are in African countries; and seven African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) have reciprocal offices in Beijing, with another twelve African countries maintaining resident military offices in their embassies to China. Although only 6 to 7 percent of all arms supplied to Africa currently come from China, Chinese weapons
have found eager buyers in Sudan and Zimbabwe—both countries under a Western arms embargo. Ethiopia is another leading destination for Chinese arms. Nigeria has also become one of China’s best African customers; after efforts by the U.S. Congress to block or delay patrol boats for use in Nigeria’s troubled delta region, Nigeria has chosen to procure Chinese military supplies, including missiles and fighter jets. China has also agreed to train Nigerian specialists in satellite operations.

Africa has been an important focus of China’s growing participation in international peacekeeping operations, with the majority of its peacekeeping troops engaged in operations on the continent. It has participated in peacekeeping operations in Liberia and has contributed troops to U.N. missions in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Ivory Coast, and the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. In addition, China committed three hundred engineers and several million dollars in support of U.N.–African Union peacekeeping operations in Sudan.

Along with political and military relations, Beijing has significantly expanded cultural and educational exchanges with Africa in the last few years, and in the framework established at the November 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is committed to doing even more. The Chinese government is establishing Confucius Institutes offering Chinese language training at universities in several countries, with three already under way in Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa and five more in the planning stages. In addition, at the FOCAC China agreed to send Chinese agricultural experts to Africa and to establish demonstration sites, committed to train fifteen thousand African professionals in three years beginning in 2007—double the number of scholarships for African students—and to send several hundred Chinese young people to Africa by 2010, through the program Chinese Young Volunteers Serving Africa, to volunteer in fields from education to sports to health and agriculture.

**China’s African Presence and International Concerns**

China’s growing presence in Africa has met with rising international controversy as international observers, including human rights groups, other countries with interests in Africa, and Africans themselves debate China’s strategic motivations and conduct on the continent. China’s development aid and economic engagement are associated with unprecedented economic growth in Africa—5.8 percent in 2007. Chinese-financed transportation and communications infrastructure projects have helped some countries overcome seemingly intractable bottlenecks and leapfrog technologically in some sectors. Chinese money linked to commercial deals has helped finance new public buildings from presidential palaces to sports stadiums. Further, as part of its stated “win-win” Africa policy, China has promised duty-free treatment for African goods to help diversify Africa’s export market. To date, China’s trade with Africa has followed patterns established by its other main trading partners.

Others see China’s deepening role in Africa in a different light. Generally, African governments and elites have welcomed the largesse and debt relief from the world’s biggest developing country as an alternative to Western aid and see Chinese trade and investment as a much-needed source of growth. But China’s expanding economic presence is also generating new concerns and tensions. Some people opposed to China’s growing footprint in Africa argue that China is just the latest power to exploit African resources, and they complain about many Chinese corporate practices. Others contend that Chinese infrastructure agreements underbid local firms and include stipulations requiring the use of Chinese labor and therefore contribute inadequately to skills and technology transfer and to generating potential local employment. In Mauritius complaints have centered on the employment of Chinese rather than local workers in Chinese-constructed factories. Elsewhere local workers in Chinese-owned mines and factories report harsh and unsafe working conditions. The flood of cheap Chinese-made goods into local markets is another area of concern. Some calculations attribute the loss of 250,000 textile-related jobs in Nigeria to Chinese imports. The impact of Chinese-led development on the environment is another source of concern amid evidence of Chinese companies violating local environmental and conservation regulations, including reports that a major Chinese oil company prospected for oil in a nature reserve in Gabon, and that Chinese companies have been engaged in illegal logging in several African countries.
Because many of the Chinese businesses operating in Africa are state owned, the behavior of Chinese firms is generally ascribed to Chinese government policies. But anti-Chinese sentiment has also taken the form of deliberate attacks on Chinese nationals, including kidnappings and arson directed at Chinese-owned businesses. What China’s presence means for the continent is beginning to influence national political debate as well. In Zambia’s 2006 elections opposition leader Michael Sata ran for president on an anti-Chinese platform, nearly unseating the incumbent.

Chinese lending practices have also raised concerns on the part of traditional donors who have decried the opacity of some of China’s loan agreements and the extension of new loans by China to countries pursuing debt forgiveness under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Some, such as Transparency International, worry that the absence of conditions tied to Chinese aid also undermines international efforts to encourage improved political and economic governance. Some observers also are concerned that the politically illiberal Chinese development model is thwarting international hopes for more open and democratic governance in African countries. Beijing’s willingness to do business with regimes with a record of human rights violations, such as Khartoum and Harare, has been criticized as helping to shield those regimes from critical international censure and worsening threats to human security. Also criticized has been the willingness of Chinese to pay bribes overseas to facilitate commercial agreements, a practice that reinforces the corrupt and opaque practices linked to political instability across the continent.

Currently, however, China-African relations appear to be entering a new phase. On the one hand, as African countries recognize they can play one resource-hungry buyer off against the other, they appear increasingly

An international delegation from Africa tours the Forbidden City with friendly Chinese cadres. PHOTBy JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
willing to risk losing deals with China for better terms and conditions. For example, pressure from South African trade unions resulted in quotas on Chinese textiles to that country beginning in early 2007; Ghana’s government has sought to create conditions for its private sector to take the lead in building economic relationships with Chinese partners in recent years; and in May 2008 Nigeria’s government rejected Chinese offers of a nonconcessionary loan for a high-speed rail project that it wishes to develop under private-sector management. On the other hand, not all African countries have the capacities of South Africa, Ghana, or Nigeria, and some African leaders have begun to push for collaboration across the continent to develop an Africa-wide strategy for relations with China.

At the same time China has appeared increasingly concerned about the impact of its role in Africa on its international image and prestige. Chinese leaders have left meetings with Zimbabwe’s dictatorial president Robert Mugabe off their itineraries during recent visits to the continent, for example. In addition, after years of international pressure to leverage its economic ties with Sudan to bring an end to the atrocities in the Darfur region, China has moved away from its strict policy of “non-interference” toward more public efforts to persuade Khartoum to agree to international cooperation in crafting a peace settlement. In 2007 Beijing appointed a special envoy on Darfur, and Chinese president Hu Jintao began to speak publicly about the need for the Sudanese government to do more to end the crisis. In the months ahead of the Beijing Olympics, China went on the diplomatic offensive, explaining its opposition to sanctions and highlighting its pivotal role in Khartoum’s agreement to allow U.N. and African Union peacekeepers into the country, as well as its contribution of several hundred Chinese engineers to this deployment. China’s galloping economic growth and surging demand for energy and raw materials assure its continued interest in deepening its role in Africa in the coming years. With the emergence of alternatives to both Western and Chinese investment, including India and oil-rich states from the Middle East to Russia, African countries will have the opportunity to manage their relations with their Chinese counterparts increasingly strategically. China’s role in Africa should therefore be seen as an evolving one, shaped not only by Chinese economic and security objectives but also by international competition and the capacity of African countries to assert their own interests.

Carla P. FREEMAN

Further Reading


Distant water won’t put out a fire close at hand.

远水救不了近火

 Yuan shuí jiù bù liào jín huǒ.
Agricultural Cooperatives Movement

The agricultural cooperatives movement, which sought to move rural China beyond small family farming, was a significant step in the socialist transformation of the Chinese countryside. It was achieved without much turmoil despite the excesses associated with various stages of the process. Once collectivization was completed, though, some of the excesses laid the seeds for the radical policies of the Great Leap Forward.

The agricultural cooperative movement was a major campaign by the Chinese government to transform rural China in the 1950s. After land reform China’s agricultural economy operated on the basis of small family farming. However, the small size of family farms and the use of simple tools not only left many peasant households vulnerable to natural disasters but also limited the scale of production. The latter made it difficult for the state to mobilize resources to supply sufficient agricultural commodities needed for industrialization. More importantly, family farming based on private ownership of land created conditions for the emergence of new class polarization in the countryside, a phenomenon that could have posed political problems for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose victory in the civil war was based largely on the support of poor peasants. Hence, the party leadership decided almost immediately after the completion of land reform to organize peasants into mutual aid teams and cooperatives in preparation for the transition to socialism.

Despite differences over the pace of collectivization, a consensus existed within the CCP leadership on the socialist transition in the countryside. As stipulated in the party’s first decision on such an issue on 15 December 1951 (published in February 1953), the party’s basic policy was that such a transition would evolve through three stages. The first stage was to organize peasants into mutual aid teams. This stage was to be followed by the establishment of elementary cooperatives. The final stage was to be the completion of the socialist transformation of agriculture with the formation of advanced cooperatives or collective farms.

Mutual Aid Teams

Experiments with mutual aid teams and cooperatives began soon after the completion of land reform in some liberated areas even before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. But major momentum developed when the CCP Central Committee issued its first decision on mutual aid and cooperation at the end of 1951.

The formation of mutual aid teams was based largely on traditional forms of mutual aid in rural areas. Mutual aid teams usually consisted of several peasant households working together in the spirit of voluntary participation and reciprocity. Members of mutual aid teams retained their private ownership of land, means of production, and outputs. Mutual aid teams were formed primarily to...
exchange labor, draft animals, and implements. Compensation was based on mutually agreeable terms.

Two types of mutual aid teams existed. One was the smaller elementary type with three to five households. It operated on a seasonal or temporary basis and was limited to certain kinds of important farm work such as planting and harvesting. After the work was done the team would disband. The other type was more advanced. It was larger, consisting of six to ten or more households. Operating on a year-around basis, its members over time might well accumulate a small amount of common property, such as farm tools and draft animals.

In both types of mutual aid teams, land, farm tools, and draft animals were still privately owned, and each peasant household continued its own production. The formation of mutual aid teams, however, made it possible for members to exchange labor and other means of production, an especially important factor for the poor, who often needed to exchange their labor for the use of the tools and draft animals of the middle peasants. Politically, the alliance forged in this process could also serve to isolate the rich peasants.

After publication of the policy guidelines regarding the socialist transition in the countryside in February 1953, mutual aid teams developed rapidly. Their number grew from 4.68 million in 1951 to 9.93 million in 1954, with the participation of more than 58.4 percent or more than 68.5 million of all rural households.

Elementary Cooperatives

Experiments with elementary agricultural cooperatives began at about the same time as the initial formation of mutual aid teams in various parts of the countryside. Given the failure of mutual aid teams to prevent the emergence of a new group of rich peasants, and the increasing polarization along class lines in the countryside, the government decided to shift the focus of rural work from mutual aid teams to elementary agricultural cooperatives.

The cooperatives were several times larger than mutual aid teams and usually consisted of thirty to forty households. Initially peasants were organized into elementary cooperatives based on the same principle of voluntary participation and mutual benefits. Elementary cooperatives were regarded as semisocialist organizations because members would retain ownership of the land and other means of production but would pool these resources as shares under a unified management. Under the new system members were paid according to the work done as well as with dividends drawn from each member’s contribution of land and other capital assets such as farm implements, farm transport, and draft animals.

Elementary cooperatives organized peasants more efficiently than did mutual aid teams. The pooling of land under a unified management would eliminate a major structural weakness of Chinese agriculture: small, dispersed, and uneconomic landholdings. The consolidation of fragmentary pieces of land under unified management would also expand the size of fields and the scale of production.

A woman carries tea-laden baskets at the Dragon Well Tea Commune in Hangzhou, 1970s. During the 1950s, small family farms were consolidated into larger agricultural cooperatives. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
agricultural activity by eliminating boundary lines between individual plots.

Elementary cooperatives were popular with the rural population not only because members were allowed to retain their ownership of land and other assets but also because participation was based on the principle of voluntarism and reciprocity. In addition, members were allowed to keep a certain amount of land as “private plots” (zi liu di), which usually did not exceed 5 percent of the size of individual landholdings. Given their popularity, the number of elementary agricultural cooperatives grew rapidly from around 300 at the end of 1951 to 497,000 at the end of 1954. By June 1955 the number of elementary cooperatives was around 650,000, with the participation of about 17 million rural households.

But the rapid growth of elementary cooperatives also created difficulties and confusion in management. First, how to accurately evaluate work and pay turned out to be a challenge. Disputes over dividends paid for land contributions also drove a wedge between the middle and poor peasants. All these problems were caused by the complexity involved in organizing large groups into collective action but also by the lack of well-trained personnel in the countryside to fill leadership positions. Because of this lack of appropriate leadership skills and proper incentive structure, most of the elementary cooperatives formed during this period were not efficient. Many had trouble with even simple tasks such as bookkeeping.

The worst problem, though, was not management and organization but rather the weakening state capacity to extract resources from rural areas. Largely because of the slaughtering of livestock and lack of accumulated fertilizer to improve the land, China suffered two grain crises from the spring of 1953 to the summer of 1955. Lower-than-expected grain production in 1953 and 1954, and increased consumption by the rural population, created uncertainty over continued delivery of sufficient grain to the state. The government responded to the situation by establishing a unified method for the purchase of grain. For the government the issue is not only output but also the insufficient amount of grain and cotton allotted for industrialization and urban consumption. In fact, part of the reason for accelerating development of the cooperatives movement was to reduce the number of producing units and to improve planning so the government could have better control over the sales of agricultural commodities and consumption.

But subsequent food shortages in some areas, which resulted from excessive grain purchases at a time of slow growth in production, caused widespread anger and resistance in the countryside. In response, the government implemented a system of assessing peasants’ grain obligations that was known as the “three fix” (fixed quotas for production, consumption, and procurement). This system was designed to ease peasants’ anxieties over their tax burdens.

The agricultural cooperatives movement went through cycles of expansion and contraction. For example, it accelerated in the winter of 1952 but slowed in the spring of 1953. It expanded again in the winter of 1954 only to contract in the spring of 1955. This pattern was clearly linked to the ongoing debate within the CCP leadership, but it also reflected the problems of disorganization and over-ambitious planning, excessive methods by local cadres,

In this wood-block-print-style propaganda poster, peasant youth criticize their former landlord, celebrate the arrival of Communism, and dance with soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
and the alienation of more productive peasants—all factors that were related to the rapid expansion of the cooperatives. When China experienced a grain crisis in the countryside in the spring of 1955 that led many peasants to suffer from severe food shortages, Deng Zihui, central government leader in charge of agriculture, advocated a cautious approach to the pace of collectivization. This approach was initially endorsed by Liu Shaoqi who was in charge of the day-to-day operation of the party at the time, and it was agreed to by CCP leader Mao Zedong himself.

But in the spring of 1955, and again on July 31 of the same year, Mao changed his position drastically with a famous speech, “On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture.” In this speech he made a strong case for accelerating the pace of the agricultural cooperatives movement to prevent the emergence of a new class of rich peasants and a dangerous new class polarization in the countryside. At the same time he launched a campaign against what he perceived “rightist deviations.” He accused Deng Zihui and those within the CCP leadership who advocated gradualism of underestimating the immense enthusiasm for socialism among the poor and lower middle peasants, denouncing them as “tottering along like women with bound feet” instead of leading the movement in the front.

Mao’s harsh criticism of right-wing conservatism silenced different voices. Under such circumstances few officials had the courage to argue for a gradual approach again. Subsequently Mao’s view was adopted as a resolution at the Sixth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP in October of 1955. The resolution accelerated the formation of agricultural collectives and provided impetus for a new campaign to change the Chinese countryside. Thus the high tide of socialist transformation predicted by Mao at the end of 1955 quickly became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The agricultural cooperatives movement quickly picked up steam as zealous local cadres exerted all their efforts to outdo each other in the implementation of the new party policy. Under pressure to show results and eager to avoid being accused of “rightist conservatism,” local and regional authorities tended to carry out the new policy with far more speed than the party resolution originally envisaged. Thus, in the months after the plenum various provincial party committees revised their plans and competed with each other for early completion of collectivization.

The race to set up cooperatives soon swept aside any remnants of the previous cautious approach based on gradualism and experimentation. Looking for quick results, local cadres frequently ignored earlier principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefits. Many peasants were pressured to join the cooperatives against their will when local cadres exerted political and economic coercion. For example, cadres frequently withheld credit from private farmers who were unwilling to join.

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Many were forced to organize into large-scale collectives directly from individual farming or small-scale mutual aid teams. Many of the proven methods of gradualism through trial and error were cast aside under mounting pressures for speedy transformation to socialism. By the beginning of 1957, the main task of the socialist transformation of agriculture had been fulfilled with virtually the entire countryside being reorganized in advanced cooperatives.

Advanced Cooperatives

Advanced cooperatives usually consisted of two hundred to three hundred peasant families. Under the new system, when a peasant became a member his land and other principal means of production were transferred from private to collective ownership. Rents for land shares and other capital assets were abolished. Payment for members of advanced cooperatives was based solely on work points earned according to types of work performed. However, peasant households continued to receive small plots of land for private use.

Mao’s about-face decision to accelerate the transition to full collectivization in the summer of 1955 arose out of contradictory goals: he wanted China to achieve rapid industrialization and yet to continue small-scale farming. Given the rising demand of grain for the development of industry and urban consumption and the slower-than-expected rate of grain production, rapid transition to collective agriculture thus became imperative. As a result, the principle of voluntary participation and gradualism gave way to the new political priority of speedy socialist transformation through collectivization.

Many local officials were worried that their political loyalty would be questioned if they remained behind other regions in the race to set up cooperatives. Therefore they competed, trying to outdo each other in this new campaign. Subsequently, the cooperatives movement went through cycles as Mao and the central party leaders set goals, the provinces outstripped those goals, the central party then revised its targets upward, and the provinces again overfulfilled them. Even at the end of 1955 Mao estimated that another three to four years would be needed to complete the establishment of the advanced cooperatives at the most basic level. But zealous local and provincial leaders again overshot this target; in the rush to collectivize, the earlier cautious policy of advancement by stages was abandoned. While Mao continued to warn against leftist excesses in the autumn and winter of 1955–1956, he was impressed by the enthusiasm and speed of collectivization.

Mao and his allies interpreted this race to collectivize as a sign to further accelerate the socialist transformation
of the countryside. In December 1955 Mao personally edited and prefaced a book, *The Socialist High Tide in China’s Countryside*. He estimated that the formation of elementary cooperatives could be basically accomplished in a single year—1956—instead of the previously estimated three or four years with total completion in 1960. On 25 January 1956, Mao called a meeting of the Supreme State Council at which he demanded the adoption of the National Program for Agricultural Development 1956–1957, which stipulated that in some areas where conditions were favorable, all peasants should be brought into the advanced type of cooperative by 1957. Accordingly, the program envisioned that the conversion of the whole countryside into advanced cooperatives should be accomplished by 1958.

The new agenda abandoned the earlier gradual approach based on voluntary participation and mutual benefits. After Mao’s call to speed up the pace of the socialist transformation, the collectivization movement reached a fever pitch. In June 1955 only 529 advanced agricultural cooperatives existed, with the participation of forty thousand peasant households. By the end of 1956 the number of advanced cooperatives reached 544,000 million, with the participation of more than 107.4 million, or 88 percent of all peasant households. By the end of 1957 the socialist transformation of agriculture was accomplished, and the number of peasant households organized into advanced cooperatives reached 96 percent.

One reason for the cooperatives movement’s rapid acceleration was shrewd strategy. The government not only provided incentives for a majority of the peasants to join the cooperatives but also left them with little choice but to cooperate. Credit cooperatives, supply and marketing cooperatives, and unified purchase of grain and other key commodities increasingly restricted the space of private economic activities for rich peasants. With economic resources gradually channeled to the cooperative sector, the incentive structure was altered to encourage peasants to join the cooperatives. During the “high tide” the cancellation of land dividends in the advanced cooperatives amounted to a direct transfer of economic resources from the rich peasants to the poor. The latter had the numerical dominance from which the party could draw support to push those who were still hesitant to join the collectives.

This rush to establish cooperatives created numerous problems. Many policies that accompanied the rush, such as direct planning over the size of sowing areas, output, and the closing of most of the rural markets, caused a major disruption in agricultural production. As a result, many officials in the central government realized the seriousness of the problems and the dissatisfaction of the peasants over the rush to collectivization. Subsequently, when the rigidity of the newly formed advanced cooperatives became increasingly obvious, a period of adjustment followed in 1956–1957.
Starting in April 1956 and continuing into the summer of 1957, some of the excessive policies associated with the high tide of collectivization were reversed. Steps to deal with problems were taken under a program that became known as “opposing rash advance.” These steps included placing new emphasis on setting realistic targets, coordinating planning and quality in output, increasing the scope of peasants’ private production, reopening some limited rural markets, and reducing the size of the cooperatives. The adjustments continued until they were swept away during the Great Leap Forward by a new wave of agrarian radicalism to organize peasants into much larger communes.

The agricultural cooperatives movement marked an important step in the socialist transformation of the Chinese countryside. It was a significant development beyond land reform to move rural China toward a more equal distribution. Overall, despite the excesses associated with various stages of the process, this was accomplished without much turmoil. First, the rents and dividends paid for the use of land and other assets were capped below compensation paid for labor. Then these rents and dividends were eliminated altogether, and pay was based solely on the type of work performed. By pooling together resources through the establishment of cooperatives, the scale factor contributed to the increase of grain production. However, once collectivization was achieved, the leadership embarked on more ambitious programs that led to the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958-1961.

John Q. TIAN

Further Reading


Agriculture has been crucial to the growth and development of Chinese civilization since ancient times. Over the past century many significant changes in agriculture have reflected large-scale political upheaval in China. Today Chinese agriculture thrives through the development of technology, but it continues to face challenges related to food security in a changing environment.

Agriculture has played an integral role in the development of civilization, society, and the rise of the modern state. Throughout China’s long history the importance of providing the nation’s people with food has been linked with the political stability of the state. Emperors and dynasties have gained and lost their political power based on their ability to ensure that the food supply is sufficient to feed the people. An understanding of agriculture’s development in China over centuries offers a unique perspective into the growth and expansion of a large and thriving civilization, not just a view of the ruling elite’s ability to maintain power. During the past fifty years agricultural production in China’s rural countryside has undergone significant transformations. From land reform and collectivization to the household responsibility system, Chinese agriculture has indeed been affected by larger political structures.

Throughout premodern China agricultural production relied on simple tools and organic methods of production. In his early study on Asian agriculture in *Farmers of Forty Centuries*, the historian F. H. King asserts that the United States and other Western countries have much to learn from Asian agriculture. His book portrays the ability of Asian civilizations to develop agricultural technologies that have produced food in a sustainable way to feed their people over centuries. He draws on experiences along the east coast of China, from Hong Kong and Guangzhou (Canton) to Manchuria, to show how...
the Chinese have developed agricultural techniques that have allowed the land to produce large amounts of food continuously. The recent introduction of mechanization (although still rather limited because of the abundance of human labor) and chemicals has placed new challenges on Chinese farmers and the environment.

The agricultural challenges that China faces are certainly intensified by the combination of its being the world’s most populous nation and having limited agricultural land. China is home to about 21 percent of the world’s population but only occupies about 6.5 percent of the world’s land area. Further complicating this disproportionate ratio is that much of China’s land is unsuitable for crop cultivation. Ninety-four percent of China’s
population lives in the eastern and southeastern regions of China, whereas the northwest and west are mountainous, dry, and difficult to navigate. Moreover, industrial and urban development in the east and southeast is beginning to threaten the ideal growing conditions found in these temperate and subtropical regions.

Major crops in China include grain (rice, wheat, corn), meats (all major types), cotton, soybeans, rapeseed (and other oils), tobacco, sugar-yielding crops (sugarcane and beets), peanuts, and tea. Apples and other commodity fruits and vegetables have also become major export crops in recent years.

Traditional Agriculture

Agricultural production began in China in the loess lands (unstratified loamy deposits found in North America, Europe, and Asia) of the Wei and Huang (Yellow) River valleys around 6500 BCE. By 4000 BCE large farming villages had spread throughout China. Millet was the main grain domesticated at this time. Animals were a part of these villages and, along with wild plants gathered, supplemented the millet diet. Both short- and long-grain varieties of rice appeared before 5000 BCE but did not gain popularity until techniques were developed later to assist with irrigation and improve yields. During the Shang civilization (1766–1045 BCE), food preparation and consumption were considered to have become ritualized and complex. In ancient China the development of food and agriculture was part and parcel of the development of Chinese civilization; cities were expanding, art was flourishing, villages were establishing rituals surrounding the consumption of the food they produced.

Chinese agriculture took shape during the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties. The imperial government established a comprehensive agricultural plan to substantially increase yields and technology during this time. These developments, including land terracing and water irrigation, led to the definitive shaping of the food system during the Song dynasty (960–1279), when food production became rational and scientific. Agricultural techniques developed during the Song dynasty, including the organic preparation of soil, maintenance of high-yielding seeds, complex irrigation systems, and the commerce of crops, remained relatively unchanged until the mid-twentieth century. Regional, elaborate banquet cuisine developed at this time, and foreign trade opened China’s economy to foreign influences. New crops that foreigners introduced were adopted and thrived.

With the development of rational agricultural techniques, the Chinese were forced to face the issue of population growth. After the Song dynasty the growth of population dramatically increased through the twentieth century. Throughout the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, as well as Republican China (1912–1949) and the early years of the People’s Republic (1949–), China’s farm economy responded to the demands of a rising population. During this period China’s population expanded by eight to ten times the level it had been in 1368, the beginning of the Ming dynasty. As the population grew, agricultural production expanded to meet the needs of the people with no dramatic changes in farming techniques or rural institutions. The expansion of agricultural production at this time is attributed to the abilities of the population to adapt to changing conditions.

In the 1930s John Lossing Buck, a professor of agricultural economics at Nanjing University, conducted a survey of Chinese agricultural management from 1921 to 1925. This survey covered 2,866 farming households during the republican period. Results were published in 1937 as Land Utilization in China and have proven useful in modern times in understanding the transition of agriculture at the turn of the twentieth century and before the Communist revolution.

Agriculture in the Maoist Period

On 1 October 1949—after the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, also known as the Second Sino-Japanese war), World War II in Asia, and China’s civil war—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded the People’s Republic of China. With a base of support from the peasants in the countryside, the Communist leadership decided that land reform would be one of its first priorities. Throughout the countryside of the new Communist China, land was taken from landlords and distributed evenly among peasant households. The Communists’ first Five-Year Plan (1952–1957) called for a socialist transformation of agriculture. Mutual aid teams and primary
and advanced producers’ cooperatives were established to achieve this socialist ideal. Collectivization efforts proved successful; by 1957, 93.3 percent of the peasant households were in advanced producers’ cooperatives and 3.7 percent in lower-level (primary) producers’ cooperatives.

The ideal of self-sufficiency drove the collectivization of agriculture. Along with the political and economic changes accompanying the communes, agricultural output quotas were established, primarily to promote self-sufficiency in grain production. Regardless of its geographical location, each production team had set grain quotas to meet. As communes were established, ownership of the means of production was emphasized as public. Not only were peasant secondary occupations banned, but also all production tools were given over to the state. Communes were entitled to the grain that production teams produced; this grain was distributed throughout the communes and served in common canteens.

The second Five-Year Plan initiated the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 advanced producers’ cooperatives merged to form communes, consisting of a number of production brigades and teams. These communes functioned as the primary form of government in the countryside. Leaders of production teams and brigades participated in local government affairs. Aside from the establishment of communes in the countryside, the central idea behind the Great Leap Forward was that rapid development of China’s agricultural and industrial sectors should take place simultaneously. Grain production and steel production were the keys to economic development at this time. But these two goals proved difficult to balance. The Great Leap Forward took its toll on the countryside when the combination of unrealistic grain production targets, the development of heavy industry, and climatic droughts led to widespread famine between 1959 and 1961. Urban residents, accessing food through ration coupons, faced the results of the famine with stricter rations but did not face famine to the extent faced by rural residents.

After the disaster of the Great Leap Forward the state loosened its control over the countryside. Farmers were given more freedom to grow and produce grain as they saw fit, although they continued to work in collectives and had to give grain output back to the state. In the mid- to late 1960s, as the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) gained momentum throughout the cities and schools were shut down, a number of children of urban residents were “sent down” to the countryside to reform their thinking. Although they were supposed to begin to understand the lives of peasants, these students were kept in separate living and working quarters from the peasant households.

Reform Era

By 1978, two years after the death of Communist Party leader Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping had become leader of China. With this power shift much of the control over the rural collectives had been lost. In some places, particularly Anhui and Jiangsu provinces, farmers began to experiment with selling their grain surplus on the market and not directly to the state, beginning the household responsibility system (HRS). This system disassembled the communes and redistributed land to peasant households through contracts. HRS spread throughout the country by the early 1980s, initiating the period of reform and opening up. The years 1978–1984 are associated with massive rural reforms that broke apart the collective agricultural system and redistributed land from collective use rights to those of individual households.

Although the collectives remained owners of the land, the land was contracted out to the households. Brigade and team leaders divided lots of land up according to their size and productivity. Some households were given a variety of plots throughout the production team area that had differing degrees of size and productivity. Farmers were given incentive to work harder to increase the output from their plots. Each household was granted a procurement goal of grain production that needed to be handed over to the state. After households reached their goal (for which the state paid low grain prices), farmers were free to grow other crops or sell their surplus of grain on the market for a higher price.

Between 1978 and 1984 grain and other agricultural crop outputs rose dramatically. From 1980 to 1985 grain output grew at the rate of about 7 percent per year. Advances in technology, such as the introduction of high-yielding varieties of grain, additional farmer incentives, and the increased use of chemical fertilizers, also contributed to this upsurge in output. This initial dramatic rise in grain output compelled the state to continue economic reforms and, in 1985, shifted reforms to urban areas.
With attention turned to urban reform, the dramatic yield increase in the countryside could not be sustained. Yields stagnated in the mid-1980s. Farmers, whose incomes had grown with the rise in grain output, experienced loss of incomes and began to turn to cash and commercial crops. They began paying the state in taxes earned from the sale of these crops rather than grain. In the years since the initial success of the HRS, the state has focused much of its attention in rural areas on the development of township and village enterprises (TVEs).
Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up came the Four Modernizations. Deng believed that modernization was the key to China’s development and took great efforts to improve China’s agriculture, industry, defense, science, and technology. The Four Modernizations accelerated the pace of agricultural industrialization in China. When Deng Xiaoping introduced his plan to bring science and technology to China through modernization, the state invested significantly in agricultural technology. The state sent scientists abroad and brought foreign scientists to China to exchange ideas and information. The Ministries of Agriculture and Science and Technology began to develop modern agricultural technologies. Agricultural extension systems were set up throughout provincial and local governments to disperse new technologies and information.

State scientists designed technology to produce high yields of grain. Hybrid rice, developed and patented by Chinese scientist Yuan Longping, is especially important to China, given the cultural importance of rice as a staple crop. Much of the high quantities of rice produced in the 1980s was attributed to hybrid rice. More recently Chinese scientists have developed genetically engineered rice that is pest-resistant. The central government, however, afraid of trade repercussions with the European Union, has not yet fully commercialized this rice.

Another technology in which China holds an advantage is aquaculture. For centuries China relied on paddy fields, ponds, and canals to grow fish and other seafood products. Scientists have developed innovative techniques in recent years to improve China’s pond-raised fish, shrimp, crayfish, and eels. The combination of intensive human labor in aquaculture and the development of controlled ponds has given China a comparative advantage in aquaculture. When China entered the WTO, it found that possessing unique comparative advantages on certain agricultural techniques worked to its benefit.

**Modern Agricultural Technology**

Since 1978 Chinese agriculture has taken several large steps toward modernizing its agriculture. Along with as a way to curb migration to urban areas for industrial jobs. Also, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 has challenged the government to align its economy with the global economy. Domestic agricultural production faces the need to find its comparative advantage in the global economy. Experts expect that agriculture will continue to adapt to the challenges and opportunities that the global economy provides in the coming years.

**Food Security in a Changing Environment**

In 1995 Lester Brown, president of the Worldwatch Institute in Washington, D.C., asked a profound question that shaped the issues of food security in China. With the publication of *Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up Call*
for a Small Planet, Brown called attention to global food security by highlighting China’s environmental problems. His simplified claim was that the combination of industrialization and population would certainly affect not only China’s ability to feed itself but also the world’s food supply. In response to this book Chinese state scientists claim that hybrid and “super” rice technology will make it possible to feed the people of China. In the years since the book’s publication, many scientists have pointed out the flaws associated with the generalized claims that Brown made.

The legacy of the book, however, is the awareness it raised about the relationship between pressures of development and feeding China’s large society. The emphasis on grain production and self-sufficiency from the Mao era continues to guide policy. Yet China faces the need to develop and industrialize its economy. Moreover, the introduction of a consumer society in urban China also has the ability to affect grain production. In 2000 the Chinese government eliminated its price support for low-quality, early-season hybrid indica rice. This move drew attention because in the past the state had pushed farmers to grow double-season, high-yielding hybrid rice to prove China could be self-sufficient in grain production. By 2004, despite a drop in the quantity of rice produced in China, state agricultural officials initiated a campaign to promote “high-quality” grain. As China competes on a global scale, the importance of producing quality food products increasingly competes with the need to produce mass quantities of grain.

Growing Challenges

Chinese agricultural history is a complicated mix of political, economic, technological, and ecological opportunities and challenges. Many traditional practices of crop cultivation and technology continue in the twenty-first century. Many other practices have given way to modern forms of technology and economics. The large-scale political and social experimentation of agricultural collectivization in the 1950s through the 1970s provides an example of how the state had the power to organize society based on its own political ideals. The more recent introduction of the market economy and global integration have provided new opportunities and challenges for Chinese agriculture. With China’s entry into the WTO agricultural production has changed so China can compete in the global economy. At the same time, however, China faces the domestic needs of feeding its population, meeting the demands of a new consumer society, and protecting its fragile environmental resources.

Amy ZADER

Further Reading

China’s expansive and diverse geography has played a key role in shaping the agricultural practices and diets of the Chinese people. The study of agricultural geography (agro-geography) can reveal how various regional cuisines have emerged. As China’s physical and human environment alike undergo dramatic changes, the food and agriculture of Chinese people is likely to change as well.

Within the vast territory China encompasses, agricultural production takes many forms and is an integral industry. Whether it consists of large-scale, state-run soybean farms in the northeast, individual household plots of terraced rice paddies in the mountainous southwest, or vast expanses of grassland in the north and northwest, China’s agro-geography is certainly diverse.

The traditional, most simplistic characterization of China’s agro-geography is found within the ambiguous rice–wheat line that separates the dry northern areas of China from the southern wet regions where rice thrives. In the dry, cold north, sorghum and millet grow alongside soybeans and corn. The climate of areas along the Huang (Yellow) River is suitable for winter wheat. Traditional cuisines and food types have been constructed around these available grain products. For example, dumplings, noodles, and steamed buns made out of wheat flour form the basis of “northern” food, while the combination of dishes of meat or vegetables served with bowls of rice is considered “southern” cuisine. In the south, rice can be double-cropped in a single season due to abundant water and large tracts of cleared paddy land.

Over the past few decades, increased transportation, regional specialization, and agricultural technology have led to the blurring of this rice–wheat line. While rice remains the dominant staple crop in most southern areas, wheat and wheat products are widely available. At the same time, the northeast region of China has dramatically increased its production of short grain japonica rice. This short grain rice can sustain a shorter growing season and higher altitude than indica varieties grown in the south.

Today in China, regions highlight their own agricultural and food specialties as a way to define and distinguish themselves from other areas. For example, Beijing peaches, Shaanxi apples, and Xinjiang grapes are all commodities with regional identities. In addition to commodity fruits, specialty cuisines also claim an identity associated with a region. Although the food types and cuisines available in specific regions continues to diversify with modern transportation and the introduction of large supermarkets, regions—whether they are towns, cities, or provinces—highlight and advertise their specialties.

Regional Cuisine

In his classic work, The Food of China, E. N. Anderson breaks traditional cuisines into the following four loosely-defined categories: the east, the west (or southwest), the far south (Guangzhou—or Canton, as Anderson wrote
in 1988), and the north. East China, as defined by Anderson, consists of the lower Yangzi (Chang) Valley and the coasts north and south of it. Eastern cuisine— influenced by the abundance of fish and seafood in the area’s fresh and salt waters, as well as by the renowned vinegar produced in the region— gets its distinctive flavor from combinations of vinegar, oil, sugar, sweet bean paste, and rice ale. Soups and fish sauces are also important components in the cooking of this region (mainly Fujian).

Western China, commonly thought of as southwestern China at the other end of the Yangzi (Chang) River, is known for its spicy (Szechwan) food. Chile pepper, garlic, brown and black pepper, star anise, and five spice are found regularly in dishes in this region. Rich mountain forests in western Sichuan provide bamboo shoots and a variety of mushroom and fungi, which are often cooked with pork, tofu, and a variety of vegetables, usually accompanied by rice. While Chongqing municipality is known for its famous spicy fire pot (hot pot), minority regions in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou also have abundant local specialties.

The home of southern cooking in China— still popularly called Cantonese by those outside the country—is Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong Province and a major city in mainland China with close ties to Hong Kong. Cantonese cuisine is known to be some of the best in China. Everyday dishes consist of simple boiled shrimp, steamed fish, stir-fried vegetables, clear soup, fried oysters, and boiled chicken. Luxury and gourmet offerings in Guangzhou feature meats uncommonly consumed in the rest of the world: shark fin, dog, cat, snake, turtle, and frog legs. Eating dim sum is a common form of snacking in south China. With its southern, semitropical location, southern China has famous fresh fruits.

The north of China is characterized by its taste for wheat products combined with mutton and other meats. Dumplings (jiaozi) and meat-filled stuffed steamed buns (baozi) are staples of this region. Muslim food from the

Flooded rice-paddy terraces are carved out of the hills and mountains all over southern China. The water prevents weeds and keeps the plants healthy and crop bountiful.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
northwest has made its way to northern China with its kabobs of spicy meat, as well as wheat breads and noodles.

**Agricultural Geography**

With the introduction of the household responsibility system and a market-based economy, agricultural production has become much more diversified in recent years. At the same time, agro-diversity has reached new regions, and agricultural production has become regionalized and specialized. The recent work of Gregory Veeck et al. (2007) divides China’s agro-diversity into nine distinct terrestrial agricultural regions and provides the most recent data from the nine regions. Veeck breaks down Chinese agriculture into nine regions: the Northeast, Inner Mongolia, East China Plain, the Loess Plateau, the Middle and Lower Reaches of the Yangzi River, the Southwest region, the South China region, the Gansu-Xinjiang region, and the Qinghai-Tibet region.

The northeast of China, generally referred to as Manchuria, includes the three provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. The land is located primarily on the Songliao Plain and rimmed by mountains to the north, west, and east. As recently as the 1950s, this region was sparsely populated and heavily forested. Today, large portions of wetland and forest have been converted to agricultural land, and the northeast is one of China’s final agricultural frontiers. The region is rapidly gaining the reputation as a major grain producer in China, as most of the farms here are large-scale, state-run, mechanized, and grain-producing. Corn and soybeans have been the main crops grown here, but China’s recent entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization) has forced China to import these products. As a result, and with new technologies developed in China, the northeast has increased its rice production of short grain japonica rice dramatically over the past two decades.

Inner Mongolia is the dry and windswept area to the northwest of Beijing. Its land consists primarily of grasslands used for herding. During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, officials in this region made efforts to turn grasslands and pasturelands to field crop cultivation. Under Mao Zedong’s “Take Grain as the Key Link” campaign to increase grain production, grassland was converted to grain production. The results of this quick and poorly-planned initiative were disastrous, with 391,000 hectares of good pasture turned into desert. Today, more reasonable strategies are being applied to prevent massive environmental degradation, and recent years have brought an increase in the careful implementation of field crop cultivation. Wool and husbandry also act as major industries in this region, and are expected to continue to expand in the future.
The East China Plain includes the drainage basins of the Huang and Hai Rivers and their deltas. At the center of Chinese civilization in the heart of one of China’s most densely populated and productive agricultural regions, the East China Plain is currently facing a severe water shortage problem that is having a negative effect on grain production. Traditionally, land was double-cropped with the production of winter wheat, barley, and rapeseed, with summer crops of peanuts, corn, soybeans, and cotton. More recently, commercial and specialty fruits and vegetables that offer higher prices to farmers have been growing in popularity, as has cotton production.

The Loess Plateau, named for its thick deposits of silt, covers approximately 300,000 square kilometers of land in Gansu, Shanxi, and Shaanxi provinces. Although the loess is highly fertile, deforestation, drought, and sloping land have led to significant erosion in the region. Recent urban and industrial development has accelerated the pace of this erosion. Local governments have invested significant time and money in efforts to stabilize agricultural production of this region. The most recent endeavor has been the promotion of fruit with the growth of apple orchards.

The middle and lower reaches of the Yangzi River are at the agricultural core of China. The mild climate and high rainfall throughout this region allow for double cropping of winter wheat and barley, rapeseed, and rice. In terms of grain production, the region boasts the highest annual mean yields throughout the country. However, industrialization and the pressures of development have forced many rural areas of agricultural production to be converted to industrialization. In recent years, vegetable, flower, and fruit production has increased dramatically, with ample opportunity for processing and exporting.

Southwest China includes two major geographical features: the highly fertile cropland of the Sichuan Basin and the high, rocky, sloped mountain terrain of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau. The Sichuan Basin produces much of China’s grain, including rice and corn, with high swine production rates as well. Its inland location allows this basin to avoid price influences from imported grain. In contrast, the rugged karst topography of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau has a poorly developed agricultural sector. The region lacks sufficient roads to transport agricultural products. Even with high production of citrus and other fruits, transportation is a problem and the industry is facing competition from southern China and Southeast Asia. Yunnan Province is China’s major source of tobacco.

The South China Region consists primarily of low mountains and hills. It encompasses the major (fertile) alluvial plains from the Pearl River Delta and the West
River. Its southern, moist location allows for double cropping of rice and, on occasion, a season of winter wheat. Mulberry production for silkworms and tea remain important non-grain crops. Sugarcane aquacultural products, tropical fruits, and spices are also major products of the region. The Pearl River Delta was, for centuries, one of China’s most important and productive agricultural regions. Today, however, due to its close proximity to Hong Kong, the region’s agricultural land is threatened by encroaching industrial and urban development.

The Gansu-Xinjiang region makes up one of the largest, driest, and least-populated areas of China. On average, it receives less than 200 millimeters of rainfall per year. Irrigation systems are fed through snowmelt of the surrounding mountain chains. In recent years, grapes, melons, dates, and other specialty crops have gained popularity throughout China. More recently, the introduction of irrigated cotton and sugar beets has presented competition with these products. Traditional practices of herding sheep, goats, camels, and horses continue in remote and nonirrigated areas. New drought-resistant grain crops have been introduced.

The Qinghai-Tibet region is on the high Tibetan Plateau (over 4,500 meters in height). The region is cold and dry. Much of the food purchased here has been brought from other areas of China. Sheep, yak, and horse herding remain an integral part of the economy. In valleys, wheat and barley are grown, as are potatoes and other vegetables. Greenhouses have been built in efforts to improve local food supplies, but in general, this region lacks fresh fruit and vegetables.

Future Directions

As China dives deeper into the twenty-first century, its agricultural production relies upon a variety of social and environmental issues. The opportunities and challenges of these issues can be understood primarily through the following four categories: water and other resource issues, industrial and urban development, farming as a livelihood, and the impact of international trade.

Water issues are a large problem in China. Climatic conditions in China vary from dry deserts in the north, to mountains in the west, to wet paddy fields in the south. Access to water has been a key factor in the growth of agricultural systems. For thousands of years Chinese leaders have manipulated water through complex irrigation systems to ensure agricultural growth. With the Three Gorges Dam and proposed South–North Water Transfer Project, the state continues to control the flow of water. As parts of north China face droughts, soil erosion, and desertification, southern China faces devastating floods. The technological solutions have ecological
and social implications that many believe the government has not effectively considered before starting the projects. As the government relies on regions of China for food production, access to water is a challenge that must be addressed.

A continuous theme that has come up in the discussion of regional variations in agriculture is the impending industrial development in certain regions of China. For example, the southeast of China boasts optimal land, soil, and climate for multiple grain crops within a single season. But this region is also China’s most rapidly growing industrial region. Hectares of agricultural land are converted to industry and suburban residential development. As a result, local governments in regions not known for optimum growing conditions are advocating the development of crop production. Having learned from mistakes of pushing the land to produce too much under Mao, these programs rely on scientific advice and technology.

Farming as a livelihood has always been of particular concern to the Chinese government. Recently, as economic reforms have favored urban residents, farmers have begun to show their distrust of and uncertainty about the government through protests and other forms of discontent. As a result, the government has instituted a series of plans meant to bring peace to the Chinese countryside through constructing a “harmonious society.” This policy, associated with the Hu Jintao leadership, acknowledges the new problems that have emerged with China’s economic growth. Tensions are rising due to increased inequality, environmental damage, health problems, and attempts to break the social pension plan known as the “iron rice bowl” that began in the Mao era. The new policy seeks to address these issues in the rural countryside.

Increased international trade resulting from China’s entry into the WTO is expected to have long-term effects. After a long struggle with the United States, China finally joined the WTO in 2001. The immediate effects of the union can be seen in the price decreases of domestic soybeans and corn. At the same time, prices of California produce such as garlic and fruit have declined as a result of the growth of Chinese exports. It is expected that similar economic issues will arise in the future as the path China takes in agricultural trade becomes more paved. Different regions in China may have to take advantage of new demands, resulting in changing social and ecological conditions.

Implications

Over the past century, changes in food production and consumption in China have affected regional specialized cuisines. However, as a result of the introduction of new agricultural products, regions are recognizing the threat of losing traditional cuisines and are marketing and promoting the agricultural and culinary specialties of their area through local restaurants or tourism industries. As regions promote certain foods and products, agricultural production has become regionalized and specialized in recent years. While grain production continues to be encouraged by the state, it is no longer the case that all farmers must produce grain. A variety of social and ecological conditions both inhibit and encourage the development of new crop specializations. It appears as though government officials and researchers are much more careful about how to implement these programs. With the growth of supermarkets, increased transportation, and interaction with the global economy, food and agriculture in China will continue to shift spatial locations.

Amy ZADER

Further Reading

American Chamber of Commerce in China

Zhōngguó-Měiguó Shānghuì 中国美国商会

The American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China (AmCham-China) helps U.S. companies succeed in China through information, networking, and business support services.

The American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China (AmCham-China) is a nonprofit organization that represents U.S. companies and individuals doing business in China. The first office opened in Beijing in 1980. With the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and the American Chamber of Commerce in South China, AmCham-China represents seven thousand companies. It is part of the larger Association of American Chambers of Commerce, which represents more than 3 million companies worldwide.

The chamber has more than forty industry- and issue-specific forums and committees, offers services such as the Business Visa Program, holds a range of networking and informational events, and meets with U.S and Chinese officials to discuss challenges and opportunities facing U.S. firms doing business in China.

The chamber’s mission is to help U.S. companies succeed in China through advocacy, information, networking, and business support services. The objectives of the chamber are to:

- promote the development of trade, commerce, and investment between the United States and China;
- provide a forum in which the U.S. business community in China can identify and discuss common commercial interests in China;
- work with existing organizations in China on matters of mutual interest;
- maintain relations with the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and other chambers of commerce or commercial organizations elsewhere.

Further Reading
As one of Taiwan’s aboriginal tribes, the Ami continue to live together in villages and practice their ancient customs and rituals. The most significant of their traditional celebrations, commonly known as the Harvest Festival, is still held annually throughout Taiwan.

The Ami is the largest of the nine tribes of indigenous people on Taiwan, numbering approximately 158,000 in 2007, according to statistics from Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous Peoples. They were known to the Chinese settlers as “the mountain people” because they retreated to the mountainous center of Taiwan when large numbers of Chinese immigrated in the seventeenth century. They still live primarily in the hilly area in the southeastern part of Taiwan and along the east coast. Many Ami are fishermen, but their main source of income comes from agricultural products such as rice, millet, sweet potatoes, seedless watermelons, sugar cane, mulberry leaves, tea, and tobacco.

The Ami people are organized into villages headed by a chief, and the family structure is matrilineal, meaning that the women own property, and the eldest daughter inherits the family property. Recent research, however, focuses on other important social organizations such as the household and age-set systems. In many indigenous cultures young men who are initiated at the same time through rites of passage into adulthood are grouped into age sets, each of which will eventually enjoy increasing power and respect as it approaches elder status. Age-set organizations are common to all traditional Ami tribes.

The religious beliefs and activities of the Ami revolve around divine spirits, divination, and ancestor worship. Rituals and traditions continue to play a significant role in the Ami culture. The largest and most important ceremony is the annual millet harvest festival, also known as the “Good Year” Festival. Just like Chinese and Western New Year celebrations, this is a time for families and friends to gather together and reinforce both personal and divine relationships. Each village decides for itself when the Harvest Festival starts, usually in late August or early September, and how long it lasts, usually between

Boys coming by in turn to sing and dance in front of the elders, 1989. PHOTO BY UBE YAMAGUCHI.
one and seven days. Tribal officials announce the dates at least a month in advance; because it marks the end of one growing season and the coming of another, the festival starts at night.

The festival is a time in which the rigorous organization of the age-set system in Ami culture is still apparent. Women are not allowed to participate in the festival on the first day, but they play an important part in the closing ceremonies. The villagers dress in colorful traditional attire and sing and dance in honor of the spirits; rice and homemade wines are served. Sports and symbolic open-sea fishing are also observed as part of the festivities. The biggest festival is held in Hualien, the largest town on the east coast. It has become one of Taiwan’s main tourist attractions.

Bent Nielsen

Further Reading


An Lushan (An Shi) Rebellion

An-Shi Zhi Luân 安史之乱

The An Lushan Rebellion (755–763 CE) was an uprising against the Tang dynasty by a rapid succession of four rebel emperors of mixed Turkic-Sogdian ethnicity, whose ancestors came from present-day Uzbekistan. The event generated a rich cultural heritage recounting the devastation of the country, and it romanticized the folly of Emperor Xuanzong and his beloved imperial concubine Yang.

On 16 December 755 CE, An Lushan (703–757), or Rokshan (Persian for “light”), swept south from Fanyang (today’s Beijing region) with a multiethnic army of 150,000–200,000 troops (Xi, Malgal, Tongra, Khitan, and Chinese) and mounted a catastrophic rebellion against Tang dynasty China (618–907) in the name of a new dynasty, Yan. In the next seven years the Tang capitals of Chang’an and Luoyang were occupied by a rapid succession of four rebel emperors of mixed Turkic-Sogdian ethnicity (An Lushan and his son An Qingxu and Shi Siming and his son Shi Chaoyi), whose ancestors came from present-day Uzbekistan and spoke a Persian (Iranian) language. The An Lushan Rebellion was more than a significant military event in Tang China; in literary and artistic circles it generated a rich cultural heritage that recounted the devastation of the country and romanticized the tragedy and folly of Emperor Xuanzong (reigned 712–756) and his beloved imperial concubine Yang (719–756), who had formerly been the wife of one of his sons.

This tomb figure of a warrior, in pottery painted with color and gold, from the end of the seventh century (Tang dynasty) is in the collection of the Historical Museum, Xi’an, Shaanxi Province. The features of this Tang warrior’s face suggest that he was descended at least partially from Central Asian forebears; military armor such as this figure wears was in use at the time of the An Lushan Rebellion. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Chinese primary and secondary sources vilify An Lushan as a semi-sinicized military governor of three strategic provinces in the northeast (Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hebei) whose rebellion brought widespread famine and deaths by the millions. The narrative is focused on the palace spectacle, where the obese and exotic-looking An Lushan had first convinced Emperor Xuanzong of his loyalty to the Tang throne through over a decade of frontier defense against the border peoples. When summoned to the Tang court, An Lushan entertained the women of the court while dressed as a baby and was adopted as a son by the imperial concubine Yang. Her cousin, Prime Minister Yang Guozhong, repeatedly warned that An Lushan harbored a seditious intent, and indeed An Lushan rebelled, and his forces quickly cut off access to the Grand Canal, the economic lifeline that connected the economies of the north and the south. The rebellion drove Emperor Xuanzong and his entourage to seek refuge in Sichuan, but at the Mawei postal station his soldiers executed Yang Guozhong and forced the suicide of the imperial concubine Yang, whom they blamed for provoking An Lushan and plunging the country into civil war. Xuanzong abdicated in favor of his son Suzong (reigned 756–762), who enlisted the assistance of the Uighur cavalry to crush the rebels. Both emperors died before the rebellion came to a conclusion in January 763, when the
much-diminished Tang dynasty allowed the rebel generals, previously connected with An Lushan, to retain their military governorships in the northeast.

**Origins of the Rebellion**

Scholarship in the West has produced translations of An Lushan’s biography in the official histories and probed deeper into the political and military developments that led to the rebellion. A patron of the arts and literature, Emperor Xuanzong has been credited with Tang’s golden age of peace and prosperity at home and abroad until the rebellion occurred. He is blamed for supporting his prime minister, Li Linfu (d. 752), whose political and military reforms in 736–752 weakened the central government and gave rise to regionalism and separatism in the northeast provinces, the base for An Lushan’s operations. In 749 Li dealt a death blow to the cost-effective *fubing* (garrison soldiery) system of soldier-cultivators, in which soldiers farmed the land in the growing season and at other times undertook military exercises and tours of duty at the capitals and the frontiers. Expenditures were kept low as the soldier-cultivators provided for their own food, equipment, and horses in return for larger land allocations and exemption from taxes and unpaid public labor. The garrison soldiery system was totally replaced by a professional army, accounting for the largest single expenditure of the central government because salaries, food, and equipment were now state expenses. Eighty-five percent of these career soldiers were placed under military governors, who had large staffs and generous funds to direct the loyalty of their soldiers to themselves rather than to the Tang throne. Contrary to the tradition of selecting military governors from the aristocracy and bureaucracy, Li Linfu appointed non-Chinese career military officers to the frontier provinces to carry out an aggressive and precarious foreign policy. In 751 Gao Xianzhi, a Tang general of Korean ancestry, lost the Battle of Talas (in Kyrgyzstan) to the Arabs, after which Tang China relinquished control over Tashkent and Ferghana in central Asia. An Lushan and Shi Siming, career military men from the Turkic-Sogdian disporic communities in Beijing, benefited enormously from Li Linfu’s military policies and exploited the discontent of the northeast population against the Tang dynasty’s discriminatory measures. The military governors were in charge of the civil and military administration, and as they increased the size of their armies, their provinces also became new centers of trade. Rebellion was ripe in the northeast provinces, which had a direct invasion route to Luoyang and were located closer than the Tang capitals to the rich south.

**Outcome of the Rebellion**

The Tibetans and Uighurs were the winners in the rebellion. The Tibetans saw the opportunity to dominate the provinces of Gansu and Ningxia when the Tang
government withdrew frontier troops to defend the capitals. In 760 the Tibetan king, Trisong Detsen (reigned 755–797), invaded Sichuan Province and exacted annual payments of silk from Tang China; in late 763 he charged into Chang’an and installed a pretender to the Tang throne. The Uighurs, who had earlier assisted the Tang dynasty with troops and horses to crush the rebel forces, now drove the Tibetans out and were paid with princess brides and a lucrative horse trade.

The Tang dynasty survived the rebellion but never recovered its external prestige and internal stability. The central government accepted the autonomy of the northeast provinces and lost 25 to 30 percent of the tax base. The financial structure of the dynasty had collapsed during the rebellion, and the taxation system had to be overhauled by 780, when the poll tax in kind (grain, cloth, corvee [labor]), based on the number of people in the household, was replaced with a twice-yearly tax payable in cash. The southward shift of population from the war-torn northeast to the Huai and Yangzi regions gave new importance to the central and southern parts of the country as the chief source of revenue for the central government.

The rebellion was a turning point in the history of Tang China in that the dynasty never recovered its strength and prestige, and the dynasty survived only with drastic changes to the provincial administration and tax systems.

Jennifer W. JAY

Further Reading
The Analects, containing the sayings of the philosopher Confucius and his followers, is one of the most influential texts in Chinese philosophy. Until 1905 mastery of the Analects was required for the imperial civil service examination.

The sayings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) and his disciples are recorded in the Analects, a text that influenced government service and education in China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan for more than two thousand years.

The Analects (Chinese Lunyu) is one of the most influential texts in Chinese philosophy. The disciples of Confucius and their followers compiled it, although historians debate exactly when, as shown by the following opinions of Confucian scholars. D. C. Lau maintains the traditional view that the first fifteen books were written shortly after Confucius’s death and that the remaining five books were written by the second generation of disciples. John Makeham argues that the changing textual material did not settle into its present form until 150 BCE, while A. Taeko Brooks and E. Bruce Brooks suggest that books 4 through 11 are the oldest, that books 9 through 11 were written by second-generation disciples, and what remains was written at different times. By 55 BCE the Analects was basically in its present form, the fragments excavated at Dingzhou indicate.

The Analects is the first of the so-called Four Books, the Confucian texts whose mastery was required for imperial civil service examinations until they were abolished in 1905. The Four Books are the Analects, the Men-tius, the Great Learning, and Centrality and Commonality, which is often mistranslated as the Golden Mean.

The Analects is made up of brief statements attributed mostly to Confucius; some are attributed to his disciples or to rulers. Modern readers generally are struck by the brevity of the statements and by the apparent lack of sustained prose or argument, which may well have been Confucius’s method of teaching. He expected his students to be eager to learn: He gave them only one corner of the square, and if they did not return with the other three corners, he would not review their lesson (Analects 7:8).

The general goal of the text is to guide the reader in self-cultivation so that the reader can become a moral example for others. For example, a reader might find the proper way to live and behave by practicing various virtues (de), thereby becoming a humane person (ren zhe) or a prince of virtue (junzi, usually translated as “gentleman”). In the Analects humanity or benevolence (ren) is the most important virtue; it is mentioned more than one hundred times. Ren is an achievement concept: A person is not born humane but rather must learn to become humane. Ren means to love others (Analects 12:22). The best way to express human kindness is the practice of ritual action (li). Ritual action is not restricted to state and religious functions but rather covers the spectrum of human behavior. Pragmatically speaking, children first must learn filial piety (xiao) and brotherly love (di) at home; then, as they grow up, they can extend their family love to others in the form of ren.
Confucius stressed literacy, study, and learning to develop moral wisdom. Rote memorization is not sufficient; one also must be thoughtful. He also expected his disciples to be loyal and to do what was proper, especially in government service. When the disciple Zigong asked if there is a single word that a person can use as guidance, Confucius replied that perhaps it would be empathy (shu): to “never do to another what you do not desire” (Analects 15:24, 12:2).

James D. SELLMANN

Further Reading

Is it not a great joy to have friends coming from afar?
有朋自远方来，不亦乐乎?
You pénɡ zì yuǎn fānɡ lái, bú yì lè hū?
Ancestor Worship

Jìdiàn zǔxiān 祭奠祖先

Devotees of nearly every religious tradition in China participate in ancestor worship, the rituals in which one commemorates, communicates with, or makes sacrifices to one’s deceased relatives. It is among the oldest and most enduring of Chinese religious practices.

Ancestor worship is the ritualized commemoration of, communication with, and sacrifice to one’s deceased relations. Even though the cult of ancestors frequently has been described as Confucian, devotees of nearly every religious tradition in China practice ancestor worship. Indeed, it is among the oldest and most enduring of Chinese religious practices, and whether Chinese participate in ancestor worship may function as an indicator of their “Chinese-ness.” For this reason Chinese Muslims and Christians, who historically have eschewed ancestor worship on doctrinal grounds, sometimes have faced questions about the authenticity of their ethnic or national identities.

Through the influence of Confucianism on China’s neighboring cultures, Chinese norms for venerating deceased kin have spread across east Asia. In spite of repressions of traditional religious activity in mainland China and forceful trends toward modernization and secularization throughout east Asia, ancestor worship remains a vital component of community life in China, its surrounding region, and throughout the worldwide Chinese diaspora.

Early History

The earliest known Chinese writings document the practice of ancestor worship among the rulers of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). Shang court diviners used oracle bones (jiǎgǔ), cattle scapulas, and turtle plastrons...
heated over a fire to pose questions to Shang royal ancestors, to whom they erected temples and offered sacrifices. Shang ancestor cult and Shang divination shared a common purpose: to maintain harmonious relations between this world and the next for the benefit of the human community. The questions or charges (mingci) inscribed on oracle bones were formulated as possible outcomes of a current situation: “In the next ten days, there will perhaps be no disasters.” “Today it will not rain.” Some charges concern the ancestor worship itself: “On the next day, we should not make offering to Ancestor Yi.” Shang diviners and their royal patrons seem to have believed that ancestors, as former human beings, maintained some interest in mortal affairs and that they were more approachable, intelligible, and consistent than other supernatural agents—such as deities of natural forces or entities, or Shang Di, the “High God,” who may have been an amalgamation of long-deceased kings—who were more remote, mysterious, and capricious. Even so, the content of Shang charges indicates that the ancestors were blamed for misfortune as well as credited with blessings.

Both sacrifices to and consultations of ancestral spirits were coordinated according to a bureaucratic calendar regulated by the state. It is unknown whether Shang commoners consulted their deceased kin or otherwise participated in ancestor worship, but the ubiquity of the practice in almost all later Chinese cultural history suggests that they did. What is clear is the powerful and persistent link between two perennial Chinese religious concerns, the relationship of the living with the dead (ancestor worship), and the significance of the past and present for the future (divination). Shang ancestor worship also unified for the first time what would become two important strands of Chinese religious life: kinship hierarchy and

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A Buddhist temple offering. The altar holds an incense burner, a lotus candle for eternal life, fruit, flowers, and wine, as well as special prayers for ancestors. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
state bureaucracy. As the Shang lost power to the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), royal divination and sacrifice to royal ancestors continued, but increasingly divination on behalf of the ruler became decoupled from the ancestors and linked to more impersonal cosmic processes. By the late Warring States period (475–221 BCE), Chinese discourse about divination tended to focus on cosmological forces such as yin (dark, female, moist, receptive energies) and yang (lucid, male, arid, active energies), the moral qualities of the diviner, or both. Yet ancestor worship remained a vital part of Chinese life.

Confucian Perspectives

While adherents of nearly every Chinese religious movement or philosophical school during Warring States seem to have practiced ancestor worship, the Confucians made it the focal point of their moral and spiritual message. The Confucian anthology known as the Lunyu (Analects) records several sayings of Confucius (Kongzi, c. 551–479 BCE) on the importance of reverence (jing) for one’s ancestors: “Observe what a person has in mind to do when his father is alive, and then observe what he does when his father is dead. If, for three years, he makes no changes to his father’s ways, he can be said to be a good son” (Analects 1:11). Subsequent Confucian texts all refer to ancestor worship approvingly and commend it as a means of cultivating the virtue of filial piety (xiao) as well as instilling harmonious relations in society. It is not always clear whether classical Confucian authors maintain belief in the supernatural existence or power of ancestors, but their reverence for ancestor worship as a core element in the spiritual life is unambiguous.

With the rise of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), which soon endorsed Confucianism as its official ideology, ancestor worship was incorporated into the systematic thought of the period, which both embraced cosmological notions about yin and yang and tended to project the bureaucratic structure of this world onto the next. Accordingly, human beings were thought to possess two distinct souls or spiritual essences. One, the hun, was identified with yang; light, ethereal, and intellectual, it was said to ascend and become an ancestor (zu) at death. By contrast, one’s po soul—dark, gravid, and sensual—was supposed to remain with the entombed corpse and become a ghost (gui). Rites for the dead then became ways in which to guarantee that the deceased’s hun and po separated properly and reached their appointed destinations. If family members displeased the dead or performed funerary rituals inadequately, they risked prompting the gui to leave the grave and wander, wreaking havoc on the living. Conversely, the failure to maintain reverence through ancestor worship could inspire the zu to abandon its advocacy for the living within the complex celestial bureaucracy envisioned by Han writings.

Archaeological and art-historical evidence suggests that, by the end of the Han dynasty, persons at nearly
all levels of Chinese society regularly worshipped their ancestors. The goal of ancestor worship became ensuring that one’s dead relations did indeed become ancestors, rather than ghosts: supernatural powers that were benevolent and remote, rather than malevolent and proximate. On this point it is important to note that, beginning with Han texts, ancestors can be described as *shen* (spirits), a term that also means “gods.” Indeed, the boundary between ancestors and deities is fluid, such that some ancestors became gods over time through promotion within the celestial bureaucracy.

**Buddhist Contributions**

Along with the ideas of afterlife and goals of ancestor ritual, these Han-era concepts represent all but one important element in subsequent Chinese ancestor worship. That final element was contributed by Buddhism, which was introduced to China sometime around the middle of the Han dynasty. Emerging from a quite different religious milieu than that of ancient China, Buddhism brought the notion of karmic retribution— whereby one’s deeds, or misdeeds, conditioned the quality of one’s rebirths in a cyclical existence—to the many Chinese who were disenchanted with Confucianism as its fortunes faded with the collapse of the Han dynasty in the third century. Chinese converts to Buddhism who took monastic vows were accused of betraying their families and abandoning their ritual obligations to ancestors. Citing the doctrine of karma, many responded by arguing that their entrance into monastic life could only benefit their families and honor their ancestors by bringing karmic merit to both. As Buddhism wove itself into the fabric
of Chinese culture, this argument proved persuasive to all but the most doctrinaire Confucians. And as sectarian Daoist movements proliferated between the Han and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties, these too presented their rites and institutions as ways of serving the ancestors, even as they also catered to quite personal concerns, such as individual immortality.

Despite the widespread practice of ancestor worship in ancient and medieval China, formalized ancestor cult was confined largely to the ruling classes through the Tang dynasty. It was not until the Confucian revival of the Song dynasty (960–1279) that elite practices, such as detailed genealogical record keeping and the construction of temples dedicated solely to ancestor worship, became part of everyday life for commoners.

**Observance for All**

Song emperors, who relied upon Confucian scholars to help stabilize and legitimize their regime, listened when Confucian thinkers such as Cheng Yi (1033–1107) advocated genealogical research and ancestral temples for nonelites. Later Confucian reformers, such as Zhu Xi (1130–1200), devised ritual manuals that helped formalize and popularize ancestor worship among the lower classes. By the end of the Southern Song period (1127–1279), ancestor worship according to canonical Confucian procedures could be found at nearly all levels of Chinese society. As the Song regime lost prestige and territory to non-Chinese powers—such as the Jurchen peoples, who overthrew Song rule in northern China in 1127, or the Mongols, who defeated the final Song emperor’s forces in 1279 and ruled China as the Yuan dynasty until 1368—ancestor worship became one way in which to bolster Chinese ethnic and national self-confidence.

**Current Role**

The unprecedented creation and distribution of wealth during the Song prompted the development of a new role for ancestor worship: safeguarding property claims. Detailed genealogies furnished the basis of a family’s ancestral rolls. These could, in turn, be used to certify a family’s claim to estates or trade monopolies. Thus, at the dawn of the modern era, as China became one of the world’s most prosperous nations, ancestor worship and its related practices proved crucial for the maintenance and transmission of prosperity.

By the late imperial period (from the founding of the Ming dynasty in 1368 to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912), ancestor worship had attained the form in which it is found today. Using genealogical records kept by senior members, families memorialize deceased kin using name plaques or tablets placed on home altars or in family temples. In some rural villages, in which most residents share a common family name, the primary venue of ancestor worship may be a public temple. Offerings of incense, cooked rice, or fresh fruit are made to ancestors who remain within living memory, usually only those of the last two or three generations. Popular understandings suggest that, much like the deceased kings consulted by Shang royal diviners, the power and willingness of ancestors to assist the living declines as the generational gap between them widens. Over time, as ancestors recede from the consciousness of the living, their name plaques or tablets are ritually burned.

**Important Festivals**

While ancestor worship may take place daily, the two occasions in the Chinese ritual year in which it is most prominent are the Ghost-Feeding Festival (Zhongyuanjie or Yulanpen), which is celebrated in late summer, and the Clear and Bright Festival (Qingmingjie), which is celebrated in early spring. Zhongyuanjie is observed on the thirteenth day of the seventh lunar month, which in turn is known as Ghost Month (Guiyue) because it is at this time that the spirits of the dead are supposed to wander the earth. Both Buddhist and Daoist elements are prominent in the celebration of this festival, which commemorates the rescue of a suffering mother in an undesirable realm of rebirth by her filial son. In addition to Buddhist and Daoist liturgies for the relief of ancestors suffering in their rebirths, Zhongyuanjie features the offering of items such as paper houses, clothing, consumer commodities, and elaborate meals to the ancestors. During Qingmingjie, popularly known as Tomb-Sweeping Day, families visit and clean their ancestors’ burial places, conduct worship services, and share festive meals. Thus
during Zhongyuanjie the dead visit the living, and during Qingmingjie the living seek out the dead.

A Lasting Practice

Like other emblems of traditional Chinese religious life, ancestor worship was the target of severe criticism and persecution when Communist leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was in power. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), in particular, popular domestic rituals, such as ancestor worship, were suppressed by the state, and community venues for ancestor worship, such as village temples, were destroyed or used for secular purposes. The traditional practice of burying one’s dead was condemned in favor of cremation. Cemeteries were converted to agricultural uses. Zealous young students supervised the burning of home altars and ancestral tablets.

The death of Mao relaxed, but did not end, government censure of ancestor worship. The Eleventh Party Congress of 1979 proclaimed that, although “certain long-standing activities such as ancestor worship” were “a kind of superstition,” henceforth they would not be proscribed “as long as they do not affect collective political and economic activities,” and that the government placed its faith in “patient persuasion and lasting education in science, culture, and atheism” to root out such practices eventually.

Since the 1980s, both public and private ancestor worship have become more prominent in mainland China, and these practices have remained strong in Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as in overseas Chinese communities.

Jeffrey L. RICHEY

Further Reading


Drain the pond to get all the fish.

竭泽而渔

Jié zé ér yú.
Anhui Province

Anhui is a small, land-locked province in eastern China about the size of the state of North Carolina. The province boasts a rich cultural history; many of China’s most important ancient philosophers and several types of traditional Chinese opera were born there.

Anhui was officially established as a province in 1667 during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The word “Anhui” is a portmanteau word derived from the Anqing and Huizhou prefectures. With Hefei as its capital city (with an estimated 2007 population of 4.79 million), Anhui Province has fifty-six counties with a total area of about 139,000 square kilometers (approximately the size of the state of North Carolina). It borders on Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Hubei provinces, and lies in the middle and lower valleys of the Yangzi (Chang) and Huai rivers.

Anhui is one of the more important agricultural provinces in China, with products ranging from rice, wheat, cotton, vegetable oil crops, tea, and silkworm cocoons. Its gross domestic product (GDP) for 2007 was 734.57 billion yuan, up 13.9 percent from the previous year, and per capital GDP reached 12,015 yuan.

Its population includes several ethnic minority groups: Hui, She, Manchu, Zhuang, and Miao. Han Chinese make up the vast majority of the population in the province; the She and Hui ethnic groups are the two largest minorities.

Anhui abounds in natural resources, with large mineral deposits of coal, iron ore, and copper ore. With two major rivers—the Huai River in the north and the Yangzi (Chang) River in the south, running through the

View of Huangshan (Mount Huang) in Anhui Province. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
province from west to east, Anhui is divided into three regions: Huaibei (north of Huai River), Jianghuai (between the two rivers), and Jiangnan (south of the Yangzi River). Lake Chaohu, in the center of the province, with an area of about 800 square kilometers, is one of the five largest freshwater lakes in China, although like many of China’s lakes it suffers from heavy pollution. Many lakes also cover the southeastern part of the province near the Yangzi River. The province enjoys a warm temperate, semi-humid monsoon climate, with annual temperatures averaging between 14–17 degrees centigrade. Annual rainfall ranges from about 800 to 1,800 millimeters.

In 1990, Huangshan (Mount Huang), known to poets and painters through history as one of the loveliest mountains in China, was added to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s
Anhui Province (UNESCO) World Heritage List (a list that seeks to identify, protect, and preserve examples of cultural and natural heritage around the world). In addition, two traditional villages of Yi County (Xidi and Hongcun) in Anhui Province were also added as cultural properties in 2000.

Historically, Anhui is the birthplace of much of China’s ancient culture, and it remained an important part of China’s cultural development for centuries. Scientists have discovered a historical site in Fanmao County where human activities more than 2 million years old can be traced. Moreover, along the Huai River basin, many philosophers, such as Laozi (credited as the founder of Daoism), Zhuang Zi, and Guan Zhong were born; their philosophies influenced more than 2,000 years of Chinese history. Operas in several forms have been developed in the province.

Anhui has a high concentration of traditional products related to calligraphy: Xuanzhou (today Xuancheng) and Huizhou (today Huangshan City) are revered for producing xuan paper (often called rice paper, but actually handmade from bark) and hui ink, respectively, which are traditionally considered the best types of paper and ink for Chinese calligraphy. She County is famous for the She Inkstone, one of the most preferred types of inkstones (a mortar-like stone used for grinding and holding ink) in the world.

The Editors

Further Reading
Antidrug Campaigns

Dàguǐmó sàngǔ yùndòng 大规模扫毒运动

Chinese regimes from the Qing (1644–1912) to the People’s Republic have struggled to control problems with drugs, most notably opium, a particularly complex issue intertwined with Chinese politics and perceptions of the nation’s social and economic health and advancement. Despite campaigns against opium, eliminating it has proved as elusive for China as it has for most of the rest of the world.

For more than a century, between the end of the First Opium War in 1842 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s name was virtually synonymous with drug problems, particularly those related to the consumption, cultivation, and sale of opium. Opium not only was considered a problem in terms of widespread addiction and impoverishment but also became a powerful symbol of all that was ailing the “sick man of Asia”: By the mid-nineteenth century the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was wracked by internal rebellions, beset by the demands of aggressive imperialist powers, and weakened by severe financial strains.

The passivity of the seemingly stereotypical Chinese opium smoker seemed an apt metaphor for the backwardness of the traditional imperial system and its alleged inability to shake itself out of its stupor. However, the reality was quite different. Most Chinese opium smokers were not emaciated, lethargic addicts, and the Chinese state made numerous attempts to eliminate what it saw as the problem of opium, launching several nationwide suppression campaigns that achieved varying degrees of success.

China’s relationship with opium is lengthy and complex. Chinese had long valued the drug for its myriad medical and sexual benefits and even for the beauty of the poppy flower. By the mid-Qing dynasty, however, China’s rulers began to worry about the impact of the drug on the elite class. China’s first anti-opium edict in 1729 struck at opium dealers and the proprietors of opium dens. Opium imports were forbidden in 1796, but the number of chests steadily increased to meet the growing Chinese demand. Two hundred chests of foreign opium (at around 61 kilograms per chest) were imported in 1729, but by 1838, on the eve of the First Opium War (1839–1842), that number had increased a hundredfold.

Early Efforts

Since the mid-nineteenth century the Chinese government has conducted four noteworthy anti-opium campaigns, initiated by each of China’s three major regimes. The first campaign, led by Lin Zexu (1785–1850), China’s most famous anti-opium activist, was largely confined to the port city of Guangzhou (Canton) immediately before the outbreak of the First Opium War. The clandestine drug trade had proven so lucrative for foreign merchants that it generated a heated debate at the highest levels of the Qing court in 1836. Several high officials pushed to legalize the drug so that the state could profit in the short
term while gaining a degree of control that would eventually allow it to eliminate the trade. Others opposed the drug trade not only because it was illegal but also because opium’s addictive nature harmed individual health and social stability.

Ultimately, the state committed itself to prohibition and named Lin Zexu imperial commissioner with the authority to eliminate China’s opium problem. The 1839 anti-opium campaign focused on Guangzhou, where the geographical isolation of China’s foreign trade under the Canton system meant an especially acute opium problem that represented a galling affront to Qing law and sovereignty. Lin paired an educational initiative with the registration and treatment of smokers, the recruitment of a network of informants to discourage smugglers, and harsh restrictions that made smoking a capital offense in certain circumstances. Even more dramatically, he demanded that foreign merchants hand over more than twenty thousand chests of opium and blockaded the merchants in their warehouses until they complied. Lin then destroyed the drug, infuriating the British and setting the stage for the First Opium War.

China’s loss in the First Opium War brought outrage and humiliation to the Chinese, but the opium trade itself remained untouched and illegal until the Second Opium War (1856–1860), when a tariff was set on each chest of imported opium. The amount of opium imported into China soared until the late 1870s and early 1880s, when competition from Chinese poppy farmers began to make serious inroads on the market for the Indian-grown drug.

Although many Chinese were involved in the cultivation, preparation, distribution, sale, and consumption of opium, popular sentiment was mixed. The Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) prohibited opium smoking among its followers, and a number of popular heterodox sects (contrary to or different from an acknowledged standard of belief) and fraternal organizations were dedicated to fighting opium and other intoxicants and vices. Ironically, the Qing government’s battle against the Taipings proved so expensive that the government initiated the lijin (internal transit tax) on all goods traveling through the country to raise revenue, and opium was among the most frequently taxed commodities. By 1890 the Qing state bowed to the inevitable and quietly legalized the cultivation of poppies in China, and although the Qing attempted to use taxation to control the trade, by the early twentieth century opium had become a crucial cash crop, a cornerstone of foreign trade, and a mainstay of China’s medical scene and social life.

As the ailing Qing dynasty clung to power, China’s Manchu rulers launched what was termed the New Policies (xin zheng), a set of reforms designed to modernize the Chinese economy, military, and political system and eliminate what they felt were backward or harmful social customs, such as footbinding and opium smoking. The state used nationalism as the motivation for reform, but opium was so intimately associated with Chinese society that when the Guangxu emperor (reigned 1875–1908) issued an edict launching a ten-year, nationwide anti-opium campaign in September 1906, it met with considerable skepticism inside and outside China.

In fact, the campaign garnered considerable success; it was well conceived and modern in its implementation, although it tended to be more successful in urban areas than in the rural villages and hinterland, where most of China’s poppies were harvested. Bolstered by a treaty signed in 1908 with the British government, in which the latter pledged to reduce the amount of opium exported

A photo from 1874 shows a man addicted to opiates smoking his pipe in a restaurant.
from India into China by one-tenth over a ten-year period, the effort targeted both the supply of and demand for opium. Opium dens were shut down, opium smokers were registered and given photographic licenses to purchase diminishing rations of the drug from licensed shops, treatment centers were opened, and officials attempted to prohibit the cultivation of poppies. The task was daunting, and because the central state could offer little or no funding for suppression in the provinces, much of the campaign was funded by fines on violators of the new restrictions. Chinese officials and reformers were often encouraged and sometimes assisted by foreign missionaries who viewed opium smoking as immoral and socially devastating, not to mention an obstacle to conversion. Ironically, the missionaries who were so critical of the Chinese tended to come from countries that not only profited from the opium trade with China but also widely consumed opium and accepted it as a medical panacea.

The numerous groups with vested interests in continuing the opium trade did not give up easily. However, the campaign had achieved enough success by 1911 that when the agreement with the British was renegotiated in May of that year, China was given the opportunity to end British imports in less than ten years if it could prove that Chinese poppy cultivation had ceased. Smoking continued secretly in many locales, but poppy farmers were the most likely to resist violently and in large numbers. The new republican state continued the anti-opium campaign, but with a new focus on eliminating cultivation, often by force. And as the government cracked down on opium, other opiates, such as morphine and heroin, became increasingly popular.

**Trafficking Rebounds**

As the country fragmented into warlord regimes after the death of republican President Yuan Shikai in 1916, the absence of a strong central government and the growing warlord demand for resources meant a resurgence of trafficking in opium and other drugs. International outcry and the work of Chinese drug reformers, such as the International Anti-Opium Association and the National Anti-Opium Association, had little effect on the situation until Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) established his Nationalist republic at Nanjing in 1927. In 1935, after other informal efforts, Chiang announced the launching of the Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium and Drugs, a plan with the express intent of bringing the drug trade under government control to eventually eliminate it. Historians continue to debate Chiang’s motivations, but the state did manage to gain considerable control over revenue that otherwise would have fallen into the hands of rival warlords.
although one of Chiang’s more questionable actions involved Du Yuesheng (1887–1951), notorious leader of the infamous Shanghai Green Gang and longtime opium trafficker, in the campaign. As China became engulfed in war, Chiang’s government fled to Chongqing, and the drug trade continued to generate much-needed revenue for the Japanese and the Chinese.

Not long after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched another nationwide antinarcotics campaign from 1950 to 1952. The new Chinese state sought to eliminate all vestiges of what it saw as the old, backward, and debauched regimes that had come before. A new China required strong, healthy citizens, citizens who were not caught up in frivolous, destructive old vices such as prostitution, gambling, and opium smoking. The comprehensive goals of the CCP initiative in many ways mirrored those of the effort launched in the late Qing, and the Chinese government initiated a mass campaign intended to eliminate opium consumption, cultivation, and distribution, while providing treatment for habitual users. The first stage relied on public trials and mass arrests, but the tumultuous first years of the new state precluded a concentrated, consistent focus on the antidrug campaign. Beginning in late 1952 the second phase was better organized and relied on mass mobilization and intensive propaganda as well as harsher punishments for violators. Hundreds were executed as the battle against opium was incorporated into broader campaigns against corruption. The campaigns were part of a comprehensive effort on the part of the new state to penetrate and control local society, and they succeeded in eliminating much of China’s illicit drug use.

Since that early campaign the Chinese government has initiated several antidrug campaigns, most of which have resulted in widespread imprisonment and some high-profile executions. Most have focused on traditionally remote and hard-to-govern minority populations, especially in Yunnan Province, part of the infamous Golden Triangle region that borders Myanmar (Burma) and Laos. Post-Mao regimes have relied less on the mass participation that was the hallmark of Maoist campaigns and have had to deal with several developments that promote increased drug use—more expendable cash, a growing income disparity, and the emergence of an enormous “floating” population of migrants whose members flock to the cities and often exist beyond government control.

No Leniency

Twenty-first-century China faces drug problems similar to those confronted by other modern and modernizing societies, and the Chinese government takes an aggressive stance. Drug addicts are required to register with the government, and although close to 1 million had done so at the outset of the twenty-first century, far more have undoubtedly hesitated for fear of punishment. In the past addicts were indeed considered criminals and punished accordingly, but the current official approach to addiction is that it requires treatment. However, many rehabilitation centers use a “detoxification through labor” regimen, and there is no leniency for drug trafficking. Tens of thousands of people involved in the production or trafficking of drugs have been arrested, and hundreds have been executed, but the problem continues to grow. So-called designer drugs such as Ecstasy have become popular, and Chinese authorities are concerned about the spread of methamphetamine production and consumption. Ironically, however, most of China’s registered addicts are hooked on heroin, derived from the opium poppy. Heroin trafficking remains especially difficult to control in Yunnan Province, and as poppy production soars in Afghanistan, that border has also become a problem. To the ultimate chagrin of Chinese authorities, as the economy flourishes and many rural Chinese want a piece of urban prosperity, poppy farming has reemerged in remote areas of China.

Joyce A. MADANCY

Further Reading


Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign

Fǎnjìngshén Wūrán Yùndòng
反精神污染运动

The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign, waged against corrupt and bourgeois ideological influences in Chinese society, took place in the autumn of 1983. Within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which had largely marginalized the factions of its late leader, Mao Zedong, this campaign was part of a struggle between reformers and conservatives, the latter being critical of some aspects of post-Mao policies of the CCP.

The origins of the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign, which began formally in October 1983 as a movement targeting corrupt and bourgeois ideological influences in Chinese society, date to 1978, two years after Mao’s death, when the party began to reject the key Maoist concepts of class struggle and continuous revolution. Instead, the party advocated the “Four Modernizations,” namely, agriculture, industry, science/technology, and national defense (but not what dissidents called the “Fifth Modernization,” that is, democratization). It also advocated the policy of “reform and opening,” that is, reforming the economic system and opening China to trade with other countries, especially those in the West.

In late 1979 and 1980 forces associated with CCP leader Deng Xiaoping and his policies of reform began calling for the establishment of a “socialist spiritual civilization,” a set of ethical principles to be followed by all members of society, ignoring any notion of class. These reforms provoked a reaction within the CCP. An emerging conservative faction became increasingly concerned about the implications of these reforms for Chinese socialism. As part of a wider strategy to combat the excess and errors of these reforms, conservatives tried to limit the spread of “bourgeois liberalization.” The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983 was one aspect of this effort.

In 1980 conservatives publicly called on the party to combat “bourgeois liberalization.” In the autumn of 1983 calls to combat “spiritual pollution” per se began, although the campaign did not formally begin until the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee adopted the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation” on 11 October 1983. The decision called for the initiation of a three-year movement to consolidate the party, including forging greater ideological unity, rectifying work style, purifying party organizations, which meant removing those members who had risen to prominence during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), and fighting “spiritual pollution” while being clear that this campaign would not be a mass campaign like the Cultural Revolution in which the masses had been called on to evaluate and rectify the errors of party members.
Ideological Influences

The party’s campaign against “spiritual pollution” generally targeted corrupt and bourgeois ideological influences undermining the “Four Cardinal Principles,” socialist and communist causes, and the leadership of the party. More specifically, it targeted pornography, some forms of advertising, and—among intellectual and literary circles—such notions as humanism, alienation, and modernism.

Humanism and alienation are categories from the early writings of the German socialist Karl Marx that Maoists and other Marxists frequently dismissed as the immature writings of the “early Marx.” Humanism implies a universal human nature rather than one determined by material conditions and class struggle. Alienation suggests disaffection from this universal human nature and implies a critique of socialism by implying that even under socialism incorrect political and economic practices still cause alienation. Modernism, as a school of literature, was criticized for its implicit critique of not merely the Cultural Revolution but also virtually the entire history of the Chinese revolution.

Like the Cultural Revolution, which had failed to provide a clear definition of class, the campaign against spiritual pollution never had a clearly defined, comprehensive, or concrete target. This ambiguity allowed critics of the unfettered reforms to attempt to expand the scope of the campaign. The critics were mainly some allies of Deng Xiaoping, such as Deng Liqun, Chen Yun, and Hu Qiaomu. Although they had all suffered during the Cultural Revolution, they were still concerned about loosening the party’s control over intellectuals and culture and the spread of “ultra-individualism.” Critics of the party’s “reform” policies also included limited numbers of “leftist” party members. Because of the lack of a clear definition of “spiritual pollution,” critics rapidly attempted to extend the range of criticism to peasant entrepreneurs, who were seen as excessively focused on money, as well as forms of Western “decadence,” such as Western dress styles and permed hair.

A series of billboards along a street advertise everything from beauty cream to medicinal products. During the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign the Chinese government attempted to combat Western materialist influences without upsetting China’s economic growth. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN
Within two months of the campaign’s inception, because of fear that it would negatively affect foreign investment and trade, a key element of the “reform and opening” policy, Deng Xiaoping, who had initially supported the campaign, made it clear that it was to be reined in. By the end of 1983 it had ceased to exist in any meaningful fashion. Nonetheless, the campaign resulted in several of the more liberal opponents of the campaign in the higher levels of the party losing their positions.

Through the mid-1980s and after the 1989 “democracy movement” and Tiananmen protests, as well as the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, party conservatives who had supported the 1983 campaign against “spiritual pollution” continued to fight against “bourgeois liberalization” (such as discussions or advocacy of Western forms of democracy) and the policy of “peaceful evolution” (which, they believed, the West could use to undermine socialism in China). They even went so far as to characterize the reform road as a de facto road to capitalism.

Turning the Tide

However, in 1992 Deng Xiaoping undertook his six-week “Southern Tour” to the “special economic zones,” the controversial areas of experimentation showcasing the reform and opening policy, including significant foreign investment and new market-based forms of economic organization and development. The rapid economic development revealed by this trip turned the tide within the party decisively in favor of Deng’s overall policies of economic—but not political—reform, that is, economic reform without democratization.

China today is dominated by various groups of reformers whose policies have led to virtually unprecedented economic growth. However, with that growth has come increasing economic inequality, rising corruption, and many of the very practices criticized in the campaign against spiritual pollution and other subsequent campaigns.

Richard LEVY

Further Reading

Anyang was the center of Chinese culture and power during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). Archaeological excavations have unearthed many artifacts that showcase the importance and predominance of its civilization, most notably the famous Bronze Age “oracle bones.” Anyang’s Yin Xu excavation site became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2006.

Anyang, a prefecture-level city in today’s Henan Province, was the last royal center of the Shang dynasty from 1300 BCE to 1046 BCE. The Shang (1766–1045 BCE) were also named the Yin; therefore, Anyang is also called Yin Xu (Yin Ruins). Around 1300 BCE, King Pangeng moved his capital here, and the city reached the height of its development during King Wuding’s period (1250–1192 BCE). Eleven kings were buried in Anyang; all the kings’ tombs, along with the tombs of some members of the royal family, were at Houjiazhuang, north of the Huan River. Some lower-ranking elite were buried near Xiaotun village on the south of the river. A temple-and-palace complex, which formed the core city of Anyang, was built at Xiaotun, surrounded by an artificial trench and the river. Workshops for pottery, casting bronzes, bone working, and carving jade, as well as cemeteries, were spread out in a huge area. Beginning with the discovery of oracle bone inscriptions in 1899, fifteen excavations were undertaken from 1928 to 1937, and ongoing excavations have continued since 1950, but it is still too early to deduce the original city plan of the Shang capital.

The locations of the temples, palaces, and cemeteries for royalty and commoners, as well as human sacrificial pits, were based on a hierarchy and suggest social position. The orientation certainly was related to a religious, cultural, and social belief systems, and the Shang elite scrupulously adhered to these beliefs. The burial sites and the associated burial rituals tell us that the Shang people were possibly divided into clans. The layout of Anyang was configured in three distinct sections: the core city, the inner city, and the outer city. The social class and position of people buried in a royal cemetery can be determined by considering its distance from the core city: the farther the location from the core city, the lower the rank of its interred occupants. Moreover, even when the population increased and the city expanded, this layout did not change, showing that the belief in hierarchy remained very strong. The scale and sophistication of the hierarchical system in Anyang did not exist simultaneously in any other urban center in East Asia.

The advanced designs of the ritual bronzes cast in Anyang represent the quality of technology at the time and some of the greatest achievements of the Bronze Age civilization in Asia. Thirty types of bronze vessels of various sizes that were used for ritual offerings of food and liquor have been unearthed there. The excavated jade carvings discovered in Anyang are a part of the unique jade culture of China, and carved bones like the ones uncovered in Anyang have never been found anywhere else.
Anyang was the center of China at the peak of the Shang dynasty. Peoples or nations from as far away as the South China Sea paid tribute to the Shang, and many people who went to war with the Shang were captured and brought to Anyang to be sacrificed to the gods or to serve as slaves. By the very late Anyang period, the Zhou people grew stronger in the west, in today’s Shaanxi Province; they conquered the Shang in 1046 BCE.


WANG Ying

Further Reading


Seafood is already a staple in the Chinese diet, but domestic consumption is projected to rise 40 percent by 2020. Of China’s total seafood output, 64 percent comes from aquaculture (the farming of aquatic life), making it the only country in the world where the amount of cultivated seafood is greater than the wild catch.

Aquaculture—the farming of any aquatic life, including freshwater and saltwater fish, mollusks, shellfish, crustaceans, and plants—is a vibrant industry in China. Several varieties of carp compose most of the cultivated freshwater species; shellfish dominate the saltwater market. However, as China’s population becomes wealthier, demand is growing for higher-value species—notably grouper—which require high inputs of “trash fish,” thereby putting an increasing strain on wild stocks around the world. Aquatic plants, such as kelp, account for 27 percent of total aquaculture output. Since 1978, China’s aquaculture production has increased 490 percent, making it now the largest in the world, and accounting for 57 percent of the global output.

Aquaculture is China’s largest “farmed” export, with Japan, the United States, and South Korea as the main destinations. Local governments promote aquaculture as a poverty-alleviating industry and have therefore subsidized production of lucrative species such as tilapia. China supplies 70 percent of the tilapia imported into the United States and is also its fourth largest supplier of shrimp (shrimp and tilapia are the first and fifth most popular seafood, respectively, of U.S. consumers).

Aquaculture is practiced all over China and aquacultivated areas are increasing, with carp farms being the most widespread. However, other fish are restricted to regions for climate and environmental reasons. For example in 2006, Guangdong, Guanxi, and Hainan produced 81 percent of the nation’s tilapia; Hubei, Sichuan, and Jiangsu produced 56 percent of the nation’s catfish; Shandong, Fujian, Guangdong, and Liaoning provinces accounted for 80 percent of the total shellfish production; shrimp and prawns are produced mainly in Guangdong as well as Jiangsu, Guangxi, Zhejiang, and Hainan; and eel is produced mainly in Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi.

Because China’s waterways are highly polluted, food safety has become a major concern for Chinese aquaculture. Besides municipal and industrial wastewater contamination, mercury emissions from China’s coal-fired power plants are another potential source of aquaculture contamination. Statistics on mercury in Chinese fish are scarce, but Chinese coal is believed to be responsible for much of the mercury contamination in fish in the western United States.

International concern about food safety has cost China’s aquaculture dearly, as countries ban species they have discovered to be contaminated. Two major cases include the 2005 eel bans in Japan and the 2003 shrimp bans in the European Union—both devastated these important aquaculture sectors in China. Chinese consumers also are
increasingly concerned about water pollution, dangerous farming practices, and poor processing in the aquaculture industry that pose serious threats to human health. The rapid development of China’s aquaculture industry is also a major polluter of rivers, lakes, and coastal waters. Moreover, this industry’s huge demand for fishmeal is driving stock depletion in the oceans.

**Environmental Impacts**

Raising carnivorous species, such as salmon and shrimp, tends to produce some of the most detrimental environmental impacts because of the amount of antibiotics and waste they produce. However, hardier herbivorous fish that require fewer chemical and organic inputs can also create environmental problems when they are farmed too intensively. In China, the high-density farming of herbivorous fish increasingly faces the same challenges of disease, overmedication, and nutrient runoff as the country’s concentrated land-animal feeding operations. Some environmental impacts causing concern domestically and internationally include:

**Oxygen Depletion and Algae Blooms**

Runoff of uneaten food and effluent from fish farms is a growing problem in China. In the past, freshwater fish fed off naturally occurring organic material in ponds. However, the intensification of farming and the increased use of manufactured feed has led to more uneaten food, effluent, and pollutants in the waterways; this can cause eutrophication, the uncontrolled growth—and decomposition—of algae and other organisms that deplete the oxygen supply in the water, choking other life forms. For example, shrimp consume only 20 percent of their food on average; the rest washes out to sea or settles into the soil, fouling the ponds.

**Antibiotics, Pesticides, and Fungicides**

Many fish farmers are individuals, rather than companies, and they often over-apply or misuse antibiotics, pesticides, and fungicides to clear the water of other creatures, reduce parasites, control disease, and boost weight gain of seafood grown in severely overcrowded conditions. Antibiotics, either applied directly to the water or that have passed through the fishes’ digestive systems, are not biodegradable and persist in the surrounding environment, threatening wild fish stocks.

**Habitat Destruction**

Lucrative fish markets prompted many Chinese rice producers in the early 1990s to switch into intensive aquaculture production. This trend, in conjunction with rapid urbanization, raised concerns about grain security and led the Chinese government in 1994 to establish the Basic Farmland Protection Regulation, which enforced a zero net-loss of grain or oilseed farmland. Nevertheless, China’s aquaculture output continues to rise as more natural bodies of freshwater and more marine coastline are converted into fish farms. Diseases and pollution from overcrowded fish farms, particularly shrimp pools, are often pumped out into natural waterways, endangering native species.

**Monoculture and Invasive Species**

A major challenge for aquaculture is the need for fast-growing species that can withstand the conditions of farms, namely overcrowding and high levels of nutrients and ammonia. Monoculture of these fast-growing fish can lead to a reduction in genetic diversity and makes farms susceptible to diseases. The quest for fast-growing species also brings in foreign species that can become invasive. Amazonian snails, for example, were imported for food and are responsible for decimating 1,600 square kilometers of farmland in China, and countless acres of natural habitat. The other disadvantage of this type of farming is the possibility of an epidemic disease that destroys the stock. Before 1993, China was the world’s top shrimp producer until an epidemic of white spot decimated the shrimp population. The market has never fully recovered.

**Food Safety Concerns**

The Ministry of Health (Luan 2007) reported in March 2007 that 196 people died of food poisoning in China the
previous year. Unsafe and undercooked aquacultural products are an integral component of this total figure. A major challenge to food safety in China is the structure of the aquaculture industry. First, there are many widely scattered players involved in the production of the feed, the farming and the processing. It is thus highly challenging, and expensive, to standardize and monitor the veterinary care and processing of the fish. Second, there is a strong preference for live and undercooked fish in China, increasing the risks to consumers and highlighting the need for timely monitoring and testing.

While the Ministry of Health issues the regulations, food safety rests essentially in the hands of local government enforcers, which in the case of aquaculture often lack the motivation or capacity to monitor strictly. According to the Chinese scientist Lei Jilin in an interview with Xinhua News Agency, the local government agencies entrusted with monitoring fish-related food safety are either doing their jobs poorly or not at all. The Shanghai food-quality inspections appear to be the most successful, as they are often the first to discover large safety mishaps. Further complicating the food-safety issue and eroding consumer trust is the fact that, while investigations are publicly announced, the findings of the investigations of farms and market studies are often not publicized.

One final concern regarding herbivorous fish is the farming practice of using human and animal waste as feed. This practice has proved particularly suspicious with regards to avian influenza around Qinghai Lake where thousands of migratory birds fell ill in 2005 near several large carp farms and feed-manufacturing facilities. There is some speculation that poultry-litter-based fish feed may have played a role in spreading this disease to wild bird populations.
HIGH-PROFILE AQUACULTURE-RELATED FOOD SCARES FROM 2006 TO 2007

- 14 October 2008: Fish in Lake Tai found to contain an excessive amount of formaldehyde.
- 19 February 2008: China recalls pesticide-tainted mackerel from Japan two weeks after tainted dumpling scandal. Although these are believed to be added at the manufacturing stage, they still impact China’s seafood trade.
- 30 April 2007: The New York Times (Barboza & Barrionuevo) reported that melamine scrap, believed to have sickened 14,000 U.S. pets, is commonly used in fish feed in China. Melamine is added to animal feed as a synthetic nitrogen enhancer, making the feed appear to have more protein and increasing its value.
- 26 April 2007: Wal-Mart removed Chinese catfish from U.S. stores due to antibiotic contamination. It was the state of Alabama, not the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, that discovered the contamination.
- November 2006: Eleven out of fifteen samples of Mandarin fish from China tested positive for malachite green in Hong Kong.
- 22 November 2006: Carcinogens (chloramphenicol, malachite green, and furazolidone) were found in turbot in Shanghai. Turbot sales were subsequently suspended in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, and Taoyuan. Turbot is a species of flatfish with low disease resistance that requires considerable and careful veterinary input. One hundred percent of the Shanghai sample tested positive.

A fisherman carrying his “butterfly nets” in Zhejiang Province, 1979.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
October 2006: Taiwan banned imports of hairy or mitten crabs from China due to traces of carcinogens.

August 2006: 87 people were diagnosed with meningitis after eating raw or undercooked Amazonian snails in Beijing.

Some Positive Steps

With wild catch rapidly decreasing due to over-fishing and pollution in China’s freshwater and coastal areas, China must increasingly turn to aquaculture to supply its protein base. The trouble with aquaculture is essentially twofold: It uses rudimentary and even dangerous farming practices, and it has weak or nonexistent food-safety monitoring. The effect is environmental degradation and compromised human safety in both domestic and foreign markets.

DEVELOPMENT OF SAFER FEEDS AND FARMING METHODS

With aquaculture and demand for fish rising substantially in China, fish farming is intensifying. Feed is a major source of concern and an integral part of intensification. The Chinese government’s priority for food security has led it to commit considerable resources to agricultural and fish research that has produced some promising new options for feeds, fish species, and farming practices. Such research holds the promise of promoting ecologically safer fish-farming practices that also will help protect human health and limit China’s use of wild ocean fish as fishmeal. Some new feeds being developed include:

- Yeast-based feed. According to World Resources Institute, “Chinese researchers are developing a protein supplement based on yeast that can substitute for more than half the fishmeal in aquaculture feed preparations.”
- Soy-based feed. As of 2007, China’s aquaculture industry used 4.5 to 5 million metric tons of soy meal a year (Ellis & Turner 2007). Some species, such as tilapia, one of China’s staple fish, can tolerate 80 percent soy in their diets. Other high-value fish can tolerate only 10 percent soy; however, even a small reduction in ocean fishmeal dependence will relieve some stress on global oceans.

Another area of research is identifying fish species with higher survival rates and faster growth rates that may reduce the need for chemicals to sustain profitable production.

Integrated polyculture systems, once the norm in China, are a more sustainable solution. One living example is the rice-field carp of Qingtian in Zhejiang Province. In Qingtian, terraced rice patties were stocked with carp by naturally flowing river water. However, farmers have intensified carp production with the addition of manufactured fish feed and by erecting concrete barriers to deepen their ponds. The damming of such rivers to create carp pools has led to increasing problems of eutrophication, interrupted water supply to farms and communities, and diseased fish. In order to encourage a return to a more environmentally friendly integrated polyculture system, the government could develop a new certification for organic rice-patty carp, which could help the Qingtian farmers create lucrative markets in the nearby tourist centers of Hangzhou and Suzhou.

FOOD MONITORING A NEW PRIORITY

As is true in the case of other environmental and health challenges in China, many superb laws exist, but monitoring and enforcement tend to be weak. During the 2006 turbot scare, it merits mention that the three farms highlighted by name as responsible in the Chinese news media were subsequently fined and ordered to suspend sale for violating bans on antibiotics in fish. The 2008 Olympic Games played a positive role in accelerating food safety progress in the Beijing area primarily by creating a “safe list” of food suppliers, which notably has been done in Hong Kong with aquacultural products from Guangdong, but there is still much to be done to address the systemic regulatory failures in the vast aquaculture system that most dramatically affect those outside big cities. Some positive trends include:

- March 2007: The Ministry of Health released a draft of a new food safety coordination law to the public via the Internet.
A fisherman at Guilin is aided by cormorants, trained since ancient times in China to catch and bring back fish to their owners. PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL.

- March 2007: The Fresno Bee reported that Global Food Technologies signed an agreement with the China Seafood Certification Institute to develop a branded food safety program for seafood beginning with one billion pounds of seafood by the end of 2009.
- November 2006: The Fisheries Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture announced a nationwide inspection targeting forbidden chemicals in the fish market.

As China develops, seafood will no doubt continue to play a major role in nutritional security as well as food safety. However, with the population becoming more wealthy, red meats and high-value fish species, such as grouper, salmon, and black seabass will take greater market shares at an ever higher threat to the environment. Increasing domestic demand for processed, rather than live, seafood will present new food safety challenges to the developing food-safety system. In the last two years, international and domestic pressures have led the central government to shift its focus to food safety, particularly in seafood. Given the chronic shortages of land and water in China and continuing population growth, regulators and policy makers must continue to prioritize the food production and distribution systems to conserve resources and protect human health. There is great opportunity to increase production through more scientific farming practices.

In terms of exports, China’s aquaculture is being more scrutinized. After the food bans in 2007 from major importers, China will no doubt diversify its sales. The United States has taken a proactive approach to continuing trade in aquaculture by signing an agreement between the Department of Health and Human Services and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine to cooperate and streamline the inspection process for Chinese aquaculture. In 2008,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration also opened offices on the ground in China, which will play a role in this process.

Linden J. ELLIS and Jennifer L. TURNER

Further Reading


Modern field paleontology and archaeology were introduced to China in the early twentieth century. Fossil remains have provided new insights into the evolution of life, paleoanthropological remains on the evolution of mankind, and archaeological excavations on the development of human cultures. The last twenty years have seen a marked improvement in research quality, an explosion of new data, and several scientific breakthroughs.

Archaeology (the study of material remains of past human life), and paleontology (the study of life of the geological past and the evolution of life) in China share a common past. The first generation of Western-educated Chinese scholars worked together in the field as geologists, paleontologists, and archaeologists surveying the country’s natural resources. Paleontology was used to find possible locations of natural resources, and to define the age of geological strata. Methodology from paleontology and geology was used in archaeology studies when archaeological remains were found and excavated during the survey work.

The first reference to fossils in China is found in the Shan Hai Jing (山海经, Classic of Mountains and Seas), mainly compiled between the fourth and first centuries BCE. It contains stories of mythical creatures of the past. The Qian Han Shu (前汉书, History of the Former Han Dynasty, c. 100 CE) mentions the find of dragon bones (龙骨, fossils) in 133 BCE during work on a canal. Several sources during the next millennium refer to fossils as ancient animals and plants, and some books have passages remarkably similar to those in modern paleontology. The Yun Lin Shi Pu (云林石谱, Stone Catalogue of Cloudy Forest, 1033 CE), for instance, contains detailed descriptions of fossil fishes. Fossils have been collected since ancient times and used in traditional Chinese medicine for their supposed magical powers and ability to cure disease. Still, in the 1950s, paleontologists made major discoveries by asking the local population where they collected their dragon bones.

The earliest Chinese experiments in what resembles modern archaeology were made during the Song dynasty (960–1279) when ancient inscriptions found on stones and bronzes were studied and catalogued. This tradition, although interrupted at the beginning of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), continued well into the late Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

Republican China (1912–1949)

The first modern survey that included some Chinese paleontology was made in the latter part of the nineteenth century during expeditions to China by the German Ferdinand von Richthofen (里希霍芬, 1833–1905). However, not until the turn of the next century was the potential of Chinese fossils realized when Western visitors found dragon bones in medicine shops. The discovery began
a fossil hunt in the drug stores. In 1914 the Swedish geologist Johan Gunnar Andersson (安特生, 1874–1960) was hired by the Chinese government to conduct mineralogical surveys around the country. He became interested in the paleontological and archaeological remains that he came across during his work. In the mid-1910s he met the Chinese scholar Ding Wenjiang (丁文江, 1887–1936), the first head of the Geological Survey of China. Trained in Japan and Britain with majors in geology and zoology, Ding represented the first generation of Chinese scholars with an education in modern science. With his background in zoology, he was also interested in paleontology. The two men began to cooperate in a search for fossils, and Ding, in a program to train geology students in fieldwork, sent students to Andersson. From 1920 onward the education of a coming generation of Chinese paleontologists was furthered with the arrival of the U.S. geologist and paleontologist Amadeus W. Grabau (葛利普, 1870–1946), who was invited by Ding.

In 1921 Andersson initiated excavations at the site Zhoukoudian 周口店, 50 kilometers from Beijing, where the tooth of a 500,000-year-old hominid (any of a family of erect bipedal primate mammals comprising recent humans together with extinct ancestral and related forms) was found the same year by the appointed excavator, the Austrian-Swedish paleontologist Otto Zdansky (鄂登斯基, 1894–1988). The tooth belonged to a new species, popularly called “Peking Man” 北京
人，which was announced in 1926 and later named *Homo erectus pekinensis*. The find stirred attention around the world and had a profound importance for research on early human development. Continued investigations at Zhoukoudian were made by a Sino-Western institute—the Cenozoic Research Laboratory—the precursor of the present Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology (IVPP). The lab was placed under the Geological Survey of China, and its first head was Davidson Black, a Canadian physician of the Peking Union Medical College. Several Chinese students who later influenced the development of paleontology in the country, such as Yang Zhongjian (杨钟健, 1897–1979), Pei Wenzhong (裴文中, 1904–1982), and Jia Lanpo (贾兰坡, 1908–2001), started their careers at the laboratory. Many of them were students of Grabau. Chinese specialists such as these also took part in surveys of the Huang (Yellow) River area at this time and in the search for paleontological and archaeological remains during the interdisciplinary Sino-Swedish expedition to northwestern China in 1927–1935. Grabau himself made surveys of great importance. In the 1920s, for instance, he was the first to describe the Jehol biota (热河生物群, the flora and fauna of a region) in northeastern China, which during the century came to reveal a whole ecosystem of fossils dating to 125 million years. Other influential foreign paleontologists of the time included Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (德日进, 1881–1955) of France, who surveyed sites in Ningxia Autonomous Region, Shaanxi Province, and Inner Mongolia during.

Yangshao 1921. A rare photo from the period when Chinese experts first participated in excavations in China. Left to right: the archaeologist and geologist Yuan Fuli of Tsinghua University (trained at Columbia University); Johan Gunnar Andersson, the Swedish geologist turned archaeologist who led the excavations; the village chief, Mr. Wang, and a local preacher also named Mr. Wang. The investigations revealed the Yangshao culture (仰韶, c. 4500–2500 BCE). This major discovery of the Neolithic era laid the foundation of prehistoric archaeology in China. From J. G. Andersson. (1934), *Children of the Yellow Earth*. USED WITH PERMISSION OF THE MUSEUM OF FAR EASTERN ANTIQUITIES, STOCKHOLM.

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the 1920s and assisted in the Zhokoudian research, and Roy Chapman Andrews (罗伊查普曼安德鲁斯, 1884–1960) of the United States, who in several expeditions during the 1920s searched for paleontological finds. The latter worked mostly outside the country, but he also did extensive surveys in Inner Mongolia, where he discovered fossils of dinosaurs and mammals.

**ARCHAEOLOGY (1912–1949)**

Modern field archaeology was introduced in China around the turn of the twentieth century when a number of foreign scholars—explorers, archaeologists, and paleontologists—went to Chinese Central Asia, mainly in search of remains along the ancient Silk Roads. The Swedish geographer Sven Hedin (斯文·赫定, 1865–1952) surveyed ruins in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and discovered the site of Loulan 楼兰 in the Tarim Basin in 1900. Sir Aurel Stein (斯坦因, 1862–1943), a British-Hungarian archaeologist, conducted excavations on sites such as Khotan 和田, Niya 尼雅, Bezeklik 伯孜克里克, and Loulan. He also visited Dunhuang 敦煌 in Gansu Province, where a Daoist priest had found a huge amount of ancient documents in the Buddhist Mogao caves 莫高窟 in 1900. Many of these were purchased by Stein and later by the French sinologist Paul Pelliot (伯希和, 1878–1945). The Germans Albert Grünwedel 格伦威德尔 and Albert von Le Coq 勒科克 made extensive investigations in Xinjiang, as did Russian explorers, who already had reported on historical remains in the area in the late nineteenth century. Japanese scholars, such as Otani Ko−zui (小泉光, 1876–1948) and Torii Ryozo (鳥居龍藏, 1870–1953), also organized expeditions. The latter found Neolithic (8000–5500 BCE) remains such as spearheads and polished stone axes during his investigations in the Liaodong peninsula in 1895 and discovered the prehistoric site of Hongshan (红山, c. 3800–2700 BCE) in Inner Mongolia in 1908.

China’s participation in these surveys increased after the May Fourth Movement (1917–1921), when many Chinese students who had gone abroad to acquire knowledge of Western sciences returned and began collaborative projects with Western scholars. In the early 1920s Andersson had become more interested in studies of the archaeological remains he found during his surveys around the country. He hired young Chinese scholars, such as Yuan Fuli (袁复礼, 1893–1987), a former student at Columbia University, and Li Ji (李济, 李济, 1896–1979) from Harvard. Andersson included Chinese specialists in archaeological excavations for the first time when he found painted pottery near the village of Yangshao in Henan Province in April 1921. The Yangshao culture (仰韶, c. 4500–2500 BCE) soon proved to be one of the major discoveries on the Neolithic era. From the pottery’s similarity to painted pottery found in Central Asia and the Near East, Andersson argued that Chinese culture might have originated from the west. To back his theory he went...
to northwestern China, where he found a western outpost of the Yangshao culture, the Majiayao culture (馬家窯, c. 3500–1500 BCE), and the early Bronze Age culture of Qijia (齊家, 2400–1900 BCE). The western-origin hypothesis was later abandoned, and some of the pottery is now believed to have spread westward from central China to its borders.

**ORACLE BONES**

The first truly independent archaeological excavations that took place at this time symbolically restored China’s self-image. Oracle bones had been found around 1900 in Anyang 安阳, northern Henan Province, and the early investigations of the ancient bone inscriptions caused Luo Zhenyu (羅振玉, 1866–1940) to claim that the site might be the location of the late Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) capital Yinxu 殷墟, mentioned in the Shiji 史記, Records of the Grand Historian), written about 100 BCE by Sima Qian (司馬遷, c. 145–90 BCE). This evidence was not enough, however, to prove the existence of the Shang dynasty, which many believed to be a myth. In 1928 the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) government made field investigation at Anyang a the priority when it formed an archaeology department within the Institute of History and Philology in the Academia Sinica. Evidence of a highly advanced Bronze Age culture as well as architectural remains of palaces and temples were

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**The excavation site at Zhoukoudian in 1921, with Otto Zdansky to the far left. The same year he made the first discovery of Peking Man—a single tooth. In the center below is Walter Granger (葛兰格, 1872–1941) from the American Museum of Natural History in New York, who visited Zhoukoudian to introduce modern excavation techniques. From J. G. Andersson. (1934), Children of the Yellow Earth. Used with permission of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Stockholm.**
unearthed during ten seasons of work led by Li Ji. In 1936 the former capital’s archive was found, finally proving the existence of the Shang dynasty. More discoveries by the archaeology department followed, such as the Neolithic Longshan culture (龙山, c. 2500–1700 BCE) in Shandong Province. These finds showed that connections existed between the Shang dynasty remains and the Neolithic cultures found so far. Li Ji’s student, Xia Nai (夏鼐, 1910–1985) was later able to put these pieces together to develop a correct chronology and classification that Andersson first proposed for China’s prehistoric cultures.

**Maoist Years (1949–1978)**

The Japanese occupation and the Chinese Civil War ended the early formative years of Chinese archaeology and paleontology. The 1950s brought establishment of two new major organizations for paleontology research that would play leading roles until the late 1970s. These were the Nanjing Institute of Geology and Paleontology (NIGP) and the Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology, both organized under the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Some of the remaining Chinese staff of the Cenozoic Research Laboratory came to work under the IVPP, among them Yang Zhongjian, who became its first head. Soon excavation at Zhoukoudian resumed, and large surveys of geological and paleontological resources, supervised by these institutions, were initiated throughout the country. The work was mainly aimed at finding new evidence of Peking Man, whose remains had been lost during the war, and at collecting new paleontological data. A large number of fossils were also discovered and identified during this time, for example, the dinosaur *Tsintaosaurus* found in Shandong Province and described by Yang Zhongjian in 1958. The most important paleoanthropology finds were made in the early 1960s in Lantian, Shaanxi Province, where hominid fossils of *Homo erectus* dating to 1.1 million years were discovered in 1963 and 1964. A year later a 1.7 million-year-old hominid fossil was found in Yuanmou 元谋, Yunnan Province.

With the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, several scholars who had developed an independent Chinese archaeology took refuge with the Chinese Nationalist Party regime in Taiwan, where their work continued at the Academia Sinica. Mainland China established the Chinese Academy of Science, whose head, Guo Moruo (郭沫若, 1892–1978), founded the Institute of Archaeology. Archaeological work there was largely managed by Xia Nai.

The focus on China’s Neolithic age was resumed, and a number of important discoveries were made in the 1950s and 1960s. Excavations at Dawenkou in Tai’an, Shandong Province, enabled a link to be made between early Neolithic southern and northern China. The painted pottery of the Dawenkou culture (大汶口, c. 4500–2500 BCE) indicated contacts with the Yangshao culture, while other artifacts had a close resemblance to those of the later Longshan culture. Large excavations at the Yangshao site Banpo 半坡, near Xian in Shaanxi Province, revealed an entire village dating to about 4800–3600 BCE.

Research on the formation of early cities and the development of ancient China led to new discoveries. Several Shang dynasty remains older than those at Anyang were found. The most important were at Erligang 二里岗 near Zhengzhou, which was probably the capital between 1500 and 1400 BCE. In the late 1950s scientists found an even older Bronze Age culture, which some scholars believe is proof of the existence of the Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE), the predecessor to the Shang dynasty. At Erlitou 二里头 in Yanshi, Henan Province, a fortified city and a palace dated to between 1900 and 1500 BCE were unearthed. Also remains from the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE) were discovered and excavated during this time, as, for instance, in 1956, when the capital of the state of Jin between the years 584 and 450 BCE was found at Houma 侯马 in Shanxi Province.

Understanding of prehistoric China had increased significantly before the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Scientific work came to a halt, both in archaeology and paleontology, in 1966, but input from unexpected discoveries and rescue excavations in archaeology continued. The buried terra-cotta army of the Qin emperor (third century BCE), for instance, was found in March 1974 near Xian in Shaanxi Province when local peasants were drilling a well. Beginning in 1972 archaeological exhibitions played an important part in opening up China and attracted huge interest from the outside world. They made the Chinese government aware of the potential that archaeological remains had for the country’s international image. Archaeology became therefore one of the first sciences to resume its work. In 1973 south of Hangzhou Bay,
the Hemudu culture (河姆渡, 5500–4770 BCE) was found. Excavations at the marshy area of this offshore island culture in northern Zhejiang Province demonstrated large finds of unusually well-preserved materials as well as of house remains that were different from those unearthed in northern China. In 1976 Lady Fu Hao's 妇好 tomb was discovered. It contained artifacts of royal life during the Shang dynasty. In Hubei Province the next year soldiers found the tomb of Marquis Yi of Zeng 曾侯乙, who died in 433 BCE. Among the remains recovered from the grave were more than 120 musical instruments—a unique collection in the world.

Paleontology Today

Methodology and technology in Chinese paleontology and archaeology did not progress despite such important discoveries. The two sciences developed largely in isolation from the outside world for four decades, and the need to catch up was urgent. Although a new generation of scholars was eager to get in contact with the research community abroad, the ban on Sino-foreign fieldwork remained. However, in 1986 a collaboration paved the way for others. It was the Sino-Canadian Dinosaur Project, a series of expeditions conducted between 1987 and 1990 to collect Jurassic (c. 200–145 million years ago) and Cretaceous (c. 145–65 million years ago) vertebrates in northern China. With the lifting of the Sino-foreign fieldwork ban in 1991, a wave of collaborations followed: Foreign scholars visited, and Chinese paleontologists went abroad for research studies and exchange. The 1980s and 1990s brought a rapid growth of university institutions, which developed their own research agendas, thus challenging the monopoly of the IVPP and NIGP. The institutional competition, the open door policy, and an increased desire to publish results abroad led to improved research quality and to an explosion of new data and scientific breakthroughs.

In July 1984 the Chengjiang fauna 澄江生物群, said to be one of the most important paleontological finds of the century, was found in Yunnan Province by Hou Xiangguang (侯先光, b. 1949). Apart from the discovery of almost two hundred species so far, this rich fossil deposit gives vital information on the evolution of primitive plants and animals. The oldest fossil vertebrate in the world, for instance, was reported from the site of Ercaicun 耳材村 in 1999. It revealed a jawless early fish, dating from the Lower Cambrian (c. 530 million years ago), thus pushing back the history of vertebrates another 50 million years. Of equal, if not more significance, was the discovery of fossil embryos dating from 570–590 million years ago in the Doushantuo 陡山沱 formation in Guizhou Province in 1998. This discovery gave evidence of the existence of animal life before the so-called Cambrian explosion, a time in evolutionary history when suddenly a large number of animal fossils appeared. The previous lack of Precambrian finds had been a mystery to paleontologists since the time of the British scientist Charles Darwin. The discovery has led to similar and even older finds elsewhere in the world. The Jehol biota in Liaoning Province also was on the agenda again from the late 1980s onward. First the bird Sinornis was found, then Confuciusornis, then a series of discoveries that culminated in the unearthing of feathered dinosaurs such as Sinosaurus and Protarchaeopteryx. These fossils challenged the theory that birds and dinosaurs had developed separately and gave insights into the evolution of flying. Recent Chinese paleoanthropology has also shed light on the development of our own species. The oldest hominin fossils in the country, for instance, were found in 1985 at Longgupo 龙骨坡, Sichuan Province, and investigations have revealed stone tools and dated the fossils to 1.9 million years.

Archaeology Today

The renewed study of the Neolithic era since the late 1970s has focused on the relationship between early farming societies and the spread of agricultural techniques. Radiocarbon dating, introduced to China in the 1960s, is used more frequently. Evidence for rice production was found in the Hemudu culture, which was a site in contact with the Majiabang culture (马家浜, c. 5000–4000 BCE)—a rice-producing economy as well—near Shanghai. The Majiabang culture in its turn showed resemblances to millet-producing cultures in the north, such as the Dawenkou. The oldest millet grains found so far in the Huang River valley were unearthed at the site of Peiligang (裴李岗, 5500–4900 BCE) in Henan Province. The oldest evidence of rice cultivation comes from
Pengtoushan 彭头山, Hunan Province, dating to at least 7000 BCE. All these finds have challenged the view that agriculture spread from the north and that Chinese rice originated from India.

Other views about China’s prehistory also have been challenged. In July 1986 a discovery at Sanxingdui 三星堆, c. 1400–1000 BCE in Sichuan Province proved the existence in other parts of China of advanced Bronze Age cultures besides the historically documented Shang. Artifacts, such as sculptured masks and human bronze heads, showed a unique style and were of a level just as advanced as those unearthed at Anyang.

When the ban on Sino-foreign fieldwork was lifted, joint archaeological explorations were conducted for the first time since before World War II. A Sino-Japanese expedition, for instance, set out for Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to search for early traces of civilizations along the Silk Roads and found Bronze Age cultures in the southern parts of the Taklamakan Desert. A Chinese-French team in the same area conducted several excavations at Yuansha gucheng 圆沙故城 between 1993 and 2005, a city that in the preliminary reports has been stated to be the oldest ever found in Xinjiang, dating back at least twenty-two hundred years.

Many sites and artifacts have been found throughout the country in recent years. The expansion of the Chinese economy and extensive infrastructure construction have led to numerous rescue excavations in the last thirty years. These in turn have led to an enormous input of new archaeological material. New university departments of archaeology have been set up throughout China. Specialized institutions, such as China’s first DNA research laboratory in Jilin, have improved the technological analysis of excavated remains. Other fields of archaeology, such as underwater archaeology, also have been introduced. The latter has been instrumental in the rescue of the late Song dynasty merchant ship Nanhai 1 南海一号, which sank eight hundred years ago in the South China Sea with bluish-white porcelain in its cargo. Found in 1987, the entire vessel was salvaged from the seabed in 2007.

Jan ROMGARD

Further Reading


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Chinese architecture—from the Great Wall to the Forbidden City—has long distinguished itself from building traditions in other parts of the world. Its breadth of design encompasses not only individual buildings like pagodas, palaces, and temples but also cities, gardens, and tombs—complex interconnected structures built according to court-produced plans.

From as early as Neolithic times, wood has been a dominant material in Chinese aboveground construction. The timber frame is considered to be China’s major contribution to world architectural technology, and its design is unparalleled in its flexibility and ability to withstand earthquakes. Other important features of ancient Chinese architecture include the raised platform and the decorative roof.

The Chinese use of wooden support systems in architecture can be traced back about seven millennia to the mid-Neolithic period. The structure was formed by a system of interlocking wooden supports, employing mortise and tenon joinery. The load-bearing timber frame supported the structure while the walls were used to separate enclosures. The oldest example of this timber frame was discovered in Zhejiang Province at the Hemudu site, which dates to about 5000 BCE. Semisubterranean structures that utilized wooden beams and pillars to support thatched roofs have also been uncovered from the mid-Neolithic period.

One critical element of the Chinese wooden structure is the bracket set, or dougong—a group of wooden interlocking components that attached pillars and columns to the roof without the use of aids in joinery. Dougong became widely used by the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) and continued to evolve into a complex system of interlocking parts by the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1270) dynasties.

The dougong sits on top of a column and under a cross-beam and is made of a double bow-shaped arm, called a gong. The gong supports blocks of wood, called dou, on either side. The brackets are stacked in layers and support the load of the roof. Hierarchical restrictions in feudal China allowed the use of these brackets only in the most important buildings, such as palaces and temples. The more important the building, the greater the complexity and number of bracket layers.

Because the dougong structure allows the weight of the roof to be supported by pillars instead of walls, it is highly resistant to earthquakes. Where brick and mortar walls would collapse, the basic framework of the building would remain intact. Hence, it is said that “Chinese houses will stand even when their walls collapse.” These bracket sets have allowed many ancient buildings in China to survive for hundreds of years.

The use of rammed earth and unbaked mud bricks was also in use by the mid-Neolithic period. Layers of earth were pounded together to form foundations, walls, and alters. Sections of the Great Wall of China were built using layers of rammed earth. Homes were often built using sun-dried mud bricks to form walls that were then built around the wooden frame. Floors were made of pounded earth that was hardened through heating.
In traditional Chinese architecture, nearly every part of a building was decorated. In ordinary buildings, ceilings were often decorated using wooden strips that were covered with paper. Latticed ceilings were made using strips of wood or sorghum stems that were woven and attached to the beams. More elaborate ornamentation was reserved for the most important buildings, such as temples, tombs, and altars. As with other structural elements of traditional Chinese architecture, roofs and ceilings were constructed without the use of nails but were held together using bracket sets.

The Chinese architectural tradition can be separated into early, middle, and late periods. The early period stretches from Neolithic times through the Bronze Age (around 2000 BCE) to the period of disunion known as the Three Kingdoms (220–265 CE) and into the North and South dynasties (220–589 CE). The middle period begins around 580 CE under the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) and continues through the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1279 CE) dynasties. Historians of Chinese architecture disagree on when the late period began. Many consider the period of Mongolian rule during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) to be a transitional period. The late period of premodern architecture is considered to have lasted from the fourteenth through the nineteenth centuries.

In this evolution, the years 1103 and 1734 stand out as benchmarks. Those are the dates when two complete and extant court-sponsored building manuals were issued: Yingzao fashi (Building Standards) and Gongbu gongcheng zuofa zeli (Engineering Manual for the Board of Works). These technical treatises provided architectural standards for builders, architects, craftsmen, and engineers. From these writings, it is known that even though general principles of Chinese construction changed little over long periods of time, there were specific differences between the construction of important, or high-ranking, architecture and more humble structures.

Three features distinguish the Chinese building tradition from those of most other parts of the world. First, Chinese architecture includes not only buildings such as pagodas and temples but also cities, gardens, and tombs. Second, traditional Chinese buildings were usually constructed as part of a complex of structures that were joined physically by covered walkways and spatially by courtyards. Third, the name of an architect was rarely associated with a building. Designs for palaces, cities, imperial monasteries, and imperial gardens were produced at court. The pay scale for workers and the allotment of building materials were standardized. Builders were craftsmen, and a modular system made it possible for a group of craftsmen and builders to erect a timber frame based on proportional units.

**Early Architecture**

Most of our knowledge of Chinese architecture before the first millennium CE has come from archaeological excavations. Some sites have been studied for nearly eighty years, such as Anyang, which served as the capital of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) from approximately 1300 to 1050 BCE. Others have been discovered and excavated more recently. Several sites dating to Neolithic times...
have been uncovered, such as Banpo in Shanxi Province, Chengziyai in Shandong Province, Hemudu in Zhejiang Province, and Niuhuliang in Liaoning Province. One of the most impressive findings from these sites is that each, despite representing a different Neolithic culture, revealed common characteristics. For example, each included evidence of four-sided structures defined by exterior columns, a great hall or temple, platforms or walls made using the terre-pisé method (also known as the rammed-earth method), and each was probably enclosed by an outer wall.

From the Anyang site and two others in Henan Province, we know that Shang cities were enclosed by walls as long as seven kilometers around, that large structures may have been palaces, that residential buildings were constructed on raised foundations, and that tombs of immense proportions were dug underground and were faced with wooden walls. Buildings presumed to be funerary shrines or temples stood above ground on top of the burial chambers.

The earliest evidence of imperial gardens and pleasure palaces comes from the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). However, information about these gardens and palaces is known only through literary sources. Perhaps more importantly, the Zhou dynasty represented a crucial period in the history of Chinese urbanism. During this period, major cities and capitals were surrounded by walls. Many cities included a wall-enclosed palace city inside the outer wall. This feature was to become a trademark of Chinese imperial planning, preserved even in the last great capital, Beijing’s Forbidden City.

Zhou cities were laid out according to three distinct plans. One plan placed the palace area near the center of the outer wall, another located it in the north center, and a third put it adjacent to the outer city. This last type is sometimes referred to as a double city. The two walls often reflected more than one building period. Texts from the Zhou dynasty describe the ideal ruler’s city and ritual halls. The earliest existing remains of imperial ritual halls, however, are from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE).

Remains of aboveground buildings and extensive information about funerary architecture exist from the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) to the fall of the Han dynasty four hundred years later. The most impressive architectural achievement of the age, however, was the Great Wall. The history of the Great Wall begins in the Warring States period, a time of disunion in China when seven powerful states competed for control of the country. Most of these states built walls along their borders, where they stationed troops to defend against their enemies. At the time, the combined length of the walls totaled about 5,000 kilometers.

In 221 BCE, the ruler of the Qin state, Qin Shi Huangdi, defeated the other six states and unified the country. Known as the First Emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi ordered that the various sections of wall be connected and further sections built in order to strengthen his new rule and defend against invaders from the north. When the work
was completed, the wall stretched from today’s Liaoning Province in the east to Lintao, Gansu Province, in the west. Construction of the wall continued sporadically from the Qin dynasty through the sixteenth century.

During the Qin dynasty and before, the wall was constructed of local materials, often earth packed between board frames. As a result, the early portions of the wall did not include fortresses, and bricks were not used in the construction of gates. Large pieces of stone were also used to build sections of the Qin wall, and detritus was collected and used to fill the gaps between them.

Remains of the wall from the Qin, Han, and Zhou dynasties still exist in Dunhuang City in Gansu Province, Yulin City in Shanxi Province, and Baotou City in Inner Mongolia. Sections built by the Zhou during the Warring States period were constructed using stamped earth between wooden frames, and the layers of earth can still be clearly seen.

Most of the freestanding architecture that remains from the Han period is a form of gate tower called que. These multistory, narrow structures stood in pairs at the entrance to tombs and on either side of gateways to cities and palace complexes. They were also mimicked in structures atop the corners of walls that enclosed palaces and cities. Additional evidence of the que form is preserved in the many relief sculptures that once lined the walls of Han tombs, especially in the provinces of Sichuan, Henan, and Shandong. The form is also evident in tomb murals from almost every part of China.

The burial chambers of the Qin emperor and of the emperors and empresses of the Han dynasty remain unopened, but hundreds of Han tombs have been excavated. From them, archaeologists have learned that while common people were buried in simple pits, wealthy citizens, aristocrats, and members of the royal family were buried in tombs with as many as nine or ten rooms. These underground palaces were constructed of permanent materials, primarily brick and stone, and were dug deep in the earth to improve preservation. It is believed that the tombs were built in accordance with the forms of residential architecture that were employed above ground but without the use of perishable wood materials. From the tombs and replicas of architectural forms, archaeologists have learned that bracket sets, ceramic-tile roofs, and vaulted ceilings were in widespread use by the Han dynasty.

The last period of early architecture in China was one in which Buddhism, brought to China from India around the first century CE, was the main religion. The influence of Buddhism on architecture was apparent in the many temples and monasteries erected. For example, more than 1,300 Buddhist monasteries were built in the capital city of Luoyang during the period of Northern Wei rule (493–534 CE). Foundations are all that remain of those temple complexes, but other examples of Buddhist architecture from the third through sixth centuries survive in the form of pagodas, interior construction, and decoration of worship caves.

The earliest dated pagoda in China was built in 523 CE and stands at Songyue Monastery on Mount Song in Henan Province. Its twelve-sided shape and fifteen tiers of densely spaced eaves are unusual. The use of brick instead of wood in its construction had much to do with the endurance of this pagoda through the centuries. The single-story, four-sided pagoda at Shentong Monastery in Licheng, Sichuan Province, was built in 544. In general,
Chinese pagodas were four-sided in plan through the early years of the Tang dynasty. In profile they could be of uniform exterior dimension, as was the case with the pagoda at Shentong Monastery. They could also taper in perimeter from the base to the roof. Made of either brick or stone, the exteriors were decorated with columns, bracket sets, and roof eaves in imitation of wooden architecture. Pagodas of different sizes and shapes are also found inside Buddhist caves known as central-pillar caves.

Middle Period

The oldest extant wooden architecture in China is a Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) hall dated to 782. It is located at the Nanchan Monastery on the sacred Mount Wutai in Shanxi Province. Three other extant wooden buildings from the Tang period are also in Shanxi; one is on Mount Wutai and two are in the southern part of the province. The timber frame had reached full maturity by this time.

No palace buildings survive from the Tang. But excavations at the capital city of Chang’an (the largest city in the world in the eighth century with a population of more than 1 million) have been so extensive, and textual descriptions are so excellent, that the placement of every building in each Tang palace complex is known. Many have been reconstructed on paper.

The sites of the tombs of each emperor and empress of the Tang period are also known, and several of the monumental sculptures that lined the approaches to those tombs survive. Scores of tombs of Tang princes and princesses have been excavated, and many of these are satellites to the tombs of the emperors and empresses.

About fifty wooden buildings survive from the two centuries following the Tang dynasty, including several of the most extraordinary wooden structures ever built in China. The Liao dynasty (947–1125), established in northern China by the Khitan people, commissioned the construction of wooden pavilions and pagodas that used more varieties of bracket sets than ever before in a single structure. For example, the 67.31-meter pagoda at Fogong Monastery in Ying county, Shanxi Province is the tallest wooden structure in the world and employs fifty-four different types of bracket. It also exhibits a second feature that is characteristic of Liao wooden buildings: concealed interior stories that do not correspond to those visible from the outside. The pagoda shows five exterior stories plus a sixth set of roof eaves, but it includes four additional mezzanine levels on the inside.

The Liao built a variety of pagodas using masonry. Some had a base, shaft, and densely placed eaves similar to the pagoda dated to 523 at the Songyue Monastery on Mount Song. Others had a shaft and roof for each story. Most pagodas of the Liao and Northern Song (960–1126), the Chinese dynasty to the south of Liao, were octagonal in plan. Octagons and hexagons also became common shapes in the building of underground rooms in Liao and Song tombs.

Later Architecture

The modern period of Chinese architecture was ushered in by Mongolian rule. In spite of the ethnic background of the imperial family, most construction during...
the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) followed Chinese building standards. More than 250 wooden buildings remain from the Yuan period. Among the most famous are a gate and three halls at Yongle Daoist Monastery in southern Shanxi.

The Forbidden City is the architectural masterpiece of imperial China’s last great age, the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. First and foremost, the Forbidden City was the home of Chinese emperors and the center of their universe. Its plan embodies the 2,000 years of architectural history leading up to it. The focus of the Forbidden City is the Three Great Halls, elevated on a triple-layer marble platform. The capital-I shape of the platform was reserved for China’s most eminent architectural arrangements. It is replicated directly behind the Three Great Halls, in the Three Back Halls, where the emperor and empress slept and where the empress held audiences. Surrounding the halls is an array of palaces, where every aspect of life—from the education of the princes, to the preparation of food, to palace intrigue—was carried out. Today, most of the Forbidden City is used as a public exhibition space to showcase former imperial treasures and to house offices of the Palace Museum. Directly in front, on ground once closed to public passage, is Tiananmen Square.

Many of China’s other architectural masterpieces of the Ming and Qing dynasties are in Beijing or its suburbs. Most important are the Ming Tombs, where thirteen emperors and their empresses are buried beneath circular mounds with ceremonial halls in front of them. Some of the ceremonial halls are raised on three-tiered marble platforms like the one under the Three Great Halls. The individual halls are also similar in form to the main halls of the Forbidden City.

Surrounding the Forbidden City were the suburban altars, epitomized by the Altar of Heaven complex. Its three main halls, arranged along a north-south line, were the locus of annual imperial supplications to heaven on behalf of the Chinese state. Circular in plan but surrounded by a four-sided enclosure, the Hall for Prayer for a Prosperous Year is the only Chinese structure with a three-tiered conical roof.

Qing imperial architecture extended beyond Beijing to include five summer palaces north of the Forbidden City, the Eastern and Western Imperial Tombs in Hebei, a palace and tombs in Shenyang in Liaoning Province, and a summer palace in Chengde, Hebei Province.

The later periods of premodern Chinese history were also times of architectural accomplishment outside the imperial sphere. Private gardens of wealthy citizens, especially in southeastern cities such as Suzhou and Yangzhou, have attracted international attention.

Contrasting with the poetics of landscape architecture are the residential styles of China’s populations on the fringes of the empire—flat-roofed houses designed for the mountainous settings of Tibet, tents of the Mongolian grasslands, houses raised on stilts in the humid swamplands of the south, circular houses of the Hakka in Fujian Province, and two-story houses with sky wells in the center in Anhui Province.

Until the last half of the twentieth century, when modern architecture was imposed through city ordinances and national laws, Chinese architecture resisted modernization. Even to this day, Chinese-style roofs cap schools, hospitals, and government offices that are otherwise made of reinforced concrete. Public buildings retain courtyards at their entrances. Hotels and restaurants relinquish precious space to make room for miniature replicas of Ming gardens. And the Forbidden City has remained the immutable focus of Beijing and a symbol of all of China.

Nancy S. STEINHARDT

Further Reading

From the nineteenth century to the present, Chinese art has undergone drastic changes that mirror earthshaking internal challenges to tradition and reflect as well a myriad of modernizing forces, many foreign, that have penetrated country and culture. Since 2000, Chinese artists have rapidly (if belatedly) garnered kudos (and high prices) in the world art market, a testament to their creativity and innovation.

Most Westerners think of Chinese art in its most traditional format: as ink painting created with brush strokes that look similar to those used in Chinese calligraphic writing. But in the nineteenth century, notions of Western modernism began to invade traditional Chinese culture. Scientific drawing, French Academic realist oil painting, and new art materials and technology challenged the tradition. Chinese reformers and artists alike undertook many aspects of modernist experimentation from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries.

In 1949, when the Chinese Communists were victorious, art was designated to serve the people and the revolution. Soviet-style socialist realism became the official style. After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 and the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), China changed into a more open society and the government eased some of its cultural control. Artists revived ink painting and explored all the international styles, including performance and new media.

Nineteenth-Century Origins

To understand the cultural changes that have influenced Chinese artists, one must briefly review the dark period that began with foreign invasions and civil wars in the mid-nineteenth century. After Britain’s victory in the First Opium War of 1839–1842 (a second war would follow from 1856 to 1860), the defeated Chinese conceded five treaty ports where foreigners could live and trade. In 1864, after a prolonged and devastating civil war conducted under the ominous presence of Western troops, the Qing imperial government forces finally triumphed over the Taiping rebellion. Chinese felt pressure after the French conquest of neighboring Vietnam, and Japan defeated China in 1895. The final blow came in 1900 when legions from the foreign treaty ports defeated the imperial troops in the Boxer rebellion.

The 1842 opening of treaty ports had allowed new influences to enter through the media of books and magazines, new technology and materials, and new visions of what the world looked like to people outside of China. Photography and various printing techniques were introduced, including Japanese-style woodblock printing, all of which were quite different from methods that had previously been available in China.

The tradition of Chinese painting in the nineteenth century looked back to the Ming-dynasty painter Dong Qichang (1555–1636), who taught a particular formula that
focused on preserving images and values of the cultivated scholar. The student was to emulate his master’s work and begin by copying old Chinese paintings; such paintings were typically brushed in ink, and they depicted small figures of a scholar and friends viewing nature from a grass shack beside a steam and mountainside. Not until the aspiring artist was fifty or older was it considered possible for him to create his own style.

Traveler in the Mountains, by Dong Qichang (1555–1636). Much Chinese painting in the nineteenth century relied on the teachings of Ming-dynasty painter Dong Qichang, who advocated preserving the values and traditions of the cultivated scholar. Dong’s paintings often depicted small figures of a scholar and friends viewing nature beside a steam and mountainside. NATIONAL PALACE MUSEUM, TAIPEI, TAIWAN.
Many intellectuals found nineteenth-century ink painting on silk and paper to be stagnant. Paintings of idealized mountain landscapes were thought to be without energy and originality. This idyll no longer represented reality in nineteenth-century China. The multiple realities of China—from the increasingly international treaty-port cities to the seemingly pristine countryside—would all be caught up in great change. But the changes to Chinese traditional painting were subtle in the beginning, introduced one small step at a time.

Only lightly tinted watercolors were used in traditional ink paintings; brilliant colors were excluded. Confucian values taught that red, yellow, green, and blue were the only acceptable colors for decoration; any color that was mixed and had an offbeat hue, such as lavender or pea green, was considered deeply suspicious because of the potential emotional response it might evoke. One innovation brought to Chinese painting at this time was a vibrant red pigment called Western red—the name, of course, reflecting the beginnings of foreign influence.

Chinese merchants, who were prospering in the treaty ports, became new art patrons. Their taste was not as refined as that of the old elite who favored monochrome or only very pale tinted paintings, and they welcomed the new decorative and colorful paintings that were beginning to emerge.

Photography, in the form of print materials, magazines, newspapers, and pictorial calendars, made a significant difference in enlarging the Chinese vision. Landscapes and portraits of people captured through the camera’s lens became favorite subjects to replace traditional paintings. Photography, as well as Japanese woodblock prints by the famous Utagawa Hiroshige, introduced compositions with newly angled views and perspectives that gained artists’ attention. Photographs were used as backdrops in portrait studios and influenced stage-set design. Slick advertisements in print and on the boxes and wrappers of all kinds of products that poured into the treaty ports—from cigarette cards to cosmetic jars—afforded great visual variety and were ragingly popular. Lithography offered new possibilities for reproducing art and, especially, calligraphic writing, an important component in painting and other art forms. Cartoons and serial stories had new life and flexibility, and were embraced by the artists dealing in a new visual world.

Historical illustration of young Chinese man painting in the Western style.

Committed to Change

Traditionally the Chinese had always considered themselves to have the highest level of cultural achievement and to be the most powerful nation in the world. But by the late nineteenth century, many Chinese intellectuals realized that their civilization was not the center of the universe. (Zhongguo, Chinese for China, literally translates as Middle Kingdom.)

The most persuasive case for reforming the arts was that Western-style painting was scientific. It introduced precise drawing of the objective world using single-point perspective, shading to reveal volume, and a single light source. This kind of representation defined buildings and machines, and was the visual expression of modern
science. Reformers introduced Western-style perspective drawing, mechanical drawing, and drafting into school curricula at the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The Chinese dynastic system ended when the imperial troops of the Qing were defeated by the revolutionary Nationalist forces in 1911; the Qing emperor abdicated in 1912. The victors established the Republic of China (1912–1949), and the new government was committed to change. Cai Yuanpei (1867–1940), the first minister of education, called for major educational reforms and championed aesthetic education. Chinese art underwent great changes during this period while still conserving and protecting many traditional elements such as ink painting.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first art teachers were Japanese who came to China to teach new techniques, especially technical drawing in pencil and charcoal. Included were design, plane- and three-dimensional mechanical drawing, perspective, and forms of projective geometry.

Many Chinese artists studied in Japan at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century and were influential in the changes. Among the earliest were those from Guangzhou (Canton)—Gao Jianfu (1879–1951), Gao Qifeng (1889–1933), and Chen Shuren (1884–1948)—who studied realism and sketched from nature in the style of Nihonga painting in Kyoto. They brought back a new, studied, and more realistic vision of landscape and bird and flower paintings in ink and watercolors, the traditional materials. A circle of artists gathered around them and was called the Lingnan School.

**New Schools**

In November 1912, after the establishment of the Republic of China, teenaged Liu Haisu (1896–1994) and two others founded the first modern art school to teach oil painting in China, the Shanghai Art Institute. Liu was a pioneer educator who welcomed both female and male students, and he introduced the practice of sketching directly from nature as well as from human models. Because it was then considered scandalous to sketch nudes and exhibit the paintings, the local warlord threatened to close the school and arrest Liu. But Liu carried on an intense campaign to legitimize his school’s practice and exhibition policy and in the end won, probably because the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek took over the area. Liu had a most important ally, scholar/modernizer Cai Yuanpei. Liu Haisu eventually traveled to Europe to exhibit his work and lecture; while there he admired and was influenced by the brilliant coloration of the post-Impressionists.

A number of traditionalists, however, such as the early twentieth-century stars Zhang Daqian (1899–1983) and Huang Binghong (1864–1955), stuck to the old ideas, using ink and paper. But they called on painters to be inventive and display a new energy within the old parameters. Huang explored a deeper level of density in black ink, creating a new, intense mood. Zhang used colors with an inventive boldness. Zhang traveled abroad and went to northwestern Gansu Province in 1942 during World War II, which the Chinese called the anti-Japanese war (especially in the context of their own War of Resistance...
against Japan, 1937–1945). There he copied some Buddhist cave paintings in styles and techniques from the fourth to twelfth centuries, which served as inspiration for generations of new Chinese artists in the late twentieth century.

Pan Tianshou (1898–1971) and Qi Baishi (1864–1957) were both influential in prolonging the popularity of traditional methods, yet each had his own view of how to go about it. Pan’s bird and flower compositions, painted on a new monumental scale never previously attempted, would compete in size and importance with the large official oil paintings. Qi, whose first career was carpentry, adopted humble subjects traditionally ignored by the literati elite—garden vegetables, fish, shrimp, and baskets—often painted with the brilliant red thought to be vulgar by the literati. His paintings were very popular.

Modernism in China

Not surprisingly, great interest in Modernist art began to blossom in 1919, the same period that the May Fourth literary movement flourished. Many Chinese artists returned from Japan and Europe where they had learned about the newest trends of Impressionism, post-Impressionism, Constructivism, Cubism, Fauvism, Surrealism, Expressionism, Futurism, woodcuts, and graphic design.

Few paintings produced in those Modernist styles during the 1920s and 1930s have survived. Some were burned when the Japanese bombed Shanghai. Others were lost when refugees escaped to Chongqing, the wartime capital (1939–1945), or were destroyed by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Others simply perished without proper storage.

Shanghai was the center of the Modernist movements in the 1920s and 1930s. Guan Liang (1900–1986) returned from Japan using Fauvism in his artistic explorations. Pang Xunqin (1906–1985) returned from France to Shanghai creating Surrealist compositions. They and other Modernists formed the Storm Society and Chinese Independent Art Association where they could meet, discuss, and exhibit art. In 1929 the government created the National Hangzhou Arts Academy (now called China National Academy of Art) and appointed the French-trained Lin Fengmian (1900–1991) as its head. Lin felt that artists should choose their own artistic path, which was a departure from the teachings of Xu Beihong, who wanted his protégés to follow his style.

Chinese Modernists of the 1920s and 1930s communicated with Europeans, which fueled the movement, but those lines were cut when the artists fled to western China during World War II. The Communist Party followed Stalin’s official line on Modernism as being capitalist and corrupt: Modernist artists’ led bourgeois or bohemian lives, the policy stated, thus their styles were morally unworthy for the ideals of socialism and therefore must be excluded.
Socialist Realism

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed from the top of the Tiananmen gateway to the old Imperial Palace that “China has stood up.” The founding of the People’s Republic of China began a new era of Chinese Communist rule, one in which art would serve the state, to quote Lenin, “like a cog in the wheel of revolution.”

In 1942, when Mao was in his wartime camp in Yan’an, he gave “Talks on Art and Literature” that set the artist’s mission. Artists must live among the peasants, he said, and “feel dung between their toes.” Only then would they undergo a class change and be able to communicate with the masses. They must paint the stories of the heroic revolutionary struggle and the triumphs of the new society.

How to achieve this new revolutionary art was an evolving strategy created by the propaganda department of the Communist Party. The first experiments were with dynamic cartoon styles, inspired by Chinese folk art, which were painted in the national-style guohua, ink and colors on paper. But soon the more dramatic socialist-realist oil-painting style of “Big Brother Soviet Union” was adopted. The style was descended from European Grand Manner compositions; nobles were re-costumed from the cannon of revolutionary art. Religious art was considered superstitious, and some commercial art was condemned as pornographic.

Within the new media two print styles that affected change surfaced in cartoons and woodblock prints. Both were used to express disgust with a corrupt republican government that did not stand up to the invading Japanese, or help the millions of refugees, or stop its troops from looting and raping local peasants. The famous writer Lu Xun (1881–1936) encouraged the woodcut artists, who were deeply influenced by the German Expressionists and Kathe Kollwitz (1867–1945). Among the many brilliant Chinese woodblock artists, Li Hua (1907–1994) created powerful prints showing the suffering and frustration of the Chinese people; produced in multiple, they functioned as Communist propaganda handbills. These artists and cartoonists would play a major role as the Communist Party defined the new official Chinese style after 1949.

Woodblock print from the Lu Xun Memorial Exhibit. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
and transformed into giant workers, peasants, and soldiers breaking the chains of capitalism.

Chinese art histories claim Xu Beihong’s painting as the source for the official state socialist-realist style adopted in 1949, thus downplaying the obvious Soviet influence. The influential Xu Beihong (1895–1953) won a government scholarship to study in France in the 1920s and became an accomplished French Academic–style oil painter, totally ignoring the Western Modernist explosion that surrounded him. He devised the new style he advocated, a technique of ink painting using deep space perspective and foreshortening, to create his famous horses and giant peasants. Ink painting was revitalized, infused with realistic strength. Xu’s personal advocacy of the style, his presence as head of the Beijing Art College (which became the Central Academy of Fine Arts after 1949), and his friendship with Zhou Enlai were all factors in elevating his painting theories and style. After his death in 1953, he was officially hailed as the creator of Chinese socialist realism.

An example of official revolutionary oil painting was Dong Xiwen’s (1914–1973) *Founding of the Nation* (1954) showing Mao atop the balcony of Tiananmen Square as he established the People’s Republic. It became an iconic socialist-realist work. The new leadership was lined up on the side of Mao in a dramatically arranged composition inferring infinite control and a great future. The painting was widely reproduced for propaganda. But within five months one of the men in the leadership was purged, and Dong had to revise the canvas to eliminate the offender’s image. (Leadership purges would continue throughout Mao’s tenure. In 1980 a copy of the original made from a print was painted by Zhao Yu [1926–1980] and Jin Shangyi [b. 1938] to restore the original members.)

**Wang Dong Ling, with his painting *Chinese Art Meets West (Twin Fish)*.**

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Traditional ink painting, with vague landscapes, birds, and flowers, was out of favor in 1949. It was deemed reactionary and linked to feudalism and the old society. Not surprisingly, many ink painters fought passionately to restore its position, and by 1957, when the leadership became increasingly disenchanted with Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, guohua regained status. The compositions retained the socialist-realist formulae, but ink and watercolor was the medium. The talented, old-time revolutionary Shi Lu (1919–1982) created Fighting in Northern Shaanxi (1959) in a reprogrammed ink-and-watercolor style. A small but empathic figure of Mao stands triumphantly peering over a severe rocky mountain dramatically bathed in a revolutionary red-washed landscape.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Mao’s wife Jiang Qing became China’s artistic czar, and she gave an emphatic boost to the socialist-realist style. She called for dramatic theatrical-type compositions that showed glowing heroes overcoming darkly cringing evil spies and counterrevolutionaries. The heightened glory of the revolution was meant to be evoked with strong forms and red, bright and shining; gray tones and any ambiguity were excluded. A vastly popular image of that time by Tang Xiaohu (b. 1941) and Cheng (Li b. 1941) was titled Follow Closely Our Great Leader Chairman Mao, Ride the Wind, Cleave the Waves, Fearlessly Forge Ahead (1972). Larger than life, Mao waves vigorously after his swim across the Yangzi (Chang) River amidst a regatta of red flags. This served to document Mao’s vigor and ability to rule China.

A New Generation
Experiments

The death of Mao in 1976, the trials of the Gang of Four, and the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping changed China. In 1979 the country saw a de-emphasis of the class struggle and new policies focused on economic development toward a market economy, which would transform the art establishment. The government was no longer the sole patron, and its iron grip was slipping away. Young artists, such as Chen Yifei (1946–2005) and Han Xin (b. 1955), pushed the official party-line limits of style and content.

In Looking at History from My Space (1979) Chen Yifei abandoned the dramatic compositional buildup of the old socialist-realist, proscenium-stage style and painted himself—with his back to the viewer and his empty studio chair off to the side—observing cinematic episodes depicting events from Chinese history in the early twentieth century. The result is a portrait of an individual artist who in the previous era would have been assigned the role of a proletarian art worker among the masses—and who, it seems, now separates himself from the events and the glorification of them.

In late September 1979 some young artists who called themselves “Star Stars” created work in the previously taboo abstract styles, with political and sexual content. They hung an unauthorized exhibition outside the National Art Gallery for two days until the police removed it. This was the beginning of experimental art in a changing China. One member of that group, the young Ai Weiwei (b. 1957), was a profound devotee of Marcel Duchamp and the Dadaists, and he consistently made jokes about the establishment. Ai would go on to become an architectural consultant in building the Bird’s Nest Stadium for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

The 1980s was a decade of change, although many ink painters sought to revive once more the primacy of traditional ink painting with vague landscapes, birds, and flowers. But many young artists broke out of the official approved styles into experimental modes. Two outstanding artists who worked with ink created new formulae for handling calligraphy, traditionally considered a sacred cannon of Chinese writing. Gu Wenda (known in the West as Wenda Gu) partially erased character strokes in his calligraphic pieces, and Xu Bing created printed books with two thousand new characters that have no meaning. Each was toying with the pillars of the established culture, suggesting its impotence and irrelevance.

In 1989 the National Art Gallery invited Gao Minglu, a curator interested in experimental art, to mount an exhibition. Huang Yongping showed a blob of mushy paper on a block titled The History of Chinese Art and the History of Modern Western Art after Two Minutes in the Washing Machine. Wu Shanzhuan sold shrimp at a food stand in order to express his “shock” that China’s new market economy was so contrary to Maoist principles. But the most dramatic piece was performed by Xiao Lu, who reproduced two phone booths side by side inhabited
by male and female dummies talking. Xiao had a gun and shot the figures in the phone booths with live ammunition. The police arrested her and her boyfriend, a collaborator, and shut the show down. This was less than six months before 4 June 1989, when the students leading the Democracy movement, which called for end of official corruption and more voice in governance, were crushed at Tiananmen Square.

Performance Art

Performance had become a favored method of expression by 1989, and those Tiananmen events were documented by film and video, media that would become the cornerstone of a new visual culture in China. Pioneering video artists Zhang Peilei scandalized his audiences by washing a chicken repeatedly for a half hour. In Brooklyn

Han Xin, seated in front of his painting *Crucifixion*, 1991. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Sky: Digging a Hole in Beijing (1995), Wang Gongxin commented ironically on the Western fantasy of digging one’s way to China. He placed a video monitor in a deep, 3-meter-wide hole near his residence in Beijing from which he played footage of the Brooklyn sky. Video artists from Shanghai, such as Yang Fudong and Yang Zhenzhong, have produced parodies of pretentious intellectuals, imitating old style literati and other provocative themes.

In the 1990s Guangzhou’s Big Tail Elephant group comprised some very talented artists who poked fun at the folly of officedom. Lin Yilin created a video piece, Safely Maneuvered Through Lin He Street, acting out the irrational nature of traffic, barriers, and drivers—official rules and noncompliance resulting in nonsense.

High-tech photography arrived in China in the early 1990s and transformed the use of the medium, previously relegated to portraiture and posed propaganda scenes. Experimental artists, such as Zhang Huan, had himself photographed and filmed while he sat in a village latrine covered in honey and fish oil, an inviting feast for flies. This stunning anti-official act of art, which commented on Zhang’s personal living conditions, was photographed by several of this new breed of photographers, including Rong Rong and Xing Danwen. Shao Yinong and Muchen have photographed derelict official meeting halls all over China, preserving in pictures of these abandoned buildings their uncompromising beauty and a nostalgia for the time when they were vital centers of Communist Party power. It was in these halls that the class struggle was acted out.

Pyrotechnics, which are powered by explosives invented by the Chinese in the ninth century, are endemic to Chinese emphatic moments. Cai Guo-Qiang grew up among the makers of fireworks in southern Fujian Province and has pioneered the use of explosives to create works of art. His pyrotechnic creations have been set off all over the world against the backdrops of sky, landscape, earth, architecture, and even paper—his earliest experiments with gunpowder in his drawings led to his explorations with explosives on a larger scale—and all have been recorded as video performance.

In 1995, for the International Women’s Conference, Lin Tianmiao created Proliferation of Thread Winding, a bed with hundreds of weaving threads attached like a glorious full skirt. In the middle of the bed, an elongated oval shape suggesting the female sex organ was filled with densely packed protruding iron needles. A video of the artist winding the threads was projected on the pillow. Lin invokes the mythology of the Chinese mythical progenitors, when the weaving maiden crosses the Milky Way to meet the herd boy, as well as the female’s primary reproductive function.

**Realism, Pop Art, and the New Century**

Amidst all the experimentation during the decades after Mao’s death, the mainstream teaching at China’s art academies continued to focus on French Academy–style realism, drawing from life to get accurate images of the subject. Although experimental artists have totally rejected the practice of this art, it continues to be a basic reference for many. Chen Danqing grew up and was mainly self-taught during the Cultural Revolution until he entered the first reopened class in 1979 for a master of arts at the Central Arts Academy. His work was admired for its unenhanced, straightforward depictions of people, without the official propaganda pitch. He greatly admired Rembrandt and Holbein. Another realist painter of that generation, Liu Xiaodong, also paints ordinary folk but usually with a stinging, acidic comment on naughty youth and corrupt officedom. Yu Hong paints her autobiography and the story of other women in a realist idiom. In the years after the 1989 Tiananmen riots, Fang Lijun painted himself, his bald head echoing an open-mouthed scream to no one. The image has a monumental intensity.

Zhang Xiaogang, an artist whose work has been represented and auctioned by some of the world’s most renowned galleries, paints his family in Bloodlines, a series of primarily black and white realist group portraits set against a backdrop of surreal clouds or seemingly covered by fine mist. On each face one colored splotch of paint suggests some kind of birthmark or skin affliction. The figures are linked to each other by thin red veins, the bloodlines that are the conduits between generations. In some works of the series Zhang uses the bloodlines to link the figures’ hearts to tiny TVs, speakers, radios, or books. Thus the paintings can be interpreted to reveal their subjects’ individual dysfunctions through the skin discolorations and to comment on the
collective heritage they are fed through their cultural surround.

Realist training also lies below the pop art surfaces of Yue Minjun’s laughing faces meant to mock the establishment. His simplified figures could just as well cry out in anger and frustration, but he makes his point by allowing them laugh. Qi Zhilong also comes from this realist background into the pop art realm, with his “sweet young things,” pig-tailed women dressed in khakis that suggests the military garb worn during the Cultural Revolution. They are the fresh faces of advertising and film who could invite a world of consumption or lead a life of service. Surely these virginal portraits were meant to invite prurient thoughts.

Wang Guangyi paints in another pop art vein in the Great Criticism series. He creates boldly colored dramatic socialist-realist compositions in which groups of muscular, oversized workers march with pens instead of guns and are juxtaposed against corporate logos from international giants such as Coca Cola. He advertises what he sees as the sellout of the proletariat to capitalism. Yet in other pop views, Li Shan’s Rouge series of the 1990s presents a pinky-red setting for a suggestively feminized Mao holding a lily in his mouth. At the same time, Yu Youhan painted the Communist leadership as faceless cutouts made from charming folk textiles. The three Luo brothers, originally from Guangxi province, have produced a unique and garish...
pop style of old and new, using traditional New Year’s babies, for instance to promote McDonalds’ hamburgers and Coca Cola. Their medium is collaged paper that is lacquered on wood.

Sculpture

Sculpture is a relatively new medium to the Chinese art scene. Two outstanding practitioners are Sui Jian-guo and Zhan Wan. Sui has produced breathlessly militant and triumphant socialist-realist groups of figures, according to the Maoist cannon calling for the glorification of workers, peasants, and soldiers. But he also has produced fire-engine-red fiberglass Dinosaurs in sizes from tiny to enormous, and appropriated parts of Mao’s imagery (and his closet), such as the Mao Jacket, the Shoes (are they filled with clay?) and the Left Hand for that medium as well. Zhan Wan is the favored traditionalist because he reproduces in stainless steel the weirdly shaped and pitted stones featured in Chinese gardens. The shiny silver material puts the sculpture in the twenty-first century, but its image recalls old Chinese culture. This was the goal of the modernizing reformers a hundred years ago.

As China’s economic success in recent decades has lead to a renewed leadership role in world affairs, so too have its artists taken a new place on the world stage. Their creations have marched into the forefront of international markets. Beginning in the year 2000, when China’s world image as a great power became internationally acknowledged, its artists began to make an impact in the world art market. By 2008, auctions in Hong Kong and New York sold work by a small group of artists like Zhang Xiaogang and Cai Guo-qiang for more than two million dollars, with other Chinese artists commanding increasingly high prices. The speed of this leap from domestic to global in the early years of the new millennium is an affirmation of China’s creativity and innovation. Even if belated, this recognition in the art world has been welcomed by the Chinese, as they achieve a difficult feat: to create new art is both international and truly Chinese.

Joan LEBOLD COHEN

Further Reading


China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.

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Artifacts from Chinese history were preserved in Chinese personal and court collections prior to the eighteenth century. After that time foreign contact, wars, and social upheaval meant removal from China and destruction of artifacts. Since Mao’s death, Chinese officials have sought to recover Chinese cultural artifacts and to preserve them from pressures of modernization and an expanding population.

China’s seven thousand years of cultural and historic artifacts represent the development of one of the world’s ancient cultures, but these artifacts have been at risk for many reasons. Age is an obvious threat, but expropriation by foreigners, political upheaval, the illegal sale and export of antiquities, and nature itself have put the physical artifacts of China’s history at risk. Only recently has the Chinese government begun to fully address the need for preservation of these artifacts and historical sites.

Dynastic Period

The emperors of the Tang 唐 (618–907 CE), Yuan 元 (1279–1368), Ming 明 (1368–1644), and Qing 清 (1644–1912) dynasties valued relics and artwork and kept these items for the use by special members of their courts. As early as the Song dynasty 宋朝 (960–1279), libraries for the collection of books had been established. Such collections were examples of the wealth of the Chinese empire, and also served to provide the educational materials necessary to provide the opportunity of education for purposes of social advancement within the Confucian meritocracy.

The Ming dynasty enjoyed great prosperity acquired through the Tributary States system and trade. The Ming was the first regime encountered by European explorers and traders, and most Chinese trade with these Western countries was in commodities (silk, cotton goods, tea, and ceramics). Because the Western traders were limited in their commerce, widespread expropriation of Chinese artifacts did not take place at first. Many of what are now seen as valuable artworks (Ming vases, etc.) were, in fact, common trade goods.

In the seventeenth century, art collection by the Chinese elite had become common. This was not done for purely aesthetic reasons; in the Chinese cosmological view of a universe based on "circular time" which repeats itself, possession of artwork from earlier dynasties gave the collector a link to the earlier era. Furthermore, the possession of an artifact owned by earlier owners could hold as much meaning as the object itself. This is similar to the quasi-religious view that an object (icon or talisman) would receive some additional meaning from an external source rather than simply having its own intrinsic value. This was evident in the Qing dynasty when replicas of artwork were common; even though the replicas were of superior quality to the original pieces, the originals were valued because of the qi 氣 (life force) they held.
As the European powers undermined Chinese authority in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Western desire for fine Chinese goods increased, and more of them were taken out of the country. To the Westerners this was simply trade in another commodity, not different from much of the other expropriation which has filled European and American museums and private collections. While this was a continuation of the superior status that Westerners felt they had, it would actually help to preserve much Chinese art and artifacts from the destruction they might have faced in the twentieth century.

Republic of China

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were violent for China. Following a military defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895–1896, the Chinese government had to deal with the Boxer Rebellion against foreigners, the subsequent humiliating Boxer Protocol that required China to pay reparations to those foreign countries, a rising nationalist movement led by Sun Yat-sen, and subsequent military action to suppress the feudal actions of warlords in northern China. Occupation by Japan followed, and, before the twentieth century was half over, a civil war ensued as well. Cultural upheaval was capped by the Cultural Revolution, during which destruction of pre-Mao artifacts was accepted as patriotic.

Chinese Civil War

The greatest threats to Chinese art and artifacts came with the general destruction resulting from the Japanese invasion of 1931 and the subsequent periods of war. During the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek had many of the greatest classical treasures removed from museums on the mainland and taken to Taiwan for “safekeeping.” The government in Beijing continues to see this as a theft of cultural antiquities; the government in Taiwan counters that if the pieces had not been removed from the mainland, they might have been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In any case, much of the greatest artwork created in China is held in the National Palace Museum in Taipei, Taiwan.

The claim that the artifacts might have faced destruction is a valid one. Although a State Bureau of Cultural Relics had been established by the victorious Communist government in November 1949, only superficial attempts at preserving historical sites and artifacts were made. The thirty-three sites identified under the Provisional Regulations on the Management of Heritage Conservation of 1961 were “revolutionary sites and buildings to commemorate the revolution.”

Cultural Revolution

The social upheaval from 1966 to 1976, which resulted from an extreme antiforeigner, anticlassical, and pro-Mao
viewpoint, was directed at placing Chairman Mao Zedong and his political philosophy above all others, including those of classical China. At the direction of the Gang of Four, which included Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, much of this was done through the destruction of historical and cultural artifacts that did not reflect Maoist thought. Items which reflected the “Four Olds” — old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas, were destroyed to keep them from corrupting the new direction of Chinese politics.

Post-Mao Era

Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping sought to renew Chinese pride in their society by allowing a resurgence of traditional forms of art, including Chinese opera. The destruction of artifacts during the Cultural Revolution was seen as an attack on Chinese culture, and renewed efforts to preserve what was left were undertaken.

The post-Mao era has brought about the establishment of the State Administration of Cultural Heritage under the Ministry of Culture whose function is to identify and protect both movable and unmovable historic items and sites. In 1982, China issued the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics, which was revised in 2002. Despite these administrative movements, the protection of historic Chinese artifacts is underfunded given the hundreds of thousands of sites and items that require protection.

One of the greatest regions under threat of destruction or theft is the area of the Three Gorges Dam, a massive engineering project to build a hydroelectric facility and inland waterway stretching westward from Hubei Province to Chongqing on the Yangzi (Chang) River. Hundreds of historic sites...
that will be flooded by the project, such as monasteries, cemeteries, and villages, have been identified, but funding for their relocation has been insufficient to protect them. Many of these sites have been looted, with their contents being sold on the black market.

One non-governmental effort to protect and reclaim historic artifacts from China is the Lost Cultural Relics Recovery Program, a non-governmental organization (NGO) under the auspices of the China Foundation for the Development of Folklore Culture. This group attempts to find and purchase historical items taken from China by foreigners. This movement has goals similar to that of Greece in trying to reclaim the marble sculptures taken from the Parthenon which are currently on display in the British Museum. However, because of the high profits which might be gained on the black market, some preservationists fear that offering to purchase artifacts taken illegally might encourage even more illegal trading.

Another aspect of artifact preservation is that of buildings and neighborhoods in historic cities. The movement for economic modernization has placed old, unused buildings at risk in areas scheduled for modernization. Chinese shikumen 石库门 (row houses) in cities like Shanghai are not truly traditional, but were built in the early twentieth century as housing for the growing population in major cities. Because they are generally small and low (one or two stories), they occupy land which could be used more productively for high-rise buildings. In Shanghai, some of the shikumen neighborhoods have been converted into Western-style restaurants and other commercial establishments, preserving the exteriors of the buildings while making more profitable use of them.

In May 2008, the Chengdu 成都 earthquake in Sichuan Province 四川 damaged hundreds of sites and artifacts, including the famous terracotta warriors at Xi’an 西安. One outcome of this cultural damage, as well as the damage to other structures, has been a greater commitment by the Chinese government to establish better construction standards for risk abatement.

From acts of nature, foreign expropriation, purposeful destruction, illegal sale and export, to the needs of an expanding population, ancient Chinese artifacts face many threats. Recent governmental and nongovernmental groups have attempted to develop an official structure to preserve and restore China’s cultural heritage.

Thomas DOLAN

Further Reading
Asian Games

Yàyùnhuì 亚运会

The Asian Games bring together athletes from Asian and Middle Eastern nations every four years to compete in conventional Olympic sports, as well as traditional regional and national sports. China and Japan dominate the events, which often serve as practice rounds for the Summer Olympics. China first hosted the event, the eleventh Asian Games, in Beijing in 1990.

Founded after World War II on the Olympic ideal of fostering peace and cooperation through sports, the Asian Games host competitions among Asian and Middle Eastern countries. The athletes compete in conventional Olympic sports, as well as traditional regional and national sports. China and Japan dominate most high-profile events, which increasingly function as preparation and proving grounds in years between Summer Olympics.

Japan won the overall championship in the first Asian Games (which had no Chinese participation) and all subsequent games up to 1978, with China the perennial winner since 1982. Taiwan’s entry as the Republic of China caused considerable controversy from the 1960s on. The controversy subsided only with the People’s Republic of China’s admission to the Olympic Games and an agreement whereby Taiwan would compete as the Chinese Taipei team.

China first hosted the event, the eleventh Asian Games, in Beijing in 1990, showcasing the city’s ability to host a major sports event. In spite of Beijing’s failed bid to host the 2000 Olympics, the Asiad helped lay the foundation for later success in landing the 2008 Olympics. China will host the sixteenth Asian Games, scheduled for 2010 in Guangzhou.

What has become Asia’s largest sports event has antecedents in earlier regional meets, notably the Far Eastern Games, initiated in Manila in 1913 and lasting through ten iterations to 1934, with hosting rotating among the Philippines, Japan, and China until the games succumbed to the expanding war in the Pacific in the late 1930s. The inaugural Asian Games were staged in New Delhi, India, in 1951, with eleven countries (not including China) competing in six sports—athletics, aquatics, basketball, cycling, soccer, and weightlifting. Although membership has fluctuated, the scale of the event has grown steadily, with the fifteenth Asian Games, held in 2006 in Doha, Qatar, drawing forty-five countries to participate in thirty-nine sports. As anticipated, China won the most medals, 316, with Japan winning 198 and Korea 193.

Planning has been periodically disrupted by disputes among member countries, leading to relocation but never cancellation. Other controversies have included Arab nations’ opposition to Israel’s participation, resulting in Israel being excluded (and redirected to European competitions); and admission of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan over some members’ objections. The Asian Games’ hallmark today is diversity: Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu athletes mingle with nonreligious athletes; medal hopes come from highly developed
countries and poor ones; and conventional Western sports such as basketball, gymnastics, and swimming take place alongside the Southeast Asian kick-volleyball known as sepak takraw, the South Asian tag-and-catch game kabaddi, and a highly touted bodybuilding competition.

In the 1980s the Olympic Council of Asia replaced the Asian Games Federation in overseeing the Asian Games. The council has steadily broadened its purview by launching the Asian Winter Games, first held in Sapporo, Japan, in 1986 (with the sixth held in Chuangchun, China, in 2007); the Asian Indoor Games, begun in 2005 and including such non-Olympic sports as bowling, chess, aerobics, billiards, dance, and indoor soccer; and the Asian Beach Games, scheduled to begin in 2008 in Indonesia.

Judy POLUMBAUM

Further Reading
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Ya-Tai Jingji Hezuò Zuzhi
亚太经济合作组织

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 to enhance economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Its future, however, is in doubt.

APEC grew out of the same philosophy as that of the World Trade Organization (WTO): to promote the dismantling of trade barriers and to enhance the overall level of global trade. The underpinning economic philosophy is that of comparative advantage: each nation produces the goods it is most capable of and proficient at, and inefficient producers are not protected by tariffs. Hence waste is eliminated from production systems.

APEC also reflects the interests of its dominant members. The largest market for China and Japan is the United States, so a close association with America is important. China and Japan, in particular, also greatly depend on international trade for their wealth. China also needs Japanese investment and technological expertise, and Japan needs China’s low-cost labor to maintain the competitiveness of its manufacturing industries.

APEC is a result of the failure of the WTO to achieve global free trade. The WTO attempts to support and regulate trade among more than 150 countries, each with its own interest groups, nationalist pressures, and economic and political agendas. It is, therefore, difficult to achieve a consensus among them. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—formed in 1947 and dissolved in 1994, the forerunner of the WTO—struggled during...
its last nine years without gaining agreement (though of course it did make progress on a number of issues). The result of not securing agreement among so many disparate members led a number of countries to turn to regional economic groupings instead.

Open Regionalism

APEC differs from other RTAs in that it pursues open regionalism, whereas most others are "closed shops." This means that in most RTAs, members trade freely among each other but not with countries outside of the grouping. In APEC any member country can trade with a nonmember country but on the same principles that the members use with each other. In this case APEC is a core organization that can theoretically spread free trade to other countries.

Challenges for APEC

Unfortunately APEC has run into the same problems as did the WTO. Some industries in member countries are highly protected (e.g., agriculture in Japan), and it is difficult in political terms to make changes to this protection. In addition, APEC, like the WTO, contains both developing and developed economies, and it has been difficult to negotiate the relative speed of tariff reduction between the two groupings. Developing countries want more time to bring their tariff barriers down so that their economies are not overly damaged in the shift to free trade. Their concern is that if they move too quickly, developed countries will gain too much advantage in their markets. Conversely, developed countries continue to worry about trade imbalances, where low cost imports from developing countries may damage their industries, creating substantial trade deficits and boosting unemployment. The dramatic rise in Chinese exports to the United States is a case in point.

The result of such problems has led to APEC’s decline in importance over the years. Some experts say its only real purpose today is to provide a forum for heads of state to hold personal discussions and build working relationships. At these forums member countries also discuss matters not directly related to economics, such as how to deal with nonmember countries in the region, global warming, and terrorism.

In part the problem APEC faces is the sheer diversity found in the region. Unlike in the EU, in Asia there are very rich and very poor countries; Islamic and non-Islamic governments; countries dominated by rural populations and those that are primarily urban; countries with huge populations, such as China; and smaller city-states, such as Singapore. It is difficult for any economic agreement to take into account the interests of such a diverse group of nations.

The growth in free trade agreements (FTAs) around the world is an indicator of the failure of such organizations as APEC. Bilateral FTAs may often be difficult to negotiate, but it is far easier to integrate two economies than it is to integrate twenty-one economies, as in APEC, or more than a hundred, as the WTO has discovered. As of July 2007, 380 bilateral FTAs were in force around the world, with more in the planning stages.

The 2008 APEC conference in Lima, Peru, focused reducing the gap between trade in developed and developing countries, while leaders also addressed the current global financial crises.

Looking ahead

While the concept of APEC is a worthy one in terms of breaking down barriers to trade and investment (though not everyone supports free trade), attempting to negotiate multilateral agreements is a daunting task. In this sense APEC suffers from the same weaknesses as does the WTO, and both are in trouble today. In the long term, however, if the global economy is to grow fully, this difficult task is one that must be undertaken. China, like many countries in the region, has moved away from a focus on APEC and concentrated on engineering a range of bilateral and multilateral FTAs.

Curtis ANDRESSEN

Further Reading


Atheism has had an enormous effect on the religious policy of the Chinese state ever since Western ideologies reached China around 1900. Since 1949 the officially atheistic Chinese Communist Party has sought to control rather than eliminate religion.

Because religion has been woven into the fabric of Chinese social life since ancient times, the rise to power of modern political forces, especially the avowedly atheistic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, was likely to have a profound effect on the state and society. Would the Communist Party state pursue a policy of reckless suppression of religious life, or would it tolerate religion, at least temporarily? Except during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the religious policy of the CCP has been guided by practical considerations rather than by its atheist ideology.

A Modern Concept of Atheism

Atheism here means a concept that rejects any form of religious belief. This definition does not include certain strands of Confucianism and Buddhism that are sometimes labeled as “atheist” on the grounds that they are not based on the concept of a personal deity. In fact, there is no reason to assume that they are incompatible with other forms of religion, and by and large in earlier times they did not interfere with sacrifices and other forms of worship. As far as religious policy was concerned, the imperial authorities tried hard to suppress “heterodox” teachings and practices that were regarded as a threat to the state; at the same time they sought to promote as well as control “orthodox” forms of worship.

Atheism as herein defined is a modern concept based on a strictly secular worldview. It entered China around 1900, along with a number of other ideologies imported from the West. Foremost among these were social Darwinism, nationalism, and socialism/communism. They were based on a specific notion of human progress and pursued a secular goal (a vigorous nation-state or a classless society) that served as a substitute for religious attitudes. Transmission of these ideas was intimately linked to the emergence of a modern Chinese intelligentsia. Young urban intellectuals who were attracted by the new ideological currents became hostile to any form of Chinese religion, including folk religion, Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, and, although it is not a religion in the strict sense of the term, Confucianism, which came under fire for its association with the official cult of the state. Because these intellectuals formed the backbone of revolutionary movements and of the emerging political parties, atheism played an important role in the political transformation of China.

Atheism during the Republican Period

Chinese atheism was first and foremost directed against religion’s most “superstitious” form: folk, or popular,
religion, which also includes certain elements of Buddhism and Daoism. The republican revolution of 1911–1912 witnessed the first large-scale campaign against popular religion, in which many temples and shrines were destroyed. Although the provisional constitution of newly founded Republican China (1912–1949) guaranteed religious freedom, attempts to weaken the institutions associated with popular religion (temples, religious associations, etc.) continued until about 1915.

The May Fourth Movement (1915–1923), a pro-Western intellectual movement, gave rise to the next wave of antireligious activity. In addition to the general critique of religion (which was guided by a belief in modern science), two targets were singled out: Confucianism, regarded as the main cause of China’s conservatism and stagnation, and Christianity, by then regarded as an ally of Western imperialism.

The Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang [GMD]), which established a national government in 1925, to some extent succeeded the antireligious movements of the 1920s but was not clearly atheistic. The GMD did claim the supremacy of its ideology, the “Three Principles of the People,” over all forms of religion. However, some of its leading members (including Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and their families) were Christians, and in the 1930s attempts were made to revive Confucian doctrines. This ambiguity notwithstanding, GMD governments at various levels campaigned against “superstition,” although with limited success.

### Atheism during the People’s Republic of China

The CCP took the Marxist view that religion is the opiate of the masses but that it will ultimately disappear in the transition to a classless society. However, the party dealt with religion within the framework of its united-front policy, a strategy designed to incorporate noncommunist social forces into the process of revolution and state building. Within this framework the party could form alliances with religious people despite its disapproval of religious doctrines.

The religious policy of the CCP was therefore guided by practical considerations rather than by a narrow ideological approach. Although the party was clearly atheistic, the state that it monopolized was not. This fact is reflected in constitutional law, which binds the state organs, although not the party. The constitution of 1954 granted citizens “freedom of religious belief” without being specific about what this guarantee exactly meant. The emphasis on belief rather than religious practice gave state and party the opportunity to suppress popular religion. Institutional religions were tolerated but brought under the supervision of the state. For that purpose a number of so-called patriotic religious associations were set up to represent the five officially recognized religions: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism (the latter two being regarded as separate religions rather than as different branches of the same religion). The Bureau of Religious Affairs, founded in 1954, served as a link between the state and the patriotic religious associations but was also meant to guide and control the latter. In spite of the constitutional guarantees, all religious organizations were under heavy pressure from the authorities. This was especially true of those religions suspected of foreign domination, particularly the two Christian ones, even though all Western missionaries had been expelled from China during the Korean War (1950–1953).

During the Cultural Revolution all religions suffered from persecution and destruction. Leaders and activists were determined to eradicate religion, which was viewed as part of the “Four Olds” (old culture, old thinking, old habits, and old customs) that were to be destroyed. At the same time, constitutional law moved into the direction of state atheism. The constitution of 1975 declared that citizens enjoyed “freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism.” In other words, atheist propaganda was constitutional, whereas religious propaganda was not.

In the course of the policy of opening up and reform initiated in 1978, the CCP has reassessed its religious policy. Although the party remains convinced that religion will eventually disappear as the result of the transition from socialism to communism and hence forbids its members to have any religious affiliation, it acknowledges that religion will continue to exist for some time. The constitution of 1982, therefore, not only confirms the right to freedom of religious belief but also establishes a framework for religious practice. The state protects “normal” religious activities, but it is unconstitutional to use religion to disrupt public order. Of course, this provision leaves
ample room for the authorities to decide which religious activities are “normal” and which are unlawful. The harsh treatment of Protestant “house churches” and the persecution of Falun Gong (a social movement with Daoist and Buddhist overtones) and its adherents, for example, must be viewed as attempts to maintain control over religious affairs and to suppress religious groups regarded as a threat to Communist rule.

A Delicate Balance

Ever since Western secular ideologies found their way to China around 1900, atheism has had an enormous effect on the religious policy of the Chinese state. However, although the political elites who ruled twentieth-century China were frequently influenced by atheism, they rarely tried to implement a thoroughly atheistic policy. They took measures to combat superstition in the form of popular religion but for the most part did not attempt to eliminate religion in general. Rather, they sought to control religious activities by officially recognizing a number of religious organizations. This is true of the most explicitly atheistic political party, the CCP. The Communists have tried to incorporate the major institutionalized religions into the state (the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution being the exception rather than the rule). In the 1980s and 1990s, not only the officially recognized religions but also popular religion experienced an astonishing revival, by and large tolerated by the authorities.

It is true that the Chinese state still has sufficient power to crack down on religious groups accused of threatening public order. If in the future it will tighten or loosen its grip on religion remains to be seen. That it will take steps to actively promote atheism—by force, if necessary—is far from likely.

Thoralf KLEIN

Further Reading


The Australia China Friendship Society promotes better cultural understanding between people of the two countries. The society sponsors lectures, tours, and educational exchanges.

The Australia China Friendship Society (ACFS) was established in 1951 and 1952 in Melbourne and Sydney. During the 1950s and 1960s the society represented a coalition of societies whose objective was to develop friendship and peace with the people of China and the Chinese communities in Australia in an effort to foster better cultural understanding. The climax of such activities was the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1972.

After 1972, when the society’s first national president, Geoffrey Stillwell, took office, the society promoted outbound tours to China, and during the 1990s the society promoted inbound tours from China.

Eight branches of the society are located throughout Australia. Membership in a branch is open to any person or corporation who agrees with the objectives of the society and pays the membership fee. As a voluntary, nonprofit, nonsectarian, and nonracially oriented organization, the society sponsors lectures, tours, film presentations, delegate meetings, educational exchanges, classes on society, language, and history, and exhibitions that tour in both Australia and China. The society’s staff is made up of volunteers from both countries.

National presidents succeeding Stillwell in chronological order have been Jack Lazarus (Victoria), Sidney Clare (New South Wales), Bruce Johnson (Tasmania), Tom Loy (Queensland), Jeff Emmel (South Australia), James Flower (New South Wales), and Keith Jenvey (Queensland). Loy was elected for a second term in 2008.

The Editors

Further Reading
Australia-China Relations

China and Australia, whose Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, is a fluent Mandarin speaker, enjoy a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship, with trade and a healthy respect for differences in culture at the center. Australian tourism officials predict that by 2013, one million Chinese tourists a year will be visiting Australia—if the global financial climate improves.

China and Australia have an abiding relationship built on mutual trust and benefit. Even before President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in 1972, Gough Whitlam, who became Australia’s prime minister that year, had visited Beijing. Since then, Australia has been a strong supporter of China’s quest to engage more fully with the rest of the world. In more recent times, Australia was a strong supporter of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Spirit of Cooperation

Relations between China and Australia have never really been strained. In 1951, just two years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Australia China Friendship Society (ACFS) was established in Melbourne and Sydney with the aim of promoting friendship and understanding between the peoples of Australia and the PRC. The ACFS is credited with contributing to the spirit of cooperation and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Diplomatic relations were established between China and Australia in 1972. (The United States established diplomatic relations with China in 1979.)

Through the years a number of cities in China and Australia have established sister-city relationships, including Sydney/Guangzhou, Melbourne/Tianjin, Darwin/ Haikou, and Brisbane/Shenzhen. Such relationships have helped open the door to tourism.

Until the recent past, Chinese families did not take holidays to travel, even within China, so tourism is still new to many people. But as the economy grows and people enjoy more disposable income, Australia has become a popular destination for Chinese traveling abroad. Thanks to trade shows, entertainment troupes, art and cultural exchanges, and consumer goods imported from Australia—along with some Australian enterprises, like Aquaria 21, an indoor aquarium in Shanghai—the Chinese have come to know and appreciate all things Australian. Tourism officials in Australia predict an increasing flow of Chinese tourists in the coming years, with more than 1 million Chinese visitors expected by 2013, making China the largest tourism market for Australia. (All such estimates, of course, are based on reestablishing a strong global economy.)

Since the 1980s China and Australia have developed a variety of joint educational programs and cultural exchanges for students, teachers, researchers, and
professionals. Education is booming, with major Australian universities gaining a foothold in China. At the same time, loosened travel restrictions are allowing Chinese scholars more opportunities for study abroad.

Joint academic and training programs conducted in China take a variety of forms. Some programs involve partnerships between private enterprises; others involve cooperation between universities, research labs, and think tanks. Some programs take place entirely in China, some partly in China and partly in Australia. Some programs are designed so that one requirement or qualification is completed in China and then further study is completed in Australia. Some programs are in English while others are partly or wholly in Mandarin.

The two countries also cooperate in a number of important joint research projects. For example: In 2006 Chinese and Australian created a joint center for water research. The center has branches at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing and the University of Melbourne. A research agreement enables Chinese and Australians
to work together directly and to seek joint funding from sources outside China and Australia. The research focuses on such issues as groundwater management and irrigation techniques. In 2007 the Chinese Academy of Inspection and Quarantine and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, Australia’s national science agency, created a relationship agreement to conduct research in biosecurity and quarantine. These two organizations have had training and research agreements since the late 1970s.

Trading Partners

The spirit of cooperation between the two countries is strongest in trade and commerce. In 2005 China and Australia started negotiations on a free trade agreement that would benefit them both. Negotiations to hammer out the details continue; in the meantime, trade between the countries goes on.

Chinese imports from Australia include raw materials, manufactured goods and professional services. In the raw-material category, wool from Australian sheep has long been a important to China. To help drive its economic engine, China imports vast amounts of coal, iron ore, alumina, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Australia. An agreement finalized in 2002 calls for Australia to ship 3.3 million tons of LNG to China over a twenty-five year period, which began in 2006. The contract is worth $25 billion, Australian, ($16 billion, American) and represents Australia’s largest export contract, in terms of revenue, in its history. Supplying China has boosted the economies of Australia’s resource-rich states. The demand for resources in China is also creating a boom for Australia in related sectors that provide mining equipment, mining technology, and services to mining, such as software and training in areas like occupational health and safety. China also has major investments in mining and other energy projects in Australia.

Manufacturing imports have been growing steadily as well but are still small relative to the commodity sector. Nevertheless a demand for Australian goods of all kinds—consumer and industrial—has been growing in China. Some 4,260 Australian businesses export goods...
More than 3,000 Australian companies have bases in China to respond to this increased demand. Of particular demand from consumers are Australian products for children. Children’s natural-fiber clothing made by eeni meeni miini moh®, educational toys from GymbaROO®, and anything recorded or licensed by The Wiggles, a children’s musical group from Sydney, are extremely popular.

Importing services from Australia has become important to China, particularly financial services and professional services such as architecture, law, and engineering. Australian architecture firms—such as PTW, who designed the National Aquatics Center, known as the Water Cube, for the Beijing Olympics—are doing well as China invests in improving its infrastructure. Australian law firms are being called in to help China-based, Australian-owned firms conduct business in China. And as China meets the challenges of climate change, it is importing Australia assistance in environmental technology and design.

Although China exports some base metals and textile raw materials to Australia, it exports chiefly manufactured products: machinery, electronic products, audio-video equipment, chemicals and related products, footwear, headgear, umbrellas, artificial flowers, and a host of miscellaneous products, such as furniture, lamps, and toys.

China recently overtook Japan as Australia’s number one trading partner. In addition, the two countries have invested in each other as well. China has large investments in Australia’s resources and agricultural sectors, while Australia invests in Chinese manufacturing and some agribusiness and service businesses. Australia and
China undertake large joint ventures too—particularly in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).

**Strong Networks**

China’s favorable attitude toward Australia stems from a number of factors. The counties have gotten to know each other. There is been a long-standing link forged by migration—and more recently by trade—that connects the two countries. Chinese emigrants to Australia include business leaders, professionals, and workers. New Chinese emigrants generally have strong links to friends, family, and business and professional contacts back home.

On the cultural level, Australia has credibility in China with no historical political baggage. In recent years Australia has often supported China in international forums. Australia is strong economically and stable politically, with a highly skilled and multicultural workforce, including many ethnic Chinese. Chinese emigrants have influenced consumer tastes in Australia, which has helped to increased demand for exports and imports in both countries.

On the commercial level, Australia’s business culture suits the Chinese. The Chinese regard the Australians as open, direct, and honest. Australians doing business with China also tend to immerse themselves in Chinese culture and to learn Chinese ways. A study of Chinese workers found that an acceptance of cultural diversity by Australian managers was regarded as a key reason why Chinese workers liked working for Australian firms.

**Continued Relations**

It appears as though relations between China and Australia will continue to be mutually beneficial. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia is a fluent Mandarin speaker and keen scholar of Chinese history and culture. Leaders of the PRC have expressed interest in enhancing the two countries’ bilateral trade, cultural, and strategic ties. The Australian-China relationship is pivotal to both the nations and their peoples.

Tim HARCOURT

**Further Reading**


Some 118 million vehicles, over 60 percent privately owned, were traveling China’s roads by 2007, although sales sagged in 2008. Despite the decline, in January 2009 China seemed on its way to becoming the largest auto market in the world. The government hopes that by 2013 one in ten cars built in China will run on alternative energy.

The Western image of China as a nation of bicyclists is anachronistic; cars are fast replacing bicycles as China’s standard mode of transportation. The economic reforms of the 1980s led to twenty years of rising income, creating a consumer society where it is now easier for people and businesses to buy many different products, including passenger cars, pickup trucks, and SUVs. Based on statistics for the month of January 2009, with China car sales (735,000) surpassing for the first time those of the United States (656,976), China seems to be on the way to becoming the world’s No. 1 vehicle market (Kurtenbach 2009); China is already the No. 3 or No. 4 manufacturer—depending on the period measured—behind the United States, Japan, and Germany. Sales of both imported and domestic-made models are forecast to grow steadily in the coming years, as long as the overall economy remains strong. China’s automobile industry has developed from a cottage industry producing outdated Russian designs to a major world player in just one generation. The growth of the auto industry is one more indication of China’s economic power.

Early Days

The first car in China arrived in 1902, thanks to Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), a high military official of the Qing dynasty and, later, Sun Yat-sen’s (1866–1925) successor as president of the Chinese Republic. Yuan imported a car made by the Hong Kong plant of the American firm of Charles and Frank Duryea. He bought the car to win favor with Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908). By 1913 Henry Ford was selling his famous Model T in Shanghai.

China traces its auto industry to production dates from 1931. That year Tang Zhongming (1879–1980), an engineer and inventor, built an internal-combustion engine powered by charcoal, which he mounted into a car. This machine was meant to be used as military vehicle by Tang’s patron, Yang Hucheng (1893–1949), a Guomindang general during the Chinese Civil War.

The first modern automaker, First Automobile Works—now known as First Automotive Group Corporation, or FAW—began producing cars and trucks, using Soviet technology, in 1953 in Changchun, Jilin Province. FAW remains one of the “Big Five” automakers in China.

During the 1950s and 1960s, with the help of the Soviet Union, Chinese factories produced light- and heavy-duty trucks for military and civilian use. Several more automobile enterprises opened, including The Second Automobile Works—now known as Dongfeng Motor Corporation—founded in Hubei Province in 1968. The construction of this plant was part of Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) Third Front strategy, a massive project of industrial development intended to provide homeland...
security. Similar plants were set up in other provinces and major cities throughout China, often with one venture for cars and another for trucks.

**Joint Ventures**

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), all of China’s industries were in turmoil, and production declined. But transport was understood to be crucial and foreign exchange constraints limited the import of vehicles; building a modern automotive industry became a goal of the post-1978 leadership. As part of the reforms of late 1970s and early 1980s, China’s leaders realized that a thriving automobile industry could contribute to economic development and attract foreign investment. But Chinese enterprises lacked the technology and the capacity to design and manufacture cars. So China turned to foreigners to acquire the needed technologies, usually by forming joint ventures. Because autos were considered a strategic industry in China, government policy limited foreign firms to a 49-percent stake in vehicle assembly plants. Thus, despite foreign firms’ attraction to China’s huge, untapped car market, joint ventures were the only means of entry. To date only one firm (Honda) has been able to obtain an exception using a promise of exports.

Since the 1980s, joint ventures of Chinese and foreign-owned companies have powered China’s auto industry. The Chinese government and Chinese businesses generally prefer the joint venture to other business structures when dealing with foreign companies. Joint ventures do, however, benefit the foreign investor by providing a local partner, typically a state-owned enterprise, thereby allowing the foreign investor favorable access to China’s huge markets and labor force. The Chinese benefit from the manufacturing, technology, and marketing experience of the foreign partner. Four of China’s Big Five automakers operate through joint ventures.

FAW had been producing medium-sized trucks since 1956 and its own car brand, the Hongqi, since 1958, when it formed a joint venture with Volkswagen in 1991 to focus strictly on cars. Since then, FAW has formed many joint ventures with businesses from around the world, including the United States, Russia, and Japan, to produce cars and parts.

In 1984 Volkswagen and the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) formed Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company, Ltd., (SVW), a 50-50 joint venture fixed for forty-five years. SVW is the largest foreign-invested enterprise in China in terms of sales. The company produces more than 450,000 cars a year and is headquartered in Anting International Auto City, in the Jiading district of Shanghai.

Dongfeng Motor Corporation also has joined in a number of joint ventures since the 1980s, including agreements with Peugeot/Citroen, Honda, Nissan, Kia, and Hyundai. It manufactures and assembles cars, trucks, buses, and parts under its own name and with its foreign partners. Although the corporation’s stocks are publicly traded, the Chinese government maintains 70 percent control of the company.

Chang’an Automobile (Group) Company, Ltd., (also called Chang’an Motors, Chang’an Auto, and Chana Auto) is the fourth-largest auto producer in China. It is headquartered in Chongqing, a provincial-level municipality in western China. Chang’an was founded in 1862 in Shanghai and developed the first industrial group in modern China, manufacturing a variety of products, including guns. In 1957 in began producing Jeeps. The company has joint ventures to build cars and engines with Suzuki, Ford, and Mazda.

Chery, the fifth-largest automaker in China, is owned by the local government of Wuhu, Anhui Province. Chery is the largest independent auto manufacture in China. Although it has not engaged in any joint ventures with foreign or domestic enterprises, it has formed strategic partnerships with companies in the United States, Austria, and Iran, and has plants in Iran, Russia, and Egypt.

Forming joint ventures for domestic manufacturing has been an effective business strategy for China’s automakers. Throughout the world the auto industry’s long-term tendency is to build where vehicles are sold. This way automakers need not worry so much about fluctuations in foreign exchange rates and the need to adapt products to match the unique nature of foreign markets.

China’s Big Five automakers take part in over a dozen loosely-integrated joint ventures. There are in addition about forty other smaller companies, operating under the protection of provincial governments. This contrasts with twelve firms in the United States, the world’s largest market. In the past, provincial governments were able to
impede outside firms from selling in the local market; such local protectionism has now receded. The overall market thus remains highly fragmented, and with the exception of a few joint ventures (SAIC-VW, SAIC-Buick, and the main ventures of Honda and Toyota) most firms operate at too low a volume to realize economies of scale yet face pressure to meet modern emissions and safety standards. There will inevitably be a shake out over the next few years.

**Makes and Models**

China’s Big Five automakers, along with about forty other smaller companies, produce the full range of commercial and passenger vehicles and parts and components. The following focuses on several Big Five specialties.

FAW produces commercial trucks and buses, coaches, passenger cars, SUVs, pickups, and parts under license from Toyota, Volkswagen, Audi, and Mazda. Its best known make, however, is its own Hongqi, a luxury sedan and limousine favored by the rich and by government leaders since the 1950s. In 2006 FAW launched the Besturn series of high-end performance luxury cars.

SAIC makes licensed versions of Volkswagen and General Motors vehicles. GM is the top-selling brand in China. In addition, SAIC makes the Roewe 750, a highly revised version of the Rover 75; MGs, including the Austin, Morris, and Sterling; and the Soyat, a Chinese brand.

Dongfeng produces commercial vehicles, including trucks and buses, and passenger vehicles, including sedans and SUVs, under licensing arrangements with its joint-venture partners.

Chang’an Motors builds licensed versions of Suzuki, Ford, and Mazda commercial trucks and passenger vehicles. In 2005 the company introduced its own car brand, the Chang’an CM8. For the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing the company supplied a number of hybrid-drive cars as taxis for athletes and spectators.

Chery makes large and mid-size sedans, city cars, and panel vans, with such names as Cowin, Eastar, Tiggo, and Karry.

**Parts and Accessories**

An important part of the auto industry in China is the auto parts sector, which in the United States, Japan, and Europe accounts for roughly three times the employment of
the automotive assembly sector. By the end of 2007, there were 7,579 makers of auto parts and fittings in China, 72.3 percent of the entire auto industry in terms of the number of manufacturers. Revenue from the auto parts sector accounted for about 35 percent of the entire industry’s revenue and about 41 percent of the profit. Unlike the auto assembly plants, most parts plants were private companies (5,137), the rest being either foreign owned (1,120) or state owned (1,322).

Certain subsectors of the auto parts sector—particularly engines, chassis, tires, and auto electronics—have been expanding rapidly in recent years. The auto parts sector has been able to meet about 60 percent of China’s demand for parts and accessories, although competition from foreign auto parts makers has been increasing. To meet the competition, the government has been developing policies to help the domestic parts makers to become more competitive through acquisitions and mergers or by going public.

**Steady Growth**

China’s auto industry has grown dramatically since the 1990s. In 1990 only 42,000 cars were produced in China, compared to some 5 million in the United States. By 2000 production in China had jumped to 2 million units. Production grew to 7.2 million vehicles in 2006 and more than 8.8 million in 2007. (The United States produced about 10 million vehicles that year.) Industry analysts predict that by 2020 China’s auto industry will be the largest in the world.

Sales for Chinese-made cars have been brisk in recent years. China itself is the main market. In 2007 the top ten passenger-vehicle manufacturers in China sold 3,062,561 cars, about 65 percent of the total national sales.

In 2007 Shanghai GM, a joint venture between General Motors and SAIC, sold 500,308 vehicles, leading car sales in the Chinese market for the third consecutive year. Shanghai GM is the first passenger-car company in China to sell more than 500,000 vehicles a year. In 2007 Shanghai GM sold 160,500 Chevrolet vehicles, up 56.4 percent from 2006; 332,000 Buick vehicles, an increase of 27,800 units from 2006; 7,040 Cadillac vehicles; and 618 Saab vehicles.

FAW-Volkswagen, a joint venture of FAW and Volkswagen Group of Germany, sold 459,359 vehicles in 2007. The Jetta accounted for 43.49 percent of the total volume.

Shanghai-Volkswagen, a joint venture between SAIC
and Volkswagen Group, sold 436,343 vehicles in 2007. Just four models—Passat, Santana, Santana 3000, and Polo—represented 91 percent of its total sales.

Chery in 2007 sold 381,000 vehicles; 119,800 were exported.

The fastest growing automaker in China in 2007 was Chang’an Ford Mazda, a joint venture between Chang’an Motors, Chang’an Ford, Ford Motor Company, and Mazda. The company was formed in 2005. In 2007 it sold 217,100 vehicles, a 60-percent increase over 2006 sales. Also in 2007 a spin-off company, Chang’an Ford Mazda Engines, began producing the Mazda Z engine for use by Chang’an Ford.

The top ten automakers, in terms of sales, in 2007 were FAW-VW, Shanghai-GM, Shanghai-VW, Chery, FAW-Toyota, Dongfeng-Nissan, Guangzhou-Honda, Chang’an-Ford-Mazda, Dongfeng-Peugeot-Citro, and Beijing-Honda.

Meanwhile, as noted above, the integration of the national market is intensifying competition, and with a dozen-plus firms investing in new capacity, prices have been forced down, despite this growth in demand. Rising sales do not always mean rising profits. As early as the second quarter of 2007, China’s automakers began to see profits dip. The increased cost of materials, most notably steel and energy (mainly coal), had begun to cut

In the last two decades China has built many super highways. While China produces its own makes of cars, joint ventures with international car makers and foreign cars offer potential car buyers a choice. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN, CAPTION BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
into earnings. And sales flattened in 2008 in China, as was the case with car sales around the world.

Export Market

While most of the cars sold by Chinese automakers remain in China, the automakers had been gradually penetrating foreign markets until the financial crisis of 2008. Rising production and demand generated a record year for exporters in 2007. Exports rose 79 percent from the previous year. Automakers shipped 612,700 vehicles and chassis overseas. Trucks accounted for 40 percent of exports; passenger cars, 31 percent; and buses and chassis, the rest. Automakers and parts makers sold their products in 220 countries and regions. The value of exports more than doubled from 2006 levels to reach $7.31 billion.

But by the third quarter of 2008, the export bubble had begun to burst. Exports were down 20 percent from the previous year. China’s major export markets—Russia, Vietnam, South America, and Central America—were experiencing their own financial problems. In addition, Russian and other countries raised their trade thresholds, which obstructed Chinese auto exports.

Quality issues have also affected exports. Chinese automakers had been trying for years to crack the U.S. market as they have the European market. By the end of 2008, Chinese cars still had not met the emissions and safety standards demands of the United States.

Domestic Market

As of 2007 China was the world’s second largest car market, following the United States. In 2007 Chinese drivers bought 8.8 million cars, minivans, and SUVs, and 3 million commercial vehicles, up from just 1.6 million vehicles sold in 1997. China is the largest market in the world for Volkswagens. In 2007 some 118 million vehicles were traveling China’s roads, 61.2 percent privately owned. Owing to improved technology and sales mechanisms, China-made cars are good value for the money.

The fastest growing segment of the Chinese car market is the first-time buyer, estimated to be 80 percent of China’s car buyers. Fewer than 50 of every 1,000 Chinese own cars. In the United States, 750 Americans of 1,000 own cars. The worldwide average is 120 of 1,000. In the so-called mature markets like the United States, Europe, and Japan, first-time buyers account for less than 15 percent of the market.

Although most of the sales of Chinese vehicles, including cars, are sold to the Chinese people, many buyers still prefer imported cars. Jaguars, Landrovers Escalades, Humvees, Range Rovers, and other high-end Mercedes SUVs are extremely popular with China’s newly rich. Sales of BMWs rose 42 percent in 2007.

Some months in 2008 saw declines in sales; some months saw gains in sales. But, overall, sales of both domestic and foreign cars remained flat in 2008. Chinese car owners were more concerned with the cost of gasoline, which was expected to continue to rise, than with the cost of new cars. China’s newly rich first-time buyers, however, showed little concern for costs in 2008 and continued to buy Chinese cars and gasoline. Nevertheless, because of the global economy and the ripple effect, China’s auto industry was not immune to the financial turmoil of 2008. By the end of the year, there was much talk among automakers and policymakers about rebuilding consumer confidence, finding ways to fight foreign competition, and planning China’s first large-scale restructuring of the industry. But based on figures for the month of January 2009, China overtook the United States in number of car sales (735,000 and 656,976 respectively). If China’s pace continues, and the U.S. figures continue to plunge, China will become the leading auto market in the world. According to Mike DiGiovanni, General Motors’ executive director of global market and industry analysis, China’s expected auto sales could reach 10.7 million units in 2009, while he projects a figure of 9.8 million for the United States (Kurtenbach 2009).

National Impact

China’s auto industry is but one industry driving the economy, but it has had a large impact—both negative and positive—on the nation and the people. It is expected to affect the economy, government policy, and social institutions for years to come.

Before 1980, when there were relatively few passenger cars in China, urban air pollution was much lower than it is now. Also, in part because there were fewer cars, the country did not consume the huge quantities of oil—domestic
or imported—that the United States and other countries used. Since 1980, motor vehicles have become the leading source of urban air pollution, and China’s demand for oil has skyrocketed. By 1993 China became a net importer of oil for the first time. By 2004 China was the fourth-largest importer and by 2005 the second-largest consumer of oil in the world. To address pollution, China has now eliminated the use of lead gasoline, and requires catalytic converters and other standards that reduce emissions. Many old vehicles remain in use, and the regulation of trucks lags behind that of passenger cars.

Upgrading the auto industry and providing more roads for all the new cars are two key component of the government’s eleventh five-year plan (2005–2010).

Upgrading, according to the plan, has been gradual and has focused on strengthening the industry through steady, sustainable growth, innovation, and increased vocational training to provide workers for the auto industry (and other industries as well). The production of cleaner, more fuel-efficient cars is byproduct of the plan with far-reaching effects.

The plan called for investing $700 billion in the highway infrastructure. The goal is to build 2.3–2.5 million kilometers (about 1.2 million miles) of new road, including 55,000 kilometers (about 34,000 miles) of expressway. Expressways are being built to connect all cities with populations of 200,000 or more.

The complex interplay of China’s auto industry with a growing and affluent middle class, shifting foreign and domestic markets, foreign competition, environmental concerns, and government policy is bound to have a profound effect on China’s future prospects.

Future Prospects

The future of China’s auto industry—and the auto industry throughout the world—remained uncertain at the end of 2008, but statistics for January 2009 proved hopeful. Full results of the eleventh five-year plan had yet to be realized. Many analysts believe that China’s auto parts sector will continue to do well and show the greatest gains in employment, exports, and profits.

One positive note is China’s interest in electric motor scooters and cars. The country has invested heavily in the technology to build and keep running hybrid motor scooters, cars, and buses. Electric-car charging stations have been built in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and other large cities as part of a pilot project. The hope is that by 2013, one in ten cars built in China will run on alternative emery.

The government has designated the automobile industry as one of the pillars of its economic growth and development. Much planning and work will be done to keep China’s auto industry one of the most dynamic and prosperous in the world.

Wendell ANDERSON

Further Reading


Autonomous Areas ▶
A fundamental aspect of China’s policy regarding ethnic diversity is the constitutional establishment of autonomous areas, where the majority of inhabitants are traditionally ethnic minorities. Autonomous areas, occupying 64 percent of China’s total territory, exist at several levels, the largest being the province-level autonomous regions, followed by autonomous prefectures, autonomous counties and banners, and, since 1993, autonomous or ethnic townships.

China has many policies and practices directed at ethnic minorities. Some have aimed to improve the situations of such groups; others have targeted relations between minority groups and the Han majority. Still others have aimed to pacify such groups. And yet others have aimed to integrate and assimilate such groups. One such policy, emulating the Soviet model, involved the establishment of a set of autonomous areas—commonly referred to specifically as autonomous regions, prefectures, or countries—even before establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

Autonomous areas come in three sizes, the largest being provincial-size autonomous regions (zizhiqu, 自治区 of which there are five). There are also 30 autonomous prefectures (zizhizhou 自治州) and 120 autonomous counties (zizhixian 自治县) or autonomous banners (autonomous areas the size of counties in Inner Mongolia, zizhiqi 自治旗). Because some areas are too small, or too much mixing of ethnic groups prevents the formation of an autonomous county, in 1993 autonomous or ethnic townships (zizhixiang 自治乡) were established to supplement the other three types of autonomous areas; by 2003 there were 1,173 of these townships.

Autonomous areas occupy 64 percent of China’s total territory. Of the fifty-five recognized ethnic minorities,

Table 1  Autonomous Regions of China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date established</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area (sq. km.)</th>
<th>Population, 2006 (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region</td>
<td>1 May 1947</td>
<td>Hohhot</td>
<td>1,197,547</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region</td>
<td>1 October 1955</td>
<td>Urumqi</td>
<td>1,655,826</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region</td>
<td>15 March 1958</td>
<td>Nanning</td>
<td>237,693</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet Autonomous Region</td>
<td>1 September 1965</td>
<td>Lhasa</td>
<td>1,274,910</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

forty-four have autonomous areas devoted to them, accounting for 71 percent of ethnic minorities.

The first autonomous region was the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, established in 1947, even before the founding of the People’s Republic. The last autonomous region established was the Tibet Autonomous Region, not founded until 1965. Some scholars regard the late date as evidence that the central government was aware that this region would not be easily settled.

Some of China’s best-known ethnic tourism sites are autonomous areas, such as the Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture and the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, both in Yunnan, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture on the border with North Korea. Most autonomous areas lie in the border areas of China, where the majority of inhabitants were traditionally ethnic minorities and where relations with other nations are sometimes delicate and unsettled.

All autonomous areas share the same guiding and foundational principles, which recognize these areas as the traditional home area of a particular ethnic minority living in “compact communities,” after which the autonomous area derives its name. (Areas can be named after more than one ethnic group.) Minority representation

Sun-dappled sitting platform in the garden home of a Uygur family in the Turpan oasis, Xinjiang Uygur, China. Grape vines provide shelter from the Taklamakan desert sun and heat. Turpan is located in a great depression 76 meters (250 feet) below sea level. Water for the oasis is carried from the Heavenly Mountains hundreds of miles underground in a karez irrigation system to permit life to grow on the desert. Uygur people are a Turkic minority who settled in Xinjiang during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE).

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN

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in government is encouraged, although usually not at the highest levels.

The term translated as “autonomy” is zizhi (self-governing), but the autonomous areas have no actual autonomy, and the inseparability of the autonomous areas from the rest of the Chinese nation was specified immediately with the introduction of the idea of regional autonomy in the First Constitution (September 1954): “Regional autonomy applies in areas where a minority nationality lives in a compact community. All the national autonomous areas are inseparable parts of the People’s Republic of China.” By law governments of these areas are required to “safeguard the unification of the country.” This policy was reaffirmed in 2001 in the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. Article 2 states, “Regional autonomy shall be practiced in areas where minority nationalities live in concentrated communities. National autonomous areas shall be classified into autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People’s Republic of China.” Further, as a result of many migrations since 1949, it is no longer necessarily the case that the ethnic group after which an autonomous area is named is in fact the majority resident of that area now. Most areas now have a majority Han population.

Susan D. BLUM

Further Reading


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One of the most influential and popular modern Chinese writers, Ba Jin critiqued the harsh realities of feudal China, which he saw as oppressing and destroying the individual. Being a life-long anarchist, he advocated change through revolutionary means.

Considered one of the most influential Chinese writers of the last century, Ba Jin was born in Chengdu, Sichuan Province. His birth name was Li Yaotang. Ba Jin is a pseudonym he adopted when he began to write. It is thought that his pen name comes from two Russian anarchist writers, Mikhail Bakunin and Pyotr Kropotkin, who greatly influenced him in his early years. Another explanation suggests that the name is the initials of a friend who committed suicide.

Ba Jin was born into a large and influential family of court officials. His early education was spent studying English, at which time he became a voracious reader and eventually found great affinity with anarchist writers such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Emma Goldman. At the age of sixteen, he joined a group of anarchists. Perhaps the appeal for radical politics came from his hatred of his own family life, which he found to be tradition-bound and oppressive. In 1923 he entered Dongnan University in Nanjing, where he further pursued his anarchist aspirations, organizing strikes and writing pamphlets.

After graduating in 1927, he left for Paris, where he began to pursue an active literary career. During his year in France, he wrote his first novel, *Destruction*, and translated many anarchist works into Chinese. He returned to China in 1928, took up residence in Shanghai, and began to write in earnest. In 1933 he published *Family*, a novel in which he showed the cruelties of a repressive family bound to feudal conventions. This was the first entry of a trilogy known as the Torrents Trilogy. The other two novels were *Spring* (1938) and *Autumn* (1940). Other notable novels by Ba Jin from the 1930s include the Love Trilogy: *Fog* (1931), *Rain* (1933), and *Lightning* (1935); *Autumn in Spring* (1932); *A Dream of the Sea* (1932); and *Miners* (1933). During the 1930s, he continuously wrote essays, which were published in various important literary journals, and undertook translations. The main themes of his writing were the cruelty of an effete traditional society and the promise of modernity. Thus Ba Jin’s writings became an essential part of what would become contemporary China.

During World War II, Ba Jin worked actively against the Japanese invaders, and when the Communists took control after the war, he welcomed them enthusiastically. However, this zeal was short lived when he and his activities were seen as suspect. During the Cultural Revolution, Ba Jin was labeled a subversive, and his writings and ideas were suppressed. These were difficult and painful times for him. In 1972 he lost his wife to illness because medical treatment was denied them both. It was only in 1977 that he was rehabilitated and his writing was again allowed to be printed.

In 1981 he was elected chairman of the Chinese Writers Association, during which time he actively advocated freedom for writers and even proposed a museum dedicated to the Cultural Revolution to ensure that such an event would never happen again. His suffering during this time is
Ba Jin and The Family

Ba’s trilogy focuses on the ills of traditional Chinese society and the old family system. It is the longest and most ambitious piece of modern Chinese fiction before World War II. Ba Jin admitted that he drew upon family life he knew during his adolescent years in Chengdu for his novel.

The Family is a true story, in that its characters represent people I loved or loathed. Some of the events I personally witnessed or experienced. As I said previously: “I don’t write novels in order to be an author. It is my past that force me to take up my pen.” Writing The Family was like opening memory’s grave. Even as a child I frequently witnessed the ruination of the lives of loveable young people who were driven to a tragic end. When writing this novel, I suffered with them and, like them, struggled in the grip of a demon’s talons. It is replete with my deep love, my intense hate.


chronicled in his five-volume work titled Random Thoughts. In 1990 he was given the Fukuoka Asian Culture Prize. Ba Jin died in Shanghai in 2005 at the age 100 or 101.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


For thousands of years bamboo has been an important practical and cultural product in China. People have used it for food, crafts, and weaponry, and to make bridges, residences, and household items.

China has used bamboo for thousands of years. Ten thousand years ago hominids (erect bipedal primate mammals comprising recent humans together with extinct ancestral and related forms) living along the Yangzi (Chang) River used bamboo. During the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) people used bamboo to make arrowheads. During the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) people carved words on bamboo strips and used them to send messages. During the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) people made pens of bamboo, and during the Jurchen Jin dynasty (265–316 CE) people made paper—one of the four great inventions of ancient China—from bamboo. During the Song dynasty (960–1279) bamboo was used as a weapon.

Chinese people have long used bamboo in daily life. Su Shi, a scholar during the Song dynasty, wrote: “Bamboo shoot for food, bamboo tile for house making, bamboo hat for rain sheltering, bamboo wood for fuel, bamboo skin for clothing, bamboo paper for writing and bamboo shoes for foot wearing, that is the life—we can not do without bamboo” (Zhaohua 2001).

In general bamboo has had four uses during China’s long history: as a versatile and durable natural resource of value in all aspects of daily life, as decoration, in weaponry, and as a cultural symbol.
Daily Life

As early as the Spring and Autumn period, the production of bamboo occupied an important position in agriculture, fishing, industry, and domestic life. The Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE) made about 60 kinds of everyday items out of bamboo; the Jin dynasty made about 100; the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song dynasties, more than 200; and the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), about 250 items. The most familiar were rulers, curtains, fans, rafts, and cases, which are still common today.

Bamboo also was used in the Du Jiangyuan hydraulic engineering works two thousand years ago, and people in Sichuan Province dug a salt well 160 meters deep using bamboo rope during the Han dynasty.

Bamboo was a dependable building material, especially in southern China. In Yunnan Province several minorities, such as the Dai and Zhuang, used bamboo pavilions as their main residences, and before the popularization of steel and concrete, bridges were built of bamboo.

Chinese also have long valued bamboo for the taste and nutritional value of its shoots. “There is no banquet without bamboo” was an often-heard saying during the Tang dynasty. In 1006 BCE the Emperor Zhou Cheng entertained his subordinates with a “bamboo shoot banquet.”

Decoration

Basket weaving was at the core of ancient bamboo culture. Basketry began during the early Neolithic period (8000–5500 BCE), and the Warring States period was the turning point of the craft as it gradually developed into a decorative art. During the Tang and Song dynasties exquisite bamboo lanterns and other woven products were used in everyday life. In the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, with the growing number of bamboo basketry artists, the types of household items bearing intricate bamboo decoration only increased.

Bamboo carving is another traditional craft. A Han dynasty bamboo spoon with a dragon pattern, found in the Mawangdui Tomb in the city of Changsha, was the earliest practical example of bamboo carving. During the Ming dynasty bamboo carving developed into an art.

Weaponry

One of the earliest uses of bamboo was in crafting arrows and lances. An ancient legend about "Hou Yi shooting the sun" featured a bamboo bow and arrow. During the Han dynasty, bamboo pieces carved with characters and patterns to represent military leadership were used as a commanders’ tallies. (Afu, the Chinese word for tally, was a form of credential or authority, or could also function as a passport). When the general was leading an army to fight, the king would give the general one half of the bamboo symbol and keep the other half. If he needed to send orders to the general, the king would let his representative take his half of the bamboo symbol and show it to the general to verify the authenticity of the orders. Bamboo played an important role in the military as bamboo guns were produced during the Southern Song dynasty.
(1127–1279). People filled the long culm (stem) with the predecessor of modern gunpowder. During the end of Han dynasty (208–280 BCE), rattan armor was the most important protecting method in Chinese southwestern national minorities.

**Culture**

In ancient Chinese culture bamboo was the symbol of good fortune and longevity, valued for its tenacious properties and its transcendent beauty; an appreciation for bamboo was considered the mark of a gentleman. Indeed, many bamboo qualities were said to symbolize those of noble human beings—its strength and solidity, for instance, representing a person’s faithfulness and firmness; its hollowness a symbol of a modest personality. Thus, bamboo became a common subject of painting and poetry. The earliest collection of Chinese poetry, *Shijing* (*Book of Songs*) (1046–771 BCE), included five poems about bamboo. Traditional Chinese alphabetical characters also reflected the importance of bamboo in the culture. Until the Qing dynasty 960 characters bore the bamboo radical. (Word radicals are the building blocks of most written Chinese words, or pictograms. Each radical conveys a certain message, either of an object or an abstract idea, which, when combined, link the core ideas to the more complex meaning of the word.)

Inspired by their traditional use of bamboo Chinese people summarized many valuable experiences and wrote related books, such as *Chinese Bestiary*, which was published in the fourth century BCE and described the distribution, characteristics, and economic values of ancient bamboo resources, and the first bamboo monograph, called “bamboo spectrum,” which in the sixth century CE described seventy bamboo species. Most of the descriptions were in accordance with modern research.

Bamboo indeed is the essence of Chinese history. As the British scholar Joseph Lee said, “East Asian civilization is bamboo civilization” (Zehui 2002).

**FU Jinhe**

**Further Reading**


Bank of China
Zhōngguó Yíngháng 中国银行

The Bank of China, one of the pillars of China’s financial infrastructure, holds a unique place as the most recognizable and international institution in the national banking system. The bank has survived numerous political transitions and economic systems and is poised to become a powerful player in the global financial scene.

Over the past century, the Bank of China (BOC) has had a hand in virtually all of China’s major financial efforts. The Bank of China had roots in a bank established by the Qing government in 1905 to serve as a central authority for the Imperial Board of Revenue. It issued notes in 1908 but did not have a powerful national presence until it was formally founded, with Sun Yat-sen’s approval, as part of the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. The BOC served as China’s primary fiscal and financial authority until 1949 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China. During the volatile period from 1912 to 1949, the bank served as one of the few stable sectors in the country. Through prudent expansion into increasingly stable areas and with prompt response to political changes, it managed to maintain its position of power and influence throughout. In 1929 the bank opened its first international branch, in London.

After the revolution of 1949, BOC was relegated to a secondary role from the newly established People’s Bank of China (PBC). The PBC controlled domestic financial and fiscal policy and was tightly controlled by the central politburo. BOC, fully nationalized, was used primarily as an international exchange bank and served mostly in this role. This thirty-year period was typified by extreme economic isolation, with all foreign banks having been required to exit the country. Representatives of the Bank of China were frequently the representatives in international trade discussion.

During and after the formal opening of China in 1979 and 1980, BOC changed from being just the international financial face of China to being the largest commercial bank. The bank took several notable steps to provide a greater range of financial services, issuing international bonds in 1984 in Japan. Japan provided BOC with one of its most fruitful initial international presences, as it was able to participate in Japan’s economic boom during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the 1990s the bank expanded its international role, using its position as the primary international bank of China to attract internationally experienced professionals to its management team. Focusing on modernizing its operations, it became the note-issuing bank of Hong Kong and Macao, and established several subsidiaries, including BOC Hong Kong, BOC International, BOC Insurance, and other lesser financial entities.

In 2003 the Bank of China became one of the pilot banks for a new project to engage in reforms to give banks more leverage to compete in international markets. On 26 August 2004, Bank of China, Ltd., was formally incorporated as a state-controlled commercial bank, a unique institution in the financial world. As a commercial bank,
it accepts deposits and makes loans to individuals and businesses.

Bank of China has more than 10,000 branches in China and more than 600 branches in 27 countries, including Canada (Toronto and Vancouver) and the United States (New York and Los Angeles). Around the world, it employs more than 200,000 people. It has assets estimated at 3 trillion yuan (about $385 billion) and has been included in the Fortune Global 500 for 17 consecutive years.

The Editors

Further Reading


Foreign banks and two traditional types of Chinese banking institutions dominated China’s financial market during the Qing dynasty. Modern banks combining Western techniques with China’s indigenous practices would emerge to play an important role in Chinese economy by the mid-1930s. But Japanese invasion, subsequent civil war, and the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China put a halt to this development.

During the entire nineteenth century, China’s financial market was dominated by foreign banks and two traditional Chinese financial institutions: piaohao 票号 and qianzhuang 钱庄. The piaohao, started in the early nineteenth century, rapidly developed into the most powerful force in the contemporary Chinese financial market. Piaohao focused on interprovincial remittances and conducted government services; high officials and big merchants were their main customers. By the end of the nineteenth century, thirty-two piaohao, with 475 branches, were in business covering all of China’s eighteen provinces, plus Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and other frontier areas.

Independent of the nationwide network of piaohao were a large number of small native banks called qianzhuang. From the beginning, qianzhuang had their own field of business complementary to, but distinct from that of, the piaohao. Most qianzhuang were local and functioned as commercial banks by conducting local money exchange, issuing cash notes, exchanging bills and notes, and accepting discounts for the local business community. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, qianzhuang and piaohao served the Chinese economy and society well.

The growth of China’s import and export business in the nineteenth century attracted Western banks into China’s financial market. A British-Indian bank introduced modern banking into China in 1845; other European, American, and Japanese banks followed. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were nine foreign banks with forty-five branches in China’s treaty ports, all of which, by virtue of extraterritoriality treaties imposed on China, operated outside the jurisdiction of the Chinese government. Not only did these banks completely control China’s international-remittance and foreign-trade financing, they also issued their own banknotes, accepted deposits from Chinese citizens, and extended loans to traditional Chinese financial institutions.

By the end of the nineteenth century, foreign banks dominated the financing of China’s import and export trade, while piaohao monopolized the domestic remittance business and qianzhuang controlled credit markets for domestic trade throughout China. Complementing and cooperating with each other these three institutions monopolized the Chinese financial market so tightly that there seemed to be little room for modern Chinese banks.
Emergence of Modern Chinese Banks

The dominance of foreign banks, qianzhuang, and piaohao in the Chinese financial market was finally broken when China’s first modern bank, the Imperial Bank of China, opened for business in Shanghai in 1897.

China’s New Financial Demands

The birth of the modern Chinese bank was first the result of China’s new financial demands. Decades of commercial contacts with the outside world and the bitter experiences of military defeats at the hands of Western industrial nations convinced increasing numbers of Chinese of the superiority of machine production over the century-old handicraft method of production. Starting in the 1860s, various munitions works, railway companies, and modern factories that manufactured military and commercial goods were created by the Qing government and private industrialists.

Unlike native Chinese handicraft workshops, modern industry needed large amounts of capital for long periods of time. The capital demands of railroad construction and other infrastructure were even greater. But the Qing government’s deteriorating financial situation prevented it from appropriating large funds to initiate more new projects.

Incompetence of Existing Institutions

Though the existing financial arrangements previously had provided sufficient credit and transfer facilities to support domestic trade within the Chinese economy, they could hardly meet China’s new financial demands. Neither qianzhuang nor piaohao, as single proprietorships or partnerships with limited capital resources, proved able to provide funding for China’s modern adventures. To extend their business, most qianzhuang in Shanghai and other large treaty ports increasingly relied on the loans from piaohao and foreign banks for their working capital. Since these loans were made on a daily basis, qianzhuang had no choice but to make short-term loans to merchants rather than long-term loans to modern industrialists. Piaohao’s branch system dispersed their relatively greater capital base. Their extremely conservative owners failed to appreciate the potential profitability of the new opportunities and refused to provide funding to modern industrialists. Thus, until the end of the nineteenth century, qianzhuang and piaohao were rarely involved in China’s modern industry. Foreign banks were more interested in making quick profits by financing China’s international trade and providing loans to the Qing government than investing in the long-term development of industry in China. Furthermore, complicated Chinese business customs and procedures with which they were unfamiliar made the risk of industrial financing extremely high for foreign banks and thus prevented them from being a capital source for China’s new entrepreneurs.

Inspiration of Nationalism

Awareness of foreign intrusion into the Chinese financial market was another significant factor leading to the appearance of modern Chinese banks. After China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) the Qing government was forced to pay a war indemnity almost three times its annual revenue and had to borrow from foreign banks. The intensive struggle among foreign powers attempting to seize spheres of influence in China imprinted strong political meaning on these loans. It was often stipulated in loan agreements between foreign banks and the Chinese government that the latter had to assign special taxes or revenues earmarked as guarantees for loans (Wang 1983, 239–260). Many Chinese officials and intellectuals saw the situation as a sign of China’s possible demise.

The establishment of modern Chinese banks was seen as an important way to protect China from economic exploitation and invasion by foreign powers. As Sheng Xuanhuai, the founder of the first Chinese bank, said, “Should China not establish its own bank, [foreign powers] would seize all China’s profit and power” (Cheng 2007, 24). Many influential Chinese had highly appraised the bank’s role in supporting the state treasury and facilitating economy. They believed that China could not be wealthy and powerful without modern industry, but modern industry was not possible without the modernization of China’s financial institutions.
Expansion and Privatization

The Chinese nationalism triggered by the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919 greatly stimulated modern Chinese banking; immediately after the inauguration of the new Republican government, modern banks mushroomed throughout the country. While the power of government-owned banks declined due to government corruption and mismanagement, private banks and privatized state banks emerged as the backbone of Chinese banking. The most prominent were the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, the so-called Three Southern Banks (Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, Zhejiang Industrial Bank, and National Commercial Bank), and Four Northern Banks (Jincheng Banking Corporation, Continental Bank, Yanye Commercial Bank, and China & South Sea Bank). Private banks dominated modern Chinese banking before the Beijing government was eliminated in 1928.

With China’s political unification under the Nationalist government, piaohao almost disappeared from the scene, while those of foreign banks and qianzhuang showed only a moderate expansion. Modern Chinese banks, however, experienced a quantitative expansion as well as a qualitative improvement, more than doubling their paid-up capital and reserve funds, tripling their loans, and quadrupling their deposits from 1927 to 1936. The banknotes they issued increased even more than five times. By 1936, modern Chinese banks held 81 percent of China’s capital power including paid-up capital, deposits, and circulated notes (Cheng 2007, 78). By 1937, the total assets of modern Chinese banks reached more than 7.27 billion fabi (Cheng 2007, 69). (In 1935 the central government prohibited the use and ownership of silver coins and

For centuries Chinese money consisted of circular coins with a square hole in the center to facilitate their being transported on a string. These particular coins belonged to the Prince of Pin, in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). Collection of the Imperial Palace in Beijing. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
issued the fabi as China’s legal tender note; fabi were replaced by jinyuanjuan [golden yuan] in 1948.)

**Change of Power Balance in the Chinese Financial Market**

The expansion of modern Chinese banks finally changed the balance of power in the Chinese financial market. Gone forever was the domination of piaohao, qianzhuang, and foreign banks in China’s financial market, thanks to the development of modern Chinese banks. Had not the development been brutally interrupted by the Japanese invasion of China, modern Chinese banks would have had the opportunity to make even further progress and greater contributions to the development of the modern Chinese economy.

**Why Modern Banks Succeeded**

While the many historical factors discussed above contributed to the advancement of modern Chinese banks throughout these years, the most pivotal but least-studied factor actually lies embedded in these banks themselves.

![The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Bund, Shanghai, China, c. 1931. Stereographic print.](image)

Although the relationship between banks and government was full of complications, and some government policies favored the improvement of the modern banking system, the government played a very limited role in this entire process.

By the middle of the 1930s, about three-quarters of the total capital and more than 80 percent of the total assets of modern Chinese banks were concentrated among a score of principal banks. The Bank of China, Bank of Communications, the Southern Three, and Northern Four banks did the best. The total assets of these nine banks reached almost 3 billion fabi. Together these nine banks conducted about 60 percent of the loans and deposits and made up 54 percent of the assets of all Chinese banks (Cheng 2007, 70). Decisions and policies made by these principal banks largely explain why the modern Chinese banks could succeed in those years.

**Adopting Western Business Methods**

Credit for the success of these banks should be largely attributed to a group of prominent bankers who were in charge of these banks for most of the time during this period. As a group of Chinese entrepreneurs, they shared native-place ties and similar educational backgrounds. All of them had a solid Chinese classical education, while the majority had gone abroad to study at Western or Japanese colleges before starting their banking careers. Armed with knowledge of both the Western and Chinese business worlds, these bankers masterfully combined modern banking business techniques with China’s indigenous business traditions. Adjusting to the changing financial market, these people constantly introduced reforms into their banks’ business practices and management.

**Overcoming Old Habits**

A bank functions as a bank only when it starts to do business with its customers’ money. Attracting deposits for reinvestment is therefore the key to a bank’s business. To do so, however, China’s new banks had to discourage the age-old Chinese habits of hoarding gold and silver—something that neither the piaohao nor the qianzhuang had attempted. Piaohao were uninterested in
attracting deposits because their monopoly on domestic remittances already gave them access to considerable amounts of floating funds that could be used to make loans and were free of interest charges. *Qianzhuang*, for their part, usually did not accept, let alone try to attract, deposits from common people, unless the depositors were the bank manager’s relatives or friends.

Modern Chinese banks, by contrast, envisioned deposits as their lifeline and went to great lengths to persuade people of the advantages they would gain by earning interest under the guidance of the new banks rather than letting money languish hidden in drawers in their homes or buried in the ground. Various saving accounts were designed to meet different customers’ requirements. By 1936, modern Chinese banks attracted more than 4.55 billion fabi of deposits from various sources, thirty-three times more than they did in 1911 (Cheng 2007, 34, 78) thus laid the foundation for their business expansion.

**Reforms in Making Loans**

While laying the foundation for their business expansion by increasing their deposits, China’s new banks also turned their attention to loans. Unsecured credit loans were the most prevalent type of loan offered by *piaohao* and *qianzhuang*; these were extended based on a customer's business aptitude and reputation. The necessity to provide guaranty for a loan was seen as reflecting unfavorably on a person’s credit standing; only people whose credit was in question had to provide collateral to receive a loan from a bank. A merchant with good credit could easily get a loan without any material guaranty; on the other hand, a debtor would make every effort to clear his debt on time.

This manner of dealing on the basis of mutual trust was very common in the Chinese business world and for the most part worked very well, so long as the financial environment remained relatively simple. With the quantitative increase and geographic expansion of commerce in the twentieth century, however, it became extremely difficult for a lender to judge the safety of a loan based only on his clients’ personal reputation. Without material guaranties, *qianzhuang* were taking big risks in making loans. A customer’s bankruptcy often led to a *qianzhuang*’s bankruptcy, sometimes even generating a domino effect that led to a more general financial crisis.

Aware of that weakness in the traditional financial system, new banks made great efforts to avoid loans based on personal credit and to encourage loans based on material security. Instead of focusing on personal credit loans, as the native Chinese financial institutions usually did, major banks based most of their loans on the security of materials. Merchants received loans by providing collateral, and manufacturing companies got loans for their working capital by depositing their raw materials or finished goods in bank warehouses. Longer-term financing of industry was provided against the security of the mortgages on factory sites, buildings, and machinery. These loans were much safer than loans based on personal credit. Most income of these banks came from the interest on these loans.

**Reforms in Management and Structure**

Recognizing the significance of human resources in a business operation, these bankers insisted on recruiting and promoting staff according to their working abilities, instead of relying on personal connections. Various methods were designed to enhance the quality of their staff, including a series of material incentive and welfare systems, which greatly improved the working conditions of their employees.

Unlike most Chinese business firms, which functioned as groups at essentially the local or regional level, these major banks operated their business nationwide, even internationally, by establishing regional branch offices and correspondent agencies in various places. They also expanded their activities across financial fields, making more industrial loans and investing capital in numerous diverse modern ventures. By the middle of 1930s, these banks were beginning to transform into an altogether new type of institution: modern enterprises. All of these major banks were organized as limited liability companies. Their corporate structure gave professional managers great leeway in running their businesses. They took long-term growth, rather than distribution of immediate dividends, as their business goal. They adopted many ways to build a sound financial foundation for their banks. For them, the long-term development of the bank was more important than short-term dividends because the incomes, careers, and
fame of these managers relied on the expansion of their banks. It was also eventually a better way to secure the interests of stockholders.

From today’s point of view, particularly in Western countries, these approaches and business practices were commonplace. But they represented dramatic changes in the contemporary Chinese business world. Reforms in banking practices and management brought these banks substantial advantages in competing with other financial institutions, but they led the for other business leaders in adopting new corporate structures and practicing new techniques.

Maintaining China’s Indigenous Business Traditions

Although China’s new banks adopted many Western business methods, they also wisely retained many of the beneficial elements of Chinese tradition.

Each of the chief executives of all nine of China’s major banks in the early decades of the twentieth century were born, or had family roots, in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. The dominance of these “Jiang-Zhe” natives (as they were called) in the Chinese financial field was not an accidental development, but one with long historical roots.

Jiang-Zhe merchants appeared in Shanghai as early as the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Chinese traders in an alien setting tended to cluster into two kinds of groups or cliques, called bang 帮—one on the basis of native-place (common place of birth or ancestral home), and the other on the basis of common occupation. Of the ten great merchant bang that appeared during the Ming and Qing dynasties, those formed by merchants from Zhejiang and Jiangsu became the most powerful after Shanghai was opened to foreign trade in 1842. Commercial acumen was an acknowledged gift of these merchants. Though Jiang-Zhe merchants were engaged in diversified business interests in Shanghai, the greatest concentration of their resources was in banking. Shanghai finance lay primarily in their hands. Western scholars have long recognized the importance that Chinese people place on the notion of native-place ties. For Chinese people, sharing the same birthplace or the same ancestral county can reduce the psychological barriers that usually exist among businesspeople and can foster cooperation. Among merchants, those from Jiangsu and Zhejiang were famous for their fierce loyalty to their native place.

In competing with the established financial institutions, these bankers consciously used this age-old Chinese tradition of emphasizing personal guanxi (connections) to strengthen their power as a group. It was common for bankers to assume positions such as director or supervisor of the board in one another’s banks, and often these major banks helped one another to pass through difficult times. They signed contracts among themselves to open accounts in one another’s banks, and the bills and checks issued by banks that had a relationship with another could be cleared without passing regular clearinghouses. When it was necessary to send cash, the accruing fees would be waived; when one bank had an emergency, others had a responsibility to help it by advancing a predetermined amount of cash. Native-place ties were the most significant factor in establishing this kind of cooperation and special consideration.

In the absence of an effective governmental administrative apparatus for urban centers in China in the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese bankers derived considerable support from their native-place ties. They helped each other deal with expected or unexpected crises, which occurred frequently in those years. Particularly, they stood together in resisting the government’s pressure to use more financial sources for unproductive purposes.

Identification of the Individual with the Group

In China, identifying individual interest with that of the group has always been the norm; the Chinese do not value rugged individualism. China’s new bankers took full advantage of this tradition and promoted the notion that an individual worker’s interest should be identified with the bank’s interest. It was in the employees’ own best interest to work hard for the bank, the bankers pointed out, because the workers would benefit only if the bank could survive and prosper. The Shanghai Bank asked its staff to bear in mind that “the bank is me, and I am the bank.”
To encourage the sentiment expressed by this slogan, the Shanghai Bank persuaded and helped staff members to purchase bank stock. Indoctrinating their employees with the Confucian value of group consciousness was at the core of the business culture of all these banks and a vital element in their success.

**SELF-IMPROVEMENT**

Since bank staff dealt with cash every day, personal honesty was extremely important. Because the banks were such large organizations, the general managers could not directly supervise and motivate each branch manager, much less each employee. Sincerely believing in the usefulness of traditional Chinese ethics, these bankers indoctrinated their employees with Confucian principles. While strictly enforcing discipline, therefore, all major banks also asked their staff to follow certain guidelines in order to promote morality, a good work ethic, and good personal habits.

The office of the general manager of Shanghai Bank, for example, instructed its workers to adhere to the four virtues of loyalty, sincerity, honesty, and modesty and to overcome the four vices of selfishness, cheating, greed, and aggressiveness; other banks followed suit.

Also as part of such self-cultivation programs, bank employees were encouraged to improve themselves in a manner that would benefit the bank, such as learning foreign languages, becoming familiar with various foreign and domestic markets, mastering the abacus, calculating statistics, and acquainting themselves with modern legal practices. The banks encouraged their staff to learn new skills and advance their education by setting up libraries or reading rooms in the banks, inviting noted scholars to give lectures, sending staff abroad to study, and publishing relevant information in bank journals.

Self-improvement was reflected in good personal habits as well. Almost all major banks set up regulations concerning personal habits and hygiene of their staff and persuaded them to avoid bad habits. The general manager of the Jincheng Bank issued an order prohibiting his staff from participating in gambling and warned that those who violated this rule might lose their jobs. Most prominent bankers tried to set examples for their staff to view their personal integrity over material gains.

**SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY**

From the middle of the nineteenth century onward, Chinese intellectuals believed that increasing China’s economic strength was the way to save China from miserable poverty, foreign oppression, and domestic disintegration. Bankers believed it was their responsibility to serve society and saw a possible means of national salvation in their successes. Shanghai Bank made its motto “Serving society” and invited famous scholars to lecture on and analyze how employees could help the bank facilitate it goals.

The Bank of China’s Zhang Jiaao set up three goals (which were later called “the spirit of the Bank of China”) for the staff. First, it was not enough for the Bank of China staff to provide a safe repository for the bank’s stockholders, depositors, and lenders; the bank must also seek well-being for all of society and increase the wealth and strength of the country. Second, every staff member, no matter how high or low their positions, had to be honest, selfless, and devoted to his or her work. Third, it was expected that while staff members would make no mistakes in routine transactions, they would devote serious efforts to improve their performance in furthering the bank’s reputation.

Chinese nationalism, stimulated by the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 and the May Fourth intellectual movement, also made a strong impression on these bankers. Shanghai Bank’s Chen Guangfu told his colleagues that the bank had a special mission, which was to save China and to resist foreign economic oppression. Unlike many radical Chinese nationalists, these bankers did not oppose foreign economic presence in China. Through contact with foreigners in China and through study abroad, these bankers acquired a nationalist vision based on economic development. They admitted the superiority of Western business methods and technology and inevitably had constant contact with foreign firms, but such contact did not lessen the Chinese bankers’ sense of their national mission. In his autobiography, Zhang Jiaao stated that even if the patriotic role played by Chinese bankers was not as celebrated as that of the May Fourth student movement, their contributions to a new society in China were nevertheless important. His view was shared by the economist Ma Yinchu, who recognized
in 1933 that, "The monopoly of the foreign banks in China has declined considerably in contrast to their previous position. This is not the result from the prohibiting of their activities, from the abolition of the unequal treaties, or from the end of the extraterritoriality. It is the result of the efforts of China's new entrepreneurs who run their banking business determinedly and have overcome all sorts of hardships and deprivations. Their activity has substantially recovered China's rights and profits [from the foreign banks] and significantly improved the unequal relationship between foreigners and Chinese" (quoted in Cheng 2007, 235).

Decline of Modern Banking in China

Unfortunately, the development of modern Chinese banking was cut off by the Japanese invasion of China. In confronting the increasing Japanese military threat, the Nationalist government carried out a series of reforms to strengthen China in the middle of the 1930s. Backed by political power, the government restored its control of the Chinese financial market through various financial reforms. More state-owned banks, such as Central Bank of China, Postal Remittances & Savings Bank, and Farmers Bank of China, were established one after another or expanded. In dealing with China's financial crisis in 1935, the government launched an overall financial reform that changed China's domestic monetary base and established a managed currency system by issuing fabi as China's legal tender note. In the meantime, the government took over Bank of China, Bank of Communications, and several private banks and turned them into government-controlled banks, from which many famous bankers left or were forced to leave. Before the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 (in China, called the War of Resistance against Japan), the government had controlled over 70 percent of the assets of modern Chinese banks and established a relatively strong government-controlled central banking system.

During the wartime emergency, the Nationalist government further consolidated its financial power by establishing the General Administration of the Four Consolidated Banks (including the Central Bank of China, Bank of Communications, and Farmers Bank) to deal with all financial issues.

Modern Banking during China's Civil War Period

The wartime financial policy was continued after the war was over in 1945 and the Nationalist government executed state monopoly over 90 percent of China's banking assets. The government's control of modern banking did accomplish its immediate goal of controlling the Chinese banking industry for the imminent war against Japan. But one consequence of excessive government control was the decay of the private entrepreneurial initiative. By 1945, the total assets of all Chinese private banks were less than those of one of the larger private banks in the prewar period.

The government's total control of banking system also provided a base for government's inflation policy during China's civil war period. To meet the massive budgetary deficit caused by military expenditures, the Nationalist government circulated more and more paper money, resulting to the worst hyperinflation in Chinese history. The official exchange rate of fabi depreciated from 77,636 yuan to 1 U.S. dollar in the beginning of 1948 to 7 million yuan to 1 U.S. dollar in the middle of August (Ji 2003, 228). Attempting to control galloping inflation and to find new financial resources for the civil war, the government launched an ill-designed new currency reform and replaced fabi with jinyuanquan (or "gold yuan") on 19 August 1948. With the rapid escalation of the civil war, jinyuanquan depreciated even faster. The supply of jinyuanquan jumped 124,900 times from August 1948 to May 1949. The wholesale price index in Shanghai was more than 1.28 million times higher in the same period (Ji 2003, 234). China's financial system was totally collapsed. Certainly one important cause leading to the Nationalist government's rapid collapse after the Second World War was its ill-designed financial policy.

Modern Banking under the Communist Regime

After 1949, the Communist government went further still. It confiscated all state-owned banking institutions left by the Nationalist government and established the People's
Bank of China to manage all financial institutions and financial activities. By 1956, the socialization of all China’s private banks and other private financial institutions was accomplished. The People’s Bank of China became the sole government bank for issuing currency, making monetary policy, and granting short-term credit and loans to both public and private commercial enterprises. Over the next three decades, China’s financial institutions were no more than money collection centers and accounting houses for the large state-controlled economy. Only by middle of the 1980s had banking reform appeared on the agenda of the Chinese government.

Linsun CHENG

Further Reading


A good fortune may forebode a bad luck, which may in turn disguise a good fortune.

祸兮福所倚，福兮祸所伏

Huò xī fú suǒ yǐ, fú xī huò suǒ fù
China’s modern banking system emerged from an era in which foreign banks were dominant, developed with little government control to become state-run, and underwent reform and further foreign involvement with China’s opening and eventual accession to the World Trade Organization. As 2009 begins, China’s banks face an uncertain future, but they’ll no doubt have an impact on how the global financial crisis is resolved.

The modern banking system in China resembles banking systems in other developed countries. Both domestic and foreign-funded banks operate within the country, although foreign banks have a more difficult time getting established. Modern banking began only in the nineteenth century and has developed unevenly since then. The success of modern banking in China’s comes from a combination of tradition, innovation, socialism, and capitalism. The future, however, is less than certain.

Development of Modern Banking

Throughout the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and until the end of the nineteenth century, the financial industry in China was dominated by foreign banks. China’s first domestic modern bank, the Imperial Bank of China, opened in Shanghai in 1897. A new type of bank was needed to meet China’s new financial demands. Since the 1860s, modern industrial practices, many borrowed from the West, had become more common in China. But modern industry needed large amounts of capital for long periods of time, which the Qing government was unable to provide and foreign banks were reluctant to lend.

The establishment of modern Chinese banks was seen as an important way to protect the country from economic exploitation and invasion by foreign powers. Foreign banks were more interested in making quick profits by financing China’s international trade and providing loans to the government than by investing in the development of industry. In addition, complicated and unfamiliar business practices made investing in industry even riskier for foreign banks.

Rising nationalism sparked by the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth Movement of 1919 stimulated modern banking and the opening of banks. Private and privatized state banks dominated the banking systems as government-owned banks declined because of mismanagement and government corruption. The leaders were the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, the Three Southern Banks (Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, Zhejiang Industrial Bank, and National Commercial Bank), and the Four Northern Banks (Jincheng Banking Corporation, Continental Bank, Yanye Commercial Bank, and China & South Sea Bank). By the mid-1930s, about 75 percent of the total capital and more than 80 percent of the total assets of modern Chinese banks were held by a handful of principal banks.
During this time the government played a limited role in the development of the banking system. The success of modern banks is attributed to a group of prominent bankers who ran the banks for most of this period. These bankers shared regional ties. They all had a solid Chinese classical education, and many had studied in the West or in Japan before starting their banking careers. They combined modern banking business techniques with China’s traditional business practices to reform the banking system. They introduced new management procedures, new types of personal and business accounts, and new bank products in the form of loans.

The development of modern Chinese banking was curtailed by the Civil War (1927–1950) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (known in China as the War of Resistance against Japan, 1937–1945). During this tumultuous time, the Nationalist government seized control of more than 90 percent of China’s banking assets to aid the war effort, which marked the beginning of the end of the private entrepreneurial initiative in China.

Banking in the PRC

Following the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, all capitalist institutions and private enterprises were nationalized. By 1956 all of China’s private banks and other private financial institutions were controlled by the state. Mao Zedong instituted one central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), akin to the U.S. Federal Reserve or the Bank of England. However, unlike those central banks, the PBC also took deposits, made loans, and served as a commercial bank for China. This move froze out foreign banks, which closed their Chinese operations and largely moved out of China. Over the next thirty years, China’s financial institutions acted merely as money collection centers and accounting houses for the large state-controlled economy.

When China began to open up during the 1970s and 1980s, China’s one central bank split into four specialized branches: the Bank of China (BOC), the People’s Construction Bank of China (now the China Construction Bank, or CCB), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Each of these banks specialized in one area of China’s economy.

In 2005 and 2006, as part of the overall shift from nationalized banking, the BOC, the ICBC, and the CCB put forward initial public offerings that are now traded on the Shanghai and Hong Kong exchanges. But the divided banks also faced some challenges as foreign financial institutions took advantage of China’s new liberalization to establish representative offices on the mainland in the hopes that China would be a future market.

Foreign Banks

At first Beijing limited foreign banks to certain services, creating regulatory protection for the four state banks and smaller local banks by blocking foreign firms from getting into the domestic currency business, but that barrier was eventually removed as part of the 2001 World Trade Organization (WTO) accession deal.

Foreign banks that want to operate in China may choose from joint ventures, alliance operations, or wholly foreign-owned operations. The terms of WTO accession has meant that any qualified foreign financial institution may operate any of these types of banks in China, but application requirements and banking regulations have made it hard for many foreign banks to meet the requirements, particularly for wholly foreign-owned operations.

Since November 2006, Beijing has allowed foreign entities to operate in any region of China, under certain conditions. An applicant must go through an approval process that can take up to a year. Then the applicant has to apply for local business licenses. Foreign or joint-venture banks must be based in a regulatory jurisdiction approved by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The bank must incorporate in China and have a minimum of registered capital of 1 billion yuan ($129.2 million) and must allocate 100 million yuan ($14.6 million) to each branch it opens. The parent enterprise of a foreign-funded or joint-venture bank must have total assets of at least $10 billion, and a foreign bank that wants to open a branch must have assets of at least $20 billion. A foreign branch bank can take time deposits only above 1 million yuan ($146,000) from Chinese citizens. Registration requirements contain loopholes that allow the CBRC to turn down any application.
Joint ventures also pose some additional challenges. While the WTO requires China to allow foreign banks to hold majority stakes in these joint operations, as of 2005, foreign partners in these ventures were limited to 25 percent shares. Joint-venture banks are subject to all the regulations governing joint ventures and foreign-owned financial institutions.

**Bank of America**

Bank of America’s wholly owned subsidiary Bank of America (Asia) was active in the Hong Kong market for ninety years. Originally founded in 1912 as the Bank of Canton (the first Chinese-owned bank in Hong Kong), it was bought by the Security Pacific National Bank in 1988 and renamed the Security Pacific Asian Bank. In 1993 Bank of America (Asia) was established after a merger between Security Pacific National Bank and Bank of America.

In 1949, when banks were nationalized in China, Bank of America closed its branch operations, but it was quick to reopen a representative office in Beijing in 1981 when China’s doors reopened to foreign banks. Bank of America (Asia) continued to grow, opening its first full consumer and commercial banking operation in Shanghai in 2004. And in January 2006, Bank of America (Asia) opened its first official Guangzhou representative office.

In 2005 Bank of America acquired a 9 percent stake in China Construction Bank, China’s second-largest bank, for $3 billion. This purchase represented the company’s largest push into China’s growing banking sector. Then in August 2006, CCB acquired Bank of America (Asia) for HK$9.7 billion (US$1.2 billion). On 12 January 2007, the official name became China Construction Bank (Asia) Corporation Limited. CCB (Asia), now a full-service...
commercial bank, has thirty branches in Hong Kong as well as corporate banking offices in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.

**Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation**

Founded in 1865 by Thomas Sutherland, a Scottish employee of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) was created to help make trade between Europe, India, and China easier. HSBC is one of the few foreign-owned banks that has had a continuous presence in China, with the exception of periods of Japanese occupation. HSBC is well known internationally, with branches and holdings around the world, including the United States. While much of its twentieth-century business before the 1970s focused on inward remittances and export bills, Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policies allowed HSBC once again to pursue a wider range of banking activities.

In 1980 HSBC became the first foreign bank to open a representative office in Beijing since the founding of the People’s Republic. In 1997 it achieved another first, becoming the first foreign-owned bank to obtain a license to engage in domestic currency business. It launched yuan services in its Shanghai and Shenzhen branches in 1997 and 1998. In 2001, with China’s entry into the WTO, HSBC became the first foreign commercial bank to buy a minority stake in a local bank, acquiring 8 percent of the Bank of Shanghai in December of that year. Also in 2001 HSBC expanded its operations to Qingdao, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. In 2004 it opened operations in Suzhou, and in 2005 it expanded its operations in Chengdu and Chongqing to full branch offices.

HSBC continued to expand throughout 2007 and 2008. During those years HSBC opened branches in Shenyang, in Changsha (the first foreign bank in Hunan Province), and in Zhengzhou (the first foreign bank in Henan Province). It also launched private banking services in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. In addition, HSBC established a locally incorporated entity on the Mainland wholly owned by the parent company. HSBC Bank (China) Company Limited started operations with a registered capital of 8 billion yuan ($1.1 billion). The bank was accepted as an overseas member of the Shanghai Gold Exchange. And HSBC joined the Credit Reporting System of the People’s Bank of China, the first foreign bank to join the system.

**Facing the Crisis**

How China’s banking system will deal with the global financial crisis that began in 2008 is difficult to gauge because of a lack of transparency in the system. Some economists believe that China’s banks are not as susceptible to worldwide pressures as banks in other countries are. Others believe that China’s banks have been just as adversely affected by bad loans and weak bottom lines as banks in other countries have been. Two things seem certain, however. The CBRC is sure to increase requirements and regulations that will affect both domestic and foreign banks. And China will work to shore up its own economy. The People’s Bank of China has already cut benchmark lending rates, and the government is investing in infrastructure improvements. Once China saves its own economy, it may become a major player in resolving the worldwide crisis.

**Further Reading**

Bankers gambling for very high stakes. (2006, January 19). *South China Morning Post.*

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Banque de l’Indochine was a French bank established in 1875 in Paris with branches in French colonial properties in South and Southeast Asia. From the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Banque de l’Indochine was prevalent in China’s larger cities, especially in the French concessions of Shanghai and Tianjin, as well as in regions of southern China.

Founded in Paris on 21 January 1875, Banque de l’Indochine (Bank of Indochina) was a French bank that managed French colonial properties in South and Southeast Asia. Beginning in the 1890s the bank shifted its main operations from Indochina to China after France established its sphere of influence in southern China. The bank established its Hong Kong branch in 1894 and its Shanghai branch in 1899 under the Chinese name Dongfang Huili Yinháng 东方汇理银行. From 1900 to 1941 the bank represented the interests of the French government in handling the Boxer indemnity and transacted international trade between France and China.

From 1875 to 1890 Banque de l’Indochine, stepping into the vacuum created by China’s lack of a central bank, circulated its own banking notes in various denominations in China. The bank enjoyed the extraterritorial protection afforded foreign businesses, which allowed them to be protected by their own governments’ laws rather than the laws of China.

Banque de l’Indochine built a banking network in China by setting up other branches in Guangzhou (Canton), Hankou, Shenyang, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhanjiang, and Kunming. The Shanghai branch was primarily responsible for accepting deposits, granting loans, remitting currencies, discounting bills, insuring guarantees and bonds, trading foreign exchange, and handling international trade settlements. A priority of Banque de l’Indochine was financing the infrastructure of the French concession of Shanghai, such as the Shanghai Electric Power Company and Shanghai Railways. By performing commercial banking roles, the bank

French Sovereignty over Indochina

The State Department issued a policy paper on post-war Asia on 22 June 1945 that recognized French sovereignty over Indochina.

French policy toward Indochina will be dominated by the desire to reestablish control in order to reassert her prestige in the world as a great power. This purpose will be augmented by the potent influence of the Banque de l’Indochine and other economic interests . . .

increased its original paid-up capital from 8 million francs to 48 million francs, with 42 million in accumulated funds by 1910.

After the revolution of 1911 Banque de l’Indochine represented the French government in the International Banking Consortium and underwrote the £25 million reorganization loans of the Republic of China under Yuan Shikai’s regime. The bank’s paid-up capital increased from 48 million francs in 1910 to 72 million in 1919. Banque de l’Indochine became a political symbol, reflecting the French image in China.

The bank closed all branches in China after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Later the bank merged with the French Credit Agricole Indosuez. However, due to Chinese economic and financial reforms, the Credit Agricole Indosuez reentered China and used its old Chinese name, Dongfang Huili Yinhang, to indicate its historical banking ties with China. The bank opened its Shenzhen branch in 1982, its Shanghai branch in 1991, and its Guangzhou branch in 1994, along with its representative office in Beijing. The bank still is the largest and most important French bank in China.

JI Zhaojin

Further Reading


Baojia

The baojia, a subbureaucratic system of hierarchically organized households, was created in the eleventh century to relieve local authorities of law enforcement and administrative functions. The system’s efficiency peaked in the Ming and Qing dynasties and was revised in the Republican era (1912–1949) by the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) to suppress Communism and train people in democratic local self-government.

During the New Policies (xinzheng) era (1069–1076) of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), one of China’s greatest reform periods, statesman Wang Anshi (1021–1086) is credited with creating the baojia 保甲, a system that organized the people into a hierarchy in which ten households (hui) formed a bao, fifty bao formed a large bao (da bao), and ten large bao formed a du bao; at each level a headman was selected from the constituent members of the bao. Throughout its history the structure and nomenclature of the baojia would be slightly altered, but the basic form was that ten households formed a jia, and ten jia formed a bao. The baojia became one of the most important touchstones in discussions by Chinese officials on cost-effective local government during late imperial and Republic of China (1912–1949).

At times the baojia became a catchall for local government functions such as mutual surveillance, collective responsibility, policing, bandit suppression, tax collection, census taking, militia organization, and even democratic local self-government. Historical evidence suggests that although the baojia served these various subbureaucratic functions successfully at times, its implementation was often spotty or overlooked by county magistrates who were overburdened by the complex bureaucracy of local government.

Antecedents of the Baojia

Prior to the introduction of the baojia, China had a long and rich history of hierarchically organized subbureaucratic systems serving a variety of functions and structuring the state-society relationship. China’s earliest recorded local organizational system, best described by the philosopher Mencius (372–289 BCE), is commonly referred to as the well-field (jingtian) system and purportedly existed in the early Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). In this system land was the property of the state, which allowed peasants to farm eight plots surrounding a ninth in exchange for the peasants communally farming the ninth plot and remitting the profits to the state. A more extensive local subbureaucratic system—and the first hierarchical one—is found in the Rites of Zhou (Zhouti). It describes a system, demographic rather than territorial like the well-field system, functioning as a mechanism for conscription, taxation, and corvee extraction (collecting unpaid labor due from a feudal vassal to his lord), as well as for local mediation, the supervision of schools, and the promotion of agricultural production. The last of
the famous ancient subbureaucratic systems is described in the *Guanzi* (seventh century BCE). The major innovation of the Guanzi system was the concept of collective responsibility for community policing. That is, all members of the community were responsible for the conduct of each individual member.

After the unification of China by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) each succeeding dynasty until the Northern Song built upon the preceding dynasty’s subbureaucratic system with structural or functional alterations responding to changing historical conditions. Not until the early years of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) was another major innovation introduced: the establishment of the “equal field” (*juntian*) system of land division, along with new tax and labor systems. The Tang system is notable for, among other things, being the first to require all households in China to register with the government—a key component of the later *baojia* system.

**Baojia in the Ming and Qing Dynasties**

After its development during the Northern and Southern Song (1127–1279) dynasties the *baojia* reached its mature form during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties (1644–1912). During these two dynasties the *baojia* became, both in government writings and the minds of local magistrates, entangled with other subbureaucratic systems. These systems functioned below the official bureaucracy and organized families into hierarchical groupings designed to serve state purposes. Through the *baojia* the government co-opted family heads as representatives of the state. Through these family heads the *baojia* became responsible for keeping the peace through mutual surveillance, the pursuit and apprehension of criminals, and the settlement of local disputes. It also assumed the duties of village patrolling and self-defense and occasionally functioned as a military force, both offensive and defensive. It also served as an organization for tax collection, labor conscription, and census taking, which made it the most important system for government extraction of resources from the local levels of society. In addition to providing needed raw resources, whether physical or material, the *baojia* served many functions that the financially strapped Ming and Qing governments could not perform with remunerated officials—usually only one county magistrate, the lowest member of the official bureaucracy, was assigned to govern anywhere from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of people. Throughout these two dynasties the *baojia* became a key fixture in discussions on statecraft as the relatively small official bureaucracy struggled to govern a massive population with its limited resources. The *baojia* provided a popular answer as it forced the people to govern themselves and be responsible for their neighbors.

**Baojia in Republican China**

The victory of the Republican revolutionaries in 1912 brought an apparent end to the imperial *baojia* system as the new constitutional government was restructured to reflect modern world practices. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, the Nationalist Party (Guomindang 国民党)
reverted to the baojia as a resource for Communist repression in the Bandit Extermination Campaigns (1930–1934) and as a vehicle for training the people in democratic local self-government in accordance with the plans of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) for a democratic China. Like statecraft thinkers before them, members of the Nationalist Party saw the baojia as a fairly inexpensive solution to fundamental problems of local governance. In the end, however, the reintroduction of the baojia failed to either suppress the Chinese Communist Party or foster local democratic government.

The baojia was finally abolished in 1951 as the new Communist government in Beijing banned its existence as a remnant of a “feudal” society; however, still struggling with the problem of governing the people in local areas without the massive expenditure required, the Communists turned to the “work unit” (danwei) to serve many of the functions handled by the imperial baojia system.

Lan J. HARRIS

Further Reading
Baosteel Group Corporation, located in Shanghai, is China’s largest iron and steel conglomerate, with a steelmaking capacity of about 30 million tons a year. In 2001, Baosteel became the primary supplier of steel to the Italian automaker Fiat, a step toward Baosteel’s goal of becoming a primary producer of automotive steel. In 2007, Baosteel was ranked 307 on the list of Fortune Global 500 corporations.

Officially named Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, Baosteel is the largest iron and steel conglomerate in China. A state-owned enterprise, Baosteel has played a significant role in the country’s economic development over the past thirty years. Ranked among the world’s top ten steel producers, the company has dominated the Chinese steel industry, accounting for some 7.8 percent of China’s total domestic steel production.

Baosteel’s Beginnings

Two events that took place in late 1978 marked the beginning of China’s reform era: the Third Plenum Session of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Beijing, and the start of construction of a new, large-scale integrated steel plant in the Baoshan District near Shanghai. After the official conclusion of the disastrous Cultural Revolution, the new Chinese leadership under pragmatic Deng Xiaoping realized steel production was an essential component of China’s effort to modernize its industrial and economic infrastructure. Therefore a plan was approved to construct one of the most modern steel plants of the time, with advanced Japanese technology. Baoshan Iron and Steel was to be an exact copy of an existing plant in Kimitsu, Japan, operated by Nippon Steel.

Initially scheduled to be completed by 1982, the new plant suffered a series of setbacks that delayed the start of production until 1988. Soon after the facility was commissioned, however, it began to play a key role in China’s total domestic steel output. A year later, Baoshan Iron and Steel became the primary supplier to the Shanghai Automotive Industry Group Corporation. As the country’s model steel enterprise, Baoshan Iron and Steel enjoyed a special status, which enabled it to recruit from among the best engineers and managers in China, gain access to cutting-edge technology, and to receive large government contracts. For years, Baoshan Iron and Steel also greatly benefited from China’s economic expansion; indeed, steel production could not keep up with the huge demand from the domestic market.

Corporate Leadership

Among the inaugural team was Xie Qihua, a 1968 Qinghua (also spelled Tsinghua) University graduate who was recruited from the Shaanxi Steel Plant in 1978. Heading up the technical division, Xie rose through ranks to become the general manager in 1994. Under Xie, a domestic and
international marketing arm, Baosteel Group International Trade Corporation, was incorporated in 1996. This strategic move not only extended Baosteel’s marketing network throughout China, but also enabled the company to begin international expansion. Two years later, Baosteel received authorization from the State Council to acquire the Shanghai Metallurgical Holding Group and Meishan Iron and Steel Company. As a result, the Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation was formed to become China’s leading integrated steelworks. The new conglomerate was the largest steel producer in the country, with annual steel production of nearly 30 million tons. Throughout her tenure, Xie has successfully employed acquisitions and mergers as corporate strategy for expansion. She has been nicknamed “Woman of Steel,” “Steel Queen,” and “Iron Lady.”

Challenges in the New Era

In the 1990s, Baosteel found itself in competition with many new rivals, both foreign and domestic. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 proved to be a major challenge: When the regional economies collapsed, Baosteel’s revenues also took nosedive. When China was admitted to the World Trade Organization in 2001, the country’s steel industry opened up to foreign competition, which for the first time significantly threatened Baosteel’s dominance in Chinese domestic steel market. However, through successful mergers and acquisitions, Baosteel was able to remain profitable.

Recognizing the importance of business expansion and diversification, Baosteel began to expand beyond steel production into other businesses, such as trading, finance, engineering and technology, information technology, coal chemicals, steel product deep processing, comprehensive utilization, and more. In order to compete effectively in global markets, Baosteel formed a partnership alliance in 2001 with former domestic rivals in the Shougang Group and Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation. In the same year, Baosteel signed an agreement with ThyssenKrupp of Germany. Baosteel has also developed a worldwide marketing network consisting of almost twenty trading companies at home and abroad. It also collaborates with
international steel conglomerates, setting up strategic alli-
ance with them to create synergy.

**Main Products and Strategies for Expansion**

In the twenty-first century, Baosteel has begun investing in developing new steel production technologies with the goal of becoming a premier research and development base for new processes, new technologies, and new materials in China’s iron and steel industry. Its current focus is on the production of steel plate and steel tubing. Baosteel’s objectives include building itself into a production center for automotive steel, transportation steel, stainless steel, household appliance steel, electrical steel, boiler and pressure vessel steel, food and beverage packaging steel, metal product steel, special steel, and high-grade construction steel. The company’s steel is also used for tools and equipment, springs and bearings, and in the aerospace and commercial aviation industries.

Baosteel is one of the first metallurgic companies in China to obtain an ISO 14001 certification, an international environmental management standard. Recognizing the importance of environmental protection, Baosteel endeavors to be a “green” steel company. Because the air quality in the plant has been rated as clean as that of a national sightseeing resort, the company has been designated the first national industrial sightseeing destination. More significantly, through implementation of an advanced quality management system in its manufacturing process, Baosteel’s main products have been recognized by several international certification institutions. The company has received ISO 9001 certification from the BSI (British Standards Institution) and QS 9000 certification from General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, the U.S. “big three” automakers. Baosteel’s products have also obtained recognition from special classification societies in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Norway. Its steel products have been exported to over forty countries and regions, including Japan, South Korea, the United States, and the European Union. In 2001, the Italian automaker Fiat chose Baosteel to be its primary supplier of steel, marking a major step forward in Baosteel’s efforts to become a supplier to the global automotive industry.

**Future Plans**

The Chinese government authorized an initial public offering of Baosteel stock on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 2000. Although the listing was restricted to domestic investors, it raised some RMB¥7.7 billion, the country’s largest public offering at that time. This strategic move not only had a major impact on Baosteel’s corporate culture, but also provided necessary capital for its investment in technology and future expansion. The public listing also set the stage for a future international listing, most likely on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, which would open the company’s capital to foreign investors.

Within Baosteel, Shanghai Baoshan Iron and Steel Company generates more than half of the group’s total production. Other principal subsidiaries include Baosteel Shanghai No. 1 Iron & Steel Company, which produces mainly premium stainless steel; Pudong Steel Corporation, a plate producer; No. 5 Steel Corporation, a specialty steel products producer; and Shanghai Meishan Company and Ningbo Baoxin Stainless Steel Company. In 2007, Baosteel Group was ranked number 307 of the Fortune Global 500 corporations, with annual revenue of more than $22.6 billion. Looking forward, Baosteel has drafted ambitious plans for expansion. It is currently constructing a state-of-the-art facility in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, at a cost of $10 billion. Expected to come into production by 2010, this plant will make it possible for Baosteel to increase its annual production capacity to 40 million tons, a lofty goal that will make Baosteel the top steel producer in the world.

**Further Reading**


Beijing

Beijing (pronounced bay-JING) is a new city with old roots and the political and administrative heart of China. Since the economic reforms of the 1980s, and propelled by the city’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, Beijing has taken its place as one of the twenty-first century’s great capitals.

Beijing has long been considered one of the great cities of the world. It is the capital city of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the political, cultural, and educational center of the county. Beijing, with an estimated 2008 population of 17.5 million, is the second largest city in China, just behind Shanghai, whose 2008 population was estimated to be near 19 million. Before 1949, Beijing was known as Peking to the Western world. The city has been known by a number of names and has seen many changes throughout its long history.

Beijing in Ancient Times

Ji City is the first recorded name for Beijing. In 1075 BCE King Wu of the Ji Kingdom declared the city his capital. Even by then there had been a settlement on the site for a thousand years.

The kingdom of Ji was replaced by the state of Yan as the local political power sometime during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). Ji City remained the name of the capital. The city continued to be an important strategic and administrative site for northern China’s rulers during the Qin (221–206 BCE) Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties.

During the Sui dynasty (589–618 CE), the city was known as Zhou and had a population of 130,000. Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) officials called the city You. During the Sui and Tang dynasties, the city developed as a major trade center while retaining its military significance in the north of China. Rulers called for the construction of palaces, military training facilities, and temples, including the forerunner of the existing Temple of the Origin of the Dharma, a Buddhist temple in modern-day Xuanwu district.

In 938 CE the city became the southern capital of the Liao dynasty (916–1125 CE), founded by the Qidan people of Inner Mongolia. The city was renamed Nanjing, or Yanjing (Southern Place).

In the early twelfth century, the Nuzhen, or Jurchen, people of Manchuria conquered the Liao and established the Jurchen Jin Dynasty (1115–1234). In 1153 Emperor Wan Yanliang moved his capital from present-day Liaoning province to Nanjing and renamed it Zhongdu (Central Capital.) Under the Nuzhen the city became an important political capital for the first time. During this period the world-famous Lugou Qiao (Marco Polo Bridge) was built. The 235-meter (771-foot) stone-arch bridge still spans the Yongding River. The bridge is known for its 485 carved stone lions (no two alike) and as the site of the start of China’s war with Japan in 1937.

The city’s name was changed again in 1271. Kubilai Khan, founder of the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), gave the city the Han name Dadu, or Ta-tu, (Grand...
Capital). The Mongols also called it Khanbaliq (City of the Great Khan). When the Mongols defeated the Southern Song in 1279, Dadu became the true political center of a unified China for the first time.

Massive reconstruction of the city began in 1267 and continued until 1293 as the Mongols reaffirmed their domination across China. The original site of Zhongdu was replaced by a larger rectangular area to the northeast in a beautiful lake region.

Construction of Dadu was accomplished in three major phases. The first phase was the raising of the imperial palaces, which was completed by 1274. The next phase included the building of mansions for the imperial princes, government offices, major temples, city walls and moats, and a system of streets for ordinary residences. The final phase was the digging of the Tonghui Canal, which connected the capital to the Grand Canal, a major transpiration and flood-control project.

The new city, with a population of about 500,000 people, was famous throughout the world for the splendor of its imperial buildings and its sophisticated temple art. This was a time when China was open to the world and welcomed traders and envoys from Asia, Africa, and Europe. Marco Polo visited the city and wrote admiringly of the magnificence of its palaces.

But Dadu was also a utilitarian city. It was rectangular, more than 30 kilometers (about 19 miles) in circumference, and laid out in a checkerboard pattern. Before this time, only the imperial family and high officials lived inside the city walls. After the reconstruction, ordinary people took up residence in neighborhoods organized by the hutong, the narrow streets or alleyways leading to the traditional courtyard homes so well known in later-day Beijing.

The city acquired another new name and new look during the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644). In 1368 Ming troops seized the city and renamed it Beiping (Northern Peace). Beginning in 1406 Emperor Yongle (1360–1424)
directed reconstruction and expansion of the city. Over the next fifteen years, new walls, palaces, gardens, streets, and residential areas were built. It was during this construction phase that two of the city’s most famous landmarks were built: the Tiananmen Gate and Gugong (the Forbidden City).

In 1421 Yongle transferred his capital from Nanjing to Beiping, renamed the city Beijing (Northern Capital), and moved into the newly built Forbidden City imperial palace. He was the first of fourteen Ming emperors followed by ten Qing emperors to live in the palace. The surviving complex consists of 980 buildings with 8,707 rooms and covers 74 hectares (about 183 acres). Since 1924—when the last emperor, Pu Yi (1906–1967) was driven from the palace—the Forbidden City has been under the charge of the Palace Museum. It houses an extensive collection of artwork and artifacts from the imperial collections of the Ming and Qing dynasties and is one
of the most popular tourists sites in the world. UNESCO listed it as World Heritage Cultural Site in 1987.

Almost immediately after the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912) took power in China and seized the city, the name was changed to Shuntian Prefectural Capital. It was also called Jingshi. It remained China's capital throughout the Qing period. Qing builders and landscape architects added open-air pavilions, huge imperial parks, and palaces, including the well-known Summer Palace, to the cityscape. During the Qing era the population of the city grew to more than 1 million people.

Beijing's history as the imperial capital ended with the fall of the Qing and the rise of Republican China on 10 October 1911.

**TWENTIETH CENTURY**

After the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Beijing suffered along with the rest of China as various warlords struggled for power. In 1928 Nanjing was officially made the capital of China, and Beijing was designated as the Beijing Special Municipality to emphasize that the warlord government in Beijing was not legitimate. In 1930 the municipality was renamed Beiping City (Northern Peace, or North Pacified).

The city was occupied by the Japanese throughout World War II, from 1937 to 1945. During the occupation the city reverted to its former name, Beijing. Following the war Beijing's name was again changed to Beiping. In 1949, during the civil war between Nationalists and Communists, Communist forces peacefully entered Beijing. There, in Tiananmen Square, on 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China, with Beijing as its capital city.

Beijing became the heart of China in the twentieth century. Beijing was not only the seat of government but also a hotbed of political activity. It was the center of Red Guard activity during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, the Beijing Spring and Democracy Wall movements of the 1970s, and the Tiananmen Square protests of the 1980s. President Richard Nixon visited the city in 1972, followed by other heads of state, sports teams from around the world, and foreign businesses and investors. For good or bad, Beijing became China’s face to the world.

By the end of the twentieth century, Beijing had been transformed, as had most of China. The economic reforms begun in the 1980s spurred rapid economic growth in Beijing. Farmland surrounding the city was incorporated and developed into housing and commercial areas, new expressways and roads crisscrossed the city, and new commercial high-rises transformed the skyline. Most parts of the old city were by then gone.

**TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

Many new construction and infrastructure projects were triggered by the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Visitors to Beijing saw a modern, thriving metropolis as the city opened to the world.

At the end of 2008, Beijing's population was estimated at 17.5 million, with 12.1 million registered as official residents.

*By Joan Lebold Cohen.*
residents and 5.5 million designated as floating population. More than 96 percent of Beijing’s citizens are Han people. The majority of people speak the Beijing dialect of Mandarin. Mandarin cuisine is the most popular cooking style in the city.

Beijing is in northern China, at 39°54’ N (roughly along the same latitude as Atlantic City, New Jersey) and 116°23’ E. The standard time zone for Beijing is Greenwich Mean Time +8.

Beijing occupies an area of 16,801 square kilometers (about 6,490 square miles), about the size of the entire state of Hawaii. (The land area of Los Angeles, by comparison, is about 489 square miles.) Beijing stretches 160 kilometers (about 99 miles) from east to west and more than 180 kilometers (about 112 miles) from north to south, about the distance between New York City and Philadelphia.

The city of Beijing is an independently administered municipal district, one of four in China. (The other three are Chongqing, Tianjin, and Shanghai.) Municipal districts are equivalent to provinces in the administrative divisions of the PRC. The greater Beijing area encompasses eighteen districts and counties, with Dongcheng, Xicheng, Xuanwu, Chongwen, Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai, and Shijingsha in the inner suburbs; and Fangshan, Mentougou, Changping, Tongxian, Shunyi, Daxing, Huairou, Miyun, Pinggu, and Yisanqing in the outer suburbs.

According to many travel companies, the top ten tourist attractions in and around Beijing are the Forbidden City, Tiananmen Square, the Great Wall, the Summer Palace, the Temple of Heaven, the Ming Tombs, the hutong tour, the Lama Temple, Beihai Park, and the Capital Museum. The National Stadium (the bird nest), built for the 2008 Olympics, is one of the city’s newest attractions.

But like all big cities in the early twenty-first century, Beijing faces many challenges. Affordable housing and a
Beijing's polluted environment are two major problems the city must solve in the coming years. The wave of commercial and industrial construction has meant the demolition of many of the traditional hutong neighborhoods, forcing people to find housing. The ongoing construction; a huge increase in the number of private cars; the common use of coal-fired boilers and furnaces; the growth of industry, especially small factories that generally do not monitor waste emissions; and the emissions from numerous heavy trucks transporting goods in, out, and around the city have all contributed to Beijing's polluted air.

City and state officials’ plans for the city’s future include cleaning up the environment, controlling development, and restricting population growth and density. The city’s unique history and status make its future a high priority for the Chinese.

The Editors

Further Reading


Beijing Consensus
Běijīng gòngshí 北京共识

The Beijing Consensus proposes establishing China as the twenty-first-century model for economic reform in developing countries, emphasizing both China’s innovative and independent decision-making processes. It serves as a direct alternative to the earlier Western prototype of development, the Washington Consensus.

Although the term had existed in the 1990s, talk of the “Beijing Consensus” became common after the 2004 publication of a booklet by Joshua Cooper Ramo, once a partner in the consulting firm of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger. According to the Foreign Policy Centre:

A new Beijing Consensus is emerging with new attitudes to politics, development and the global balance of power. It is driven … by a ruthless willingness to innovate, a strong belief in sovereignty and multilateralism, and a desire to accumulate the tools of “asymmetric power projection.” Though it is often misunderstood as a nascent superpower, China has no intention of entering an arms race. Instead, it is intent on projecting enough “asymmetric power” to limit US political and military action in its region. Through fostering good international relations, it is safeguarding the peaceful environment needed to secure its prosperity, and deterring the attempts of some on the fringes of U.S. politics to turn it into a pariah. (Ramo, 2004)

Ramo argued in the paper that, after the collapse of the Washington Consensus, China acts as a model to developing countries, providing a more equitable paradigm of development. The Washington Consensus had first been devised in 1989 and was most famously set out in a paper by John Williamson at the Peterson Institute for International Economic Studies in Washington, D.C. In Williamson’s view, developing countries should introduce a package of reforms to restart and rejuvenate their economies. The Washington Consensus was promoted through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in rescue packages for countries in Latin America and, up to a point, in Africa and Asia during the 1998 Asian economic crisis.

The consensus was labeled, unfairly in Williamson’s view, as market fundamentalism. Its main prescriptions, set out in ten policy guidelines, were to impose fiscal discipline; introduce tax reform, exchange-rate controls, and public-spending restraints; liberalize the regulations for foreign direct investment; and privatize state-owned enterprises. Williamson himself was to acknowledge that naming this raft of proposals the “Washington Consensus” gave it an unwelcome political sheen.

China and India have been the two outstanding countries who have taken a much more selective approach to the ideas as originally set out in the Washington Consensus. They have introduced fiscal controls and liberalized...
foreign investment policy. China in particular has become one of the world’s largest, and most open, places for foreign direct investment, with over half a million joint ventures or wholly owned foreign ventures by the end of 2007. It has undertaken reforms of its state-owned enterprises, particularly since the 1990s under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. According to the 2005 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report on China, over half of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth can now be attributed to the private sector.

But in other areas, China has pursued a unique path, maintaining a very high level of state control. It has not allowed the convertibility of Chinese currency into other foreign currencies, and, while it has loosened up controls of capital outflows from China since 2005, it has maintained strict limits on how much can be used abroad. Political control from the Communist Party (through the State Council) on approving all major inward and outward investments remains strong, as does management of macroeconomic policy.

Ramo’s argument that China’s development model could be generalized to other developing nations was articulated at a time when the United States, under the Bush presidency, was suffering a decline in prestige and influence, particularly in Asia. The need for an alternative model therefore was on many policy makers’ minds. Ramo recognized the ongoing and dynamic process of innovation in the Chinese system, something that had been there since the Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) era, with its emphasis on making practice the main criterion for policy, and willingness to experiment in order to work out what might best fit China’s circumstances. Ramo also argued that China’s emphasis on maintaining the sovereignty and independence of its own decision-making processes in the economic and financial sector was also very important.

Whether this adds up to a specific model that is relevant to other countries, rather than just blandly appealing to their nationalistic aspirations, is another matter. Many would argue that China’s economy, with its mix of inward and outward investment, agriculture and heavy industry, developed and undeveloped areas, and wealth and poverty, is so complex and unique that it offers no real framework to apply anywhere else. And even as a model for China, it sometimes lacks coherency. Countries in the Asian region have evidently been attracted by the ability of the Chinese model to deliver high levels of GDP growth, but whether they would be interested in the social and environmental costs of this is another matter.

At the heart of the Beijing Consensus is perhaps something that is not so new—the desire, both within and outside China, to act as a leader and role model for the developing world. This has been apparent before, when China presented itself as the head of nonaligned countries in the 1950s and 1960s, even during a period of increasing isolation, and again in the early 1970s, when Mao Zedong developed the theory of the Three Worlds, promoting China as the leader of that “third world.” Such a role is supported by many developing countries if only because it breaks up the monopoly on international influence and power exercised by the developed world in general, and the United States in particular. Moving beyond this to articulate how Chinese economic policy making and planning might be of use to other countries has proven far more difficult. The crisis in the global financial system from 2008 onward makes confident talk of any particular kind of model even more contentious.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading
The name “Bian Que”扁鹊 refers to a legendary early physician who is traditionally credited with the founding of the four methods of diagnosis in Chinese medicine—looking, listening/smelling, asking, and pulse-taking—as well as with the authorship of Nanjing (难经 Classics of Difficult Issues), an important classical text of Chinese medicine.

Early Chinese literature abounds in anecdotes about the skills of a physician named Bian Que. One such anecdote, found in Chapter 5 of Liezi (a Daoist text), tells of how he treated two male patients suffering from mind (heart)-body imbalances; one of them had a mind (heart) that was too weak and hesitant for his body, whereas the other had the opposite problem. Bian Que put both men to sleep with a drug and exchanged their hearts. The surgery was said to be so successful that each man, upon waking, headed straight back to the other’s home.

Bian Que was revered by generations of Chinese physicians as the father of diagnosis by the pulse (sphygmology), as the author of Nanjing (Classic of Difficult Issues), one of the core classical texts of Chinese medicine, and as the founder of the so-called Bian Que School, which counted among its members such renowned physicians as Hua Tuo (c. 141–208 CE). But modern scholarship has raised significant doubts as to when and where Bian Que lived or even whether he lived at all.

The first full biography of Bian Que, which was also the earliest biography of a Chinese physician, was composed by the historian Sima Qian (145?–86 BCE) in his Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian). It states that Bian Que was a man from Zheng in Bohai District (in modern-day Hebei Province) and that his real surname was “Qin” and personal name “Yueren.” It was said that he was initiated into the healing arts by an immortal who gave him many books of taboo recipes and made him take a medicinal concoction that subsequently enabled him to see objects on the other side of a wall. Thus, when examining his patients, Bian Que could see clearly the obstructions and nodes in their internal organs and vessels. Sima Qian’s biography recounts several highlights of Bian Que’s medical career, stressing his remarkable abilities as a diagnostician and acupuncturist, and these highlights provided the core of the life of Bian Que known to subsequent centuries. But as an historical document Sima Qian’s account is fraught with difficulties. First, it places Bian Que in historical contexts that stretched across vast geographical distances and spanned from the late sixth to the third centuries BCE. Second, the text ascribed to Bian Que some of the medical concepts that are now known to have been absent during those early times.

The consensus among modern scholars is that “Bian Que” was a common laudatory title given to superior healers in ancient China and that one of those receiving the title may have been Qin Yueren, whose life and accomplishments may have partially corresponded to Sima Qian’s narrative. “Bian Que,” literally referring to a bird, once was the title of the official in charge of regulating...
therapeutic stone needles (used in acupuncture and moxibustion) in the small state of Tan during the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE), a title that may have totemic roots going back to the era of Yangshao culture (3200–2500 BCE). In the 1970s a stone relief was discovered in the hills of Weishan County, Shandong Province, dated to the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), depicting a figure with human’s head and bird’s body holding a stone needle to perform an acupuncture. Some scholars see this relief as a confirmation of the totemic origin of Bian Que, and the relief has since been called Bian Que Performing Acupuncture (Bian Que xing zhen tu). Some other scholars, however, suggest that “Bian Que” may have been a sinicized version of the mythical gandharvas, the human-headed birds known in India since Vedic times that were traditionally regarded as skilled physicians. In this interpretation both the bird-man disguise and some of the healing techniques of Bian Que may have resulted from maritime cultural contact between the East China coast and India that had occurred in high antiquity. Despite the mystery surrounding the historicity of Bian Que as an individual, there is no doubt that, as the stuff of legend, he enjoyed an eminence in the history of Chinese medicine unparalleled by any other physician.

Qiong ZHANG

Further Reading


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A bianzhong is an ancient Chinese musical instrument comprising bells of different sizes—most often they are made of a copper, tin, and lead alloy—which are hung in an orderly way from a wooden rack and struck with a mallet. The instrument’s popularity grew after its first appearance in the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) and did not fade until the Song dynasty (960–1279).

The earliest of the ancient Chinese musical instruments called bianzhong mostly consisted of three bronze bells. As has been revealed from excavations, the number grew to five, and then to eight by mid–Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE). Bianzhong of nine or thirteen bells could be seen by the middle and late Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE). A bianzhong found in a tomb of the early Warring States period (475–221 BCE) has over sixty bells: the famous Zenghou Yi Mu Bianzhong (Bells from the Tomb of Marquis Yi of the Zeng State 曾侯乙墓编钟).

The Zeng bells were unearthed in the Sui County of Hubei Province, China, in 1978. The Chinese characters engraved on one of the bells disclose that the instrument was a gift to Marquis Yi 乙侯 from Xiong Zhang 熊章, King of the Chu State in 433 CE. The largest of the bells stands 153.4 centimeters (about 5 feet) tall, and the smallest stands 37.3 centimeters (about 1.2 feet) tall. The bells were hung in three tiers, the top having nineteen bells in three groups; the middle, thirty-three in three groups; and the bottom, twelve in two groups. The dimension of the set is 2.75 meters (9 feet) in height, 7.48 meters (24 feet) at the long side, and 3.35 meters (about 11 feet) at the short side. Together, the set weighs a total of 2,500 kilograms (about 5,512 pounds).

Because of the right burial conditions, the Zeng bells are still intact, capable of producing melodies. By accident, it was found that each of the bells can give two tones when struck in different locations. According to Martin Braun (2003, para. 13), a neuroscientist of music from Sweden, the craftsmanship of the instrument is such that the Zeng bells prove that about 2,500 years ago the Chinese had fifth generation, fifth temperament, a twelve-tone system in musical practice (not just in theory), a norm tone for an orchestral ensemble, an integration of fifths and thirds in tuning, and a preference of pure thirds over pure fifths. At this point in history, China was 2,000 years ahead of Europe, not only in bell casting, but also in musical acoustics.

Other bianzhong sets have been excavated, including quite a number of replicas of Zhou bells made in the Song dynasty such as: the archaistic Dasheng and Taihe series; the Number One Bianzhou of Western Han (202 BCE–CE 8), unearthed in 2000 in the Luo village of Henan Province; and a set of sixteen gold bells made in 1790 for the Qianlong emperor.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading
Bianzhong (bronze bells) from the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE) shown at the Imperial Palace, Beijing. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.


From 1703 to 1820, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) had its summer capital in the city of Chengde, north of the Great Wall. Twice as big as the Yuanming Yuan summer palace of Beijing, Bishu Shanzhuang (Mountain Resort to Flee Summer Heat) of Chengde is today China’s largest imperial park. The imperial residence of Bishu Shanzhuang lies between the Chengde and the Waiba Miao temples (Eight Outlying temples) in a small basin crossed by the Wulie River and surrounded by mountainous terrain dominated by Chuifeng Peak. The Waiba Miao temples surround the gardens of the imperial residence. The Wulie River isolates four Waiba Miao temples from the Qing residence, which is further protected by a massive wall and a dam. Within the residence three districts extend from north to south: the Wanshu Yuan prairie around the Mongol camp; the Chinese garden district around Ruyi Lake and Island; and the three imperial palaces. The Qing court sojourned every summer in Chengde and hunted in the natural reserve of Mulan.

The Bishu Shanzhuang hills constitute the largest and most original landscape component of the imperial residence. They evoke the Changbai Shan Mountains, where the Qing dynasty had its mythical birthplace. The hill district was designed also for seclusion and contemplation. Si Mian Yun Shan, the name of a kiosk that lies at the center, epitomized Chengde’s lifestyle: isolation surrounded by clouds.

The composite style of the Chengde gardens is uniquely rich in political, aesthetic, and religious references. The built landscape results from the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors’ careful analysis of the internal spatial organization of the residence, the interactions suggested by the physical and architectural landmarks of the site of Chengde, and the universal appeal the two monarchs wanted to grant to the mountain resort.

The Kangxi emperor (1654–1722) chose the site, designed the palace and gardens, named thirty-six vistas, established a network of twenty-one hunting lodges along the road he built to link the Gubeikou gate of the Great Wall to Mulan, and authored an illustrated album of Bishu Shanzhuang.

Born in Chengde, the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799) enlarged the palace, added a library, built ten outlying temples, conceived a new series of thirty-six vistas, commissioned a number of paintings, and reedited Kangxi’s album. The Qianlong emperor used topography to magnify the unequal relationship the Qing state developed with the Tibetan Buddhist dignitaries after the Qing banners (Manchu military groups) conquered Lhasa in 1720.

The two emperors built facilities inside Bishu Shanzhuang to entertain Mongol vassals, Tibetan dignitaries, and foreign ambassadors. They erected mighty Sino-Tibetan temples around the imperial residence that competed with those of Lhasa and Shigatse.

The panorama of the Waiba Miao temples can be admired from the kiosks erected on the summits of the imperial residence. The most prominent of Waiba Miao temples, the Sumeru and Potala temples, are in Shizi Gou, the religious valley of Bishu Shanzhuang.
With its distinctive pagoda, Jinshan is the focal point of most vistas. The fabricated island is the highest landmark of the garden district. The island is surrounded by lakes and islands that reflect the cosmic jiu shan ba hai landscape archetype. A mountain at the center of eight concentric continents separated by eight seas constitutes the Buddhist universe. Jinshan is the collective name of the nine mountains of this cosmogony. In Chengde, Jinshan stood for Mount Sumeru and acted as the local substitute for the pivot of the Buddhist universe. The various heavens of Buddhist cosmology surround the towering Sumeru. The defender of Buddhism, Indra (Tiandi in Chinese), lives on its summit.

Today, the imperial gardens exude an overarching style of grandeur and significance, and manifest the territorial right and might of the administration that has restored them. In 1994 UNESCO approved the inscription of Bishu Shanzhuang and Waiba Miao temples on its World Heritage list. The short report submitted by China described the mountain resort as the crystallization of imperial garden and temple construction. Apart from its economic significance to the domestic tourist industry, Chengde serves again the political needs of an autocratic and multiethnic state.

Philippe FORÊT

Further Reading
The term “black gold politics,” which refers to the practices of an alliance of corrupt officials/elites, criminal elements, and businesspeople, has become ubiquitous in discussions of the Taiwanese government, calling into question the integrity of the powerful and exposing the dark side of Taiwan’s democratic development.

Black gold politics, or hei jin, refers to the mixture of money, politics, and corruption in Taiwan (the Republic of China). Gold suggests the power to influence politics and the economy, whereas black suggests various illicit or corrupt activities that take place: bribery, kickbacks, money laundering, electoral violence, political assassinations, bets on which candidates will win or lose electoral contests, and secretive monetary exchanges among corrupt government officials, elected politicians, gangsters, and businesspeople.

The origin of Taiwan’s black gold politics can be traced back to the 1930s and 1940s Guomindang, also known as the Nationalist Party, when its leader, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) cultivated close connections with Du Yuesheng (1888–1951), the leader of the “Green Gang,” a criminal network / secret society based mainly in Shanghai. After the Guomindang withdrew from the mainland to the island of Taiwan in 1949 (where it would then be called the Kuomintang, KMT), black gold politics followed in the form of politicians who tried to maintain electoral victory by mobilizing local gangsters to campaign for them in elections and by mobilizing citizens to vote for them. After the Kuomintang members were elected to the Legislative Assembly, they paid for criminal political support by granting construction and government projects. A web of patron-client networks became firmly entrenched. In the face of mounting pressure from the dangwai (the political opposition) in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Kuomintang relied heavily on the heidao (triads or organized crime groups) to retain its political influence in the political arena.

After Chen Shui-bian (b. 1950) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency in 2000, it was rumored that a businessperson with heidao connections, Chen Yu-hao, made a huge donation to pay down the president’s campaign expenses. Chen Yu-hao then financially supported the ticket of Kuomintang leader Lien Chan and People First Party’s James Soong during the 2004 presidential election. Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in 2004 ushered in an era of political corruption by his family. His wife, Wu Shu-jen, was found to have misused state funds by falsifying receipts and laundering money through various overseas accounts in Switzerland, Singapore, and Mauritius. Taiwan’s democratic image was dealt a severe blow because of the Chen family’s political corruption, which some commentators referred to as another example of black gold politics at the top level, where the president and his wife were not subject to internal checks and balances from the party in power. Nor were they subject to sufficient scrutiny from anticorruption and anti-money-laundering institutions. Another element in the Chen family’s corruption was the deliberate withholding of information on the family’s suspected laundering.
activities from the public by the Ministry of Justice’s Investigation Bureau director Yeh Sheng-mao. Although Yeh was indicted by Taiwan’s prosecution office, the black gold politics that plagued the former first family revealed that a minority of top-level officials colluded in self-enrichment by plundering state coffers. Chen Shui-bian’s connections with some important businesspeople in Taiwan were also called into question. The entire political-corruption scandal demonstrates the pervasiveness of black gold politics from the grassroots to top-level political echelons.

Chen was voted out of office in March 2008; on 20 May of that year, Taipei mayor and KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou defeated his rival, Frank Hsieh of the DPP, to become the new president of Taiwan on a platform of clean government. Ma himself has not escaped the cloud of black gold politics, having been charged with money skimming in 2007 (a charge he vehemently denied, and was acquitted of later that year). In 2006, Ma told Time: “We have set up a ‘clean government’ commission to monitor our officials. When I was justice minister more than 12 years ago, I cracked down on corruption and vote-buying. I have a reputation for being clean and impartial, [and] we know that how clean we are determines our future” (Abdoolcarim and Tso 2006).

Although he was protected from charges while he was in office, former president Chen was arrested and indicted in December of 2008 for money laundering, embezzlement, and other crimes, the only former president of Taiwan ever to be jailed for corruption charges.

Sonny LO

Further Reading


Blogs, or public online diaries, emerged in China in 2002 and have become very popular with Internet users, who blog to express their opinions, share their resources, and make friends. In the meantime, blogs are also having an unprecedented impact on the various aspects of society.

The word blog (bo ke in Chinese) originated from the word weblog, meaning “online diary.” The word weblog was created by Jorn Barger on 17 December 1997. The short form, blog, was created by Peter Merholz, who jokingly divided the word weblog into the clause we blog in the sidebar of his blog, Peterme.com, in 1999. Internet users quickly adopted the word as both a noun and a verb (to blog meaning “to edit one’s weblog or to post to one’s weblog”).

According to the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), a blog is a kind of web space provided by a bulk synchronous parallel (BSP) computing model and registered by “netizens” (citizens of the Internet) who wish to express their own opinions and ideas on the web for others to browse. In short, a blog is a public web diary that has the function of recording and reporting. Many blogs contain personal thoughts. Other blogs are collective efforts, created by groups based on themes or shared interests.

Blog Authors and Readers in China

According to the Chinese Academy of Social Science, the average Chinese blogger is younger than thirty, and
80 percent of bloggers are under age twenty-four; 60–80 percent fall in the age group of 25–29, and 77 percent are single. In contrast to the gender ratio of general Internet users—that is, 57.2 percent are male—57 percent of bloggers are female. Most blog authors are in senior middle school or have a bachelor’s degree or above (white-collar professional workers). The main purposes of maintaining a blog, according to the CNNIC in 2006, are recording a diary, expressing one’s opinions, sharing one’s resources, and making friends.

The motivations of blog readers are a little different from those of blog authors. Most blog readers seek entertaining accounts. Others want to explore society through different perspectives, to learn and improve oneself, to gain insight into the stories behind news reports, and to find the focus of public attention. Only 42 percent of blog readers are female. The educational background of blog readers is similar to that of blog authors.

Development of Blogs in China

Blogs began in China in 2002. At first they were called “web diaries,” and the word blog was first used in China by Fang Xingdong and Wang Junxiu in July 2002. In August 2002, Fang Xingdong and Wang Junxiu coestablished the website Blogchina. In 2003 they published the first blog monograph in China, Blog—Fire-Stealer in E Era, in which they variously described a blog as a “fast and convenient knowledge-reaching-and-managing system,” a new “cooperative media,” a “non-stop web trip,” an “individual publication (community),” an “information radar system in the web,” a “manual research engine,” an “expert filter,” a “free organized web ecology,” and “the fourth web communication method after Email, BBS and ICQ.”

The year 2003 was important for the development of blogs in China; the number of users reached 200,000. In 2004 came the commercialization of the blog. In 2005 blogging spread from the elites to all netizens and non-netizens. In July 2005 the first Chinese blog movie was made. Since 2006 the number of Chinese bloggers has grown rapidly. According to the Survey Report of Chinese Internet, by the end of November 2007 the number of Chinese blogs had reached 72.82 million, whereas the number of Chinese bloggers had reached 47 million—30 million more than in August 2006. Among those bloggers 17 million were active.

The statistics of CNNIC show that only 3 percent of blogs are visited more than one hundred times per day, and 8 percent are visited more than fifty times per day. It is difficult to exploit the advertisement value of blogs if one only operates a single blog as a media forum. As bloggers become more sophisticated and prolific, the possibilities for reaping a larger profit from blog sites multiply. In September 2007 SINA blog (part of the online SINA Community) signed a contract with two thousand bloggers in China, saying that every blogger would be paid 200 RMB per 10,000 visits if the visits exceed 10,000. After the contract went into effect advertisements in SINA blogs showed a noticeable increase.

The importance of blogging in China does not lie in what information or content blogs convey but rather in the fact that blogs exist, blogs have begun to change the traditional closed and conservative ways that information is communicated in Chinese society. Blogs, by breaking through regulations and other controls, have begun to serve as advocates for individuality and personal civil rights. Although the contents of most blogs can be classified as recordings of personal feelings and private matters, technological development and increased intellectual participation gradually shift the focus of the contents to political and societal subjects that attract many more blog readers. Thus, to some degree information communicated through blogs is creating a new public media platform in China. Not only blog authors but also many blog readers have begun to comment on many aspects of China’s reforming and opening up, and in doing so enlighten ordinary citizens and government officials. With the blog’s development Chinese society has begun to embrace the core elements of liberalism, including tolerance, democracy, justice, consultation, and pluralism.

Hopes for Chinese Blogging

It is hoped that in the future blog websites in China will be more professionalized. First, the mechanics of blog self-development, such as an individual credibility system, evaluation system, and so on, will continuously
evolve. The content and format of blogs will be more enriching. Standards and rules and regulations will be monitored. Second, the social influence of blogging will increase. Blogs will become a comprehensive information platform for the whole society. Blogs will push the media industry and publishing industry to reform and will be widely utilized in government administration, businesses, education, and other structures of society. With the improvement of education and technology, the blog in China will influence not only communication but also social democracy and the spirit of liberalism. Third, blogs are becoming commercialized. Online commercials, mobile blogs, media publication and being paid for blogging, media products, and mergers, for example, will make it feasible to profit from this commercialization.

Junhao HONG and HE Wenfa

Further Reading
Blue Shirts Society

Lanyīshè 藍衣社

The Blue Shirts Society, composed of the young graduates of Huangpu Military Academy, were the secret agents of Nationalist China’s leader Chiang Kai-shek during the 1930s. Modeled on the European fascist practices, the Blue Shirts pledged unquestioned loyalty to Chiang and engaged in subversive activities and mass socialization, which helped to consolidate Chiang’s authoritarian rule before the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945.

In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek declared that warlordism in China had been eliminated and that China was unified under the Guomindang (GMD, Chinese Nationalist Party) government led by Chiang Kai-shek, with the capital relocated from Beijing to Nanjing. However, this national unification was nominal as warlords remained the true rulers in their respective regions, and their allegiance to the GMD government was merely symbolic. Within the Chinese government Chiang faced challenges from different cliques, and he headed the Huangpu (Whampoa) clique. At large, the Chinese Communists were growing rapidly, competing against Chiang for national power. China therefore remained divided and weak, inviting foreign intrusion, especially by the Japanese, who established a stronghold in the northeast.

To save China a group of GMD members demanded reform of the GMD and society along European fascist lines. Members of this group, aged between twenty and thirty, some of whom had received overseas education, were graduates of Huangpu Military Academy. During their Huangpu years Chiang had been their principal. They therefore naturally looked upon Chiang as their leader simply because of that affiliation. The idea of reforming the GMD came to Chiang’s attention in autumn 1931 when Liu Jianqiong, a party member, approached Chiang and brought up the idea of forming an elitist special force to assist Chiang in factional struggles.

With Chiang’s consent, these Huangpu graduates founded the Blue Shirts Society (BSS) (Lanyīshè) on 1 March 1932 in Nanjing. Its leader was He Zhonghan, and members included Liu and Dai Li; the latter was responsible for spying activities that earned him fame as “China’s Himmler.” Like its counterparts in Europe, the BSS pledged unquestioned loyalty to its leader (Chiang), promotion of militant nationalism, and fascistization of society, all deemed necessary to achieve national salvation.

The BSS was an elitist secret service organ, with its initial membership about twenty and no more than ten thousand when it was disbanded. To avoid a partisan outlook, members called themselves simply the “Blue Shirts,” identified by the color of their uniforms. To facilitate their secret activities, they operated behind the formal GMD structure. Yet, their influence was strongly felt in the police force and public security, the party, and the military. At the same time Chiang never publicly acknowledged the formal existence of the BSS.
BSS activities included subversion in the government to get rid of rival cliques, extermination of the Chinese Communists, and convert actions in the northeast to expel Japanese invaders. To strengthen Chiang’s ruling position and cultivate his cult of personality, the BSS helped to instill rank-and-file military officers with fascist ideas and organized mass socialization programs launched by Chiang in the mid-1930s, such as the New Life Movement, the National Voluntary Labor Movement, and the National Military Education Movement. The BSS paid special attention to recruiting and organizing youths.

The BSS was dissolved in March 1938 because of the Second United Front, which required that Chiang put aside the campaign against the Chinese Communists and cooperate with them to fight the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War). Nevertheless, the BSS spirit and some of its members were shortly transferred to a new organization called the “Three People’s Principle Youth Corps,” founded in May the same year.

LAW Yuk-fun.

Further Reading
Bo Juyi (also known as Bai Juyi) was a prolific poet, scholar, and government official active during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). He was widely influential for his realistic poetic style and his emphasis on social reform.

The writings of Bo Juyi (772–846 CE) stand out for their realistic style and content. The origins of Bo Juyi’s realistic approach are ascribed to his difficult early years. He witnessed life’s harshness in his youth, fleeing from battlefields and subsequently wandering from place to place with his family. He learned how to write poetry when he was five or six years old, and later achieved high official posts.

Bo did not have a smooth career in politics. In his teens, Bo resolved to take the national Jinshi examination, but was impeded by his father’s death and his mother’s illness. He finally passed the exam in 800 CE when he was twenty-nine years old and was awarded his first post. After the failure of his political patron Wang Shuwen (753–806 CE), a famous reformer of the time, Bo was demoted and thereafter transferred to various minor posts as a result of being slandered. He was hailed during his tenure as governor of Hangzhou in 822 CE for his beneficial construction work in the area. He spent his final years quietly in Luoyang.

Bo is always associated with Yuan Zhen (779–831 CE) in Chinese poetic history because the two friends wrote in a similar style and advocated social criticism as a mission for literary creation. They laid special stress on “healthy” content and unembellished style. This mission was a direct reaction to the prevalent pursuit of floridity in literature. Bo’s literary agenda was vehemently expressed in “A letter to Yuan Zhen,” which has long been seen as a manifesto on literary reform. He advocated a realist style that reflects people’s feelings, a style first demonstrated in the Book of Poetry and later considered to be a central literary tenet in normative Confucian poetics. This principle was put into practice in his poems written in the series of “neo Music Bureau songs,” a vehicle for a rejuvenation of the realism of the Han-dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) folk-song tradition. To ensure that the social criticism in his work would be widely circulated, Bo put his compositions through a special procedure for revision before being finalized. He read them aloud to old ladies at the marketplace, making sure the language did not hinder comprehension. This practice accounts for the fluid and colloquial style in most of Bo’s poetry.

Bo did not limit himself to one style of poetry. Late in life, Bo compiled his works in four categories: “satirical,” “leisure,” “lament,” and “miscellaneous regulated verse.” “Satirical” poems carried out his mission of social criticism. “Leisure” poems express the enjoyment in his reclusive life. Of the “lamenting” works, his long poems “Lasting Regret” and “The Lute” established his monumental role in Chinese poetic history. The former is a lyrical epic on the love story between Emperor Xuanzong (reigned 712–56) and Precious Consort Yang. The latter concerns a music performance along with some autobiographical sentiments.

Bo played an important role in Chinese poetic history. His poetry and literary agenda reversed the prevalent
trend towards literary decadence, and influenced many later writers to return to the poetic simplicity espoused in Confucian doctrine.

Timothy Wai Keung CHAN

Further Reading

An Epic Love Poem

“Lasting Regret,” one of Bo Jiyu’s more famous works, established his monumental role in Chinese poetic history. This is a lyrical epic on the love story between Emperor Xuanzong and Precious Consort Yang.

Monarch of Han, he doted on beauty, yearned for a bewitching temptress; Through the dominations of his sway, for many years he sought but did not find her. There was in the family of Yang a maiden just then reaching fullness, Raised in the women’s quarters protected, unacquainted yet with others. Heaven had given her a ravishing form, impossible for her to hide, And one morning she was chosen for placement at the side of the sovereign king. When she glanced behind with a single smile, a hundred seductions were quickened. All the powdered and painted faces in the Six Palaces now seemed without beauty of face.

Following the successful development of the Yangzi (Chang) and Pearl River deltas, the Bohai Economic Region, located in the northeast of China, is expected by economists to be another growing center for the Chinese economy. The Bohai area includes the cities of Beijing and Tianjin, the provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong, and part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

With the development of the Yangzi (Chang) and Pearl River deltas and several special economic zones (SEZs), such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, the south of China has been consolidating in terms of economic prosperity. The north, as a more politically and culturally powerful area of China, with Beijing at its center, also needs to be supported economically and for sustainability. To address that concern, in October 1992 the Fourteenth People’s Congress proposed the idea of the Bohai Economic Region, and declared that region would be a priority for China’s national development plan. After years of development questions arise as to whether the Bohai Economic Region functions as well as (or better than) other economic development regions in China.

Brief Description

Bohai (Bo Sea) is a C-shaped arm of the Yellow Sea, off China’s northeast coast; the Bohai Economic Region is composed of the surrounding Liaodong Peninsula, Shandong Peninsula, and Huabei Campagna, which cover 77,000 square kilometers. It is the optimal channel through which products from the inland and northeast of China reach the Pacific and then the world. Products of the area, such as grains, poultry, and oil from Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, coal and fur from the northwest, textiles and aquatic products from the Bohai area, and even goods from Qinghai and Xinjiang, which are thousands of kilometers away, are transported through this area to the world.

Geographically speaking the Bohai Economic Region covers Bohai, the Yellow Sea, and related coastal areas located in the west Pacific, which is called the “Golden Coast” of China. The Bohai Economic Region is of vital importance in China’s economic opening to the world, especially for the north and northeast of China.

The Bohai area in general includes the directly administered (by the central government) cities of Beijing and Tianjin, the provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, and part of the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia. Bohai is 1.12 million square kilometers in size, which is 12 percent of China’s total area, and contains 260 million people, which is 20 percent of the national total. The Bohai area has 157 cities, accounting for one-fourth of the cities in China. Bohai has thirteen cities with more than 1 million people. The economic volume of the Bohai Economic Circle (The Bohai Economic Region plus peripheral areas) is 45.3 percent that of the Yangzi River Delta Economic Circle (The Yangzi River delta plus peripheral areas) and is 10 percent that of the Pearl River Delta Economic Circle (The Pearl River delta plus peripheral areas).
areas). However, the area has great potential for further development.

Advantages

As an economic region in the north of China, the Bohai Economic Region had a number of advantages over others in China. The region is unique in its location, sitting in the center of the Northeast Asia Economic Circle. The region connects the Yangzi River delta, Pearl River delta, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian countries in the south. It connects Korea and Japan in the east and Mongolia and Russia in the north. As the center of an economic network, the Bohai Economic Region has already attracted investment from China and abroad, which further facilitates economic cooperation with different partners.

As a booming area, the Bohai Economic Region is not only an energy consumer but also an energy provider,
which makes development of the region less dependent on the outside. The region has rich marine, mine, gas, petroleum, coal, and tourism resources and is an important agriculture base: It has 2,656 hectares of farmland, accounting for 25 percent of the national total and producing 23 percent of China’s grain.

In addition to resources, the Bohai Economic Region is rich in industry, science, and technology. It is the biggest base for both heavy industry and the chemical industry in China, with advantages in resources and market access. At the same time the region has great science and technology power. Beijing and Tianjin research institutes and universities employ one-fourth of the national total in science and technology faculty, an advantage that, when combined with rich resources, creates tremendous economic power.

Transportation is important for development and is another advantage of the Bohai region. The region has more than forty seaports, making it the most intensive seaport area in China. Its railway, road, air transportation, and communication networks also are well developed. Because of these advantages, the Bohai Economic Region is a vital distribution center sitting between the northeast, northwest, and central China and international markets.

Powerful cities working together will create an even more powerful Bohai Economic Region. Two directly administered cities, Beijing and Tianjin, are at the center; coastal cities, such as Dalian, Qingdao, Yantai, and Qinghuangdao, and capital cities farther away, such as Shenyang, Taiyuan, Shijiazhuang, and Hohhot, are at the periphery. This distribution of cities makes the Bohai Economic Region the most significant community in China in terms of politics, economy, cultural exchange, and international communication. With international economic power gradually moving to the Asia-Pacific area, Bohai is going to play an even more prominent role.

**What Has Been Achieved**

In terms of national economic development, the comprehensive capability of the region has been improved, the economic opening has been further enhanced, and its tertiary (or service) industry has been improved. Following the success of the Yangzi River delta and the Pearl River delta, the Bohai Economic Region has been predicted by economists to become a major development engine in the north and the third “pole of economic development” in China.

The Bohai Economic Region is the center of the railway network in China, with many national main railways, such as the Daqin Line for coal transport and the Jinghu Line, Jingguang Line, and Jingjiu Line for both passengers and goods. The region has 21,543 kilometers of railway, accounting for 30 percent of the national total, with a railway network density of 16.14 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometers. Also, because the region is a strategic area for coal transport, investment in railway construction has always been a focus in the region, and the network of both passenger and goods transportation is becoming more efficient.

The Bohai Economic Region also has the highest density of foreign businesses in the north of China. More than 40 percent of the research and development centers set up by multinational enterprises in China from more than eighty countries, such as Motorola, Hewlett Packard, Panasonic, Microsoft, and Fujitsu, are located in Beijing, and more than ten thousand foreign corporations have invested in Tianjin. Of the top five hundred global enterprises, more than two hundred are setting up production centers in the region. Those in Dalian have been particularly impressive.

After a decade’s development the Bohai Economic Region has been largely influenced by management, technologies, and marketing skills from foreign enterprises, which further promote marketing mechanisms, motivate the reform of existing industries, and produce economic and social benefits in the region.

**Other Regions**

The economic potentials of the Bohai Economic Region and the Yangzi River delta and Pearl River delta have already been contrasted. However, differences exist in other aspects as well.

As far as the operational environment in the Bohai Economic Region is concerned, the region still has strong and influential administrative power, but compared with Yangzi River delta and Pearl River delta methods of resource allocation, the BER’s are comparatively weak.
Such a situation is not advantageous for a region striving to be built up and improved.

As far as the business enterprise structure in the Bohai Economic Region is concerned, some enterprises have outstanding economic performance and high status. But most such enterprises are large state-owned businesses (the percentage of which in the Bohai Economic Region is higher than that in the Yangzi River delta and Pearl River delta and higher than the national average). A relatively low ratio of small- and medium-sized enterprises might not provide a stimulating environment for enterprises without adequate competition, motivation, and dynamics.

Localism in the Bohai Economic Region still prevails and is strong enough to lower the efficiency of regional development. Because of overlapping administrative managements, the coordination costs of some places in the region is still high, and the flow of capital, human resources, technology, and other producing elements is not as smooth as it should be because of the low level of market development.

Looking Ahead

Regional cooperation and development are never easy tasks; they require more than good plans, effort, and resources. Despite what has been achieved in the Bohai Economic Region, much remains to be done.

Theoretically speaking, an economic region needs two elements: principal areas, which act as leaders in economic development, and hinterlands, which provide backup for development and tie the region together. In the Yangzi River delta Shanghai undoubtedly is the principal area, whereas Suzhou, Zhejiang, Anhui, and some other areas play the hinterland role; in the Pearl River delta the principal areas are Hong Kong, Guangzhou (Canton), and Shenzhen, which are geographically adjacent, whereas the hinterland is the whole area excluding Guangdong Province. What about the Bohai Economic Region? Judging from economic volume, Beijing and Tianjin are the principal areas, but there is no hinterland; the Bohai Economic Region is a conglomeration of individually powerful places rather than an influential and cooperating region.

Planners understand this problem and want to integrate every part of the Bohai Economic Region into a truly unified region, but have had relatively little success. Localism has made it difficult enough to coordinate activities even within a province, not to mention within the region (Shandong Peninsula Production Base was under consideration for regional economic development because of its labor and geographic advantage, but ultimately nothing has been worked out).

Yet another problem of the Bohai Economic Region is environmental pollution, which is the product of the policy of “develop first and preserve later.” People look up to a sky that is gray, not blue. In addition, in an area with marine resources at its center, Chinese oceanographers have warned that the Bohai is going to be polluted within ten years if no effective measures are taken.

The Bohai Economic Region is moving ahead, developing plans and assessing resources. It has achieved goals that other economic regions have not, and has failed at goals that other economic regions have achieved. But with determination and energy, the region may yet become the third pole of economic development in China.

ZHOU Guanqi

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Without rice, even the cleverest housewife cannot cook.

巧妇难为无米之炊
Qiāo fù nán wéi wú mǐ zhī chuī
In the early 1920s the Russian-born Mikhail Borodin, a Bolshevik Party member, became one of Moscow’s most influential foreign operatives in China. As chief advisor to Sun Yat-sen he led the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) to adopt Leninist ideals, and went on to play a key role in Soviet secret diplomacy.

Mikhail Markovich Gruzenberg, alias Borodin, was born in Yanovichi of Vitebsk Province in Russia. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1903. After the 1905 revolution he emigrated to the United States and set up a school for immigrant children and propagated socialism in Chicago. In the wake of the October Revolution of 1917 Borodin hurried home to place himself at the service of Communist leader Vladimir Lenin. He undertook a series of secret assignments for the Bolshevik Party in Scandinavia, Spain, Turkey, Britain, and Germany, earning the reputation of being a man capable of handling all kinds of complexities.

In the early 1920s Moscow adopted a dual policy toward China, nurturing revolutionary goals and pursuing Soviet national interests. In 1923 Borodin became one of Moscow’s foreign operatives in China. After arriving in China Borodin served as the chief advisor of Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang). He guided the transformation of the Nationalist Party into a Leninist party, playing a crucial role in creating the “united front” between the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1926–27 he was a driving force behind the decisions leading to the Northern Expedition and so-called Great Revolution, aimed at defeating various warlords and achieving China’s unification. Many scholars thus believed that Borodin was an agent of the Comintern (the Communist International established in 1919 and dissolved in 1943) and that the main goal of his China mission was to “make revolution.”

New Russian and Chinese documentation reveals that the Bolshevik Party Politburo, rather than the Comintern, sent Borodin to China. Borodin’s assignments in China went far beyond “making revolution.” A principal agent of Soviet policy toward China, he followed Moscow’s instructions to coordinate his activities with Lev Karakhan, the top Soviet diplomat in China. His monthly reports to Moscow also went through Karakhan in Beijing. In addition to working with Sun, Borodin was involved in almost every important aspect of Soviet operations in China, including secret diplomacy with the northeast warlord Zhang Zuolin and the warlord government in Beijing. In May 1924 Borodin and Karakhan cooperated to make the Beijing government sign the Sino-Soviet agreement on terms satisfactory to Moscow. Consequently, the China Eastern Railway was continuously managed by the Soviets, and the Red Army remained in Mongolia.

After Sun’s death in March 1925, Chiang Kai-shek became the Nationalist Party leader. In March 1926 Chiang acted to restrict the CCP’s influence within the Nationalist Party. Because Moscow’s main strategic goal was to check Zhang Zuolin and the expanding Japanese influence in Manchuria, Borodin urged the CCP to compromise with Chiang. After Zhang expelled Karakhan from China in October 1926, Moscow appointed Borodin to be
BORODIN, Mikhail ▪ Bào Luǒtīng ▪ 鲍罗廷

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the top Soviet representative in China. Borodin assumed the overall responsibilities in dealing with the Nationalist Party, the CCP, and the various warlords—including the warlord-controlled Beijing government. Following Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s strict instructions, Borodin emphasized the importance of relying on the Nationalist Party–CCP united front. Even after Chiang’s anti-Communist coup in April 1927, Borodin obeyed Stalin and continuously made efforts to work with the Nationalist Party left wing, represented by Wang Jingwei in Wuhan, until Wang announced a split with the CCP and Moscow in July 1927. Borodin’s China mission failed.

In the same month Borodin left China. After returning to Moscow he was assigned a few insignificant positions, among them an editorship of an English-language newspaper in Moscow. He survived the Great Purge of the 1930s. However, when the Chinese Communist revolution achieved nationwide victory in 1949, he was arrested. He died in a labor camp in Siberia in October 1951.

CHEN Zhihong

Further Reading


Boxer Protocol (Xinchou Treaty) ▷
Boxer Protocol (Xinchou Treaty)

Xīn-Chǒu Tiáoyuē 辛丑条约

The Boxer Protocol was the treaty that ended the Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1900, awarding indemnities to the eleven victorious foreign powers. In 1937 Japan invoked provisions of the protocol when it invaded China.

The Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1900 is perhaps best remembered because of the twelve-article and nineteen-annex protocol, which was signed by elder Chinese statesman Li Hongzhang and representatives of eleven foreign powers in September 1901 as a peace treaty after the catastrophic event. In 1937 Japan invoked Article 9 of the protocol, which allowed foreign troops to occupy stations between Beijing and Tianjin, when Japan exploited the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to launch its invasion of China at the start of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War). However, the pretext of the Japanese was weak because the Marco Polo Bridge was not one of the twelve stations where the foreign powers would have been allowed to deploy.

What began as a scattered targeting of Christians by the Boxers soon was generalized to the destruction of anything foreign: churches, mines, railways, and foreign institutions, which were blamed for all the hardships that China suffered. Many of the Boxers were alienated and impoverished peasants, unemployed persons who had been dismissed from the imperial troops or local militias that disbanded, or long-distance porters who had lost their jobs to the railway companies. The Qing dynasty was neutral at first, although it benefited from the Boxer slogan; “Support the Qing and eliminate foreigners!” However, in May 1900 the Qing court began to lend support to the Boxers because it believed in their power and was ready for a confrontation with the West in order to rescue something of its downtrodden prestige in the country after the Korean debacle.

Boxers Begin Siege

The rebellion itself began on 20 June when the Boxers began an eight-week-long siege against the foreign embassies in Beijing, which had been forced on China in the first place and had destroyed its worldview of the tributary
system (dating from premodern times, when foreign powers paid homage to the emperor, pledging wealth, assets, and goods in exchange for reciprocal trade agreements or special treatment) with such “barbarians” now that China had to host them in the capital. The dowager empress foolishly declared war on the foreign powers the next day and directed the provincial governors to participate. However, they knew the military might of the West and understood the scope of the looming catastrophe. Li Hongzhang, a senior official who was respected by the West because of his experience and wisdom, had fallen from grace in Beijing and was in exile in the south.

The foreign powers finally acted to extricate their embassies from the siege. The foreign powers replaced the two thousand troops who withdrew under pressure by the Boxers with an expedition of nineteen thousand soldiers, most of them Japanese because of the ability of the Japanese to bring in reinforcements from nearby Korea while the European and U.S. troops lagged behind. The expedition conquered Beijing on 14 August, and Emperor Guang Xu and the dowager empress fled to the ancient capital of Xian. Facing defeat and chaos throughout the country, Li Hongzhang, together with Governors Liu Kon-I and Zhang Zidong in the southeast, who had previously refused to join the war, in Guangzhou (Canton) signed separate settlements with the foreign consuls in their provinces in order to avert collapse of the country.

**Peace Settlement**

These leaders again came to the rescue of the now-discredited Manchu dynasty and negotiated a peace settlement in Shanghai, known as the “Boxer Protocol.”
The most humiliating terms of the protocol were those that dictated an enormous indemnity that China was forced to pay each of the eleven foreign powers, and the twelve stations on the road between Beijing and the sea that the foreign powers were permitted to occupy to defend their reinforcements should the need rise again. That is the article that Japan invoked in 1937. Other articles in the protocol were a burden, but the burden of the indemnity, which held China’s budget hostage to foreigners for many years, was probably the most oppressive.

However, one can see some positive outcomes of the rebellion and the protocol: The Boxers proved that China could fight courageously against the West, and the protocol avoided the partitioning of China. Because the Manchus were now repudiated as foreigners who let the dynasty fall to the pressure of the West, the Chinese proved that they were capable of forming a patriotic front. This confidence was picked up by a new type of leader, Sun Yat-sen, who began to explore alternative forms of government after it became obvious that the dynasty was falling.

Raphael ISRAELI

Further Reading

Boxer Rebellion
Yihétuán Yùndòng 义和团运动

The Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1900 was a bloody uprising against Western imperialism in north China. The Boxers, a group known for their expertise in the martial arts, targeted both foreigners and Chinese Christians. Foreign troops were sent in to put down the rebellion, resulting eventually in even more foreign control over the Chinese government.

The Boxer Rebellion broke out in Shandong Province in 1899 and spread across much of north China before it ended in 1900, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of foreign missionaries and thousands of Chinese. In its aftermath foreign powers greatly increased their control over the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) court, and the partitioning of China seemed a real possibility.

The rebellion began in western Shandong among secret societies. As elsewhere in China commoners in Shandong often looked to secret societies and sectarian groups for mutual aid, religious and magical services, and martial arts training, the latter causing these groups to be labeled “Boxers.” The Boxers most prominent in the rebellion were the Boxers United in Righteousness (Yihetuan), who drew members from various groups, including the Small Sword Society (known for its invulnerability magic—the belief that potions, charms, and martial-arts rituals would protect them against bullets), and the Spirit Boxers, who provided techniques for mass spirit possession. The rebellion grew rapidly in part because of local unhappiness with the increasing power of Christian missionaries, especially German Catholics in Shandong, but above all because of the drought, floods, and growing famine in north China. As the rebellion spread it became increasingly violent and led to a number of attacks against Christian missionaries and Chinese Christians. Traditional policy for dealing with peasant rebellions called for executing the leaders and encouraging the followers to return home. In this case the policy merely encouraged the spread of the rebellion and made it more diffuse. By late 1899 the rebellion was spreading rapidly.
The court was divided on the issue of the Boxers, with some officials favoring support because the Boxers’ slogan, “Support the Qing, destroy the foreign,” suggested that the Boxers’ popular antiforeignism could be used for the court’s benefit.

**Foreign Guards Sent In**

As the situation became increasingly chaotic, foreign countries sent guards to their legations in Beijing. In June 1900 the Boxers cut the railway line between Tianjin and Beijing, and a force of 2,100 foreign troops was sent from Tianjin to protect the legations in Beijing. This expedition was turned back by the Boxers, convincing some officials at the court, including the empress dowager, Cixi (1835–1908), that the Boxers could in fact defeat foreign troops. Although the empress dowager apparently did not believe in the invulnerability magic that the Boxers claimed to have, she was impressed with their ability to rally mass support. On 21 June the court declared war on all Western powers, seeing the movement as a way to retaliate against increasing foreign Imperialism. This official Qing backing led the rebellion to spread rapidly across north China, but many provincial officials remained skeptical of the Boxers, and most of them made no effort to attack foreigners or to encourage the rebellion. Many foreigners and thousands of Chinese Christians were killed during the summer, mostly in Shanxi, Zhili, and Inner Mongolia.

On 4 August twenty thousand foreign troops, including British, French, American, Russian, and German, and with more than half of them from Japan, began marching toward Beijing. They had already taken the city of Tianjin back from the Boxers and Qing troops after heavy fighting, and they drove quickly toward the capital, where the foreign legations had been under siege since June. Foreign troops entered Beijing on 14 August, and members of the court fled disguised as commoners. The Boxers in the countryside dispersed rapidly, in part because the rebellion had been defeated and in part because the drought had ended. The foreign troops looted the city and launched a series of punitive expeditions into the countryside. The German troops, whose minister had been killed, were particularly interested in extracting revenge and teaching the Chinese a lesson—the two main purposes of the punitive expeditions.
In the aftermath of the rebellion the Chinese were forced to agree to the Boxer Protocols. These required China to pay the Western powers affected by the uprising an indemnity of 450 million taels of silver (although some governments later refunded some of the money), to destroy all the forts between Beijing and the sea, to allow the stationing of foreign troops along the route to the capital, and to agree to the creation of a permanent legation guard. A number of officials were to be punished, including Prince Zhuang, who was ordered to commit suicide. The civil service exams were to be suspended for five years in forty-five cities where the Boxers had been active. These provisions were important steps toward foreign control over China. The indemnity, plus interest, was a huge drain on the government, making it even more dependent on foreign loans. The demands for the punishment of officials and the suspension of exams were more intrusive involvement in the government of China than foreigners had ever demanded before, and after the rebellion foreign consuls exerted even more control over the Chinese government. The Russians had taken advantage of the rebellion to move into Manchuria, and although pressure from the other powers eventually forced Russia to leave after the rebellion, the partitioning of China—or “carving the melon,” as Chinese nationalists called it—seemed a real possibility.

Boxer Influence

The Boxers influenced China and its relationship with the outside world long after they had been dispersed. Foreigners continued to refer to the danger of “boxerism” (wild, irrational violence) as a justification for foreign power inside China. Chinese views of the rebellion were more mixed, with the anti-imperialist May Fourth reformers seeing the Boxers as an example of the feudal backwardness that was weakening China, and the Communists seeing the Boxers as an example of the power of the aroused masses and proof of the Chinese peasantry’s innate hatred of imperialism.

Alan BAUMLER

Further Reading

Boycotts and Economic Nationalism

Chinese have used economic boycotts of foreign countries for over a hundred years to protest foreign interventions and perceived humiliations. In the early twentieth century, boycotts precipitated or accompanied major turning points in China’s relations with the imperialist powers, and since the 1980s have reemerged as China has reintegrated itself economically with capitalist countries.

The boycotting of goods has figured prominently in Sino-foreign relations for more than a hundred years. Boycotts began in the first third of the twentieth century as a means of protesting against foreign powers who intervened in Chinese affairs or who were perceived to have humiliated China. As China re-integrated itself into global capitalist markets in the later twentieth century boycotts reemerged to foster Chinese economic nationalism, although the World Trade Organization, with China as a member since 2001, has tried to ensure market access to foreign goods.

Boycotts as Policy

Beginning in the early twentieth century boycotts gave rise to or occurred simultaneously with major turning points in China’s relations with the imperialist powers. There were significant boycotts in 1905, 1908, 1909, 1915, 1919, 1923, 1925, 1928, 1931, and then nearly continuously into the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). The policies behind the boycotts may have even provoked the war with Japan, which sought to ensure market access.

On one level prewar boycotts followed a predictable pattern. After a specific foreign humiliation, a popular protest ensued, which included a boycott. They generally ended when government suppression from above, inertia from below, and the profit motive among merchants, who made imports irresistibly inexpensive, undermined the commitment of participants. On a deeper level these individual boycotts did not merely emerge from nowhere as an emotional response to an act of foreign aggression in China. Rather, they are best viewed as the most conspicuous aspect of a broader continuous effort to combine nascent nationalism and consumer culture by teaching Chinese to differentiate Chinese products from foreign products. Although boycotts always included opportunists, such as hooligans and petty government officials who used the events to shakedown merchants, the core supporters remained active between boycotts. Even when boycotts failed to ban the targeted imports, which they always did, they played a pivotal role in developing Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism.

The Anti-American Boycott of 1905 institutionalized the use of boycotts in China as an expression of anti-imperialism and nationalism. The anti-American boycott of 1905 was atypical in that it began after affronts to Chinese overseas rather than infringements of Chinese sovereignty within China. Like subsequent boycotts, this one had an identifiable spark: the increasingly restrictive U.S. immigration measures applied to all Chinese. To
express their outrage and help pressure the United States, Chinese merchants in cities throughout China boycotted American products.

This boycott was critical to the development of a sustained economic nationalist movement for four reasons. First, it initiated a long series of anti-imperialist boycotts. Second, it was national in scope, with participants in at least ten provinces and many major cities throughout China and within Chinese communities abroad, such as San Francisco. Third, the boycott cut across class lines. U.S. immigration officials had mistreated all Chinese, including manual laborers and aristocrats, so all classes supported the boycott. Fourth, the boycott created new ways and co-opted others to foster popular participation, including modifying popular songs, destroying stocks of American products, soliciting pledges, tearing down advertisement posters for American goods, spreading rumors (for example, that American cigarettes contained poison), and using advertisements to identify products as Chinese and encourage their consumption.

Protestors used different media to reach as many people as possible. Newspapers targeted the cultural elite; songs, lectures, slogans, drama performances, and cartoons of mistreated Chinese reached a wider audience; and handbills, leaflets, and placards written in the colloquial language informed intermediate groups. In short, the boycott, which gradually dissolved by 1906, fostered economic nationalism among Chinese consumers and a growing sense of empowerment through consumption and nonconsumption.

The next major anti-imperialist boycott occurred in early 1908 after Chinese officials in Guangzhou seized a Japanese ship, the Tatsu Maru II, which they believed to be smuggling weapons to anti-Qing revolutionaries. The Japanese government demanded the immediate release of the ship, an indemnity, and a formal apology, which the weak Qing government agreed to. The agreement, however, angered Chinese in the south who wanted their government to stand up to the Japanese. The chamber of commerce and native-place associations in Guangzhou proposed a boycott of Japanese products until the aggregate value of the boycotted goods matched the indemnity. Longshoremen refused to unload Japanese ships, local shipping companies vowed not to use these ships, and merchants burned Japanese products. As with other boycotts, ad hoc organizations formed to support this one. The boycott spread to other cities, particularly those with populations of merchants from Guangzhou, such as Shanghai, and in overseas communities in Honolulu, Manila, and even the Japanese city of Nagasaki.

This boycott, though short-lived, further established the usefulness of boycott process by demonstrating how quickly locals formed boycott organizations of broad social coalitions. Moreover, these groups simultaneously promoted both the boycott and the development of Chinese industries. Seventy-two leading merchants in Guangzhou, for example, were asked to finance the establishment of a large commercial firm, where merchandise of every description would be collected from all over the country and sold at a designated price to encourage and to help improve Chinese industry. The boycott also broke, if only temporarily, established trade relationships. This opened up the possibility that domestic manufactures would replace Japanese imports, allowing Hangzhou umbrella manufacturers, for instance, to gain a foothold in a market dominated until then by popular Japanese-manufactured umbrellas. Above all, the boycott provided a lasting reminder that Chinese outside the government could take foreign policy into their own hands and express nationalism and anti-imperialism through commodities. The formal boycott lasted only a few months. Nevertheless, this form of protest had been introduced to new areas of China and would soon be repeated.

Boycotts and Rising Nationalism

Japan’s treatment of China during World War I, particularly its issuance of the notorious Twenty-One Demands of 1915, which initially called for the elimination of Chinese sovereignty, led to the first nationwide, prolonged boycott of Japanese goods. The lengthy negotiations over the demands gave the Chinese plenty of time to grow impatient and organize opposition. But with Japanese pressure on the Chinese government to crack down on boycotts, supporters had to turn to less explicit ways of disseminating the call to boycott by referring to Japan indirectly. In Guangzhou, for example, Chinese newspapers regularly received letters from readers offering money to support armed resistance against the “unwarranted aggression of a certain empire.” Likewise, Chinese
were enjoined not to buy “inferior products,” which along with “enemy products” became code words for Japanese goods.

The protests surrounding the Versailles Peace Conference (1919), which grew into the larger May Fourth Movement, provide another example of the how boycotts are linked and reveal the development of Chinese nationalism. As with earlier boycotts, a specific national humiliation was at the center of protests in 1919, in this case, a shift in the foreign control of Shandong Province. Since the late nineteenth century, the province had been part of Germany’s sphere of interest. During World War I, however, Japan took over and expanded the German possessions in Shandong and required China to recognize its interests there as part of the Twenty-One Demands. China had expected to recover control of the Shandong concessions as a reward for entering the war against Germany.

Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination heightened this expectation. However, Japan had carefully laid the groundwork for assuming control with secret agreements. The publicizing of these agreements during the Versailles Peace Conference sparked Chinese demonstrations. On 4 May several thousand students gathered at Tiananmen Square at the entrance to the Forbidden City to advocate the return of Qingdao and denounce the Versailles settlement. In the following weeks and months, the inhabitants of some two hundred Chinese cities spread over twenty provinces participated in strikes and boycotts that lasted, depending on the place, until 1920 or 1921. The protest aimed to translate humiliation into retaliation by boycotting Japanese products, ships, and currency.

New humiliations continually stoked anti-imperialist sentiments and kept the boycotts alive. Indeed, it is not clear that any boycott ever ended. In most places they
gradually declined, only to be rekindled by new humiliations in the 1920s and 1930s. These new boycotts heightened economic nationalism through increasingly violent and vigorous means.

One of China’s most famous boycotts, that of 1925, may appear unique because it was the first time two countries were boycotted at once. The demonstrations and strikes grew out of months of escalating conflict, following the death of a Chinese factory worker at the hands of his Japanese boss. On 30 May 1925, Chinese responded to the broader mistreatment of workers at a local Japanese-owned textile mill by holding a demonstration on Shanghai’s Nanjing Road. British-led police officers from the International Settlement, of which Nanjing Road was a part, fired on the crowd, killing eleven and wounding a few dozen more Chinese. Within days strikes broke out across Shanghai and spread throughout the country. In contrast to earlier actions, Chinese demonstrators explicitly targeted both the British and the Japanese. But this fact becomes less remarkable when viewing the boycott as part of a larger effort to promote economic nationalism, which had from its start stigmatized the consumption of all imports. By the same token, interpretations of the boycott of 1925 as an event run by the fledgling Communist Party, whose labor activism undoubtedly played an important role, are overly narrow.

Expanded Scope of Boycotts

By 1925 the Nationalist Party had begun to strengthen its relationship with organizations advocating economic nationalism. Boycotts in 1928 and 1931 were the most effective to date. The nationalists greatly extended the scope of these boycotts, but they never completely controlled (and certainly did not invent) these events. Indeed, proponents of economic nationalism used the nationalist government as much as the other way around. For instance, economic nationalists used an official government campaign against cigarette smoking in the mid-1930s as a pretext for confiscating only foreign cigarettes. Ultimately, heavy pressure from Japan and the policy of “first internal pacification, then external resistance” convinced nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi 将介石, 1887–1975) to withdraw support for boycotts. Nevertheless, even after the nationalist government began suppressing the boycott in May 1932—attempting to ban, for instance, the popular term enemy products—many Chinese continued to pressure merchants by picketing stores, confiscating goods, sending intimidating anonymous letters and postcards, disrupting distribution channels, pasting posters on storefronts, and forcing shopkeepers to place advertisements in local newspapers in which they vowed not to sell imports.

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chinese leaders finally and completely gained control over tariffs. Within a few years, the PRC government effectively banned the importation of virtually all consumer goods, particularly those from capitalist countries. Chinese consumers had no choice but to buy Chinese. Thirty years later China dramatically changed course. With the initiation of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and opening to the outside world, China slowly began to import consumer goods.

Boycotts in Modern China

Since the start of China’s market reforms in 1978, imports from capitalist countries have once again arrived in ever-greater numbers. Such imports have collided with established economic interests as well as a growing consumer movement, which is ever ready to call a boycott against companies and countries deemed to have treated Chinese consumers unfairly.

As the range and volume of imports grew, particularly with the lead up to and China’s ascension to the World Trade Organization in 2001, the tension between Chinese products and foreign products periodically reemerges for at least three reasons. First, China’s WTO commitments allowed easier market access for multinationals and rendered countless village-owned and state-owned enterprises uncompetitive, creating millions of unemployed workers. Although less visible internationally, government and academic critics remain opposed to China’s reintegration to the capitalist market. Second, a new generation of students continues to invoke the language of economic nationalism and call for boycotts, as did those protesting the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the widespread boycotts of...
the French retailing giant Carrefour in China in 2008 in retaliation for the disruption of the Olympic torch relay in Paris. Finally, Chinese consumers periodically call for boycotts of specific foreign products when they feel Chinese consumers collectively have been treated poorly or differently by multinational companies.

One hundred years after the first nationwide boycotts began to popularize product nationality, and even as the WTO attempts to ensure market access to foreign products, the real and imagined nationality of products and brands still influences Chinese life.

Karl GERTH

Further Reading


China’s first history of the United States was written by an American missionary named E. C. Bridgman who believed that if he could impress his Chinese audience with American accomplishments, the Chinese would be more amenable to Western ideas and diplomatic practices.

Elijah Coleman (E. C.) Bridgman was a man of firsts. He was the first Evangelical Protestant missionary to China; the first Chinese expert in America; first editor of the first major journal on sinology, the Chinese Repository; author of the first book on the Chinese language; one of the first credible Chinese translators in the United States; and author of the first history of the United States written in Chinese, an important work that helped build Sino-Western relations.

Bridgman was born 22 April 1801 in Belchertown, Massachusetts. He received his education at Amherst College and Andover Theological Seminary. After he was ordained in 1829, he was appointed to China by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the first American Christian foreign missionary organization.

Chinese Mission

Bridgman arrived in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1830 and began his mission at a time of unrest in China, particularly in Guangzhou.

In the years preceding the First Opium War (1839–1842), relations between Westerners and Chinese had deteriorated as tensions escalated over the opium trade and as Westerners grew increasingly frustrated with China’s restrictive trade system, which required all foreign trade to be conducted exclusively in the southeastern port of Guangzhou through a small group of officially designated Chinese merchants.

Worried about the possibility of military confrontation, Bridgman and his fellow missionaries worked to break down the cultural barriers that they believed were obstructing direct communication with Chinese authorities. They thought that by transmitting Western scientific, technological, and cultural information to the Chinese, the Chinese would be sufficiently impressed with the achievements of the West and embrace more positive and productive exchanges with the foreign “barbarians.” These missionaries, along with several British and American merchants in China who offered financial support, established the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China (SDUKC) in November 1834. Bridgman was the first joint secretary. The society began publishing inexpensive, easy-to-read material in Chinese.

America for the Chinese

Among the works published by the SDUKC was Bridgman’s short book A Brief Account of the United States of America (Meilige heshengguo zhilue), written in Chinese. Bridgman’s work demonstrated his grasp of the Chinese language and his skill at appealing to the cultural
Bridgman began with the Christian concept of the origins of civilization, which he conveyed through typical Chinese phraseology and narrative style. In his account of the American Revolution ("Commoner Overthrow of English Rule"), Bridgman explained how the colonies grew, prospered, and expanded their trade and commerce. He described how the King of England imposed unfair taxes on the people, including the tax on China's most important export, tea, which was brought to America aboard British ships. After explaining the causes and outcome of the American Revolution, Bridgman described the important personal contributions of George Washington and how he refused to make himself king. Bridgman knew that this story would remind his Chinese readers of Yao and Shun, two venerated sage-kings of ancient China who sought the most qualified of their subjects to succeed them instead of creating a ruling dynasty.

Photograph of E. C. Bridgman.
a similar-sounding Chinese character or two. Bridgman pointed out the advantage of the phonetic alphabet over the mode of writing used by the Chinese, noting that it could be mastered even by a small child.

Bridgman devoted considerable attention to religion and morality. In a chapter titled “Distinguishing Heresy and Orthodoxy,” he hoped to attract the interest of his readers by convincing them of the simple truths and morally transforming influence of Christianity. And although much of his discussion of Christian doctrines and beliefs must have seemed bizarre or superstitious to Chinese readers, the important point implied in the title of this chapter would have been familiar to educated Chinese because it pertained to the broader context of their own religious and philosophical traditions.

Bridgman’s Legacy

Bridgman’s history was a major source of information for the first generation of Chinese scholars and officials who, because of the challenging circumstances of their times, felt compelled to learn more about the lands, customs, and ideas of their powerful Western adversaries. The 1862 version was even translated into Japanese, and for many years afterward also served as that country’s major source of information about the United States.

But Bridgman’s contributions did not end with one book. He helped to translate the bible into Chinese. He founded the Morrison Education Society, an organization that promoted Western-style education in China. In 1841 he completed a set of textbooks/teaching aids for Chinese-language learning. He helped organize the Medical Missionary Society in China. In the early 1840s, he served as an adviser and translator in American-Sino trade negotiations.

On 28 June 1845, Bridgman married Eliza Jane Gillett (1805–1871), an American Episcopalian missionary. She went on to found the Bridgman Academy in Beijing, a school for girls. They lived in Guangzhou and adopted two Chinese girls. E. C. Bridgman died in Shanghai on 2 November 1861. Both he and Eliza are buried there.

Michael LAZICH

Further Reading


The British American Tobacco company was among the most significant of Western companies to have invested in production facilities in China during the first half of the twentieth century. By 1937 it was manufacturing annually 55 billion machine-made cigarettes, distributed largely through indigenous Chinese mercantile networks. In 1941 its assets were seized by Japan; the company was ejected from China in 1953.

The early history of the British American Tobacco (BAT) company provides an example of both successful collaboration and intense competition between Western and Chinese businesses in pre-Revolutionary China. At its zenith in 1937 BAT manufactured and distributed 55 billion machine-made cigarettes to Chinese consumers. By adroitly aligning its manufacturing facilities with an elaborate system of Chinese mercantile networks, BAT was able to peddle its cheap tobacco products extensively throughout the hinterland of the Republic of China, generating substantial revenues for the company’s shareholders and for its Chinese partners. At the same time, BAT engaged in fierce competition with independent Chinese cigarette manufacturers—Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company being the most successful of these—throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century.

Effectively BAT sought to maintain its control over the technology and manufacturing processes while allowing indigenous merchants the opportunity to profit from their involvement in the distribution and retailing of cigarettes.

BAT had been established in London as an international joint venture between U.S. and British tobacco manufacturers in 1902. The new organization inherited a factory in Pudong, Shanghai, which one of its parent companies, W.D. & H.O. Wills, had earlier acquired. From this base the company began to develop a nationwide system of sales and production, initially dividing the country into north and south for administrative purposes and later setting up a divisional structure based on five regions (Shanghai, Hong Kong, Hankow, Tianjin, and Manchuria). In the beginning most of its Western employees were recruited from the tobacco-growing regions of the United States. The most prominent of these employees was James Augustus Thomas, who was posted to Shanghai in 1905. In turn Thomas formed a long-term working relationship with Wu Ting Seng, a Chinese merchant with close links to the Shanghai Tobacco Guild. Over time Wu’s organization—the Wing Tai Vo Tobacco Company—developed into BAT’s main partner in China, having found its initial success in the distribution of BAT’s popular Ruby Queen cigarette brand.

After World War I the London-based elements within BAT’s management strengthened their position, and from this point U.S. influence on BAT in China began to wane, other than in the area of tobacco cultivation. Although BAT itself did not grow tobacco on a commercial scale in China, it provided advice and support, along with a ready market for the leaf, and was thus responsible for the emergence of flue-cured bright leaf tobacco as a cash
British American Tobacco Company n Ying-Měi Yâncāo Gōngsī n 英美烟草公司

Tobacco Industry in China: Better Money or Better Health?

One of the most popular and deadly habits is also the Chinese government’s highest source of income. A balance between health and wealth has been hard to come by, but remains a constant goal in China.

The tobacco industry has always been the biggest fiscal pillar for the Chinese government. In 2007, the Chinese tobacco industry, which delivered RMB 388 billion (US$51.7 billion) taxes and profits to the government, up 25% from 2006, again secured the top position on the corporate taxpayer list. 2007 was the fastest growing year for China’s tobacco industry, as a result of product mix changes and improvements, as well as expansion of premium grade cigarettes.

Smokers are addicted to cigarettes, so is the government treasury. The Chinese government has long been trying to strike a balance between responsibility for citizen health and incentives for such a profitable industry to operate.


Further Reading


crop in the regions of Shandong, Henan, and Anhui in the late 1910s.

BAT proved relatively adept at overcoming the political and military dislocations that beset China during the Republican period (1912–1949) and also supported famine relief schemes, partly to promote its corporate image as a responsible Chinese institution. Its operations provided substantial amounts of tax revenues, particularly in the form of transit taxes ( liken ). Despite threats of nationalization by the Republican regime, only after the incursion of the Japanese state tobacco monopoly into China after 1931 did the company find its political position undermined. In 1941, all BAT assets were seized by Japan (with whom China had been at war since 1937), and many of its Western employees were interned for the duration of the conflict. The end of the war permitted a brief renaissance for the company in China, but after the establishment of the Communist government BAT was confronted with huge tax liabilities and was ultimately forced to withdraw from the People’s Republic of China completely in 1953, retaining only its operations in the British Crown colony of Hong Kong as a legacy.

Howard COX
The British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS) is an umbrella organization composed of more than two hundred individuals and organizations from the worlds of academia, industry, government, and the media. The group was founded after the end of China’s Cultural Revolution in 1976, reflecting China’s opening to the Western world.

The British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS), known in Chinese as Yingguo Hanxue Xiehui, was founded in 1976 to promote the study in Britain of China and of Chinese culture abroad and to inform its members of current events and research in Chinese studies. Its founding coincided with the end of the Cultural Revolution, reflecting the growing accessibility of China to British scholars and students at that time. It was founded by members of a delegation of young sinologists on the staffs of universities throughout the U.K. who were invited to China by the Chinese government in April 1976. The idea of setting up a national association was developed on a plane on the flight back from China. The group included both humanities and social science scholars, setting the tone for the association as an organization catering to all aspects of Chinese studies.

BACS is a nonpolitical organization with a membership of more than two hundred individuals and organizations whose interests relate to greater China, primarily from the academic community, but also from industry, the media, and government. BACS grew in the subsequent period of greater openness of China to the outside world.

Promoting, Liaising, and Consulting

BACS has developed numerous mechanisms for promoting Chinese studies. Its school liaison officer seeks to encourage and facilitate the study of China in schools and colleges in Britain below the university level. An affiliated organization, the British Chinese Language Teachers Society, represents the interests of teachers of Chinese at the university level. BACS also encompasses the China Postgraduate Network (CPN), which provides an organizational framework for postgraduates whose research concerns China, and aims principally to disseminate information, offer advice, maintain a database of postgraduates in Britain, and pursue links with similar organizations in other countries. The CPN produces an annual newsletter, which complements the yearly bulletin published by BACS, and holds workshops and conferences for postgraduates. In 2008 the Association for Speakers of Chinese as a Second Language was launched as part of BACS. This group represents the interests and addresses the information and networking needs of those who have spent considerable time and investment learning Mandarin Chinese as a second language. BACS also runs its own website and an e-mail list to facilitate the sharing of information and views in Chinese studies.
BACS plays a role in liaising and consulting with other area studies organizations, with funding bodies, with China-related representative offices, and with government departments. It has promoted the interests and priorities of area studies in respect of British government initiatives, such as the Research Assessment Exercise, the Teaching Quality Assessment, and the HEFCE China Studies Review. It is affiliated with United Kingdom Council for Area Studies Associations and thereby contributes to the promotion of area studies within British higher education and research.

From the beginning the main event of the association has been the annual conference at which academic papers are presented by scholars from the U.K. and other countries. It has always welcomed participation by both members and nonmembers. Each year the conference is held at a venue where Chinese studies are active and arranged around a theme of academic and public interest. Since 1995, BACS has cooperated with the British Association for Japanese Studies and the British Association for Korean Studies in organizing a joint East Asian studies conference, which takes place every three years.

BACS operates in a context where alternative organizations may engage the interests, time, and energies of its members and potential members. As is the case with other area studies associations, BACS competes for potential members with other associations that represent a dominant interest in particular academic disciplines. Thus, for example, political scientists or economists with a special interest in China may find themselves torn between involvement with BACS and engagement with associations for practitioners of their disciplines. In addition, as a nonpolitical organization, BACS may not be seen as the ideal forum for potential members whose interest in China lies primarily in the direction of political engagement, whether that may be, for example, in the promotion of or opposition to communism or socialism (with or without Chinese characteristics), in the promotion of human rights or of environmental protection.

BACS Administration

BACS is a registered charity and is funded primarily by subscriptions from individual and corporate members. It also receives grants for specific purposes from the Universities’ China Committee in London, the British Academy, and the British Council, among others. BACS also administers scholarships for U.K. students to study in Taiwan.

BACS is administered by an elected committee whose members come from academia and from governmental and nongovernmental bodies involved in China. The president is usually a leading academic from within the broad range of Chinese studies. The president whose term began in 2008 is Tim Wright, Professor of Chinese Studies at Sheffield University. Recent presidents have been Don Rimmington (University of Leeds), Don Starr (University of Durham), Tao Tao Liu (University of Oxford), Delia Davin (University of Leeds), Bonnie S. McDougall (University of Edinburgh), Frank Dikötter (School of Oriental and African Studies), Stephan Feuchtwang (London School of Economics), and Harriet Evans (University of Westminster). Presidents have been drawn from a wide range of disciplines, including linguistics, literary studies, history, economics, politics, anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies.

Norman STOCKMAN

Further Reading

The British Chamber of Commerce in China, based in Beijing, maintains a network for British companies doing business in China and provides information on industry, the economy, and politics in China.

The British Chamber of Commerce in China (BCCC), previously known as the "Association of British Business in China," began in 1981 but was not formally established until 1993. Based in Beijing, it seeks to provide a network for Britain to do business in China. Four other British chambers of commerce are spread across mainland China, as well as entities in Hong Kong and in Taiwan. Each chamber operates independently but cooperates on a number of issues. Members consist of British businesses and organizations of various sizes in China as well as enterprises representing businesses or organizations in China with significant U.K.-related business interests.

Like other national chambers in China (such as the French and German chambers), the BCCC provides updates and information to people involved with industry, the economy, and politics in China. The BCCC sponsors lectures, forums, and other events with politicians from the U.K. and Chinese governments, as well as with economists, consultants, and other specialists. Forums allow BCCC members to give and receive information either relating to a specific industry such as financial services or relating to issues such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) or human resources. The BCCC also helps members recruit employees.

The BCCC maintains a directory of its twenty-five hundred members across the mainland and Hong Kong and a bimonthly magazine, British Business in China, which provides information on the latest trade issues in China and highlights members' commercial successes.

Because the BCCC is based in the capital city of Beijing (the location of the British Embassy), it is able to keep close relationships with government officials from both China and the U.K. Members of the executive committee of the chamber often represent the chamber and various members at media events and discussions with other chambers in Beijing. The BCCC's relationship with the British Embassy in Beijing lets its members have direct contact with U.K. government officials in China to discuss trade issues and policies and to lobby for support. In addition, the views of British businesses are sought from chamber members when the U.K. government discusses issues of national commercial interest with the Chinese government.

The BCCC is funded by membership fees and receives no government funding. Its governance and strategy are the responsibility of the executive committee. All members of the committee occupy full-time posts elsewhere, often as senior leaders at companies such as Standard Chartered Bank, Saatchi & Saatchi, Shell, and Rolls-Royce. The executive committee also includes one representative from each of these U.K.-China commerce bodies: China Britain Business Council, U.K. Trade and Investment, the British Council, and the Confederation of British Industry. The operational running of the
chamber is carried out by the secretariat—full-time employees who deliver services for members.

The British Chamber of Commerce in China has an annual growth rate of 8–9 percent, continually attracting British organizations and introducing new services. Key persons involved with the chamber in Beijing include Henry Wang, general manager and principal service manager, Clean Coal Energy China, Shell; Richard Margolis, regional director, Greater China, Rolls-Royce; Charles Sampson, general manager, Saatchi & Saatchi; Lyn Kok, head of financial institutions in China, Standard Chartered Bank; Ian McKendrick, managing director of the British Chamber of Commerce in China; and Michael Fosh, chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in China and chief representative of Herbert Smith.

The Editors

Further Reading
Thousands of one-of-a-kind ritual bronzes have been excavated in China, all artifacts of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). The sophisticated construction and often stylized designs indicate that the Shang used an advanced technology to create some of the greatest treasures of the Bronze Age in China.

The alloy of copper (usually around 80 to 85 percent), tin, and lead produces a tough and durable metal—bronze—that the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) used to develop a unique culture during Bronze Age China. Instead of making only utilitarian items from bronze, the Shang chose to cast ritual vessels as offerings to their gods and ancestors. The largest number of bronzes has been excavated at the Shang dynasty’s last royal center, Anyang, “the Yin Ruin,” in Henan Province. Many other regions within the Shang domain, or under its cultural influences, also produced bronzes with or without regional styles.

The Shang bronzes were piece-mold cast wherein the mold was made of carefully selected clay that was sculpted, incised, and polished to form inner and outer molds. After the melted alloy was poured into the mold and allowed to cool down, the molds were removed to reveal the newly designed pieces. Because the process of removing the molds destroyed them, each set could be used only once to make a single object, therefore every artifact was individually designed and cast, and no two were identical, even the ones designed as pairs.

Some of the bronzes were cast with inscriptions of their owners or symbols of a family or tribe. Often particular patterns were cast on certain parts of the vessels. The double-eyed image, which was called a mask or taotie, was commonly used; other motifs consisted of mythical animals (such as dragons and imaginary birds) and real animals including elephants, tigers, bison, cattle, fish, snakes, and owls. Geometrical patterns were also common. The combination and location of these motifs and designs suggest some cultural significance, since their patterns were used for hundreds and thousands of years; if they were not related to beliefs or customs of the Shang, the designs might have changed through the years. But their meaning is still a mystery.

Typology and Ritual Functions

Most bronzes have been excavated from large tombs of royalty and the elite; some are from sacrificial pits, and very few are from architectural remains. Museums and private collections have preserved a great number of bronzes, although many of the bronzes were originally taken from excavation sites by looters.

The earliest ritual bronze discovered so far was a type of vessel called a jue, which was used for holding liquor and might have also worked as a cup; it was excavated in 1959 from the Erlitou site in Henan Province, which was the center of the late Xia (2100–1766 BCE) and early Shang dynasties. This vessel shows a sophisticated casting technique and is elegant in design, indicating that it was not from the early stages of bronze casting.
the beginnings of China’s Bronze Age therefore depends on finding older artifacts in future excavations.

The ritual bronzes can be catalogued according to their functions: containers for cooking food, for eating, and for holding liquor and water; weapons and tools, musical instruments, and other uses. Some pieces were used as sets and in various combinations for different occasions.

There are about thirty types of ritual bronze vessels for food and drink, and many thousands of examples have been excavated. The most important vessel is a ding—both round ding and fangding (square vessels) with three or four legs have been unearthed. Fire could be lit underneath the vessels for cooking. The remains of a whole cow were found in a large-sized ding, yet the small ones functioned as bowls. Only the highly ranked elite could use ding.

Large-sized weapons have been found in the tombs of kings, queens, and military leaders. Most bronze weapons were ritual objects that were never used but only symbolized the power and position of their owners. Sets of bells and drums have been excavated as well, indicating that music was important in ritual practice.

Anyang and Regional Cultures

In the central plains—the center of the Shang culture—a clearly advancing chronology of development in techniques, styles, types, and numbers is evident from bronzes excavated at the sites of Erlitou, Erligang, and Anyang. In Anyang, the most important and the largest site of the Shang dynasty, scholars have established four periods of bronzes, along with pottery and oracle bone inscriptions. A revolution in casting technique occurred during the
thirteenth and twelfth centuries BCE: A rich style of three layers of high and low reliefs was invented. Many bronzes from this time and place were fully covered with designs. In 1976 the tomb of one of King Wuding’s consorts, Lady Hao (often referred to as General Hao, since apparently she led several battles), was excavated to much excitement: It had never been looted in antiquity and contained approximately 900 ritual bronzes with nine kinds of inscriptions. Some types of artifacts were seen for the first time during the excavation. Daggers and axes found in her tomb indicate her high position in the Shang army.

Locally made bronze vessels display significant regional character. In Xingan Dayangzhou in Jiangxi Province, ritual pits with a large number of bronzes were found. These bronzes show a clear similarity to the Shang bronzes, yet they are different in proportion, motif combination, and casting techniques.

In the southwest, at Sanxingdui in Sichuan Province, more ritual pits and altars were excavated, and large-sized bronze human figurines and human masks were found. Elongated bronze vessels that are unique to this area were unearthed also. In the northwest, small groups lived in the mountains of Shanxi, and their bronzes exhibited a strong local character also; yet the bronzes found in the far northeast regions of today’s Liaoning Province show no local distinction but are similar to what was found in Anyang. The bronzes prove that the Shang culture spread throughout China, and that the Shang had lived together with many other peoples who also made bronze ritual artifacts but retained their unique lifestyles. The ritual bronzes are the highest achievement of the Shang dynasty and exhibit the beliefs and social systems of the Shang as well as their private lives.

WANG Ying

Further Reading


Through research funding, print and online publications, and expert testimony to commissions, among other activities, the Brookings Institution’s China initiative—the John L. Thornton China Center—provides analysis, facilitates dialog, and gives recommendations on issues of Chinese domestic development and implications of China’s policies for the global economy and security.

The Brookings Institution, headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a nonprofit public policy organization that conducts research and analysis on topics of global concern. The John L. Thornton China Center assesses issues in the general areas of Chinese domestic challenges, economics and trade, energy, and foreign policy. The Center opened offices in Washington, D.C., in 2006 and created the Brookings-Tsinghua Center on the campus of Tsinghua University in Beijing in 2007.

One Brookings Institution report concerning Chinese domestic challenges addresses a proposal for land reform. Cheng Li, senior fellow at the China Center, published an analysis of this proposal that focuses on China’s ability to deal with the socioeconomic consequences of incentives for land transfer and for rural laborers to move to urban areas. Another example in this context is a 2008 panel discussion of religion in China, moderated by the China Center and attended by representatives of Chinese Buddhist, Catholic, Muslim, Protest, and Daoist communities. In the area of economics and trade, a commentary on Chinese imports by Jeffrey Bader of the China Center focused on reasons for product safety issues, including fragmentation of the manufacturing sector in China. Testimony from China Center fellow Erica Downs to the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission discussed China’s new National Energy Administration and its potential for governing the energy sector, along with an analysis of implications of how China’s efforts to secure energy abroad might affect the United States. Analyses of China’s foreign policies consider not only United States–China relations but also China’s relations with its neighbors. For example, a report by fellows of the Brookings Institution discusses potential impacts of changes in recruitment, training, and education of the Chinese military.

The Brookings Institution’s China Center is named for its benefactor. John L. Thornton, who retired in 2003 from the presidency of the Goldman Sachs Group, is chairman of the board of trustees of Brookings and is professor and director of the global leadership program at Beijing’s Tsinghua University. The first director of the China Center was Jeffrey Bader, whose government career included positions in the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Trade Representatives Office. Bader, who served as National Security Council director for Asian affairs in the Clinton administration, accepted the same position in the Obama administration in 2009.
Further Reading


A long march starts from the very first step.

千里之行，始于足下

Qiān lǐ zhī xíng, shǐ yú zú xià
Buddhism was introduced to China from India during the first century CE. Since then the religion has been gradually adapted to Chinese culture and society. The long process of cultural interaction and assimilation also has resulted in distinctively Chinese Buddhist schools. Today, especially in Taiwan, Buddhism continues to play a significant role in people’s spiritual and religious lives.

Buddhism in China underwent a long process of sinicization during which the imported Indian religion was adapted to the indigenous cultural milieu and became an integral part of Chinese life. In the process Buddhism gained patronage from the ruling elite and support from the common people. It also contributed significantly to Chinese culture and thought. At the same time Buddhism was profoundly transformed by Chinese culture, as can be seen in the development of the distinctively Chinese Buddhist schools and the subordination of the Buddhist sangha (monastic community) to state control and regulation. Buddhism in China, in short, represents one of the most fascinating cases of acculturation in world history.

Arrival

Buddhism arrived in China during the first century CE during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). The Silk Roads between China and central Asia were an important route for transmitting the religion. Dunhuang, the frontier town on Han China’s northwestern border, became a great Buddhist center; many Buddhist scriptures, sculptures, and wall paintings from that period are preserved. Buddhism also reached central China via Nepal and Tibet, southwest China via Burma (Myanmar), and south China by sea from India.

At the time of Buddhism’s arrival China had already developed a highly advanced culture with sophisticated religious traditions and philosophical systems. Its two main indigenous religious traditions were Confucianism, the teaching of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE), and Daoism, the teachings of the legendary Yellow Emperor (mid-third millennium BCE) and the Chinese philosopher Laozi (sixth century BCE).

The Han imperial state sponsored Confucianism, which emphasized family values, social responsibility, and the virtues of filial piety and loyalty. Buddhism, with its emphasis on monasticism, celibacy, and withdrawal from society, ran counter to Confucian ethics and therefore met resistance among the Confucian ruling elite, who saw it as subversive to the Han imperial order.

Daoism, on the other hand, although not yet a formal religion, was popular among the Chinese people because of its ideals of longevity and immortality. To help practitioners to maintain health, achieve a long life, and even become immortals, Daoism further developed many meditative techniques and respiratory exercises. It was through its alliance with Daoism that Buddhism was able to take root in China. Indeed, many of the Buddhist texts that were translated during this early stage were on the
subjects of meditation, and most of those people who helped the foreign monks translate Buddhist scriptures were Daoist practitioners.

One significant device used for translating the Buddhist scriptures from Pali and Sanskrit was called geyi (matching the meaning)—that is, rendering Buddhist teachings by borrowing the indigenous Chinese, mostly Daoist, concepts and vocabulary. For example, dao (way) was used to translate the word dharma (divine law), shouyi (guarding the One) for Buddhist meditation, and wuwei (nonaction) for nirvana (the final beatitude that transcends suffering and is sought through the extinction of desire and consciousness). Another result of the Buddhist-Daoist alliance was the theory of huahu (converting the barbarians). Accordingly, Laozi, after leaving the Western Gate on the Chinese boarder, went to India,
where he converted the barbarians and became the Buddha. Because the Buddha was but an incarnation of Laozi, it was acceptable for the Chinese to worship the Buddha and practice Buddhism.

Some Chinese converts wrote treatises to explain Buddhist teachings in a more accessible way and, on the other hand, to defend against Confucian accusations of Buddhism’s foreign origin and monastic lifestyle. The Mouzi lihuo lun (Master Mou on Disputing the Doubts [about Buddhism]), dated around the second century, is a good example of the Chinese Buddhist apologetic writings during this early stage.

**Expansion**

Buddhism offered people solace during the period of disunity that followed the fall of the Han empire. In the north the non-Chinese rulers were impressed by Buddhist culture and gave Buddhism their full support. In the south members of the elite found consolation in Buddhist religious messages, and many of the elite became interested in Buddhist metaphysics. The “Learning of Mystics” (xuanxue) emerged during this period as a result of the mixture of philosophical Daoism and the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. Important Mahayana scriptures such as the Vimalakirti Sutra (Scripture of the Layman Vimalakirti), the Prajna Sutras (Scriptures of the Perfection of Wisdom), and the Saddharmapundarika Sutra (Lotus Sutra), were translated and widely circulated among Chinese intellectuals. Kumarajiva (344–413 CE), a native of Kucha in central Asia, was the most important translator of his day.

Aside from scriptural translation, apocryphal texts (weijing or yijing) were composed in an attempt to increase the acceptance of Buddhism. Indian or central Asian origins were claimed for these apocryphal texts, but in fact they were produced by native Chinese. The Dasheng qixin lun (Treatise on the Awakening of Faith According to the Mahayana), for instance, is a suspected Chinese apocryphal composition of the sixth century; its discussion of mind exerted a great influence on many of the Chinese Buddhist schools, such as Huayan 華嚴 and Chan 禅.

On the popular level the Buddhist theory of karma (the force generated by a person’s actions and held to perpetuate transmigration and to determine the nature of a person’s next existence) and doctrine of impermanence gained acceptance among the common people. Many Chinese men and women joined Buddhist monastic orders, which offered a haven to those who wanted to escape wars, conscription, and corvée (unpaid) labor. By the time China was unified in 589 under the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE), Buddhism had pervaded the realm.

**Maturity**

The period of the Sui and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties is often viewed as the golden age of Chinese Buddhism, characterized by intellectual vitality and creativity. The most famous translator was Xuanzang (d. 664), who made a pilgrimage to India and brought back to China hundreds of Buddhist scriptures. He later founded the Faxiang (Characteristics of the Dharmas or Mind-Only) school, corresponding to Indian Yogacara Buddhism. The esoteric (Tantric) forms of Buddhism were also introduced to China and flourished briefly. However, the most significant development during this period was the

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**An historical block-print image of the Buddha.**
formation of distinctively “sinicized” Buddhist schools: Tiantai, Huayan, Chan, and Pure Land (Jingtu) all emerged with great creativity and prominence.

During this period the state also assumed control over the Buddhist sangha. The government took charge of almost all Buddhist activities; it sponsored translation projects, regulated ordination procedures, and controlled the size of the clergy through clerical examinations. Meanwhile, the monasteries were also deeply involved in local community projects, commercial activities, and charitable programs. The “transformation texts” (bianwen; stories drawn from the Buddhist scriptures) and “transformation illustrations” (bianxiang) discovered in the Dunhuang area are surviving examples of contemporary efforts to reach the Chinese people on a grassroots level.

During the late Tang dynasty, however, the expansion of the Buddhist monasteries, the growth of the clerical population, and the increasing accumulation of tax-free temple lands and wealth eventually prompted the court to suppress Buddhism. The Huichang Suppression (842–845 CE), which occurred during the reign of Emperor Wu-zong (reigned 841–846), brought empire-wide destruction of temples and shrines, confiscation of temple lands, and laicization (to put under the direction of or open to the laity) of Buddhist clergy. Although the Huichang Suppression was not the first such incident in Chinese Buddhist history (two earlier incidents occurred in 446 CE and 574–577 CE), it was the most severe, marking a turning point in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Some argue that Chinese Buddhism entered into an age of decline at this point, whereas others say that in the following centuries Chinese Buddhism took a new direction to retain its vitality and popularity.

Syncretism

After bringing an end to a century of domination by military warlords, the Song dynasty (960–1279) established a new civil order under a centralized government. The Emperor Taizu (reigned 960–975 CE) issued an imperial decree integrating Buddhism into the state’s civil order, and the first Chinese edition of the Tripitaka (the Buddhist canon) was printed in Sichuan Province from 972 to 983. Four other editions were also published during the Song dynasty.

Although the Song dynasty did not witness the emergence of new Buddhist schools, it was a period marked by doctrinal developments, institutional growth, and a tendency toward syncretism (the combination of different forms of belief or practice). After a period of decline Tiantai was revived through the editing of old texts and the composing of new ones. Tiantai also consolidated its institutional foundation by gaining imperial recognition and local support. Huayan, although it ceased to be an independent school, influenced Tiantai and Chan teachings. Pure Land Buddhism was popular among people of all social classes. Chan developed its unique identity and became the dominant form of institutional Buddhism, enjoying prominence both within clerical circles and among the secular elite.

A strong tendency toward syncretism was evident in Chinese religions from Song times onward. It was reflected in the advocacy of harmony among the various Buddhist schools and also in the promotion of “the Unity of the Three Teachings” (in other words, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism). Tantric Buddhism, the Tibetan form of which flourished under the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912), held little appeal for the Chinese common people in general. Lay Buddhism, a Buddhist movement that became popular in the Song dynasty, rose to prominence under the leadership of the Ming monk Zhuhong (1535–1615) and continued to be active through the end of the nineteenth century.

Buddhist Schools

Huayan, Tiantai, Pure Land, and Chan were the most significant Buddhist schools in China. Whereas both Chan and Pure Land focused on practice, Huayan and Tiantai were doctrinal schools. Both Tiantai and Huayan built their theories of universal salvation on the doctrine of tathagatagarbha (Chinese: rulai zang, “embryo of the Tathagata [Buddha]”), or the doctrine of the Buddha-nature. The Tiantai school was named after Mount Tiantai in Zhejiang, southeast China, where its founder, Zhiyi (or Zhikai, 538–597 CE), resided. The basic text of the Tiantai school was the Lotus Sutra. Zhiyi’s most significant contribution to Chinese Buddhism was his theory of “doctrinal classification” (panjiao). He divided
the Buddha’s divergent and often contradictory teachings into chronological periods based on the Buddha’s life in an attempt to integrate them into a complex and coherent scheme. In this way Zhiyi established an eclectic school that recognized all forms of Buddhist teachings and ranked them in a hierarchical order.

Tiantai emphasizes mutual identification between all things and the absolute on the basis of the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness. The whole universe is present in a grain of sand or a drop of dew, and the wisdom of the Buddha is present in every individual’s mind.

The Huayan (garland) school was named after its scripture, the *Avatamsaka Sutra* (Chinese: *Huayan jing*). Like Tiantai, Huayan was a purely Chinese product, with no Indian counterpart. Huayan’s third patriarch, Fazang (643–712 CE), and fifth patriarch, Zongmi (780–841 CE), were the most significant masters. Fazang, who was often considered to be the real founder of the Huayan school, systematized Huayan teachings into a well-coordinated system. Zongmi synthesized Chan and Huayan teachings, and his theory of sudden enlightenment versus gradual enlightenment had significant impact on the development of Chan.

Like Tiantai, Huayan is concerned with the relationship between absolute reality and things in the phenomenal world. The entire universe is seen as a single nexus of conditions in which everything simultaneously depends on and is depended on by everything else.

Chan, the school of meditation, claims that its teaching was a silent, mind-to-mind transmission directly from the Buddha. The transmission eventually came down to Bodhidharma, who allegedly traveled from India to China around 520 CE and founded the Chan school. Chan emphasizes self-enlightenment, that is, realizing one’s inherent Buddha-nature by sitting in meditation and by practicing *gong’an* (public case). The
Linji school, well known for advocating *gong’an* meditation, and the Caodong school, well known for teaching “silent-illumination Chan” (*mozhao chan*), were the two most prominent Chan sects.

Pure Land Buddhism, on the other hand, teaches that faith in Amitâbha Buddha can lead one to be reborn in his happy land after this life and finally enter nirvana. Mindfully reciting Amitâbha’s name (the ritual is known as *nianfo* in Chinese) has been the most popular practice among the Pure Land devotees.

**Chinese Culture**

Buddhism introduced many terms to the Chinese vocabulary and led the Chinese to invent devices of phonological and grammatical analysis to deal with foreign languages. Buddhism as an organized system of religion stimulated the organization of religious Daoism into an institutional entity with its own canons, doctrinal system, and priesthood. In addition, Buddhism exerted a great influence on neo-Confucian theories of lineage transmission, mind cultivation and concentration, and attainment of sagehood, the ideal goal for neo-Confucians through spiritual cultivation and moral perfection. The Buddhist concept of karma and retribution became a dominant theme in Chinese vernacular literature, and images of Buddhist deities and figures such as the bodhisattva (deity) Avalokitesvara (Guanyin) and arhats (*lohan*, Buddhists who have reached the stage of enlightenment) were common subjects of artistic expression.

Nonetheless, to assume that Buddhism developed in China as an independent entity is to ignore the long, complex process of acculturation between Buddhism and indigenous elements. The feminization of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara and the transformation of Maitreya...
Contemporary China and Taiwan

During the early twentieth century the monk Taixu (1889–1947) led a reform movement to organize the Buddhist clergy, promote social engagement and popular education, and propagate Buddhist studies among intellectuals. Under the leadership of Taixu a number of Buddhist institutes were established in the early 1920s, and the Chinese Buddhist Society was founded in 1929. The movement, however, was hindered by the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945) and the civil war between the Communists and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) (1946–1949).

After the Communist victory in 1949 Buddhism suffered from official denunciation and periodic suppression. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) Buddhist temples were closed, and monks and nuns were sent to work in fields and factories. After the Cultural Revolution, however, with the aid of government grants, Buddhist monasteries and nunneries have been restored, and the damaged Buddhist statues, images, and temples are being repaired. The government has also helped organize provincial and regional Buddhist associations. The Chinese Buddhist Association in Beijing, which was founded in 1953, has now resumed its national leadership. It sponsors the publication of Buddhist journals, establishes training centers for monks and nuns, and promotes Buddhist studies. The association is eager to extend its network to an international level, and it sends delegates to Buddhist conferences in south Asian countries, the United States, and Europe.

Whereas Buddhism suffered a serious blow under the Communists, it flourished in Taiwan, where the Nationalist government moved after its defeat in 1949. Between 1953 and 1986 the official representative of Buddhism was the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), led by a group of mainland Chinese monks who fled to Taiwan when Communists began to take over China. The association was authorized by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, and in turn it served the party’s interests. With the end of martial law in 1987, the BAROC lost its monopoly within Buddhist circles. Meanwhile, the government has increasingly granted autonomy to civic organizations, and, as a result, many Buddhist communities and organizations have risen to prominence. Most importantly, women play a significant part in all kinds of Buddhist activities. The lineage of bhiksunis (fully ordained nuns) in Taiwan has become the main source of legitimacy for Buddhist women who aspire to receive full ordination.

The two most prominent Buddhist organizations in Taiwan are the Ciji (Compassion Relief Foundation), founded in 1966 by the nun Zhengyan (b. 1937), and the Foguangshan (Mountain of Buddha’s Light) Monastic Order, founded in 1967 by the monk Xingyun (b. 1927). Ciji is the largest civic organization in Taiwan, currently claiming more than 5 million members worldwide. It has its own hospitals, medical school and university, journal, research center, and satellite television channel. Zhengyan started Ciji with one single goal: “To help the poor and educate the rich (jipin jiaofu).” By mobilizing lay volunteers, Ciji raises relief funds and enacts welfare reform. Recently the foundation has expanded its charitable work into the fields of bone marrow donation and environmental protection.

The Foguangshan Monastic Order likewise offers social services in addition to preaching the Buddhist teachings. It has a worldwide network of diversified operations, including temples, foundations, publications, libraries, charity services, and a satellite television channel. Xingyun particularly promotes the notion of “Humanistic Buddhism” or “Buddhism in the Human Domain” (renjian fojiao). The core ideal of Humanistic Buddhism is that salvation is achieved not in the other world but rather in the here and now and that all Buddhists should strive to build a Pure Land on Earth.

Both Ciji under the nun Zhengyan and Foguangshan under the monk Xingyun have demonstrated the capacity to adapt to a new age. Both are able to respond to the new political and economic situations in Taiwan, adopt modern technology to spread Buddhism, and modify old Buddhist teachings to meet the new religious needs of people. Under the influence of Zhengyan, Xingyun, and other Buddhist leaders, Buddhism in Taiwan has moved to a new stage of social engagement.

Ding-hwa HSIEH
Further Reading


Although its emphasis on seated meditation is rooted in Indian Buddhism, Chan Buddhism is a genuinely Chinese product. The goal of Chan practice is to attain a sudden awakening of one’s inherent Buddha-nature. Chan texts are well known for their iconoclastic, non-conceptual style, characterized by a unique form of intuitive, spontaneous “encounter dialogues” between Chan Buddhists.

Chan is a Mahayana Buddhist school that developed in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and flourished in the Song dynasty (960–1279). It emerged as a reaction against the intellectual tendency to conceptualize Buddhism. The word chan is from an abbreviation of channa, which is in turn a Chinese transliteration of the Sanskrit word dhyâna, meaning “meditation.” Aside from the Indian Buddhist emphasis on meditation, Chan also appropriates indigenous Daoist concepts such as naturalism, nondualism, and nonaction (wuwei).

History
Chan traces itself back to the historical Buddha (c. 566–486 BCE). According to the classical accounts of Chan lineage, during one of his sermons Śâkyamuni (the historical Buddha) made a wordless mind-to-mind transmission (ixin chuanxin) to his disciple Mahákâśyapa by saying nothing, but simply holding up a flower. The line of transmission was carried on through twenty-seven Indian patriarchs and eventually to Bodhidharma, who allegedly traveled to China around 520 CE and founded the Chan School. It is said that Bodhidharma meditated by facing the wall for nine years and that even his legs became withered.

Bodhidharma is acknowledged as the first patriarch of Chinese Chan Buddhism. From him the patriarchal lineage was transmitted to Huike (c. 485–574 CE), Sen-gzan (d. 606 CE), Daoxin (580–651 CE), and Hungren (601–674 CE). (These are not family names but “dharma names,” Buddhist names given to monks and nuns.) After Hungren the Chan lineage was split into two branches: the Northern School led by Shenxiu (605–706 CE), who is said to have taught gradual enlightenment (jianwu), and the Southern School led by Huineng (638–713 CE), who taught sudden enlightenment (dunwu). Shenxiu’s school eventually declined while the Southern School continued to grow. Huineng was later recognized as the legitimate sixth patriarch. His autobiography, sermons, and verbal exchanges with his disciples were included in the Platform Sûtra of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu Tanjing), dated around 780.

From Huineng the Chan lineage was expanded into the Five Houses and Seven Sects (wujia qizong). Among them the Linji School founded by Linji Yixuan (d. 866 CE) and the Caodong School by Caoshan Benji (840–901 CE) and Donshan Liangjia (807–869 CE) gained prominence in the Song dynasty. Both Linji and Caodong were introduced to Japan and Korea around the twelfth century and have continued to flourish there.
Doctrine and Practice

As a school of Mahayana Buddhism, Chan’s rationale for universal salvation is based on the doctrine of Tathāgata-garbha (rulai zang), embryo of the Buddha “Thus-come.” According to this doctrine, Buddha-nature as the absolute reality is the basis for human perfectibility. Every person is endowed with a Buddha-mind and can achieve enlightenment here and now. Enlightenment, as Chan claims, is to realize one’s innate Buddha-nature with sufficient faith.

The vision of Chan as a mind-to-mind transmission of the Buddha’s teaching is summarized in the following four-part slogan:

A special transmission outside the scriptural teachings (jiaowai biechuan);
Not setting up the written words (buli wenzi);
Directly pointing to the human mind (zhizhi renxin);
Seeing one’s self-nature and achieving Buddhahood (jianxing chengfo).

Although individual phrases appeared already in the Tang period, this conception of Chan’s self-identity did not emerge as a set formula until the early twelfth century and was attributed retrospectively to Bodhidharma.

The most common Chan practice is “sitting in meditation” (zuochan). In addition, Chan adopts the gong’an as an object of mental absorption. Gong’an, in origin a secular term for “public or legal case,” is a brief record that contains the unique form of intuitive, spontaneous “encounter dialogues” (jiyuan wenda) between Chan Buddhists. Mazu Daoyi (709–788 CE), for example, is well known in Chan history for his use of shouting, beating, and paradoxical statements to lead his students toward the experience of sudden enlightenment.

Under the Linji master Yuanwu Keqin (1063–1135) and his disciple Dahui Zonggao (1089–1163), Chan gong’an was no longer a literary piece intended for reading but rather an object used for meditation. Dahui, in particular, played a significant role in systematizing Chan gong’an meditation into the so-called kanhua Chan (Chan of investigating the [critical] phrase). The gong’an that Dahui often taught was the one attributed to Zhaozhou Congshen (778–897 CE):

A monk asked Zhaozhou: “Does a dog have Buddha-nature or not?”
The master said: “No (wu)!"

“No” is the huatou, “head of speech,” of this entire exchange. Dahui instructed students to simply meditate huatou and emphasized the peculiar role of doubt (yi) in kanhua Chan. He thus claimed, “A great doubt will definitely be followed by a great awakening.”

The Linji School was famous for its advocacy of gong’an meditation, while the Caodong School emphasized sitting in meditation, known as “Silent-illumination Chan” (mozhao chan). In practice, however, Chan masters would usually adopt both forms of meditation in teaching students in the monasteries.

Chan Buddhist Literature

A great number of Chan texts were written and compiled during the Song dynasty. The main characteristic of Chan literature is the unique form of “encounter dialogues.” There are altogether three distinctive Chan genres: (1) the “discourse records” (yulu) that focus on the words and deeds of a single Chan master; (2) the “lamp histories” (denglu) that chronologically list the biographical accounts of a series of Chan masters in various lineages of transmission; and (3) the gong’an anthologies, among which the Record of the Blue Cliff (Biyen lu) by Yuanwu Keqin and the Gateless Gate (Wumen guan) by Wumen Huikai (1183–1260) are perhaps the most well-known works.

Chan and Chinese Literati Culture

Chan Buddhism had a close connection with Chinese literati culture. The sudden/gradual polarity that characterized the development of Chan became a dominant theme in Chinese poetic criticism, painting theories, and intellectual discourse. Literary critics and poets frequently discussed poetry in terms of Chan’s notion of the relationship between practice and enlightenment. Theorists of painting liked to analyze artistic expression...
by analogy to the Northern and Southern schools. The Chan concept of lineage transmission was influential in Song neo-Confucians’ formation of the “Orthodox Succession of the Dao” (daotong), and the Chan doctrine of Buddha-nature also played a crucial role in the neo-Confucian advocacy of “Learning of the Mind” (xinxue).

**Chan Today**

In modern China notable monks such as Taixu (1890–1947) and Yinshun (1906–2005) studied Chan. Xuyun (1840–1959) was a renowned Linji master, and Shengyan (b. 1930) received the dharma (basic principles of cosmic or individual existence) transmission in both the Linji and Caodong lineages. Chan meditation is a common practice among Chinese Buddhists today. Since the 1960s Chan has also attracted a large number of people in the West. Known commonly in the West as “zen” for its Japanese pronunciation, Chan becomes a fashion of spiritual pursuit and a source of inspiration for artistic expression.

*Ding-hwa HSIEH*

**Further Reading**


Buddhism, Four Sacred Sites of

The four sacred sites of Buddhism in China are Wutai Shan, Emei Shan, Jiuhua Shan, and Putuoshan, mountain homes of Buddhist enlightened ones. Although the religious complexes at these sites are smaller than those existing at the height of Buddhism’s existence in China, the “holy mountains” remain attractions for their religious context and artifacts and for their natural beauty.

The “four most famous Buddhist mountains” (sida Fojiao mingshan) were traditionally considered as bodhimanda (mountain residences) of bodhisattvas (pusa in Chinese), spiritual beings who, according to Buddhist scriptures, assist all sentient beings in transcending suffering. The Chinese tradition of “paying respect to a holy mountain” through pilgrimage (chaobai sheng shan) predates the arrival of Buddhism in China. This pilgrim tradition was mentioned in the Shujing (fifth century BCE compilation of documents relating to ancient Chinese history), and it was probably related to the ancient cosmology according to which mountains provided access to the heaven, served as pillars for the sky, or constituted abodes where Daoist sages, shamans, and immortals lived. Buddhist monks hoped to visit the four mountains; there was a widespread belief among them that the bodhisattva of each mountain would take the form of an individual and show itself to pilgrims, sometimes in the form of another monk, sometimes as a beggar. Pilgrims traveled long journeys, from their points of departure to one of the mountains, by making a prostration—touching the ground with the head every three steps. It was customary for pilgrims to visit in this way all the temples and shrines in the mountains. Lay Buddhists visited these mountains in great numbers to make vows (huanyuan) or to perform penance. Many nonbelievers also traveled to the sacred sites to accomplish a feat from which they could derive prestige. The pilgrimages were often in groups because the journey to the nearest cities to the sites was sometimes long and dangerous.

Wutai Shan: Five Terraces Mountain

Wutai Shan, or the “five terraces mountain,” in Shanxi Province, is the bodhimanda for Wenshu Pusa (the bodhisattva of Wisdom; in Sanskrit, Manjusri, “Gentle Glory”). It is often referred to as the “first of the four sacred Buddhist mountains” because it was the first to be identified as sacred. Temples were built during the rule of Emperor Ming Di (reigned 58–75 CE), and by the time of the Qi dynasty (550–577 CE) up to two hundred existed, but most were destroyed later. Today over fifty-eight temples remain, including the oldest wooden structures of China, the Nanchan Monastery and the East Hall of Foguang Monastery, built in 782 and 857, respectively.

Because it has long been difficult to access, Wutai Shan was spared much of the destruction of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Currently, better roads have facilitated access to the site, and it has become a major
tourist destination. Tradition claims that Wenshu can offer pilgrims extraordinary visionary experiences, and the site is also considered a location of importance for Daoists. The Chinese government hopes that Wutai Shan will be added to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) list of World Heritage Sites. Yedou Shan, the highest of the five peaks, has an elevation of 3,061 meters.

Emei Shan: Towering Eyebrow Mountain

Emei Shan, or the “towering eyebrow mountain,” in Sichuan Province, is the bodhimanda for Puxan Pusa (the bodhisattva of Benevolent Action; in Sanskrit, Samantabhadra, the “Universal Worthy”). Many consider Sichuan to be the first location in China where Buddhism was practiced, and claim that it is in this area that the first Buddhist temple was built in the first century CE. By the fourteenth century, the site had over one hundred temples, monasteries, and other buildings. Seventy of these remain today, but only twenty are active.

Because of the wet climate, the summit is often foggy. Under certain meteorological conditions, refraction of water particles produces rainbow rings that surround one’s shadow over a sea of clouds below the summit. Known as “Buddha’s light,” this phenomenon has inspired devotees to jump off the cliff convinced that this was a sign from heaven calling them, which prompted the authorities to set up barriers to prevent suicides. Emei Shan’s scenic area, which includes the carved stone Buddha of Leshan,
was made a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996. At 71 meters high, the sitting Buddha statue is the tallest of its kind in the world, and with an elevation of 3,096 meters, Emei Shan is the highest of the four sacred mountains.

**Jiuhua Shan: Nine Glorious Mountains**

Jiuhua Shan, or the “nine glorious mountains,” in Anhui Province, is the bodhimanda for Dizang Pusa (the bodhisattva of Salvation; in Sanskrit, Ksitigarbha, the “Earth Treasury”). This bodhisattva, who has vowed to delay the attainment of Buddhahood until all beings are freed from hell, is much revered in East Asia.

In 719 CE, a wandering Korean Buddhist, Kim Xiao Kak, came to his journey’s end and founded a temple dedicated to Dizang Pusa. After Kim’s death, the site’s eminence rose. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), there were about 150 temples and thousands of monks in residence. By the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), there were as many as 360 temples and between four thousand and five thousand monks and nuns. But as a consequence of the destruction caused by political and social upheavals from 1851 until 1976, the site now counts only seventy temples and monasteries.

The tradition claims that the area received its name after the poet Li Bai wrote that its nine mountains were holding heaven. The area is difficult to access, but this relative isolation makes it more peaceful than the other great tourist site in Anhui Province, Huangshan (Yellow Mountain). The highest of the peaks in the area is 1,342 meters high.

**Putuoshan: Mountain of the “One who Perceives Sounds”**

Putuoshan, on the island of Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province, derives its name from Potalaka, the bodhimanda of Guan Yin (the “One who Perceives Sounds”) Pusa, the Chinese version of the bodhisattva of Compassion (in Sanskrit, Avalokitesvara, the “Lord who looks down”). A feminine figure, Guan Yin is a revered bodhisattva throughout East Asia.

Putuoshan became a site for Buddhist pilgrims slightly later than the other mountains. In 916, the island became the primary shrine to Guan Yin, and during its heyday, it counted over eighty temples and nunneries, as well as over 120 shelters that could house over four thousand monks and nuns. Today, there are five hundred resident monks on the island. This is noteworthy in the history of contemporary Buddhism because it was chosen as a retreat by the famous reformist monk Taixu.

Much closer to the wealthy and densely populated parts of China, Zhoushan is easy to access, and therefore it is a popular tourist destination. Foding Shan, the highest peak on the island, rises 297 meters.

The four sacred mountains of Buddhism, each dedicated to a different Buddhist holy being, remain pilgrimage and tourist destinations today.

**Further Reading**


Buddhism, introduced from India, became widely accepted in China in the third century CE but suffered from persecution over the years for various reasons: rejection of Buddhism as a foreign or idolatrous religion, feelings of antireligion in general, or by the desire to redistribute the wealth and land owned by Buddhist temples.

Although Buddhism did not come to China through violent military conquest, its introduction was not easy, and it took centuries before Buddhism was widely accepted. The religion was widely embraced only after the fall of the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 CE), and was adopted by the rulers of smaller kingdoms. This embrace, however, was not universal, and the religion suffered from persecution. Chinese sources mention the “three disasters of Wu,” from the names of the emperors under whom bans against Buddhism were enforced. Persecutions have also occurred in the late dynastic era, during the Republican period, and in the People’s Republic of China.

### The First Disaster of Wu

The first disaster occurred in 446 CE, when northern China was under the control of the Toba (or Xianbei) people, during the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534 CE). The Emperor Taiwu (reigned 423–452 CE) prohibited Buddhism, following the urging of his Prime Minister Cui Hao. Cui, who wanted to establish an ideal Confucian state in North China, considered Buddhism to be a foreign religion that had to be eliminated in order to sinicize the Toba people. Decrees designed to weaken the monastic organization were issued beginning in 438 CE; in 444 CE, one decree proclaimed that the penalty for privately supporting monks was death. In 446 CE, believing monks were helping his enemies and finding weapons in temples, Taiwu prohibited the religion throughout the empire. He ordered the slaughter of monks, the destruction of temples, and the burning of sutras (classic Buddhist religious texts). This ban, however, did not affect Buddhists in southern China, ruled by the Liu Song (420–479 CE). The ban in North China was short-lived. The crown prince Huang, himself a devout Buddhist, helped monks to escape or hide, and the ban was formally ended in 452 CE, after Taiwu was assassinated and his grandson Wencheng (reigned 452–465 CE) acceded to the throne.

### The Second Disaster of Wu

The second disaster occurred during a period when China was still divided, this time between the two short-lived dynasties of the North and South Dynasties period, Northern Zhou (557–581 CE) and the Chen (557–589 CE) to the south. This second wave of persecutions was carried out by the Zhou Emperor Wu (reigned 560–578 CE) in 574. The Zhou ruling house was not of Chinese origin, and the Emperor sought to demonstrate that he was Chinese
in his thinking and action. He was initially reluctant to voice his displeasure over Buddhism because of its influence over many of his subjects. He was encouraged to denounce the religion, however, by a memorial written to him in 567 CE by Wei Yuansong. Wei argued that the religion was wasteful and that it impoverished the country, but that because its main virtue was its teaching of compassion, it should be managed by the state, and the clergy returned to lay life. The Emperor Wu was infuriated by protests from the monks in 574 CE and decreed the suppression of the religion. After his conquest of the Northern Qi in 577 CE, Wu issued another decree extending the proscription over the rest of North China. This persecution, however, was also short-lived and limited in its effects: it stopped after the Emperor Wu’s death in 578 CE. In 581 CE, the Northern Zhou were superseded by the Sui, who proclaimed Buddhism as state religion.

Under the Sui (581–618 CE) and the Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties, Buddhism experienced great prosperity and influence. The memorial of Fu Yi against Buddhism, written in 621 CE, was one of the most important documents written against the religion, but it is a testimony to the status Buddhism enjoyed that for more two centuries no persecution affected the religion. In fact, Buddhism benefited from state patronage under the first decades of the Tang dynasty, most remarkably under the Empress Wu Zetian (reigned 690–705 CE). The state patronage of Buddhism under the Empress, however, represented a turning point. After her rule, Emperor Xuanzong (reigned 712–756 CE) adopted a series of measures to regulate Buddhism, and put the religion on an equal footing with Daoism. The large amount of Buddhist land exempt from taxation and the vast wealth in temples that was unavailable to the state continued to stir objections from Confucian and Daoist men of letters.

**The Third Disaster of Wu**

The factional strife within the court contributed to the third disaster of Wu. The emperor and scholar-bureaucrats opposed the privileges of the Buddhist religion and the eunuchs approved it; ideological conflicts occurred between Daoism, which was portrayed as a genuine Chinese religion, and Buddhism, which was criticized as foreign; and finally, a great loss of revenue to the state was caused by the exemption granted to temples. This unfolded from 842 to 845 CE, when Tang Emperor Wuzong ordered that Buddhist temples, shrines, and statues be destroyed and that their landed properties be confiscated, forcing the secularization of the clergy. Like the previous two persecutions, it started out as a violent and sudden attack, but it was quickly terminated, this time with the death of Wuzong. This last suppression of Buddhism was much larger in its scope than the two previous ones: it unfolded throughout the empire, and its consequences for the religion were long lasting. Buddhism never recovered fully from this persecution. This last wave of persecution also differed from the previous two persecutions and from the anti-Christian persecutions in ancient Rome and the
persecution of Buddhism, which 235

religious wars that would divide Europe seven centuries later: Buddhists were not killed because of their beliefs, and monks were simply returned to lay life.

**Persecution in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries**

Arguably, three other waves of persecution could be added to this list. The first one, under the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), resulted from the Taiping uprising of 1851–1864. This persecution against Buddhism was not caused by the government, the weak Emperor Xianfeng (reigned 1851–1861), or his successor Tongzhi (reigned 1862–1874), who was a child when he succeeded to the throne. The Taiping Rebellion, motivated by a utopian ideal of land distribution and a messianic belief that borrowed loosely from Christianity, sought to destroy Buddhist and Daoist temples, which were viewed as symbols of idolatry. The leader of the Taiping, Hong Xiuquan, believed he was the younger brother of Jesus and resolved to fight evil in this world to establish a Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping Tianguo). He also believed that the Buddhist and Daoist religions were part of the evil on earth, and many temples were destroyed wherever his troops were in control. Only after the rebellion was quelled by the Qing dynasty could Buddhists rebuild their temples.

The second persecution, under the Republican regime (1912–1949), occurred as part of a short-lived antireligionist movement that sought to convert temples into schools between 1923 and 1927. In this period of great political instability and division, many members of the Nationalist Party’s radical wings who sought to modernize China encouraged the transformation of temples into schools. This time the Buddhist clergy and lay people did react. They mobilized and pressed President Jiang Jieshi to stop the campaign. The generalissimo, who also wanted to limit the influence of the radical elements in the Nationalist Party, put an end to that wave of temple expropriation.

Finally, the third persecution of modern times broke out during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). These persecutions were not limited to Buddhists and were antitraditionalist as well as broadly antireligious. During these ten years of disorder monks and nuns had to return to lay life, and some were forced to participate in public self-criticism sessions. Temple properties were sacked and destroyed by the Red Guard, or closed and converted to other use. For example, the Jing’an temple in Shanghai, which was originally built in 246 CE, became a plastic factory during the Cultural Revolution and was reopened only in 1983.

The Chinese government since the beginning of reform has adopted a very different attitude toward Buddhism. It recognizes its value as part of the national cultural heritage and as a resource to help diplomatic relations with many neighboring Asian countries where Buddhism is an important religion. In recent years, the government has encouraged the restoration of temples, the development of pilgrimages, the development of Buddhist associations engaged in publishing and philanthropic activities, and even the organization of major international symposia on Buddhism. Buddhist associations themselves have been eager to show that they support the government by supporting its campaign against “evil cults,” taking charge of orphanages and schools for disabled children, and organizing relief during national disasters such as the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan. The official statistics remain vague but there is agreement that Buddhism is experiencing a revival of its fortune among ethnic Chinese.

Another development of note is the popularity of Tibetan Buddhism among non-Tibetans. However, the Communist Party remains hostile to the idea that the Dalai Lama represents the religious authority for Tibetan Buddhists, despite the anecdotal evidence that shows this is the wish of a majority of Tibetans.

In sum, although diminished politically and culturally as an institution, Buddhism nevertheless survives in China to this day, albeit as a shadow of its former self.

**Further Reading**


Buddhism, Pure Land

Jingtǔ 淨土

Pure Land Buddhism teaches that faith in the power and grace of Amitabha Buddha, who presides over the western Pure Land, will lead to final salvation. This originally Indian Mahayana form of Buddhism has not only been transformed into a uniquely Chinese Buddhist school but has also become one of the most popular religions in East Asia.

Pure Land Buddhism is based on three principal scriptures written originally in Sanskrit. The Shorter Pure Land Scripture (Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra; Chinese: Amito jing) tells the story of Amitâbha and depicts the wondrous qualities of his paradise. The Longer Pure Land Scripture (Chinese: Wuliangshou jing) is an expansion of the shorter one. Finally, the Scripture of Meditation on the Buddha of Measureless Life (Amitâyurdhyāna-sūtra; Chinese: Guan wuliangshou jing) contains thirteen practices of visualization on Amitâbha and his Pure Land.

The Longer Pure Land Scripture was translated first into Chinese by Samghavarman around 252 CE. However, the Shorter Pure Land Scripture, translated by Kumârajīva (344–413 CE) in 402, gained wide popularity among Pure Land devotees. The Scripture of Meditation on the Buddha of Measureless Life is said to have been introduced to China by Kâlaya'sas around the first half of the fifth century, but many scholars speculate that it is actually an apocryphal text composed in China or central Asia.

Doctrine and Practice

According to the Pure Land teaching, this world is full of suffering and defilements, and people alone can hardly save themselves. Salvation, therefore, is achieved best at another time (in the next rebirth), in another place (the Pure Land), and through another power (that of Amitâbha). One of the theories developing in Pure Land Buddhism, furthermore, is the coming of the “Age of the Final Dharma” (mofa). It is believed that after the age of the “Orthodox Dharma” (zhengfa) and then the age of
the “Semblance of the Dharma” (xiangfa), Buddhism will enter its final stage, during which people are no longer capable of achieving enlightenment, and all the traditional Buddhist practices are impossible to carry through. The only path to nirvana is via rebirth in the Pure Land by having faith in the power and grace of Amitâbha Buddha.

Pure Land scriptures thus contain a variety of practices to help people cultivate their faith in Amitâbha and his Pure Land. In China mindfully reciting Amitâbha’s name, known as nianfo in Chinese, has been the most popular practice; daily repetition of the simple phrase “Homage to Amitâbha Buddha” (Nanwu Amito Fo), often counted with the beads in a rosary, is believed to ensure the devotee’s rebirth in the Pure Land.

Faith in the reward of paradise usually coexists with the fear of punishment in hells. In Pure Land painting and writing the joys and blessings of the Pure Land are often shown in sharp contrast to the horrors and miseries of hells. Fearing to be reborn in hells, people will become even more motivated to do meritorious deeds and cultivate the Pure Land faith.

Devotion to the bodhisattva Avalokite’svara, the chief assistant of Amitâbha, is also popular. Originally an Indian male deity, Avalokite’svara is transformed into a goddess of great mercy and compassion, called “Guanyin” or “Guanshiyin” in Chinese. Belief in her efficacy and miraculous aid in times of need makes Guanyin a widespread religious cult throughout China.

Pure Land Patriarchs and Masters

In China, Pure Land Buddhism never developed into a distinctive, full-fledged sect (zong); its transmission lineage was actually established through the monks of Tiantai, another Chinese Buddhist school, in the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279). Throughout most of Chinese history Pure Land teachings and practices were mingled with or incorporated into other forms of Buddhism.

Nonetheless, many monks were known for their influential roles in popularizing Pure Land devotion. The first Chinese Pure Land center was the White Lotus Society founded by the monk Huiyuan (334–416 CE) on Mount Lu (present-day Jiangxi) in 402 CE. Huiyuan was later regarded as the founder and first patriarch of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism. After Huiyuan, a series of masters contributed further to systematizing the Pure Land doctrine and popularizing the practice.

Tanluan (476–542 CE) began to advocate nianfo among lay people. Daochuo (562–645 CE) wrote the Collection of Essays on [the Land of] Peace and Happiness (Anle ji) to emphasize the point that to be free from suffering and defilement, all one needs to do is have faith in Amitâbha. His disciple Shandao 善導 (613–681 CE) laid out the definite framework for Chinese Pure Land Buddhism. In his influential Commentary on the Scripture of
Meditation on the Buddha of Measureless Life (Guanjing su), moreover, Shandao made a significant shift of emphasis from the practice of visualization on Amitâbha to the devotion through nianfo, insisting that the latter was not only the right practice but also the most efficient one to ensure a rebirth in the Pure Land.

After Shandao the two important Pure Land masters who sought to synthesize Chan (Japanese: zen) and Pure Land were Cimin Huiri (680–748 CE) and his disciple Fazhao (c. 800 CE). In later times continued efforts were made to align the Pure Land nianfo with Chan gong’an meditation. The question “Who is the one reciting Amitâbha’s name?” becomes a gong’an for people to contemplate in their meditation.

Pure Land Buddhism has also enjoyed a wide appeal in Japan. Monk Hônen (1133–1212) founded the Jõdo shû sect, while his disciple Shinran (1173–1262) founded the Jõdo Shinshû sect. Both sects remain active today.

Amitâbha’s western paradise really exists, he encouraged his followers to practice nianfo on a daily basis. His lay disciple Li Bingnan (1890–1986), who moved to Taiwan in 1948 when the Communists began to take over China, continued to promote Pure Land Buddhism. Monk Xingyun (b. 1937), founder of the Fouganshan monastic organization, urges people to make Taiwan a Pure Land in this world. On the whole, Amitâbha worship and the belief in the Pure Land have always been popular among Chinese Buddhists.

Ding-hwa HSIEH

Further Reading


Buddhism, Tibetan
Zàng Chuán Fójiào 藏傳佛教

Tibetan Buddhism is one of most important and rigorous living Buddhist traditions in the world. Its history can be traced back to the seventh century. Tibetan Buddhists have also developed their unique monastic rituals and scholastic tradition.

Although Tibetan Buddhism is known by many unofficial terms in numerous popular books, including Vajrayana (Vehicle of the Diamantine Thunderbolt), Tantrayana (Vehicle of Tantra), and Lamaism (Teaching of Spiritual Master), by consensus it is a Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition that pursues Budhhahood, the highest state of enlightenment. In many other Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions in central China, Korea, and Japan, Tibetan Buddhism is also considered a special branch of Esoteric Buddhism, which is different from the Esoteric Buddhism of other regions, such as Han Esoteric Buddhism in central China and Shingon Buddhism in Japan. It is noteworthy that Esoteric Buddhism is neither the only religious tradition in Tibet nor the exclusive religion among Tibetans. However, in Tibet the esoteric tradition is regarded as the highest form of Buddhism. Before Buddhism was introduced to Tibet in the seventh century, the Tibetans were adherents of the Bon religion. Later Chan Buddhism, Manichaeism, and Nestorianism briefly flourished in Tibet from the eighth to the tenth centuries.

The first important figure in the history of Tibetan Buddhism was the Emperor Srong-btsan Sgam-po (605–650 CE). Tibet first became a unified empire and began to expand under his reign. He began to establish a firm friendship with Tibet’s neighbors, the kingdom of Nepal and the Tang dynasty, by marrying the Nepalese princess Khris b’Tsun and the Chinese princess Wencheng (Tibetan: Mung-chang Kungco), the daughter of the Tang emperor Taizong. The princesses, both Buddhists, brought their religion to Tibet. Thereafter, Srong-btsan Sgam-po initiated the construction of Buddhist temples. Srong-btsan Sgam-po was viewed as the first Dharma-Raja, the righteous ruler who supported and advocated the Buddha’s teaching. Later kings were less interested in advocating Buddhism. However, when Khris-srong Lde-btsan came into power in the eighth century, he invited some influential Indian masters such as Shantarakshita and Padmasambhava to teach in Tibet. With his efforts Buddhism revived and flourished, taking shape as a new tradition during his era. Since the late eighth century the Tibetan ruler has been viewed as the embodiment of the bodhisattva (a being that compassionately refrains from entering nirvana in order to save others and is worshipped as a deity in Mahāyāna Buddhism) Avalokiteshvara, known in Chinese as “Guanyin.”

In the ninth century the Tibetan empire conquered many regions in central Asia and even temporarily blocked the silk trading route that linked central China and central Asia. Tibetan Buddhism was also spread to some oasis towns on the Silk Roads, such as Turfan and Dunhuang. Numerous manuscripts written in Tibetan have been discovered in Dunhuang. Starting in the eleventh century, Tibetan Buddhism gradually spread to the nomadic tribes who ranged through the Mongolian area. Subsequently
Tibetan Buddhism was accepted by the Mongols and Manchurians and even became the state religion of the Chinese Yuan (1279–1368) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. In 1578 an abbot at the Drepung monastery, Sonam Gyatso, received the title of “Dalai Lama,” which later became the official title of the head of the Tibetan Buddhist Church. “Dalai” means “the ocean” in Mongolian, which refers to the Tibetan word “Gyatso.” Lama is from the Sanskrit word “Guru,” the spiritual teacher. Sonam Gyatso was viewed as the third Dalai Lama. The current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), is the fourteenth leader who holds the title of Dalai Lama. The traditional seat for the Dalai Lama is Potala Palace in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. The second-ranking official in the Tibetan Buddhist Church is the Panchen Lama, whose traditional seat is at Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse. The tenth Panchen Lama was Lobsang Trinley Lhündrub Chökyi Gyaltsen (1938–1989), commonly known as Chökyi Gyaltsen. Since the twentieth century Tibetan Buddhism has also spread to other neighboring regions besides Qinghai, Mongolia, and Manchuria, notably Nepal, Bhutan, and western Sichuan and Yunnan provinces in China. After the 1960s, with the exile of the Tibetan government, Tibetan Buddhism also spread to Europe and North America. Nowadays there are numerous Tibetan Buddhist centers in the United States.

**Doctrine and Practice**

The textual foundation for Tibetan Buddhism is the Tibetan Buddhist canon, which is usually divided into two categories: Kanjur and Tanjur. The former includes sections of the Vinaya Perfection of Wisdom sutras (discourses of the Buddha that constitute the basic text of Buddhist scripture), Avatamsaka, Ratnakuta, and other Mahāyāna and Agāma sutras, as well as tantras (later Buddhist scriptures dealing especially with techniques
The latter includes commentaries and treatises. The esoteric tradition of Tibetan Buddhism is a Mahāyāna tradition, mainly based on the Madhyamika theory of the “Middle Way” (dbu-ma). In general it teaches fast and complete enlightenment; yet, certain esoteric aspects make it unique in terms of tantrism, which emphasizes the application of divine power and the guidance of the spiritual gurus. Other important practices include the use of mantra (enlightened sound, powerful syllables), mandala, and sexual rituals involving female participation. In order to pursue Buddhahood, Tibetan Buddhism develops a unique method for a practitioner to control his or her body, speech, and mind as three esoteric elements. This method is designed to help practitioners eliminate negative karma (the force generated by a person’s actions held in Buddhism to perpetuate transmigration and in its ethical consequences to determine the nature of the person’s next existence). It requires its practitioners to develop strong contemplative powers through meditation and visualization. Unlike in other Buddhist misogynic traditions, the female plays an important role as a companion in the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan Buddhism has inherited some aspects of the indigenous Bon religion: For instance, it relies on the supernatural power of shamans. The famous mantra Om mani padme hum is said to be able to invoke powerful blessing.

The term mandala literally means “circle” and refers to a pattern that represents a cosmos or a microcosmos of both mental and spiritual dimensions. The Tibetan mandala usually consists of an inner square and an external circle, often occupied by the divine figures, such as Buddhas and bodhisattvas. It functions as a sacred place where the deities manifest themselves in what is known as the “Buddha field.” In Tibetan Buddhism the mandala is a crucial visualization technique used in meditation. It also plays a central role in the rituals of purification and visualization. Sand mandalas are also often constructed and immediately destroyed in the teaching of Tibetan Buddhism; this process symbolizes the critical Buddhist concept of impermanence.

**Schools of Tibetan Buddhism**

Tibetan Buddhism has four main traditions: Nyingmapa (also known as hong jiao in Chinese or “red school”), Kagyupa (bai jiao in Chinese or “white school”), Sakyapa (hua jiao in Chinese or “flower school”), and Gelugpa (huang jiao in Chinese or “yellow school”).
Nyingmapa is also called the “ancient ones,” denoting the oldest school that was founded by Padmasambhava. It focuses on meditation practice. Numerous meditation centers are affiliated with this school. Kagyupa is the school of “oral lineage,” which emphasizes the transmission of teaching and practice from the master to the disciple. Sakyapa literally means “gray earth” and originated in the Sakya Monastery following its construction in 1073. Gelugpa means “way of virtue” and was founded by Gyalwa Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). Since its later origin it has comprehensively incorporated many ideas and practices of the first three schools as well as traditional Mahāyāna teachings. It is commonly called the “Yellow Hat School,” whereas the former three schools are called “Red Hat schools.” The current Dalai Lama belongs to the Gelugpa lineage. In Tibetan Buddhism, the incarnated lamas also earn a title commonly known as Rinpoche, which literally means “the precious one.” Tibetan Buddhism, especially the Gelugpa tradition, emphasizes scholastic learning. Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition develops a series of titles for different degree holders. The highest degree is called Geshe, which means “spiritual friend” in Tibetan. The curriculum of Geshe study is involved in the learning of Scriptures, commentaries, treatises, and monastic code.

Huaivyu CHEN

Further Reading


The currently Beijing-based Buddhist Association of China (BAC) was founded in Shanghai in 1927 by lay Buddhists who were inspired by reformist monks such as Taixu to defend their collective interests. The organization fell apart during the civil war and its factions split under Communist rule, but resumed activities in 1976 under the leadership of Zhao Puchu.

Until recently only two organizations claimed to represent all Buddhists in China: the Buddhist Association of China ([BAC] zhongguo fojiao xiehui), based in Beijing, and the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China ([BAROC] zhongguo fojiaohui), based in Taipei, Taiwan. This situation differs from that in imperial China, when Buddhists were not affiliated with a unique institution. In the absence of a supreme authority Buddhists have been spared internecine (occurring within a group) conflicts over doctrine, but on the other hand they have been vulnerable to attempts by the state to control or even suppress their activities.

Beginning with the persecution against them during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), Buddhist institutions experienced a secular decline until laypeople revived the tradition through charity work at the end of the nineteenth century. Although the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was supportive of the Tibetan Buddhism practiced by Mongols, Tibetans, and other minorities, it did not protect

Fei lai feng Buddha, from the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen

Buddhist institutions during the Taiping Rebellion, and the later emperors were too weak to react when modernizers converted temples into schools. In this context lay Buddhists during the beginning of the Republican period
(1912–1949) tried to set up a unified Buddhist organization to defend their collective interests. In 1927, inspired by reformist monks such as Taixu (1890–1947), they founded the BAC in Shanghai. The civil war proved fatal to the organization, which split after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power. Some monks went into exile in Hong Kong, others to Taiwan or abroad. In 1950 exiled monks living in Taiwan created the BAROC, which exercised a monopoly of representation for all Buddhists on the island and claimed to represent all Chinese Buddhists in international Buddhist organizations during the period of martial law (1947–1987).

Although the BAROC represented a small proportion of Chinese Buddhists in the world, it was the only organization recognized by the World Buddhist Sangha Council. The BAROC benefited from the protection of the government, but its authority declined at the onset of the democratization process as new organizations, such as the Fuguangshan monastic order and the Tzu Chi Foundation, became much more important in Taiwan and within the Chinese Diaspora (scattering of a people). Meanwhile, in the People’s Republic of China, the CCP encouraged monks and laypeople to join the BAC, which was reconstituted in 1953. The BAC was cautious and expressed its loyalty to Chinese authority, but this attitude did not prevent the organization from suffering persecution during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). As a result the organization could not operate for years, and its future was uncertain. The BAC finally resumed activities in 1976 under the leadership of Zhao Puchu (1908–2000), a lay leader who shared the ideas of Taixu. Under his leadership Buddhism experienced a remarkable comeback and even an endorsement by CCP leader Jiang Zemin. In 2006 the BAC sponsored a historical gathering in Hangzhou, China, when it organized the first World Buddhist Forum, at which monks from the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan jointly acted as overseers.

André LALIBERTÉ

Further Reading
Since 1954 the Bureau of Religious Affairs has been responsible for protecting freedom of religious belief. Although the bureau has been instrumental in helping religious bodies restore properties lost or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), it has also monitored so-called ethnic, politically suspect, or unregistered religious groups whose activities are perceived to be at odds with the maintenance of national unity.

Established in 1954, the Chinese national government’s Bureau of Religious Affairs protects freedom of religious belief and fosters the rule of law and patriotism by linking legitimate religious activities with the maintenance of state order, national unity, and socialist development. Administered by the State Council, the bureau’s tasks are to register venues (such as monasteries and churches) for “normal religious activities,” to ensure that religious organizations are not subject to any foreign domination, and to protect freedom of religious belief.

Article 36 of the 1982 Chinese constitution defines “normal religious activities” as activities that do not “disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state.” This definition reflects the post-1976 shift away from the fiercely antireligious stance of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976), but it also echoes Chinese state policies toward religion established as early as the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE).

The People’s Republic of China claims that the bureau fosters the rule of law and patriotism by linking legitimate religious activities with the maintenance of state order, national unity, and socialist development. The bureau has been instrumental in helping religious bodies reclaim and restore properties lost or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). It also has tended to scrutinize some religious groups and activities more than others, especially so-called ethnic religions (Buddhism in Tibet and Inner Mongolia, Islam in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region), small unregistered bodies (charismatic Protestant Christian house churches), “superstitions” (mixin) such as fortune-telling and faith healing, and politically suspect groups (Falun Gong/Falun Dafa). Recently the bureau has gone beyond regulation to assert the right of the Chinese state to adjudicate the status of anyone claiming to be a reincarnated Buddhist figure, such as the Dalai Lama of Tibet, and has proclaimed that no one born outside of China’s borders will be so recognized.

Jeffrey L. RICHEY

Further Reading
Bureau of Religious Affairs Upholds the Constitution

The Constitution of the PRC represents a formal articulation of Party policy. As Peng Zhen, then Vice-Chair of the Committee to Revise the Constitution, pointed out in 1980, “The party leads the people in enacting the law and leads the people in observing the law.” This edict remains a bulwark of the Party’s approach to law making. During the post-Mao period, policies of limited tolerance for religion were reflected in the provisions of Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution.

- Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.
- No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion: nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe it, or do not believe in any religion.
- The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.
- Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.


As an American diplomat in China in the 1860s, Anson Burlingame advocated expanding commerce and promoting Christian missionary efforts. After retiring from public service he became an advisor to the Qing court. With the Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868, he helped forge one of the least-humiliating agreements, which in part welcomed Chinese immigrant labor to the United States, in China’s unequal treaty era.

Anson Burlingame shaped relations between the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) court and the United States in the 1860s. His career in China grew from political failure in the United States. Burlingame lost an election for the House of Representatives in 1860 and was to have been U.S. minister to Austria but the county refused to receive him as minister. President Abraham Lincoln then appointed him envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to China in June 1861. During the U.S. Civil War the Lincoln administration focused on preventing European powers from recognizing the Confederacy, and China was not a priority. Nor was the United States important to the Chinese, who were confronting domestic upheaval in the Taiping Rebellion and external threats from the British and French.

While never abandoning the goals of expanding commerce and promoting Christian missionary efforts, Burlingame did urge Europe and the United States to limit their demands on China. He retired from government service in 1867 and was immediately employed by the Qing dynasty as an advisor and envoy. Hiring foreigners to assist in relations with foreigners was not unprecedented. For example, Jesuit missionaries negotiated the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia on the Qing dynasty’s behalf. The Qing court and prominent officials such as Li Hongzhang sought to reduce Western imperialism by highlighting China’s development and ability to cooperate with the outside world. In 1868 Burlingame...
was accompanied by two Chinese envoys to the United States and Europe.

Burlingame’s most tangible achievement occurred in the United States, where he helped forge one of the least-humiliating agreements of China’s unequal treaty era. The Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868 generally affirmed the privileges detailed in the 1844 and 1858 treaties between the Qing dynasty and the United States. In other ways, however, the treaty was equal and reciprocal in that it guaranteed citizens of each nation the rights to live, work, worship, and build schools in the other nation. The treaty allowed the Qing dynasty to dispatch consuls to U.S. ports—a sign of China’s gradual acceptance of Western diplomatic norms. The treaty also outlawed the “coolie trade” by which Chinese men were kidnapped to serve as laborers overseas. The treaty highlighted one of the most cherished ideals of the United States about its relationship with China, namely, that the United States rejected “intervention by one nation in the affairs or domestic administration of another.”

More controversially, the treaty welcomed Chinese immigrant labor to the United States (but did not contain provisions for emigrants from either nation to become citizens of the other). The U.S. domestic reaction to increased immigration, particularly in California, would result in the 1880 Angell Treaty, part of a series of increasingly stringent restrictions on Chinese labor culminating in the 1882 Exclusion Act. Far from improving relations, ultimately Burlingame’s treaty made the Chinese acutely aware of U.S. racism.

Anson Burlingame died while leading the Chinese delegation to Russia in February 1870. His sympathy for China’s plight was important in shaping the alleged special relationship of the United States with China. His career also illustrated Qing-era China’s tentative steps to engage in diplomacy on Western terms.

Steven PHILLIPS

Further Reading
Butterfield and Swire Co, Ltd. was a British firm formed in 1866 to trade with China and Japan. Its business activities quickly expanded to include extensive shipping operations in China as well as manufacturing and services. The Swire Group, a contemporary multinational, remains an important investor in enterprises in China and Southeast Asia today.

Butterfield and Swire was a subsidiary of the British trading firm John Swire and Sons that was founded to expand the firm’s business to Japan and China. John Samuel Swire formed Butterfield and Swire by partnering with wool merchant Richard S. Butterfield in 1866 in order to sell British textiles in China and to buy silks and teas for export to England.

In 1867 Butterfield and Swire’s first office opened in Shanghai using the Chinese hong name (given to a commercial establishment or house of foreign trade in China) Taikoo 太古. The partnership between John S. Swire and Butterfield ended the next year, leaving Butterfield and Swire under the control of John Swire and Sons.

In addition to its trade activities, Butterfield and Swire was the agent for Alfred Holt’s Ocean Steamship Company (or Blue Funnel Line) in Japan and China. This association allowed Butterfield and Swire to expand its network of branch offices in China and provided the basis for its long involvement in shipping in Asia. Between 1870 and 1890 Butterfield and Swire added branches in Hong Kong, Tianjin, Hankou, Guangzhou (Canton), Fuzhou, Su’a, Jiujiang, Xiamen, and Qingdao as well as in Kobe and Yokohama. Responding to quickly changing economic conditions in China, within a few years of its founding the trading activities of Butterfield and Swire were subordinated to the management of new lines of business begun by the broader Swire organization. Most prominent of the new businesses was the China Navigation Company, a steamship company established in 1872 with capital from the Swire and Holt families. The China Navigation Company began on the Yangzi (Chang) River and later expanded its routes to the China coast, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asia, often acting as a feeder service for the Ocean Steamship Company. China Navigation became one of the most prominent shipping companies in Chinese waters before World War II.

The Taikoo Sugar Refinery (established in 1881 in Hong Kong) was another Swire business; Butterfield and Swire managed its sugar shipments; China Navigation ships transported them. By the 1890s Butterfield and Swire had almost completely withdrawn from trade to concentrate on these associated businesses, which later included the Tianjin Lighter Company (1904), the Taikoo Dockyard and Engineering Company (1908), and the Orient Paint, Color, and Varnish Company (1934). Butterfield and Swire branches throughout China acquired agencies for other shipping companies, banks, insurance firms, and other businesses in addition to managing Swire affiliates.

World War II brought permanent change to Swire activities in China. After Japan attacked the U.S. naval fleet...
at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Japan seized most Swire properties, including China Navigation ships. After the war China’s government and shipping interests resisted the return of foreign ships to China’s coastal waters. Unable to continue its shipping business on the mainland, Swire shifted its base of operations to Hong Kong, completing the transition in 1953 when the firm transferred ownership of its remaining mainland properties to the government of the People's Republic of China. Today the Swire Group remains an important multinational firm, owning manufacturing, waste management, bottling, and real estate development interests in Hong Kong, Cathay Pacific Airways, and the China Navigation Company (now a Pacific Rim container line). Swire also has invested in businesses in the United States and Australia and in the 1980s began to reinvest in mainland China in a range of real estate, manufacturing, and aviation concerns.

Anne REINHARDT

Further Reading


Tales of the ill-fated “Butterfly Lovers,” Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai, have roots in the Yuan dramatic corpus. Modern adaptations of this story in popular theatrical, musical, and cinematic venues often inject sociocultural themes ranging from advocacy for women’s education to cross-dressing and homoeroticism.

The earliest historical records of the tale of the lovers Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai date back over a millennium. Zhu Yingtai, a young girl of a good family, cross-dresses to attend a school where she befriends a fellow student, Liang Shanbo. Without his ever becoming aware of her gender, they study together, and when he dies years later, she jumps into his tomb, an officially commemorated act of virtue on her part. In later vernacular versions Liang realizes during a reunion with Zhu at her home that she is a woman; he falls in love with her, but she has already been betrothed to a rich landowner. When Liang dies of lovesickness, Zhu passes Liang’s grave, the tomb miraculously opens, and Zhu jumps in to be united with Liang’s spirit. Two butterflies were said to dance upon the site, symbolizing the two lovers and their devotion to one another.

In the wake of the emergence of author-generated libretti in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), songwriter and dramatist Bai Pu treated the Zhu-Liang story in a now-lost Yuan zaju drama, Zhu Yingtai Marries Liang Shanbo in Death. Emotionally charged key scenes from other early dramatic forms—Yuan dynasty xiwen and Ming dynasty (1368–1644) chuanqi—depicting the imminent departure of Zhu and the reunion of the pair at her home survived in late Ming song miscellanies. The version contained in Feng Menglong’s (1578–1644) seminal collection of vernacular tales, Stories Old and New (1620), develops to the theme of deep and ultimately lethal passion in a manner not unlike the famous play Peony Pavilion (1598). During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) numerous storytelling genres embraced the romantic tale, as did many regional operas. (Ironically, the role of the Liang Shanbo would have been played by a cross-dressing man in nineteenth-century Beijing Opera productions, which at that time were renowned for employing female impersonators.) Beijing, Guangzhou (Canton), Shaoxing, Huangmei, and Sichuan opera companies, among others, continue to feature it in their contemporary repertoires.

With the development of modern media, the story was newly rendered in films, animation, concertos, ballets, and spoken drama. Many of these adaptations have been wildly popular with audiences in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Shao Zuiweng’s silent film The Heartrending Story of Liang and Zhu (Liang Zhu tengshi, 1926) starred actress Hu Die. Liang Zhu (1933) with Shaoxing opera star Yuan Xuefen was the first operatic film shot in color in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), contributing to the popularity of the story up to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when the subject of personal love became anathema. Cast in the Huangmei opera style featuring female star Ling Bo, Hong Kong filmmaker Li Hanxiang’s Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai (1963) also played to unprecedented sold-out crowds in Taipei, Taiwan.
Meanwhile “The Butterfly Lovers Violin Concerto” (composers: Chen Gang and He Zhanhao, 1958) synthesized Western instrumentation and Chinese tonalities in the tradition of pentatonic (consisting of five tones) romanticism. The piece premiered to great acclaim amid the social reforms of the early PRC period and served as the musical score for newer filmic and animated adaptations of the Liang-Zhu story in the 1990s and 2000s. These and other renditions vary in thematic emphasis, ranging from unrequited love and monogamous marriage to advocacy for women’s education, cross-dressing, and homoeroticism.

Patricia SIEBER

Further Reading

Cadre System

Gàn'bù zhìdù 干部制度

Similar to the system of China’s traditional civil service hierarchy, the cadre system refers to the fifteen ranks (previously twenty-five) by which Communist Party functionaries and other civil servants are categorized. Higher ranks have better salaries, medical treatment, and pensions, as well as access to more desirable living quarters.

In China the term cadre refers both to all Communist Party functionaries and civil servants in administrative institutions, public organizations, and armed forces and to persons in leading positions. It is important to differentiate between party, administrative, and military cadres. Because the term covers party and state leaders as well as village officials and police officers, it does not refer to a homogeneous group.

Beginning in 1956 cadres were classified according to twenty-five ranks (ji). Grade twenty-five was the lowest grade. The original classification was dependent on how long a person had attended the revolutionary movement or when a person was admitted into the Communist Party, as well as on one’s contributions to the revolution or “liberation.” The early classification was influenced by the Soviet cadre system but also by traditional ranking patterns of the civil service in imperial times.

The cadre system was remodeled in 1993 by the Provis-ional Regulations for Public Service into fifteen grades, starting with the prime minister at grade one and running down to ordinary officials at grades ten through fifteen. The grading is the same in each level of the party, in the People’s Congresses (parliaments), and in the Political Consultative Conferences. This same grading also regulates salaries and privileges. State cadres, that is, civil servants paid by the state, are put on the official schedule by the responsible personnel offices. Organization departments are responsible for party cadres. State cadres are paid out of the official budgets, whereas the other rural cadres have to be paid by extrabudgetary means. Each cadre grade is treated differently, with privileges increasing as grade level rises. “High cadres” (grade five and up) enjoy the greatest privileges as far as salaries, labor conditions, size, and standard of accommodation, medical treatment, and pensions are concerned. They also receive more servants paid by the state, a better official car with driver, the right to travel first class in trains and planes on official trips, and, last but not least, access to detailed information on China and foreign countries.

This hierarchical system is similar to China’s traditional civil service hierarchy, which was also divided into grades in what was known as the “ji hierarchy.” There were two main categories: civil and military service. From the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) onward each category was divided into nine grades, each grade being divided into two classes, upper (shang) and lower (xia), for a total of eighteen ranks. Each grade was characterized by special insignias and salaries. The higher the rank, the greater the attendant privileges and nonmaterial advantages.

Today, as in the past, losing an official position or being excluded from the hierarchy means the loss of all kinds of privileges as well as a significant decrease in standard of living. Success in such a system and the social
security it offers make it attractive to become a member of the party and to join some kind of network that will guarantee advancement in the hierarchy.

Thomas HEBERER

Further Reading


CAI Yuanpei

1868–1940 Educator and Leader of the New Culture Movement

Cai Yuanpei, an accomplished student in the Confucian tradition, became part of China’s cultural and political elite at Beijing’s Imperial Hanlin Academy, where he was exposed to translated works from the West. As chancellor until 1926 of Beijing University, he was renowned for his commitment to intellectually diversity, center of the New Culture Movement.

Born in Shaoxing District, Zhejiang Province, to a family of bankers, Cai Yuanpei lost his father when he was only eleven years old. Despite declining fortunes, his family was able to support his education in Confucian traditions at several private schools. In 1892 Cai passed the highest level of the civil service examinations and earned the Jinshi degree at age twenty-four. In 1894 Cai was appointed as a compiler at Beijing’s Imperial Hanlin Academy, which brought him to the circle of national cultural and political elites. Also in Beijing he gained easy access to translated works from the West, including Yan Fu’s translation of Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, which Cai read more than once.

Cai’s most significant impact on modern Chinese history was his tenure as chancellor of Beijing University between 1917 and 1926. He adopted an inclusive policy of staffing the faculty with people of widely diverse intellectual orientations, hence creating a vibrant cultural environment that made Beijing University the powerhouse of the New Culture Movement. In hopes of training a new generation of well-rounded intellectuals, he especially encouraged physical and aesthetic education in addition to science and technology in hopes of training a new generation of well-rounded intellectuals.
science and technology. He was a vocal advocate of the vernacular and argued for the independence of education from political intervention.

During the reorganization of the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in the early 1920s, Cai was in Europe but was elected in absentia to the Central Supervisory Committee. Although in 1927 he supported the Guomindang’s suppression of the Communists, he later regretted the brutal killing of the radicals. He was appointed president of the National Academia Sinica in 1928 when it was founded by the national government. In 1932 Cai joined with other liberals to organize the China Civil Rights Protection Alliance in protest of the national government’s repression of dissidents. Cai’s health began to decline in the mid-1930s, and he went to Hong Kong after the War of Resistance against Japan broke out in 1937. He died from a stomach tumor in 1940.

**Further Reading**


**LU Yan**

Display one’s proficiency of axe in front of the master carpenter.

班门弄斧

Bānmén nòng fǔ
Calendar

Yínlì 阴历

The ancient Chinese calendar is still used to mark religious and traditional holidays and festivals. Its form is derived from astronomical observations of the longitude of the sun and the phases of the moon. Unlike other calendars, it does not count years in an infinite sequence.

China has a long tradition of astronomical observation. The main calendars used in the Far East were Chinese in origin until the nineteenth century; today such long-established calendars still are used to mark religious and traditional holidays and festivals; the Gregorian calendar regulates only civic affairs.

The origin of the Chinese calendar is steeped in myth; the legendary Emperor Huangdi supposedly created the calendar in 2637 BCE. But historical evidence dates the invention of the calendar well into the fourteenth century BCE. Its form is lunisolar (derived from astronomical observations of the longitude of the sun and the phases of the moon), therefore its year matches the tropical year (the period between two successive times when the sun reaches its most northerly point in the sky), and its months coincide with the synodic months (the period between two successive full moons or two conjunctions of the sun and moon).

An ordinary year in the Chinese calendar, as in the Jewish, has twelve months, whereas a leap year has thirteen months. As a result, an ordinary year has 353, 354, or 355 days, and a leap year has 383, 384, or 385 days.

This Qing dynasty illustration shows yet another version of the calendar-creation legend. In this legend the Xi and He brothers receive a government commission from emperor Yao to organize the calendar with respect to the celestial bodies.
To determine the Chinese year, first the dates of the new moons are established. A new moon is interpreted as a completely “black” moon (when the moon is in conjunction with the sun), not the first visible crescent, as stipulated in Islamic and Jewish calendars. The date of a new moon is the first day of a new month. Calculated next are the dates when the sun’s longitude is a multiple of 30 degrees. These dates, called the “principal terms,” are used to calculate the number of each month. Therefore, each month carries the number of the principal term that occurs in that month.

All astronomical observations are made for the meridian 120 degrees east of Greenwich, England, which approximately aligns with the east coast of China. The Chinese calendar, unlike other calendars, does not count years in an infinite sequence. Instead, years have names that are repeated every sixty years. Within a sixty-year cycle each year is assigned a name composed of two parts: the celestial stem, the terms of which cannot be translated into English, and the terrestrial branch, the terms of which correspond to animals of the Chinese zodiac. This method of using a sixty-year cycle is ancient: The cycles are numbered from 2637 BCE, when the Chinese calendar supposedly was established.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading

An inch of time is an inch of gold, but an inch of time cannot be purchased for an inch of gold.

一寸光阴一寸金，
寸金难买寸光阴

Yì cùn guāng yīn yì cùn jīn,
cùn jīn nán mǎi cùn guāng yīn
Chinese calligraphy (from the Greek kalligraphia, “beautiful writing”) is the art of writing that educated Chinese have practiced for millennia. All students of written Chinese practice calligraphy, but becoming a good calligrapher requires practice, self-discipline, and an artistic sense. Chinese calligraphy, therefore, is more than just the mere art of penmanship.

The Chinese Character

Written Chinese is ideographic and in some cases pictographic. Thus each Chinese character is a monosyllabic word that conveys an idea. Characters, insofar as they are sometimes pictographic, also provide a visual expression of the ideas that they represent in a way that purely phonetic scripts do not. Characters, each composed of a series of strokes, make up words when written in a particular order. No matter how many strokes a character may be composed of, it must fit perfectly inside an imaginary box that is the same size as those of the characters preceding and following it. A character usually has two components:

Calligraphy painting by C. C. Wang. Calligraphy is one of China’s earliest and most revered art forms, a symbol of culture, education, self-discipline, and erudition. The quality of one’s calligraphy was thought to provide insight into one’s moral character. Calligraphic writing on paintings, a means for imparting wisdom or advice, was often integral to the composition of the images. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
a radical that indicates meaning in a very broad sense, and a phonetic component that indicates sound, also in a broad sense. These components may be side by side or one on top of the other, inside the imaginary box within which each character is composed. Calligraphy is the art of writing these characters.

**History of Writing and Calligraphy**

Historically, writing and power have been intimately related in China, and calligraphy has been of much greater importance there than penmanship has been in Western societies. The earliest examples of writing in China appear on oracle bones from the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). These oracle bones were tortoise shells and scapula of mammals, etched with questions for the gods and then held over heat until they cracked. Shamans (magicians), who had written the inscriptions in the first place, interpreted the cracks as divine answers to the questions. People with the ability to write in ancient China, therefore, had the power to communicate with Heaven and to interpret Heaven’s will. Early Chinese rulers, eager to empower themselves in every possible way, surrounded themselves by those who could write and help them communicate with Heaven.

Although, as the oracle bones show us, writing existed in China at least three thousand years ago, there was not a unified written language in China until the third century BCE. At that time, Shi Huangdi (c. 259–210 BCE), the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), who was trying to reshape the numerous kingdoms of the Chinese landmass into a unified empire, standardized writing. The creation of a single, unified written language in a nation full of spoken dialects, where there was no universally comprehensible spoken language, made the written language that much more important.

Over time education in China’s written language became essential to participation in government, and an imperial examination system evolved to test candidates’ skill in written expression. From the Tang (618–907) to the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), calligraphy was considered an important criterion for passing all three levels of these civil service examinations. The quality of one’s calligraphy was thought to provide insight into one’s moral character. Beautiful calligraphy became a symbol of culture, education, self-discipline, and erudition.

Certain people became known for their calligraphy, and the calligraphy of other people became known because the calligraphers themselves were famous or powerful. Writing on paintings, memorials, and other materials became a way for superiors to impart wisdom, advice, and injunctions to their inferiors. Virtually any literate person recognized the calligraphy of the emperor and the most important government figures of the time.

**Calligraphic Styles**

A variety of styles of calligraphy, or scripts, evolved over time, each coming to be identified with particular types or styles of writing. The script that became standard during the reign of Shi Huangdi is known as small seal (xi-aozhuan) script. This script is difficult for people to read
Calligraphy today and is generally used only in works of art. Among other scripts that have evolved, the most common is regular (kaishu) script, in which each stroke of a character is clearly written. Because of its clarity, regular script is generally used for printing. The clerical (lishu) style was developed during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). It is most commonly used today in inscriptions on monuments and public buildings. Writers of informal notes or letters probably use the running (xingshu) style of script, in which the separate strokes of a given character are often run together. A variation on the running style is the grass (caoshu) style, which actually omits strokes and joins separate characters together. The grass style was particularly popular among literati in the late imperial era.

Calligraphy as Art

Chinese calligraphy is ornamental. Its beauty lies in both the concepts expressed and the form of expression. Throughout the Chinese world, people display decorative calligraphy in homes and businesses. Couplets, often written on strips of red paper, hang at the entrances of homes; lucky characters are pasted on the walls and windows of shops, restaurants, and homes at the Chinese New Year; and scrolls of calligraphy hang in living rooms.

Perhaps because calligraphy is an art form and a means of self-expression rather than simply a vehicle for conveying meaning, works of art—such as paintings, sculptures, and buildings—are themselves often adorned with calligraphy. In many cases the inscriptions on paintings, and the etchings on buildings, monuments, and places of natural beauty are expressions of appreciation, commentaries, or labels appended by later owners or observers (often the emperor). These calligraphic additions are not generally seen as detracting from the original piece, but as adding something to it.

Contemporary Calligraphy

During the twentieth century, China underwent several attempts to simplify the written language. Language reformers, hoping to increase literacy, introduced both phonetic scripts using roman letters and simplified characters, the forms of which, interestingly, are derived in...
many instances from *caoshu*, or the grass style of calligraphy. Although the phonetic systems have not become especially popular, more than two thousand simplified versions of commonly used characters were introduced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the official written form between 1956 and 1964. Their use in the PRC has relegated to the past the more complex forms of characters and the art of writing them for most Chinese.

Nonetheless, calligraphy has remained important in post-1949 China, and the calligraphy of famous Communist Party members can be seen on various signs throughout China. The characters for the name of the newspaper called the *People’s Daily* (*renmin ribao*), for instance, are printed in the calligraphy of Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The presence of Mao’s calligraphy on the front page of every edition of the *People’s Daily* shows the world that the paper benefited from his patronage.

While the forms of characters may have changed during the twentieth century, the functions of calligraphy have remained essentially the same. Calligraphy is the artistic expression of the power of language by the individual. Both the form and content of calligraphy inform the reader or viewer about the morality, education, and dedication of the calligrapher.

J. Megan GREENE

**Further Reading**


The Canada China Business Council promotes trade and investment between the two nations through programs and events that disseminate market insight and information.

A private, nonprofit, membership-based organization, the Canada China Business Council (CCBC) was incorporated in 1978 to promote and assist in trade and investment between Canada and China. It has become a preeminent authority on China-Canadian trade.

CCBC has approximately three hundred members that include large Canadian and Chinese firms in addition to small and midsized entrepreneurs from both countries. Membership is about equally divided between companies and individual members that represent a variety of sectors, including financial services, legal services, information and communications technology, education, manufacturing, construction, transportation, mining, and energy.

The council acts as a Canadian chamber of commerce in China, providing business networking opportunities and advocating on behalf of the business community. Headquartered in Toronto, it also has offices in Vancouver, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Shenzhen. Through this network, the CCBC gathers market information and connects its members to opportunities in many of China’s emerging regions. In addition, the CCBC also operates chapters in Beijing and Shanghai. Established in the 1990s, these chapters sponsor events such as networking functions, seminars, and roundtable discussions for Chinese and Canadian business people, allowing for the establishment of a broad communication forum within China and Canada.

To facilitate trade and investment between the two nations, the council institutes programs and events that disseminate market insight and information, support business and logistics services, and uncover leads for business opportunities in Canada and China. Along with the CCBC’s annual general meeting, these functions are forums for bilateral interchange and are attended by both Canadian and Chinese business and government leaders.

The council is the largest Sino-Canadian business association, with a board of directors that includes former Canadian ambassador to China Howard Balloch and three top officials of Power Corporation of Canada, including the presidents and CEOs of its financial services division and technology investment divisions. The council has thirty directors.

For much of the twentieth century, the Chinese were the largest visible minority in Canada, and this has remained true in the first decade of the twenty-first century. According to Statistics Canada, a department of the Canadian government, 16 percent of all immigrants to Canada came from China from 2002 to 2004. Currently there are approximately 1 million Chinese immigrants in Canada, and the majority reside in Ontario and British Columbia—the home provinces of Toronto and Vancouver, respectively, and locations of CCBC’s two Canadian offices.

The Editors

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Chinese Immigration to Canada

In the early twentieth century, Canada passed numerous laws restricting and even preventing Chinese immigration. Some of the laws, like the one below, explain the Head Tax placed on Chinese immigrants to Canada.

TAX AND EXEMPTIONS

7. Every person of Chinese origin, irrespective of allegiance, shall pay into the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada, on entering Canada, at the port or place of entry, a tax of five hundred dollars, except the following persons who shall be exempt from such payment, that is to say: —

(a) The members of the diplomatic corps, or other government representatives, their suites and their servants, and consuls and consular agents;

(b) The children born in Canada of parents of Chinese origin and who have left Canada for educational or other purposes, on substantiating their identity to the satisfaction of the controller at the port or place where they seek to enter on their return;

(c) Merchants, their wives and children, the wives and children of clergymen, tourists, men of science and students, who shall substantiate their statues to the satisfaction of the controller, subject to the approval of the Minister, or who are bearers of certificates of identity, or other similar documents issued by the government or by a recognized official or representative of the government who subject they are, specifying their occupation and their object in coming into Canada.


Further Reading

The Canton Fair, officially known (until 2007) as the China Export Commodities Fair and afterwards as the China Import and Export Fair, is China’s No. 1 fair. It has the longest history, largest scale and variety of products, largest attendance, and greatest business representation of any such fair in China. It has promoted economic and trade cooperation and technology exchange between China and the world.

To develop China’s exports to capitalist countries, the Chinese government held three export exhibitions in Guangzhou (Canton) from 1954 to 1956. Building on these exhibitions, the first session of the Canton Fair was held in Guangzhou in 1957. Since then two sessions of the fair have been held every year in Guangzhou. One session starts on 15 April, and the other starts on 15 October. From 1957 to 1981 every session lasted a month. From 1982 to 1988 the sessions were shortened to twenty days; and beginning in 1989 they were shortened to fifteen days. Every session was then divided into two phases with a four-day break between 21–24 April and 21–24 October. The Canton Fair’s 104th session, held in October 2008, was arranged in three theme-based phases, allowing for more business participation; the first phase was held from 15–19 October, the second from 24–28 October, and the third from 2–6 November.

In addition to the traditional method of bringing sample products to the fair, the fair now has an online component. Its website, in operation since 1999, has become a platform for international business communication in what can now be called the “Never Ending Canton Fair.”

Since the first session in 1957 China has experienced natural and political disasters, such as the Great Chinese Famine from 1960 to 1962, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic in 2003, and the Sichuan Province earthquake of May 2008, but the Canton Fair has never been canceled. This is highly unusual in the history of international exhibitions.

The China Export Commodities Fair was renamed the “China Import and Export Fair” (CIEF) at its 101st session on 15 April 2007. The change was part of China’s efforts to improve its imports from trading partners and narrow the trade gap.

**Organization**

The China Foreign Trade Center (CFTC) is in charge of the organization, management, and operation of the Canton Fair. Its predecessor, the Chinese Export Commodities Exhibition Hall, was founded in 1957. It was renamed the “Guangzhou Foreign Trade Center” in 1979, the “China Foreign Trade Center (Guangzhou)” in 1986, the “China Foreign Trade Center (Group)” in 1988, and finally the “China Foreign Trade Center” in 2001. The name changes reflect its institutional reform from a state-owned
enterprise under the direct control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to a government-sponsored institution that operates independently and has the full responsibility for its profit and loss.

Exhibition Halls

The Liuhua Complex, an exhibition hall established in 1974, hosted each of the Canton Fair sessions until April 2004. Because of the increasing size of the fair, construction began on a new exhibition hall, the Pazhou Complex, which was partly finished and used for the ninety-fifth Canton Fair in April 2004. Since then all of the fairs (including the ninety-sixth Canton Fair in October 2004) have been held simultaneously in the Pazhou Complex and the Liuhua Complex. The Parzhou Complex, completed at the end of 2008, covers an area of 810,000 square meters with a structural area of 1.1 million square meters; it has an indoor exhibition area of 350,000 square meters—enough space for 17,500 exhibition booths—making it the third-largest exhibition hall in the world.

Importance to China’s Economy

The Canton Fair has been the most important channel for Chinese enterprises to enter the international market. In the 1960s and 1970s the proportion of trade done at the Canton

Sculptures of Buddha and Bodhisattva (Guanyin) for export at Canton Trade Fair, Guangzhou, China, 1979. In the last three decades the international fair has expanded its physical quarters with brand new exhibitions halls, its reach with an online component, and its offerings, with an increasing variety and number of Chinese brand name.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Fair, relative to China’s total exports, increased steadily. From 1965 to 1979 the proportion averaged 34 percent, and in 1972 it hit a high of 54 percent. Since China’s opening to the world in 1979 Chinese enterprises have had many more opportunities to enter the international market. The Canton Fair’s relative importance to China’s exports has therefore been decreasing steadily. Since 2003 less than 10 percent of China’s annual exports come from the Canton Fair. But the number of visitors and the business turnover of each session of the fair continued to increase steadily until the 101st session in April 2007, and despite some gradual declines in the following two sessions, statistics for the 104th session in October–November 2008 were better than predicted, especially given the global financial crisis. With the rapid increase in the volume of China’s international trade the Canton Fair, therefore, remains China’s No. 1 fair.

102nd Canton Fair, 2007

The 102nd Canton Fair, which was held 15–30 October 2007, had 189,500 visitors from 213 trading countries and regions, and the total export turnover of that session reached $37.45 billion. The number of visitors decreased by 8.3 percent from the highest level, achieved at the 101st session, but the export figure hit a high with an increase of 2.9 percent over the 101st session in April 2007 and a 10 percent increase over the 100th session a year earlier. Mechanical and electrical products occupied the lion’s share of the deals, and light industrial products occupied second place. Several commodity categories that are undergoing tariff rebate policy adjustments suffered a dip in their transactions. Categories included garments (decreased by 8.8 percent), footwear (decreased by 9.2 percent), toys...
(decreased by 10.7 percent), and motorcycles (decreased by 30.7 percent).

104th Canton Fair, 2008

The 104th Canton Fair, which was held from 15 October to 6 November, 2008, had 174,562 visitors from several hundred trading countries and regions, and the total export turnover of that session reached $31.55 billion. Although this was a decrease in the number from the previous year, given the downturn presented by the global financial crisis, the result was better than expected. Moreover, at this fair there was an increase in Chinese brands on display, as well as an emphasis on higher technology products. It is clear that China is attempting to move up the technological ladder.

Outlook in the Twenty-First Century

The Canton Fair is a long-standing showcase for products made in China and, increasingly, for foreigners seeking to sell their products in the Chinese market. Its fame comes partly from its long history and partly from China’s increasing importance in world trade. While the fair is a somewhat outdated phenomenon in an age of e-commerce, and there are many other ways now for producers to sell their products, the Canton Fair will continue to be an important forum for international trade in the twenty-first century.

SHU Ping

Further Reading

Canton System

The Canton System refers to the Qing dynasty’s practice of confining Westerners who wanted to trade with “The Middle Kingdom” to the confines of the city of Canton (now known as Guangzhou), believing they would be easier to control if confined to one area. The Chinese mandarinate kept extremely tight control of foreign trade, keeping a careful eye on foreigners once they set foot on Chinese soil.

The city of Guangzhou (Canton) is located at the mouth of the Canton River just before the river flows into the Boca Tigris estuary, the large waterway that separates Macao and Hong Kong. The geostrategic site of the city gives it a great military and commercial importance beyond its privileged position as the capital of Guangdong Province and the seat of the governor of the province.

Eighty-five years prior to the opening of China in 1842, the Chinese empire had determined to limit the foreign trade of the country to Guangzhou because the city constituted an easy access to the foreign traders (“barbarians of the Western Seas”) and especially because the traders were easier to control if they were in one location rather than roaming the entire Middle Kingdom unhindered.

That was the foundation of the Canton System, which coerced Western nations who wished to trade with China to confine themselves to Guangzhou and its regulations under the stultifying close supervision of the Chinese mandarinate (the office of a public official). The tight control of foreign trade was not only a technical issue of watching the steps of the foreigners after they set foot in Chinese territory, but also a cultural issue derived from Chinese worldview. China never gave high precedence to international trade, preferred its economic autarky (self-sufficiency) over dependence on others, and acted under the conviction that since it was the center of the universe (Zhong guo, literally “Middle Kingdom”) and their emperor had universal kingship, any foreign barbarian who came to China had to come in submission, provide his goods as if they were part of the tribute that he owed to the Ruler of the Celestial Empire, and take back with him the “presents” that the emperor bestowed on him.

British Domination

Although a Chinese official (hoppo) controlled that trade and levied hefty taxes on it, it was in practice conducted by a monopoly of Chinese private companies. These companies—restricted to about twelve in number and known as hong merchants—paid the authorities well for their lucrative permits to trade with their private foreign counterparts, who established parallel “factories” that represented major Western trading companies.

The British, who dominated that trade, were represented by the East India Company, whose monopoly was to be abrogated on the eve of the Opium War in later years. British domination of that trade was derived from the proximity to the China coast of the major Indian ports that were under British dominion. Instrumental in
facilitating that trade were Chinese compradors (buyers), who were accompanied by a crowd of translators, money changers, and clerks. These trade intermediaries between China and the West were to emerge as a powerful mediating class that took the lead in the pioneering modernization of the country.

The hong were organized into a guild (co-hong), which not only paid heavily for its monopoly on trade but also was held responsible to authorities for the conduct of foreigners while they were in Chinese territory during the trading season (October to January), which avoided the seasonal hurricanes (typhoons). All contracts were signed one year earlier and carried out during the trading period when the foreigners arrived in Cantonese waters, loaded the Chinese goods, mainly tea, silk, pottery, lacquer, and rhubarb, and left behind a trickle of British goods (furs, metals, wool) and shiploads of silver currency. When in the early nineteenth century the British began substituting the cheap opium that they grew in nearby Bengal, India, for the silver that had depleted their treasuries since tea had become their national beverage a century earlier, they created massive opium addiction in China, which escalated into the First Opium War (1839–1842).

After the goods were exchanged and paid for, the foreign ships sailed to Macao at the mouth of the Boca Tigris, were provided with food and water, and, after registering their orders for the year after, set sail for their European or U.S. destinations. Western powers, far from adapting to Chinese ways, sought to break the confinement of the Canton System so as not only to spread trade all over the long Chinese coast but also to sail inland along the Yangzi and the Canton rivers and so widen their markets with the help of the compradors whom they were to cultivate in the major ports. But not until the First Opium War broke out in 1839 against the background of the British attempting to turn the devastating opium trade into a legal and unlimited one, were five more ports opened under the Nanking Treaty, which put an end to the three-year war.

Aftermath

The opening of new ports, which forced China into the international trade system and gave a permanent base in Hong Kong to the British, brought an end to the Canton System after this major port became only one of the five open trading centers. Moreover, the open ports grew into foci of interaction between Chinese and Westerners since the latter obtained concessions that gave them virtual extraterritorial rights and an incentive to widen their rule on Chinese soil. The culture of treaty ports was born and a decade later brought about the opening of yet more ports in the hinterland and the almost complete subjugation of China to foreigners for the century to come.

Raphael ISRAELI

Further Reading

Fifty-five million Chinese speak Cantonese (Yue), which makes Cantonese the second-most-spoken language in China after Mandarin. But is Cantonese—and Mandarin for that matter—a language or a dialect of a larger Chinese language? Linguists have long debated the point.

Many people think of Mandarin (putonghua, literally “commoner’s language”) as the modern standard Chinese language. Chinese, in fact, is a group of many languages and dialects, including Cantonese, or Yue. Cantonese is the tongue of some 55 million speakers in China and about 20 million speakers around the world. Cantonese is usually considered the language of southern China; Mandarin, the language of the north. Cantonese is spoken extensively in Guangdong Province, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Macao, and Hong Kong. Cantonese is also the most common form of Chinese heard in Chinatowns around the world.

Language or Dialect?

Cantonese belongs to the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan family of languages. This language family contains some 250 languages spoken in East Asia. The Sinitic group comprises the seven recognized major language groups and numerous dialects of China. Most of these languages are not mutually intelligible; that is, speakers of Cantonese and Mandarin cannot understand each other. Whether Cantonese is a true language or a dialect is an ongoing debate among linguists. (For convenience, language will be used here).

Yuehua (Yue speech) is the formal name given by linguists to the Cantonese language, particularly when referring to the many dialects, not just to the standard Cantonese that is the everyday speech of the cities of Guangzhou (Canton) and Hong Kong. Guangdong and Guangxi (a province before it became Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) are often referred to as the liang guang (two Guangs), liang yue (two yues), or Lingnan (south of the mountain range). The forms of Cantonese are quite diverse. Even in Guangzhou and the surrounding area, there are sharp dialectical differences. Linguists have identified seven dialect areas in Guangdong, most of them in the Zhu (Pearl) River delta and western Guangdong: Guangfu (the speech of Guangzhou), Yongxun, Gaoyang, Siyä (four districts), Goulou, Wuhua, and Qinlan. These are spoken around specific geographical areas.

Origins of Cantonese

At an unknown time, a group of Sinitic people moved across the Nan Ling Mountains in southern China into the Lingnan, or what became the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi. The indigenous peoples of the Lingnan were eventually assimilated into new Sinicized cultural and language groups. The various Yue-speaking people originated in this way. The basic ideograph yue means...
“to exceed, to go beyond.” It has been extended to mean “frontier,” or “beyond the borderland.”

Separated from the rest of China by the high Nan Ling range, which runs east to west, the people of Guangdong and Guangxi have considered themselves different from other Sinitic peoples. Cantonese speakers are more likely to identify themselves as Tongyen (Yue) or Tangren (Mandarin), that is, “Tang persons,” rather than Hanren, or “Han persons,” which is how most Chinese identify themselves. This is mainly because it was during the Tang period (618–907 CE) that the homeland of the Yue people became part of the Chinese cultural realm. The Cantonese traditionally speak of classical written Chinese as Tong man or Tang wen (Tang language). Cantonese is closer to ancient Chinese than Mandarin is.

**Characteristics of Cantonese**

Standard Cantonese, the dialect spoken in Guangzhou and Hong Kong, demonstrates a number of phonetic (speech sounds) and grammatical features that set it apart from other Sinitic languages.

Cantonese retains the ancient final consonants that have been lost in the north. These include \(-m\), \(-p\), \(-t\), and \(-k\). The retroflex consonants that characterize Northern Mandarin are absent. (Retroflex sounds are produced with the tongue curled up and back until it touches the hard palate. English has no retroflex consonant sounds). Cantonese has syllables that begin in \(ng\). Cantonese lacks any phonetic distinction between the sounds \(s\) and \(sh\), \(ts\) and \(ch\), and \(ts'\) and \(ch'\) (these last two are not heard in English.) In Cantonese there is a separate series of long and short vowels. Additional vowel sounds and the final consonants in standard Cantonese mean that Cantonese has almost twice the number of syllables that Mandarin has.

While standard Mandarin has four tones, the number of tones in Cantonese varies according to the dialect. Standard Cantonese has nine tones. Speakers in Zhongshan County, located between Guangzhou and Sze-yap, use only six tones. In other counties there are ten or even more tones. Cantonese, unlike many of the other southern languages, has little tone sandhi (changes in tone when tones run together in speech flow). It has none of the unaccented toneless neutral syllables that form parts of compounds and other connected utterances in standard Mandarin. There is a pattern in Cantonese, however, in which a change in a word’s tone can be used to modify it to mean a related term. One example is the word for tobacco, which is a tonal variant of the word for smoke.

Cantonese also differs from standard Chinese in grammar. One difference is the ordering of the indirect and direct object in a sentence. In Mandarin the ordering is similar to that in English. For example, the sentence “give me (indirect) something (direct)” would have the same sequencing in both Mandarin and English. For standard Cantonese, the ordering is more like “give something (direct) me (indirect).”
Linguists believe that the Cantonese spoken in southern China has been heavily influenced by the languages of the peoples who lived there before the coming of the Sinitic peoples. Linguists believe that these languages were related to the Tai branch of Sino-Tibetan. This influence is apparent in word order and grammar. In Tai-related languages, as in Cantonese, the adjective follows the noun. In Mandarin, as in English, the adjective precedes the noun. This is why many two-character terms in Cantonese appear to readers of Mandarin to have been put together in backward sequence. The pattern is especially evident in some dialects of Cantonese, particularly in southwest Guangzhou.

Because the language is so flexible, Cantonese has been able to absorb many foreign words, including words from English, such as *salad* (sah-lud), *bus* (baa-see), and *taxi* (dik-see). Oddly enough, however, Cantonese has not borrowed as much from northern Chinese as, for instance, the Wu or Min languages have.

Cantonese and Mandarin also differ in terms of written Chinese characters. This is in part because new characters have been added to stand for the words that are apparently exclusive to Cantonese. In some instances characters that are no longer in use in Mandarin have been used to transcribe words in Cantonese. This means that there can be written texts that are uniquely Cantonese that would be difficult for someone from northern China to read without a special study of Cantonese.

### Cantonese Speakers

The best known and most populous of the speakers of Cantonese are the people of Guangzhou and Hong Kong. The language form that these people speak is composed of many dialects, known to linguists as the Yuehai dialect of Yuehua. The most influential dialect is standard Cantonese. Linguistically, the Yuehai region is rather fragmented, but the core is the so-called Three Districts (Sam-yap in the vernacular) around Guangzhou. The districts are Namhoi, Punyu, and Shuntak.

Other well-known speakers of Yuehua are people of the Four Districts, or Sze-yap (Siyi in Mandarin). The Sze-yap dialect has many features that mark it from standard Cantonese so that speakers of the two would find it difficult to understand each other. Both the tonal pattern and vowels are different.

*Guinan* is the name usually given to the Cantonese dialects of the interior of Guangxi. Among the Guinan are dialects also, which can be called subdialects. They are known as Wuzhou, Guixian, Cangwu, Guiping, and Tengxian. Many of these Guinan subdialects have pronunciations of certain sounds that are unlike those of other Cantonese dialects. There are initial consonants, like *b* and *d*, that might not be found in standard Cantonese.

The general impression among the Chinese is that, with the exception of speakers of standard Cantonese, most Cantonese speakers have not played much of a role in the cultural development of China. Consequently, the Guangxi part of the Yue region has been treated more as a cultural backwater, even by other Cantonese speakers. Yet Cantonese speakers have contributed greatly to the large cultural mix known as China.

**OOI Giok Ling**

### Further Reading

Cao Xueqin wrote The Story of the Stone, the novel that was the basis of The Dream of the Red Chamber, one of the most celebrated novels in the history of Chinese literature.

Cao Xueqin (Ts’ao Hsueh-ch’iin) was born in Nanjing into a powerful and wealthy family. Shortly after Cao’s birth, the family became involved in political intrigues, falling into disgrace and financial ruin. Beginning in 1742 Cao lived in poverty in the western suburbs of Beijing, making a little money selling his own paintings. It was there that he wrote Shitou ji (The Story of the Stone).

Although the manuscript was left unfinished when he died, handwritten copies with eighty chapters began to appear before long. In 1792 the novel was printed with an additional forty chapters, usually attributed to Gao E, under the title Honglou meng (The Dream of the Red Chamber). It is one of the most celebrated novels in the history of Chinese literature. The novel, which has some strong autobiographical elements, focuses on the downfall of the Jia family. The principal characters are Baoyu, who is born from a stone into the Jia family, and Daiyu, who is deeply but unhappily in love with Baoyu. The decline of the Jia family follows the death of one of the daughters who was an imperial consort, but in the end the imperial favors are restored, and Baoyu passes the imperial examinations. The novel has been translated into English several times.

Further Reading

CAO Yu
Cáo Yú 曹禺
1910–1996  Playwright

Author of the classic Chinese play Leiyu (Thunderstorm), Cao Yu is considered one of the most important playwrights of twentieth-century China. He was instrumental in the acceptance of the Western style play into the Chinese theater tradition, and his plays are still popular in China today.

Cao Yu was China’s most accomplished playwright of the twentieth century. Born as Wan Jiabao in Qianjiang County of Hubei Province, Cao Yu relocated to Tianjin with his parents when he was young. In 1922 he went to Nankai Middle School, where three years later he joined its Xinjushe (Society of New Theatric Arts) and played a key role in it. A lover of literature, he read a great deal of Chinese and Western classics. In 1928 he enrolled in the Department of Political Science at Nankai University, Tianjin, and transferred to the Department of Foreign Languages at Tsinghua University in Beijing the next year. There his interest in Western theatrical arts and traditional Chinese operas intensified. He was particularly drawn to Shakespeare and classical Greek and Roman tragedians.

In the year of his graduation in 1933, he finished his debut work, Leiyu (Thunderstorm), which became a classic. He used his pen name Cao Yu instead of his real name;
Cao yu are the two parts that form the traditional character wan, his last name. In the same year Cao Yu enrolled in the Graduate College of Tsinghua University to study theater. The next year he became a teacher at Tianjin’s Hebei Normal School for Women, where he completed his second script, entitled Richu (Sunrise), which turned out to be another classic. In 1936 Cao Yu was hired by the National Institute of Dramatic Art in Nanjing to teach playwriting and Western drama. That year he wrote Yuanye (The Wilderness). When the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War) broke out Cao Yu took refuge with his school in Chongqing, a city in Sichuan Province behind the frontline. He served as a member of the Council of National Anti-Japanese Association of the Literary Circles and worked as a playwright for a movie studio. His works of the time included Tuibian (Metamorphosis), Dujin (Gild), and Beijingren (Beijing Man). In 1946 he was invited by the State Department of the United States to teach as a visiting scholar. A year later he returned to China and was hired by the Shanghai Experimental Drama School. He published his play Qiao (Bridge) and wrote and directed the movie Yanyang tian (Sunny Skies) produced by the Shanghai Wenhua Film Company.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Cao Yu came to Beijing from Shanghai
via Hong Kong. He served successively as the associate dean of the Central Academy of Drama (1950), director of the Beijing People’s Art Theater (1952), and secretary of the Secretariat of Chinese Authors Association (1956). In 1956 he finished his play Minglang de tian (Bright Skies) and co-authored Dan jian pian (Courage and Swords) in 1960. Two years later he planned to write a play entitled Wang Zhaojun but was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), during which he was forced to work as a gatekeeper and often publicly humiliated. Not until 1978 was he able to complete the play.

Cao Yu was pivotal to giving a foothold to the Western-style play after its introduction to China, where it is known as huanju (verbal drama) as opposed to the traditional Chinese operas that require singing. His plays still hold the limelight on the Chinese stage. Another contribution of Cao Yu was his masterful integration of Western and Chinese theatrical arts.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading

Learn from other’s strong points to offset one’s shortcomings.

取长补短
Qǔ cháng bǔ duǎn
For more than two thousand years caoyun was the centralized transportation system used by central governments of imperial China to collect grain—an important form of tax levied on agricultural land—and transport it to locations such as capitals, the metropolitan garrison, the court, and the metropolitan bureaucracy. The caoyun system consisted of water transportation and land transportation.

The centralized caoyun system of water and land transportation was established during the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) to meet the consumption needs of the government and military and to distribute grain as welfare to people who needed it. During a warring period with a neighboring tribe to the north, Qin Shi Huang—who was the first emperor of the Qin dynasty and unified China—ordered the Linqu Canal to be built. This canal connected the Li Jiang River in Guangxi and the Xiang Jiang River in Hunan, enabling faster supplying of troops.

By the late Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the caoyun system was out of use. One of the obvious reasons for its demise was the destruction of the Grand Canal during the lengthy civil war between Hong Xiuquan’s Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1851–1864) and the Qing government. In fact, in the late nineteenth century China’s modernization and the increasing use of steamships and railways made the caoyun system obsolete.

From the Qin dynasty to the Qing dynasty, a period of about two thousand years, the caoyun system played an important role both politically and economically. The caoyun system was developed and improved throughout the major dynasties in between—the Han (206 BCE–220 CE), Sui (581–618 CE), Tang (618–907 CE), Song (960–1279), Yuan (1279–1368), and Ming (1368–1644).

For instance, during the Han dynasty the Cao Qu Channel was built, running parallel to the Wei River. Hence, the distance of water transportation between the grain-producing areas and the capital city Chang An (Xi’an) was significantly shortened. The amount of grain tribute able to be shipped to the capital had once reached 6 million shi (1 shi is about 62.5 kilograms) a year. The average yearly amount was about 4 million shi, according to historian Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian.

Although the Sui dynasty spanned a relatively short period, its contribution to the caoyun system was significant. The newly dug canals of Guang Tong, Tong Ji, Shan Yang, and Yong Ji had connected five large rivers: Hai, Huang (Yellow), Huai, Yangzi (Chang), and Qiantang. As a result, a great water network was formed that was maintained and expanded by the Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties.

The caoyun system reached its maturity during the Tang dynasty. The Grand Canal served as a lifeline to provide the grain needed by the central government and the capital city. The flow of grain was mainly from south to north and from east to west.

The Song dynasty had its capital at Da Liang (now Kaifeng city in Henan Province). The nearby four
Caoyun System ■ Cáoyun xìtōng ■ 漕运系统

rivers—Bian, Huang, Huimin, and Guangji—were connected to support the distribution of grain tribute.

During the Yuan dynasty the caoyun system experienced a shift from shipment by rivers and the canal systems to shipment by sea. Two special caoyun offices were established. One office was responsible for gathering and transporting grain from all over the empire to the city of Zhongruan. The other office was responsible for shipping the grain from Zhongruan to the capital city Dadu. Three thousand ships were built for the grain tribute.

The Grand Canal, connecting the Qiantang, Yangzi, Huai, Huang, and Hai Rivers, was in its grandeur during the Ming dynasty. Starting in 1415 the Ming dynasty ordered that all grain tribute had to go through the inland rivers and canals. As a result, the grain transported via the Grand Canal system accounted for three-quarters of the total. At the time the Grand Canal ran through most of the major cities.

Like so many other Chinese institutions, the grain tribute system entered a period of crisis during the Qing dynasty. The First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Qing empire and Great Britain severely damaged the Grand Canal. The final blow to the caoyun system came from modern transportation by sea and by railway. In 1872 the Ship Bureau was established in Shanghai. In 1911 a railway between Tianjin and Pukou was opened. The grain tribute system officially ended in 1901. The demise of imperial China followed in 1912.

Di BAI

Further Reading

Once a tree falls, the monkeys on it will scatter.

树倒猢狲散
Shù dǎo hú sūn sàn
Chinese world maps have evolved over the years in response to China’s changing views of the world, from the Song dynasty Huayi Tu (Map of China and the Barbarians), a 3-meter-square work, carved in stone, to a map from a 1912 almanac identifying all the places taken from China by foreign imperialism. Maps could be extraordinarily accurate, but often the lines between “China” and what lay beyond were blurred.

Since at least the tenth century, Chinese scholars have produced what might be called world maps. However, until the late nineteenth century, a person contemplating any given world map might well have difficulty determining exactly where China ended and where the rest of the world began. This difficulty arose because large-scale cartographic representations of space during late imperial times in China involved a number of overlapping political, cultural, and geographical images, identified either by dynastic names (Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing) or by designations such as the Central Cultural Florescence (Zhonghua), the Spiritual Region (Shenzhou), the Nine Regions (Jiuzhou), the Central Kingdom (Zhongguo), the Central Land (Zhongtu), and All under Heaven (Tianxia). The relationship between these conceptions is by no means always evident in traditional Chinese maps.

Many, if not most, premodern Chinese world maps show an abiding concern with the so-called tributary system, which endured as a prominent feature of China’s foreign policy down to the late nineteenth century. This system, which underwent many changes through time, was designed to confirm institutionally the long-standing theory that all of the people living beyond China’s constantly shifting borders, like all those people within them, were in some sense Chinese subjects.

The bringing of tribute to the Chinese emperor by foreign representatives testified to this conceit. As loyal subjects they dated their communications by the Chinese calendar, came to court, presented their local products, and performed all appropriate rituals of submission, including the standard three kneelings and nine prostrations (kowtow). In turn they received a patent of appointment as well as an official seal for correspondence with the Chinese Son of Heaven. They were given lavish presents, offered protection, and often granted privileges of trade at the frontier and at the capital. This assumption of universal overlordship blurred the distinction between maps of China and Chinese maps of the world.

Earliest World Maps

The earliest existing world maps in China date from the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE). One of the most famous examples is the vaguely square-shaped Huayi Tu (Map of China and the Barbarians, 1136), a 3-meter-square work, carved in stone, that boasts about five hundred place names and identifies a dozen or so rivers. The map shows a few foreign lands—notably, Korea and India—but it...
represents more than a hundred different groups of “barbarian” peoples only by written notes in the margins. Several of these notes refer specifically to tributary relationships, past and present.

However, not all Song dynasty renderings of space followed this vague model. Indeed, inscribed on the reverse side of the Huayi Tu is an astonishingly modern-looking work entitled the Yuji Tu (Map of the Tracks of Yu, 1136). It is the earliest existing example of the so-called latticework cartographic grid in China. The outstanding feature of this map, in addition to the near total absence of written commentary, is its extremely accurate depiction of major landforms, including the Shandong Peninsula, as well as China’s two major waterways, the Huang (Yellow) River and the Yangzi (Chang) River. Throughout the remainder of the imperial era, down to 1911, Chinese cartographers continued to produce both kinds of world maps. However, tributary-oriented cultural representations of the Huayi Tu variety vastly outnumbered mathematically accurate ones.

Jesuit missionaries brought sophisticated surveying techniques to China in the seventeenth century, enabling the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to create extraordinarily accurate maps of the empire for certain political and strategic purposes, but they did not inspire a more general cartographic revolution in China, much less provoke a change in the way the Chinese viewed the world. To be sure, Chinese scholars were not averse to using Western cartographic knowledge selectively. Consider, for example, Cao Junyi’s Tianxia Jiubian Fenye Renji Lucheng Quantu (A Complete Map of Allotted Fields, Human Events and Travel Routes [within and without] the Nine Border Areas under Heaven, 1644). This expansive work acknowledges the existence of Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and India, and gestures toward mathematical accuracy by providing longitudinal lines and degrees, which do not, however, correlate well with specific locations. Yet the Middle East and India are represented primarily by cartouches (ornate or ornamental frames), and Africa, which appears only about one-tenth the size of China, hangs down on the western side of Cao’s map as if it were little more than a protective flank. Europe, tiny and even more marginal, is barely recognizable in the upper northwest portion of the map. Significantly, in his treatment of barbarians, Cao does not differentiate clearly between actual foreign countries and the lands and peoples described in ancient mythical works such as the Shanhai Jing (Classic of Mountains and Seas).
Other Cartographic Traditions

The work of Ma Junliang (flourished c. 1780) shows another effort to integrate radically different cartographic traditions into a single production. Although his Jingban Tianwen Quantu (Capital Edition of a Complete Map [Based on] Astronomy, c. 1790) is dominated by a rectangular Huaiyi Tu–style rendering of the world, with inscriptions that emphasize the process by which barbarian envoys come to China and offer themselves as vassals of the Qing dynasty, it also boasts a seventeenth-century Chinese version of a Jesuit map of the Western Hemisphere and a similarly structured, but more detailed, Chinese map of the Eastern Hemisphere that was first published by Chen Lunjong in his Haiguo Wenjian Lu (Record of Things Heard and Seen in the Maritime Countries) in 1730. An interactive version of Ma’s three-part map with commentary can be found at http://library.rice.edu/services/digital_media_center/projects/jingban-tianwen-quantu.
The rise of Western imperialism during the nineteenth century brought a new level of global awareness to China. Intelligence-gathering efforts during the Anglo-Chinese War of 1839–1842 began the process, and by the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the traditional Chinese worldview had been completely undermined. From this time onward, in elite journals and even popular almanacs and encyclopedias, Chinese readers sought ever more accurate knowledge about other parts of the world, including Japan. As in many other aspects of Chinese life after 1895, the rise of Chinese nationalism—generated by China’s humiliating defeat by the Japanese—brought a revolution in Chinese cartography. One revealing example is a map taken from a popular almanac of 1912, the year the Qing dynasty fell. Although not particularly sophisticated in terms of mathematical cartography, it is instructive because its commentaries identify all the places taken from China by foreign imperialism, including the province of Taiwan and the former tributary states of Korea, the Liuqiu Islands, and Vietnam. Chinese cartography had suddenly become irrevocably global in a radically new and highly nationalistic way.

Richard J. SMITH

Further Reading


An unfolded map reveals a dagger.

图穷匕见

Tú qióng bǐ xiàn

Cashmere Industry ▶
Cashmere Industry

Shānyángróng gōngyè 山羊绒工业

The northern border steppes of China have been the world’s largest source of cashmere fiber for centuries, but during the past twenty years, the animal hair processing and textile making industry has expanded greatly, so that it now dominates the global market.

The fiber from different varieties of cashmere goats (Capra hircus laniger) has been a major agricultural product of China’s northern border grasslands for centuries. Cashmere—the fine (dehaired) downy undercoat shed by goats living in the high, dry altitudes of Eurasia—lies beneath the coarse outer hair and provides insulation from the cold. This rare, precious natural fiber (often called soft gold or diamond fiber in China) has been prized since Roman times for its lightness, warmth, and softness. The value of the dehaired cashmere is influenced by its fineness in microns, length in millimeters, and color. For centuries it was used exclusively in luxurious fabrics that only royalty could afford: Napoleon III gave cashmere shawls to the empress Eugenie, and Queen Victoria treasured the fabric. In the 1920s, cashmere fabric was made into fashionable clothing by the Parisian designers Coco Chanel and Jean Patou. Cashmere has remained a highly desirable product ever since.

China is considered the home of the finest cashmere and has become the world’s largest cashmere producer. Although agricultural statistics are unreliable, China is thought to produce around 60-65 percent of the world market of 12,000 tons per year. Mongolia is the second-largest producer with about 3,000 tons annually. Other cashmere-producing countries include Iran, Afghanistan, New Zealand, Nepal, Australia, and the United States. The United States is the largest importer of finished cashmere goods, buying three quarters of all finished cashmere knitwear since 2000, according to The Wall Street Journal (Chen 2001).

The cashmere-manufacturing industry developed in the nineteenth century in Scotland, which was recognized for the specialized-weave knit techniques developed there. In the last decade of the twentieth century, cashmere processing and manufacturing increasingly has moved from Europe to the countries of fiber origin, especially China. It takes a Kashmir goat four years to produce enough hair for one sweater. The herders comb the goats by hand every spring; the hair then is sold in bales. Chinese cashmere-down hair comes from goats grazing on the plains of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and the Himalayan Mountain highlands that lead to the Tibetan Plateau—regions surrounding the Gobi Desert. The fibers are locally combed, cleaned, dyed, and spun before being exported or knitted into fabric in northern Chinese mills.

The Cashmere Industry in China

The cashmere industry is divided into three distinct sectors: raw (or greasy) cashmere gathered by herders; processed (or dehaired) cashmere, which is a refined...
combing, cleaning, and sorting process; and finished (or manufactured) cashmere products, including yarns and clothing. Two kilograms of raw cashmere yield one kilogram of processed cashmere.

Before the 1990s most raw cashmere from China was exported (mainly to Europe) for processing and manufacturing. But in the late 1970s, as the Chinese government began moving to a market economy, government officials looked to establish cashmere factories within China. By the 1980s lower-priced cashmere sweaters and other items were being exported, and over the next ten years, the Chinese cashmere industry grew to monopolize the market. Foreign businesspeople were essentially unable to purchase raw cashmere from China. According to the China Chamber of Commerce of Import/Export of Foodstuffs, Native Produce and Animal By-Products (CFNA), there are now more than 2,000 companies in China processing cashmere that use over 90 percent of the world’s raw cashmere (CFNA 2005).

In addition, these businesses process not only domestic cashmere, but also some imported from Mongolia and other countries. After a change in government in 1996, Mongolian authorities lifted a mid-1990s ban on the export of raw cashmere, replacing it with a 30 percent export tax on raw cashmere. However, the tax was poorly implemented, as corrupt senior officials realized that they could make fortunes by selling raw cashmere tax free to Chinese factories. According to a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) May 2005 cashmere study, it was estimated that 40-50 percent of Mongolian raw cashmere is smuggled, duty free, to China. This has allowed China to capture the

Uygur girl and a goat in Kashgar, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Cashmere is gleaned by combing the fine down from under the goat’s coarse outer coat. It can take three to four goats per year to make one cashmere sweater. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Mongolian raw cashmere-export market, depress the Mongolian manufacturing sector, and take control of the world cashmere market.

In 1997, China produced nearly 10,000 tons of raw cashmere and imported over 800 tons of raw cashmere (primarily from Mongolia), exporting no raw cashmere. A total of over 5,000 tons was processed; half was used in the domestic market and half was exported. The half that remained in China was made into finished goods, about a quarter of which went into domestic sales, while the rest was exported. For the past several years, raw cashmere production in China has stabilized to about 12,000 tons (China Daily 2005).

In Inner Mongolia, the number of goats increased tenfold from 2.4 million in 1949 to almost 26 million in 2004 (Osnos 2006). The sharp increase in demand for raw cashmere has had negative environmental consequences on Chinese and Mongolian grasslands where the goats graze. Overgrazing exacerbated by government-imposed limitations on the amount of pastures accessible to the herders has degraded the quality of grasses and caused desertification. As a result, restrictions on the size of goat herds have been implemented in China, although with only limited success (Zukosky 2008).

Cashmere Trade and Future Prospects

In the 1990s, Chinese decollectivization and promotion of private enterprise manufacturing policies led to the rapid expansion of goat herds and to what most experts agree was an oversupply of low-quality cashmere. World prices of raw cashmere dropped from about $60 per kilogram in 1989 to as low as $15 per kilogram in 1998, before climbing somewhat higher. This accounts for the flood of finished cashmere goods at greatly reduced prices, which became available to middle-class consumers on the world market. With the Asian economic crisis of the 1990s, the main market for cashmere goods shifted from Asia and Europe to the United States, which has favorable import regulations.

China’s supply of raw cashmere is expected to remain stable in the next few years, while worldwide demand for cheap cashmere is expected to continue. But with the recent global economic downturn, rises in hair prices in recent years may depress international demand for finished cashmere goods unless attractively low prices are maintained.

Alicia J. CAMPI

Further Reading


Celadon

Qingcí 青瓷

Celadon wares—ceramics with a green or blue-green glaze—are among the oldest glazed ceramics; they during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). The green color results from a chemical reaction to small amounts of iron and titanium oxide in the glaze during firing in a kiln.

Celadon is the term for a wide range of ceramics with a pale green or blue-green glaze. The origin of celadon can be traced to the first glazed ceramic objects, which appeared during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). The dispersal of celadon across the world indicates a global culture of ceramics that dates to before the era of blue-and-white ware’s dominance in the fourteenth through eighteenth centuries. Indeed, celadon’s global tracks are evidence of the Silk Roads and maritime trade routes linking China with the rest of the world.

Chemically, celadon’s greenish tint results from small amounts of iron and titanium oxide fired in a reducing atmosphere (a kiln atmosphere with a high level of carbon monoxide). Because of the difficulty of maintaining the reducing atmosphere in a kiln during firing, and thus maintaining the chemical reaction, celadon glazes also contain olive and yellow colors.

Conceptually, ancient celadon wares stand in contrast to the class of ceramics known as “porcelain,” a distinction based on body composition, firing temperature range, and degree of vitrification. The term porcelain technically connotes use of petuntse (a form of feldspar occurring only in China) and kaolin, which is a fine, white clay. The combination of these two materials made for a higher firing range. Porcelain stone was first utilized in ceramic making during the tenth century, when potters extracted the raw material in southern China at the porcelain center of Jingdezhen, Jiangxi Province. Porcelain rose in prominence, and the wares were more produced prolific after the late fourteenth century due to the official patronage of Jingdezhen porcelain by the Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), who set up an official administrative unit to govern porcelain one year before they conquered all of China. By contrast, ancient celadon encompasses the stonewares that dominated production before the rise of porcelain production in the tenth century.

Development

The first ceramic glazes appeared in China during the Shang dynasty. The bodies of glazed ceramics were high fired, meaning that their firing temperature was around 1,200° C. In general, they were used mostly in ritual ceremonies. By the eastern Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) the centers of celadon production were located primarily in modern-day Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces in the lower Yangzi (Chang) River valley. The celadons produced during this time were also fired at around 1,200° C. Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces correspond roughly with the territories under the control of the Yue and Wu states, thereby explaining the common association of the term Yue ware with types of ancient celadon. During the third and fourth centuries celadon production spread to

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Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi provinces. Celadons were produced in southern and northern kilns from the seventh century onward. Their main period of development occurred between 220 CE and 618 CE, encompassing the North and South Dynasties period (220–589 CE) and the Sui dynasty (589–618 CE). Technical development of ancient celadon production culminated during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), when they were fired in kilns in the region known then as “Yuezhou” (present-day southern Zhejiang Province). The eighth century brought a resurgence of the greenwares of the Yue kilns, whose term was revived from five hundred years earlier, when it was first used during the Han dynasty. Celadons were the dominant type of wares produced until the late fourteenth century, when they were surpassed by the growing demand for white-bodied porcelains with white-blue glaze made in Jingdezhen, a southern kiln site. This change was also marked by the rise in prominence of blue-and-white wares and a shift in porcelain production centers from the northern kiln sites to southern kiln sites. The Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) brought an increased production of celadon referred to as “Ru ware” and “Guan ware” at kiln sites. After the capital moved to Hangzhou in southern China, celadons—known as “Longquan wares”—were produced at the Longquan kilns, also in southern Zhejiang Province near present-day Wenzhou city. The production of blue-green, thickly glazed, simply shaped celadon stonewares in Longquan County marked another notable point in celadon history.

History of Terminology

In Chinese-language texts, celadon wares are known simply as “greenware,” demonstrating the crucial place of color in celadon’s definition. The comprehensive Chinese-language technical guide to porcelain, entitled Records of Jingdezhen Pottery (Jingdezhen Taolu), dating to the turn of the nineteenth century, refers to celadon wares using the terms for their glaze color, qing and qingci. Translated directly, these two terms mean “greenware.” The Western derivation of the term celadon may have begun in 1171 with a corruption of the name of the sultan Saladin, who made a gift of such celadon wares to the sultan of Damascus, or with the seventeenth-century French play written by Honore Darfe, which featured the shepherd Celadon who...
wore a greenish-gray cloak. Thus, in Western etymological terms, no technical description of the term *celadon* exists. Rather, *celadon* is simply a term whose history comprises descriptive usages.

Ancient celadon has been praised by Chinese writers and collectors in many ways, variously compared with the color of jade or clouds or the sound of light rain. During the Tang dynasty the revival of Yue kilns in southern Zhejiang Province resulted in part from official patronage of celadon wares by the Yue royal families and from the growing popularity of tea drinking as an art and cultural form in China, as well as among other East Asian places. In this cultural context an important document detailing the aesthetics and intricacies of tea drinking reveals the high value of Yue celadon wares at the time. The document, *Classic of Tea* (*Chajing*), written by Lu Yu (733–805 CE), was the first monograph on tea ever written. It comprised ten chapters and praised Yue porcelain for resembling jade and ice. The green color of Yue porcelain, according to Lu Yu, enhanced the green color of the tea itself. About a hundred years later, another poem, written by Xu Yin, a Tang dynasty poet and official active during the late ninth and early tenth centuries, lauded the ability of celadons to enhance the experience of drinking tea. The title of this poem refers to celadons as “secret color” (*mise*):

**The Secret-Colored Bowl as Given to the Emperor**

NEWLY GLAZED IN AUSPICIOUS JADE-LIKE COLORS,

the finished bowl was first given to my lord.

skillfully molded like a clear moon dyed with spring water,

deftly rotated like thin ice holding green clouds,

like a moss-covered ancient bronze mirror present at this occasion,

a tender, dew moistened lotus leaf parted from the river’s edge,

with zhongshan bamboo-leaf wine so recently brewed,

i am weak and unable to withstand such an experience! (Mino and Tsiang 1986, 13)

Evidently, as this poem shows, literati during this period appreciated celadons and compared them with ice, clouds, and jade. The term *mise* (secret color) ware originated during the Wu Yue state of the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE). According to the *Jingdezheng Taolu* (Records of Jingdezhen Pottery), production of secret-color ware began during the tenth century and ceased at the beginning of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), and because it existed for specific use at the imperial palace, the ceramics acquired the term *mise*.

**Technological Definition**

The scientific and industrial revolution of the mid-nineteenth century produced new understandings of porcelain. Alexandre Brongniart, a French chemist writing in 1844 as director of the French national ceramic manufacturing center at Sevres, attributed to porcelain these distinctive characteristics: whiteness, translucency, hard paste, not to be scratched by steel, homogeneous, resonant, vitrified, and impermeable to water. In Brongniart’s studies ceramics consisted of three types: earthenware, stoneware, and porcelain. Celadon, according to these types, is stoneware. Stoneware, which dates to the Shang dynasty, was fired at temperatures ranging between 1,100° and 1,270° C. Stoneware has also been called “porcelain ware,” and it includes vitrified objects. By the Han dynasty glazes containing ash content gave rise to the color now subsumed in the definition of celadon, a stoneware of brownish-green or yellowish-green glazes. Also during the early western Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) the word *zi*, an antecedent of the word *ci* (porcelain), was first used to refer to celadons, which were used in burial tombs of elites.

Twentieth-century scientific studies revealed a wide array of chemical elements in various celadon glazes, including calcium, magnesium, soda, phosphorus, titanium, aluminum, silica, and potassium. The degree of translucency or transparency depends on the interaction between the physical properties of light rays and their interaction with heterogeneities of the glaze at the surface and beneath the surface. Approximately 4–6 percent of incidental light rays are reflected and scattered at the outer surface of the glaze. Glazes with elements having a higher atomic number, such as lead, and having a higher mass weight, reflect more light. Glazes of such composition thus appear brighter than feldspathic (relating to or containing feldspar) or alkaline glazes.

The portions of incidental light rays that do pass through the surface are then affected by the internal
structures in the glaze. Bubbles of 0.1 millimeter or smaller in the glaze produce specular reflection, just like the glaze surface. As a result, light bounces off each of the bubbles and produces the glaze’s brightness and luminosity. Undissolved quartz particles absorb light and make the glaze appear matte. Crystals in the glaze result from the long firing and slow cooling at high temperatures. When raw materials are not finely ground and are insufficiently mixed, chemical heterogeneity ensues and creates a chemical composition similar to the crystal. Fine crystals on the order of microns in the glaze refract and scatter the light, thus giving a translucent appearance to the glaze. A rough layer of crystals at times grows at the layer where the glaze touches the clay body, creating the optical effect of a white slip. This layer of white ground reacts with the light and creates internal reflection in the glaze. The combined effect of bubbles, quartz inclusions crystals, and white grounds adds a depth and a luster to celadon glazes that make them appear like jade or green feldspar.

**Major Types of Ancient Celadon**

There are six major classifications of celadon, one of which, Chai ware, survives today only as described in historical texts. The availability of local minerals was a big factor in the makeup and appearance of the various styles.

**Yue Ware**

Yue ware dominated the history of ancient celadon from the Han dynasty to the sixth century CE. Coming to prominence between the third and sixth centuries, the bodies of Yue ware were gray and dense with a thin layer of glazes. Yue ware experienced a revival during the Tang dynasty and was found in Iraq and Iran. Its glazes averaged about 0.2 millimeters and had a high calcium content—up to 60 percent. It was fired mostly in the dragon kilns popular in Zhejiang Province, which caused a rapid cooling cycle. Yue celadons are not as translucent and jade-like as later celadons.

**Longquan Ware**

Longquan celadons, made in a mountainous region in Zhejiang Province southwest of present-day Shanghai close to Fujian Province, were produced during the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) and probably are the best known of all celadon types. They are a translucent blue-green color and are often found in the shapes of bowls and jars. They were traded to places such as Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Africa, and the Near East between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Thicker than the earlier Yue celadon glazes, Longquan celadon glazes ranged from 0.4 millimeters to 1.7 millimeters thick, thus creating a more translucent visual effect than the earlier Yue.
Celadons. Longquan wares contain small amounts of undissolved clay and quartz, indicating that the Longquan glazes are not as finely grained as Yue ware glazes.

**YAOZHOU WARE**

During the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) celadon wares known for their molded and incised decorations were produced in Shaanxi Province. They supplanted the white wares and black-glazed wares of the north. Their glaze was gray-green or olive-green, thinly laid over deeply carved or molded bodies. The thickness of the glaze ranged from 0.4 to 0.8 millimeters and was not as unctuous (smooth and greasy in texture or appearance) as that of Longquan wares. The presence of titanium in the raw materials available in the north was responsible for the olive-green hue of the glaze. The titanium increases the brown color when combined with iron in the glazes.

**RU WARE**

Ru ware, another type of Northern Song celadon known for its opaque, unctuous blue glaze on often-undecorated bodies, appeared near the end of the eleventh century. It is extremely rare, with fewer than one hundred complete pieces preserved, mostly in the Percival David collection in London or in the National Palace Museum. Presumably fired for the imperial court, Ru ware was produced only between 1086 and 1106 and was immediately treasured during the twelfth century because of its short production period. Ru ware was probably ordered to replace Ding ware, whose rough, unglazed rim did not please the court. The Ru glaze is so thickly applied that it was likened to layers of fat in the Chinese-language connoisseur texts.

**GUAN WARE**

Guan ware was produced during the Northern and Southern Song dynasties. The Southern Song Guan wares were produced for the imperial court, and thus the term *guan* refers to “official” ware. During the Southern Song dynasty the center of production for Guan ware was right outside Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province, where the court reestablished its capital city after the conquest of the northern provinces by the Mongol Yuan dynasty. Guan glazes are often more than 1 millimeter thick, crackled, and opaque, and the bodies are dark-colored and thin. The bodies are granular because of the presence of find sand in the body composition. Guan wares have a dark mouth (rim) and dark foot, referred to literally as “iron foot” in Chinese-language texts. Modern examinations of Guan shards (pieces or fragments of a brittle substance) reveal that the glaze was often applied by potters in an average of four layers. The high lime content accounts for the crackle. Guan ware is often underfired at a temperature of 1,000° C.

**CHAI WARE**

To date, no archaeological findings can confirm the actual existence of Chai celadon. However, numerous ceramic connoisseurship texts praise Chai ware for being “blue as sky, clear as mirror, thin as paper, and resonant as a musical Bowl made at You-chou kiln, Shaanxi Province, eleventh/twelfth century (Song dynasty). Northern celadon porcelain. Shown at the Ceramic Exhibition, Imperial Palace, Beijing. Photo and caption by Joan Lebold Cohen.
stone” (Hayashiya and Hasebe 1996, 48). Qing dynasty (1644–1912) texts on ceramics note that Chai ceramics were produced for Emperor Chai Shizong (954–959). This elusive but poetically described celadon ware awaits more research, but its mention in texts demonstrates the aesthetic significance of celadon's natural beauty.

**Export History**

The Tang dynasty was an exuberant period of Chinese artistry and foreign contact. Yue celadons were a large part of the export trade between China and Central Asia since the time of the Tang dynasty. Yue celadon wares dating to the ninth century have been found in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Persian Gulf, and Cairo. The early ninth century brought a large-scale oceangoing trade between the Persian Gulf and China, affecting the trade of celadon ceramics. The first countries to import and even improve upon celadon technology were Korea and Japan. Korea in particular was a major player in the production of celadon. In the eleventh century Korean potters substituted porcelain stone for body clay in their celadon glaze recipes and produced brilliant blue-green celadon wares.Excavated Longquan wares and Guan wares dating to the thirteenth century have been found in Japan and Korea, demonstrating the continued trade of celadon wares through the Yuan dynasty. Longquan wares made during the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties were exported to Japan and the Philippines, and the presence of such late greenware ceramics in Japanese museums reveals the widespread appreciation for the simplicity and elegance of celadon glazes.

Ellen HUANG

**Further Reading**


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Steal beams and replace them with poles.

偷梁換柱

Tōu liáng huàn zhù
Central Asia-China Relations

Zhōngyà gèguó hé Zhōngguó de wàijiāo guānxi
中亚各国和中国的外交关系

China has complicated relations with the central Asian nations that became independent of the Soviet Union after 1991. Issues include boundary disputes, population growth, economy, nationalism, and separatist movements.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 China faced the challenge of managing bilateral relations with the newly independent nations of central Asia. The independence of these nations worsened long-simmering ethnic unrest in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which borders several central Asian nations. China, after establishing relations with the central Asian nations in early 1992, signed with them more than twenty agreements on boundaries and cultural and economic cooperation within a short period.

Unequal Treaties

The boundary between China and central Asia was originally established by so-called unequal treaties—the 1860 Treaty of Beijing, the 1864 Protocol on the Northwest Boundary, the 1881 Sino-Russian Treaty of Ili, and the 1884 Sino-Russian Treaty of Kashgar. According to China, these treaties gave czarist Russia 440,000 square kilometers of land at the expense of China. After the central Asian nations became independent, China was willing to accept the unequal treaties as the basis for new boundary agreements.

After several years of negotiation, on 4 July 1996 China reached a boundary agreement with Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan and China have since reached agreements to open new border crossings and to build a railway linking the two nations. On 4 July 1998 leaders of China and Kazakhstan signed a boundary treaty that settled lingering questions about the 1,700-kilometer Sino-Kazakh boundary.

China and Tajikistan settled their historically complicated boundary dispute in 2002. China claimed that Russia violated the 1884 Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty in 1892 and occupied 28,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory in the Pamir Mountains and that the boundary remained undefined. Nevertheless, the two nations negotiated many agreements, including one to open a road connecting China and Tajikistan to ease border trade before settling the boundary dispute. In the final settlement, China received approximately 1,000 square kilometers of its original claim.

Demographic and Economic Threat

The central Asian nations view China as a demographic and economic threat. One of their concerns is China’s dramatic increase in population. Central Asia, with its vast territory and rich natural resources, is a logical area for China to covet. More than 300,000 Chinese have settled in central Asia, and that number may increase to 500,000 by the end of 2010. In fact, officials in Kazakhstan...
worry that if the flood of Chinese coming into their country continues, Chinese could overwhelm Kazakhstan by 2020. In addition, Chinese traders have bought considerable amounts of real estate in Kyrgyzstan.

For its part China is apprehensive about instability along its border. After a summit in Shanghai, on 26 April 1996 Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement with China concerning confidence-building measures along the border. On 24 April 1997 the nations agreed to withdraw military forces 100 kilometers along the 3,500-kilometer boundary. A third agreement, signed on 3 July 1998, stressed cooperation to lessen ethnic unrest in the region. Each nation promised to fight arms smuggling and not to allow its territory to be used to undermine the national sovereignty, social order, and security of any of the five nations.

Nationalism and Separatist Movement

Ethnic unrest in Xinjiang Autonomous Region has been a major concern for China since the independence of the central Asian nations. A continuing source of stress in China–central Asia relations has been the sensitive subjects of pan-Turkic nationalism and the Xinjiang separatist movement. China historically has struggled to maintain central government control over that region. Recent issues have been Russian and Soviet intrigue and local independence movements. In 1944 the short-lived East Turkistan Republic was established in what is now Xinjiang Autonomous Region; it had a national anthem and a national flag—a white crescent and star against a blue background. The Uyghurs of Xinjiang, led by Islamic scholars, wanted a homeland free of Chinese influence. China in 1962 put down a revolt by thousands of Kazakhs, who then fled across the border to Soviet Kazakhstan. China now feels that the simmering independence movements in Xinjiang Autonomous Region are the main threat to stability in western China.

A central point in most discussions between China and central Asian nations is a commitment not to support separatist movements. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, with 80,000 and 200,000 Uygurs, respectively, have agreed to suppress such movements. Several separatist movements have migrated from Kazakhstan to Turkey, and Kyrgyzstan has suppressed organization of an ethnic Uyghur political party. The Uygur nationalist groups that continue to operate in central Asian states remain a major source of tension in their relations with China.

Nations that have fundamentalist Islamic orientations are a factor in fomenting ethnic unrest in the region.
For example, the Jamaat-i-Islami, based in Pakistan, has encouraged Islamic activism in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, as have other Islamist movements such as the Taliban (when it was in power in Afghanistan). Uygurs receive religious training in Pakistan, and Islamic and Afghan militants have smuggled arms into China. The number of Islamic schools in China has increased rapidly; in 1997 the government shut down as many as three hundred “illegal” schools. Some neighborhood mosques have become the focus of anti-Chinese activity. China has clamped down on what it considers to be illegal religious activities and has closed many mosques.

The increase in ethnic unrest and pro-independence demonstrations and other activities has deep religious and historical roots and will continue for the foreseeable future. Many leaders are not simply religious fanatics but rather are pan-Turkic nationalists. Support for their movement comes from neighboring Turkic-speaking countries. In spite of a pledge by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan not to support the Xinjiang separatist movement, supporters of the movement openly operate from these two countries. Uygurs living in Turkey also support the movement. Anti-Chinese colonialism and pan-Turkic nationalism are important sources of the unrest. Uygurs are attempting to preserve their cultural identity and to resist the large influx of Chinese settlers into their region.

**Increasing Border Trade**

During the 1990s central Asia quickly became an important part of China's economic attention. Border trade is a vital part of growing economic relations. In 1989 Xinjiang Autonomous Region's trade with Soviet central Asia totaled only $118.5 million. In 1995 total trade between China and central Asia was estimated at $718 million, of which $500 million was border trade. China since 1991 has become the second-largest trading partner for central Asian nations, significantly displacing Russian influence in the region. Kazakhstan's major trading partner is now China, and one-quarter of Kyrgyzstan's foreign trade is with China. As of 2008 trade with China (including oil exports) has increased to account for 60 percent of the region's foreign trade.

The development of gas and oil is an area of vital strategic economic cooperation. China and Turkmenistan in 1994 signed an agreement to build a Turkmenistan-China-Japan gas pipeline. In 1997 China won the bid to develop Kazakhstan's Uzen oil field and to build a 3,000-kilometer oil pipeline from Kazakhstan's Caspian oil fields at Tengiz to Xinjiang Autonomous Region and then to China's east coast. China also signed agreements with Kazakhstan to develop the Aktyubinsk oil fields along the Russian-Kazakh border. China's total investment in developing oil resources in Kazakhstan is estimated at $9.7 billion. That is equivalent to 50 percent of Kazakhstan's gross national product. Such agreements indicate that China and central Asia are developing an important economic and strategic relationship. China not only is seeking to ensure its energy security for the future but also is seeking to shift the focus of central Asia's global vision toward China and away from Turkey and Russia.

**Eric HYER**

**Further Reading**


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Changling Mausoleum

The Changling Mausoleum is the resting place of the Ming Yongle Emperor (reigned 1403–24), whose given name was Zhu Di and whose posthumous title is Chengzu. At 120,000 square meters, it is one of the grandest and certainly the best preserved of all of the Thirteen Ming Tombs (shisan ling) that lie roughly 45 kilometers north of Beijing in a valley below the Tianshou Mountains.

Emperor Ming Yongle, or Zhu Di as he was known at birth, was an emperor of usurpation. He gained the title after a four-year war with his nephew, whom the first Ming emperor had chosen for the throne. Like the construction of the Forbidden City in Beijing, which Zhu Di designated the Ming capital after his ascension to the throne, the building of the Changling Mausoleum was yet another project to legitimate Zhu Di as the true successor to the Ming emperorship, and Beijing as the true capital of the Ming Empire.

The construction of Changling began in 1409. By 1413, the underground tomb was completed. The exact structure of the Changling tomb is not known, but it is likely that it is similar in construction to the excavated Dingling tomb. Upon completion of the tomb, Zhu Di ordered the body of his empress Xu, which was being kept in Nanjing, to be buried in the tomb chamber. The tomb was covered with a large mound, or tumulus, which remains undisturbed today.
Over the next fourteen years, workers continued to build the complex of ceremonial halls leading to the Changling tumulus. The entire complex runs roughly from south to north, ending at the tumulus. It is approached almost directly from the Spirit Path (shen dao) upon which all emperors living or dead must be carried as they approach the Thirteen Tombs. Following a slightly winding road around 5 kilometers northward from the exit of the Spirit Path, one reaches the entrance to Changling, a standard ceremonial arched gateway with three entrances. The emperor would pass through the central entrance, while nobles passed through the right entrance and officials through the left. The design of the Changling is quite similar in ways to that of the Forbidden City, also constructed under the Yongle reign.

Built upon a hillside, the ceremonial path through the tomb complex leads northward and upward. Beyond the entrance and to the right lies a double-eaved wooden pavilion erected in 1542, housing a stele carried by a mythical animal with a tortoise body symbolizing longevity and with a coiling dragon on top. During the Ming, the stele contained no epitaph, but during the Qing it was engraved with imperial edicts and poems of Qing emperors, who sought to legitimize their own succession by honoring the Ming imperial tombs.

The imperial pathway then passes through the Ling’en Gate, an open hall with three entranceways. A set of stairs leads to the gate on both sides. Upon the central stairway over which the living emperor passed as he paid homage to his ancestors is a marble carving showing water, deer,
mountains, and two dragons flying in clouds, symbolizing imperial power or perhaps the soul of the emperor in the afterlife. Two sacrificial burners lie on either side of the north exit of the gate, which faces into a large square section containing the Ling’en ceremonial hall. These burners were meant for silk, money, and other combustible items that could be sent on to the afterlife by burning them.

This Ling’en hall is a uniquely preserved feature of Changling and by far its most distinguished. It is the second largest hall of its type that still survives from the Ming dynasty. The hall is elevated and is approached by a set of stairs with marble balustrades. Like the halls of the Forbidden City, there are three tiers, the lower symbolizing hell, the middle earth, and the higher heaven. A marble pathway built for the emperor lies upon the middle stair.

The hall is covered by a large double-eaved rooftop, decorated with images of dragons and other mythical creatures. Supporting the roof are sixty columns constructed out of nanmu, a fragrant cedar indigenous to southwestern China. It took about five years on average for each tree to be transported to the northern tomb, which helps to explain why it took workers another four years after the emperor’s death to complete this building and the tomb complex. During the Ming dynasty, the Yongle emperor’s spirit tablet was kept in the hall, and during ceremonies such as Yongle’s birthday, the living emperor, nobles, and officials would give food and other offerings to the spirit tablets of the emperor and empress.

Having passed through the Ling’en hall, one enters through a simple gateway known as a “stargazing gate” to

**Altar in front of the stele tower, Tomb of Emperor Zhu Di (the Yongle emperor).** Vessels used for offerings were usually made of lacquer, metal, or ceramic, but here they have been fashioned for posterity out of marble. The central vessel simulates a censer (incense burner) in a ding tripod shape. The sculptor has formalized the vaporous emissions, like a great conical hat. A dragon resides in this cloud. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
the Soul Tower, a pavilion built atop a tall stone edifice containing a stele commemorating the Yongle Emperor. Before the Soul Tower is a marble altar containing five ceremonial objects—the last step in the ritual process of obeisance to the spirit of the emperor. A passageway leads through the fortification and around the other side to the Soul Tower. Behind the Soul Tower lies the tumulus, which is still undisturbed.

The Changling Mausoleum provided the basic blueprint for the construction of the subsequent twelve surrounding Ming tombs, though they all differ in detail. Some scholars speculate that were it not for the construction of Changling, Beijing may not have remained the imperial capital, as it was vulnerable to attacks from the Mongols. Moreover, in 1421, the year that Zhu Di finally led the imperial retinue to the new capital from Nanjing, some palaces in the newly built Forbidden City were struck by lightning and burnt down. While some officials saw this as a bad omen and suggested moving back to Nanjing, others remarked that the imperial tomb was already in the area of Beijing, thus justifying remaining there despite the ill omen. In this sense, Changling was the anchor that held the capital in Beijing.

One of the reasons that the tomb complex is so well preserved is that Mao Zedong paid a visit to Changling in 1954, thereby consecrating it as a historical site and preserving it from the ravages of the Cultural Revolution.

Andrew FIELD

Further Reading


CHEN Cheng
Chén Chéng 陈诚
1898–1965  Military leader under Chiang Kai-shek

Chen Cheng was Chinese Nationalist Party leader Chiang Kai-shek’s right-hand man during the early years of the Republic of China (1912–1949) and later, under Chiang, was premier of the Guomindang (Kuomintang) government-in-exile in Taiwan.

Chen Cheng was born in Zhejiang Province. He attended Whampoa (黃浦 Huangpu) Military Academy, where he met Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) leader Chiang Kai-shek, whom he eventually followed into exile. During the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945) he was China’s minister of war. Later he was promoted to a full general, chief of general staff, and commander-in-chief of the Chinese navy.

After Chiang’s defeat in the Civil War between the Nationalists and Communists (1945–1949), Chen fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek and became governor of Taiwan (1949–1950). He also served nonconsecutive terms as premier of Chiang’s government-in-exile in Taiwan from 1950 to 1954 and from 1958 to 1963. Chen’s major

Chen Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s “right-hand man,” at a tree planting ceremony in Yilan County, 1954. By instituting universal primary education and expanding opportunities for secondary and college education, Chen promoted strong investment in “human capital.”
accomplishments in Taiwan included land reform policies, which had two major components: (1) He reduced rents by 37.5 percent on crop-producing land, and (2) he sold public land held by the ROC government to tenant farmers. In addition, Chen implemented a massive program to provide farmers with new technology, obtained through U.S. assistance, to maximize production. Chen implemented the so-called import substitution policy, establishing strong government control over many kinds of imports to protect the domestic market from foreign competition, while saving foreign exchange for products that Chen thought could be used to promote Taiwan’s industrialization. Furthermore, he promoted strong investment in “human capital” by instituting universal primary education and expanding opportunities for secondary and college education.

Winberg CHAI

Further Reading
Chen Duxiu 陈独秀
1879–1942  Chinese Communist Party founder

Chen Duxiu 陈独秀, founder of the Chinese Communist Party and a leader of the New Culture Movement (c. 1915–1923), was a lifelong rebel who fought corrupt political practice, first against the Qing dynasty, then against the warlord Yuan Shikai 袁世凯, and finally against the ruling Guomindang 国民党 (Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石).

Chen Duxiu was a classically trained scholar-turned-rebel who published the famous journal, *New Youth (Xin Qingnian)*, which persuaded an entire generation of young intellectuals to repudiate their own culture and to embrace a Western scientific frame of mind and a democratic political outlook. At the same time, he and his fellow intellectual Hu Shi 胡适 succeeded in bringing about the vernacular movement, or the change from writing in a classical to a colloquial syntax. In 1920 he established the Shanghai Marxist Study Society, which was the precursor of the Chinese Communist Party. He was expelled from the party in 1929.

Chen was born in Huai-ning (now Anqing), Anhui Province. Classically educated, he placed first in the first-level civil service exam at age seventeen. He failed the next level of exam but wrote *A Treatise on the Defense of the Yangzi River* — a reflection of his growing patriotism — a year later. He studied in Japan on five occasions and joined the Youth Society, in 1902. He was expelled from Japan in 1903 for cutting off the queue (a braid of hair usually worn hanging at the back of the head) of a Chinese official — an
act that symbolized his hatred for the ineffective and corrupt Qing dynasty (1644–1912). He returned home and formed the Anhui Patriotic Society. In 1903, with the closing of the revolutionary newspaper Subao, Chen and his friends edited its replacement, The Citizen's Daily (Guomin riribao). When this enterprise fell apart due to internal dissent, Chen returned to his home province and published the Anhui Vernacular Paper in 1904. For a brief period he also learned to make bombs with the Shanghai Assassination Squad established by Cai Yuanpei. Chen formed an anti-Manchu organization, the Yuewanghui, in 1905 and was implicated in Xu Xilin’s assassination of Governor-General Enming.

After the 1911 revolution, which established Republican China (1912–1949), Chen briefly served as secretary-general of the Anhui provisional government and helped to develop a military strategy to overthrow President Yuan Shikai. When the attempt failed, Chen escaped to Japan and edited Tiger magazine with Zhang Shizhao in 1914. He returned to Shanghai in 1915 and founded Youth magazine, later renamed New Youth. Chen became the dean of the School of Letters at Beijing University in 1917 at the invitation of Cai Yuanpei, then chancellor of the university. Chen galvanized a generation of young people with his eloquent essay, “Call to Youth” (1915) in which he urged the young to adopt six new attitudes: to be self-directed, progressive, proactive, global, practical, and scientific. He hailed French civilization for bestowing upon humanity three gifts: science, democracy, and socialism. Chen and Professor Hu Shi played a leading role in transforming written Chinese from a classical form to one reflecting the spoken language, a development of enormous importance. Disillusioned by the clash between Western powers in World War I and the outcome of the Treaty of Versailles, and inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Chen turned to Marxism as a means to building a strong, self-sufficient China. Aided by Russian Comintern (the Communist International established in 1919 and dissolved in 1943) agent Gregori Voitinsky, Chen founded the first Communist cell in Shanghai in the summer of 1920 and was elected secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at its first congress on 23 July 1921. In 1920 Chen also served briefly as education secretary for the Guangzhou (Canton) warlord Chen Jiongming. As party secretary from 1921 to 1927 Chen Duxiu repeatedly protested Moscow’s contradictory directive to join the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) and usurp its power from within. He was blamed by the CCP for carrying out Comintern orders to conduct doomed labor and peasant uprisings in the face of overwhelming opposition by the warlords and by General Chiang Kai-shek. He resigned as party secretary on 15 July 1923 and was expelled from the CCP on 15 November 1929 for failing to follow Comintern directives, for being antiparty, and for thinking like a Trotskyite (an adherent of Russian Communist leader Leon Trotsky). Chen joined the Chinese Trotskyites for a brief period. He was jailed by Chiang Kai-shek from 1932 to 1937. In prison he pursued his scholarly interest in phonetics and philology (the study of literature and of disciplines relevant to literature or to language as used in literature). He died destitute five years after his release from prison.

Anne Shen CHAO

Further Reading


Film director Chen Kaige became the first member of the so-called Fifth Generation of Chinese film directors to win international success when he made *Yellow Earth* in 1984. His latest film is *Forever Enthralled* (2008).

With his film *Yellow Earth* (1984), Chen Kaige became the first member of the so-called Fifth Generation of Chinese film directors to attain international success. The Fifth Generation, whose members were graduates of the first class of the reopened Beijing Film Academy after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), came of age after the death of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and reacted against the didacticism and melodrama of China’s film tradition.

*Yellow Earth* contains beautiful visuals similar to Chinese paintings. Deceptively simple with minimal action and dialogue, the film is a multilayered examination of the effect of China’s feudal culture and modern revolution on the peasants.

Chen’s next film to gain international fame was *Farewell My Concubine* (1993). This film is set in the Beijing Opera of the twentieth century and deals with the betrayal of...
love and art. It won the Palme d’Or prize at the Cannes Film Festival and other awards. Chen’s 1999 film, *The Emperor and the Assassin*, is a historical epic about Qin dynasty emperor Shi Huangdi or Ying Zheng, who unified China in the third century BCE.

In the 1980s and 1990s Chen and other filmmakers achieved success in international film festivals and art house markets and looked overseas for financing for their projects. His 2005 film *The Promise* was edited and adapted for North American audiences and released in May 2006; his most recent film *Forever Enthralled* (2008) is a biographical film based on the life of Mei Lanfang, the male Beijing Opera star famous for playing women’s roles.

Robert Y. ENG

Further Reading


The more you try to cover things up, the more exposed they will be.

欲盖弥彰

Yù gài mí zhāng
Chen Shui-bian was the second Taiwanese native to be elected president of Taiwan, winning his first term in 2000 and his second term in 2004. (Lee Teng-hui was the first native-born Taiwanese elected president.) Chen's second term ended in May 2008, and by law he was not permitted to run for a third term.

Chen Shui-bian was born into a poor family in Tainan, Taiwan, on 18 February 1951. He graduated from National Taiwan University, majoring in law, in 1974. He began his law practice in 1976, gaining prominence in 1980 when he defended Annette Lu (his second-term vice president) against charges that she helped organize an antigovernment political protest that became violent. The protest, known as the "Kaohsiung Incident" after the city in which it took place in December 1979, resulted in alleged injuries to 181 police officers, although no protesters were injured. The government, dominated by the Guomindang (Kuomintang, Chinese Nationalist Party), held a trial in March 1980 and sentenced the organizers to jail. Chen himself was convicted of slander and forced to serve a short jail sentence.

Chen Shui-bian, former president of Taiwan, and Congressman Gary Ackerman of New York. Chen's political career began in 1981 when he was elected to the Taipei City Council, where he served until 1985 as a non-Kuomintang member. Soon Chen became prominent within the Democratic Progressive Party, rising to become president in 2000.
Chen's political career began in 1981 when he was elected to the Taipei City Council, where he served until 1985 as an independent (that is, non-Guomindang) member. Soon Chen became prominent within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), serving most notably as a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee, 1987–1989; DPP Caucus member, 1990–1993; and convener of the DPP’s National Defense Committee, 1992–1994. He was also elected to Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, 1989–1994, during which time he chaired the Formosa Foundation (1990).

In 1994 Chen was elected mayor of Taipei, defeating the Guomindang incumbent Huang Ta-chou. Chen lost his reelection bid in 1998 to Ma Ying-jeou of the Guomindang. However, this loss afforded Chen the time to prepare his run for the presidency in 2000, when he won with less than 40 percent of the votes cast after the Guomindang split into two parties, thus dividing the electorate three ways. Chen was the least known of the candidates and had not been expected to win. In 2004 Chen was reelected president with the help of former President Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwan Solidarity Union, although his razor-thin margin of victory generated some controversy. Just hours before votes were to be cast, Chen and vice presidential candidate Annette Lu were allegedly shot at by a would-be assassin using a “home-made” bullet. Some in the opposition implied that the shooting had been staged to generate sympathy and called for a recount but ultimately were unsuccessful in challenging Chen’s reelection. Later that year, however, Chen’s DPP suffered a setback in the Legislative Yuan elections.

During Chen’s terms as president he faced accusations that his government mismanaged Taiwan’s economy. Even his wife, Wu Shu-chen, and their son-in-law faced legal charges for corruption. Chen Shuibian went on trial in March 2009 on charges of embezzling 104m New Taiwan dollars (£2m) from a special presidential fund, receiving bribes, and laundering money.

Despite these controversies Chen has hoped that history will view him more kindly as the “founding father” of an independent Taiwan for maintaining steadfast, public opposition to Taiwan’s reunification with the Chinese mainland.

Further Reading
Chen Yifei was one of the most prolific and successful artists in twentieth-century China. His paintings were well received by audiences in both Europe and the United States. He was also one of a small number of Chinese painters who was able to sell the majority of his paintings in his lifetime and to demand high prices.

Chen Yifei was born in Zhenhai, Zhejiang Province, and initially trained as an oil painter specializing in the realistic oil painting technique at Shanghai College of Art (or Shanghai Painting Academy) in the 1960s. He received his master of fine arts degree from Hunter College in New York City in the 1980s. At the Shanghai Academy of Art, his formal training was in Russian social realism; however, artists of the Baroque era and Romantic artists (such as the French painter Eugene Delacroix) may have influenced his composition and his use of light and shadow. He was commissioned by the Chinese Communist Party to design inspiration propaganda for the Military Museum in Beijing in 1977. He responded with the ambitious oil painting, Overturning the Dynasty of Chiang Kai-shek, which was completed in collaboration with Wei Jingshan (b. 1943). Another masterpiece, Looking at History from My Space (1979), which has been exhibited in the United States, displays a self-assurance and profound reflection of social realism and patriotic youth. Such views of historical events are characteristic of Chen’s works before 1980.

From 1981 to 1992 Chen resided in and traveled in the United States and Europe and expressed his view of China in a sentimental fashion. His paintings during this time often took as their focus Chinese women figures with elaborate traditional Chinese costumes. A typical example is Lingering Melodies from the Xunyang River (1991), which satisfied Western appetites with the “exoticism” and “Orientalism” of its subjects. From 1993 until 2005 Chen frequently visited China and expanded his artistic talents into industrial endeavors, including films and fashion designs. The first of his films was entitled Haishang jiumeng (Old Dreams of Shanghai, 1993). He died during the filming of his fifth film, Lifa shi (The Barber), in 2005. During his early film career Chen established a modeling agency to recruit and train actresses for his films. Some of these actresses later became models for his oil paintings. His modeling agency and his later work as a fashion designer grew out of his ambitions in the film industry. Through his various endeavors Chen intended to cultivate his actresses in bourgeois taste and manners. In 1997 Chen established his first logo and retail fashion store in Shanghai; today more than 170 retail stores in China bear his logo. During this productive post-1992 period he continued to execute realistic oil paintings. Women figures, dressed in traditional Chinese costumes, remained the focus of his oil paintings. In this last phase of his artistic career he also produced portraits of Chinese ethnic minorities, including Tibetans.

Chen Yifei’s early oil paintings were “academic” and “idealistic” in light of the motivation that sustains his artistic reputation in the modern era. However, such labels minimize the sophistication and depth of his early...
work. His choices of exotic subjects such as fashionable Chinese women were successful in terms of bringing him fame and fortune, but the “commercial” success of these works is controversial in terms of his deeper motivations and apparently compromised ideals. Chen abandoned his idealistic and patriotic view of China and found success in culturally decorative and visually appealing subjects. Furthermore, even though he focused on ethnic minorities in some of his later paintings, this choice comes across as simply a response to demands to produce a trendy cultural product. Although Chen consistently obtained supreme realistic techniques in oil painting, the subject matter and themes in later works failed to match his early monumental pieces in composition, sophistication, complexity, and depth of ideas and ideals.

Diana Y. CHOU

Further Reading


CHEN Yun
Chén Yún 陈云
1905–1995  Early Communist leader

Chen Yun, one of the most influential of China’s early Communist leaders, occupied a central place in the inner circle of leadership for much of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He served on the Central Committee for 56 years and on the Politburo for over four decades—longer than Deng Xiaoping—but was never a contender for the party’s top post.

Considered to be one of China’s “eight immortals,” a group of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) patriarchs who held significant power after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Chen Yun was perhaps most famous for his theory of the “bird-cage economy.” He held that China’s market should be allowed to perform like a bird in a cage. The cage should not be so small that the bird cannot fly, but the bird should remain within the confines of a cage, lest it fly away.

Born in Qingpu near Shanghai on 13 June 1905, Chen worked as a typesetter in Shanghai before joining the CCP in 1925. He participated in the early part of the Long March before being sent to Moscow for training. After returning to China, Chen emerged as a key economic thinker and ideological theorist, especially during the 1942 Rectification Campaign. After the Communists came to power in 1949, Chen became the head economic planner, successfully managing the first phase of industrialization and ending runaway inflation. His economic policies, heavily based on the Soviet model of industrialization, provided the basis for economic development into the mid-1950s. But when the Chinese leadership decided to abandon the Soviet model to follow a more Chinese path to socialism, conflict between Mao and Chen began to emerge.

Chen rejected Mao’s view that economic development could be attained through the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses. Instead, Chen argued for slower and more stable economic growth, saying that the market, rather than mass political mobilization, should play a role in boosting agricultural production. Mao’s view won out, however, in 1956 when he pushed through a plan for collectivization of agriculture and rapid industrialization that eventually led to the Great Leap Forward and the deaths of 40 million Chinese from starvation between 1958 and 1961.

Following the Great Leap Forward, Chen toured the countryside to assess the movement’s failures and later found support for his criticisms from key leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. By 1962, Chen’s economic theories were again accepted, and he succeeded in achieving a measure of economic recovery. But his policies were set aside once more in 1966 at the onset of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). His political survival skills served him well, however, as he managed to hold on to his seat on the Central Committee while many other leaders, including Deng, suffered political persecution.

The Cultural Revolution caused significant damage to the Chinese economy, and in 1978 Chen was called on to put things right. He helped bring about the return of
Deng, and for a short time the two developed a partnership that sought to privatize some land for farmers and allow limited foreign investment—ideas that later formed the core of the Deng-era reforms. However, the two came to disagree over the speed and scope of reform. By 1984, Chen had become one of Deng’s harshest critics as the economy moved further from central control and more toward open markets.

In 1987, Chen “retired” from his official post on the Central Committee but remained highly influential behind the scenes. After the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, he came out in support of Deng and the military. But he remained a constant critic of economic reforms into the 1990s, faulting the reformers for producing unbalanced regional growth and for failing to balance the budget. By the time of his death on 10 April 1995, he held little political influence. His economic theories, once considered to be advanced, were now seen as hard-line and conservative. China’s economy had already flown too far toward open markets to be brought back into the “bird cage.”

Joel R. CAMPBELL

Further Reading
Chen Ziang helped to instill in early Tang dynasty poetry the need for meaningful content. The past as perfect and the present as flawed were important themes in his poetry.

The influence that Chen Ziang exerted in the development of early Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) poetry is remarkable because he took it from the fashionable concern for ornate style and imbued it with the need for meaningful content. Being a scholar-official, he served the royal court in various capacities while exerting great influence with his writing, both poetry and prose. His entire life was spent serving Empress Wu, the first and only emperor in name of China.

Chen drew his inspiration from the past and looked to the aesthetics of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) to inform and guide his own literary production. Thus, his idea of change was peculiar in that it involved not the invention of new modes of artistic endeavor but rather the restoration of what had existed before and what he felt had slowly been eroded and squandered by the pursuit of an excessively ornamental style in his own day. During the Wei and Han periods he found writing to be concerned with its proper subject: content. He wished to see literature involved not as a means of entertainment but rather as a didactic tool to better the individual and society. Chen’s desire to establish once again ancient modes of literary expression stemmed from his own Confucian ideas that favored simplicity over vain linguistic bedazzlements, shortcomings that he ascribed to courtly decadence. Thus, he promoted the recovering of ancient wisdom that may become a guide for the present. Such an outlook made Chen into an important literary theorist whose concepts would, in time, come to be highly influential on the writers of the later Tang period who adopted his ideal of simplicity and economy of expression over impressive yet meaningless ornamentation.

Some scholars feel that Chen used his poetry to write cryptic attacks on the rule of Empress Wu, especially his noted collection of thirty-eight poems known as the Ganyu. However, it is difficult to imagine that Chen would cast his words in such an arcane fashion because that would defeat his own aesthetic of gaining a mode of expression entirely free of artificial contrivances. Rather, it is more fruitful to view Chen as a thinker concerned with intellectual reforms that would in turn influence the way society functioned and governed itself, which would also be in keeping with his Confucian ideals, which advocated a concern for the here-and-now rather than the hereafter.

The past as perfect and the present as flawed became important themes in the prose and poetry of Chen. Because he cast the past as idealized history, the imitation of which will liberate the present, he sought examples that would serve this end. And yet his approach was never heavy-handed because he also recognized that his aesthetic may well have been futile in that the past forever remains elusive and cannot be fully recovered. In a famous poem, “Song on Ascending the Tower at Yu-chou,” Chen describes this dilemma by stating that the past lies before him in that the ancients are his guides, and the future is behind him in that it consists of people yet unborn.
and therefore unknown. Yet, he is able to see neither the ancients nor the generations yet to come. This realization leads him to a curious existential sadness.

Chen supposedly died in prison, where he had been sent because of his open criticisms of the government. However, his death is a source of contention, and the truth of his last days is unclear.

**Further Reading**


Chengdu is the modern, busy capital city of Sichuan Province in south central China. It is a key economic area, a major transportation hub, an important communication center, and the gateway to the Wolong Nature Reserve, the natural habitat of the giant panda. It also became widely known in 2008: the epicenter of the deadly Sichuan earthquake was a mere 80 kilometers away.

Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province in south-central China, lies on the western edge of the Sichuan Basin. The climate of the area is mild, with long summers and short winters but quite humid and cloudy all year round. Chengdu, in fact, has fewer sunny days per year than London has.

Sichuan Province is rich in natural resources and fertile farmland. The Min and Tuo rivers, two branches of the Yangzi (Chang) River, supply an irrigation area of more than 700 square kilometers (270 square miles) and help supply Chengdu with abundant hydroelectric power.

Chengdu covers a total area of 12,300 square kilometers (4,749 square miles), which is quite large for a city (again, for comparison: London, a large city by any standard, covers 2,263 square kilometers). In China’s administrative structure, Chengdu is one of sixteen subprovincial cities, an entity that controls other cities and counties in its region. A subprovincial city is governed by its province but independently manages its own economy and legal structure. Its status is below that of a municipality, which does not belong to any province, but above that of a prefecture-level city, which is governed by its province. Chengdu’s government controls nine districts, four cities, and six counties.

Greater Chengdu has a population of more than 11 million people. The majority of the people are of the Han ethnic group. Chengdu residents have a reputation for being relaxed and fun loving. The city has more bars and teahouses than Shanghai has, even though Shanghai has twice the number of people. The local cuisine is the hot and spicy Sichuan style, with such popular dishes as dan dan noodles and the many varieties of the hotpot.

Chengdu was founded in the third century BCE by the ancient state of Qin, and benefited from one of the oldest and best Chinese irrigation systems constructed in the same century with water from the Min River, which is still in effective use today. It has remained a prosperous city through the centuries and gained a position as one of the most important trade centers of the empire. Traders in Chengdu were the first to use paper money, in the tenth century. Chengdu also became the center of the silk brocade manufacturing industry.

The 1937–1945 Japanese occupation of eastern China gave Chengdu an unexpected boost because the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) established its capital in Sichuan and moved important industries to the city.

Today Chengdu has a wide variety of industries. Heavy machinery, aluminum plants, chemical plants, and especially electronics are important. In addition,
the textile industry—manufacturing cotton, wool, silk, and satin products—is a major part of the economy. In recent years the city has become a major regional financial center. The city also has a number of universities and other higher education institutions, including Sichuan University and a college of traditional Chinese medicine.

Chengdu received international attention on 12 May 2008 when the deadly Sichuan (or Wenchuan) earthquake struck the region, killing more than 69,000 people and injuring a further 374,000. The initial quake measured 7.9 on the Richter scale, and there were as many as 21,000 aftershocks for several weeks after. The epicenter of the earthquake was 80 kilometers (50 miles) northwest of Chengdu in Wenchuan County. The areas hardest hit were within 100 kilometers (62 miles) of the epicenter. Dams, bridges, and schools collapsed, and about 3.5 million homes were destroyed. In some of the smaller cities and villages, as many as 80 percent of the structures were demolished. Estimates are that more than 14 million survivors have had to rebuild their homes.

Chengdu became a hub for rescue operations and humanitarian aid. The city’s hospitals and shelters were forced to erect tents to help care for the injured and homeless. The city itself, however, was mostly untouched. There was no disruption of essential services or business or business. Within a few days of the quake, Chengdu was back to its bustling normalcy.

Bent NIELSEN and Wendell ANDERSON

Further Reading


It is easy to dodge a spear that comes in front of you but hard to avoid an arrow shot from behind.

明枪易躲，暗箭难防

Míng qiāng yì duǒ, àn jiàn nán fāng
CHIANG Ching-kuo

Jiǎng Jingguó 蒋经国

1910–1988  Former president of Taiwan

Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek (also a former president of the Republic of China, i.e., Taiwan, 1949– ), was arguably the most influential political leader in Taiwan until his death in 1988. In a public opinion poll reported by Shijie Ribao (World Journal) in 2007, 65 percent of Taiwanese citizens surveyed ranked Chiang as the president who made the greatest contribution to Taiwan.

Chiang Ching-kuo was born in Fenghua, Zhejiang Province, in 1910. As a young man in 1926 he was sent by his father to the Soviet Union where he at first studied at Sun Yat-sen University for foreigners in Moscow as well as at USSR Military & Political Institute. After relations between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek soured, the younger Chiang was sent to labor camps on the Soviet Union’s frontiers. He was allowed to return to China, with his Russian bride, in 1937.

During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945, known in China as the War of Resistance against Japan), Chiang held a number of key administrative positions, including institutional administrative commander of southern Jiangsu Province from 1939 to 1945 and foreign affairs administrator for the northeast administration of the Republic of China during the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949). In 1948 he was sent by his father, who had become president of the Republic of China, to “clean up” political and economic corruption in Shanghai, which was rife with powerful mafia-like gangs.

When Chiang Kai-shek went into exile in Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Ching-kuo was at his father’s side and became a powerful force in Taiwanese politics.

Chiang Ching-kuo was chairman of Taiwan’s Guomindang (Kuomindang, Chinese Nationalist Party) provincial headquarters from 1949 to 1950 and director-general of the political department of Taiwan’s military from 1950 to 1954. He then rose in rank in the government over the years, becoming first vice premier (1969–1972), then premier (1972–1978), and finally president (1979–1988).

Priorities as President

Chiang made developing a modern economic infrastructure a priority, emphasizing power, transportation, communications, and irrigation systems. He also expanded the influx of foreign investments. In 1965 direct foreign investments amounted to only $10 million. By 1979 direct foreign investments showed a net balance of $121 million. Other inflows of long-term private capital amounted to more than $300 million in 1979.

In foreign relations Chiang tried to reverse the decline of his government’s international standing after the United States switched course and sought better relations with mainland China. When Richard Nixon announced in 1971 his intention to visit the People’s Republic of China, where he signed the Shanghai Communiqué on 27 February 1972, the negative impact on Taiwan was
immediate. Taiwan was expelled from the U.N. in 1971 after the announcement of Nixon's proposed trip, Japan switched its recognition from Taiwan to China in 1972, and twenty-five other nations followed suit between 1971 and 1972.

Then when U.S. president Jimmy Carter formally normalized relations with China and invited Deng Xiaoping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, to visit on 1 January 1979, Chiang, who was now Premier, launched his most intensive public relations outreach in the United States ever and strengthened his pro-Taiwan lobby in the U.S. Congress. His campaign succeeded on 10 April 1979, when Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which provided the legal basis for the defense of Taiwan by the United States for years to come, thus promising U.S. military intervention should mainland China try to “retake” Taiwan by force.

**Political Policy**

Chiang also liberalized Taiwan’s domestic political system, which helped lead to Taiwan’s eventual democratization. His initial domestic political policy was the same as his father’s, that is, authoritarianism under one-party (Kuomintang) rule. However, he eventually instituted U.S.-style “affirmative action” programs to bring Taiwanese-born administrators into the ruling Kuomintang and all levels of government.

In 1986 Chiang Ching-kuo repealed the “Emergency Provisions” law, that is the martial law that limited civil liberties that had been in effect since his father Chiang Kai-shek had become President of Taiwan in 1950. Thus, for the first time on the island it became legal to organize opposition parties whose candidates could run for elected office.

Chiang Ching-kuo, like his father, absolutely opposed any demand for Taiwan’s independence. But unlike his father, Chiang Ching-kuo took significant steps to relax tensions with the mainland government. In 1987 he permitted Taiwan residents for the first time since the 1950s to conduct indirect trade and to make personal visits to the mainland; he permitted scientists, professional experts, and athletes from Taiwan to participate in international competitions with their counterparts from the mainland. Then, on 26 July 1987, Chiang allowed Taiwan residents to travel to Hong Kong to meet their Chinese relatives from the mainland openly (although “direct” contact on mainland soil was still officially forbidden). Finally, on 15 October 1987, under his orders the Kuomintang’s Central Standing Committee lifted the thirty-seven-year ban barring Taiwan’s residents from visiting their relatives on the mainland.

Chiang’s new policy had a profound effect on the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The first week after the travel ban was lifted, some twenty thousand people in Taipei filed applications for permission to visit the mainland. As for indirect trade, Taiwanese businesses invested more than $50 million in fifty enterprises in Fujian Province alone during the first three months of 1988. China in 2008 was Taiwan’s largest trading partner; exports to China have accounted for one-third of Taiwan’s total exports since 2004; and more than 2 million Taiwanese maintain permanent residences in China.

Although Chiang’s reforms were substantial, historians believe Chiang was making plans for the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland just before his death. Chiang’s confidante and former student, Lee Huan, who was also the Kuomintang’s secretary-general, revealed after Chiang’s death that Chiang was prepared to begin negotiations with China’s Communist leaders to find a way to reunify the two governments and had sent envoys to “test the waters” for such negotiations in the years immediately preceding his death.

**Further Reading**


CHIANG Kai-shek

1887–1975  Military and political leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Republic of China from 1928 until 1975

Chiang Kai-shek was the successor to Sun Yat-sen and political leader and military chief in China’s war against Japan; after his defeat by Mao Zedong in China’s Civil War (1945–1949) he escaped to Taiwan and established the Republic of China on Taiwan. As President of Taiwan, Chiang vowed to retake the mainland. With the help of the U.S. military and economic aid, Chiang did help to build Taiwan into a modern and prosperous nation.

Chiang Kai-shek is easily one of the three most important figures to shape modern Chinese history in the twentieth century, the other two figures being Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong. Sun led the revolution that overthrew the decaying Qing dynasty in 1911, Chiang became his successor as head of the Nationalist Party, and then fought a civil war against Mao’s Communist Party, which led to Mao’s victory on the mainland and Chiang’s establishment of the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan in 1950.

Chiang, also known as Chiang Chung-cheng in Chinese, was born in Fenghua, Zhejiang Province, on 30 October, 1887. He graduated from Paoting Military Academy in China in 1906 and then studied at the Tokyo Military Academy in Japan the next year. He joined Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary party, called Tung Meng Hui, in 1908 and participated in the formation of the Nationalist Party (known in English as the Guomindang or Kuomindang). He then supported the Nationalists’ revolts against the Manchu-led Qing dynasty, which lead to the dynasty’s overthrow in December of 1911.

Because of Chiang’s extensive military training, Sun Yat-sen appointed Chiang as President of the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton in 1923. The Academy was non-partisan in its politics; famed Communist Party member Zhou Enlai was named its political director and famous Communist General Lin Biao got his start as a cadet there.

After Sun Yat-sen’s death from cancer in 1925, Chiang assumed the role of Sun’s successor. He was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Revolutionary Forces. Recruiting cadets from the Whampoa Military Academy, Chiang led them on the so-called Northern Expedition to attack various warlords in China in an effort to unite the country under the auspices of the Nationalist Party.

By 1926, Chiang’s forces had succeeded in reaching the outskirts of Shanghai, but unfortunately he was also out of money. Thus, Chiang made a pact with the devil, so-to-speak, that would ultimately come to haunt him as a leader for the rest of his life: He agreed to purge his forces of all Communist sympathizers and massacre Communist party members inside Shanghai in exchange for funding from Shanghai’s pro-Western industrialists and mafia-like gangs. The April 1927 Massacre, as it came to be known, was thus the first salvo in China’s ongoing Civil War between the Nationalists and the Communists. However, this pact allowed Chiang to enter the city without a fight and established the Nationalists as a pro-Western capitalist party. The disillusioned left wing of the party,
led by Sun Yat-sen’s widow, Soong Ching-ling, then set up a rival government in the city of Wuhan. The next year, Chiang married Ching-ling’s youngest sister, Soong Mei-ling, who had been educated by Western missionaries and studied at America’s Wellesley College. Chiang, who conveniently left his first wife for this auspicious union to the daughter of a family rife with money and Western ties, then converted publicly to Christianity himself.

To compete with the rival Wuhan government, Chiang made Nanking (Nanjing) the new capital of the Republic of China in 1928. He assumed various leadership positions in his government, including Chairman (Commander-in-Chief) of the National Military Council. He then personally negotiated with warlords across China, persuading them to join his government.

In one particularly bizarre episode, Chiang traveled to Xi’an in Shaanxi Province to meet with its military leader, the so-called “Young Marshal” Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang), on December 8, 1936. The Young Marshall took this opportunity to kidnap Chiang, refusing to release him unless Chiang agreed to stop his persecution of Chinese Communist Party members and instead to concentrate on fighting the Japanese military, which had already taken over Manchuria and established a puppet state known as Manchukuo there. Finally, Madame Chiang flew to Xi’an where she personally negotiated for her husband’s release with the aid of Communist leader Zhou Enlai. Chiang then agreed to stop fighting the Communists and form a “United Front” with them to fight the Japanese invasion. Young Marshal Chang then released Chiang and agreed to return as Chiang’s prisoner to Nanjing as a sign of his sincerity.

On July 7, 1937, full-scale war erupted between China and after Japanese troops attacked Chinese troops stationed near the Marco Polo Bridge outside Beijing. The better-equipped Japanese military quickly defeated the Chinese and gained control over the entirety of northern China. The Japanese Army then advanced southward. Chiang lost Shanghai in November and was forced to flee his capital of Nanjing, in December, which led to the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in the infamous “Rape of Nanking.”

Chiang retreated to the interior of China and established a new capital in Chungking (Chongqing). His wife’s Western ties allowed him to gain American support, war material, and advisors after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor forced America to enter World War II. The Communists, after initially suffering defeats from Nationalist troops, began to take advantage of the Japanese advancement to expand their territories by initiating guerrilla warfare against the Japanese (and the Nationalists) in the countryside.

In politics, Chiang always made loyalty his most important criterion for support, rather than ability or devotion to any particular political program. Furthermore, Chiang allowed rival cliques to divide the Nationalist Party so that he could play these factions against each other to his own advantage. Personal rivalry and factionalism thus paralyzed the Nationalists in their struggle against both the Japanese and the Communists.
In his government in Chungking, Chiang assumed the most powerful positions. He was named Generalissimo of the Nationalist Party from 1938 to 1946. After the Americans defeated the Japanese military, Chiang was finally named President of the National Government of the Republic of China, as a result of elections held by a newly formed National Assembly, which also adopted a Constitution. However, in China, he was always referred to by one title, wei yuan zhang (委員長), which can be translated as the Chairman or the Generalissimo.

In terms of policies, Chiang Kai-shek made little effort to present to the Chinese people attractive political, social and economic policies. His officials were corrupt and amassed huge personal fortunes while the nation’s ordinary citizens suffered. He demanded political and ideological unification of all of China under Confucian virtues, as he interpreted them, despite his conversion to Christianity. He blamed all China’s ills on the imperialist policies of Western powers and refused to accept any personal criticism. As a result he lost his earlier support of the United States for his government.

After he lost the Civil War against the Communists in 1949, he went into exile in Taiwan, which he declared to be the Republic of China. He was an authoritarian leader and imposed Martial Law, which had first been established on the mainland as “Emergency Provisions” during the Civil War and which limited many civil liberties, including free speech and the right to form opposition political parties. He continued to fight Communism relentlessly, vowing to take back the mainland from Mao. Chiang forbade any contact with the mainland by his citizens on Taiwan, including reading mainland newspapers, listening to mainland radio broadcasts or even receiving mail from relatives on the mainland.

Schools were not permitted to study subjects related to mainland China, including modern Chinese history. At the same time, Taiwanese were not allowed to talk about independence either.

After the Korean War broke out, the U.S. decided to support Chiang’s government as a bulwark against Communism’s spread in Asia and pledged military support as well as billions of dollars to build up Taiwan’s economy. The U.S. recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan as the sole legitimate government representing all of China until 1979, when President Carter normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China. By then, Chiang had already been dead for four years, never seeing his dream of “taking back the mainland” realized.

Winberg CHAI

Further Reading

From its beginnings in 1981, China Daily has developed into the national English-language newspaper of China. With a circulation of 300,000 and an online edition, its target audience is tourists, business leaders, diplomats, and other visitors to China; it also has a large Chinese readership.

Founded in 1981, China Daily, China’s national English-language newspaper, began as a small but ambitious experiment, led by a corps of experienced journalists of cosmopolitan outlook, with a score of reporters recruited largely from among English language teachers and recent college graduates. Originally operating out of shabby borrowed quarters on the east side of Beijing, in two decades China Daily has grown into a large enterprise with its own modern compound and presses, hundreds of employees, a stable of ancillary publications and activities, and status as a quasi-official paper of record.


In 1993, the paper launched 21st Century, a weekly educational publication for students of English that subsequently branched into several editions for elementary, middle school, high school, and college levels as well as teachers. Other offshoots include Business Weekly, begun in 1985, and Beijing Weekend, begun in 1991, which both became regular inserts in the paper; the regionally-circulated weekly Shanghai Star, started in 1992; and color tabloids published in conjunction with Beijing’s hosting of the 1990 Asian Games, the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, and the 2008 Summer Olympics. Among other activities, the paper has hosted CEO roundtables for executives of multinational corporations, organized English language and journalism training courses, and sponsored an annual English speaking contest for college students beginning in 1996.

China Daily’s initial leadership was an eclectic mix. Publisher Jiang Muyue, who did not speak English but had long been associated with foreign-language publications, played a supportive but largely ceremonial role. The initial editor in chief was veteran journalist and author Liu Zhunqi, who had joined the Communist underground as a student at the missionary-run Yanjing University in Beijing and later worked for the U.S. wartime information center in Chongqing. Although he was in poor health due to mistreatment during the Cultural Revolution, Liu contributed a quiet gravity and distinction.

The undisputed mastermind and energizer of the early China Daily was Feng Xiliang, a longtime editor of
the weekly *Beijing Review*, who had studied journalism at St. John’s University, a missionary school in Shanghai, and earned a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Missouri. As head of the paper’s founding commission and then managing editor (1981–1984) and editor-in-chief (1984–1987), Feng often stated that *China Daily*’s objective was to help foreigners understand China and China understand the world. Indeed, a large (although usually unacknowledged) proportion of *China Daily*’s readership is composed of Chinese readers.

Among Feng’s innovations were the use of foreign news agency reports in addition to the official Xinhua News Agency for international news, an emphasis on striking layout and large headlines, and prominent use of photographs. Rather than relying on translations from Chinese to English, Feng emphasized writing of news and features as well as commentaries directly in English. As part of his effort to reach international audiences through colloquial language that broke with political jargon, he recruited advisors and “polishers” from Britain, Australia, and the United States; encouraged study abroad for young Chinese reporters; and initiated exchange agreements and training programs for staff.

Feng, who later was an advisor to the *South China Morning Post* in Hong Kong, developed Alzheimer’s disease and died in Beijing in 2006 at age eighty-six. Succeeding him as chief editor were Chen Li (1987–1993), (who also passed away in 2006), Zhu Yinghuang (1993–2004), and Zhu Ling (b. 2004), all men—although the initial senior editorial leadership included a number of older women, and a female reporter from the original staff, Huang Qing, rose to the level of first deputy chief editor.

Along with other major newspapers in Beijing, *China Daily* provided overwhelmingly sympathetic coverage of the student protests in Tiananmen Square during the spring of 1989, with many of its journalists joining in at the height of mass demonstrations. Like other news organizations, the paper experienced a retrenchment period after the declaration of martial law and military crackdown of 4 June, including a temporary reduction in size from eight to four pages and adoption of the official description of the demonstrations as a “counterrevolutionary rebellion.”

Often described by foreign media as “official,” and technically under the supervision of the Propaganda Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *China Daily* nevertheless resists definition as a simple mouthpiece. Along with carrying pronouncements that are clearly obligatory, the paper has developed a reputation for lively, original reporting, with a staff that prides itself on professionalism. Its upstart traditions, extensive international ties, roster of foreign employees and goal of reaching foreign tourists, business people, diplomats, and other expatriates and visitors gives it a distinctive, if quixotic, status.

**Judy POLUMBAUM**

**Further reading**


For millennia China has influenced and been influenced by the world—scientifically, agriculturally, politically, culturally, and economically—and in 2008 had a population of 1.33 billion, larger than any country’s. Despite past political turmoil and natural and human-made disasters, China’s current government has reasserted an imperial unity and expanded its global influence beyond all earlier limits.

China is a very big country. Today China’s land and water mass is nearly 9.6 million square kilometers (fourth after Russia, Canada, and the United States). Its land boundaries extend to fourteen countries—a world record it shares with Russia, although China’s borders out-measure Russia’s by about 2,000 kilometers. The 1.33 billion people living within those borders (as of 2008) give China the distinction of being by far the most populous land on Earth. China is also a very old country. Homo erectus populations lived there about 900,000 years ago, and modern Homo sapiens arrived about 40,000 years ago. Agriculture dates from about 10,000 years ago; Chinese state-building and civilization arose, initially in the Huang (Yellow) River valley, after about 4,300 years ago, and attained lasting and distinctive forms with the establishment of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE).

China’s role in world history is correspondingly prominent. To begin with, its distinctive civilization affected neighboring peoples in east Asia—Koreans and Japanese to the east, steppe nomads to the north and west, and tropical gardeners to the south. China has always retained primacy in that part of the world thanks to the skills, the numbers, and the economic and political prowess of its population. As transport and communication improved over time, China’s influence reached ever more widely across Asia, and Chinese civilization continually enriched itself by importing new skills, new knowledge, and new things from afar. Beginning about 100 BCE, with the opening of organized caravan trade along the so-called Silk Roads, this process of interaction began to affect western Asia and even distant Europe as it established an Old World web that eventually expanded around the globe after 1500, creating the tumultuous world we know today.

Early China to 221 BCE

Chinese writers preserved a uniquely comprehensive political narrative. It begins with mythical divine rulers, and no archaeological trace of the first merely human dynasty, the Xia (c. 2100–1766 BCE), has yet been discovered. But in the 1920s excavation at Anyang, seat of the last rulers of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE), uncovered thousands of oracle bones inscribed in a script close enough to modern Chinese writing to be readily interpreted. They and other remains show that basic elements of subsequent Chinese civilization had already appeared by 1300 BCE.

Anyang is situated where the Huang (Yellow) River of northern China traverses a region of soft, windblown
loess soils. That was where early farmers had begun to raise millet, which was later supplemented by wheat and barley coming across Asia from Mesopotamia. The Shang armies also used horses, chariots, and compound bows, introduced from the western steppe. But script, religion, and family patterns were unique and closely resembled later Chinese practices.

Far-reaching changes came under the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). First of all, rain-watered agriculture, which had been basic for the Shang peoples, came to be supplemented and soon overshadowed by extending cultivation to the fertile soils of the river floodplain, a process that required massive building of dikes and canals to control and direct the flow of water. When successful, this water engineering assured ample moisture for the harvest and diminished north China’s dependence on uncertain monsoon rains. It also vastly expanded the area of cultivation as the labor of generations of conscripted farmers

The oldest printed map in any culture, a map of West China (Di Li chin Tou) in the Liu Qing Tou (Illustrations of Objects mentioned in the Six Classics), an encyclopedia circa 1155 BCE. Province names are written in white on black, and the line of the Great Wall is clearly visible along the top half of the map.
extended dikes and canals up and down the river valleys and across the coastal plain of north China.

Drainage canals permitted early Chinese farmers to irrigate their new fields and thus to raise rice. Rice grew naturally in shallow water along lake shores and river banks of Southeast Asia, where local gardeners began to harvest it as early as 8000 BCE. But artificial dikes and canals, like those the Chinese built in the northern Huang River valley, enormously extended the area of suitably shallow water. Consequently, by 200 BCE rice had become the main food of China’s rapidly growing population, as it remains to this day.

When low-lying river floodplains began to fill up with cultivated fields, Chinese farmers took on the even more strenuous task of leveling slopes, building dikes around small, artificially leveled fields called “paddies,” and channeling even very small streams to bring water to them. This improvement allowed hillsides in what eventually became central and southern China to produce rice almost as abundantly as the naturally flat river floodplains did.

As this enormous engineering effort gradually expanded across the landscape—a process that took millennia and may not have reached its final limits in the Himalayan foothills even today—China’s population began to assume the close-packed density and imposing numbers that still characterize the country. Human muscles, assisted by shovels and wheelbarrows (a Chinese invention), did almost all the work. It remains the most extensive, drastic, and successful remodeling of a natural landscape ever undertaken by humankind.

**Impact of Rice Cultivation**

In time similar rice paddies spread to Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, and all the great river valleys of Southeast Asia, as far away as the Ganges River in India. Wherever wet rice cultivation spread, dense rural populations arose and supported royal or imperial governments. Something like half of humankind came to depend on this sort of agriculture and still does. And because its two great rivers drained such extensive watersheds, China remained by far the largest and most populous country among all the rice-growing lands.

Rice, like other grains, must be harvested when ripe, and harvests must be stored to feed the farmers throughout the year and provide seed for next year’s harvest. Stores of grain in turn allowed governments and an ever-growing class of landowners to arise by collecting part of the harvest as taxes and rents, thus turning once-independent farmers into peasants. Rice-growing peasants had more to spare than other grain farmers, since a single rice seed ordinarily produced several stalks carrying more than a hundred seeds in all, while wheat farmers of medieval Europe made do with a seed-to-harvest ratio of only about 6 to 1. But this did not mean that Chinese farmers were rich. Instead, taxes and rents rose high enough to transfer extra food to city folk—rulers, landlords, artisans, and casual laborers. Accordingly, from the time rice became the staple crop in China, cities grew larger than was possible in rain-watered lands elsewhere.

Despite its unrivaled productivity, irrigated rice cultivation had serious costs. Standing water in paddy fields...
made malaria and the debilitating disease schistosomiasis very common; for a long time the Yangzi (Chang) River valley—today the most fertile and populous region of China—remained notoriously unhealthy and was less densely populated than the north.

In the north, however, China’s other main river, the Huang, reacted to confinement between human-made dikes by clogging its channel with silt it had picked up when flowing through the soft loess soils. As happens along the lower Mississippi River today, silt soon raised the lower course of the Huang above the level of the land outside the dikes. Efforts to forestall floods by building higher dikes could stave off disaster for a while, but sooner or later the river broke through, and resulting floods became greater and more damaging than before. The Huang River thus earned the nickname “China’s sorrow.” No other river carries so much silt, and the Huang is correspondingly unstable. In historic times unusually high floods on several occasions have shifted its lower channel by several hundreds of miles.

Increasing Rule of Landowners

The large-scale water engineering that reshaped China was initiated by enterprising local landowners who conscripted farmers to do the work. As new fields came into existence, landowners’ income and authority increased, and local rulers emerged who were strong enough to pay no attention to the distant emperors. But from the start they quarreled among themselves. Centuries of upheaval ensued, while rising agricultural wealth sustained intellectual and cultural efforts to contain the ills of intensified warfare among all the rival states.

Confucian and other schools of thought competed in words as vigorously as the rival armies did in battle, defining much of what became classical rules of behavior for later generations. But ideas in and of themselves had little to do with the ultimate restoration of public order. Rather, when the Zhou dynasty died out in 256 BCE, even the pretense of imperial unity was abandoned; the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) came to a climax in 221 BCE when a single warlord from the state of Qin on the northwest borderland subdued all rivals. His rule (Qin dynasty, 221–206 BCE) did not long survive. Instead, after another bout of warfare, China attained a more lasting imperial and cultural unity under the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE).

Imperial China (206 BCE to 1912)

The Han dynasty turned out to be a lasting model for later dynasties in Chinese history, and the advantages of imperial government in uniting the fertile river valleys of north and south China with shifting control over borderlands were so great that whenever a dynasty collapsed, a new emperor and dynasty soon emerged after relatively brief civil wars. Today, for all its ideological departures, Communist China looks like a new dynasty of a quite traditional sort. This amazing continuity presumably reflects the fact that Chinese people came to prefer unity and learned to feel themselves a single people in spite of local dialectical differences that made their spoken language unintelligible across long distances.

Written characters, however, can also be voiced in different ways and used to record languages as different from Chinese as Japanese and Korean, just as the numerals 1, 2, and 3 represent entirely different words in English, French, and German. Eventually the characters of classical Chinese literature, as edited, elaborated, and preserved by Confucian scholars—and then propagated by formal education among untold millions of Chinese across two thousand years—provided a set of ideas and precepts that both restrained and guided rulers and also taught obedience to the emperor and his officials, just as long as the Mandate of Heaven kept him on the throne. The Han dynasty was the first to patronize Confucian scholars, and the emperors spent much time performing ancestral rituals designed to maintain good relations with heaven and the lesser spirits, as Confucius (551–479 BCE) had prescribed. Even when Buddhism won a large following at court and in the country at large, subsequent dynasties continued these rituals to be safe from supernatural harm.

The Confucian style of commitment to imperial unity was in turn sustained by the way bulky goods, which were paid as taxes in kind, could be carried in barges along canals (initially constructed for drainage and irrigation), and delivered to the imperial capital across long
distances. At first the Yangzi Valley remained isolated from the Huang River network of canals, and thus its resources could not easily reach the imperial court. But in 611 CE the Grand Canal was opened, connecting China’s two principal river systems so that canal boats could move safely and cheaply to and fro between the imperial capital, which remained in the north, and the far reaches of the Yangzi Valley. Nothing close to such a capacious, cheap, and safe transport system existed elsewhere. The Chinese government and people prospered as a result, spreading rice paddies and building cities throughout the hills and valleys of the Yangzi River watershed, more

During the Han dynasty, China established peaceful relations with nomad chieftains, giving them goods they desired as gifts in return for obedience to the Chinese emperor. But such treaties often broke down and raids began anew. This particular illustration is an early Qing dynasty representation of the exchange of tribute.
than doubling China’s size and resources by the time the lengthy pioneering effort neared completion.

Massive expansion southward in turn allowed the government to cope, not quite so successfully, with the problem of protecting itself and its subjects against outside dangers. Enlarged tax income made it easy to elaborate court rituals for propitiating heaven and other powerful spirits. Keeping steppe nomads at a distance and preventing their destructive raids were more difficult. Horses raised themselves on the grassy steppes; nomad tribesmen spent much of their lives in the saddle, guarding their herds against outsiders, and, when opportunity offered, raiding horses from one another or invading Chinese borderlands to seize grain or anything else they found useful.

**THE GREAT WALL—AND ITS IMPACT**

Men mounted on horses moved far faster than infantry could ever hope to do. Because fortified walls were an obstacle horsemen could not easily overcome, the famous Great Wall of China was constructed across centuries in hope of stopping their raids. Infantry equipped with crossbows (a Chinese invention) could indeed repel steppe attackers from on top of the wall as long as enough bowmen were already in place to meet them. But hundreds of miles of wall and open country between its gaps required more men on guard than even the Chinese empire and its canal transport system could support day after day, year round.

Two alternatives existed: hiring nomads to stop their fellows from attacking by paying them with what they might otherwise have seized or training and supplying enough Chinese cavalymen to meet and defeat steppe raiders. Both methods were tried over and over, but the problem would not be lastingly solved until after 1750. Hired nomads could change sides at any moment, while keeping horses in China was horribly expensive. In the absence of natural grass, a horse ate many times as much grain as a man needed, so matching steppe horsemen with enough Chinese cavalymen was costly. A more successful tactic was to establish peaceful relations with nomad chieftains, giving them goods they desired as gifts in return for ritual recognition of obedience to the Chinese emperor. But such treaties often broke down, and raids began anew.

Nonetheless, over centuries the effect of raiding and gifting between China and the peoples of the steppe was to familiarize nomads with more and more aspects of Chinese civilization, eventually spreading key Chinese inventions far and wide throughout Eurasia. Chinese armies and armed expeditions also extended Chinese influence westward from time to time, beginning in 101 BCE, when the Han Emperor Wudi sent an expedition to the Ferghana Valley in modern Uzbekistan to bring back a breed of “blood-sweating” horses capable of carrying heavily armored men on their backs. For centuries thereafter caravans connected China with western Asia along what westerners called the Silk Roads. As a result, communication within the Eurasian web attained a new velocity and regularity that increased little by little and reached a climax under the Mongol conqueror Chinggis Khan (often spelled Genghis Khan, 1126–1227) and his successors.

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To begin with, China had much to learn from Indians and west Asians. Buddhist holy men began to filter into China even before the Han dynasty collapsed; during the years of civil strife and divided sovereignties that ensued, the new religion won many adherents, including the emperor who founded the Sui dynasty (581–618 ce) and reunited China in 589. Buddhists retained imperial favor until 843, when Confucians succeeded in disbanding Buddhist monasteries and prohibiting their religion. But the Confucians had to borrow much from the Buddhists in order to refute them, so restored Confucianism came to resemble the other high religions of Eurasia more closely than before. Buddhist sects continued to exist, especially among the poor and oppressed, and often sparked rebellions when a dynasty began to weaken.

Buddhist art also affected older Chinese styles profoundly. In particular, the landscapes and portraiture of classical Chinese painting owed much to their Buddhist predecessors. More important for Chinese society as a whole was the fact that Buddhist monasteries introduced the Chinese to the habit of buying and selling goods for daily consumption. In ancient China money had played almost no role. Taxes, rents, and services were paid in kind, and peasants lived on what was left after taxes and rents had taken their share. Buddhist monks, however, coming from India along the Silk Roads, were accustomed to selling the produce of landed estates that pious believers deeded to them and then using money to buy whatever the monastery needed. Before their dissolution in 843, each monastery in China therefore became the center of a local market; Chinese townsmen and peasants far and wide soon learned the uses of money by buying from and selling to the monasteries.

**Cash and Carry**

Use of money became widespread enough that under the Song dynasty (960–1279), the imperial government found it convenient to collect taxes in money rather than in kind. Before a century had passed more than half the government’s income took the form of first metal, then paper currency. Consequently, millions of ordinary peasants started to sell part or all of their harvest to pay taxes. Thereupon, goods of common consumption—rice, salt, iron, silk, and innumerable others—began to circulate along the waterways of China. Even a small difference of price made it worthwhile for merchants to carry goods to distant markets along the canal system; all the advantages of specialized production, which the Scottish economist Adam Smith later analyzed so convincingly, came into operation among something like 100 million Chinese. China began to grow in population, wealth, and skill more rapidly than ever before, while the government fanned the whole process by spending its cash income on whatever it needed.

Simultaneously, agriculture intensified after a new species of early-ripening rice reached China from the south after 1000. Wherever water was available all summer long, this meant that Chinese farmers could raise two crops a year, thereby doubling production per acre. Needless to say, the effect was enormous. Work intensified, and

**Paper money was invented in China, and quickly spread around the globe. This particular note is from 1380.**
population increased and became denser than ever, since throughout the well-watered plains families could survive on half as much land as before. The social discipline of working ceaselessly to keep fields, dikes, and canals in order made the Chinese workforce far more diligent and productive than most others, and eventually gave it an enormous advantage in competition with foreigners, as we shall see.

This superiority began to show under the Song dynasty, when important new industries appeared, not the least of which was the manufacture of guns and gunpowder. Newly perfected porcelain began to rival silk among China’s exports, and, when the discovery of how to make coke out of coal solved a long-standing fuel shortage in northern China, large-scale iron works multiplied. Fragmentary tax records show that iron production almost quadrupled from 32,500 tons a year in 998 to 125,000 tons in 1078, but that pace was not long sustained, and by 1260 production had dropped to a mere 8,000 tons per year.

**GUNS AND GUNPOWDER**

Chinese officials shaped by the Confucian tradition distrusted captains of industry almost as much as soldiers. Such persons, left to themselves, officials feared, might become rich and powerful enough to threaten their public authority. So the fact that officials closely supervised weapons manufacture from the start, and then monopolized the sale of iron agricultural implements in 1083, may have upset prices and made iron production unprofitable. But no one knows what actually happened. We do know that most imperial tax income went to supporting armies along the steppe frontier, and as its steppe neighbors became more formidable, the Song government began systematically to reward the inventors of new and more efficient weapons. Gunpowder weapons accordingly came quickly to the fore.

The Song government soon needed all the help it could get, for in 1127 it was driven from northern China by a new tribal steppe confederation. Nonetheless, strenuous investment in naval vessels, defended by newfangled guns and catapults as well as by crossbows, allowed the dynasty to survive as the Southern Song (1127–1279), ruling from a new capital in the south on the Yangzi River. But after a new steppe confederacy under Chinggis Khan conquered north China in 1227, his grandson Khubilai Khan ordered Chinese artisans to build a navy for him, and he used it to overrun south China, thus founding the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

**MONGOL EMPIRE**

The massive commercialization of Song China and accompanying improvements in weaponry soon spread far and wide within Eurasia. Steppe peoples were the first to feel the impact, as the rapid development of their military formidable demonstrated. Indeed, the Mongol Empire at its height extended across all of Asia to the shores of the Mediterranean and northward into Russia. No empire since has equaled its extent. For two or three generations after the 1240s, thousands of soldiers, merchants, captives, and caravan attendants moved continually back and forth across the steppe.

The mingling of peoples that the Mongol conquests provoked was extraordinary. We know that when a papal emissary, William of Rubruck, reached the Mongol capital at Karakorum in 1253 he met the wife of a goldsmith who had been born in Flanders a few miles from his own birthplace; about a century later the Muslim traveler Ibn Battuta tells how he met a merchant from his native Morocco in south China. Innumerable such encounters spread detailed knowledge far and wide about superior Chinese skills. It is striking to realize that the

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The Chinese invented gunpowder and rocketry, which was then exported to the rest of the world. Efficient handguns were developed after about 1550.
three inventions the English philosopher Francis Bacon would later declare to have made Europe modern—the compass, gunpowder, and printing (together with its essential partner, paper-making)—all reached Europe from China by word of mouth and without leaving any written record. Motifs of Chinese painting also traveled throughout the Muslim world, eventually so misunderstood that stylized drawings of the massive Yangzi River gorges became perches for peacocks.

Borrowing from afar always involved transformation and adjustment to a new environment. That had been true of Chinese borrowing from India and west Asia in earlier times as they developed their own Buddhist sects and forms of mounted warfare. European, Indian, and west Asian responses to gunpowder, printing, and the compass were just as varied, but everywhere the new Chinese techniques affected warfare, shipping, and communication, even though Muslims at first rejected printing.

Native Chinese were never fully reconciled to foreign rule, and when the Huang River broke through its dikes and, before finding a new path to the sea, devastated much of northern China, they knew that the Mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn from their Mongol rulers. Plague also ravaged China in the 1330s, and the government mismanaged the paper currency by indulging in reckless inflation. Not surprisingly, public order broke down until, after years of fighting, a new and authentically Chinese dynasty, the Ming (1368–1644), united the country once more. As the Mongol power collapsed, caravan linkages across Asia diminished without breaking off entirely. But the Chinese promptly began to explore alternative sea routes after defenses along the northwest frontier seemed sufficiently secure, allowing the third Ming
emperor, Zhudi (1402–1424), to embark on an ambitious program of overseas exploration and expansion into the Indian Ocean.

Altogether, six armadas, dispatched between 1405 and 1433, carried hundreds of ships and thousands of men to the shores of the Indian Ocean, touching on the coast of east Africa and even penetrating the Red Sea. Wherever the ships appeared the Chinese admiral, Zheng He, collected rarities as gifts and demanded that local rulers recognize the dominion of the Chinese emperor. The scale of these expeditions dwarfed that of the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama, who started on his voyage to India in 1497 with just four ships; but unlike the Portuguese discovery of the sea route to India, Zheng He’s voyages had no enduring effect. Instead, when the next Ming emperor incautiously led an army onto the steppes in 1449, his Mongol enemies captured him. Even though he was released the next year, memories of Chinggis Khan were far too fresh for the Chinese to spend any further resources on the fleet. Instead, sailing the seas was forbidden until the 1570s, and the imperial navy was allowed to rot away.

**OVERSEAS TRADE DECLINES**

Private overseas trade from Chinese ports dwindled as long as sailing remained illegal, but Chinese emigrants had already begun to prosper throughout southeast Asia and continued to thrive until recent times. So the Chinese never withdrew entirely from the seas. What might have been if they had anticipated Europeans by crossing the Earth’s oceans and reaching both the Americas and Europe sometime before 1450, as they were certainly capable of doing, beggars the imagination. This is perhaps the most dramatic turning point in world history—an abdication whose long-term consequences still reverberate.

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**Ancient junks sail amidst modern boats on the Huangpu River in Shanghai.**

*Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.*
Nevertheless, from their own point of view, China's rulers were wise in concentrating public effort on safeguarding their landward frontier while closely regulating trade with the European and other foreign merchants who began to visit their ports after 1520, when the first Portuguese ship showed up. For little by little the Chinese began to prevail against the steppe horsemen, and by 1750 Chinese frontiers had shifted far to the west, approximately doubling the total area of the empire and subjecting millions of Tibetans, Turks, Mongols, and Manchus to Chinese rule.

Circumstances go far to explain this seismic shift in China's relation with the steppe peoples. First of all, beginning in the time of the Mongol empire, bubonic plague spread across Eurasia, killing up to one-third of the population on its initial onslaught. Probably the plague bacillus had emerged from one of its long-standing homes in the Himalayan foothills when Mongol horsemen raided northern Burma (Myanmar) in 1252–1253 and then carried it back in their homeland, where a new array of burrowing rodents—the normal carriers of the infection—offered the bacillus a new set of hosts.

Within a few decades the disease became endemic across the entire Eurasian steppe, infecting burrowing rodents of several species; after the initial catastrophic attacks on human populations in China, west Asia, and Europe between the 1330s and 1349, lesser outbreaks of plague recurred from time to time across the agricultural lands of Eurasia until as recently as the 1920s. We have no written record of what happened among steppe dwellers, but it seems certain that their exposure was greater than among farmers, since wherever they pitched their tents the reservoir of infection among the burrowing rodents of the grasslands lay immediately under their feet. Nomad populations shrank substantially as a result, and nomad strength in war diminished accordingly.

Eventually people adopted folkways that diminished exposure to the plague bacillus: For example, in 1920 Manchus knew not to come near infected marmots in their homeland, so it was the ignorant, immigrant Chinese who killed them for their fur and caught the plague. This development brought European and Japanese doctors to the scene, where they duly discovered *Pasteurella pestis* and its mode of transmission between rodent and human populations. The plague today has therefore ceased to matter among humans, even though the bacillus now infects burrowing rodents around the Earth, even in the United States.

The development of more efficient handguns and crossbows after about 1550 and of better supply systems was another factor in weakening nomads against the Chinese (and Russian) armies. The Ming dynasty began to expand its power into the steppe, organizing mobile armies of foot soldiers, equipped more often with crossbows than with hand guns, and supplied by wagon trains trained to form defensive circles in case of nomad attack. These tactics proved effective and soon allowed Chinese settlers to begin to move into the grasslands wherever moisture was sufficient to sustain crops.

**SECOND CONQUEST**

Nonetheless, between 1644 and 1683 China suffered a second conquest from the steppes when Manchu cavalrymen took advantage of quarrels among rival Chinese generals, seized Beijing, and proclaimed a new dynasty, the Qing (1644–1912). The Manchus were already familiar with Chinese ways and were correspondingly more acceptable to their Chinese subjects than the Mongols had been. Their cavalry, supplemented by Chinese infantry, made a formidable force and allowed the Chinese to expand their power westward until they encountered the equally expansive Russian Empire. Thereupon, two treaties—signed in 1689 and again in 1727—defined the new boundaries between China and Russia. The last steppe confederacy to resist the Chinese met defeat in 1755, and Tibet was subdued between 1755 and 1779, bringing China's imperial boundaries to limits that still prevail.

**EAST/WEST EXCHANGE**

This expansion westward was also sustained by a massive growth in China's population. Here it was crops introduced from the Americas—potatoes, sweet potatoes, and peanuts—that made the most difference. Sweet potatoes, in particular, tolerated poor soils and could grow on higher slopes and other marginal locations where rice could not thrive. They therefore became significant in south China, while ordinary potatoes played the same role on a somewhat smaller scale in the north.

Communication with Europe expanded and became far more precise after 1601 when a Jesuit mission was
admitted to the Ming court. Surprisingly, the Chinese made the Jesuits responsible for correcting the Chinese calendar to fit the seasons properly. The emperor and his ministers believed that rituals assuring the harvest could work only when offered at the right time of year, and nothing mattered more than that. Later they also asked the Jesuits to cast cannon for their armies and to supervise a ground survey and then make a map of the entire empire.

Jesuit missionaries continued to be active at the Chinese court until 1706 and year after year reported everything they did to Rome. They attracted only a handful of converts but nevertheless found much to admire in Chinese practices; European readers of their detailed reports often did so, too. In particular, the long-standing Chinese practice of recruiting government officials by written and oral examinations seemed rational to learned Europeans, and several German states imitated the Chinese example early in the eighteenth century. A little later Chinese decorative art, as transmitted by porcelain and embroideries, became suddenly fashionable as well. And radical eighteenth-century French writers, such as Voltaire, thought the Chinese example of a country without priests or revealed religion was far superior to European superstition. In short, the two civilizations were exchanging ideas among experts as never before and on a scale that began to affect them both in far-reaching ways.

Overall, therefore, the Chinese government and economy prospered at home and abroad until the closing decades of the eighteenth century. But by about 1775, population pressure on the land began to provoke rebellions, and trade in opium imported by the English East India Company created addicts in Guangzhou (Canton) and adjacent regions despite official efforts to prohibit it. The Chinese rebuffed a British effort to negotiate a trade treaty in 1793 when Lord Macartney refused to prostrate himself before the emperor, as court ritual required. Thereafter, frictions over opium continued to mount until the British navy showed up on the Chinese coast in 1841–1842 and proceeded to bombard coastal ports into submission and even interrupted traffic on the Grand Canal. A series of “unequal” treaties ended this Opium War, transferred Hong Kong to British control, opened Chinese ports to European traders, established a uniform 5 percent tariff, and gave Europeans the protection of consular and mixed courts for settling disputes among themselves and with the Chinese.

Dead Chinese soldiers at Fort Taku, Tianjin, in 1860. These soldiers were killed by Anglo-French forces in one of the key battles of the second Opium War. PHOTO BY FELICE BEATO.
Such harsh humiliation was impossible for the Chinese people to accept, while European admiration for things Chinese turned into something like disdain for their helplessness. At the bottom of Chinese society, half-baked efforts to adopt European secrets of power began to spread among angry young men, as the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) showed. It was led by a man who, after repeatedly failing the imperial examinations, met an American Baptist missionary from Tennessee and subsequently claimed to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ, sent by God to bring heaven to Earth and rid China of its corrupt foreign rulers in the bargain.

For a few years the Taipings met with widespread success, overthrowing the imperial administration in south China and almost capturing Beijing. But Britain and France sent armed forces to safeguard their treaty rights, and after occupying Beijing and sacking the emperor’s summer palace in 1860, they joined forces with local Chinese militias and defeated the Taiping rebels by 1864. By then between 20 and 30 million Chinese had died, and much of the country had been laid waste. The dynasty barely survived, harassed by increasing diplomatic and military pressure not just from Britain and France but also from Russia, a newly united Germany, and most acutely from neighboring Japan. In 1900 the so-called Boxer Rebellion, provoked this time by an underground Buddhist sect, tried to drive the foreigners away, only to meet defeat. Desperate efforts at self-strengthening ensued, but starting to build a European-style army merely created a disloyal officer corps that joined rebellious students to overthrow the dynasty in 1912.

**Post-Imperial China (1912–present)**

Although China evolved from a republic to a people's republic under Communist rule, and then to a nation reopened to the free world under the leadership of Deng Xioping in 1978–79, the rebellions, wars, and general disorder in the years after the Qing dynasty closely resembled previous dynastic transitions.

**THREE PROMINENT FIGURES**

Three figures dominated the tumultuous political scene in republican China after 1912: Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925); Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), and Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Sun Yat-sen was trained abroad as a medical doctor, but turned into a revolutionary conspirator before becoming the first president of Republican China (1912–1949) in 1912. As head of the newfangled Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), he aimed to reshape Chinese society, but local warlords operating in many provinces
resisted his leadership, and by the end of his life the Guomindang found itself sharing power with the rival Communist Party, modeled in part on the Russian example.

Chiang Kai-shek, trained as a soldier in Japan and Russia, became head of a new military academy organized by the Guomindang before succeeding Sun Yat-sen after Sun's death. Chiang quarreled with the Communists in 1927 and compelled them to withdraw from around Guangzhou, where Mao Zedong had already begun to recruit an army of guerrillas among impoverished peasants. After months of marching the Communists found refuge in the northwest, where supplies of arms could reach them from across the Russian border.

Chiang then set out to defeat competing warlords and was able to occupy Beijing before the Japanese army invaded Manchuria in 1931 and then China proper in 1937. Chiang's armies eventually had to retreat up the Yangzi River all the way to Chungking (Chongqing), while Japan set up a puppet Manchu emperor over the rest of China. Nonetheless, the United States and Britain recognized Chiang's government throughout World War II and made Chiang's China a founding member of the United Nations Security Council.

Then Japan's defeat in 1945 reopened the struggle between Chinese Communists and the Guomindang (Nationalist Party), and despite U.S. efforts to support Chiang, Mao's forces prevailed, setting up the People's Republic of China in October 1949. Chiang and a remnant of his army withdrew to the island of Taiwan, where their successors still remain in power.

Chaos before and after the end of the Qing dynasty closely resembled previous dynastic takeovers, and Mao's government behaved very much like a new dynasty, even though it depended upon a small circle at the top of the Communist Party rather than upon a court circle of Confucian officials serving a new ruling family.
Internationally, Mao’s victory at first seemed to strengthen the Communist cause enormously, and for a while U.S. politicians were much agitated by their “loss” of China. Yet, in fact, Russian and Chinese Communists were rivals as much as allies from the start, and 1968–1969 border disputes even led to brief armed collision between the two governments. U.S. president Richard Nixon took advantage of this rift to reestablish diplomatic relations with China in 1972, thus recognizing its growing economic and political power.

Since then China has gone from strength to strength. Mao’s successors, notably Deng Xiaoping, relaxed efforts at collectivization of farm land in 1981, allowing peasants to produce what they chose and to sell their surpluses at will. Parallel private competition with state-run factories soon provoked urban and industrial expansion on a quite extraordinary scale—as much as 12 percent growth in gross national product a year. Chinese products soon became cheaper and often better than anything available elsewhere. Exports swelled accordingly, and other countries, with the United States in the lead, went deeply in debt by importing all sorts of consumer goods from China. In 2008 China hosted the Olympic Games, a crowning glory for a government that has never ceased to face foreign criticism for its suppression of human rights in Tibet and elsewhere.

And yet all is not well in the new China. Ecological pollution is widespread and acute. Population presses heavily on resources, and official efforts to diminish the birth rate by prohibiting couples from having more than one child may strain normal generational transitions. The vast and controversial Three Gorges Dam under construction on the Yangzi River, and scheduled for completion in 2009, has displaced more than a million people and may damage age-old methods of irrigation; and innumerable other disasters, like the 2008 earthquakes in Sichuan Province may arise. But so far, at least, the Communist government has been successful in reasserting political unity, restoring the nation’s wealth, and expanding China’s worldwide influence beyond all earlier limits and can triumphantly expect the future to take care of itself.

William H. McNEILL

Further Reading


China Institute in America

Huá-ēi Xiéjínshè 华美协进会

China Institute in America is a nonprofit educational and cultural institution located in New York City. It operates programs in both the United States and China with the hope of fostering understanding between the two nations.

China Institute in America was founded in 1926 as a nonprofit educational and cultural institution to promote a deeper understanding of China through programs in education, culture, business, and art in the belief that cross-cultural understanding strengthens the global community. Its programs are designed for people of all ages and backgrounds, including children, businesspeople, artists, and educators.

China Institute was founded by a group of American and Chinese educators that included John Dewey, Hu Shih, Paul Monroe, and Kuo Ping-wen. The idea for the institute was born after the educational philosopher John Dewey spent eighteen months lecturing and teaching in China. He realized the majority of students he met knew a great deal about the United States, but that the same could not be said for American students’ knowledge of China. Upon his return he founded the institute with the hope that it would encourage Americans to learn more about China. Using $25,000 from the China Foundation, which administered the money China had paid as reparations for the Boxer Rebellion, Dewey, along with his student Hu Shih, who would go on to become a leader of the May Fourth Movement, started China Institute in New York.

It is the oldest bicultural organization in American devoted exclusively to China and houses one of the longest-running schools of Chinese studies in the United States. It teaches Chinese to children and adults, offers professional development opportunities for K–12 educators, develops K–12 curriculum, and promotes Chinese culture through its exhibitions and programs about traditional and contemporary Chinese arts and culture. It administers a number of overseas study opportunities for both teenagers and adults. The institute hosts in-house and traveling art exhibitions that are accompanied by scholarly expositions, curators’ lectures, and other programs that provide an in-depth background to Chinese art. In addition, the institute sponsors lecture series, short courses, symposia, film screenings, and workshops covering a range of traditional and contemporary topics, including history, literature, and philosophy.

The institute also provides executives from around the world with forums for networking and information sharing on critical issues in U.S.-China business relations, including an annual China Institute executive summit, regular panel discussions and speeches, and a corporate language program.

Further Reading

A Closer Look at John Dewey

In this brief biography of John Dewey, an American educator who was highly influential in China, his dedication to learning and to social change is apparent.

John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20th 1859. After a period as a schoolteacher, he became a graduate student in philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, under the tutelage of the Idealist George S. Morris. With Morris, he left Johns Hopkins to take up a position at the University of Michigan. Dewey's early philosophical work was characterized by the attempt to combine the tenets of the Idealism imbibed from Morris with the emerging approach of experimental psychology to understanding the mind, exemplified by the work of another of Dewey's colleagues, G. Stanley Hall. Through the 1890s, and particularly after a move to the newly founded University of Chicago in 1894, Dewey began a steady drift away from Idealist metaphysics, a process that he describes in an autobiographical essay “From Absolutism to Experimentalism”...

...Dewey left Chicago in 1904 for the Columbia University, where he remained until his retirement. Dewey’s immense philosophical and other written output...extends over a long working life and encompasses most areas of philosophy as well as a host of other educational, social and political concerns. At the core of what may be called his “mature” outlook, expressed in his essay “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (1917), is a concern that philosophy turns away from pseudo-problems in epistemology and metaphysics to concern itself with the “problems of men.” This was a proposal for the recovery of philosophy, not for its abandonment, and it is very much as a philosopher that Dewey approaches these problems, not (on the whole) as the architect of detailed institutional reforms.... Dewey’s interest in education was embedded in a wider concern about progressive social change. He was a supporter of such causes as women’s suffrage and the Settlement House movement of his friend Jane Addams. His immense range of public and political activities included presidency of the teachers’ union, sponsorship of the ACLU, support for the “Outlawry of War” movement in the interwar years, chairing the People’s Lobby, and (persuaded by his Sidney Hook) participation in the “trial” of Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1938. After his move to New York, and particularly after the onset of the First World War, a substantial part of his published output consisted of commentary on current domestic and international politics, and public statements on behalf of many causes.


radio86.co.uk/china-insight/china-perspective/5479/the-china-institute-of-new-york-eight-decades-of-promoting-chinese-culture


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China National Radio (CNR) is the official radio system of the People’s Republic of China, with correspondent branches in forty cities. CNR is the farthest-reaching radio network in the country and one of the most important media organizations. Its nine channels of programming are under the editorial control of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.

Established in 1940, China National Radio (CNR / 中国中央人民广播电台) is the official radio system of the People’s Republic of China, broadcasting 270 programs in nine channels, with 198 hours of daily broadcasting through satellites as of 2007. In 2002, CNR launched its website “CNR.CN” (www.cnr.cn), on which a nationwide broadcasting network of central and local radio stations was established to capture domestic and international audiences by providing news, entertainment, and other information-based programs.

CNR is the farthest-reaching radio network in the country and one of the most important media organizations. Administratively CNR is controlled by the National Bureau for Radio, Film, and Television within the State Council of China. Editorially it is controlled by the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.

CNR grew out of Yan’an Xinhua Broadcasting Station, which was established by the Chinese Communist Party as China’s first “Red” national radio in 1940 in the city of Yan’an, then the base of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1949 Yan’an Xinhua Broadcasting Station (renamed “Shanbei Xinhua Broadcasting Station” after it moved from Yan’an) began broadcasting in Beijing under the name of “Peiping [Beijing's former name] Xinhua Broadcasting Station.” On 5 December 1949 it was officially named “Central People’s Broadcasting Station.” Since January 2002 the station has been called “China National Radio,” with its acronym forming the basis for a website aimed at broadening its readership.

By 2007 CNR was broadcasting 270 programs in nine channels, with 198 hours of daily broadcasting through satellites. Channel 1 mainly transmits news in Mandarin to a national audience. Channel 2, Business Radio, airs economic, scientific, and technological information and service programs in Mandarin throughout China. Channel 3, Music Radio, is an FM stereo music channel. Channel 4, Metro Radio, provides live programs exclusively to listeners in Beijing. Channel 5 and Channel 6, Cross-Taiwan Strait Radio, aims its programming to listeners in Taiwan, while Channel 7, Huaxia Radio, broadcasts programs for listeners in Hong Kong, Macau, and the region of the Pearl River delta. Channel 8, Ethnic Minorities Radio, airs programs in Mongolian, Tibetan, Uygur, Kazakh, and Korean, and as well as in Mandarin. Channel 9, Story Radio, specializes in entertainment, including comic crosstalk and storytelling programs. After a recent reform CNR has increasingly stratified its programming to capture more specific target audiences.

CNR has forty correspondent branches in major Chinese cities, including Hong Kong and Macao, and has...
established cooperative relationships with major broadcasting organizations in forty foreign countries and regions. The new headquarters of CNR in Beijing, which opened in 1998, was a milestone in the organization’s transition to digitalization. The building houses world-class recording equipment, studios, and an eight-hundred-seat concert hall.

In the effort to become an integrated media organization, CNR has diversified its broadcasting-related services. It runs a publishing house, China Broadcasting Audio and Video Press, which produces several publications, including China Broadcast Weekly, China Broadcast Magazine (monthly), International Music Exchange (monthly), and Radio Songs. In addition, it has established its own TV-program production center. In 1998 CNR launched its official website, the first of its kind among the media organizations under the central government. On 1 January 2002 the website was officially named “CNR.CN” (www.cnr.cn), on which a nationwide broadcasting network of central and local radio stations was established to target domestic and international audiences by providing news, entertainment, and other information-based programs.

YU Xuejian

Further Reading

China-Britain Business Council

Yīng-Zhōng Màoyì Xiéhui 英中贸易协会

The China-Britain Business Council assists British companies and organizations doing business in China. The council operates through seven offices in the United Kingdom and a network of eleven cities in China.

The China-Britain Business Council (CBBC) is the leading British organization promoting trade and investment between the United Kingdom and China. The council’s history dates back to the early 1950s when British companies were among the first to establish trade with Communist China and became known as the “48 Group of Companies.” At the same time, the British government had a semiofficial trade body known as the “Sino-British Trade Council,” which promoted British participation in trade fairs and exhibitions in China. Despite these trade agreements, the U.K. did not officially recognize the People’s Republic of China until 1972.

The China-Britain Trade Group was established in 1991 when the 48 Group of Companies merged with the Sino-British Trade Council with the establishment of the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry. The organization changed its name to the “China-Britain Business Council” in 1998 to reflect the growth of business between the U.K. and China, which by that point encompassed investment, trade, licensing, and other forms of business.

The objective of CBBC is to assist any British company or organization to do business in China. It works in collaboration with U.K. Trade and Investment, for whom it delivers China business development services. CBBC also cooperates with the private sector and trade associations, the British Embassy and Consulate Generals in China, the British Chamber of Commerce in China, and other regional development agencies in the U.K. In addition, CBBC provides missions to the Chinese market, business opportunities, and research, as well as a range of services for companies in the marketplace. CBBC also hosts inward delegations from China, arranges events in the U.K. and China, and hosts business events for senior Chinese leaders visiting the U.K.

CBBC operates through seven offices in the U.K. and a network of eleven cities throughout China. The main office is in Beijing, and the other offices are located in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Chengdu, Qingdao, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Shenyang, Guangzhou and Chongqing.

CBBC relies on a bilingual and experienced staff and other organizations to provide business leaders with tailored advice and support in all aspects of setting up a presence and doing business in China. CBBC conducts smaller research projects through the Overseas Market Introduction Service for China and also provides in-house research services tailored to the needs of each company. All research is carried out by CBBC’s project managers across the China offices. CBBC has conducted research projects that encompass a wide range of sectors, including both product and service industries, and has processed a diverse variety of enquiries.

One of CBBC’s services, Launchpad, offers CBBC member companies a fast, cost-effective, and low-risk way to establish a presence in China by providing office space,
a dedicated CBBC project manager, and support in one of the CBBC China offices.

Lotta SILFVERBERG

**Further Reading**

In 1978 after long and arduous negotiations, the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty was ratified, setting a new tone of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial exchange of cultural ideas, economic goods, and technological advances between the two rivals, and simultaneously contributing to the security of the Asia-Pacific corridor.

After forty years of antagonism, China and Japan signed the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in Beijing on 12 August 1978. This treaty represented the turning point of Sino-Japanese relations, and its policies became the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy.

Japan acknowledged the government in Beijing as China’s legitimate government in 1972 with the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué. Once diplomatic relations were therefore renewed, the path was opened for a treaty reflecting greater rapprochement, but it was not smooth going. Although negotiations began in November 1974, the treaty was not signed until four years later, in 1978.

The China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty actually addresses, to the greatest extent, political and economic relations, reflecting the principle of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué and the essential principles of Chinese foreign policy. Article I of the peace treaty contains China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

- mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,
- mutual nonaggression,
- noninterference in each other’s internal affairs,
- equality and mutual benefit, and
- peaceful coexistence.

However, it does not address the two nations’ territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

The China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty served to set the tone for friendly relations between China and Japan, to further cultural, economic, and technological exchange between the two nations, and to contribute to the overall security of the Asia-Pacific region. But many issues remain to be resolved in Sino-Japanese relations: territorial disputes (including the East China Sea dispute), visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and differences in the recognition of history within junior high school history textbooks. The year 2008 represents the thirtieth anniversary of the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty, and although issues between China and Japan flare up regularly, work continues on both sides to strengthen the Treaty and settle their cultural differences and differences in perspective.

Unryu SUGANUMA

Further Reading

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Deng Xiaoping on the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty

When Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Japan in October 1978 to attend the ratification ceremony of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, he discussed the specific steps for implementing the Li-Komoto agreement in his meetings with Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo and other Japanese government and business leaders. At his Tokyo press conference, Deng declared:

We have signed a long-term trade agreement between the two countries. But just one such agreement is not enough. The total business turnover involved in this agreement is 20 billion U.S. dollars. It will be doubled or trebled. The road will be even broader when our country is developed. We have much to learn from Japan. There are many fields in which we can make use of Japanese scientific and technological achievements and even funds... It is only natural that with the conclusion and implementation of the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty, cooperation between the two peoples will be strengthened. Cooperation between the two countries in political, economic, cultural and scientific fields will all be increased.


Chinatowns developed worldwide as Chinese immigrants settled to seek new lives abroad. Once considered ghettos for the poor, today’s Chinatowns are symbols of welcome cultural diversity.

Chinatown is a segregated community of Chinese immigrants. Chinatowns are located in many countries worldwide. The oldest are Japan’s Shinchimachi in Nagasaki, an enclave settled by Chinese traders as early as the seventeenth century, and Thailand’s two-century-old Chinatown in the area surrounding Yaowarat Road in Bangkok. Many Chinatowns originated during the mid-nineteenth century as Chinese fled the poverty and chaos of the late Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and sought to improve their lives abroad.

Chinatowns differ from segregated settlements or ghettos inhabited by Europeans living in Western countries because racial and cultural differences have made it more difficult for Chinese to assimilate. Moreover, in some countries, such as the United States, which had twenty-eight Chinatowns in 1940, Chinese were barred from citizenship and prohibited from property ownership until the mid-twentieth century. As a result, Chinatowns have continued to exist while many of their European counterparts have disappeared.
Early portrayals of Chinatowns were mostly negative, a phenomenon that often reflected tensions between Chinese and non-Chinese populations. Popular journals of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries perpetuated the image of Chinatowns as repugnant. Common complaints included unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, unpleasant smells, and immoral or illegal activities. Chinatowns, especially in the West, became stereotyped as slum areas where opium smoking, gambling, prostitution, and gang activity flourished. In the United States such negative images helped fuel the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. That act barred immigration of Chinese laborers into the United States for ten years. The exclusion laws that resulted from the renewals and modifications of the original act were not repealed until World War II.

Recently the portrayals of Chinatowns have changed for the better; Chinatowns have become tourist attractions and examples of welcome cultural diversity in many countries. Sociologists have offered several explanations for the more appealing image. Since the 1960s Chinese in the United States and elsewhere have been characterized as an achievement-oriented minority group whose members have overcome discrimination and hardship to attain success. Pejorative terms such as insularity, clan-dominated, and old-fashioned have given way to positive terms such as industriousness, family pride, and self-respect. And yet a number of Chinatowns worldwide have been both victims and beneficiaries of urban renewal projects and stepped-up law enforcement: As urban property values rise and real-estate developers replace older housing with higher-priced buildings, the number of Chinese
residing in these neighborhoods has decreased—while the perception of safer Chinatown neighborhoods attracts non-Chinese to patronize their businesses. Many Chinatowns, such as London’s, have become primarily commercial areas where relatively few people live.

In many cities Chinatowns have been targeted for development projects that enhance their unique cultural traits so that they may serve as tourist attractions. Since 2000 cities such as Antwerp, Boston, Sydney, and Vancouver have preserved or built traditional Chinese-style gates and other landmarks setting their Chinatowns apart from other neighborhoods. Many Chinatowns today are residential and commercial centers that also try to preserve Chinese culture.

June GRASSO

Further Reading


Chinese Central Television (CCTV, 中央电视台) is the official television broadcasting system of the Chinese government. Growing steadily since its trial broadcast in 1958, CCTV claimed to reach 94 percent of China’s population in 2008 with 16 channels and a daily total of 220 hours of programming. CCTV’s program content is heavily scrutinized by the Chinese government.

Chinese Central Television (CCTV) is the official television broadcasting system of the Chinese government, placed administratively under the National Bureau of Radio, Film, and Television within the State Council and editorially under the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. It is one of the most important media organizations of China.

CCTV began its trial broadcast on 1 May 1958 and began its official broadcast on 2 September 1958 as Beijing Television. In 1978 it was officially named “Chinese Central Television.” CCTV broadcasts on sixteen channels with a daily total of 220 hours of programming. Channel 1, a comprehensive channel, offers mainly news and other information-based programs. The other channels and their content are Channel 2, business; Channel 3, mixed entertainment programs; Channel 4, Mandarin broadcasts to an overseas audience; Channel 5, sports; Channel 6, movies; Channel 7, children’s, military, and agriculture; Channel 8, TV drama series; Channel 9, international broadcasts in English; Channel 10, science; Channel 11, theater; Channel 12, legal issues; Channel 13, news; Channel 14, children’s programming; Channel 15, music; and Channel 16, programs in French and Spanish. CCTV International was launched in September of 2000 and is an English-language twenty-four-hour news channel dedicated to reporting news and information to its global audience. Both Channels 4 and 9, with a special focus on China, are transmitted through satellites for audience overseas.

In addition, since 2003 CCTV has offered eleven pay channels that have even more diverse programming and are tailored toward special interests. CCTV also has twenty-eight channels of programs available online through its website (www.CCTV.com). CCTV’s estimate of its audience base in China is 1.1 billion.

Within CCTV’s structure are fifteen departments or centers responsible for various aspects of the TV system’s operation. In addition, CCTV owns China TV Drama Production Center (established in 1983), Central Documentary Production Studio (since 1993), and Beijing Science and Education Film Studio (created in 1995). CCTV also has its own TV program distribution center, China International Television Company (since 1984); Central Satellite TV Broadcasting Center (established in 1995); and China Philharmonic Orchestra (created in 2003). It also has its own publishing house, which publishes China Television, Television Studies, and Modern TV Technology. CCTV employs nearly ten thousand fulltime and part-time staff members.

Besides its claim to reach 94 percent of China’s population, CCTV has made an effort to capture audiences...
overseas. By 2007 it had established business relationships with more than two hundred TV stations in thirty-six countries. CCTV has fourteen foreign correspondent branches around the globe for international news coverage in addition to its extensive correspondent network in China.

CCTV’s new broadcasting center in Beijing, designed by the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas and equipped with the most updated technology, was completed in 2008 and in operation in time for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics; this new facility has the capacity of broadcasting in two hundred channels. CCTV is the most steadily growing media organization in China, and its program content is heavily scrutinized by the Chinese government.

**YU Xuejian**

**Further Reading**


Communism spread to China from the Soviet Union in the years surrounding the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1912. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 by intellectuals Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) and Li Dazhao (1888–1927). Sending its rival, the Chinese Nationalist Party, into exile on Taiwan in 1949 after a four-year civil war, the Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China and instituted massive socialist reforms with mixed success.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was born from the infiltration of Western ideas into China at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. After the Treaty of Versailles ceded Chinese territory to Japan at the end of World War I (despite China’s having participated in the war on the side of the Allies), Chinese students and intellectuals took to the streets in protest. During this time agents of the Comintern, the Soviet-dominated international Communist organization, agitated actively for the formation of a Chinese Communist Party, which they achieved in July 1921.

Early Days

In early 1920 the Communist International (Comintern) sent a young revolutionary organizer, Gregori Voitinsky (1893–1953), to China to establish a Chinese Communist party. Before he arrived the Soviet Union issued the Karakhan Declaration renouncing imperial Russia’s claims on China. This declaration set the Soviet Union apart from the West, which continued its exploitation, passing Germany’s concessions in China to Japan in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, despite China’s having been an ally in World War I. As a consequence, many Chinese lost faith in Western ideals, and Voitinsky found a warm welcome.

Voitinsky helped Chinese intellectuals such as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu form Marxist study groups in Beijing, Shanghai, Changsha, Guangzhou (Canton), and Jinan. In the mid-1921 delegates representing about sixty members became the core of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), committed to ending exploitation based on private ownership. Yet, the CCP was tiny, whereas the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang [GMD]), led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), was a growing revolutionary anti-imperialist party with an army. To promote
revolution, the Comintern pressed the CCP into an alliance with the Nationalists. The aim was for the CCP to help the GMD develop while simultaneously extending Communist influence to eventually make the Nationalist Party a Communist one.

The first period of GMD-CCP cooperation (the First United Front) ended in April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), commander of the GMD forces, turned on the Communists. Communist membership fell from fifty-eight thousand to four thousand active members, now experienced in organization, activism, and military and political affairs. While its urban influence evaporated, the CCP survived in the countryside, where, under Comintern direction, it instigated a series of failed uprisings, established worker-peasant-soldier soviets (councils), and implemented radical agrarian revolution, violently confiscating and redistributing land to the poor.

In October 1934 encirclement and attacks by GMD and local elite troops forced the CCP to flee the Chinese Soviet republic it had established in Jiangxi Province in southeastern China in November 1927. During this retreat, known as the “Long March,” Mao Zedong (1893–1976) rose to prominence. The threat of war with Japan allowed the Communists to portray themselves as patriots heroically advancing to fight Japan despite GMD resistance. Indeed, after Nationalist generals had kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in Xi’an in 1936 the Communists intervened, urging the generals to spare Chiang’s life if he agreed to a GMD-CCP united front against Japan.

**From the Second United Front to Civil War**

In 1937 popular opinion and pressure from the Soviet Union forced the GMD and CCP into their second period
of cooperation, this time against Japan. This alliance formed half of the CCP’s Second United Front. The other half consisted of winning as many allies as possible among intellectuals, warlords, landlords, and others by making concessions in Communist ideology and practice. Mao justified these concessions by invoking the idea of “New Democracy,” a period of transition from the allegedly old “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” society to a socialist one. This transition would entail the long-term coexistence of different classes and forms of property ownership until the forces for the final transition to a classless socialism were strong enough. During this time all classes allied to the CCP would be represented in the political system. This policy was reflected in moderate policies including rent and interest-rate reductions rather than radical land confiscation and redistribution.

Inside its rural bases the CCP experimented with policies determined by local class structures and attitudes, GMD responses, rural conditions, attitudes of local elites, and international conditions. No overarching revolutionary theme of nationalism or land revolution existed to guarantee success for any one policy throughout China, although the CCP made much of its patriotism and worked hard to win support from the poor and landless in particular.

After the end of World War II in 1945, the CCP delayed civil war as long as possible, building military and political strength. Meanwhile, the GMD, racked by infighting and corruption, rapidly deteriorated. The GMD lacked a strong political and social base, while the economy suffered hyperinflation, further undermining the GMD’s legitimacy. Reviving the anti-CCP civil war cost the Guomindang more support, and its political weakness became increasingly obvious. The GMD was eventually defeated by CCP armies of rural soldiers won over by the promise of land, and by GMD deserters, disaffected students, and others who were promised a new China. The GMD fled to Taiwan in 1949.

**People’s Republic of China**

On 1 October 1949 Mao declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The CCP quickly moved to eliminate potential enemies, institute thought reform, confiscate many businesses, and implement land reform. The CCP subjected private businesses to repeated campaigns aimed at delegitimizing them and forcing them into state or cooperative ownership. Soviet-model rapid industrialization using central planning to develop state-owned enterprises was implemented according to five-year plans. Despite the Korean War (1950–1953), in which China was involved, the economy grew quickly. In 1956 Mao declared the transition to socialism complete and ended the “New Democracy.”

**Maoism**

Despite the apparent success Mao also saw increasing bureaucratism, dogmatism, and sectarianism in the CCP. Mao’s methods for rectifying these problems included allowing intellectuals to criticize government. Mao’s 1957 speech, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions,” especially his line “Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred thoughts contend,” implied there was no more need for class struggle and reassured many that it was safe to speak up. However, Mao was shocked when his Hundred Flowers Movement, intended to encourage constructive criticism of CCP shortcomings, including criticism from the CCP’s United Front allies, also elicited severe criticisms of both the party and himself. In response he launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign. This campaign re-emphasized class struggle and encouraged anti-intellectualism. Mao promoted the use of big-character posters (in which propaganda slogans were broadcast in huge red pictographs), public meetings, and debates to force criticism and self-criticism—so-called big democracy. These methods often involved public humiliation and even torture of critics. Accusations of rightism could be spawned by denying the centrality of class struggle, advocating markets in economics, or opposing central planning or party control over politics and culture. Hundreds of thousands were labeled, exiled, imprisoned, demoted, and sidelined. These features of Maoism also marked the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

The Great Leap Forward was an experiment by Mao to overcome the problems of central planning and to speed up industrialization. These goals were to be achieved by emphasizing mass mobilization, native ingenuity, and correct ideological viewpoint. Moral incentives rather than financial rewards were stressed, and distinctions between politics and technical knowledge were to be
eliminated to make individuals both “Red and expert.” Relying on surpluses from agriculture to fund industrialization, the Great Leap Forward accelerated the socialization and industrialization of agriculture by creating communes of up to five thousand households, where private plots, markets, and sideline businesses such as selling homemade pickled vegetables were eliminated. Decentralization and self-sufficiency were also key goals. The most famous Great Leap initiative was the building of “backyard” furnaces in communal settlements to raise steel output, but instead it created large amounts of unusable pig (crude) iron at enormous cost in labor, raw materials, and wasted resources. The CCP mobilized the masses to build rural infrastructure such as dams and irrigation projects. Unfortunately, poor planning, excessive state extraction of grain taxes, shortcomings in communes, and other problems, together with bad weather, resulted in an estimated 20 million deaths from starvation in rural areas.

After 1959, stung by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao retreated from leadership. Pragmatic leaders, including Liu Shaopin (1898–1969) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), then instituted moderate policies, allowed private plots and sidelines, and rehabilitated some alleged rightists. Mao saw this moderation as revisionism and betrayal of revolutionary ideals. He began building support in China’s army (the People’s Liberation Army) and in September 1962 asked everyone never to forget the class struggle. In 1964 Mao began to reimpose his will and ultimately created the Cultural Revolution.

Through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as it was officially named, Mao encouraged the army and students in particular to criticize those such as Liu and Deng, whom he saw as taking the capitalist road. Mao told students that rebellion is justified and that they should fight selfishness and criticize revisionism. CCP leaders and intellectuals such as teachers became targets of student Red Guards, who had prepared themselves by memorizing Mao zhuxi yulu (Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong), nicknamed the “Little Red Book.” Many people, including Liu Shaopin, were tortured and died as a result. In line with Mao’s calls students also worked to destroy old ideology, culture, customs, and habits (the “four olds”). However, Mao’s egalitarianism also spurred the development of basic health care and education and attacked traditional elitism.

China and the CCP since Mao

The CCP now describes the Cultural Revolution as ten years of chaos and waste. After Mao’s death in September 1976 an interregnum existed under Chairman Hua Guofeng (b. 1921). The so-called Gang of Four (including Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, 1914–1991) and others were arrested and blamed for the Cultural Revolution. In 1978 Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919) (tentatively) replaced Hua as China’s premier, but Deng Xiaoping came to wield the most power beginning in 1979 when he officially took over Hua’s position. The new leaders began rebuilding support among non-“Red” classes, especially intellectuals, former businesspeople, and those with overseas connections. The goals were the four modernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense) and a dramatic increase in economic growth. Farmers benefited first when the communes were replaced with the household responsibility system, under which individual families again had responsibility for many decisions in the management of agriculture and rewards related directly to their success in production. The state increased produce prices and allowed the revival of private markets.

In 1980 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in China’s south, where foreigners, overseas Chinese especially, could invest in manufacturing for export. After the SEZs proved successful, efforts to attract foreign investors spread widely. The state also began gradually relaxing controls on private business. Rural industries built by communes for self-reliance assisted rapid rural industrialization because their products could be sold at the revived rural markets or exported. Township and village enterprises (both village and privately owned) are now a major feature of the Chinese economy. State-owned enterprises have dramatically declined in importance and efficiency, and most are now heavily indebted and a drag on the economy. The CCP’s reform and opening-up policy marked a shift from autarky (self-sufficiency). The intent was not to abandon Communist ideals but rather to create socialism with Chinese characteristics, which proved itself by building national strength and raising living standards.

The changes created by reform have created major dilemmas for the CCP and its ideology. China is now a major economic power but only after abandoning most tenets of its original ideology and retreating from full
socialization of ownership to mixed ownership and markets. In 1987 Zhao Ziyang justified the CCP’s return to a New Democracy–type economy by declaring that China was in the initial stage of socialism and that full socialism could be achieved only when all the productive forces were fully developed and modernized. This formulation was reinforced by the 1992 promulgation of the concept of the socialist market economy, under which the declining state-owned sector coexists with cooperatives and foreign-owned and joint-venture businesses as well as, increasingly, Chinese privately owned enterprises.

In 1980 Deng Xiaoping had mooted major political reforms after blaming feudal and undemocratic traditions for the overconcentration of power in one person that had resulted in excesses such as the Cultural Revolution. Deng advocated a separation of the roles and powers of the CCP and government and called for more people’s democracy and debate in the party itself. A party theorist, Liao Gailong (b. 1919), promoted reforms, including direct elections at all levels and a two-house national parliament—one for regions and one representing economic interests—but with the CCP maintaining overall power. Deng’s ideas and Liao’s corporatist proposal were forgotten after the rise of Poland’s Solidarity trade union movement highlighted the threat of relaxing controls over mass movements by demonstrating how such movements could easily become dangerously politicized and threaten CCP rule.

A similar fate befell Zhao Ziyang’s modest late-1980s proposals to build socialist democracy—a broadening of representation and participation in the political system by new groups and experts in particular areas—by developing the national and lower-level People’s Congresses and by expanding United Front work and its public face, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Whereas the congresses are elected and have nominal power to make decisions, conference representatives are

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**Shanghai Municipal Building. In July 1921, when the Chinese Communist Party was founded, the first party congress was held in Shanghai—not publicly in any official edifice, but in secret at a girls’ boardinghouse. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.**
appointed. They can only review laws and policies and can make only recommendations to the government, the CCP, and public organizations. The student movement of April–June 1989, during which student demands for better living conditions, jobs, and less corruption, escalated to calls for an undefined democracy; the army violently suppressed the protests at Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. Zhao was sacked for his sympathy for the students’ demands, and his reforms were dropped.

Jiang Zemin (b. 1926), the PRC’s president from 1993 to 2003, endorsed upholding Deng Xiaoping’s four cardinal principles: the socialist path, proletarian dictatorship, leadership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. While maintaining CCP dominance, these principles left little room for democratization. The party repeatedly campaigns against bourgeois liberalization (any calls for Western-style political reforms) and spiritual pollution while promoting construction of an ill-defined socialist spiritual civilization and nationalism as counterweights. In February 2000 Jiang began promoting the CCP as being the representative of advanced forces of production, of the fundamental interests of the broad masses, and of advanced culture. After 1987 incremental improvements were made in the local election process. Steady improvements have been made in China’s legal system but they have tended to focus on rule by law rather than on the idea of rule of law, something that is thought to be a better guarantee of the rights of Chinese citizens as written in the constitution. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, its ever-increasing presence in international policy shaping, and its central role in the efforts to respond to the global economic crisis that began in 2008, tend to promote rule-based decision making.

The “eight immortals,” a group of older party members of the Chinese Communist Party who wielded power in China from the 1980s through 1990s. Top row, left to right: Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun. Bottom row, left to right: Song Renqiong, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, Li Xiannan.
During the last decade, the Chinese Communist Party has presided over a transition to a market-based economic system and seen an economic growth rate that has surpassed developed nations, such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, while acquiring some $1.2 trillion in U.S. debt. It has done so while conscious of the urgent need to maintain social harmony by improving living standards.

The global economic crisis that began in 2008 presented the CCP with new challenges: It must deal with the plunge in China’s exports and the resulting job losses, and at the same time put a huge stimulus package into effect. By managing to contend with both these difficulties the party will make a significant contribution to the world economy.

Gerry GROOT

Further Reading


Return the jewelry but keep the box.

买椟还珠

Mǎi dú huán zhū
Originally known as the “People’s Construction Bank of China,” the Chinese Construction Bank (CCB) is one of the big four banks in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and has been making significant contributions to Chinese economic development for more than half a century, including the financing of such controversial projects as Three Gorges Dam construction.

Founded on 1 October 1954, the bank was wholly state owned under the direction of the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and in charge of administering and disbursing government funds for construction and infrastructure-related projects. For decades the bank had played a key role in the planned economy of mainland China.

In 1979 the People’s Construction Bank of China became a financial institution under the direction of the State Council and gradually assumed more commercial banking functions. In 1994, after the establishment of the China Development Bank, the People’s Construction Bank of China became a full-service commercial bank, and two years later its name was changed to Chinese Construction Bank. Since then it has become a leading commercial bank in China, providing a comprehensive range of services. As the bellwether in China’s financial reform, in late 2003 the State Council approved CCB’s application to become a shareholding bank. On 17 September 2004, Chinese Construction Bank Corporation was founded.

The year 2005 was important in the history of the bank. In March CCB Chairman Zhang Enzhao resigned for “personal reasons.” However, a lawsuit in the United States alleged that he received a bribe of $1 million from Alltel Information Services for securing a contract. Despite the negative publicity, the Bank of America decided to acquire a 9 percent stake in Chinese Construction Bank for $3 billion later that year. This measure represented the U.S. company’s largest foray into China’s growing banking sector. Bank of America was looking to greatly expand its Chinese business, which then had only branch offices in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Canton). On 27 October 2005, Chinese Construction Bank made an initial public offering on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and since February 2006 the share price has risen about 50 percent. In late 2007 CCB made China’s second-largest initial public offering of 57.12 billion yuan ($7.6 billion) on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.

Corporate Strategies

Chinese Construction Bank is currently among the market leaders in China in a number of products and services, including infrastructure loans, residential mortgages, and bankcards. Its core business consists of three principal segments: corporate banking, personal banking, and treasury operations. With the goal
of becoming a world-class bank, CCB has a corporate strategy of focusing on its customers, products, and geographical regions. The bank has strived to strengthen its historically strong relationships with large corporate customers by focusing on leaders in strategic industries such as power, telecommunications, oil and gas, and infrastructure, as well as major financial institutions and government agencies, and by developing relationships with small- and medium-enterprise customers. In the personal banking segment CCB seeks to increase revenues from high-income retail customers while capitalizing on its cost efficiency and economy of scale to serve mass-market customers more efficiently. In terms of its services, CCB has developed both wholesale and retail products with a focus on fee-based businesses, including payment and settlement services, personal-wealth management, and corporate-treasury management. In light of high savings rates and a booming real estate market in China, CCB also endeavors to increase its personal banking business with a focus on residential mortgages, diverse savings products, and an industry-leading credit card business. Its geographical focus is in the major cities of the more developed markets of the Yangzi (Chang) River delta, Pearl River delta, and Bohai Rim regions. In addition, the company has an ambitious goal of growth in the capital cities of inland provinces in China. CCB has already built an extensive customer base and established relationships with many of the largest business groups and leading companies in industries that are strategically important to China’s fast-growing economy. Its network includes approximately thirteen thousand branch outlets.

**International Expansion**

During recent years CCB has also expanded internationally. The bank is a member of the Global ATM Alliance, a joint venture of several major international banks that allows customers of the banks to use their ATM card or check card at another bank in the Global ATM Alliance with no fees when traveling internationally. In addition, CCB maintains overseas branch operations in Hong Kong, Singapore, Frankfurt, Johannesburg, Tokyo, and Seoul and has representative offices in New York and London. In 2006 CCB acquired Bank of America (Asia), which started in 1912 in Hong Kong as Bank of Canton with a subsidiary in Macao. After the acquisition Bank of America (Asia) became the Chinese Construction Bank (Asia) Corporation. CCB’s other subsidiaries include Chinese Construction Bank (Asia) Limited (formerly Jian Sing Bank Limited), Sino-German Bansparkasse Co., and Chinese Construction Bank Principal Asset Management Co. In 2007 *Fortune* magazine ranked CCB at 230 on its Global 500 List (CCB had previously ranked 277). Within the banking sector CCB is ranked 34, with annual revenue of more than $28.5 billion.

Wenxian ZHANG

**Further Reading**


The Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), which began as a parliamentary party in 1912, has seen three major eras (from 1912 to 1927, 1927 to 1978, and 1978 to the present) in which the party leadership, its objects, and its strategies have changed dramatically—in both China and Taiwan. It is currently in the unfamiliar position of opposition party to the Democratic Progressive Party.

The Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), which began as a parliamentary party in 1912, has lived through three major eras. The Nationalists' role, as well as their strategy and goals, has shifted dramatically within each era.

During the first era (1912–1927) Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) led the party until his death. He made major adjustments in the Nationalists' goals and structure because of domestic warlordism and competing foreign interests in China. Sun set forth the Nationalists' philosophy, the Three Principles of the People, but had little success in the contest for political power. Sun's loyal military commander, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), assumed command of the party in 1927 and established the Republic of China in the Nationalists' second era (1927–1978). His dominance lasted in spite of dramatic shifts in Nationalist fortunes until his death. Even though the Nationalists lost the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) to the Chinese Communists, Chiang Kai-shek managed to reestablish a Nationalist Party–led Republic of China on Taiwan. Thus, the Nationalist Party completely dominated the Republic of China both in China and on Taiwan from 1927 until 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in the Republic of China on Taiwan well into the third era of party history, which began in 1978).

After establishing the Republic of China at Nanjing in 1927 the Nationalists enjoyed a decade of relative peace. Then, in spite of Nationalist efforts to postpone a war, the Japanese invaded China and began a long, debilitating struggle from 1937 to 1945. Following Japan's defeat, the weakened Nationalist Party lost control to the Chinese Communists in a civil war ending in 1949. The Communists, under the leadership of Mao Zedong (1893–1976), established a new People's Republic of China (PRC). With Chiang Kai-shek still in command, the Nationalist Party and the Republic of China, still inseparable, withdrew to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek established a dictatorial state ruling under martial law and pledged to retake the Chinese mainland. After his death the Nationalists entered their third era. Leadership passed to Chiang's son, Jian Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) (1910–1988). Beginning in 1975 the party slowly moved away from its revanchist (relating to a political policy designed to recover lost territory or status) goals to emphasize economic development and popular democracy in Taiwan. The Nationalists as a party and the people of Taiwan all prospered during these years. However, in 2000 the Nationalists lost political control of the government to a Taiwanese party, the Democratic Progressive Party. The Nationalists thus became the chief opposition party in a two-party political...
system on Taiwan. Since then the party has pinned its hopes on regaining control through regular democratic elections.

**First Era, 1912–1927**

After the fall of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) in 1912, Sun Yat-sen envisioned China as a modern national state governed through a parliament and representative government. To that end Sun advocated that his umbrella anti-Manchu coalition known as the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance) be transformed into a parliamentary party, the Nationalists. The heart of the Tongmenghui was its opposition to the rule of the Manchus and the advocacy of a new government that would be led by Chinese. The Tongmenghui involved garnering support from various groups: radical revolutionaries who wanted to assassinate the Manchu leaders, simple patriots, businessmen hoping for a modern economic system, advocates of parliamentary democracy, promoters of provincial self-rule, champions of militarized China, and non-Marxist socialists and anarchists. This dream quickly faded because Sun had no real office in the new government, and General Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), the first president, had the Nationalist parliamentary leader Song Jiaoren (1882–1913) assassinated. Beginning in 1913 Sun tried a number of means to gain power including armed revolution; creation of the secret Revolutionary Party (Gemindang), in which members signed a loyalty oath to Sun himself; alignment with progressive warlords; and courting of Japan, England, and the United States for aid. In 1917 Sun established Guangzhou (Canton) as his base and revived the Nationalist Party as an organization. The warlord Chen Jiongming (1878–1933), distrustful of Sun, expelled the Nationalists from Guangzhou in 1922. After a decade of the Republic of China, Sun and the Nationalist Party seemed doomed to more failures.

This prospect changed in January 1923 with a formal alliance between the Nationalists and the Soviet Communist International. Behind the scenes Sun Yat-sen had courted Soviet interest and support from 1920 as the newly victorious Bolshevik Revolution in Russia began reaching out for allies in the colonialist world. Sun began borrowing from the Marxist-Leninist program. He adopted Marxist anti-Western, anti-Japanese rhetoric as well as efforts to organize Chinese workers and peasants. Sun also accepted members of the fledgling Chinese Communist Party into the Nationalist Party. The Soviets sent military advisors and equipment. Sun made an impressive and loyal military officer, Chiang Kai-shek, head of a new military academy just outside Guangzhou. As the Nationalists’ prospects brightened Sun promoted the Northern Expedition, in which armed forces would combine with workers and peasant uprisings to rid China of warlordism. The Nationalist Party would then establish a genuine Republic of China at Nanjing.

In these same years Sun made a number of modifications in his famous Three Principles of the People—nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood. Sun’s
ideas about nationalism initially had focused on the Han Chinese majority in the former Qing empire but evolved into a concept of a multinational polity filling all the territory ruled by the Manchus, including Mongolia and Tibet. For Sun democracy originally meant a representative government elected by popular vote and operating under a constitution. He always believed that the Nationalists would need to exercise tutelage for years during which the party educated the Chinese people about democracy. His experience in the decade after 1912 led him to extend this period of tutelage indefinitely. The concept of tutelage opened the door for the Nationalists to assume authoritarian powers. People’s livelihood always seemed an amorphous principle linked most closely to traditional Chinese concepts that the state should foster the well-being of its subjects. As a consequence of Soviet influence, people’s livelihood in the early 1920s came more clearly to reflect Marxist socialism and to be modeled on the Soviet state-managed economic order.

Pancreatic cancer took Sun Yat-sen’s life in March 1925 before the Northern Expedition could be launched. A period of disorder in the party leadership followed his death. Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), a confidant of Sun who embraced Sun’s anti-imperialist, class warfare views,

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chiang, Kai-shek, and Winston Churchill in Cairo, Egypt, 25 November 1943. Chiang assumed command of the Nationalist Party in 1927. Despite dramatic shifts in Nationalist fortunes throughout the various contexts of war with Japan, and after defeat in the civil war by the Communists, Chiang’s dominance in the party lasted until his death. NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
was a contender. At the time, most people believed that Chiang Kai-shek, the loyal commander of the Nationalist military, also supported this leftist, pro-Soviet position. More conservative Nationalist Party members created their own rump party in Beijing and denounced the Communist influence at Guangzhou. However, Chiang Kai-shek, who had visited the USSR and had not liked what he had seen, began revealing his distrust of the Soviets in March 1926, a few months before launching the Northern Expedition.

The Northern Expedition, led by Chiang Kai-shek, began in July 1926 with full support of the Soviet advisors and the leftist elements in the Nationalist Party. It won impressive early victories even while fracturing into left and right wings. The leftists, including the Soviet advisors, the Chinese Communist leadership, and Wang Jingwei, based themselves in Wuhan, while Chiang Kai-shek took Nanjing and then Shanghai. On 12 April 1927 Chiang Kai-shek, with assistance from Shanghai underworld gangs, attacked the Communists and the Shanghai labor movement, decisively severing his previous association with the pro-Soviet elements in the Nationalist Party.

Within months Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) recalled the Soviet advisors to Moscow, the Communist Party carried out abortive peasant uprisings, and the leftist headquarters at Wuhan collapsed. Chiang Kai-shek made opportunistic alliances with northern warlords and set up a Nationalist Party state at Nanjing that won international diplomatic recognition. China appeared to have ended the warlord disorder, to have turned away from the Soviet Union, and to have taken a path friendly to capitalism.

**Second Era, 1927–1978**

The year 1927 ushered in an era of peace and economic construction in Nationalist history called the “Nanjing Decade.” The Nationalists maintained firm control of policy under the rubric of Sun Yat-sen’s principle of tutelage. All hints of radical Soviet-style land reform and other Marxist socialist policies disappeared. Chiang Kai-shek and his advisors favored state capitalism in which government-owned enterprises controlled the manufacture of major capital and military goods, while other state-sponsored corporations dominated trade in the chief commodities. Private businesses continued to operate, but the Nanjing bureaucracy determined much of their destinies.

In fact, Chiang Kai-shek’s rule rested on his ability to manage a number of factional elements within the Nationalist Party. He proved adept at this game while organizing loyal young followers in a “Blue Shirt” organization while trumpeting the New Life Movement to improve public behavior and morals. Chiang Kai-shek himself was presented as a remote but concerned father/ruler in the Confucian mode. The Nationalists were copying qualities of Italian, Spanish, and German fascism.

The Nationalist government in Nanjing worked for two major domestic goals. First, Chiang Kai-shek wanted to destroy the Chinese Communists once and for all. Second, he wanted to reduce the autonomy and military capacity of the remaining warlords in China. To do this Chiang Kai-shek needed to build up his military strength with larger, better-equipped armies. He turned to Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States for military supplies and advice.

Chiang Kai-shek, who had received his military education in Japan, understood that the Japanese presented the greatest challenge to the Nationalist government through their policies of military expansion in China. Expansionist and aggressive Japanese policies rested on a conviction that Japan’s own success at modernization entitled it to leadership throughout Asia. Japanese ruling circles rejected the Anglo-U.S. view that Chiang Kai-shek was the new leader of a united China. Instead they saw him as a regional warlord who wrapped himself in Sun Yat-sen’s impractical political ideas.

Beginning with the takeover of Manchuria in 1931, waves of Japanese military aggression against China heightened nationalistic resistance in the Chinese public. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government placed their struggle against domestic enemies first. This policy led to the Chinese Communist–supported kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek at Xi’an in December 1936 in hopes of turning attention to Japan’s aggression. This so-called Xi’an Incident produced a temporary revival. Undeclared war broke out in June 1937, and the Japanese drove the Nationalist government out of its strongest regional base in the lower Yangzi (Chang) River valley and into isolation in the Sichuan basin. Chiang Kai-shek remained in control, but the Nationalist Party splintered with Wang
Jingwei breaking away in 1940 to set up a rump Nationalist government in Nanjing under Japanese auspices.

The United States stepped up its support for the Nationalist government even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, but the twin effects of fighting against the Japanese and suffering runaway inflation ate away at the Nationalists in the early 1940s. When World War II ended in August 1945 Chiang Kai-shek attempted to assert Nationalist control throughout China, but even with U.S. assistance he failed. A civil war broke out between the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communists. The Nationalists’ apparent advantages evaporated quickly, and their government collapsed in the autumn of 1949.

A sizable remnant of the Nationalist armed forces, including much of the air force and navy, withdrew to Taiwan. Taiwan had become a Chinese colony in 1895 but was returned to Chinese control after World War II. The first occupying Nationalist army had carried out a repressive occupation, and thus there was no real welcome for the fleeing Nationalists when they arrived 1949–1950. Loss of the Chinese mainland obviously is a critical turning point in Nationalist Party history, but the continuation of Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalist Party domination of the Republic of China makes these years all one era.

The future of Chiang and the Nationalists as rulers of Taiwan appeared bleak until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. From that point on the Nationalist government received generous economic and military support from the United States as part of U.S. strategy in the Cold War. Chiang himself continued to dream of returning to the Chinese mainland and expelling the Communists. The Nationalist government and military on Taiwan lived by that dream but never received sufficient support from the United States to attempt a full-scale invasion.

On Taiwan the Nationalists ruled through martial law but maintained a façade of representative government through a 1947 constitution and an elected parliament. It still paid homage to Sun Yat-sen and his Three Principles of the People as its guiding philosophy. A major land reform was undertaken with impressive results in increased production and diversification. The Republic of China remained the internationally recognized government of China until 1973, when, after U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing, the People’s Republic of China replaced the Republic of China in the United Nations. Chiang Kai-shek’s dreams for the party came to an end with his death in April 1975.

**Third Era, 1978 to Present**

Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Jiang Jingguo (1910–1988), had been appointed premier in 1972 and became president in 1978. He began the third era of the Nationalist Party with the appearance of continuing his father’s policies. It seemed that Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian style would continue to prevail. In fact, a major economic transformation had already begun through efforts to promote medium- and small-scale production for export to U.S. and Japanese markets. The Taiwan economy prospered. Individual households became wealthier, and the Nationalist Party itself became rich through its ownership of many businesses. The party used its wealth to buy support for its regime. During the decade of Jiang Jingguo’s leadership he loosened the Nationalists’ grip on political power. A key indicator was the election of representatives to the Taiwan provincial legislature who did not follow the Nationalist Party line.

Upon Jiang Jingguo’s death leadership of the party passed to Li Donghui (Lee Teng-hui, b. 1923), a native Taiwanese educated in Japan and the United States. Under his control the long period of Nationalist Party tutelage finally ended. Li proclaimed a goal of full democracy in 1990. Martial law was rescinded in 1991. A popularly elected national legislature replaced a body dominated by a 1947 election on the Chinese mainland. Politics became much more open, but the influence of money and corruption increased. Li Donghui became the first popularly elected president of the Republic of China in 1996. In this period the Democratic Progressive Party, a Taiwanese-based party advocating a Taiwanese identity separate from China, became a real rival to the Nationalists.

Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People remained enshrined as the official ideology in the Republic of China. No one is sure if “nationalism” refers to a pan-Chinese notion or should be a Taiwanese notion. Democracy has proven to be a messy but still enormously absorbing means of political rule. People’s livelihood seems to have been achieved but through a much more capitalistic form than Sun Yat-sen advocated.

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In the elections of 2000 the DPP won control of the legislature, and its candidate, Chen Shuibian (b. 1950), won the presidency. This election put Nationalists in the role of an opposition party for the first time since 1927. Stung by the defeat and fearful that the DPP would openly declare independence from China and bring about a military confrontation with the People's Republic of China, the Nationalist Party turned on Li Donghui and expelled him for what they considered to be his underhanded advancement of Taiwanese independence.

In the unfamiliar role of an opposition political party the Nationalists advocated less-confrontational policies with Beijing. Chen Shuibian and the DPP became strident advocates of Taiwanese independence from China and claim the Nationalists are inclined to compromise and accept eventual unification with the People's Republic of China. In March 2008 the electorate in Taiwan, unhappy with the DPP leadership and policies, turned back to the Nationalist Party. Ma Yingjiu (Ma Ying-jeou) (b. 1950) defeated Chen Shuibian in the Presidential race, thus returning the leadership of the Republic of China to the Nationalist Party.

David D. BUCK

Further Reading

Chinese, Classical

Wényánwén 文言文

Classical Chinese refers to the formal written language of China prior to the twentieth century, a terse, learned language of the educated distinct from the spoken vernacular of the masses. Following the Vernacular Language Movement of the 1910s, writing in China shifted to vernacular Chinese, but remnants of the classical language survive in modern writings in the form of allusions, idioms, and set expression.

Classical Chinese refers to the language of established literature and formal writings in China before the twentieth century. In the early twentieth century, language reforms were instituted so that writing was no longer carried out in the classical language, which was understood by only an educated elite, but instead done in an approximation of the modern vernacular (everyday language) of the north.

The expression Classical Chinese has a narrow and a broad sense. In its narrow sense, Classical Chinese (gūwen, ancient text) is the designation for written language from the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) through the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), encompasing the language of the Chinese classics and early historical narratives. Later imitations of the classical style, used in literature and formal writings from the third century to the early twentieth century, are referred to as Literary Chinese (wényanwén, literary text). The classical/literary divide is in many ways similar to the relationship between Classical Latin and Medieval Latin, both learned languages. In actual usage, however, the classical/literary distinction is not always maintained by Chinese academics, as gūwen and wényanwén are used interchangeably to refer to formal writing styles before the advent of modern literature (baihuawén, plain speech text).

When attempting to frame a formal definition of Classical Chinese, linguists tend to resort to one of two strategies. The first is to treat Classical Chinese as all that is not vernacular writing—definition by default. The second is to pinpoint the historical period out of which Classical Chinese writing developed and state that Classical Chinese consists of literary traditions that grew out of the speech habits of a particular time and place.

The Classical/Vernacular Divide

Criteria that have been traditionally used to distinguish Classical and Vernacular Chinese include the following:

1. **Intelligibility**: Is the text readily understood by the average native speaker, or is the language comprehensible only to an educated elite?
2. **Spoken versus written mode**: Does the text resemble natural speech, or is it more characteristic of stylized writing?
3. **Time depth**: When speaking of natural speech and average native speaker, are we using present-day speakers as a reference point?
Intelligibility means that the language is comprehensible to a general audience. If it cannot be understood by the average native speaker without further training, it is considered unintelligible. Vernacular Chinese (baihua, plain speech) is Chinese written in language the average speaker can understand. Everything else is classified as Classical Chinese regardless of the source. This view is often reflected in popular comments about writing styles. Certain styles are difficult to understand because they are too wenyan (classical/literary). In this view Classical Chinese stands for all writing styles understood by only a few.

There are problems with this approach, however. The first is that intelligibility judgments are limited to the here and now, for there is no way of determining whether people in ancient times could understand a particular style of writing. We are tied to the judgments of a modern audience. If we were to do this, we run into a second problem, which is that we would have to exclude from our definition of Vernacular Chinese the language of popular historical novels such as Outlaws of the Marsh (Shuihu Zhuan) and Dream of the Red Chamber (Honglou Meng), which are traditionally considered vernacular literature (baihua xi-aoshuo) but are in modern times not fully comprehensible to the uneducated reader.

An alternative to the intelligibility criterion is that of language mode: spoken language versus written language. Most of the world’s languages maintain a distinction between spoken and written modes. The spoken mode is usually more informal and involved, employing more first- and second-person pronouns (I, you), conjunctions (and, but), and situation-dependent references (last night, over here), whereas the written mode tends to be more informational, abstract, and explicit, often containing learned or technical vocabulary. Relying on such universal tendencies, we can determine whether the text at hand is closer to typical spoken language or written language. Texts that resemble spoken language are then labeled Vernacular Chinese. Those with attributes of written language are relegated to Classical Chinese.

Written language. It is not the case that uneducated speakers can only understand language in the spoken mode, and find formal writing entirely unintelligible. There is an area of overlap where language can have characteristics of the written register, and is yet comprehensible to the uneducated reader.

Whether we use intelligibility or spoken/written mode as criterion, however, an additional variable is time depth, the historical period of the intended audience. Writing that is intelligible to or characteristic of the population of one historical period may be unintelligible to or uncharacteristic of the speech of another stage in history. For this reason it is important to specify the period on which we are to base our definition.

Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of Communism in China, was both a scholar and a rebel. He and his fellow intellectual Hu Shi succeeded in bringing about the Vernacular Movement, or the change from writing in a Classical Chinese to a colloquial syntax.
A definition of Classical Chinese based on spoken/written mode from the perspective of a historical audience was given by scholar Hu Shi (1891–1962), who was one of the chief proponents of language reform and vernacular writing in early Republican China. In his influential work Baihua Wenxue Shi (A History of Vernacular Literature, 1928), Hu described a division in which vernacular literature is literature written in the spoken language of the day (which may be far removed from the spoken language of today), and classical literature is all other literature. By this definition what is vernacular and what is classical is not a fixed notion, but rather varies with each historical period. Hu’s definition, while similar to the European notion of vernacular and mainstream literature, is actually foreign to the Chinese tradition. Hu is often criticized for framing a definition of vernacular language that is too broad. His definition would necessarily include obscure works of oral literature from remote periods, which speakers of Modern Chinese have great trouble understanding.

A more widely accepted definition of Vernacular and Classical Chinese is that of Lü Shuxiang (1944, 12), which states that vernacular literature is written text that corresponds to spoken language from the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) onwards. All else is relegated to Classical Chinese. Lü’s treatment avoids the shortcomings of both Hu’s working definition and the layman’s notion of the vernacular. It includes drama and popular writing from

Gates to the Altar of Heaven, within the Temple of Heaven complex, Beijing. Built in 1530 (Ming dynasty) and enlarged in 1749. Ming and Qing dynasty emperors offered prayers on this altar to the “Great Spirit Who Resides in Heaven” at the time of the winter solstice. If emperors (or their imperial scholar-officials) had written out their prayers it would have been in Classical Chinese, the language of established literature and formal writings in China before the twentieth century. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties while excluding obscure pre-Tang works of oral literature. Lü’s definition is sometimes criticized for its arbitrary choice of the Tang dynasty as a divide, but it is worth noting that the intermingling of Sinitic and Altaic-speaking populations in cosmopolitan Tang society accounts for the considerable linguistic gap between Middle Chinese (265–1269) and Premodern Chinese (1269–1795). It is also during this period that basic Chinese word order began to shift from subject–verb–object to subject–object–verb—a change often taken to be an important distinction between Classical Chinese and Modern Chinese.

A number of linguistic features distinguish Modern Chinese from its classical predecessor. Whereas Modern Chinese acquired a system of stress and rhythm that led to the development of longer words, vocabulary in the classical period consisted by and large of single-syllable word forms. In the classical language, words can easily change from noun to verb or adjective and vice versa, whereas in the modern language such flexibility is rare. When counting objects, nouns in Modern Chinese are always preceded by a measure word—not so in Classical Chinese. Classical Chinese does not require a “to be” verb, and its pronouns and articles are significantly different from those of modern day usage.

Classical Chinese, as an abstract form of writing far removed from the Chinese spoken language, was an East Asian lingua franca readily borrowed by neighboring states. It was in wide circulation outside of China proper, often existing as an elite written language alongside the local vernacular, similar to the use of Latin in Western Europe. Up until the twentieth century, the educated classes in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam possessed a reading knowledge of Classical Chinese (known as kanbun in Japanese and hammun in Korean). Being a semantic (related to meaning) rather than phonetic (related to sound) means of representation, Classical Chinese did not have a uniform pronunciation but instead was incorporated into the pronunciation system of the local language or dialect.

Classical Chinese through the Ages

Some scholars believe that the classical writing style may have been derived from the spoken language of an earlier period. Linguists have found considerable overlap between Classical Chinese grammar and the syntax of Old Chinese oracle bone and bronze inscriptions of the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE) dynasties. The inscriptions are for the most part short sentences describing ceremonies and divinations, and are considered a more or less faithful record of the spoken language of the day in the Huang (Yellow) River basin.

With the breakup of the Zhou empire (1111–256 BCE), a new culture of pluralism demanded a more stylized form of writing suited to political oratory. This is reflected in the language of works such as the Confucian Analects (Lunyu) and Mencius (Mengzi), which shows obvious imitations of earlier classics and is more concise and structured, and richer in rhetorical devices.

Writing during the later Warring States period (475–221 BCE) and the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han dynasties saw a further move toward allegory and ornamentation, resulting in a style distinct from the vernacular language of the day. It was during this period that Classical Chinese forged an identity as a literary language separate from vernacular speech, and it is the conventions of this period that later authors sought to emulate when writing in the “classical style.” For this reason some sinologists reserve the term Classical Chinese (guwen) for the writings of the Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties and refer to the language of later imitations as Literary Chinese (wenyanwen).

Following the Han dynasty, worship of form was taken to an extreme at the expense of substance, giving rise to the parallel prose (pianwen) of the Southern dynasties (420–589 CE), in which balance of rhythm, imagery, and tonal patterns became the focus. This worship of formal elements created a backlash in the Tang dynasty, in which neoclassicists such as Han Yü (768–824 CE) and Liu Zongyuan (773–819 CE) called for a return to substance and the rhetorical styles of the Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties. From the Tang dynasty onward, different schools of writing have offered different takes on the classical language, and literary aesthetics have swung back and forth between form and substance, and between arch conservatism and the adoption of new grammars and lexicons.

The dominance of Classical Chinese started to wane after the Opium War (1840–1842), as intellectuals began to see the classical/vernacular gap as a hindrance to greater literacy and called for the replacement of Classical Chinese with the modern spoken language in education.
and media as part of the modernization of China. In the New Culture Movement of the late 1910s, promotion of Vernacular Chinese gathered momentum through the efforts of noted scholars such as Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), Qian Xuantong (1887–1939), and Fu Sinian (1896–1950), culminating in the Vernacular Language Movement (Baihuawen Yundong) of 1917–1919. The success of the movement led to the adoption of Vernacular Chinese as the language of textbooks, and influential new works of literature by authors such as Lu Xun (1881–1936) began appearing in the vernacular.

To this day, however, the classical language lives on in government notices and legal documents and in all manner of writing deemed formal. Classical patterns and set expressions appear frequently in vernacular prose—more so in Taiwan and Hong Kong than in mainland China. Despite the efforts of early twentieth-century language reformers to make a clean break with wenyan, it looks as though it will be some time before the new writing born of the Vernacular Language Movement can forge an identity fully distinct from that of the classical language that has been standard for much of Chinese history.

Chris Wen-Chao LI

Further Reading
The Chinese-American Networking Symposium (CANS) is held annually as a forum for leaders in networking and applications research and development. It offers a forum in which to exchange information and to promote partnerships between Chinese and U.S. institutions, both from the private and public sector. The theme of the 2008 meeting encapsulates the symposium’s goals: “One world, one network.”

Participants of the Chinese-American Networking Symposium (CANS), an annual networking forum, include faculty, students and professional staff from leading universities and research centers, government agencies, and the private sector from both the United States and China. CANS sessions are designed to promote collaborative partnerships in network research and across scientific and academic disciplines. Alternating yearly between U.S. and Chinese venues, the symposium includes presentations by networking experts and disciplinary researchers, panel discussions, and parallel technical and non-technical (executive) sessions.

The Chinese-American Networking Symposium was initiated in 1998 by Donald R. Riley, of the University of Maryland College Park, and Xiao Shuigen, of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology, USA (CAST-USA), in partnership with the China Education and Research Network (CERNET) and the China Science and Technology Network (CSTNET, Chinese Academy of Sciences). The first symposium was held in Washington, D.C., in January 1999 with more than fifty executives, network industry leaders, and officials from China, and more than sixty participants from the United States. Chinese attendees represented the education and research community and the major Internet service providers in China: CERNET, CSTNET, China Commercial Network (ChinaNet), and representatives from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information Industries, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and some local Chinese governments.

Technical topics have focused on the traditional advanced networking research and infrastructure development issues that have been integral to CANS and remain important but have evolved to include higher-level subjects: infrastructure development and especially Open International Exchange Points (a network hub facility to which any international research and engineering [R&E] network may connect and also interconnect to other international R&E networks to exchange network traffic); the complexities of international network interoperability and routing issues; Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) development; middleware (computer software that connects software components and deals with network interface and security issues); technical aspects of grids; and e-science and research collaboration support. Each CANS symposium also offers cultural experiences for the attendees.
Today CANS is sponsored by Internet2 (a nonprofit consortium that develops advanced network technologies for research and education in the U.S.), CERNET, CSTNET, and CAST-USA. The CANS Council and Organizing Committee sets the direction and oversees the planning of each CANS meeting. The CANS Council includes co-founder Riley, as well as representatives of the four sponsors, plus a representative from the U.S. National Science Foundation.

CANS highlights have included:

- Signing of the international collaboration agreement between Internet2, CERNET, CSTNET, and NSFCNET (Natural Science Foundation of China Network).
- Collaboration of CSTNET with the University of Tennessee on the Global Ring Network for Advanced Application Development (GLORIAD) project funded under the National Science Foundation International Research Network Connections (NSF IRNC) program. GLORIAD is a multi-gigabit-per-second global ring that initially connected the United States, Korea, China, and Russia and then NORDUNET (a collaboration between Nordic national R&E networks) and SURFNET (Samenwerkende Universitaire Reken Faciliteiten, the Dutch national R&E network).
- Collaboration of CERNET with Indiana University and Internet2 on the TRANSPAC2 project funded under the NSF IRNC program.

TRANSPAC2 provides multi-gigabit-per-second connectivity from the United States to CERNET and members of the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network (APAN).

Such interoperable high-performance network connections enable many scientific and educational collaborations between the United States and China. And CANS has played an important role as a neutral forum for initiating and strengthening the human interactions and cultural exchanges needed for scientific, educational and technical collaborations.

Donald R. RILEY

Further Reading

Chinggis Khan was a tribal leader in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. He first united Mongolia, then conquered northern China and much of central Asia. The Mongol empire eventually stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Adriatic Sea.

Chinggis Khan, meaning “resolute leader” (sometimes spelled “Genghis Khan”) was born with the name “Temujin.” Although scholars are not certain of his birth year, the country of Mongolia has accepted 1162, although 1165 and 1167 also have been viewed as reasonable. Temujin, after surviving tribal wars in Mongolia after the death of his father, Yesugei, built a tribal confederation that radically restructured Mongolia. After gaining power in 1185 Temujin suffered numerous setbacks and eventually victories. Among these was the kidnapping of his wife, Borte, by the Merkit tribe. Although Temujin eventually got her back, almost a year had passed and Borte was pregnant. Although Temujin accepted Jochi (d. 1225), as the child was named, scholars have little doubt that Jochi was fathered by a Merkit. His ancestry later became an issue in determining a successor to Temujin.

Temujin was able to recapture Borte only with the help of Toghril Ong-Khan (d. 1204), ruler of the powerful Kereit confederation and the former blood brother of Yesugei. During his time with Toghril, Temujin also learned...
the arts of war from Temujin’s blood brother, Jamuqa (d. 1205–1206). However, Temujin’s relationship with Toghril and Jamuqa eventually soured. Rivalry between Jamuqa and Temujin for leadership of the Mongols led to a clash. Although Jamuqa won the battle in 1187, Temujin won the war as more Mongols flocked to support him because of his charisma as a social revolutionary. Temujin increasingly implemented laws that, although not favoring the lower classes, made tribal life more egalitarian rather than simply favoring the aristocrats, as Jamuqa had. One example was a more equitable distribution of the plunder from battles.

Temujin returned as a major force in the steppe (one of the vast, usually level and treeless tracts in southeastern Europe or Asia) in 1195. After his return he slowly accumulated power in eastern Mongolia by defeating rival tribes. Although his relationship with Toghril seems to have protected him from further feuds with Jamuqa, Temujin eventually clashed with his overlord. Toghril, who seems to have viewed Temujin as a potential successor, led his armies against Temujin at the urging of Jamuqa and Toghril’s children, who feared that they would lose power after Toghril died. In 1203 Temujin defeated the Kereits, thus also gaining ascendancy over central Mongolia. In 1204 he defeated the Naiman and Merkit tribes in western Mongolia. By 1206 Temujin was the dominant power in Mongolia and received the title “Chinggis Khan.” The years between 1185 and 1206 were the most difficult years for one of the most respected but feared men in history.

**The Desire for Stability**

After uniting the tribes of Mongolia into the Mongol supratribes, Chinggis Khan conquered much of northern China and central Asia. He launched his invasions not to rule the world but rather to maintain stability in
Mongolia. His concerns stemmed from the fact that although he had unified Mongolia, many tribal rivalries continued. If other tribes were left to their own devices, warfare could easily break out. Thus, by sending them to raid in China, he reduced the threat to Mongolia. In addition, the sedentary states bordering Mongolia had a long history of intervening in Mongolia for their own motives, primarily to prevent one tribe from becoming too powerful. Chinggis Khan’s rise to power in the early 1200s seems to have happened too quickly for any of the sedentary rulers to react to it. Nonetheless, because Chinggis Khan had lived in northern China after his defeat by Jamuqa, he probably understood Chinese policies toward the steppe tribes. The raids thus also prevented the Chinese states from meddling in the steppe because they now had to defend themselves.

In 1209 the Uygurs voluntarily submitted to Chinggis Khan. Later that year the Mongols began their conquest of the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia, located in China’s northwestern Gansu Province. After the Tanguts submitted in 1210, hostilities flared between Chinggis Khan and China’s Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234). Although the Jin were not defeated until seven years after Chinggis Khan died, the Mongols conquered much of northern China during his lifetime.

Chinggis Khan led his forces toward central Asia in 1219 after a Mongol-sponsored caravan was massacred in the Khwarazmian empire (consisting roughly of modern-day Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, part of Pakistan, and Iran). In fighting with the Khwarazmian empire, the Mongols devastated most of central Asia and eastern Iran. After routing the Khwarazmians the Mongols withdrew to deal with their disobedient vassal Xi Xia, which had refused to send troops for the campaign in central Asia. During this campaign Chinggis Khan died from internal injuries suffered after he fell from his horse while hunting in August 1227.

Historical illustration of “Merchants offering their Goods” at one of Chinggis Khan’s encampments. From Ghengis Khan by Jacob Abbott. Even after his death the Mongol armies dominated the battlefield until the empire stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Adriatic Sea.
The wars of Chinggis Khan were motivated as often by retaliation as by greed for territory or riches. His strategic and organizational genius created one of the most highly disciplined and effective armies in history, but that same genius created the core administration that ruled that army. Even after his death the Mongol armies dominated the battlefield until the empire stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Adriatic Sea.

**Nonmilitary Achievements**

Chinggis Khan's nonmilitary achievements include the introduction of a writing system to the Mongols, the ideal of religious tolerance throughout his empire, and unity among the Mongols. His accomplishments cannot be counted in terms of territory or victories but rather in the presence of a Mongol nation and culture. Mongols still venerate him as the founding father of Mongolia, naming airports, hotels, streets, universities, and banks after him.

*Timothy M. MAY*

**Further Reading**


Chongqing
Chóngqìng 重庆
31.4 million est. 2006 pop.

Chongqing Municipality is the largest of four province-level municipalities in China (the others are Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin). Chongqing City is the largest city in Chongqing Municipality. Modern-day Chongqing, municipality and city, is one of the fastest growing and dynamic regions in the country; it is one of the main industrial centers in southwest China.

Chongqing (also known as Yu and formerly as Chung King), is the largest of four province-level municipalities in China. A municipality is not the same as a city; it encompasses urban areas, suburbs, and surrounding farmland and wilderness. Chongqing City, with a population of 5 million, is the largest city in the municipality and an important river port. Chongqing Municipality is one of the main industrial centers in southwest China. Also, with its rich natural resources, its favorable location, and its potential for development, Chongqing Municipality is one of the fastest growing regions in the country.

Landscape
Chongqing Municipality runs from latitude 28 degrees north (roughly the latitude of Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida) to 32 degrees north (roughly the latitude of Savannah, Georgia), about 450 kilometers (280 miles). From east to west, it stretches some 470 kilometers (292 miles) between longitudes 105 and 110 east. The municipality covers 82,300 square kilometers (31,776 square miles), roughly the size of South Carolina. Chongqing shares borders with the provinces of Hunan to the southeast, Guizhou to the south, Sichuan to the west, Shaanxi to the north, and Hubei to the east. Along the Chongqing–Hubei border the Yangzi (Chang) River cuts through Mount Wushan to form the famous Three Gorges.

The climate is subtropical, with extremely hot summers (Chongqing City is known as the “Furnace City”), mild winters, and two monsoon seasons. It has an annual rainfall of 1,000–1,400 millimeters (39–55 inches). The area is quite foggy and humid year round. Rain in late spring and early summer usually falls at night, making the city famous for its night rain in the Ba Mountains.

The Chongqing region is mountainous and crisscrossed with springs and rivers—most notably the Yangzi and Jialing rivers—and dotted with caves and gorges. Chongqing City is very hilly and the only major city in China without a lot of bicycles. More than 20 percent of the region is forested, with many species of harvestable trees, along with a number of rare indigenous species protected by the state.

Natural Resources
The area is also rich in mineral resources. Chongqing Municipality is a major producer of coal, manganese, mercury, aluminum, vanadium, molybdenum, barium,
and strontium, along with natural gas. Chongqing also produces nonmetal minerals such as rock salt, barite, fluorspar, limestone, and silicon. The area is also rich in underground thermal energy and drinkable mineral water.

The Yangzi River runs through the municipality. The Yangzi is joined by the Jialing, Qujiang, Fujiang, Wujiang, and Daning rivers and hundreds of streams to make the municipality one of the most important in China for actual and potential hydropower. In 1994 the central government began work to control the Yangzi with the ambitious but controversial Three Gorges Dam project.

Three Gorges Dam

East of Chongqing City the Yangzi cuts through the limestone Wushan Mountains to form the celebrated Three Gorges: Qutang, Wuxia, and Xiling. The river then spills over the Yangzi Plain at Yichang and continues its course to the Pacific Ocean. At 6,276 kilometers (3,900 miles), the Yangzi is China’s longest river and the third longest in the world, behind the Nile and Amazon. The watershed created by the great river covers 19 percent of China’s total landmass.

The Three Gorges Dam is the world’s largest hydroelectric project and the biggest engineering project in China since the Great Wall. When the dam reaches full operational capacity in 2009, twenty-six generators will produce some 8,200 megawatts of power, enough to meet almost 10 percent of China’s requirements. It will be the largest source of clean, renewable energy in the world.

But the damming of the river has drowned fertile farmland and destroyed settlements of the ancient Ba people. Many artifacts were also lost although archaeologists were able to save some, which now reside in the Three Gorges Museum in central Chongqing City. The dam project has also forced the relocation of 1.3 million people at a cost of more than 45 billion yuan ($6.5 billion). In 2007, because of instability problems with newly formed land, the Chongqing Municipality government relocated an additional 4 million people.

Cultural Resources

The people of Chongqing Municipality are said to be straightforward, enthusiastic, and generous yet somewhat rustic. The majority of the people of the municipality are Han, but people from forty-nine minority groups also live in the municipality, mainly in rural areas. The population of the minority groups is about 1.75 million, or 5.6 percent of Chongqing’s total of 31.4 million. The Tujia people are the largest minority group, at 1.13 million, followed by the Miao at 520,000. The other groups include Mongolians, Tibetans, and Koreans. Mandarin is the principal language. Only about 20 percent of the population lives in urban areas. Sichuan is the main cooking style, with variations of the hotpot one of the most popular dishes.

Chongqing Municipality is rich in traditional Chinese culture and performing arts. Chongqing City alone boasts of twelve museums and memorial halls, including the Chongqing Museum, the Hongyan Memorial Hall of Revolution, and the Geleshan Revolutionary Martyrs Tomb. Traditional performing arts have a strong folk-art flavor, with some 3,000 arts organizations and twenty-nine professional troupes in the area. Two local performance groups have won international acclaim. The Chongqing Artistic Troupe combines acrobatics with traditional folk music and Chinese opera. The Chongqing Municipal Acrobatics Troupe, formed in 1951, performs traditional martial arts, juggling, and acrobatics. Its artists are famous for their juggling bowls while on an unbalanced teeterboard routine. The troupe has won many international acrobatics competitions. A popular street scene is groups of older citizens dancing for exercise, instead of practicing the art of Tai Chi, which is so common throughout China.
Chongqing Municipality is also noted for its historic sites. There are about fifty national, provincial, and municipal preservation sites. These include the Shi Bao Zhai tower, a twelve-story temple built in the eighteenth century; the Ba hanging coffins, ancient burial sites in and along rock formations; and the Dazu Rock Carvings, a collective name for some 50,000 carved and sculpted religious figures, created between 665 and 1249, at seventy-five sites.

History

Human activity in the locale now called Chongqing Municipality goes back to the end of the Old Stone Age, 20,000 to 30,000 years ago. When the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) replaced the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE), the Ba people established their state with present-day Chongqing City as its capital. The city was known first as Jiangzhou and then Ba Prefecture. During the North and South dynasties (220–580 CE), it was renamed Chu Prefecture. During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, Chongqing City became an important trading, transportation, and industrial center and the link between southwest China and the upper Yangzi River with the rest of the world. In 1891 it was declared an open port, and a customs house was established there.

In 1929 Chongqing was officially established as a city. In 1939 it was elevated to the status of municipality. From 1940 to 1946, it served as the wartime provisional capital for the Nationalist government and became China’s political, economic, financial, commercial, transportation, and cultural center. When the Nationalist government returned to its former capital, Nanjing, in 1946, Chongqing was returned to its position as a municipality.

In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, Chongqing served as the seat of the Southwest Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, the seat of the Southwest Military and Administrative Commission, and the political, economic, and cultural center of southwest China. It functioned as a municipality directly under the central government until 1954 when its official status was changed again to a city, under the government of Sichuan Province. This last change was part of a nationwide administrative reorganization. In the 1950s Chongqing City became a center for trade. In addition, bridges and railways were built in southwest China, making Chongqing an important transportation hub connecting railways from the west to the far cheaper river transport to the east.

Chongqing City’s star continued to rise after the opening of China in 1979. In 1981 it became China’s first inland port opened to the outside world. Over the next several years, it became an official foreign port, a designated model city for market economics to attract foreign investments, the first pilot city to test a comprehensive reform of China’s economic system, and the first city at the provincial level granted the authority to manage its own economic affairs. In the 1980s Chongqing was given jurisdiction over the cities of Wanxian and Fuling, and the Qianjiang Prefecture. Finally, on 14 March 1997, Chongqing became China’s fourth direct-controlled municipality and the only one in western China, thus opening a new chapter in its long history.

Administration

Direct-controlled municipalities are the highest level cities under China’s administrative structure. Their status is equal to that of provinces. The municipalities are enclaves, culturally and ethnically distinct from the territory and people that surround them. They occupy strategic positions within or between provinces. There are three other municipalities besides Chongqing in the People’s Republic of China: Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. Chongqing is divided into thirteen districts, six counties, five autonomous counties, and sixteen county-level cities.

Chongqing City and its environs is also one of the main industrial centers in southwest China, with such heavy industries as iron works and steel mills. There are many factories for the manufacture of motorcycles, cars, heavy machinery, electronic equipment, chemicals, and textiles, and for the processing of food, farm products, and timber. The city is the largest port along the Yangzi
River and the transportation and communication hub of southwest China. Chongqing Municipality is rich in natural resources and natural beauty, attracting a steady stream of tourists from China and around the world. Since ancient times, the area has been known as the Land of Abundance.

Bent NIELSEN and Wendell ANDERSON

Further Reading

The Chongyang Festival dates from a legend first described in the fifth century CE, in which a magician warns a young scholar to get his family to higher ground on the ninth day of the ninth month to avoid calamity.

The Chongyang Festival is also known as “Deng-gao Jie” (Mountain Climbing Festival) and “Juhua Jie” (Chrysanthemum Festival) after the major activity or item involved in the event. The festival falls on the ninth day of the ninth lunar month—hence the name chongyang (double nine). On that day people old and young climb mountains or high ground, taking with them chrysanthemum wine and sweet flour fruit cake and wearing dogwood leaves (Evodia rutaecarpa) on their heads or arms. In Chinese folk medicine chrysanthemum wine has the ability to lower blood pressure and thus extend life.

In Chinese folk belief chrysanthemum, whose yellow color is similar to that of sulfur, has the ability to ward off ghosts or evil spirits. Likewise, in Chinese folk medicine, dogwood leaf is used to prevent mosquitoes and to treat cholera. Thus, people who leave congested cities for high mountains in early autumn and take along food that has medicinal uses have health considerations in mind, as do those who attend the Dragon Boat Festival on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month.

Scholars generally believe that the Chongyang Festival was a post–Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) development. The earliest record of the festival is in a book, Xu Qixieji (续齐谐记), compiled by Wu Jun in 460–450 CE. According to legend, Huan Jing, a young scholar, once studied under a famous magician, Fei Changfang, for several years. One day Fei warned Huan, “Your family would face major calamity on the ninth day of the ninth month. You should go home and bring your family members to high grounds on that day. Tie dogwood leaves on their arms and ask them to drink chrysanthemum wine. This would prevent the disaster from happening to your entire family” (Bodde 1977, 69). Huan followed his master’s advice and rushed home. He took all the members of his family to a nearby mountain on the morning of the ninth day of the ninth lunar month. They carried chrysanthemum wine in bottles and dogwood leaves on their arms. At dusk when they returned to their farmhouse, they found that all the domestic animals, including dogs, oxen, sheep, goats, and fowl, had died of unknown causes. It is said that ever since that time, people have followed this practice of climbing mountains or high ground on that day, carrying the specified wine and foods.

The late professor Wolfram Eberhard believed that the Chongyang Festival, similar to Zhong Qiu (Moon Festival), was not originally a Han Chinese festival. It was, he believed, a festival belonging to the Yue people who once lived widely scattered in south China’s Fujian and Guangdong provinces but who now live mainly in Vietnam. As agriculturalists, the Yue people celebrated the completion of their harvest by hiking up the mountains to avoid the dangers lurking in the valleys.

HUANG Shumin
Kite flying is a favorite pastime during the Chongyang Festival (or Double Ninth Festival). Integral to the celebration is drinking wine made from the chrysanthemum plant, whose properties are said to drive away evil spirits. **Photo by Tom Christensen.**

**Further Reading**


Chopsticks

Kuài zi 筷子

There have been many tales about the emergence of chopsticks and the evolution of their names. Chopsticks have been made in various materials and with diverse artistic styles, and numerous etiquettes are involved in their use. Disposable chopsticks have become an environmental concern today.

By tradition, silverware is the choice eating utensil of Europeans and Americans; the hand is the preference of Indians, Indonesians, and people of the Middle East; and chopsticks are the favorite of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese.

Chopsticks are a pair of tapered sticks of even length. The Chinese word for chopsticks is kuài or kuài zi 筷子. Kuài is a phono-semantic compound (characters linked together to indicate a related meaning and a sound), the character for quick 快 indicating its pronunciation and the radical for bamboo 竹 hinting at the major material of its making. The word chopstick seems to come from Cantonese Pidgin English chop chop (quick, quick 快快).

The Chinese name for chopsticks has changed over time. Originally known as jia 蒯 (to hold), the utensil assumed the name zhu 竹 around the Qin–Han period (221 BCE–220 CE). Zhu, however, is homophonous (having the same pronunciation) as stop 止 or bore 蚧 (by insects). The Chinese, especially those who boated in the south, considered the word unlucky and replaced it with a word sounding like kuài 快, a homophone of quick, sometime during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912).

Chopsticks are made primarily of wood and bamboo, though ivory chopsticks are said to have existed some 3,000 years ago, and royal families and aristocrats preferred silver ones, believing in the metal’s capacity to detect arsenic. Today chopsticks can be made of coral, jade, silk, plastic, horn, porcelain, animal bone, and stainless steel. Since the Song Dynasty (960–1279), artistic designs have become part of chopsticks. Dream of the Red Mansion, a classic of Chinese literature written in 1754, depicts a pair of ebony chopsticks decorated with sections of silver inlays.

The origin of chopsticks is unknown, but it must be closely related with the Chinese diet and cooking methods. Chinese eat grains as staple food, supplementing them with vegetables and meat. They cut the vegetables and meat to convenient sizes before cooking, and it would be hard to pick them up from hot soup with bare hands. A pair of improvised twigs may have led the early Chinese to create chopsticks. Later, as vessels like bowls became light enough to be held in one hand, chopsticks became useful for shoving rice and small pieces of food into one’s mouth.

Legends about the origin of chopsticks abound. One recounts Jiang Ziya, a legendary figure of the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE). A magic bird gave him a pair of bamboo twigs capable of revealing poison to save him from his murderous wife. Another story tells that Da Yi, a concubine of King Zhou of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE), fed him with her hairpins when she found the food was too hot for her hand. Still another story recounts that Yu, a flood-fighting hero of the Emperors Yao and Shun period, which predated the Xia dynasty.
A pair of chopsticks decorated with cloisonné enamel, and held in the traditional manner. Diners in Westernized Chinese restaurants, used to paper-wrapped disposable chopsticks, might be surprised to see chopsticks so fancifully embellished—and either intimidated or amused by the formal etiquette surrounding their use. Do not, for instance, point them at people, or allow sauces to drip from them, or use them by their wrong ends, or rest them upright in a bowl of rice. PHOTO BY ANNA MYERS.

(2100–1766 BCE), was too busy to wait for his food to cool, so he fished it out of boiling soup with a pair of twigs he broke from a tree.

Many rules of etiquette govern the proper use of chopsticks. The following acts are considered bad manners: laying them in a disorderly fashion on the table; pointing them at people; sucking the tips; allowing sauces to drip from them; using them by their wrong ends; resting them upright in a bowl of rice; dropping them onto the floor; beating them on a surface like drumsticks; and using them to pierce food or to poke around looking for a particular item in a dish. To avoid smearing the tablecloth at formal dinners, people often place chopsticks on small rests of porcelain or glass specially crafted for the sticks.

For hygienic reasons China began using disposable chopsticks from Japan in the 1980s. Today China uses 45 billion pairs of disposable chopsticks a year, equaling 1,660,000 cubic meters (2,169,935 cubic yards) of timber. Appeals are being made for supplementing bamboo for wood and encouraging people to bring their own chopsticks when they go out to eat. As of 1 April 2006 China levied a 5 percent tax on disposable wooden chopsticks in an effort to cut down on their use.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading

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Christianity in China remained for several centuries a marginal, foreign religion that attracted relatively few converts. Missionaries and Chinese Christians were considered a threat to the political and social order in late imperial, republican, and early Communist China. Anti-Christian agitation and conflict were not uncommon. In recent decades the authorities have permitted a degree of religious freedom, thus enabling the remarkable expansion of Christianity.

The first reliable evidence of Christian missionary activity in China is found on a famous monument—erected in Chang’an (now Xi’an) in Shaanxi Province in 781 CE and rediscovered in 1625. The Chinese and Syriac inscriptions state that a certain Alopen arrived in the capital of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) in 635. Alopen, a member of the Church of the East (called “Nestorianism” by some), translated The Sutra of Jesus the Messiah, borrowing the vocabulary from Buddhist and Daoist concepts. It became the first Christian book in Chinese. The eastward spread of the Church of the East from Persia (Iran) along the old Silk Roads to China occurred at a time of remarkable religious tolerance and cultural openness. However, after these auspicious beginnings, the Church of the East began to decline in China soon after the erection of the monument. When the Tang dynasty was overthrown in 907, China’s first Christian church vanished in the chaos that followed.

The Mongol expansion in Asia created the conditions for the reappearance of Christianity in China. The pragmatic policy of religious toleration of Khubilai Khan, founder of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) in China, enabled the Church of the East to make a comeback. The Mongol world empire also facilitated direct contacts between east Asians and Europeans. In 1287 the Nestorian monk Rabban Sauma, an Önggüt Turk who was born in what now is Beijing, was sent on an embassy to Europe. He visited Rome, Paris, and Bordeaux, meeting the pope and the kings of France and England.

The favorable conditions of the Yuan dynasty also allowed Roman Catholicism to enter China. Pope Innocent IV and other European rulers conceived the idea of an alliance with Mongols against Islam. Several fact-finding missions were sent to the Mongols. However, the missions of the Franciscan monks Plano Carpini (1245–1247), William of Rubruck (1253), and others to the East were unsuccessful. Not until the arrival of the Franciscan friar John of Montecorvino in Khanbaliq (or Dadu, present-day Beijing) in 1294 was Western Christianity able to establish a foothold. John was permitted to build a church in Beijing in 1299. In a letter written in 1305, he reported some six thousand converts. In recognition of these achievements Pope Clement V appointed him archbishop of Cambaluc (Khanbaliq) and patriarch of the east. Subsequently a Catholic presence was established in other places. By the time the Franciscans Odoric of Pordenone (around 1322) and John of Marignolli (1342) arrived in China, the Yuan dynasty was already in decline, to be overthrown in 1368.
In the next year all Christians were expelled from Beijing. Once again Christianity disappeared with the fall of a dynasty. The new isolationist Ming dynasty (1368–1644) would not tolerate foreigners and their religions, whether Catholic or Nestorian.

**Planting Christianity in Late Imperial China**

The Jesuit Francis Xavier, having evangelized in Japan, hoped to begin work among the populous Chinese as well. However, he died in 1552 on Shangchuan Island (St. John’s Island) off the coast of southern China before he could reach his goal. The first two Jesuit missionaries who successfully entered the Chinese empire in 1583 were the Italians Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) and Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607). After a number of false starts they were invited by the prefect of Zhaoqing near Guangzhou (Canton) to reside in his city. Between 1589 and 1601 Ricci traveled and established a number of missions in some cities of central China. Finally, in 1601 he was permitted to go to Beijing, the imperial capital. The years from 1601 until his death in 1610 mark the peak of Ricci’s achievement, setting the pattern of activity for the Jesuit mission in late imperial China.

In order to gain the respect of the Chinese ruling class (scholars and officials), Ricci and his Jesuit successors studied the Confucian classics. At the same time they strove to impress the Chinese elite with Western achievements in the fields of astronomy, mathematics, and mechanical skills (instruments and clocks) to convince

Church spires rise between buildings. Figures are uncertain, but it may be reasonable to accept the latest estimate of 53 million—mainly unregistered—Christians in China, of which 39 million are Protestants and 14 million are Catholics. PHOTO BY BERKSHIRE PUBLISHING.
them that the Europeans were no mere barbarians. This approach brought them to the attention of well-known scholars, high-ranking officials, and even some of the emperors. Because of their scientific knowledge, some Jesuits were retained by the imperial court as quasi-officials. Having gained the intellectual respect of the Chinese elite, the early Jesuit missionaries began to propagate their religion. Ricci in particular sought to avoid unnecessary conflict with Chinese tradition and questions of dogma by interpreting the terms used in Chinese classic texts as elements of Christian doctrine when doing so would be appropriate. By this means the Jesuits showed their willingness to accommodate and had limited success in converting some important scholar-officials, most notably Paulus Xu Guangqi (1562–1633).

After the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, a number of Jesuit missionaries were retained in imperial service by the new Qing dynasty (1644–1912) in Beijing. Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1592–1666) acted as director of the Astronomical Bureau. His successor, Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688), was able to gain the attention of the great Kangxi emperor (reigned 1662–1722). Indeed, the emperor’s attitude toward Catholicism during the middle years of his reign can be regarded as one of “positive neutrality,” culminating in the promulgation of the so-called Edict of Toleration in 1692. Yet soon afterward the situation of the missionary enterprise in China became increasingly precarious.

**Rites Controversy and Its Consequences**

The exclusive position of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in China had been undermined since the 1630s with the arrival of Dominicans, Franciscans, and priests of the Paris Foreign Mission Society (MEP). These missionaries worked primarily among the common people in the provinces. Here they came face to face with Chinese popular religion, with its pantheon of popular deities and the ubiquitous ancestor worship and geomancy (feng shui). Whereas the court Jesuits had adopted a tolerant attitude toward Chinese rites, the provincial missionaries denounced them as superstitious practices. Consequently the protracted “Rites Controversy” caused considerable disagreement within the missionary community. Another controversial issue within the missionary community concerned the nature and rendering of “God” in Chinese. Eventually the term Tianzhu (Lord of Heaven) was adopted, and Catholic Christianity henceforth became known as Tianzhujiao, the religion of the Lord of Heaven.

Because the Kangxi emperor was supporting the Jesuits, Pope Clement X sent a papal legate to China in 1704 to present the opposite position, forbidding Christians to take part in sacrifices to Confucius or to ancestors. Offended by this papal interference, the emperor issued an order that all missionaries, in order to obtain a permit (piao) to remain in China, would have to declare that they were going to follow “the rules of Matteo Ricci” in their activities. The decision of Pope Clement XI in 1715 to rule against the Jesuit compromise did not help matters. The ruling was finalized in 1742 by Pope Benedict XIV in the papal bull Ex quo singulari. The refusal by Rome to allow Christians to take part in the Confucian and ancestral rites was to have grave consequences because Chinese converts were cut off from the Confucian cultural tradition and thereby from society at large.

In 1724 the Yongzheng emperor issued an edict proscribing Christianity. Christians were commanded to renounce their faith, and foreign missionaries, except those attached to the Bureau of Astronomy in Beijing, were expelled from China. Church properties were confiscated and used for secular purposes. For the next 120 years Christianity was officially proscribed as a heterodox (contrary to or different from an established religion) and subversive cult. Catholicism retreated into the remoter parts of rural China, increasingly vulnerable to persecution. The papal abolition of the Society of Jesus in 1773 aggravated the precarious position of Christianity. The few remaining priests (Chinese and European), operating secretly in the country, provided rather inadequate pastoral supervision.

In the absence of regular priestly care, many Chinese Christians were left to their own devices for years if not decades. In any case, successful evangelization had from the beginning depended on the generous assistance of native converts. In spite of the many vexations and periodic persecutions, Chinese laypeople, especially the so-called institute of virgins, were instrumental in preserving the
faith. Some 200,000 Christians are said to have existed nationwide in scattered communities at the beginning of the nineteenth century. These congregations of “old Christians” formed the vital bases from which the next phase of Catholic expansion would be launched in China.

**From Mission to Church in Modern China**

The religious revivals in Europe and North America at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the early twentieth centuries engendered renewed missionary interest in China. However, the Chinese people remained suspicious of and hostile toward the foreign religion, and missionary activities continued to be illegal and precarious. Not until after the opium wars and the imposition of the so-called unequal treaties was the propagation of Christianity greatly facilitated. The most important concessions were gained by the missionaries in the treaties of 1858–1860. These treaties permitted travel and evangelization anywhere in the interior of China. Particularly noteworthy here is the French treaty (especially the notorious Article VI of the 1860 Beijing Convention, containing surreptitiously inserted additional rights in the Chinese version), permitting the purchase of land and erection of churches anywhere in the country. Associated agreements exempted Catholics from contributing to communal endeavors that were thought to have a “superstitious” component. Most important, the French government assumed a religious protectorate over all Catholics in the Qing empire, including foreign missionaries regardless of nationality as well as Chinese converts.

The arrival of Protestant missionaries, starting with Robert Morrison of the London Missionary Society in 1807, added a new dimension after 1800. Prior to the treaties these missionaries were confined to Macao and seasonal residence in Guangzhou. In both locations their religious activities were severely restricted. The Treaty of Nanjing (1842) enabled the Protestants, mostly from the United States and Britain, to establish themselves in the newly opened five treaty ports and Hong Kong. After 1860 the Protestant missionary presence grew rapidly in size and complexity. Mission stations were established in all the new coastal and riverine treaty ports and spread from there into the interior. By 1900 foreign Protestant missionaries and their wives in China totaled about three thousand, representing several denominations and more than sixty agencies from Western countries. Female missionaries (married and single) outnumbered male missionaries and played an active role in the dissemination of the Christian message.

The growth of the missionary enterprise did not go unchallenged. In spite of the continuous expansion of Christianity, its native adherents amounted to only a fraction of 1 percent of the total population of China. However, they were protected by the treaties, backed by foreign diplomatic and sometimes military intervention. Their increasingly powerful social and political role was, however, resented by both rural elites and common people. Moreover, Christian beliefs and practices undermined long-established traditions and provoked the anger of non-Christians. Anti-Christian agitation, fed by inflammatory rumors, created fear and suspicion that resulted in violent incidents. These increasingly endemic local tensions reached a climax in the intensely xenophobic Boxer Uprising of 1900 in which many missionaries and thousands of Chinese Christians were killed.

**Chinese Christianity in War and Revolution**

The aftermath of the disastrous events of 1900 brought about significant changes in China’s relations with the West. Traditional anti-Christian sentiments subsided significantly, and missionaries and Christians were able to play a more constructive role in Chinese society. At the same time Protestant Christianity became much more diverse than it had been before 1900. Many new Christian mission groups established themselves, including Pentecostals and Adventists. Many more independent or “faith” missionaries came to China. Meanwhile, the mainline mission societies and their churches, schools, and hospitals also grew substantially.

In the early twentieth century, against the background of growing Chinese nationalism, the contours of an emerging Chinese Protestant Christianity began to take shape, as indicated by the growth of independent Chinese Protestant forces. The early 1920s brought the formation of an interdenominational Church of Christ in China, a Sino-foreign body with a significant degree
of Chinese leadership and responsibility. The National Christian Council, a Protestant coordinating and liaison body, was also a product of this period. However, these changes did not really constitute a great deal of movement toward an authentically indigenous Chinese church. Attitudes of missionary paternalism remained strong and were exercised primarily through financial control.

Around 1920 a rather more radical independent sector of Chinese Protestantism came into being, including the True Jesus Church, a Pentecostal church founded in 1917; the Assembly Hall (Little Flock), organized in the mid-1920s and led by Ni Tuosheng (Watchman Nee); and the Jesus Family, a unique Pentecostal communitarian church started by Jing Dianying in rural Shandong Province in the 1920s. In addition, several individual evangelists and teachers emerged, including Wang Mingdao, famous for his conservative theological stance and outstanding moral rectitude, and the radical revivalist preacher Song Shangjie (John Sung).

In spite of the growing number of Chinese priests in Catholic missions, the move toward greater leadership roles for them was rather slower than among the Protestant establishments. The Belgian Vincentian missionary Vincent Lebbe pleaded passionately for greater involvement of indigenous clergy in the running of the Catholic enterprise. His concerns are reflected in the apostolic letter Maximum illud issued by Pope Benedict XV in 1919. It deplored, among other things, the effects of European nationalism on the Catholic church in China and called for the elimination of entrenched prejudices of Western
priests as well as eventual ecclesiastical administration by the Chinese clergy. The lack of enthusiasm among the Catholic missionary community notwithstanding, the process gained momentum with the consecration of six Chinese bishops in Rome in 1926.

Although the rising tide of nationalism and revolution fostered the radical anti-Christian movement in urban China in the mid-1920s, the prevailing chaos caused by political instability and military conflicts during the early republican period (1912–1927) created new opportunities for foreign missionaries and Chinese converts. The Christian organizations were able to expand their routine social service operations, especially during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945). Another important development occurred in 1939 when Pope Pius XII reversed the fateful ruling of 1715 and permitted Catholics to participate in ancestor worship. Thus, the way was clear for the emergence of a Chinese Catholic church. In this connection Japan’s attempts to control Chinese Christian establishments and remove all other foreign influences in areas under its occupation forced Chinese Christians to assume greater responsibility for maintaining church life. In many ways this development was another important step toward realization of the “three-self” ideal.

Chinese Church under Communism

Although the Chinese Communists had tolerated Christians and missionaries to some extent during the War of Resistance against Japan, their attitude changed dramatically after 1945. After the Communists had gained control of state power in 1949, anti-Christian campaigns were organized throughout the country. By 1954 the foreign missionaries had been either expelled from the country or imprisoned. However, China’s Christians continued to constitute an ideological and organizational challenge to the Chinese state even after the removal of the foreign missionaries. In response, the new government established the Religious Affairs Office (later Bureau), staffed with religious specialists to oversee and control religious affairs. To this end the government sponsored the Catholic Three Self Movement of 1950–1951 to establish a self-governing, self-supporting, self-propagating church free of all foreign influence. The state obtained its objective with the establishment of the National Patriotic Catholic Association (now known as the “Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association,” CCPA) in 1957 and the consecration of government-sponsored bishops in 1958. Officially the Chinese Catholic Church had severed all links with the Vatican.

Many Chinese Protestants had welcomed the Communist victory and were actively involved in setting up a national church body in 1951, for which the name “Three-Self Patriotic Movement” (TSPM) was adopted in 1954. It was utilized by the state to eliminate foreign influence, unite Protestants in one organization, and promote Communist policies within the church. Many of its leaders had been active in the YMCA and YWCA in the 1930s and 1940s. In spite of the willingness of many liberal Chinese Protestants to cooperate with the Communists, opposition remained strong among the more conservative
elements. Many of the indigenous Protestant groups and charismatic evangelical leaders resisted coerced unification or collaboration with the new state. In response the TSPM organized a series of denunciation campaigns against unaffiliated groups and individuals in the 1950s. Jing Dianying, Wang Mingdao, and Ni Tuosheng were some of the prominent victims.

The period from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s was a time of great suffering for Chinese Christianity as a whole. The nationwide mobilization campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and the calamitous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in particular adversely affected the Christian churches. These events led many outsiders to assume that the Christian faith was doomed in China. Yet by the late 1970s it became clear that it had survived, essentially in the form of clandestine “underground churches” and family prayer meetings. Since then an explosive growth of Christianity has occurred in many parts of the country, both within officially recognized church organizations and unregistered communities. This so-called Christianity fever has been particularly prevalent in Chinese Protestantism. Exact figures are difficult to establish because many Christians do not wish to register with the government-sponsored TSPM or CCPA. Discounting wildly inflated figures, it may be reasonable to accept the latest estimate of 53 million—mainly unregistered—Christians in China, of which 39 million are Protestants and 14 million are Catholics. Yet when considered against China’s total population of 1.3 billion, it is clear that numerically Christianity has remained a marginal religion, accounting for a little over 4 percent of the total.

At the same time Christianity faces a number of problems in China. The process of improving Sino-Vatican relations has been tortuous and slow and in turn has prevented the unification of the official and underground Catholic churches. The severe shortage of priests has placed great responsibility on the laity. Protestant churches are facing similar problems. The reemergence of denominationalism (this development explains in part the persistence of unregistered “house churches” in China) hinders moves toward greater unity and cooperation. Moreover, rapid Christianization has also encouraged certain sectarian tendencies, such as false teachings, extreme doctrines, and immoral practices. Nevertheless, Chinese Christianity as a whole (Protestants, Catholics, and a small number of adherents of Russian Orthodoxy) may emerge as a major force in world Christianity in the twenty-first century.

R. G. TIEDEMANN

Further Reading


Regarded as the ancestor of anthologies in Chinese history, Chuci 楚辞 (Verse of the Chu State) is an important literary work of poems, dialogues, hymns to local deities, proverbs and other allegories written during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) from the southern state of Chu (in modern Hubei and Hunan provinces).

The earliest known edition of the anthology Chuci, in sixteen juan (installments), was recompiled by Liu Xiang (c. 77–76 BCE) from earlier sources. This edition was subsequently augmented to seventeen juan with commentary by Wang Yi (c. 89–158 CE). The Chuci buzhu (Subcommentary on Chuci) of Hong Xingzu (1019–1155), which incorporates Wang’s commentary, is the most important edition. Most of the Chuci poems were written during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) and performed, sung, and spoken in the Chu dialect. They record Chu culture and history, and present a distinctive Chu style.

The anthology consists of individual poems and suites. The first and most representative work in the collection is the “Lisao” (“Encountering Sorrow”). This first-person, politically oriented poem in 187 couplets is one of the greatest, and longest, poems in Chinese literature. Thus the Chuci style is often simply named, after this monumental poem, the Sao style. The anthology also includes shorter lyrical and narrative poems, dialogues, and hymns to local deities, most of which have traditionally been interpreted as allegories for the poet’s frustrations.

Qu Yuan (c. 340–278 BCE), once a high official of the state of Chu. Many works in the anthology Chuchi were attributed to him, especially the poem “Encountering Sorrow.” Readers of the anthology sympathized with the political misfortunes of Qu, who was slandered, estranged, and finally exiled.
The attribution of the *Chuci* poems is uncertain. Qu Yuan (c. 343–290 BCE), a high official of Chu who was later slandered, estranged, and finally exiled, was long considered the author of “Lisao” and of most of the *Chuci*. These works, accordingly, were read against the story of his political fortunes. Although this view is not clearly proven by the evidence, it has found sympathy from readers who see in Qu Yuan a patriotic hero, who, thwarted in his efforts to serve his king, ended his life by throwing himself into the Miluo River in northeast part of modern Hunan province.

Timothy Wai Keung CHAN

**Further Reading**


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**Encountering Sorrow**

This brief translation by E. H. Parker of Qu Yuan’s famous *Chuci* poem, *Li Sao* (*Encountering Sorrow*), exemplifies the common literary style.

Seize, thus, the moment whilst life is early,
Whilst Vice is of modern birth,
Before King Time with his ruthless sickle,
Sweeps Virtue from off the Earth.

(*Li Sao*, lines 150–51)

Chinese cinema has evolved for nearly a hundred years—from the earliest silent films to the latest box office blockbusters—with a host of renowned directors, screenwriters, and film stars in genres as diverse as martial arts movies, romance, melodrama, and political propaganda. Chinese cinema can be categorized into six generations, each generation reflecting the technology and culture of its time, the politics of government, and the aesthetics and convictions of the filmmakers.

Cinema in China is visually, sociopolitically, and historically significant. Analyzing the key eras in Chinese film history by generation is not absolute, but doing so does provide a conceptual framework to position the changes and rhythms of the medium and its appeal to audiences worldwide.

First-Generation Cinema, 1896–1929

The first film was screened in China on 11 August 1896 by Spanish businessman Galen Bocca. The initial films screened in China were watched in venues such as teahouses and outdoor tents until the transition to modern air-conditioned theatres in Shanghai by the end of the 1920s. The first film production company in China was called “Yaxiya” (Asia), and it was founded by another foreign businessman, Benjamin Brodsky. Ren Qingtai is known for starting film production in China, making his own films by 1905. The initial films he and others made during this early era were often shot with stationary cameras and frequently portrayed famous film opera stars, such as Tan Xinpei.

In 1918 Commercial Press in Shanghai created its motion picture department, and in 1921 it released Yan Ruisheng (director, Ren Pengnian), a film based on the real-life murder of a prostitute. Like cinema in general, it was extremely popular and was reviewed in the newspapers that by the 1920s were covering film. In 1922 Mingxing (Star) Studio was established by Zhang Shichuan and “the father of Chinese cinema,” Zheng Zhengqiu, who wrote the screenplay for the oldest extant film in China is Laborer’s Love (director, Zhang Shichuan, 1922). In 1923 Mingxing Film Company was purportedly saved from financial ruin by releasing an extremely successful melodramatic film entitled Orphan Rescues Grandfather (director, Zhang Shichuan). Other important genres in the 1920s included martial arts films and historical costume dramas, which Tianyi (First) Film Company, founded by the Shao (Shaw) brothers, was famous for producing.

Historical movements and political trends, such as the Republican rebellion of 1911 and the effects of foreign imperialism, influenced China’s film industry and were often depicted visually. For example, ideas that stemmed from the May Fourth Movement (1915–1923, but named for a demonstration in Tiananmen Square on 4 May 1919) led to the production of political films in contrast to escapist, romantic, and entertaining “Mandarin Duck
and Butterfly School” films. And screenwriters and film critics who were members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in Shanghai in 1921, introduced artistic debates that would be discussed in film circles for decades.

**Second-Generation Cinema, 1930–1949**

In 1927 179 Chinese-owned film companies operated in China, most of them in Shanghai, but after consolidation in the 1930s “fewer than a dozen” operated (Zhang 2004, 46). It was a time when large crowds went to art deco theaters with seating capacities of more than one thousand to see the most recent films from home and overseas, mostly from Hollywood. Lianhua (United) Film Company emerged as one of the big three domestic studios in the early 1930s alongside Mingxing and Tianyi. Lianhua produced films starring famous actresses such as Hu Die and Ruan Lingyu, and the studio’s memorable titles included *Wild Flower* (director, Sun Yu, 1930), *Song of the Fisherman* (director, Cai Chusheng, 1934), and *Goddess* (director, Wu Yonggang, 1934).

**Silent to Sound**

Technologically, Chinese film of the early 1930s was in the midst of the expensive transition from silent to sound film. The first sound film released in China was made in Shanghai in 1931. Politically, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) was dealing with the Manchurian

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The Japanese have just invaded China in this scene from the famous film *Lin Family Shop*, based on a story by Mao Dun. The film was directed by Lin Jia Puda, the screenplay written by Shao Yen, and one of the leading roles was played by Shi Tian.

PHOTO COURTESY OF JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Incident of 18 September 1931 and the Shanghai Incident of 28 January 1932, while it also sought to control cinema in China by banning foreign films that portrayed China or the Chinese people in demeaning ways, martial arts and magic spirit pictures that had been popular in the 1920s, and leftwing films critical of the government. Key leftwing film personnel included Tian Han and Xia Yan. Aesthetically, formal debates included whether or not to produce “soft cinema” (entertainment film) or “hard cinema” (social/critical film).

In 1937, during the first part of the War of Resistance against Japan, Mingxing studio was destroyed, Lianhua closed its doors, and Tianyi moved its operations to Hong Kong. Many directors in Shanghai went to Hong Kong, among them Cai Chusheng and Situ Huimin; others went to the GMD wartime capital of Chongqing to make patriotic films for Zhongdian (Central) Film Studio and Zhongzhì (China) Motion Pictures, while others went to Yan’an to make films for the CCP. Chinese filmmaking in Shanghai from 1937 to 1941 was produced in the International Settlements and French Concession surrounded by Japanese occupation, known as the “orphan island.” A renowned film in that era was Mulan Joins the Army (director, Bu Wancang, 1939) by Xinhua (New China) Studio, established in 1934 by Zhang Shankun. In 1941 the Japanese overtook the foreign concessions, and in 1942 the Japanese started Zhonglian (China United) Film Production Corporation in Shanghai, which produced films alongside its other studio, Studio Manei, in Manchuria.

**Cinema Nationalized**

After the Japanese forces were defeated in 1945, the GMD confiscated Japanese film production centers in China as enemy property, nationalizing cinema in China as never before. Displaced film personnel who returned to
Shanghai either chose to work for the GMD studios or to establish new private studios, such as Wenhua (Culture) Film Company. During the civil war (1945–1949) notable films included Spring River Flows East (directors, Cai Chusheng and Zheng Junli, 1947), the classic Spring in a Small Town (director, Fei Mu, 1948), and Crows and Sparrows (director, Zheng Junli, 1949), which was in production before and after the CCP victory in 1949.

Third-Generation Cinema, 1949–1965

The new government was keen to use the medium of film to further its social project as a didactic medium. Films deemed subversive to the CCP, such as The Life of Wu Xun (director, Sun Yu, 1950), were denounced. The government’s Central Film Bureau consolidated all studios into the state system by 1952 under three studio branches: Northeast Film Studio, Beijing Film Studio, and Shanghai Film Studio. Key veterans active in the 1950s film industry included Sun Yu, Lai Chensheng, Situ Huimin, Shen Fu, Zheng Junli, and Cai Chusheng. Hollywood cinema was prohibited, whereas films from the Soviet Union were welcomed to the screens.

This seventeen-year period was marked by moments of cultural openness and censure at the state’s discretion. For example, in China’s highly politicized culture, the Soviet-inspired “socialist realism” style was imposed on narrative films after 1949 because this film style teleologically (relating to design or purpose, especially in nature) and thematically anticipated the triumph of Communism with characterizations of heroic soldiers, workers, and peasants. Xie Jin was an excellent director of this generation of filmmakers because his work followed the political ebb and flow. During the Hundred Flowers movement of early 1957, when CCP leader Mao Zedong seemed to be asking intellectuals to voice criticism of the present state of affairs in order to shake up the bureaucracy, Xie started working on Woman Basketball Player Number Five, which depicts athletes rather than revolutionaries. After the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958 to 1961, and ruptured diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the government initiated plans to reinstate the intellectuals in a united front from 1961 to 1963, a time referred to as a “cultural thaw.” This was when Xie Jin directed The Red Detachment of Women (1961) about revolutionaries on Hainan Island. In 1962 Popular Cinema magazine initiated the reader-voted Hundred Flowers Film Awards. Red Detachment and its depiction of the pre-1949 era won the awards for best picture, best director, best actress, and best supporting actor. But in 1964 and 1965 the “cultural thaw” ended. Xie Jin’s classic film

A movie set at a film studio in Beijing. By 1952 the Chinese government’s Central Film Bureau consolidated all studios into a state system under three studio branches: Northeast Film Studio, Beijing Film Studio, and Shanghai Film Studio. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Two Stage Sisters was made in 1965 but was not exhibited upon completion because the Cultural Revolution was about to begin.

**Fourth-Generation Cinema, 1966–1983**

The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought the film industry in China to a standstill. Political pronouncements that served as harbingers for the upcoming devastation were prevalent as early as 1964. After the Cultural Revolution began, many directors and film personalities were punished, put to work in the countryside, or killed—some of them tragically among the number who were displaced throughout China and Hong Kong during the civil war and then returned to make films under the CCP in 1949. During the Cultural Revolution Mao Zedong’s wife Jiang Qing was the figurehead of the film industry. Her strategy was to produce model stage operas, such as an adaptation of The Red Detachment of Women (1971), which would present simplistic, clear-cut delineations between good (CCP) and evil (bourgeois).

After the Cultural Revolution directors who had been trained in cinema but who did not have the opportunity to make films emerged. These directors are known as the “fourth-generation directors” and included Xie Fei, Zhang Nuanxin, and Zheng Dongtian (Zhang 2004, 231). Xie Jin also made melodramatic films alongside this generation. His films denounced both the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution. Fifth-generation film challenged the “Xie Jin model” of filmmaking, but before this mainland development is considered, filmmaking in Hong Kong and Taiwan should be examined.

**Hong Kong Cinema**

Hong Kong cinema began with early screenings of films when the island was a British colony. Among key players in the Hong Kong industry by the 1920s was Li Minwei, a founding member of Minxin (New People) Motion Picture Company in 1922, which eventually merged with other companies to create Lianhua film studio in Shanghai. In 1933 Tianyi produced the first sound film in Cantonese, The Platinum Dragon (director, Tang Xiaodan).

An important studio at the time was Grandview, which was initially established in San Francisco.

**Mandarin Films**

Mandarin-language films became prevalent in Hong Kong during the 1930s. In 1937 Tianyi was renamed “Nanyang” (South Sea) and moved to Hong Kong, as did the famous actress Hu Die and film moguls such as Zhang Shankun, who co-founded Yonghua (Forever China) and Changcheng (Great Wall). When Japan occupied Hong Kong from 1941 to 1945, no films were produced in Hong Kong. After 1945 came an exodus of Mandarin film directors, but some remained in Hong Kong during the civil war, when Da Zhonghua (Great China) studio made thirty-four Mandarin-language films. After 1949 came an influx of right-wing directors who moved to Hong Kong as part of a mass migration, and left-wing directors returned to the mainland. The Shaw brothers remained in Hong Kong, and reclaimed their Nanyang Studio, which in 1957 began using the name “Shaw Brothers.”

In the 1950s film in Hong Kong was immensely popular, marked by the stand-out, pop music-filled Mambo Girl (director, Yi Wen, 1957). In the 1960s the two megastudios of Hong Kong, Shaw Brothers and Cathay’s MP&GI (which closed in 1972), participated in a cut-throat race to be the first to produce captivating, blockbuster-style titles. Director Li Hanxiang’s late 1950s and early 1960s Cantonese opera movies were big screen draws, to be followed in the mid-1960s by martial arts films such as those by King Hu. Although cinema declined in the late 1960s, and left-wing studios such as Changcheng were poorly received because of the Cultural Revolution, stars Josephine Siao and Chan Po-chu still brought ardent fans to the theaters.

**Cantonese Films**

King Hu’s Touch of Zen (1970), Bruce Lee’s worldwide hits with Jiahe (Golden Harvest) Film Company, and The House of Seventy-Two Tenants (director, Chu Yuan, 1973) mark the beginning of 1970s cinema in Hong Kong. In 1971 only one film was made in Cantonese, but Cantonese films came back into popularity by the end of the decade. In 1977 the Hong Kong International Film Festival was established. And in 1978 a new wave of films and directors
(such as Tsui Hark, Ann Hui, Yim Ho, and Allen Fong) who wanted to shift the focus of narratives away from simplistic fantastical plots to relevant social issues emerged. In the 1980s key developments included the films of John Woo, such as *A Better Tomorrow* (1986), and, because the market of mainland China was opened to Hong Kong, a wider audience base and studio co-productions. The second-wave directors of Hong Kong in the 1990s included Wong Kar Wai, Stanley Kwan, Fruit Chan, and Clara Law. Director John Woo, actors Chow Yun-Fat and Jackie Chan, and actress Michelle Yeoh moved to Hollywood in the 1990s. Director Stephen Chow’s films in the early 2000s marked the latest global success of Hong Kong Cinema.

**Taiwan Cinema**

Taiwan cinema began within the Japanese colonial system, which imported films from Japan, China, and Hollywood. Films were also produced in Taiwan by the Japanese and by Taiwanese investors. In addition
to the filmic image, film exhibition included a *benshi*, a person who stood in front of the audience next to the screen and both narrated the film and provided an audience response. The Japanese film centers in Taipei and around the island, including production and distribution networks, were taken over by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) in 1945 when Taiwan was returned to China. The KMT first set up Taiwan Studio in Taipei, and then the government apparatus brought with it Zhongdian (Central) Film Studio, Zhongzhi (China) Motion Pictures, and Nongjiao (Agricultural Education) Film Company when the government fled to Taiwan in 1949.

State production of film in Mandarin in the 1950s stalled initially, but after a decade of trial and error government film got off the ground. After Gong Hong became manager of the Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC) in 1963, he produced a series of “healthy realist” films such as *Oyster Girl* (directors, Li Xing and Li Jia, 1964) and *Beautiful Duckling* (director, Li Xing, 1965) that competed financially in the open market with popular films from Hollywood and Hong Kong. The films also

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**Beijing Opera actor Tan Xinpei in the first Chinese movie *Dingjunshan* (1905).**
served to extend the international market of Taiwan films to Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. Meanwhile, Taiwanese-language film was an important part of the Taiwan film market. Film declined in the 1970s but re-emerged with New Taiwan Cinema in the early 1980s with a new cultural impetus and government sponsorship. Famous directors included Edward Yang, Hou Hsiao-hsien, and Wu Nian-zhen. Although not successful at the box office, these directors’ films entered international art-house circuits. New strategies and styles by such directors as Tsai Ming-liang were developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the transplanted Taiwanese director Ang Lee (Li An) found success both at home and abroad with *The Wedding Banquet* (1993) and his hit film *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (2000). Both films won Taiwan’s Golden Horse Best Film Awards. Today’s Taiwan film productions are intertwined with those on the mainland.

**Fifth-Generation Cinema, 1984–1993**

While fourth-generation directors in the 1980s continued to make reflective films, such as *Sacrificed Youth* (director, Zhang Nuanxin, 1985), the first graduates from Beijing Film Academy, including Tian Zhuangzhuang and Zhang Junzhao, burst onto the scene in 1984 with Chen Kaige’s *Yellow Earth*, featuring cinematography by Zhang Yimou. The term *fifth-generation cinema* primarily refers to the early films of these graduates, and this cinema was referred to as “new Chinese cinema” in the 1980s to distinguish it from cinema of the socialist period.

The imagery in *Yellow Earth* is predominated by aesthetically innovative landscape shots of the sky and rolling hills in the Shanbei region, which contrasts with representations of revolutionaries typically found in films made in accordance with the Xie Jin model. This film, along with other fifth-generation movies, highlights the landscape, people, culture, and history of China over political concerns and the supremacy of the CCP. In this way the films indirectly challenge the stereotypes of socialist realism and the ideology of the Communist revolution. *Horse Thief*, Tian Zhuangzhuang’s film from 1986, depicts the Tibetan landscape, which is geographically as far removed from political centers as possible. *Red Sorghum* (director, Zhang Yimou, 1987), starring Gong Li and Jiang Wen, the latter a sixth-generation director, was popular overseas, winning a Golden Berlin Bear Award. After this film fifth-generation films won over global art-house audiences with a distinct mixture of Chinese folk culture, repressed sexuality, and dynamic landscapes. Zhang Yimou rode a wave of artistic and commercial success overseas while losing his fan base at home. The legacy of fifth-generation cinema stretches to 1993, when Chen, Zhang, and Tian all made watershed films that portrayed the Cultural Revolution.

**Sixth-Generation Cinema, 1994 to Present**

The so-called sixth generation, also referred to as China’s “urban,” “independent,” or “underground” film, initially emerged as members of a new group of filmmakers in China found themselves unable to acquire funding for their film projects after the government permitted rampant privatization alongside the influx of multinational corporations. These new directors found alternative ways to produce films, either by funding movies themselves or receiving investment from overseas. Their films, often touted as “banned in China” by film festivals outside of China because the films were released before receiving government authorization, are often low in production quality. But this feature is worn by the directors as a badge of honor in their attempts to depict what they perceive as their reality, namely, the false values of their socialist heritage, the demolition of old parts of town to make way for new skyscrapers and factories, government corruption, waves of immigration, and the marginalization of prostitutes, migrant workers, and drug addicts. These raw depictions are in opposition to the heightened characterizations of the fifth-generation films.

Rock music is a central theme in many of these films, such as *Beijing Bastards* (director, Zhang Yuan, 1993), *Dirt* (director, Guan Hu, 1994), and *The Making of Steel* (director, Lu Xuechang, 1996). *In the Heat of the Sun* (director, Jiang Wen, 1994), an adaptation of a satiric Wang Shuo novel, questions the validity of accepted versions of history under Communism in China. In films such as Zhang Yuan’s *East Palace, West Palace* (1996), the first famous film from China depicting homosexuality, the power of the government authority is challenged. These films are
made by directors who see themselves as on the margins of culture themselves, and these directors often cast little-known actors and actresses and present their stories in a docudrama style. Depictions of the underprivileged in the face of globalization can be found in *Beijing Bicycle* (director, Wang Xiaoshuai, 2001), and a documentary style permeates *Suzhou River* (director, Lou Ye, 2003). Director Feng Xiaogang’s New Years pictures such as *Big Shot’s Funeral* (2001) take into account the commodification of Chinese culture in a humorous way, while contemporary films by Jia Zhangke expose financial poverty and ruin in difficult, beautiful films such as *The World* (2004) and *Still Life* (2006). These films enter a market in China that is dealing with copyright issues, rampant piracy, and a state funding system that tends to serve only a handful of directors, including Zhang Yimou.

**Cinema Inside and Outside China**

The images that cinema in China has produced have captivated audiences worldwide for nearly one hundred years, and the films that China has imported have been received with critical acclaim. From current mainstream Chinese directors Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou, Hong Kong directors John Woo and Wang Kar Wai, and Taiwanese directors Ang Lee and Hou Hsiao-hsien, transnational flows of capital and images remain constant, just as they were when the first film was screened in China in 1896. Chinese cinema has always been truly transnational.

*James WICKS*

**Further Reading**


The civil service examination system, a method of recruiting civil officials based on merit rather than family or political connections, played an especially central role in Chinese social and intellectual life from 650 to 1905. Passing the rigorous exams, which were based on classical literature and philosophy, conferred a highly sought-after status, and a rich literati culture in imperial China ensued.

Civil service examinations connected various aspects of premodern politics, society, economy, and intellectual life in imperial China. Local elites and the imperial court continually influenced the dynastic government to reexamine and adjust the classical curriculum and to entertain new ways to improve the institutional system for selecting civil officials. As a result, civil examinations, as a test of educational merit, also served to tie the dynasty and literati culture together bureaucratically.

Premodern civil service examinations, viewed by some as an obstacle to modern Chinese state-building, did in fact make a positive contribution to China’s emergence in the modern world. A classical education based on nontechnical moral and political theory was as suitable for selection of elites to serve the imperial state at its highest echelons as were humanism and a classical education that served elites in the burgeoning nation-states of early modern Europe. Moreover, classical examinations were an effective cultural, social, political, and educational construction that met the needs of the dynastic bureaucracy while simultaneously supporting late imperial social structure. Elite gentry and merchant status groups were defined in part by examination degree credentials.

Civil service examinations by themselves were not an avenue for considerable social mobility, that is, they were not an opportunity for the vast majority of peasants and artisans to move from the lower classes into elite circles. The archives recording data from the years 1500 to 1900 indicate that peasants, traders, and artisans, who made up 90 percent of the population, were not a significant part of the 2 to 3 million candidates who usually took the local biennial licensing tests. Despite this fact, a social byproduct of the examinations was the limited circulation in the government of lower-level elites from gentry, military, and merchant backgrounds.

One of the unintended consequences of the examinations was the large pool of examination failures who used their linguistic and literary talents in a variety of nonofficial roles: One must look beyond the official meritocracy to see the larger place of the millions of failures in the civil service examinations. One of the unintended consequences of the examinations was the creation of legions of classically literate men who used their linguistic talents for a variety of nonofficial purposes: from physicians to pettyfoggers, from fiction writers to examination essay teachers, and from ritual specialists to lineage agents. Although women were barred from taking the exams, they followed their own educational pursuits if only to compete in ancillary roles, either as girls competing for spouses or as mothers educating their sons.
Pu Songling (1640–1715), a failure many times himself, immortalized the travails of those trapped in the relentless machinery of late imperial civil service examinations in his many stories that parodied the examination system. His most famous portrait sketched “The Seven Likenesses of a Candidate”:

A licentiate taking the provincial examination may be likened to seven things. When entering the examination hall, bare-footed and carrying a basket, he is like a beggar. At roll-call time, being shouted at by officials and abused by their subordinates, he is like a prisoner. When writing in his cell, with his head and feet sticking out of the booth, he is like a cold bee late in autumn. Upon leaving the examination hall, being in a daze and seeing a changed universe, he is like a sick bird out of a cage. When anticipating the results, he is on pins and needles; one moment he fantasizes success and magnificent mansions are instantly built; another moment he fears failure and his body is deduced to a corpse. At this point he is like a chimpanzee in captivity. Finally the messengers come on galloping horses and confirm the absence of his name on the list of successful candidates. His complexion becomes ashen and his body stiffens like a poisoned fly no longer able to move. Disappointed and discouraged, he vilifies the examiners for their blindness and blames the unfairness of the system. Thereupon he collects all his books and papers from his desk and sets them on fire; unsatisfied, he tramples over the ashes; still unsatisfied, he throws the ashes into a filthy gutter. He is determined to abandon the world by going into the mountains, and he is resolved to drive away any person who dares speak to him about examination essays. With the passage of time, his anger subsides and his aspiration rises. Like a turtle dove just hatched, he rebuilds his nest and starts the process once again. (Elman 2000, 361)

This account is, of course, fictional, but its cultural content lays out in full relief the psychological strain that candidates experienced inside and outside the examination compounds.

Women along with Buddhist and Daoist clergy were excluded, so the pool of candidates in late imperial China—as in contemporary education circles worldwide—was exclusive. Because of the requirement to master nonvernacular classical texts, an educational barrier was erected as the hidden curriculum that separated those licensed to take examinations and those who could not because they were classically illiterate. The circulation of partially literate nonelites and lesser lights as writers-for-hire was an unintended byproduct of the civil examination’s educational process and explains the value of examinations for the many and not just the few in premodern China.

When modern reformers summarily decided to eliminate the civil service examinations in 1904 the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) undermined its longstanding partnership with gentry-merchant elites. The dynasty fell before a new schooling system could be put in place empirewide. With hindsight one can see that civil service examinations had served both imperial interests and literati values. Along with the examinations the dragon throne (symbol of dynastic government) and its traditional elites also collapsed in the twentieth-century Chinese revolution.

Examinations as Socio-Cultural “Glue”

In addition to their governmental role, imperial Chinese civil service examinations played a central role in Chinese social and intellectual life from 650 to 1905. Beginning in 1400 imperial examiners were committed to the “Learning of the Way” (neo-Confucianism) as the state orthodoxy in official life and in literati culture. From 650 to 1200 literary talent and classical learning had been tested as important, dual-track educational proficiencies. A unifying philosophical orthodoxy was not widely influential in the examination halls until Chinese literati deemed that they needed to speak with a single cultural voice at a time when the political unity of the empire had been squashed by the Mongol conquest (1240–1368). Han Chinese classical scholars built a new cultural and educational fortress around the bequeathed neo-Confucian teachings of the literati of their beloved but vanquished Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279).

Civil service examinations reflected the larger literati culture because they were already penetrated by imperial interests and local elites who together formed the
classical curriculum. Gentry and merchant status groups were defined in part by their examination credentials. The intersections between elite social life, popular culture, and religion from 1400 to 1900 also reveal the full cultural scope and magnitude of the examination process in the 1,300 counties, 140 prefectures, 17 provinces, as well as in the capital region, where they were administered. These regular testing sites, which in terms of the role of police surveillance in the selection process operated as “cultural prisons,” elicited the voluntary participation of millions of men—women were excluded from participating in this aspect as well—and attracted the attention of elites and commoners at all levels of society.

The demise of civil service examinations yielded consequences that the last rulers of imperial China and reformist gentry generally underestimated. The Manchu court was complicit in its own dismantling after the forces of delegitimation and decanonization were unleashed by reformist Chinese gentry, who prevailed in late-nineteenth-century education circles in the 1890s and convinced the imperial court to eliminate the institution in 1904.

Education reform and the elimination of examinations were tied to newly defined national goals of Western-style change that superseded the conservative goals of reproducing dynastic power, granting elite prestige, and affirming the classical orthodoxy. The ideal of national unity replaced dynastic solidarity as the sprawling, multiethnic Manchu empire became a struggling Chinese republic. It was later refashioned as a multiethnic communist nation.
in 1949. With the Republican Revolution of 1911, the imperial system ended abruptly, but its demise was already assured in 1904 when the Qing state lost control of the education system.

**Power, Politics, and Examinations**

Classical philosophy and imperial politics were dubious partners during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties when Song classical interpretations became the orthodox guidelines for the examination system. Ming and Qing appropriations of that orthodoxy as a single-minded and monocular political ideology affected politically and socially how literati learning would be interpreted and used. The mark of the late imperial civil service system was its elaboration of the examination model through the impact of commercialization and demographic growth when the reach of the process expanded from metropolitan and provincial capitals to all thirteen counties. In addition, the upsurge in numbers of candidates was marked by degree inflation at the lower levels. Palace graduate degree-holders dominated most positions of higher office. Officialdom became the prerogative of a slim minority. As the door to official appointment, civil service examinations also conferred social and cultural status on families seeking to become or maintain their status as local elites.

Competitive tensions in the examination market explain the police-like rigor of the civil service examinations as a systematic and stylized educational form of cultural hegemony (influence) that elites and rulers could both support. Imperial power and bureaucratic authority were conveyed through the accredited cultural institutions of the Ministry of Rites, the Hanlin Academy, and civil service examinations. Political legitimation transmitted through education succeeded because enhanced social status and legal privileges were an important byproduct of the examination competition to enter the civil service.

Fixed quotas based on the ratio between successful and failed candidates demonstrated that the state saw educational access to the civil service as a means to regulate the power of elites. Government control of civil and military selection quotas was most keenly felt at the initial licensing stages for the privilege to enter the examination selection process at the county level. In 1600 China had perhaps 500,000 civil licentiates in a population of 150 million, or a ratio of 1 licentiate per 300 persons. By 1850, with a population of 350 million, China had only 800,000 civil and military licentiates, but still only about a half-million were civil, a ratio of 1 per 1,000 persons.

Because of economic advantages in south China (especially the Yangzi [Chang] River delta but including the southeast), candidates from the south performed better on the civil service examinations than candidates from less-prosperous regions in the north, northwest, and southwest. To keep the south’s domination of the examinations within acceptable bounds, Qing education officials maintained the official ratio of 60:40 for allocations of the highest *jinshi* (literati eligible for appointments) degree to candidates from the south versus the north, which was slightly modified to 55:10:35 by allocating 10 percent for the central region.

The overcrowded examination hall became a contested site, where the political interests of the dynasty, the social interests of its elites, and the cultural ideals of classical learning were all compromised. Moreover, examination halls empirewide were supervised by literati officials, who were in charge of the military and police apparatus when so many men were brought together to be tested at a single place. Forms of resistance to imperial prerogative emerged among examiners, and widespread dissatisfaction and corruption among the candidates at times triumphed over the high-minded goals of the classical examinations.

**Literacy and Social Dimensions**

The monopolization of “cultural resources” by local elites depended on their linguistic mastery of nonvernacular classical texts tested by the state. Imperial examinations created a written language barrier that stood between those who were allowed into the empire’s examination compounds and those classical illiterates who were kept out. In a society with no “public” schools, education was monopolized by gentry and merchants who organized into lineages and clans to provide superior classical educations. The Mandarin vernacular and classical literacy played central roles in culturally defining high and low social status in Chinese society. The selection process
permitted some circulation of elites in and out of the total pool, but the educational curriculum and its formidable linguistic requirements effectively eliminated the lower classes from the selection process. In addition, an unstated gender ideology simply assumed that women were ineligible.

Literati regularly turned to religion and the mantic (relating to the faculty of divination) arts to understand and rationalize their chances of success in the competitive local, provincial, and metropolitan examinations. Examination dreams and popular lore spawned a remarkable literature about the temples that candidates visited, the dreams that they or members of their family had, and the magical events in their early lives that were premonitions of later success. Both elites and commoners used fate to describe the forces operating in the examination marketplace. The anxiety produced by examinations was a historical phenomenon that was experienced most personally and deeply by boys and men. They encoded fate using cultural glosses that had unconscious ties to popular religion.

The civil service competition affirmed a classical curriculum that consolidated elite families into a culturally defined status group of degree-holders that shared (1) internalization of a common classical language, (2) memorization of a shared canon of classics, and (3) a literary style of writing known as the “eight-legged essay.” Elite literary culture was in part defined by the civil service examination curriculum, but that curriculum also showed the impact of literati opinions about education. The moral cultivation of the literatus was a perennial concern of the imperial court as it sought to ensure that the officials it chose in the examination market would be loyal to the ruling family. For the literatus it was important that the dynasty conformed to classical ideals that literati themselves had formulated.

The bureaucracy made an enormous financial commitment to staffing and operating the empirewide examination regime. Ironically, the chief consequence was that by 1800 examiners no longer could read each essay carefully. Final rankings, even for the eight-legged essay, appeared haphazard as a result. Although acknowledging the educational impact of the curriculum in force, one should guard against portraying weary examiners with so many papers to read as the dynasty’s “thought police,” operating inside the examination halls trying to impose orthodoxy from above. Overall, however, examiners as an interpretive community did uphold canonical standards. They marked their cognitive world according to the moral attitudes, social dispositions, and political compulsions of their day.

**Fields of Learning**

In the nineteenth century the examination curriculum increasingly conformed to the statecraft and evidential research currents then popular. In the late eighteenth century the Qing dynasty had initiated “ancient learning” curricular reforms to make the examinations more difficult for the increasing numbers of candidates by requiring mastery of not one but all of the Five Classics. In addition, the formalistic requirements of a new poetry question after 1787 gave examiners an additional tool, along with the 8-legged essay “grid,” to grade papers more efficiently. Later rulers failed to recognize that an important aspect of the civil service examinations was the periodic questioning of the system from within that gave it credibility from without.

Literati fields of learning, such as natural studies and history, were also represented in late imperial civil examinations, particularly in the reformist era after 1860. Such inclusion showed the influence of the Qing court and its regional officials, who for political reasons widened the scope of policy questions on examinations in the 1880s and 1890s.

**Delegitimation and Decanonization**

Radical reforms were initiated to meet the challenges of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) and Western imperialism. Even the Taipings instituted their own Christian-based civil service examinations in the 1850s. When the examinations lost their cultural luster and became an object of ridicule even among literati-officials, the system was derided as an “unnatural” educational regime that should be discarded. During the 1890s and 1900s new political, institutional, and cultural forms emerged that challenged the creedal system of the late empire and internationalized its educational institutions.
The emperor, his bureaucracy, and literati cultural forms quickly became symbols of backwardness. Traditional forms of knowledge were uncritically labeled as “superstition,” whereas “modern science” in its European and U.S. forms was championed by new intellectuals as the path to knowledge, enlightenment, and national power. Perhaps the most representative change occurred in the dismantling of the political, social, and cultural functions of the civil service examination regime in 1904–1905. By dismantling imperial institutions such as the civil service examination system so rapidly, the Chinese reformers and early republican revolutionaries underestimated the public reach of historical institutions that had taken two dynasties and five hundred years to build.

When they delegitimated the imperial system within two decades starting in 1890, Han Chinese literati helped to bring down both the Manchu dynasty and the imperial system of governance. Their fall concluded a millennium of elite belief in Song dynasty literati values and five hundred years of an empirewide civil service examination. A social, political, and cultural nexus of classical values, dynastic power, and gentry status unraveled as Manchu rulers meekly gave up one of their major weapons of cultural control that had for centuries induced popular acceptance of the imperial system. The radical reforms establishing new schools initially failed, however, because they could not readily replace the public institutions for mobilizing millions of literati in examination compounds based on a classical education.

Traditionalists who tried to reform classical learning after 1898 paid a form of symbolic compensation to classical thought by unilaterally declaring its moral superiority as a reward for its historical failure. The modern invention of “Confucianism” was completed in the twentieth century despite the decline of classical learning in public schools after 1905. In China and the West “Confucianism” became instead a venue for academic scholarship, when the “modern Chinese intellectual” irrevocably replaced the “late Qing literatus” in the early republic. However, the demise of traditional education and the rise of modern schools in China were more complicated than just the end of imperial examinations and the rise of modern education because the latter would also subordinate examinations to new forms of schooling. The ghost of the civil service examinations lived on in Chinese public school and college entrance examinations, which have now become universal and are no longer unique to imperial China.

Benjamin A. Elman

Further Reading
Shang Yanliu. (1958). Qingdai keju kaoshi shulue [Summary of civil examinations during the Qing period]. Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore.
The Chinese Civil War was a competition for power between Chiang Kai-shek’s more city-based Nationalist forces and Mao Zedong’s more rural Chinese Communist Party. Both sides sought to control and unify China. While Chiang relied on assistance from the United States, Mao won in the end by enlisting the help of China’s people, particularly the rural populace.

The Chinese Civil War was rooted in the competition for power between the Nationalist Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party. Following the defeat of Japan in 1945, the two factions of China’s military competed for power for another four years in the Chinese People’s War of Liberation. The leaders of these two had been chosen by China’s first twentieth-century Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen, but they had become adversaries before and during the fight against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek headed the Nationalist Chinese forces (Kuomintang, KMT), while Mao Zedong led the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo Gongchandang, CCP).

Background of the Conflict
Sun Yat-sen tried to broaden the base of support for his nationalist movement by incorporating the CCP, which had the support of the Soviet Union. Sun had no intention of compromising his own principles for this support, and his death in 1925 led to a power struggle within the KMT. Because Chiang Kai-shek controlled the military forces, he became its primary leader.

In order to develop the resources necessary to modernize a nationalist China, Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang to Russia in 1923 to observe Soviet methods of discipline and indoctrination; upon Chiang’s return in the summer of 1924, Sun had him establish the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou. Much like the military leaders in the American Civil War who were trained at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the leaders of both sides of the Chinese Civil War were trained at the Whampoa Military Academy.

The conflict between the KMT and the CCP began when both sides were attempting to subdue Chinese warlords in northern China (1926–1928) and continued through the Japanese occupation (1932–1945). The need to eliminate the warlords was seen as necessary by both Mao and Chiang, but for different reasons. For Mao, their elimination would end the feudal system in China, helping to prepare the country for socialism and communism. For Chiang, the warlords were a threat to the central government. This fundamental difference in motivation continued throughout the years of fighting against Japanese occupation in China, despite a common enemy.

Mao’s Communist forces mobilized the peasantry in rural China against the Japanese, and at the time of the Japanese surrender in 1945 the CCP had raised an army of nearly a million soldiers. The Soviet Union benefited from the pressure Mao’s forces placed on the Japanese, and the
CCP forces were supplied by the Soviets. The ideological unity of the CCP, plus the experience gained in fighting the Japanese, prepared it for the next struggle, which would be against the KMT. Although Chiang’s forces had been well equipped by the United States, they lacked political unity, effective leadership, and experience.

Opening Stage of the Civil War, 1945

When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, Mao and Chiang entered the next phase of their competition. At that time Mao’s forces controlled the northern part of China, while the Nationalists held the territory south of the Yellow River. This gave Mao the capacity to move into Manchuria, but Chiang’s KMT had control of the large cities of Nanking 南京 (Nanjing), Shanghai 上海, and Chungking 重庆 (Chongqing).

At the time of Japan’s surrender, roughly two million Japanese soldiers were in China. As members of the Allied forces, Chiang’s Nationalist forces, the Soviets, and the Americans wanted to disarm the Japanese and to evacuate them in accordance with agreements made at the Potsdam Conference. The situation was complicated when Mao’s Red Army refused to follow Chiang’s
order directing the Communists to stay away from the Japanese. The American military commander, General Douglas MacArthur, ordered the Japanese to surrender only to Nationalist forces. The Americans assisted the Nationalists by bringing in U.S. Marines to control Peking (Beijing) and Tsingtao (Qingdao), and eventually 53,000 Marines landed in China to assist with the retreat of Japanese forces and to deny the Communists control of major cities. American aircraft also transported over 100,000 Nationalist soldiers to Shanghai, Peking, and Nanking.

The Soviet Army had moved into Manchuria to deal with the Japanese there, but by late 1945 they had planned to withdraw their forces. Chiang feared that this would leave Manchuria open to capture by Mao’s Red Army, and requested that Soviet forces delay their withdrawal. Even as the Soviets remained, Red Army forces led by Lin Biao 林彪 established a foothold in the rural areas of Manchuria and waited for the Soviets to leave. By mid-December, Nationalist forces began arriving in Manchuria, assisted by American naval and air forces.

Attempts at Reconciliation

The United States sent General George C. Marshall to China with the status of “special envoy” to negotiate a ceasefire between the CCP and KMT and to establish a coalition government. In early 1946 Marshall met with Nationalist general Chang Chun 張群 and Communist representative Zhou Enlai 周恩來 to develop plans for an end to the fighting between Nationalist and Communist forces, to establish plans for shared power between the two sides, and for the eventual demobilization of much of the military. While agreements appeared to be progressing well, neither the Nationalists nor the Communists set aside their plans to eliminate the other. General Marshall left China in mid-March to report his progress to President Truman, and within a month full-scale war had broken out between the Nationalists and Communists in Manchuria.

Even as Marshall attempted to restart negotiations, Nationalist and Communist forces continued to fight through the summer in Manchuria. The situation was complicated by the presence of U.S. Marines and naval forces, who were accused by the Communists of fighting alongside the Nationalists.

With no progress being made through his three-man committee, Marshall proposed a new negotiating team that included two members from each side and was headed by the new American ambassador, Dr. Leighton Stuart. This committee failed to end the fighting, and the continued American support of Nationalist military forces convinced the Communists that the U.S. was not neutral in the conflict.

By 1946 Marshall realized that another element of the continuation of the conflict was the fault of Chiang and the Nationalists, especially the extreme right-wing of the party that was headed by Chiang’s adopted nephews Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu. This reactionary wing of the Nationalist Party continued to interfere with attempts at reconciliation, and in January 1947 General Marshall was called back to Washington after his mission to facilitate reconciliation failed.

The Military Situation in 1946–1947

By the end of 1946 Communist forces controlled nearly three-fourths of Manchurian territory and half of its population. Lin Biao’s army of about 300,000 was smaller than the Nationalist forces in the region, but more motivated and highly disciplined. Most of the weapons the Communists had were either taken from the Japanese, or captured from Nationalists. The Communists controlled the rural areas, while the Nationalists held the major cities.

The Nationalist forces in northern China were equipped with American weapons and vehicles, as well as some aircraft. However, in general, Nationalist soldiers were less motivated, and their officers were often corrupt. One particular failing on the part of the Nationalists was that when they surrendered, they turned over their weapons to the Communists rather than destroying them.

In January 1947, Lin Biao led an attack on the Manchurian capital of Changchun 长春 with a force of 60,000 soldiers. Communist forces captured the town initially, but were soon forced out by the Nationalists. After retreating, the Red Army forces moved against Changchun again in February, but were forced back across the Sungari River a second time. A third Communist offensive in March was beaten back by the Nationalists, but the Red Army had succeeded in wearing down the Nationalist forces.
The continuing Red Army attacks forced the Nationalists to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula in May. Nationalist efforts consisted largely of attempts to hold the cities of Mukden (Shenyang, 沈阳), Changchun, and Kirin (Jilin, 吉林) and the rail lines connecting them.

From January to March, at the same time the Red Army was weakening the Nationalist forces in Manchuria, the Nationalists moved on the Communist-held city of Yenan (Yan'an, 延安), which was defended by a small number of untrained, poorly equipped, Communist forces. When Nationalist forces finally moved into Yenan in the morning of 19 March 1947, they found that the city was empty. The Communist forces had withdrawn entirely, as was the case with most Nationalist attacks on Communist-held strongholds.

Throughout the Civil War, Chiang's American-trained Nationalist forces expended their efforts on targets which would be found empty. However, in addition to expending resources and time, this placed the Nationalists deep into territory held by the Communists, at risk of becoming encircled by Red Army forces.

Communists in Manchuria in the last half of 1947 also reflected this strategy of encircling the enemy. In September of that year another Communist campaign aimed to isolate Mukden. Because the Communists controlled the countryside and had the support of the rural population, the continued Nationalist control of the cities did not undermine this Communist control. Despite Chiang’s declaration in January 1948 that Communist forces had failed in their efforts to encircle Mukden, the real cost for the Nationalists by this time was the loss of half a million men to combat, desertion, or capture in northeast China.

### Ideological Aspects of the Civil War

Throughout the conflict, the Communists used the traditional resentment of peasant farmers toward landowners to their benefit. The KMT were portrayed to Chinese farmers as landlords and warlords, while the Red Army soldiers were seen as commoners.

During the Civil War, CCP forces were required to be more mobile than they had been during the Japanese conflict, and therefore they could not serve as both farmers and soldiers. To meet the need for village organization, the position of village activist was established to mobilize the masses to support the Communist forces. In 1947 the Land Reform Law authorized the confiscation of land held by the KMT. Also in 1947, as a reflection of this growing power, the Communist forces were renamed the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiefàng Jūn, PLA, 中国人民解放军).

Differences between Communist and Nationalist forces were very clear. Most of the Red Army forces were volunteers from the regions where they fought. Nationalists, on the other hand, had been conscripted into service and were fighting far from their homes, and thus suffered from lack of morale.

Sentiment of the two sides toward the United States was also quite different. Although the Communists were equipped with many American weapons, vehicles, and communication equipment, these had been captured from the Nationalists. The Communists remembered America's support of the Nationalists, the provision of equipment and air transport to Chiang's forces, and General Marshall was portrayed as a conspirator who had supported Nationalist interests rather than as a mediator.

### The Military Situation in 1948

Lin Biao launched another attack on Mukden in January 1948. To emphasize the need to hold this city, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Mukden to direct its defense. Lin was able to stop reinforcement of Mukden by rail, and Chiang was left with only aircraft to resupply Mukden. Lin's Red Army forces gradually took the surrounding cities, essentially leaving Mukden isolated as the only major Nationalist-held region in Manchuria.

American advisors had long advised Chiang to abandon Manchuria to the Communists, but he refused. Although Nationalist forces were better equipped than the Red Army forces opposing them in Manchuria, Chiang's generals seemed only willing to defend their areas of control, and did not attack the Communists.

To the southwest, Communist forces again moved to retake Yenan, which the Nationalists had given up in April. The Nationalists were able to defeat a Communist offensive in Sichuan Province 四川省 that month, but the Communists still controlled the countryside in Shaanxi 陕西省 and most of the Sichuan Province.

By the spring of 1948 the Nationalists had not only suffered the loss of nearly all of Manchuria, but much of
the territory south of the Yellow River that they had held in 1945. Between March and May of 1948 the city of Luoyang 洛阳 was taken by the Communists, retaken by the Nationalists, and finally retaken by the Communists, who took prisoner some 25,000 Nationalists in mid-May.

By the summer of 1948 the greatest part of the fight between Mao’s Communists and Chiang’s Nationalists had shifted from Manchuria to central China. The Red Army had steadily grown in size and armaments since 1945, while Nationalist forces had been reduced by about one-third. The Communists were supported by most of the rural population, while the Nationalists were generally disliked by them.

As the number of cities held by the Nationalists decreased during 1948, Chiang became more determined to hold them, a tactic which had been failing since 1945. Chiang’s American advisors, headed by General Barr of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), repeatedly encouraged Chiang to give up cities that could not be held and to concentrate on those which could. Chiang put his faith in his air force’s ability to airlift men and equipment where he wanted it. However, one of the last major Nationalist cities, Jinan 济南, fell to the Communists in September when the Communists first seized the city’s airfield, then captured the city and the Nationalist garrison there.

The following month Lin Biao again led the Red Army against Nationalist forces in the last holdout cities in Manchuria, capturing land, weapons, and high-ranking officers. Other than Peking and a few cities in the north, this left Chiang with only Xuzhou 徐州, Nanking, Shanghai, and the southern and western parts of China under his control. Again, the Nationalists sought only to defend their territory instead of attacking the Communists, and entire Nationalist divisions deserted to the Communist side. The battle for Xuzhou lasted more than two months, and the Nationalist army lost more than a half a million men who were killed, captured, or defected.

Political Ramifications of the Nationalist Military Defeat

Chiang Kai-shek’s military and political failures were due at least in part to his unwillingness to accept the advice of his American advisors. General George Marshall had attempted to resolve the conflict between the Nationalists and Communists, but had failed largely because of Chiang’s intransigence. Similarly, Chiang had rejected the advice of General Barr of JUSMAG. Once his forces at Xuzhou had been defeated, he sent his wife, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, to Washington to make an appeal for more assistance. Arriving in early December 1948, she was coldly received and before the month was over American support for Chiang’s government was terminated.

Final Defeat and Departure

One of the last Nationalist generals to maintain a defense against the advancing Communist forces was General Fu Zuoyi 傅作义, who commanded the railroad corridor connecting Peking with the last of the cities held by the Nationalists. In November and December 1948 Lin Biao led attacks against Fu’s forces, and Fu gradually retreated. Rather than engage in a military bombardment of Peking, Fu and Lin agreed to allow the Communist capture of the city. The twenty-five divisions under Fu’s command would eventually be absorbed into the People’s Liberation Army.

Chiang Kai-shek stepped down as leader of the KMT in January 1949 and was replaced by his vice-president, Li Zongren 李宗仁. Li and Mao entered into negotiations for peace, but Nationalist hardliners rejected Mao’s demands. The Communist military capability was a determining factor in resolving the impasse, and when Li sought an additional delay in mid-April 1949, the Red Army crossed the Yangzi (Chang) River. Chiang Kai-shek fled to the island of Formosa (Taiwan, 台湾), where some 300,000 soldiers had already been airlifted. Chiang also relocated his air force in Taiwan and sent the 26 naval vessels of the Nationalist navy there.

The final Communist assault against Nationalist forces began on 20 April 1949 and continued through the summer. By August the Red Army controlled nearly all of mainland China; the Nationalists held only Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands (P’eng-Hu Ch’üan-Tao, 澎湖群島), Guangdong 广东, and a few regions in the far west. From Taiwan, Chiang’s air force attempted to bomb the mainland cities of Nanking and Shanghai, but to no effect. Chiang’s ground forces attempted a return to the mainland, but without any long-term success, and the last of the Nationalist leadership evacuated the city of Chengdu 成都 on 27 December 1949.
This left Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in control of all of China except Hainan Island, Tibet, and Taiwan. The Nationalist forces on Hainan were defeated by Lin Biao’s forces in April 1950, and Lin’s forces moved into Tibet to control that region as well. In just over five years, the Chinese Communists had defeated a military force supplied and trained by the most powerful government in the world. This demonstrated that the effectiveness of the mass movement centered in the rural population used by Mao was more effective than the Nationalist strategy of controlling population centers.

**Thomas P. DOLAN**

**Further Reading**


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**A governor may commit arson while the governed are not allowed to light a lamp.**

只许州官放火，不许百姓点灯

*Zhī xǔ zhōu guān fāng huǒ, bù xǔ bǎi xìng diǎn dēng*
Through her regency Cixi held power over Qing dynasty political life for almost half a century. She supported officials who encouraged the anti-foreign Boxer movement and accepted the humiliating treaty, the Boxer Protocol.

Wang Yehonala of the Manchu Blue Banner, also known as “Cixi,” held power over Qing dynasty (1644–1912) political life for almost half a century. She was a consort of Emperor Xian Feng (1831–1861, reigned 1850–1861) and bore his successor, Tong Zhi (1856–1875, reigned 1862–1874). After Xian Feng’s death in 1861, Cixi seized power by removing eight conservative regents from the court and setting up her own regent over the boy emperor. In 1875, after Emperor Tong Zhi died with no heir, Cixi named her three-year-old nephew Guang Xu (1871–1908, reigned 1875–1908) to the throne.

In 1898 Cixi resumed the regency as a result of a coup in which she crushed the emperor’s attempt to push through a number of radical proposals designed to modernize the Chinese government. In 1900 Cixi supported officials who encouraged the antiforeign secret-society Boxer movement. A coalition of foreign troops soon captured the capital, and Cixi was forced to flee from Beijing to northwestern China, where she accepted the humiliating treaty, the Boxer Protocol, in 1901. Returning to Beijing in 1902, she finally began to implement a number of the innovations that the reformers had sought in 1898.
The Empress Dowager Cixi. In 1898 Cixi resumed the regency as a result of a coup designed to crush the emperor's radical proposals in the effort to modernize the Chinese government.

including the inception of China's constitutional establishment. Cixi died on 15 November 1908, one day after the emperor's death.

Shiwei CHEN

Further Reading
With almost 10 million square kilometers of territory, China has a wide range of climate, largely determined by two weather systems that divide the country east to west. Vegetation adapts to the climate and is one of the richest in the world.

China covers an area of 9.6 million square kilometers and has an immense diversity in climate and vegetation. More than 1.2 million square kilometers are covered by sand and rock-strewn deserts, whereas another 2.1 million square kilometers have a continuous permafrost, with glaciers covering nearly 60,000 square kilometers. Only an estimated 1.7 million square kilometers are arable land.

China may be divided into two halves roughly along the 102° longitude meridian because, generally speaking, two weather systems exist. The comparatively low areas to the east of this meridian are dominated by a temperate, dry or subtropical, humid monsoon climate, whereas the highlands to the west have a significantly drier continental climate. Apart from factors such as latitude and elevation, deviations in temperatures and precipitation within and between regions are influenced by topographical features. Mountain ranges, plateaus, river valleys, and proximity to the ocean all have an impact on local weather conditions.

East of the 102° longitude meridian, the division between the temperate north and the subtropical south approximately follows the Qinling Mountains in southern Shaanxi Province and the Huai River, which traverses southern Henan and central Anhui and Jiangsu provinces. North of this line the January mean temperatures decrease from zero to below −20°C in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, whereas Hainan Island in the far south enjoys a tropical climate, with annual average temperatures between 22°C and 26°C. The July mean temperature for the same area, with an elevation below 1,000 meters above sea level, shows little difference from north to south. Annual precipitation decreases from more than 2,000 millimeters in the southeastern coastal provinces to 500–750 millimeters in the northeast. The rainy season follows the southeastern summer monsoon, which lasts from April to September in the southeast, whereas it is considerably shorter in the northeast, lasting only through July and August.

Tropical China includes the Leizhou Peninsula of southern Guangdong Province, Hainan Island, parts of Taiwan, and the five thousand islands and islets of the South China Sea, which covers an area of 2.3 million square kilometers south of the Chinese continent. The largest concentrations of islands are the largely uninhabited and disputed Paracel and Spratly islands. The South China Sea has a monsoon climate, with northern winds in winter and southern winds with high precipitation in summer. Annual temperatures average between 22°C and 26°C. Hainan has an annual precipitation of 1,600 millimeters, which increases with the elevation. Except for February and March the islands of the South China Sea and Hainan are repeatedly hit by typhoons that may last for several days. Situated between the East China Sea and the South China Sea, Taiwan is on the border of the...
subtropical and tropical zones. The eastern plains have an annual average temperature of 22° C, which decreases with the elevation in the mountainous areas in the western part of the island. The July mean temperature of the plains is 28° C, whereas peaks above 3,000 meters may be covered in snow during winter. Annual precipitation varies greatly around the island, from 2,000 millimeters in the south to 6,000 millimeters in the northeast, where the city of Jilong records 214 rainy days a year. In the south rain is more frequent during the summer months, when it is often accompanied by devastating typhoons.

**Subtropical Monsoon Climate**

The roughly 25 percent of China situated to the east of the Tibetan Plateau and south of the Qinling range and the Huai River has a subtropical monsoon climate with long, hot summers and short, mild winters. The area may be divided into three regions: the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau and the Sichuan Basin in the west, the river plains along the Yangzi (Chang) and Zhuijiang (Pearl) rivers, and the mountainous territories of Zhejiang, Fujian, and southern Jiangxi in the east.

The Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau rises from 1,200 meters above sea level in western Guizhou to about 2,000 meters in northern Yunnan. It is a rugged limestone terrain where the subtropical monsoon climate, combined with the high altitude, means pleasantly warm summers, with July average temperatures between 18° C and 28° C in the low-lying parts in the north and 19° C and 22° C in the higher south. Winters are mild, with January mean temperatures between 3° C and 10° C. As a consequence of the great variation in altitude, especially in Yunnan, local climatic conditions may vary considerably. Annual average precipitation in the Guizhou area is 1,200 millimeters, unevenly distributed over valleys and mountain slopes, and hailstorms and droughts are common. Whereas up to 50 percent of the rainfall in Guizhou occurs during the summer months, in Yunnan the rainy season from May to October accounts for 85 percent of the annual average of 1,000 millimeters, and spring droughts are common. The regions bordering on Laos and Myanmar (Burma) have the most rain, with up to 2,000 millimeters annually.

The Sichuan Basin, which occupies the eastern part of Sichuan Province, has an elevation up to 700 meters above sea level and is surrounded by high mountains. The subtropical climate gives mild winters, with January mean temperatures around 6° C, and hot summers, with average July temperatures of 27° C. The average annual precipitation varies from 600 millimeters to 1,200 millimeters and as high as 1,500 millimeters in the Qingyi River valley in the far west of the basin. The rainy season is in late summer and autumn. The plateau of the western half of Sichuan rises to 4,500 meters above sea level, with peaks such as Mount Gongga reaching to 7,556 meters, more than 6,000 meters above the valley of the nearby Dadu River. Here the climate varies greatly between mountains, with cold and dry weather throughout the year and subtropical valleys with warm winters and cool summers.

The plain along the Yangzi River, which includes the southern parts of Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangsu and the northern parts of Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, has a subtropical climate and four seasons with short springs and autumns. Average January temperatures are between 3° C and 9° C, and July temperatures are between 27° C and 30° C. Extreme lows below −18° C have been recorded in Wuhan, which is otherwise known as one of the “four furnaces” (together with Chongqing, Changsha, and Nanjing) because of an average July temperature of more than 37° C. Half of the annual precipitation of 700–2,000 millimeters falls between April and June, often followed by droughts well into September. The subtropical plain drained by the Zhuijiang River and its tributaries, which flows through the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Guangdong Province, have annual mean temperatures up to 22° C. Large parts of Guangdong and Guangxi are above 1,000 meters above sea level and therefore cooler. The river plain has a July average temperature of 27–29° C, whereas January mean temperatures range between 6° C and 15° C. Annual precipitation varies from 1,250 millimeters to more than 2,500 millimeters, with 80 percent falling between April and September.

**Well-Defined Seasons**

The hilly terrain of the eastern coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian and southern Jiangxi farther inland has four well-defined seasons and a typical humid subtropical monsoon climate, with average temperatures reaching between 27° C and 30° C in July and between 6° C and 9° C.
in January. Several mountain ranges, of which the highest is the Wuyi on the border between Jiangxi and Fujian, run parallel with the coastline and are traversed by rivers, resulting in many ravines and a highly serrated landscape. Local variations in weather conditions depend on elevation and location on leeward and windward slopes of the ranges. Extreme low temperatures in the mountains go down to −9° C, whereas the coastal valleys record summer temperatures well above 40° C. The annual precipitation varies greatly, from 900 to 1,500 millimeters on the coastal areas of Fujian to 2,200 millimeters in the mountains, with 40–50 percent falling in spring and early summer, followed by frequent typhoons and torrential rain from July to September.

The area north of the Qinling range and the Huai River is in the temperate zone; the low plains and the coastal areas in the east have a monsoon climate with hot, wet summers and cold, dry winters, and to the west the loess (an unstratified, loamy deposit) plateau has a predominantly continental climate. The Gulf of Bohai and the Yellow Sea (Huang Hi) have January mean temperatures that vary from −4° C to 3° C from north to south, and the July mean temperatures are between 26° C and 29° C. In the dry, cold winters Bohai and the inner Yellow Sea freeze over, and ports may be ice-locked for up to eighty days. The annual average precipitation increases from 570 millimeters in the Bohai area up to 1,200 millimeters in the southern parts of the Yellow Sea. In the north up to 75 percent of the annual precipitation falls in July and August, compared to 40–60 percent in the south. The northeastern plain, which incorporates Liaoning and Jilin provinces, has average January temperatures ranging from −5° C near Bohai to −21° C, whereas the coastal valleys record summer temperatures well above 40° C. The annual precipitation varies between 600 millimeters in the lowlands and 1,000 millimeters on windward slopes of the mountains and is largely concentrated in the summer months.

The Huang (Yellow) River plain covers the greater parts of Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces. In Hebei the annual mean temperatures increase from 1° C in the mountainous north to 15° C in the south, and the average January temperatures are −21° C and −1° C, respectively, with extreme lows down to −43° C in the north. July mean temperatures range from 18° C in the north to 27° C in southern Hebei, where summer temperatures above 40° C are common. Up to 80 percent of the annual precipitation of 350–750 millimeters falls during the three summer months, with little or no rain on the leeward slopes of the mountains. The remaining part of the Huang River plain has a more uniform climate, with four well-defined seasons. Average winter and summer temperatures vary only slightly, −2° C to 3° C in January and 24° C to 29° C. The northern plain in eastern Henan and Shandong has significant higher differences between absolute high and low temperatures, and torrential rainstorms alternate with periods of drought. The annual precipitation averages 600–900 millimeters.

**Huang River**

The severely eroded loess plateau, which covers southern Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and the western part of Henan, is drained by the Huang River. Except for the southern tips of Gansu and Shaanxi the plateau has a temperate continental climate, and it is considerably colder in Ningxia and Inner Mongolia in the north, with average January temperatures from −30° C to −10° C, as opposed to −3° C to 3° C in the south. July temperatures average between 15° C and 26° C in the north and 20° C and 28° C in the south, where summer temperatures above 40° C are frequent. The southern plateau receives 500–860 millimeters of rain a year, 60–70 percent of which falls between July and September. The annual precipitation decreases from south to north and east to west to as little as 100–200 millimeters in Inner Mongolia.

The topographical features of western China are arguably the most extreme on the planet, with the world’s highest mountain range and plateaus, deep river canyons, huge deserts, and depressions below sea level next to snow-capped peaks rising to 5,400 meters. The area consists of the autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang Uygur in the southwest and northwest, respectively,
the former covering 1.2 million square kilometers and the latter almost 1.7 million square kilometers. Qinghai Province and the northwestern parts of Gansu add another 1 million square kilometers to this diverse territory, which has a distinct continental climate with marked differences between summer and winter and day and night temperatures. The climate ranges from warm temperate in the comparatively low-lying areas of Xinjiang and Gansu to alpine in the southern Tibetan Plateau, which is situated up to 5,000 meters above sea level. Except for some mountain regions and the valleys in southeastern Tibet, the annual precipitation in the greater part of western China is below 250 millimeters and virtually nonexistent in some parts of the deserts of Xinjiang. In southeast Tibet, which is affected by the southwestern monsoon, up to 90 percent falls in the rainy season between June and September, whereas the annual rainfall in the north is evenly distributed throughout the year.

Xinjiang is divided by the Tianshan range into the large Tarim Basin in the south and the smaller Junggar Basin in the north. The Tarim Basin, which is separated from the Tibetan Plateau in the south by the Kunlun and Altun mountains, is dominated by the Taklimakan Desert. Whereas all of Xinjiang has a warm, temperate continental climate with hot days and cold nights, the temperature differences between north and south are significant. Average January temperatures in the south vary between −8° C and −10° C, as opposed to −15° C and −20° C in the north. Winter temperatures in the northeast may drop below −50° C. July average temperatures in the south are between 25° C and 27° C and only slightly lower in the north. The hottest place in Xinjiang (and China) is the Turpan Depression just south of the Tianshan range, which has an elevation of 154 meters below sea level and summer temperatures recorded as high as 48° C. Except for the Tianshan range, which may have an annual rainfall of 500 millimeters or more, the average in the north is between 150 and 250 millimeters and in the south as little as 50–100 millimeters. The Turpan Depression receives only 4 millimeters a year.

Vegetation

The vegetation adapts to the climatic zones of the different latitude regions as well as the various altitude belts, and in terms of biodiversity (biological diversity in an environment as indicated by numbers of different species of plants and animals) the vegetation of China is one of the richest in the world. In addition to the factors determining weather conditions, vegetation depends on soil types and the extent to which humans have affected it by cultivation, deforestation, mining, and other practices. Little natural plant life has survived undisturbed in the eastern China plains, where cultural vegetation is dominant. In the northern temperate zone crops such as wheat, millet, corn, and soybeans are widespread, whereas rice is the major crop in the subtropical south.

About 12 percent of the total area of China is covered with forests, and about 50 percent of that consists of coniferous forests, which may be found in all climate zones. Cold, temperate or boreal coniferous forests are common in the northeast and on mountain slopes throughout China and include species such as pine, fir, spruce,
and larch. Spruce and fir are especially numerous in the mountainous regions in the southwest, and together with larch they constitute an important source of raw materials for the timber industry. Coniferous forests of warm, temperate zones consist of various types of pine and are mainly found as plantations in northern China and on the lower mountain slopes of northern Sichuan and southern Shaanxi. Subtropical and tropical zones are characterized by a great diversity of local coniferous forests, many of which contain species endemic to China and even species that were believed to be extinct. The Dawn redwood (*Metasequoia glyptostroboides*) was known only from fossils until it was discovered by biologists in the 1940s in Sichuan and Hubei. In addition to pine these forests include fir, cypress, and cedar; for example, the Chinese cedar (*Cryptomeria fortunei*) may reach a height of 73 meters and is among the tallest trees in China.

Broad-leaved forests account for about 47 percent of China’s forested area, whereas only about 3 percent are mixed coniferous and deciduous forests; the latter are mainly limited to a few regions in the northeast and some small forests in subalpine mountain areas of southern China. Deciduous broad-leaved forests are common in mountainous regions in all climate zones, and the most important species are oak, beech, alder, birch, and popular. Many types of oak and birch forests are found, and a larger variety of species, such as aspen, maple, willow, and elm, may be observed in beech forests. In the subtropical zone with high precipitation the evergreen broad-leaved forests, which are characterized by an overwhelming diversity of species, are widespread. Dominant species vary greatly, and in northern areas of the subtropical zone and at altitudes up to 2,000 meters mixed deciduous and evergreen broad-leaved forests are common. Generally speaking, the broad-leaved forests of China are seriously threatened by deforestation, which turns large forest areas into plains or substitutes them with new conifer or bamboo plantations.

Mangrove forests are found along the southern coast and on the island of Hainan, and tropical rain forests stretch roughly from the coasts of Guangdong Province westward until reaching an elevation of about 1,000 meters in southeastern Tibet. Although they are comparatively small, the richness and diversity of species in this area exceeds those of all other regions. In spite of increasing awareness of the need for conservation and the establishment of nature reserves, the areas covered with tropical rain forests are still under pressure from advancing civilization and exploitation by monocultural plantation operations.

The Tibetan Plateau is a treeless wetland and steppe (vast, usually level and treeless tracts in southeastern Europe or Asia), which gradually turn into an alpine desert in the higher and more arid northern part, where elevation is above 5,000 meters. On the southern and eastern edges and in the deep river valleys forests grow in distinct vertical climate belts. Although the greater part of Xinjiang is characterized by sand deserts, salt marshes, and arid grassland, some irrigation-based oasis agriculture produces wheat, corn, and fruit. The forested slopes below the alpine tree line of the Altay and Tianshan mountains are mostly populated with larch, spruce, and fir.

**Further Reading**


Climate Change—Export Emissions

Qihòu biànhuà—chūkǒu páifǎng
気候変化—出口排放

China currently emits more CO₂ into the world’s atmosphere than any other country (but not more per capita). It faces international pressure to control these emissions because they are a primary cause of climate change, but China claims it should not be held responsible for CO₂ “export emissions” that can be attributed to the production of items for export to the United States and other nations.

It is an accepted fact that China’s exports are responsible for large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions; in 2005, carbon dioxide emissions from China were estimated at 1700 Mt (million metric tons, compared to around 30,000 Mt emitted by humans due to fossil fuels each year), or 6 percent of global emissions from fossil fuels, which is unusually high, as US exports are about 500 Mt. Reacting to international demands to reduce greenhouse gases, China has claimed that limits on carbon dioxide emissions would hamper both economic development and its efforts to relieve poverty. It has also emphasized that per capita emissions ranked only seventy-third in 2004, but this ranking is higher than some developed countries, and it is growing rapidly. China also argues that its historical, cumulative contribution to carbon emissions is low, and while this is true on a per capita basis (China ranked ninety-second in cumulative emissions from 1900 to 2004), it is fourth in cumulative emissions since 1990. A final argument against mandated emissions limits is related to the role of exports (that is, products made in China for sale elsewhere): China claims that it should not be held responsible for emissions that can be attributed to the production of items for export to the United States and other nations.

Gauging the contribution of exports to China’s carbon dioxide emissions is not easy, but they have clearly risen dramatically over the past decade. A 1997 study by the ecologists Ahmad and Wyckoff found that 15 percent of China’s emissions were “embodied” in products to be exported to other countries (that is, they were the byproduct of the manufacturing of toys, electronics, shoes, and other exports, while only 3 percent of China’s domestic emissions were imported. By 2001, further studies found that the figures had increased to 24 percent and 7 percent respectively, showing that a larger volume of goods was being traded. But the export amount is still much higher than that of imports, as one would expect from the current balance of trade between China and, for example, the United States.

Export Growth

In 1987, 12 percent (230 Mt) of China’s domestic carbon dioxide emissions were created during the production of exports; by 2005, this figure steadily had risen to 33 percent (1700 Mt). These numbers closely mirror the rise of exports as a percentage of China’s gross domestic product.
(GDP), which suggests that export products are no more or no less carbon-intensive than products for domestic consumption.

Of China’s 1700 Mt of export emissions in 2005 (which was comparable to the 1850 Mt total emissions of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), 22 percent came from exports of electronic goods, 13 percent from metal products, 11 percent from textiles, and 10 percent from chemical products. The recent surge in export emissions can be attributed to value-added products, which is evident when compared to previous years. In 1995, for example, the breakdown was very different: 19 percent textiles, 13 percent electronics, 12 percent machinery, 10 percent chemicals, and 7 percent metal products. Emissions embodied in primary product exports—such as minerals, raw timber, raw chemicals, and basic metals—decreased from 20 to 24 percent during the years from 1987 to 1992 to only 13 percent during the years from 2002 to 2005, showing how the Chinese economy has evolved into producing higher value-added items, such as electronics, which are more valuable as a product than their parts combined.

International attention to China’s role in causing—and mitigating—climate change shows how important trade is in the environmental profile of many countries. In general, small countries have larger shares of domestic emissions from the production of exports (for example, most European countries have a 20 to 50 percent share) while relatively self-sufficient countries have lower shares (such as the United States with 8 percent, Japan with 15

Exhaust from a factory near a beach in China. If China doesn’t adopt advanced energy technologies and policies to cut energy-demand growth, the country’s energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions could grow more than fourfold in the next twenty years. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
percent, India at 13 percent, and South Korea, 28 percent). China does not fit into this categorization because it is a large country with a large share of exports contributing greenhouse gases; its exports therefore play a more important role in its environmental profile.

Environmental Implications

Experts question whether the rapid growth of exports in China (or any other country) comes at the loss of production in developed countries, a phenomenon termed “carbon leakage” or the “pollution haven hypothesis.” The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the international group that represents the consensus on climate change science, has not rated carbon leakage as very important, because its definition of leakage only considers marginal emission changes in nonindustrialized countries that have been caused by climate policy in industrialized countries. It remains unlikely, however, that this is the case in China, where the increase of emissions is most likely a byproduct of China’s other advantages for production—in particular, lower environmental standards and lower labor costs.

A large proportion of goods responsible for China’s export emissions go to the developed world: approximately 27 percent to the United States, 19 percent to the twenty-seven European Union countries, and 14 percent to the other remaining Annex B countries, mainly Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. (Annex B countries are those industrialized nations that have agreed to emissions caps according to the Kyoto Protocol, a binding intergovernmental agreement signed in 1992.) While approximately 40 percent of China’s export emissions go to other developing nations, flows to these countries may displace their own domestic production or production from another trading partner that might have produced goods with less energy intensity than China. (Energy intensity is defined as the energy required per unit of economic output, or energy demand per unit of GDP.) This may be significant because production is more polluting in China than in many other countries due to inefficient systems and a coal-dominated electricity supply. The apparent low cost of Chinese production comes with other consequences: damage to the Chinese environment and increased energy emissions that contribute to the international risk from global warming. Some energy experts point out that if the Chinese could decrease the cost of the production of environmentally friendly items such as energy-efficient lighting or wind turbines, the effect of emissions would be outweighed by the beneficial impacts of their use.

Potential Solutions

A possible approach to solving the problem of a huge amount of export emissions would be to use monetary or tax policies to discourage large-volume export commodities such as electronics, machinery, metal products, and textiles. But these higher value-added products contribute to China’s economic growth more than primary products like natural resources, so in a time of economic challenge, this could lead to a loss in competitiveness and higher costs to consuming countries through inflation. Over the long term, it is in the interest of both the West and China to lower the energy and carbon intensity of its production practices, and to cooperate on low-carbon research and development.

While China benefits from export growth in terms of its GDP and balance of trade, consumers in developed countries also benefit. For this reason, there are efforts to hold consumers in developed countries at least partially accountable for emissions occurring because of the demand for low-priced goods. If consumers were to take some responsibility for China’s export emissions, it is conceivable that China would be more willing to play an active role in post-Kyoto climate commitments. And if China does not want to be held wholly responsible for its export emissions (as it claims), then it must at least be held responsible for what it imports. This could become important in the future, as China shifts to more of a consumption-driven economy.

Although one-third of China’s carbon dioxide emissions result from the production of exports, the remaining two-thirds need to be addressed as well. Inefficient, coal-dominated electricity production is the major cause of China’s carbon dioxide emissions, accounting for 44 percent in 2005. Urgent improvements are needed in this sector. Increasing efficiency in manufacturing as well as domestic and commercial building and in transportation
is essential. Other solutions are expanding renewable energy generation and investing in new technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), which seeks to develop ways to capture, purify, and store carbon dioxide instead of releasing it and contributing to climate change. Allowing parties to the Kyoto Protocol to shoulder some of the incremental cost of CCS as part of their commitment to decrease greenhouse gas emissions would be a first step, as this would allow importers of China's carbon-intensive, emissions-producing goods to invest in lowering the carbon intensity of what they buy.

Christopher WEBER

Further Reading


Cooperation between China and the United States, the world’s two largest emitters of carbon dioxide, to limit emissions and pursue alternative energy paths has become a major global political challenge. NGOs, academic organizations, and policy think-tanks are involved in breaking through current barriers to cooperation.

Cooperation between the United States and China to reduce climate change (or global warming) is widely seen as one of the most pressing issues for the worldwide community. China’s energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions could grow more than fourfold in the next twenty years, thus catching up with and overtaking large industrialized nations (with the exception of the United States and Canada) in per capita emissions. Or, China could implement advanced energy technologies and policies to cut energy-demand growth, in which case its carbon dioxide emissions might only double. The first case would impact the global environment very seriously; the second case is more tolerable. If the latter is accompanied by significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries and the aggressive development of low-carbon energy technology, the world could be on the way to cutting emissions significantly by 2050.

Strategic mistrust between China and the United States, however, has interfered with a binding global agreement on energy caps. The Chinese believe that a commitment to reducing carbon dioxide emissions could stifle their development; the U.S. speculates that, because of its large trade deficit with China, any adoption of a carbon dioxide cap without a comparable commitment by China could drive the two nations’ trade balance out of control.

A solution to the problem of greenhouse gas emissions depends critically on both countries. China and the United States account for nearly 40 percent of current global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions; they also have the greatest potential to reduce emissions growth. The participation of both nations is essential in the effort to establish a global regime to contain these emissions.

Background History

Fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—provide most of the world’s commercial energy. When they are burned, carbon dioxide is released; it and other greenhouse gases keep solar radiation (or heat) trapped on Earth. This is known as the “greenhouse effect.” According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the mean global temperature increased approximately 0.6°C from 1890 to 1990, and they predict a 1.1°C–6.4°C rise during the twenty-first century. This increase in surface temperatures on Earth can have catastrophic results, affecting weather, global water levels, and plant and animal life, among other issues. Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions make up approximately 80 percent of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, so their containment is a global issue.
While there is disagreement about solutions to climate change, there are some facts that are generally accepted regarding the historical, current, and anticipated future situation of China and the United States and greenhouse gas emissions.

The first mutually accepted fact is that the United States is responsible for 28 percent of total cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide from energy consumption, while China is responsible for 8.5 percent. Because of carbon dioxide's long “residence time” in the atmosphere (more than 100 years), the contributions from many years ago affect the global greenhouse as much as today's emissions. Therefore, the most important measure of energy-use contributions to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is the cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide.

A country’s energy use conventionally is presented in terms of per capita emissions, in the same way that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, not GDP alone, is a measure of the economic well-being of a country. (GDP is the total market value of all of a country’s goods and services produced in a given year minus the net income earned abroad.)

In describing contributions of a country, it is useful to present this in terms of per capita emissions, in the same way that GDP/capita, not GDP, is a measure of the economic well-being of a country. That is, over the entire period during which we can estimate carbon emissions due to human activity (roughly since 1850), China’s cumulative per capita emissions of energy-related CO2 are less than 8 percent of those of the United States.

This is generally seen as a remarkable achievement, as virtually all countries undergoing very rapid economic development—China had 9–10 percent annual GDP growth over those two decades—experience energy growth that is faster than GDP growth. China’s reduction in energy demand growth was the consequence of explicit policies carried out domestically. If energy had grown just at the rate of GDP, China’s emissions of CO2 would be more than twice as great as today’s emissions.

Notwithstanding these reductions in growth of CO2 emissions, U.S. CO2 emissions per capita are still greater than those of the European Union countries and 2.1 times those of Japan. The European Union and Japan are not far behind the United States in GDP/capita. But these nations have much less land per capita and have much higher population densities. High population density reduces travel demand and results in smaller per capita emissions.

For industrialized countries, emissions are likely to decline over time in proportion to GDP growth because many activities and products have saturated their markets: For example, not many people are purchasing their first car, and virtually all homes have refrigerators and most are not seeking to have a second. This is confirmed by the fact that from 1975 to the present, the United States reduced the growth of its energy-related carbon dioxide emissions more than any other large industrialized country in the world. GDP per capita grew almost 200 percent while energy consumption (and carbon dioxide emissions) per capita remained constant. But it is useful to use a baseline that has carbon dioxide emissions growing at the rate of growth of GDP when making comparisons among countries.

China and the United States currently produce approximately equal levels of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions and together are responsible for almost half of such emissions worldwide. According to the International Energy Agency’s 2008 World Energy Outlook, China is projected to account for more than 40 percent of new energy-related carbon dioxide emissions globally between 2008 and 2030, thus being by far the largest future contributor to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. But in 2006, China instituted a national program to reduce energy intensity 20 percent by 2010; it is noteworthy that in 2006 the energy intensity (energy demand per unit of GDP) decreased by 1.3 percent (that is, energy grew 1.3 percent less rapidly than GDP) and by 3.7 percent in 2007, with greater intensity declines projected for 2008. The program started slowly but is now approaching its annual target.

The United States, meanwhile, has the greatest potential of any country in the world to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. This is true for two reasons: First, because the U.S. per capita intensity of these emissions is considerably higher than those of other large industrial countries (2.5 times that of the European Union and 2.1 times that of Japan), there is greater opportunity to decrease the numbers; and second, the United States has the scientific, technical, and economic capability of developing viable alternatives to fossil-energy technologies and is likely to be the world leader in any breakthrough technology, if one is developed. Annual growth of energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions in the United States in the coming decades is expected to be in the range of 0.5–1.0 percent unless new policies are enacted to cut carbon dioxide emissions.

For the future, neither China nor the United States have agreed to binding commitments on greenhouse gas emissions. In 1992 the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) established an intergovernmental plan to reduce and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions; the resulting agreement is named the Kyoto Protocol. China is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, but it actually contains no binding commitment for developing countries. Recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on industrialized nations. As of 2008, the United States had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

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In the background at the 30th anniversary celebrations in the National Stadium in 1979 are oil derricks and a dragon with oil flowing from its mouth, showing how increased oil production was central to the goal of modernizing China by the year 2000.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
explicit policies carried out in China. If energy had grown just at the rate of GDP, China’s emissions of CO₂ would be more than twice as great as today’s emissions.

Notwithstanding these reductions in growth of CO₂ emissions, U.S. CO₂ emissions per capita are 2.5 times greater than those of the European Union countries and 2.1 times those of Japan. The European Union and Japan are not far behind the United States in GDP/capita. However, these nations have much less land per capita and have much higher population densities. High population density reduces travel demand and results in smaller per capita emissions.

**Two Viewpoints**

It is generally not understood in the West that China has put tremendous effort into reducing the growth of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions through the design and implementation of aggressive and innovative energy efficiency policies. Instead, there is a perception that China has paid little attention to the matter of greenhouse gas emissions. From 2001 to 2006, China’s energy demand and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions grew faster than the 10 percent annual growth of GDP. This led to an increase in China’s emissions from 12.7 percent of global emissions (2001) to 18.4 percent (2006). Many in the United States look at these facts, noting how rapidly China has grown in the past five years, and are aware of the forecasts that predict that a large proportion of the world’s expected increase in energy-related carbon dioxide emissions this century will come from China. Many Americans express concern that emissions reductions applied to the United States could increase the cost of producing goods and services there, thus placing the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage with any country that does not do the same.

But the perspective from China is very different. The Chinese note that per capita energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions are much lower in China than in the United States. They emphasize the disproportionate cumulative contribution of the United States to the global greenhouse gas problem, pointing out that the United States, with a population one-quarter the size of China’s, is responsible for putting far more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than has China. This point is made to indicate the inequity inherent in focusing on current emissions while a large part of the problem is caused by emissions over long periods of time.

These views may provide a philosophical underpinning that supports China’s major concern looking forward: China believes that it will need more energy for development—much more. Chinese officials observe that the industrialized countries have already been through the energy-intensive phase of their development, but China is in the midst of its own. The possibility of gaining a competitive trade advantage through a new climate treaty is much less significant to the Chinese than the possible roadblocks to achieving social development goals that could result from a commitment to mandatory emissions targets.

**Efforts Towards Cooperation**

It is not enough that China and the United States both take steps to reduce carbon dioxide emissions; it is essential that the two countries do this cooperatively. As long as China does little to reduce growth of greenhouse gas emissions (or appears to be doing little), it will be politically difficult for the United States to sign a binding international treaty that commits to a serious cap on emissions. And as long as the United States either does little or appears to be doing little, it is impossible to imagine China committing to any international treaty that limits its own emissions.

At a 2008 hearing held by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, representatives from the China Energy Group proposed that the United States and China should engage in regular, formal discussions that focus on working together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with the goal of influencing global negotiations. A serious proposal agreed to by both the United States and China is likely to be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries.

A research group that has worked with energy policymakers in China for two decades to analyze, develop, and enhance Chinese energy policy, the China Energy Group further recommended that in the short term, the greatest support the United States can provide to China (and other developing countries) is to build capacity in those countries to create and implement policies and programs
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Western resources can provide training and technical assistance to Chinese enterprises that will in turn establish new energy standards and compliance regulations. The assistance develops the potential for the Chinese to pursue energy efficiency, but does not pay for it. Such a program also will need to engage the full participation of the international community: It should include all industrialized countries as donors and key developing countries as recipients. This is not an investment program; it is focused on building capabilities to design and implement policies, many of which will facilitate investments with funds coming from other sources.

In the long term, the solution to climate change will have to rely on technology that is not yet commercialized. New low-carbon technologies are essential to reduce energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to appropriate levels. For the most part, such technology is not available today, and the intellectual property for these technologies does not exist yet. There is a need for programs to support joint development of such technologies, using the technical and financial resources of many countries. The United States government could play a key role in establishing a basis for performing research and development on these technologies with other nations (including China) and the sharing of intellectual property of these future technologies among nations of the world.

The China Energy Group also proposed that the leaders of the high-level teams from both countries should be policy makers above the level of the climate-change negotiators. These discussions should not be construed as bilateral negotiating sessions; the goal is for China and the United States to reach a consensus that can serve as a model for the European Union and developing nations. Any agreement must include binding commitments that will not threaten China’s growth and internal development goals, and that will give China access to the knowledge, tools, and technology that lower the cost of reducing emissions; for the United States, it is crucial that implementation of the agreement will not exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit with China. A formula that might work in China is a commitment that industrial emissions would grow slower than the industrial value added over the next decade, for example, 80 percent as fast, after which time a new formula could be agreed upon. The advantage of this approach is that it places no constraint on the consumer economy, which China views as necessary to meet its social and economic development objectives. A further advantage is that this approach addresses the industrial sector, which is responsible for 70 percent of all energy-related emissions; it thus speaks to the activities in China that are by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.

There are other formulas that could be used for China as well. Most involve the adoption of an emissions target that increases as GDP increases, thus assuring China that growth would not be impacted as long as proper measures are taken to reduce the growth of greenhouse gases. Like the industrial emissions approach, the formula could involve a commitment that greenhouse gas emissions grow at a rate lower than that of GDP with the provision of technical support, capacity building, and/or funds to facilitate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Achieving better results could trigger greater levels of assistance.

**Trade Policies**

Trade remains a major divisive topic, but there are different ways to deal with this issue. One, for example, is based on the concept of “carbon credits,” a tool formalized in the Kyoto Protocol and monitored by the UNFCC that expects to reduce greenhouse gases by having countries honor their emissions quotas and offers monetary incentives for being below those targets. (This system has been adopted by the European Union, and it has resulted in carbon credits of about $20 or $30 per metric ton.) To avoid impact on trade in the case where limits on Chinese emissions in early years would produce only small increases in the price of its products for export, China would agree to a tax on exports equal to the cost of a carbon credit (in dollars per metric ton). To avoid this being too cumbersome, it would apply only to products that are energy- (and therefore carbon-) intensive in their manufacture. Under this proposal, China would collect the tax and be required to apply it to its program of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. A program such as this would eliminate the trade advantage that China might gain by having less rigid commitments than industrial countries. It would have the further benefit of assuring...
that resources in China would be used to address greenhouse gas emissions.

An international commission would be needed to oversee the uses of the tax in China (and presumably other developing countries, if the approach is extended to them) as well as the provision of resources from the United States and other industrialized countries to support greenhouse gas abatement in developing countries.

**Protecting Economic Growth**

In the United States, economic growth and energy use over a period of a decade or longer are relatively predictable. Absent a multiyear recession, annual economic growth over a period of a decade or more is likely to be 1.5–3 percent. Growth in annual energy demand and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions, without new policies, is likely to be in the range of 0.5–1.0 percent. (With a long-term recession, the growth of energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions will be at a decreased rate, thus lowering the difference between targets and emissions in a base case.)

Forecasts in this range apply to most industrialized countries, for which many consumer products such as refrigerators and cars have already approached saturation. In short, it is possible to understand at a general level what is entailed in achieving certain targets for greenhouse gas emissions over a period of one to two decades.

But for a rapidly developing country such as China, growth in energy demand and resulting carbon dioxide emissions can have much greater variations. The Chinese economy grew at annual rate of 9–10 percent from 1980 to 2000; during this period energy demand grew at an annual rate of 4–5 percent. (In only one year during this period did the increase in energy demand growth exceed even 60 percent of that of GDP.) But from 2001 to 2006 GDP in China continued its growth at 10 percent per year (or greater). One might have predicted that energy demand in China would have grown at a rate lower than 5 percent per year, as it had done over the previous twenty years; indeed, forecasters did predict this. But energy demand grew even faster than GDP during the period, averaging almost 12 percent per year.

Consequently, it is extremely difficult in China, in its present stage of economic development, to predict with any accuracy the energy-demand growth over a ten- to twenty-year period. This is one reason that China cannot accept a binding cap that is expressed in absolute terms, unless such a cap were well in excess of the higher range of expected emissions. (But if a cap were set so high, it would be meaningless.)

China and other developing countries will have the largest emissions in the future, and there is great concern worldwide that China will continue increasing its energy demand and spewing carbon dioxide into the environment forever, or at least for a very long time. But China is in the middle stage of building its infrastructure—housing, commercial buildings, roads, hospitals, schools, and the like. It is at a relatively early stage of increasing the mobility of its population, and large quantities of energy are required to accomplish these tasks. This period is likely to last for fifteen to twenty-five years, depending on whether China continues its breakneck speed of construction and whether large numbers of rural dwellers continue migrating into urban areas. At the end of this construction period, China's economy will be much like today's developed countries. Energy-demand growth will decline markedly, just as it now has in the industrialized world. Scarcity of traditional energy sources could slow energy-demand growth even further in this time.

**Outlook for the Twenty-First Century**

The key question about the future concerns what China's energy demand will be when its economy becomes mature, or when infrastructure is built out and most amenities have been met. If China has a structure of consumption similar to that of the United States today, and the construction techniques and industrial processes are inefficient in their use of energy and other resources, then not only China but the world will be in serious trouble. But from 1980 to 2000, China has shown its willingness to grow its economy while constraining energy growth to less than half that of economic growth. Today China exhibits a serious willingness to once again limit energy growth, and significant support from industrialized countries can help greatly in achieving this objective. If at the
same time the industrialized countries learn to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—and transfer this knowledge to China and other developing countries—then a sincere start at addressing the serious challenge of climate change will be possible. This approach can buy time while energy supply technologies that produce low carbon emissions are developed and deployed on a large scale.

Mark D. Levine

Further Reading


Cloisonné ▶
Cloisonné, also known as inlaid enamel, is a decorative art form brought to China from the West around the fourteenth century. Pulverized enamel or glass is fused onto a metal surface; soldered wires separate the different colors or elements of the design to become part of the design itself. The technique reached its height during the early Ming dynasty.

Cloisonné is a technique employed in the decorative arts in which pulverized multicolored enamel or glass is fused onto a metal surface; the enamel is held in wire cells (from the French cloisons). The technique came to China from the West during the fourteenth century (or earlier) and reached its pinnacle during the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644) under the rule of the Jingtai emperor (1428–1457). In fact, one of the terms by which cloisonné is known in China is jingtai lan. Other terms for cloisonné tell of the technique’s foreign origins: A text from the Ming dynasty states that cloisonné came to China from Da Shi (Arabia) and Folang (Byzantium), thus yielding the terms dashi yao, Arabian ware, and falan or falang, likely a corruption of the Chinese term for Byzantium.

Cloisonné enameling uses cells formed from slender metal wires to hold the enamel paste in place. These wires become part of the overall design of the piece and are soldered onto a metal foundation. After the enamel paste is added to the cells the piece is fired at a temperature high enough to fuse the paste without destroying the metal cells or the metal foundation. Pieces often need to be fired a second time to correct any flaws in the enamel and to fill up the cells. The piece is then polished with a pumice stone to smooth the surface and heighten its luster.

The earliest cloisonné pieces carrying a reign mark date from the reign of the Xuande emperor (1399–1435). The usual colors of these early pieces are a distinctive turquoise blue, deep brown-red, lapis lazuli blue, yellow, green, black, and white. (A true pink was not seen until the famille rose palette was developed for porcelains in...
the early eighteenth century. The pieces are strikingly simple in both decoration and shape. One characteristic of Ming cloisonné is the presence in the enamels of the solder used to hold the metal wires to the base. This flaw was remedied during the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century by the use of vegetable glues, which burned away in the heat of the firing.

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) production of cloisonné wares increased because of the establishment of imperial palace workshops under the Kangxi emperor (1654–1722) in 1680. The aesthetic quality of pieces during this time is said to have suffered in the quest for technical perfection. This was especially true during the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799), when the wires were gilded, frequent firings dulled the finish, and designs were busy and complex.

Today cloisonné continues to be produced using the same methods as in the past, with most of the work being done by hand. But despite the technical achievements of the past several centuries, fifteenth-century pieces remain the apex of the art.

Catherine PAGANI

Further Reading


From the prehistoric to the People’s Republic, traditional clothing in China has reflected the culture and the technology of its time. Clothing has been worn to denote rank, to symbolize virtues, and to express political ideology.

Prehistoric Chinese made clothing from animal skins and furs and from plant fibers of hemp, wisteria, and ramie (an Asian perennial plant of the nettle family). Bone, shell, and stone ornaments have been discovered in caves and ancient tombs. Bone needles and awls also have been discovered; the discovery of awls suggests the use of leather for clothing.

Clothes before Qing Rule

By the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) trade and tribute with neighboring regions were well established. Tribute goods included woven and dyed cloth. Sericulture (production of raw silk by raising silkworms) had grown into an industry, and Chinese silk fabrics were highly prized trade goods. Simple cut-and-sewn garments such as straight, narrow robes, skirts, and trousers were worn during this time. Robes closed to the right, and sleeves were long and covered the hands to show respect. Hair was braided; hairpins were symbols of rank and distinction. Clothing was used to distinguish between stratified social classes.

Clothing continued to help maintain a stratified class system during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). The *Zhou li* (Book of the Rites of Zhou) included sumptuary laws (relating to personal expenditures and especially to prevent extravagance and luxury) regulating the use of dress to show rank; the designation of special robes with special symbols worn by the emperor; and the dictate that all garments must close to the right. The usual clothing worn was the long, slim, narrow-sleeved embroidered robe and trousers or skirt; by the end of the Zhou dynasty a spiral-wrapped, one-piece robe was popular. Hats and shoes were symbols of distinction and rank. As Daoism was incorporated into Chinese life, the symbols for the Daoist immortals were frequently embroidered on clothing. These symbols included the fan (life infused into the dead), the bamboo tube (longevity), the magic saber (magic), the pair of castanets (music), the magic gourd (medicine), the flute (harmony), the basket of flowers (longevity), and the lotus flower (purity).

Another philosophical ideology was formed by the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE). His teachings included the importance of maintaining an orderly society and filial piety, which became important in some clothing traditions. Correct appearance was believed to help maintain order and to help people recognize and understand authority through clothing, fabrics, and accessories. Filial piety and respect were also expressed through appearance; men and women did not cut their hair because hair, like life, was a gift from one’s parents.

During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) minority clothing influenced Chinese dress. The *hu fu*, a short jacket and long trousers, was introduced. The *hu fu* was widely adopted throughout China by men and
women, particularly those living in rural areas. Robe sleeves began widening near the end of this period.

During the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han dynasties (206 BCE–220 CE) color symbolism was defined and became an important characteristic of ceremonial and ritual robes. Black denoted darkness, dawn, or evening; green or blue was considered the color of creation or life; red meant burning brightly and was the color of the sun and happiness; white was associated with opening, clearing, and cracked ice; and yellow denoted sparkling light and sunshine. These colors also symbolized the universe and the elements: Black signified north and water; green or blue signified east and wood; red signified south and fire; white signified west and metal; yellow signified center and earth. From the classical text *Yijing* red became associated with the masculine concept (yang), and blue became associated with the feminine concept (yin). One-piece robes were popular, as was a spiral-wrapped robe;
both had large curved sleeves. Wealth was displayed by type and amount of embellishment and amount of fabric used in the robe. Hats and ribbons continued to denote rank. During the Han dynasty the trade route now known as the Silk Roads was established, and silk was introduced to Europe.

Buddhism reached China by the end of the Han dynasty, and Buddhist symbols were used as embroidery motifs on clothing; these symbols included the parasol (charity), fish (tenacity), the sacred vase (ceremonial), the lotus (purity and marriage), the seashell (appeal to wisdom), the canopy (spiritual authority), and the Wheel of the Law (infinite changing). Toward the end of the Han dynasty women began to favor a two-piece ensemble consisting of a long, pleated, wrap-around skirt and short jacket.

Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) clothing featured a narrow silhouette. Women continued to wear the jacket and skirt; red became the most popular color for skirts. Sleeves could be narrow or wide. A popular robe was the band robe. This robe featured a rounded neckline and a section of fabric sewn to the lower half of the front and back of the robe in a wide, horizontal band. Colors and fabrics continued to be used to indicate rank.

During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) Chinese envoys spread Chinese costumes throughout Asia, particularly affecting court dress in Japan and Korea. Tang dynasty dress was more elaborate and had a larger silhouette than the dress of previous eras. High-ranking men wore a stiff leather hoop belt with decorative plaques, often of gold, jade, or silver.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279) cotton was introduced from India and became an important textile crop in China for domestic use and foreign export. It began to replace indigenous cellulose fibers used in Chinese clothing. In particular, cotton became widely used in the clothing of the lower classes. Song dress included large, full robes with large, wide sleeves. Robes opened down center front or closed to the right. Hoop belts with decorated plaques were also worn.

The tradition of foot binding, which was practiced in China before the Tang dynasty, was well established by the Song dynasty. Foot binding was usually characteristic of Han (the dominant Chinese ethnic group as opposed to ethnic minorities) women only. Tiny embroidered shoes, called “lotus slippers” or “lily slippers” became important dress and cultural attire.

Under the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) trade with other countries was encouraged. The cotton industries were well established. The Mongolians considered the Han Chinese inferior but borrowed many Han Chinese dress traditions, such as color symbolism and clothing items denoting rank. The Mongolians reduced the width of the robe and the sleeves and introduced the finial, an ornament worn on the top of hats, to designate rank.

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was the last Han Chinese dynasty to rule China. Ming means “brilliant” or “glorious,” and red was its dynastic color. Sumptuary laws from the Han, Tang, and Song dynasties were reestablished, and clothing regulations for all social classes were strictly codified in such documents as the Ming Hui Dian. For the upper classes Ming dress was characterized by extreme width and long, wide sleeves. During the Ming dynasty rank or insignia badges, usually in the shape of a square, were used to indicate the civil or military rank of officials. Civil officials used birds to indicate rank; military officials used other animals to designate rank. These became known as “mandarin badges”; the word mandarin was derived from a 1589 Portuguese word meaning “a Chinese official.”

**Clothes after Qing Rule**

China’s final dynasty was founded by a group of conquering horsemen from the north, the Manchus. The Manchus took the Chinese name Qing, which means “pure” or “clear.” The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) instituted new sumptuary laws, many designed to assimilate the Han Chinese into Manchu culture. All Han Chinese men were forced shave their forehead and to wear their hair in a long queue or braid in the Manchu style (the Queue Order of 1646); those in government positions had to wear Manchu-style garments, namely, the chang pao, a one-piece robe with no pleats and with sleeves ending in the distinctive horse-hoof cuffs. Horse-hoof cuffs were distinctive features of Manchu robes, deriving their name from their resemblance to the hoof of a horse. The wide, flaring cuffs could be turned down to extend over the
hands of the wearer for protection or warmth or to show respect when saluting high-ranking officials.

The Qing dynasty was also responsible for the many regulations that controlled the use and the possession of the dragon robe as a court and official costume. Robes with dragons as the main design appear to have been in existence since at least the Tang dynasty and were worn by imperial and high-ranking officials of each successive dynasty; records also indicate that robes with dragon motifs were given as gifts to foreign heads of state. However, not until the Qing dynasty did the dragon robe become part of the Chinese official costume; in 1759 an imperial edict codified the use of dragon robes according to rank.

The style characteristics of dragon robes worn by the emperor were regulated to set him apart from any other official. Qing imperial dragon robes had nine dragons embroidered on them; only the emperor could have five-clawed long dragons. The emperor was the only person who could have all Twelve Auspicious symbols on his robe. These symbols, whose use dates back to the Han dynasty, represented the qualities desirable in an emperor: enlightenment represented by the sun, moon, and stars (constellations); the ability to protect represented by the mountain; the ability to be adaptable represented by the dragon; literary refinement represented by the pheasant; purity represented by the water weed; filial piety represented by two sacrificial cups; the ability of the emperor to feed the people represented by the plate of millet or grain; brilliance represented by fire or flame; the power to punish represented by the ax; and the power to discriminate between right and wrong represented by the fu symbol. Groupings and placement of these symbols also had meaning. The sun and moon placed at the shoulder and the stars and mountains at the chest and back represented four important annual sacrifices that only the emperor could make. The fu symbol and ax groupings represented the emperor’s authority over the natural worlds. The five elements of the natural world were also represented with a grouping of the mountain (earth), waterweed (water), flame (fire), sacrificial cups (metal), and plate of millet (wood or plant life).

Rank or insignia badges to indicate the rank of military and civil officials were also regulated by Qing sumptuary laws. Qing rank badges were square and were sewn to the upper back and chest of the pu fu or surcoat worn over long robes. Because the pu fu opened down the center front, Qing insignia badges to be worn on the front chest were made in two halves.

Men in the Qing court wore three basic types of robes. The most formal court robe was the qao fu (chao fu), a one-piece, dragon-figured robe with a pleated skirt attached at the waist and horse-hoof cuffs on the sleeves. Qao fu is believed to have been cut down from Ming dragon-figured robes. The heavily embroidered pi ling, or cloud collar, was worn with this robe. The qi fu (chi fu or long pao) was a semiformal dragon robe worn for festive occasions and is the robe that is usually considered as the Qing “dragon robe.” It was in the typical Manchu style, having no pleats, horse-hoof cuffs, and side and center front and back slits (women’s robes had only side slits). The pu fu with insignia badges was worn over the qi fu. Wives of officials (whether Han Chinese or Manchu) were also allowed to wear their husbands’ insignia badges. The third type of robe worn by middle- to upper-class men was the qang fu (chang fu, chang pao, chang shan, or cheong sam), an ordinary robe worn for informal occasions. This robe was generally not embroidered and was often worn with the ma kua (ma gua), or short jacket.

For women the rules of dress were more relaxed, particularly for Han Chinese women, and distinct visual differences existed between Han Chinese and Manchu women’s dress. Han Chinese women typically had bound feet, wore a two-piece garment (a jacket and long pleated skirt or trousers), maintained regional hairstyles, and continued using embroidered sleeve-band cuffs instead of the horse-hoof cuff. Manchu women wore the feminine version of the Manchu long robe, the one-piece qi pao (chi pao or cheong sam), and wore the distinctive Manchu black cloud headdress or liang pa tou erh, the “two handle headdress,” a hairstyle formed by using real or false hair built over a frame to form symmetrical wings on either side of the head. Manchu women, for whom foot binding was forbidden, wore shoes with high platform soles that emulated the gait and the small pointed toe of the Han Chinese lotus slippers. Han Chinese women did not appear to borrow many Manchu dress traditions; Manchu women, however, frequently borrowed Han Chinese dress elements, such as the embroidered sleeve bands.

Everyday dress worn by the lower classes in the Qing dynasty was simply cut and decorated. The sam fu, a two-
piece ensemble, was worn by men, women, and children. The *sam* was a long- or short-sleeved, hip-length jacket that closed to the right, and the *fu* was a pair of trousers. These were usually made from wool, hemp, or cotton fabrics and could be lined, quilted, or padded for warmth. These garments were cut to be comfortable and to allow the wearer to work efficiently. By the end of the Qing dynasty *sam* for men used a center front closure.

**Adoption of Western Clothing**

After the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1912 Chinese citizens began to wear Western clothing, and its adoption was particularly strong in coastal urban areas. Chinese businessmen who dealt with Westerners on a daily basis were the first to cut their queue and to adopt total Western dress. More typical was the incorporation of Western dress with traditional clothing, such as wearing the *qang pao* (*cheong sam*) with Western hats, shoes, and a suit coat. Men in rural areas were less likely to adopt Western clothing.

Urban women in China also embraced Western dress, especially hairstyles and shoes, and many totally abandoned traditional clothing. Most urban women wore modernized versions of the jacket and skirt; the *qi pao* became popular and was styled after Western silhouettes and hem lengths. Peasant or lower-class women in urban and rural areas continued to wear the *sam fu*.

Revolutionary political leader Sun Yat-sen, the “Father of the Nation,” was responsible for encouraging Chinese men to Westernize their clothing by wearing a suit based on European military uniforms and Japanese cadet uniforms. This suit had Western-style trousers, and the jacket had a convertible collar, four patch pockets, and a five-button center front opening. In the 1920s and 1930s civil servants wore this suit, and it was also modified into a military uniform worn by the Chinese army during World War II.

After the rise of the Chinese Communist Party and its leader, Mao Zedong, in 1949, many restrictions on apparel were instituted, and people were allowed to own only a small quantity of clothing. The *qi pao* was eventually considered not representative of Chinese ideals and banned from the mainland. For men and women Mao favored the suit developed by Sun Yat-sen, naming this jacket and trouser combination *chien fang i fu* or “liberation dress” and instituted this ensemble as Chinese national dress. Called the “Mao suit” or the “Mao tunic,” this uniform was believed to be in keeping with the Communist

The “dragon robe” of an emperor. Although robes with dragons as the main design existed as early as the Tang dynasty and were worn by imperial and high-ranking officials of each successive dynasty, the Qing was the first to regulate the use and possession of the dragon robe as a court and official costume. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
precepts of universal comradeship and equality. Although the government approved other articles of clothing, the Mao suit became one of the world’s most recognized national costumes. It was usually made from blue cotton twill fabrics, although often wealthy Chinese had hand-tailored Mao suits of luxury wools.

The Mao suit was the dominant Chinese style in clothing until after the death of Mao. In the decades after his death clothing restrictions in China relaxed as the result of changes in government policies and the introduction of capitalism. As many young Chinese became exposed to the West, many of them began to wear Western clothing; soon the Mao suit was seen only on older people and people who lived in rural areas. Ironically, as the Mao suit has become less popular on the mainland, it is enjoying a resurgence outside China. Called the “Zhongshan suit,” the suit now honors Sun Yat-sen. Many young Chinese nationals living outside of mainland China often wear the Zhongshan suit as a way to declare pride in their national identity, and the suit is available through retail and Internet sources. Because of its association with Sun Yat-sen, the suit is considered to be a symbol of patriotism, and meaning has been attached to the style components of the jacket. For example, the four pockets of the jacket represent four essential principles that should guide behavior and conduct—propriety, justice, honesty, and a sense of shame. The five buttons of the center front closure represent the five government branches created by the constitution of the republic—executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and censorate. The three buttons on the cuffs represent the Three Principles of the People—nationalism (the right of the Chinese people to govern themselves), democracy (the right to have a republican form of government with elected officials), and people’s livelihood (the equalization of land and wealth to allow all people to be able to earn a livelihood). The Zhongshan suit has been the subject of many art works and is considered by many to be a cultural icon.

Just as the Zhongshan suit has become an expression of cultural identity, an interest in Han fu or “ancient clothing” has also emerged. Han fu is the traditional clothing worn during the Han Chinese dynasties—most notably the Han and Tang dynasties—and includes the one-piece, spiral-wrapped robe, the straight robe, traditional skirts and jackets, and hats, shoes, and accessory items. The phrase “Han fu” is derived from the Book of Han, which described Chinese court clothing during the Han dynasty as “delighting” visitors. The wearing of Han fu is encouraged for historical reenactments, as a hobby, and for rituals and services (such as university graduations); some Han Chinese even promote Han fu for everyday dress. For many of the Han Chinese ethnic group, the interest in promoting Han fu is a reaction against the presumption of the Manchu qi pao (cheong sam) as the representative Chinese garment.

China plays an important role in apparel manufacturing for Western companies; much of the clothing sold in the United States is made in China. The design sector of the fashion industry is experiencing growth as many young Chinese designers, trained in European fashion schools, return to China. Using traditional clothing as inspiration, Chinese designers, with their unique design aesthetic, are working to establish China as a major fashion center.

Laura KLOSTERMAN KIDD

Further Reading
Although traditional Qing dynasty clothing such as the changshan (long gown) is rarely seen outside of ceremonial occasions, the more recent cheung sam (long dress) continues to be worn in Hong Kong. Made of silk, cotton, or, recently, rayon, the cheung sam is still the uniform for many Hong Kong schoolgirls and is worn on a daily basis by many older women.

In Hong Kong, a remote and unimportant regional province during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) men wore a silk or cotton changshan (long gown), which fastened with buttons and loops on the right side, with a stand collar. Garments for winter were wadded or lined with fur. Women wore the ao, which was a knee-length changshan-like dress, and a full-length, paneled skirt with side pleats or godets (insets of cloth placed in a seam to give fullness) to allow movement. Later the embroidered part of the skirt below the ao was plain black or another dark color. Ku, which were loose, baggy trousers, were worn under the ao and continued to be worn without the skirt by female workers. Middle- and upper-class women’s accessories included an embroidered headband that hid the plucked forehead, bound-foot shoes, and ankle covers. The changshan and women’s qun gua (skirt and jacket) and dajinshan (blouse with large lapels fastened with buttons and loops) became ceremonial dress during the twentieth century. In the 1960s and 1970s heavily embroidered versions were fashionable when shops sold or rented the changshan magua (long gowns and short jackets) for men and qun gua (gua, red, front-opening jacket; qun, long, black skirt) for women. Red jackets embroidered with longfeng (dragon-and-phoenix motif), flowers, mandarin ducks, and plants later became popular bridal dresses with zisundai (offspring bands), two decorative sashes embroidered at the center of the lapel.

After the Qing Dynasty

After the Qing dynasty the qipao or cheung sam (long dress or Manchu gown) and magua (horse jacket), originally a man’s short jacket, were worn. The slim-fitting jacket had tight-fitting sleeves, side slits, and a high collar. The cheung sam became tailored using bias-cut fabric molded to shape and darts for a closer fit, with a right-front-fastening, glue-stiffened, contrasting satin binding. The cheung sam, signifying urban modernity, was accessorized with Western makeup, hairstyles, stockings, and high-heeled shoes. Girls who wore tight-fitting cheung sam in advertisements and prewar Shanghai linked the cheung sam with fashion, overseas Chinese, and Hong Kong, where it was popular. The cheung sam, a symbol of Chinese decadence after the Communist revolution (1949) and banned during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), became tighter and shorter, reflecting both Western fashion from the 1940s through the 1960s and Chinese uniformity. The cheung sam was universally worn, its tightness varying depending on the wearer’s position in society, modestly concealing the arms, neck, and legs. Variations

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included sleeveless cheung sam; shoulder pads; zippers set in the side slits, which were lowered en route to work and raised in a club or bar; full-length for evening wear and shorter for everyday use. Fabrics included rayon brocade, silks, and printed cottons. The cheung sam continues to be worn today as a dress-up item by actresses and some local people at Chinese New Year. A few older women wear the cheung sam on a daily basis, and many wear it on special occasions. A plain, woven-cotton cheung sam is the much-disliked uniform of some girls’ schools in Hong Kong.

The loops and buttons used to close garments were made from bias-cut strips of glue-stiffened satin reinforced with an iron wire: huianiu for women’s wear and luosiniu for men’s wear. They were featured in one, two, or three colors matched to the garment and its trimmings. Patterns included birds, fish, flowers, or insects, symbolizing Chinese characters with auspicious meanings, and reflected the tailor’s taste. Each huianiu comprised the male knotted end (gong) and the female eye (na). The same-sized huianiu are used on women’s gowns, whereas

Ladies wearing traditional Hong Kong qipao dresses. By the end of the Qing dynasty in the early twentieth century, women in Hong Kong signaled their urban modernity by accessorizing traditional clothing with Western makeup, hairstyles, stockings, and high-heeled shoes.
men’s gowns have a larger gong and a smaller na stitched near the shoulder.

**Bound-Foot Shoes**

Bound-foot shoes were usually made by the wearers: Wealthy bound-foot women were common at one time but are now uncommon in Hong Kong. Having learned to embroider, women learned to make shoes at age eleven or twelve. They embroidered the cutout parts of the shoe before assembly. The sole was made from bamboo culm, washed, straightened, bound with layers of cloth, and stitched together with a thin linen rope. Winter shoes were lined with cotton wool. Heels were made from lychee tree wood or carved pomegranate or wrapped in fabric. These were self-made or bought from vendors of wool and string. Fake bound-foot shoes, designed so that a viewer at first glance would mistake the heel for the ankle, were worn by women who wished to look as though they had bound feet.

**Minority Peoples**

The Hoklo people of Hokkien or Fujian origin wear traditional clothing for festive occasions: Whereas everyday clothing is dark, festive clothing is bright. Children’s garments and accessories, such as baby carriers, are decorated with beads, bells, decorative trims, and

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*Traditional Hong Kong wedding clothes, an important element of the ceremony as well as the reception. According to gossip posted in February 2009 on the Internet forum Asian Fanatics, Hong Kong superstar Gigi Leung will wear the traditional red wedding dress when she gets married.*
embroidery, and boys' hats are made in animal shapes to confuse evil spirits. Cotton waist purses are appliquéd with bright thread. The Tanka, Hong Kong fishing people, also make brightly colored items, including baby carriers. Hakka women wove hemp during the early part of the twentieth century, making narrow braids, huadai, on waist looms. These formed straps to keep in place their liangmao—a blue or black cloth, fringed, flat, circular, bamboo brimmed hat. Hemp, handspun on a bamboo pole, was woven to make blouses and dyed by boiling yam and dyer's weed or in Kowloon's commercial dyehouses.

Contemporary Revival

Contemporary fashion designers and design students looking for new ways to wear old fashions regularly revive the cheung sam. Occasionally international fashion adopts the cheung sam, most recently in 1997, when the collection of Christian Dior included versions. New York designer Vivienne Tam, who is popular in Hong Kong, has made the most successful use of ethnic dress. Reappropriation via New York seems to be a crucial element in her success.

Decline of Ethnic Clothing

Women still wear a simplified phoenix-and-dragon robe at many weddings, but a strapless version of the Western white wedding dress—with a padded bust, tight waist, and hoop skirt—has replaced the red wedding dress, although a red evening dress (one of five changes of dress) is worn at a reception. Generally among Cantonese and minority peoples in Hong Kong the use of ethnic clothing has declined.

Valerie WILSON TROWER

Further Reading

Taiwanese traditionally made their clothing from materials at hand, such as jute, pineapple fiber, taro flax, and banana fiber, and later from cotton cloth brought from mainland China. Clothing trends in Taiwan changed in reaction to occupation: by the Dutch (1624–1662), the Chinese in the late Ming and part of the Qing dynasties (1662–1912), the Japanese (1874–1945); and then Chinese Communists.

After the expulsion of the Dutch and a period of occupation (1662–83) by Chinese still loyal to the Ming dynasty, the Qing dynasty formally annexed Taiwan in 1683, and the Taiwanese adopted mainland Chinese fashions as many indigenous Taiwanese groups were assimilated into mainland emigrant society.

The Musée de l’ Homme in Paris displays the dress of the remaining Puyama and Paiwan tribes of southwestern Taiwan, dating from approximately the 1940s. The man’s black cotton top was made of rectangles of fabric with embroidered edges, fastened with frog fastenings and silver buttons. Multicolor leg coverings, made of strips of fabric, featured insets of indigo-dyed double ikat (fabric in which yarns have been tie-dyed before weaving) around the crotch. A waist tie of braided linen with embroidered ends and fringing was attached to the top of the leg coverings and tied twice around the waist. Also displayed at the museum is a rectangular linen cape—probably a woman’s mourning cape. The cape was made in three sections, with a cream background with red double stripes and edging. A padded headband resembling a turban completes the outfit.

Taiwanese men during the Qing dynasty wore the zhanpao (long robe) and magua (horse jacket) under an outer jacket, or gua (vest). Men wore the zhanpao, which was shorter than the gua and extended to the middle of the abdomen, with a “melon rind” skullcap. Officials wore long “python gowns” under a short gown (guazi). The guazi was longer than the gua and resembled a windbreaker jacket. Men wore these clothes in contrasting color combinations: dark or light green, blue, gray, white, or red. Manual workers wore a shan (shirt) and trousers, together known as dangshan, with a bamboo hat.

Women also wore the zhanpao, which fastened on the left and right and was decorated with brass bells and embroidery on both arms, with geometrically embroidered hand covers tied with cerise (moderate red) braids. Leg coverings were made of indigo-dyed fabric with a double-ikat spot motif, which also decorated the below-knee-length apron/skirt. The skirt had vertical bands of royal blue, indigo-dyed edging, and a central panel of embroidery in red, black, and blue. ‘Set in below the waist was an older band in blue, brown, and red fabric, suggesting fabric was precious and was reused where possible. Women also wore conch-shell necklaces.

For formal wear women wore the tadaoshan, a wide-sleeved, tight-fitting jacket trimmed with ribbon, and the mamian chun (long skirt). They wore gu (silk trousers) for formal occasions and for everyday wore a cotton version accessorized with a headband and bound-foot shoes.
Popular for women's dress were contrasting shades of red, including carmine, peach, and pink.

**Influence of Western Dress Following Japanese Trends**

Although the Japanese made little effort to introduce changes to Taiwanese dress apart from banning foot-binding, the appropriation of Western dress by the Japanese was emulated by the Taiwanese, as Western dress represented a forward-looking ideology. Western dress was combined with Chinese dress in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Han Chinese men in Taiwan wore the *zhangshan* with Western leather shoes and hats. In 1911 Taiwanese and mainland Chinese men cut their queue (a braid of hair usually worn hanging at the back of the head), and women adopted Western-style leather shoes worn with the traditional pants and jacket. By the 1920s, as Western dress increasingly replaced traditional Taiwanese dress for women, silk stockings and knee-length skirts worn with traditional short-sleeved velvet jackets, a handkerchief, and a parasol became fashionable. However, differences between the Han Chinese (who originated in Fujian or Guangdong [Hakka] provinces) continued: The Hakka preferred simple, decorative but durable materials, whereas Fujian styles were more intricate and lavish.

**Influences of China and Japan**

During the Ming and Qing dynasties imported Chinese cloth was used for garments because Taiwan had no sericulture (the production of raw silk by raising silkworms), and grew little cotton or hemp. Locally produced fibers were colored with chemical dyes, which replaced plant dyes. Pineapple fiber, jute, taro flax, and banana fiber were also used. After 1918 Japanese spinning and weaving technology was imported, and large-scale production used Japanese cotton for everyday wear, eventually replacing Chinese imports. After two or three decades of occupation, Japanese fabric patterns and the pale “refined” colors favored by the Japanese (lake green, grayish blue, pink, baby-blue, and beige) became standard and replaced the bright colors and patterns of the Qing dynasty. After Japan declared war on China in 1937 the Japanese attempted to weaken Chinese cultural links and fashions in Taiwan: Although older men continued to wear traditional dress, young men adopted military uniforms, *muge* (Japanese wooden clogs), and “duck’s tongue” hats—a wider version of the Western cloth cap. Women wore the kimono. As on mainland China, children dressed like small adults: Cloaks and hats had decorated hems, tassels, and embroidery for special occasions; pants had split seats; and in 1925 Western-style school uniforms were introduced.

The popularity of the *qipao* or *cheongsam* (in Cantonese), the asymmetrically fastened dress worn by women, peaked between the 1940s and 1960s. The Sun Yat-sen suit (named for the Chinese revolutionary) became unfashionable after mainland Chinese Communist rule was established in 1945 but was worn formally by some Republican (Republic of China) government officials, tailored in khaki-colored wool, with breast pockets and military-style brass buttons, flaps, and a high collar.

In the mid-twentieth century on special occasions the *hong gua*, a red embroidered jacket and a black embroidered skirt featuring dragon and phoenix motifs, was worn with a headdress. For special occasions in rural areas, men wore a traditional blue gown with a diagonal red sash and gilt hat sprays on each side of a skullcap or trilby hat. During the 1960s and 1970s, as Western fashions were adopted, these fashions declined in popularity.

**Valerie WILSON TROWER**

**Further Reading**


Tibetan costume reflects the environment and lifestyle of Tibet’s people and plays an important role in regional, familial, and individual expression. Tibetan traditional clothing is characterized by the dual purpose of being aesthetically pleasing as well as functional.

Influences from Abroad

Traditional Tibetan costume was influenced by the custom of exchanging tribute gifts between Chinese and Tibetan nobility. Chinese silks are believed to have been given to the Tibetan emperor Songtsan Gampo by the Tang emperor in 649 ce. Other Chinese costume characteristics, such as color symbolism and the right-over-left closure method, are also reflected in Tibetan costume. Tibetan and Mongolian traditional costumes also share characteristics; in particular, lamas of both countries share similar costumes, among them the zi xia (crested helmets).

Fabric and Color Choices

Fabrics used for Tibetan clothing include hemp, Chinese cottons and silks, rayon, satins from India, indigenous animal furs, felted fabric derived from the hair of the yak, and pulu, a traditional woolen cloth. Pulu was a popular tribute cloth given to China.

The weight and type of materials used for clothing varies with the climatic regions of Tibet. Daily temperatures fluctuate greatly, and Tibetan garments are worn layered, which allows adjustments for comfort. Although there are regional stylistic variations in Tibetan garments in embellishment, materials, and colors, the basic pieces are similar and worn by both men and women.

Tibetan costume is characterized by the use of strong, unrestrained, dramatic color combinations. Strong contrasts in color combinations are made harmonious through the use of white and black bindings at clothing edges and elaborate gold and silver embroidery across the surface of the garments. Common color contrasts used in Tibetan clothing are white and black, red and green, orange and blue, and yellow and purple, colors that also reflect the influence of Buddhism.

Typical Garments

The most distinctive Tibetan outer garment is the chuba, a loose-fitting robe made of sheepskin or pulu. The pocketless chuba closes to the right and is tied at the waist with sashes or belts. The sleeves on the chuba are long, often reaching to the knee. The chuba may be as long as seven
feet, and the upper part is bloused over the waist ties to adjust the length to knee level for men and ankle level for women and priests. The extreme length of the chuba allows the robe to be used as a blanket or sleeping bag. One or two leather belts or sashes are used to keep the chuba in place. When the upper part of the robe is pulled over the waist ties, a pocket is created that is used to hold objects or form a child carrier. Waist ties also keep the robe in place to allow the wearer to pull out his or her arms for cooling. Typically, the right arm is worn uncovered by the robe. This has become known as the Tibetan style and is one of the most culturally distinctive style characteristics of Tibetan costume.

Many styles of chuba are specific to occasion or region. Styles include the guxiu, a sleeveless, broad-shouldered robe made of black pulu or animal skins, and the giubjialo, a lined pulu robe with a floral design on the collar. The cha is a fur-lined robe worn by men and is made either from jacquard silk fabric (for special occasions) or plain-colored leather (for everyday wear).

Women’s garments include the anju, a long-sleeved top made of plain or printed silk, cotton, or rayon. This is often worn with a skirt and an apron (bangdian). Another garment worn over the anju is the anduh, a full-length, sleeveless dress usually made of black pulu and lined with blue fabric.

Various styles of vests and jackets constructed from a variety of materials are worn by both men and women. Men and women also wear leggings tied to a waist girdle.

Costume indicates a woman’s marriage status. Married women wear the bangdian, an apron that varies in style from region to region. Usually rectangular, bangdian are constructed from three widths of fabric sewn together vertically. Each narrow fabric width is hand-woven wool or silk fabric, horizontally striped in shades of primary and secondary color combinations. Another style is a plain-colored bangdian made from blue, black, or gray cotton or pulu cloth. In some areas plain cloth and striped fabrics are used together.

Different hairstyles and hair ornaments are also important marital indicators and vary by region and tribe. An important style characteristic is the symmetry of the hairstyles and ornaments in the hair. One very distinctive regional hairstyle for married women is the peyrak, a Y-shaped style, in which the hair is curved into two ram-shaped horns encircling the head. Women’s hair is also embellished with many hair ornaments of precious metals and materials.

**Standard Accessories**

Accessories are important in Tibetan costume, serving decorative and practical purposes. Silver belt buckles and belts are common for both sexes. Many accessories hang from the waist ties. Males typically hang swords, Buddhist boxes, cartridge clips and belts, and bagu (metal wallets) from their waist ties or belts. Women often hang needle cases and small household implements from their waist ties.

Both men and women wear jewelry such as earrings, bracelets, and necklaces. Men might wear only one large dangling earring. Turquoise, agate, coral, jade, amber, silver, and gold are highly prized jewelry materials. Women wear more jewelry than men do. Part of the wealth of the family is kept in women’s jewelry, and women often wear large amounts of very large and heavy jewelry pieces.

One of the most important accessories worn by women is the kou, or gau, a square metal box with a diamond shape on it. The kou contains a Buddhist religious artifact and is worn around the neck on a chain so that it rests on the woman’s.

Square-toed boots (sunpa) are a popular type of footwear. Sunpa have soles of thick yak hide with leather or fabric foot and leg sections. They may be embellished with embroidery. Sunpa lace or tie up the back.

Headwear is also an important part of Tibetan costume, and the shape and quality of the hat indicate rank, status, and regional and tribal affiliation. The xiamou jiasi (golden flower) hat is worn in winter by men, women, and children. The xiamou jiasi has a tall crown of fabric, felt, or leather, and four fur flaps. It is often trimmed with gold rickrack imported from India or China.

The kata, or khata, is an important Tibetan textile material artifact. It is a white scarf symbolizing purity that is offered as a gift when greeting people. Kata is also used as an offering when visiting shrines and during other rituals such as wedding and funeral rites. This tradition is believed to have evolved from an ancient custom of clothing statues of deities.
Changes in Fashions

Changes are occurring to Tibetan costume, probably because of exposure to Western clothing styles. Although strong colors are still preferred, some of the traditional dramatic contrasts have been replaced in some areas with strong matching colors, often in single-color schemes. Another change is in the fit of Tibetan robes. Robes are being fit closer to the shape of the body. This silhouette modification is particularly evident in women’s clothing. Still another change is in the wearing of bangdian. Originally worn only by married women, unmarried girls and women have started to wear the bangdian for special days and celebrations.

Exposure to Western clothing has also resulted in some Tibetans wearing Western clothing exclusively. Other Tibetans wear a combination of Western and traditional styles; for example, men wear the chuba with Western style shoes. Traditional clothing is still worn exclusively in less populated regions.

Traditional clothing is recognized as important to the culture and unique to the people and the region. Local tailors promote the use of traditional clothing for women, believing that traditional styles best showcase the beauty of Tibetan women. Traditional clothing worn by local people is an important tourist attraction, and many visitors to Tibet purchase traditional clothing items as souvenirs. Tibetan traditional clothing has also been recognized as a source of design inspiration. In recent years modern designers, such as Wu Haiyan from China, have created high-end fashion lines inspired by the distinctive clothing styles from the “roof of the world.”

Laura KLOSTERMAN KIDD

Further Reading
The Committee of 100, which actually has more than 150 members, is an organization of prominent American citizens of Chinese descent that works to bridge U.S.–Greater China relations.

The Committee of 100 is a national, nonpartisan organization whose members are American citizens of Chinese descent. It was founded in 1990 by leaders in the Chinese-American community who saw the need for an organization that would bring a Chinese-American perspective to relations between Greater China and the United States; they envisioned an organization that would address the concerns of Americans of Chinese heritage. The members, who have achieved prominence in a broad range of professions, pool their strengths and experiences to further the goals of the organization.

The Committee of 100 has a twofold mission. It is first concerned with bridging the gap (and strengthening relations) between the United States and Greater China. In addition it encourages Chinese-Americans to participate in all aspects of American life. During the 1990s the committee's efforts were primarily focused on this second purpose, but as China has changed, so too has the Committee's mission. Now the committee wants to be seen as a cultural ambassador in the exchange and sharing of perspectives, ideas, and experiences among all those concerned with Greater China-U.S. relations.

Many of the committee's members are involved in academics, government, business, law, science, and the arts. Its founders include the cellist Yo-Yo Ma; Shirley Young, a senior adviser to General Motors; the architect I. M. Pei; and Oscar Tang, an investor and philanthropist. The committee has more than 150 members.

Recognizing that highly skilled, well-educated individuals are essential to China's continued growth and prosperity, the Committee of 100 has established endowment funds to provide scholarships for outstanding students and teachers at several universities in China. In conjunction with its annual conference, the committee, since 2003, conducts mentoring events for students and young professionals. Each mentorship event provides young professionals, the next generation of Chinese-American community leaders, the opportunity to connect with committee members who are prominent leaders in their fields. Participants at each event are able to learn directly from committee members who share their personal experiences, successes, and challenges. Participants also discuss their unique issues with members.

In 2006 the committee introduced a mentoring website, www.c100mentoring.org, to provide another portal for participants and to serve as well as a resource for those unable to attend a mentoring event. The site consists of essays on career advice written by members.

In addition to its mentoring efforts, the committee regularly conducts opinion surveys in order to provide objective data on the mutual perceptions of American and Chinese regarding such subjects as economics and trade, product safety, environment and climate change,
American Attitudes Toward China

A survey conducted by the Committee of 100 in 2004 examined American opinions about China.

American attitudes toward China have improved significantly over the past 10 years since the Committee of 100’s study in 1994, indicating that 46% of Americans view China favorably versus 59% in 2004. Also, familiarity with US-Chinese issues by Americans has grown. Further, Americans expect US-China relations to continue improving.

Despite American concerns about job losses and outsourcing/off shoring, the benefits of China’s low cost products appear to outweigh the negatives even among union members and those that have lost jobs (who do not blame China).

Compared to 10 years ago, China is now viewed as much more of an economic vs. military threat. China is viewed as an ally by significantly more Americans (48% of the general public) than 10 years ago (25%). However, China’s support of the US in the War on Terrorism is not well known nor recognized by either opinion leaders or the public, with only roughly 30% of both groups viewing China as a dependable ally in the War on Terrorism.

Human rights remain the key concern by Americans towards China with its impact on the global environment - being registered as a second key concern by opinion leaders and fourth by the general public.

The overall trend of increasingly positive attitudes toward China may influence American attitudes towards Chinese Americans. In contrast to a Committee of 100 survey, “American Attitudes Toward Chinese Americans and Asian Americans,” conducted in 2001, this study reflects a positive shift in attitudes toward the immigration of Chinese to this country. Another interesting finding was that the 23% of respondents who claim to have family or friends who have adopted a Chinese baby could suggest that increasing numbers of Chinese adoptions has an impact on American attitudes towards China and the Chinese people.


and Taiwan. Public opinion plays a significant role in shaping government policymaking and forecasting the direction of bilateral relationships. Over the years the survey results have been relied upon by the media, opinion leaders, and decision makers.

The Committee’s headquarters are in New York. It also has an office in Hong Kong.

The Editors

Further Reading


Committee on Scholarly Communication with China

Zhōng-Měi Xuéshù Jiāoliú Wěiyuánhuì
中美学术交流委员会

The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, known since 1996 as the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China (CSCC), was founded in 1966 and is devoted to fostering and promoting academic relations, research, and exchange programs between American and Chinese students and scholars.

In 1966, the United States National Academy of Sciences (NAS) partnered with the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) to jointly sponsor the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), with a new office in Washington, D.C.

The decision to develop a committee on China came mainly from the NAS, after China successfully detonated an atomic bomb in 1962. This success caught the attention of American scientists and in 1963 the NAS convened to discuss the establishment of a China committee. In an effort to provide American China specialists with access to China and provide better communication among scientists from the two countries, the NAS decided to focus the committee mainly on the natural sciences, though some attention was also paid to the social sciences and the humanities.

The CSCPRC was formed at a time when such communication was not routine. Years of an estranged relationship finally began to tentatively resolve in the early 1970s, when a visit from President Nixon initiated the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to sign an agreement to amend academic ties nearly a decade after the CSCPRC was formed. However, it was not until long after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 that the academic relationship between the two countries developed into the free flowing current of ideas seen today.

The first signs of an improved relationship between the two countries came with President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. The event led to the organization of approximately 67 delegations between the two countries over the course of a month, covering topics mainly in the natural sciences such as herbal pharmacology, linguistics, seismology and early childhood education. Though delegations that focused on the social sciences and the humanities did occur, a greater interest was held with studies in technical and natural sciences. The reports written and published from these delegations marked the beginnings of Chinese research institutes and filled a gap in American knowledge of Chinese science. Also in the 1970s, reassurances from Mao Zedong that Chinese-American scientists were welcome in China helped keep the exchange of people and ideas flowing, and soon US industry leaders Exxon and IBM were openly welcoming Chinese specialists.

As the work of the CSCPRC grew during the 1970s, the idea of reciprocity of ideas and scholars, and eventually of students, was greatly enforced. In 1978 US-China political relations moved more toward normalization and...
a proposal was made by President Carter’s Science Advisor, Frank Press, to exchange ten students from each country. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping then proposed that China send 500 students and scholars to the United States the next year.

The CSCPRC often encountered problems with the exchange of students in early years. The U.S. was denied a centralized office in China to aid in placement of American students, and was forced to go through Chinese agencies like the Ministry of Education (MOE). Finally, in 1986 the Committee received permission from both U.S. and Chinese officials to open an office in Beijing. This new office was sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and facilitated programs to help coordinate placement of students and scholars in China.

For thirty years the CSCPRC helped develop and foster academic ties between the US and China, and the main responsibility of the committee came from the NAS. In 1996, however, ACLS President Stanley Katz announced that budget restrictions and a decline in private and federal support forced the closure of the Washington, DC office of the CSCPRC, now renamed the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China (CSCC). When the Washington office closed, the Slavic, East European and Asian Reading Room (SEEARR) of the Gelman Library of The George Washington University received the CSCPRC’s Washington-branch library as a donation, along with its corresponding non-administrative information files. These information files comprise 96 boxes of material organized by subject-matter and further organized chronologically into colored file folders.

Working out of the Beijing office, the Committee still serves as a link between the NAS and the CAS and, thanks to the Committee’s long experience fostering such relations, remains a preferred route for students and scholars pursuing research and studies in China and in the United States.

Further Reading


External communication refers to broadcast information that is meant for a foreign audience. Similar to the United States’ Voice of America and the BBC’s world services in the U.K., China employs a vast array of media outlets (in dozens of languages, in addition to Chinese) to project a positive image to the world, with varying degrees of success.

External communication in China, often termed duiwai chuanbo 对外传播, refers to news reports and other communication activities that aim to enhance better understanding and promote a favorable image of China among global audiences via media channels such as radio, TV, newspapers, news agencies, and websites normally run by Chinese organizations inside China. These efforts are similar to the Voice of America in the United States and the British Broadcasting Corporation’s world services in the United Kingdom.

Since the concept of external communication is so frequently related to China’s image around the world, external communication, since the 1980s, has become an increasingly significant topic for a country that has been eager to project itself to the rest of the world as a peaceful rising power. The idea of a China “brand” was frequently discussed in the media before the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and remains relevant to companies seeking to introduce Chinese products to global markets.

Historical Development

While external communication, or duiwai chuanbo (dui-wai means “external”; chuanbo means “communication”), is a contemporary term popular only since the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) instituted China’s open and reform policies, the concept can trace its origins to the nineteenth century, when China was known as a sleeping giant (a term coined by Napoleon) and was forced by Western powers to cede some of its territory.

The idea of external communications was first initiated by Chinese intellectuals educated in the West in the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), which, with a strong intention to make China one of the powers in the world, came to understand that the then passive and backward status quo of China had somewhat resulted from the huge imbalance of information flow from the West and lack of sufficient information exchange and communication from China to the West and the rest of the world. Since most Westerners did not understand Chinese, it was natural for these Chinese intellectuals to resort to foreign-language publications to introduce China.

Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), often known as the Father of Modern China and founder of the Guomindang (GMD), or Nationalist Chinese Party, paid special attention to launching news publications in and outside China during his political career. But external communication in China did not get into full swing until it was supported by the Guomindang government in 1930 when foreign-language newspapers, radio stations, and news agency were set up in China. Thus 1930 has been
heralded as the starting point for external communication in China.

External communication has since witnessed three stages of development. The first stage was from 1930 to 1949 when the GMD’s Republic of China was forced to Taiwan and the Communist Party of China established the People’s Republic of China. During this time external communication was still dominated by the GMD government in parallel with the news-related activities of the Communist Party. External communication in China did not see a peaceful transition and continuity when political power shifted. For instance, the GMD government blew up the then largest radio station in Asia (Voice of China) in Nanjing on 29 November 1949 when it left the mainland for Taiwan.

The second stage was from 1949 to 1980 when the Communist Party established external communication in China. Everything in China at that time was politically oriented, and external communication was no exception. It was during this time that external communication was, in fact, duiwai xuanchuan (对外宣传), (xuanchuan 宣传 means “propaganda”). It should be noted, however, that in Chinese xuanchuan has no negative connotation, even though it often has in the Western perspective. Chinese considered duiwai xuanchuan a neutral or even positive term, equal or similar to external communication. The term itself thus incited numerous mixed responses about China because China was then completely isolated from the outside world for political reasons.

The third stage started in 1981, marked by the birth of the China Daily, the first English-language newspaper in China since the North China Daily News. The North China Daily News, a very influential foreign newspaper, was set up by the British in 1864 in Shanghai and ceased publication in 1951. The birth of the semiofficial China Daily was a landmark for external communication in China. It deviated from the propaganda style of the party organ People’s Daily, popular during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1977), and targeted English-reading audiences, with a Chinese perspective. The birth of the China Daily also sparked a wave of English-language media, including CCTV-9 at the central level, the Shanghai Daily and the Shenzhen Daily at the local level, and more recently English-language websites in almost all the major cities in China, in addition to the expansion of existing China Radio International (CRI) and the restoration of English-language magazines that had ceased publication during the early years of the People’s Republic.

It was in this third stage that most people in China also realized the negative connotation of the English word propaganda and started to employ a more neutral term, duiwai chuanbo, or external communication, or external publicity if literally translated from Chinese. At present most scholars and media practitioners in China prefer to use external communication (even global communication or international communication) to describe the Chinese perspective of duiwai chuanbo.

Characteristics

Since it originated from a unique historical background, external communication in China has enjoyed its own characteristics, as compared with internal communication in Chinese.

As it is elsewhere in the world, external communication in China has a strong political orientation and produces media content mainly in an effort to influence global audiences in favor of China’s national interests. The ultimate goal is to promote a better understanding between China and the rest of the world. Almost all external communication activities are sponsored by the government. This is particularly true when faced with a major news event like the Beijing Olympics.

In terms of media categories as well as media content, external communication is diversified and comprehensive. In China media organizations for external communication include radio stations (CRI); newspapers (the China Daily and the Shanghai Daily); TV stations (CCTV-9 in Beijing and ICS in Shanghai); numerous magazines; and websites, such as Xinhuanet and Eastday, both at the central and local levels, normally in cooperation with traditional media organizations. In addition to daily news reports, these media organizations offer other content, including entertainment, tourism background, educational information, and services of all kinds in an effort to better cater to the needs of a global audiences. This is a very different approach from the propaganda style of the past.
External communication in China employs a number of languages in addition to standard Chinese. For instance, CRI broadcasts in forty-three languages and four dialects. The major foreign language used for external communication is English, as far as media categories and content are concerned. The English dominance of media is especially evident in the metropolitan areas like Beijing and Shanghai, which provide global audiences with a good choice of local and international media in English. However, in inland and mountainous areas, English media are still scarcely available.

Unlike the Voice of America in the United States, which is made available only to foreign audiences, external communication in China is available to not only foreign audiences but also Chinese audiences inside and outside of China. Given the size of the Chinese population, it is no surprise to find that the Chinese audience greatly surpasses that of foreign audiences, according to surveys conducted by CCTV-9 and the China Daily in 2001 and 2002. The surveys also offered a reasonable explanation for the large size of the Chinese audience: They want to use the English-language media available to them, including textbooks, to learn English rather than to consume media content.

The overwhelming enthusiasm of Chinese audiences to learn English may have diluted some of the effectiveness of China’s efforts of external communication in the world, according to the above two surveys. Despite the government’s strong support for external communication, China’s English-language media have not always received a positive response from foreign audiences. However, it should be noted that the not-so-positive survey results for external communication in China is sometimes more ideological and cultural than it is journalistic because foreign audiences, particularly from Western countries, have an inborn distrust toward media owned and operated by the government, even when Chinese journalists practice good journalistic professionalism for external communication. Except for English-speaking journalists, who often serve as English-language polishers, most staff in English-language media organizations are Chinese journalists and editors who reside in a Chinese environment. Although their English writing is communicative enough, they may still encounter cultural obstacles that, on some occasions, may confuse and even create misunderstanding for global audiences. Other reasons can also be cited, but it remains true so far that external communication in China has not been as effective as expected.

**China’s Image**

Even though external communication aims to create a favorable image of China as a nation, China’s image has not really been portrayed by these media for external communication inside China. Rather, the projection of China’s image in the world has been heavily influenced by writings about China by Western authors and news coverage by Western media, which tend to play up or ignore different elements of the real China, inevitably from a Western perspective, which may seem critically negative and unfriendly to most Chinese.

As a result, China’s image in Western media is generally accompanied with such key phrases as democracy, human rights, and freedom of the press, leading to a climax during the torch-relay demonstrations in 2008 when China hosted the Beijing Olympics.

In 2004 the Chinese government initiated the first of many Confucius Institutes (in Seoul, South Korea) to address growing interest in China and the international demand for Chinese language instruction; by 2009, there were 307 such institutes in seventy-eight countries. Reaction to the Confucius Institute vary. There is concern about the institutes’ sponsorship by the Chinese government; some universities and individuals fear that this sponsorship could lead to undue government influence on curricula within Asian studies departments.

While part of China’s image may be based on Western biases and lack of sufficient knowledge, discussions of China’s image have helped China open up to the world and contribute to its social improvements in the past three
decades, particularly after China successfully hosting the Beijing Olympics. External communication, though perceived as ineffective in building China’s national image, is still considered an important part of China’s global interaction with the rest of the world.

**Challenges**

External communication is still regarded as a unique concept in China but reasonable and necessary because of China’s historical, linguistic, and ideological isolation in the past, and differences between external communication (mostly in English) and internal communication in China. The uniqueness of China’s external communication system is best illustrated by the media practice and rule of *neiwai youbie* 内外有别, which means “keep external communication separate from internal Chinese communication.” As a result, China has established two kinds of media systems for the two forms of communication systems, each with its respective target audiences, funding channels, personnel recruitment, and even journalistic styles and guidelines. But as China has become more global and mature in its market economy, particularly since the Beijing Olympics, it has become more difficult to maintain the practice of *neiwai youbie*.

China will most likely have to merge the two sets of communication systems in the future, but it remains a question as to when and how it will take place.

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**Further Readings**


Established in the 1920s, the Youth League has been the training ground for the Chinese Communist Party for the last eighty years. With over 86 million members, it has been a route since the 1980s for leaders to enter the top echelons of the party, and is one of the most influential groups in China.

The Communist Youth League (CYL) was established in Shanghai as the Socialist Youth League of China in 1920, a year before the first congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), an organization that the CYL's history has shadowed. When the CYL held its first congress in 1922 in Guangzhou (Canton), one of the leading intellectuals of early Chinese Communist history, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), spoke. The league changed its name to the "Chinese Communist Youth League" in 1925 and to the "Chinese New Democracy Youth League" on establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. At about this time it became more merged into the organizational structure of the CCP. It was named the "Communist Youth League" in 1957.

Suspended during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the league came to greater political prominence in the 1980s, being perceived as a training ground for future high-level Chinese leaders, among them President Hu Jintao. This idea of the CYL being a “party reserve” lingers, with several of the current members of the Politburo (the principal policymaking and executive committee of a Communist party) having had positions in the CYL. The extent of its influence, however, is debated, with many arguing that the CYL's influence has been overstated.

In terms of size and structure the CYL reflects the CCP. Its 70 million members come close to the 74 million members of the CCP, with 210,000 committee members. It has a party secretary, much as the CCP does, who sits, in fact, on the Central Committee of the CCP and reports to that committee. Like the CCP, the CYL holds five yearly congresses, the last of which, in 2003, included the election of Hu Chunhua, previously a party official in Tibet (like Hu Jintao). Membership in the league is restricted to people ages fourteen to twenty-eight, with the Young Pioneers group open to those up to the age of fourteen. Like the CCP, too, the CYL has representation and separate command structures in China's provinces, autonomous regions, and cities under municipalities. The CYL operates the China Youth Daily (established in 1951).

According to its mission statement, the CYL “unites and leads youths to focus on economic construction, and doing the great practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, to temper themselves as successors who are well educated, and have lofty ideals, moral integrity, and a high sense of discipline.” (Retrieved from http://www.cycnet.com/chinayouth/organisms/ccyl.htm). The CYL was led from 1957 to 1978 by Hu Yaobang, who was to go on to become general secretary of the CCP in the 1980s and whose death in 1989 was one of the precipitating facts of the Tiananmen Square disturbances that year. The CYL was led from 1984 to 1985 by Hu Jintao and from 1993 to 1998 by Li Keqiang, who is a current Politburo member and predicted to be one of China’s key leaders after the retirement of Hu and Wen Jiabao in 2012.
The idea of the CYL being a training ground for elite politicians took root in the 1980s when CCP leader Deng Xiaoping elevated people with a previous record in the CYL to national positions. At the seventeenth party congress in 2007 a new group of younger leaders who had previously occupied positions in the league was elevated to the Politburo. However, the highly diffracted nature of Chinese politics now means that it is increasingly difficult to settle on clear factions. The influence of the Shanghai group, associated with CCP leader Jiang Zemin in the 1990s and early 2000s, has also been questioned. In the end the best that can be said of the CYL is that it remains an important (and large) organization under the CCP and that it is likely to continue producing political figures and being a political network. However, the CYL itself is not associated with any specific viewpoint on important policy and social issues.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading

Compendium of Materia Medica

Běncǎo Gāngmù 本草纲目

The Compendium of Materia Medica (Bencao gangmu; 1596) was an encyclopedic work of medicine and natural history written by Li Shizhen (1518–1593) in the last decades of the sixteenth century. Since the early seventeenth century it has become one of the most widely cited and studied books in the history of Chinese science and medicine.

An encyclopedic work of medicine and natural history, the Compendium of Materia Medica (Bencao gangmu; 1596) was written by Li Shizhen (1518–1593) in the last decades of the sixteenth century. Although the author’s own text grafts together several scholarly genres, the Compendium is best known as the result of a rich tradition of bencao literature. The term bencao has variously been translated as “pharmacopoeia,” “materia medica,” “pandect of natural history,” “pharmaceutical literature,” and “encyclopedia,” all of which approximate the nature of the genre. This type of medical text focused on the drugs used in Chinese medical prescriptions, classifying each drug according to qualities such as flavor, toxicity, presence or absence of heat, and appearance, and occasionally provided an explanation of the most common or alternate names for the substance. Bencao texts could also include discussions of the textual and natural history of each drug or debates about its properties, and for this reason, bencao are valuable sources for the study of plants, animals, and stones throughout the history of China.

The Compendium comprises fifty-two juan (roughly equivalent to chapters) and almost 2 million characters, enormous in scope for a bencao work. Of the 1,892 drugs included, 374 were added for the first time by Li Shizhen. The Compendium broke from previous collections of materia medica in the extent to which it incorporated literature from nonmedical texts (poetry, history, tales of the strange, and so on) as sources on the natural history of medical drugs. The structure of the work was based largely on Tang Shenwei’s (ca. 1086–1093) Organized and Classified Materia Medica (Zhenglei bencao), a model in its own gestures toward incorporating nonmedical scholarly texts into the service of explicating the use of plants and animals in medicine. The title of the Compendium reflected Li’s intellectual debt to neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200): The phrase gangmu invokes the structure of Zhu Xi’s own Tongjian gangmu, with a basic macroclassification (gang) supplemented by more detailed analyses of individual entries (mu).

Contents of the Compendium of Materia Medica

Several editions of the Compendium have been published since its first printing in 1596, and most contain the same basic elements. (For a list of the contents, see table 1.) The text began with a section of introductory material, including a preface by famous Ming scholar Wang Shizhen (1526–1590), 1,109 illustrations drawn by Li Shizhen’s son Li Jianyuan and collected together in two separate juan,
a table of contents, and a preface by Li Shizhen. Li’s own short, prefatory remarks provided background on the macrostructure of the text and the logic of its arrangement, from the most elemental (water) to the most complex (humans). Li also discussed the place of the Compendium with respect to prior works of its kind as well as the reasons behind the inclusion or arrangement of certain drug entries.

Next, Li chronicled the history of bencao literature and provided a bibliography of medical and nonmedical sources consulted in writing the Compendium, along with a list of previous bencao and the number of drugs in various categories that each contained. Extended descriptions of the contents of two foundational bencao texts (both of which Li attributed to Tao Hongjing, though the authorship of the second is now questioned), the Shennong bencao jing and the Mingyi bielu, were followed by Li’s discussion of medical principles such as seasonality, organ/functionality systems, flavor, and yin and yang and their relevance to the prescription of drugs. Li followed this with a long section on the theory and practice of pharmacology, including discussions of drug interactions and a list of materials organized according to major illnesses they were used to treat.

The remainder of the text consisted of classified descriptions of individual drugs, including elemental materials such as water and fire, stones, tools and implements, plants, animals, and humans. According to Li, the logic of the arrangement progressed from the lowliest of creatures

| Table 1 | Contents of the Compendium of Materia Medica (Bencaogangmu) |
| Prefatory material | Wang Shizhen, 1590 preface* |
| | Appended Illustrations |
| | List of Contents |
| | Author’s Preface |
| Juan 1: Introductory Materials A | Bencao through the Ages |
| | Medical Bibliography |
| | Nonmedical Bibliography |
| | Collected List of Drug Products Included in Previous Bencao |
| | Introduction to the Shennong bencao jing |
| | Measurement and Preparation of Drugs from Tao Hongjing’s Mingyi bielu |
| | Timing of Drug Collection According to Qi and Wu |
| | Seven Prescriptions |
| | Ten Functions |
| | Quality, Flavor, Yin, and Yang |
| | Recommendations and Taboos Concerning the Five Flavors |
| | Dominating and Submissive Relationships of the Five Flavors |
| | Symptoms and Root Causes of Yin and Yang |
| | Rising, Falling, Floating, and Sinking |
| | Seasonal Drug Use |
| | Principles of Using Drugs According to Five Evolutions and Six Excesses |
| | Using Drugs to Nourish and Purge the Viscera (Six Fu and Six Zang) |
| | Nourishing and Purging According to the Five Zang and Five Flavors |
| | Principles of Using Drugs According to Emptiness and Fullness of the Viscera |
| | Guiding Principles |

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<th>Table 1 (continued)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 2: Introductory Materials B</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Drugs with the Same Name and Drugs with Different Names</td>
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<td>Drug Relationships of Mutual Affinity, Enhancement, Rejection, and Inhibition</td>
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<td>Incompatible Drugs</td>
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<td>Food Taboos When Taking Drugs</td>
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<td>Taboos during Pregnancy</td>
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<td>Taboos of Food and Drink</td>
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<td>Li Dongyuan’s Preface to Suizheng yongyao</td>
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<td>Chen Cangqi’s Preface to Zhuxun yongyao</td>
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<td>Zhang Zihe’s Gantu xia sanfa</td>
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<td>Eight Imperatives, Six Losses, and Six Incurable Illnesses</td>
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<td>Yaodu’s Suiwu yaopin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Table of Contents of the Shennong bencao jing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tables of Contents of Song Bencao Works</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 3–4: Main Indications of Drugs for One Hundred Illnesses</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>114 illnesses listed</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 5: Waters</strong></td>
<td>43 drugs: heaven (13); earth (30)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 6: Fires</strong></td>
<td>11 drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 7: Earths</strong></td>
<td>61 drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 8–11: Metal and Stone</strong></td>
<td>161 drugs: metals (28); precious stones (14); stones (72); salts (20 + 27 appended)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 12–21: Herbs</strong></td>
<td>611 drugs: mountain (70); fragrant (56); marshy (126); toxic (47); creeping (73 + 10 appended); aquatic (23); rocky (19); mosses (16); miscellaneous (9); with a name but no use (153)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 22–25: Grains</strong></td>
<td>73 drugs: sesame; wheat; and rice (12); millet (18); beans (14); fermented and prepared (29)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 26–28: Vegetables</strong></td>
<td>105 drugs: pungent (32); slippery (41); melons (11); aquatic (6); fungi (15)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 29–33: Fruits</strong></td>
<td>149 drugs: five fruits (11); mountain (14); exotic (31); flavorful (13); melons (9); aquatic (6 + 23 appended); appended miscellaneous (21 + 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 34–37: Woods</strong></td>
<td>180 drugs: fragrant (35); tall (52); watery (51); parasitic (12); luxuriant; bamboos (4); miscellaneous (7 + 19 appended)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 38: Clothing and Tools</strong></td>
<td>79 drugs: clothing (25); tools (54)</td>
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<td><strong>Juan 39–42: Bugs</strong></td>
<td>106 drugs: egg-born (45); change-born (31); moisture-born (23 + 7 appended)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 43–44: Scaly</strong></td>
<td>94 drugs: dragons (9); snakes (17); fish (31); scaleless fish (28 + 9 appended)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 45–46: Armored</strong></td>
<td>46 drugs: turtles and tortoises (17); shellfish (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 47–49: Birds</strong></td>
<td>77 drugs: aquatic (23); grassland (23); forest (17); mountain (13 + 1 appended)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 50–51: Beasts</strong></td>
<td>86 drugs: domestic (28); beasts (38); mice (12); <em>“dwellers”</em> (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juan 52: People</strong></td>
<td>37 drugs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This list was compiled on the basis of the Liu Hengru and Liu Shanyong edition of 2002, which in turn was based on the 1596 Jinling and 1603 Jiangxi printings of the *Compendium*. The Jiangxi edition also included prefaces from Xia Liangxin and Zhang Dingsi, along with Li Jianyuan’s memorial.
to the most noble. The structure and contents of the *Compendium* were also influenced by Li’s deep interest in the five phases (water, fire, earth, metal, and wood).

**Printing of the Compendium of Materia Medica**

Li Shizhen spent more than thirty years researching and compiling the *Compendium* and spent the last decade of his life searching for a publisher. The carving of blocks for the first edition of the *Compendium* by printer Hu Chenglong finally began in Nanjing in 1593, but the work was not printed until 1596, three years after Li’s death. This first edition of the *Compendium*, known as the Jinling edition (an archaic term for Nanjing), was probably sold in limited quantities to the relatively wealthy professionals who could afford it.

Li’s son Li Jianyuan had accompanied his father along many of his travels, had drawn the illustrations for the *Compendium*, and was foundational in ultimately getting the work published. He submitted a memorial to the imperial palace in the first lunar month (January or February) of 1596, presenting the first printed copy of the *Compendium of Materia Medica* to the emperor in an attempt to obtain imperial backing for the printing of his father’s work. An account in the *Ming History* attests that the emperor admired the *Compendium*, ordering that it should be printed and circulated throughout the empire so that scholars would all have the book. However, this account is probably an exaggeration: The inscription on the manuscript in the Ming imperial library simply stated that the emperor saw the *Compendium*, the Ministry of Rites knew of it, and it would stay in the palace.

Further editions were printed in 1603, 1606, 1640, and then countless times through the twenty-first century. The 1603 Jiangxi printing included additional prefaces, along with Li Jianyuan’s memorial to the emperor. More illustrations were added in successive printings of the *Compendium*, some illustrations were significantly altered, and Qing editions began appending Li’s shorter works to the text. Zhao Xuemin’s (1719–1805) *Correction of Omissions in the Compendium of Materia Medica (Bencao gangmu shiyi)* was the most significant revision of and commentary to Li’s text. It was added as a further appendix to later editions of the *Compendium* after its initial publication in 1871.

**Current Influence in China**

The *Compendium of Materia Medica* is still studied as part of Chinese medical curricula, and modern scientists are still researching the biochemical bases of many of the drugs discussed by Li Shizhen. Partial or complete translations of the text have been published in Japanese, French, German, and English. Li was reinvented as a father of traditional Chinese medicine under Chinese Communist rule, and the *Compendium* is now typically acknowledged as a fundamental text in the history of Chinese science and medicine. Several Chinese artists
in the twenty-first century, including the installation artist Huang Yongping and the popular musician Jay Chou, have reinterpreted the Compendium in works that challenge ideas of traditional Chinese culture.

Carla NAPPI

Further Reading


Confucian Ethics ▶
Confucian Ethics

Confucian ethics teaches that no fixed and binding rules govern the moral life. Rather, a person must be trained to weigh the relative value of actions in specific situations in regard to specific persons. Confucian ethics had a strong influence on Chinese, Korean, and Japanese cultures.

Confucian ethics, founded on the idea that people must strive to do their best to express human kindness or love for others, left an indelible mark on the development of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese cultures.

Confucian ethics can be compared with Aristotelian and feminist virtue ethics and best understood as a contextualistic virtue ethics based on self-cultivation. Three general categories are used to classify moral systems: absolutism, relativism, and contextualism. Ethical contextualism holds that there are no absolute moral rules and that cultural customs or feelings cannot be blindly followed; alleged absolute codes or customs and feelings can serve only as guidelines. Each person must decide what is the best that she or he can do in that particular context to complete an action of a higher value such as authenticity, love, or virtue. The philosophies of the ancient Greek Aristotle, the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE), and the existentialists, as well as and modern situation ethics are examples of ethical contextualism. Confucian ethics can be summarized as the art of contextualizing the practice of virtue.

Confucian ethics bears some similarity to Aristotelian ethics. Both are virtue-based systems (virtue ethics refers to the moral quality of a person’s character or personality as opposed to a person merely obeying moral rules) that acknowledge that no fixed and binding rules govern the moral life. Rather, a person must be well trained and habituated to weighing the relative value of actions in specific situations in regard to particular persons.

Confucians and Aristotelians soon part company, however. Aristotle held what has been called the “doctrine of the golden mean,” namely, that most of the virtues are at the midpoint between the extremes of deficiency and excess. Regrettably, Zhongyong (centrality and commonality), one of the Four Books of the Confucian canon, was misleadingly translated as the Doctrine of the Mean, allowing for superficial comparisons. The Confucian concept of “centrality” refers to the condition before feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are expressed; clearly it is not the mean between extremes.

Confucius and Earlier

Confucian ethics began long before the time of Confucius. It was rooted in the clan values of the early Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) aristocracy. Confucius was both a traditional and an innovative thinker; he breathed new life into the traditional aristocratic clan ethics of the Zhou. His innovation was that he sought to transform aristocratic values and practices into everyday practices and values for common people. Thus, he reinterpreted the label for “prince” (junzi, the son of the ruler) to mean any

All Confucians agree that moral education begins at home. Only after a child learns filial respect for parents and brotherly love for siblings can he or she be expected to extend respect and love beyond the family. Methodologically, filial piety (xiao) is primary; ontologically (relating to being or existence), person-to-person care (ren, usually rendered as “benevolence” or “humanity”) is the significant trait of being human. To be a caring person is to be a moral example or moral authority for others to follow. After proper rearing, a person needs instruction from a Confucian teacher to develop his or her practice of caring. This instruction focuses primarily on gaining literary achievement (wen); memorizing the Four Books (four ancient and venerated Confucian texts), large sections of the Five Classics (also important Confucian texts), and other important Confucian works; and learning Confucian rituals and music so as to habituate the student in the practice of being virtuous.

person who achieves the status of being a noble and moral example for others, that is, a prince of virtue.

Although Confucius had his gender biases, the content and practice of his moral teachings are similar to those of the feminists who advocate a contextual care ethic. Speaking generally, Confucius, like the feminists of care, was concerned about interpersonal relationships founded on love and affection; his known writings contain nothing of an ethics based on impersonal duty. In the writings of both Confucius and certain feminists, moral values are learned at home by participating in a morally healthy parent-child relationship. The writings of Confucius emphasized the father-son relationship rather than the feminist mother-child relationship, but both advance the importance of proper child rearing for the cultivation of a moral personality that learns to contextualize values and actions in particular situations in relation with particular persons.
The Confucian virtues are best understood in terms of actual human behavior rather than intellectual beliefs. Confucians, both past and present, are concerned with the practice of taking care of others, not the abstract idea of care. The five constant virtues are person-to-person care (ren), ritual action (li), rightness (yi), trustworthiness (xin), and moral wisdom (zhi). Person-to-person care is defined as “love” in the Analects of Confucius. Confucians do not advocate random acts of love; all of the virtues must be practiced according to the requirements of ritual action. Confucian society is based on ritual order, not legal order.

The art of contextualizing the virtues in practice is clearly expressed in being a person of rightness (yi). Although the examples of the ancient sages serve as a guide, no absolute standards of rightness exist. Rightness entails doing the right thing to the right people at the right time in the most appropriate manner. Confucius invested a lot in trustworthiness (xin); exemplars of the moral must stand by their words. They must practice before they teach others, and they must teach only what they themselves have practiced.

Even moral wisdom (zhi) should be understood in terms of practice, or doing the right thing, rather than merely knowing what should be done. It is bolstered by the virtues of literary accomplishment (wen) and studiousness (xue). Any virtue may have to be practiced with bravery (yong). The virtues of reverence (jing) and sincerity (cheng), only briefly mentioned by Confucius, were developed by later Confucians and were understood to be part of the structure of the universe.

Mencius and Later Philosophers
Whereas the writings attributed to Confucius were primarily concerned with the practice of moral behavior, those attributed to the Chinese philosopher Mencius (371–289 BCE) understood the cardinal virtues to constitute the operations of the human heart-mind. Although the writings of Mencius and Xunzi (c. 310–213? BCE) disagreed on the natural goodness of humans, with Mencius claiming that people are basically good and Xunzi that they are basically deviant, both emphasized the importance of proper rearing, education, and ritual action for the correct expression of moral virtues. Not until Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) and Zhang Zai (1020–1077) revitalized the study of Confucianism did all the Confucian virtues come to take on a cosmological as well as a social moral role. To the extent that Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, and other Southeast Asian cultures adopted and adapted Confucianism, they also accepted and transformed Confucian ethics to meet their social and moral needs.

James D. Sellmann

Further Reading
Confucian Sites at Qufu
Qǚfǔ Sān Kǒng 曲阜三孔

The city of Qufu, Shandong Province, the legendary birthplace of Confucius, is the seat of the “Three Kongs:” The Temple and Cemetery of Confucius and the Confucian Family Mansion. The complex today is a major tourist site; it has been one of China’s foremost protected cultural relics since 1961 and a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site since 1994.

The Confucian Temple (Kongmiao 孔庙) and the Family Mansion (Kongfu 孔府) lie side by side in the southern part of the Qufu, Shandong Province, the birthplace of Confucius. The cemetery (Konglin 孔林, or Wooded Park of Confucius), lies about four kilometers to the north. Together they are known as “San Kong,” or “The Three Confucian Sites.”

The Temple

The Temple of Confucius was built onto the structure of Confucius’s three-room house to commemorate him in 478 BCE, a year after his death. In 153 BCE it officially became a temple of the state. During the course of history the temple has experienced four major destructive fires (with the first caused by lightning in 1499); it was rebuilt each time.

Today the temple complex measures about 650 meters from north to south and 150 meters from east to west, covering an area of about 95,000 square meters (about 24 acres). The complex contains nine courtyards comprising more than a hundred buildings that have a combined total of 466 rooms. A broad “sacred path” (shendao 神道), flanked by tall cypresses, runs through the middle of the temple. The famed Kuiwenge 奎文阁, a three-storied pavilion used as a library, stands in one of the courtyards. Walking further north, one sees fifty-three steles. They are among the temple’s five thousand stone tablets dating back to the dynasties of Song, Jin, Yuan, Ming, and Qing, (from 960 to 1912, inclusive) with epitaphs in scripts from different ethnic Chinese such as the Han, the Mongolian, and the Manchu. Some of the epitaphs are written in Phags-pa, a fabricated script with which Khubilai Khan meant to replace all other languages during the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368).

The most important part of the temple lies farther north. It is divided into three sections. In the middle is the Dachengdian (“Palace of Great Accomplishment 大成殿”). Modeled after the structures of the Imperial Palace in Beijing, it was rebuilt in 1724 after it was destroyed by another fire caused by lightning. As one of its unique features, its roof is supported by twenty-eight marble columns, embellished with carved reliefs of dragons and clouds. The use of the dragon motif, a sole privilege of the monarch that was denied to common people, shows that the descendants of Confucius enjoyed royal status.

The original residence and altars of Confucius, as well as the first four generations of his descendants, are in the east section of the temple. Confucius’s parents are worshiped in the west section. The last of the nine courtyards houses the Palace of the Sage’s Deeds (Shengidian 圣迹殿) with carved stone portraits of Confucius and...
an additional 120 stone carvings from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) depicting the political travels he made during his life time.

The Family Mansion

Adjoining the east section of the Temple of Confucius is his Family Mansion, also known as the Family Mansion of Duke Yansheng. (Yansheng, meaning “overflowing with wisdom,” was the honorary title that successive Chinese rulers and governments gave to the descendants of Confucius from 1055 to 1935.) The mansion was originally built for a fifty-fifth-generation descendant of Confucius by the Hongwu Emperor of Ming in 1377 and rebuilt by the Hongzhi Emperor in 1503. A decade later, the mansion was relocated to where it is today to be part of the “Three Kongs.”

The Family Mansion of Confucius occupies more than twelve acres, extending 352 meters from north to south. Its north end runs 111 meters long; and its south end, 193 meters. Like the Temple of Confucius, the mansion complex is also divided into three sections. Nine courtyards consisting of 480 rooms sprawl through the middle section. Stepping into the first few courtyards from the south, one finds rooms that used to serve as offices, where the Yansheng dukes performed their official duties. Further north, one enters the courtyards that functioned as living quarters. The courtyard in the far north was the family garden. The east section of the mansion includes official reception rooms, utility rooms, and an ancestral temple, and the west section was designated for private reading and social activities.

The mansion, renovated several times in history, houses a large collection of archives, costumes, artifacts, and crafts of great historical value, documenting the family’s affairs and activities from 1534 to 1948. Since 1949, research in the archives has yielded over nine thousand volumes of books.

The Cemetery

Four kilometers to the north of the Temple and Family Mansion of Confucius is located the Cemetery (Konglin,孔林), the largest and oldest of family cemeteries in China. A grey brick wall 7.3 kilometers long and over 3 meters high surrounds this 494-acre cemetery park, which has a number of different types of trees, many planted in the Song (96–1279) and Yuan (1279–1368) dynasties. From the memorial archway known as paifang in the very south that serves as the entrance, a sacred path over a kilometer long leads to a large castle-like structure named Guanlou.
A creek, dubbed Shengshui (Water of the Sage) flows from west to east across the cemetery. Across a bridge to the north is the Hall of Enjoyment (Xiangdian 享殿), where tribute is paid to Confucius through offerings of incense.

Behind the Hall of Enjoyment are the tombs of the Confucian Family, with Confucius himself in the center. On the left is the tomb of his son Kong Li. In the front is that of his grandson Kong Zisi. This peculiar layout is in conformity to a Chinese burial tradition, in which the father appears to be holding the son in one hand and carrying his grandson in the other.

In addition to the tombs of the three Confucian ancestors and their direct descendants, there are also tombs of famous people in and outside of the Confucian family. Kong Shangren (1648–1718), a famed playwright, is one of them. He is buried there because he used to show the Kangxi Emperor (1654–1722) around the cemetery. Direct descendants of Confucius have been buried in the cemetery for generation after generation, their tombs numbering more than a hundred thousand. Out of reverence and in respect for the Confucian ideal of moral strength, monarchs over the past two thousand years have renovated the Cemetery of Confucius as many as thirteen times. Today it has become not only a place for worship, but also a source for research in the burial customs from the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) to the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). With numerous trees of various species, the cemetery is also regarded as a botanical garden.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading


Confucian Temples

Kŏngmiào 孔庙

Confucian temples are places to worship Confucius, his students, and other Confucian thinkers. But they also served as arenas for Chinese rulers throughout history to express to their subjects the value of culture and education. Many of these temples in China, no longer active for worship, have become bastions of China’s complex culture. Qufu Temple, in Shandong Province, is the oldest and most iconic.

The teachings of Confucius have shaped Chinese thought and values throughout history; Confucian temples in China are primarily places to worship the philosopher and his disciples. But many Confucian temples today have become valuable repositories of Chinese culture in the form of museums and educational facilities. The Qufu 曲阜 Confucian temple in Shandong Province, for instance, is now the most popular tourist destination in China after the Forbidden City.

The History of Qufu

Confucian temples are located all over China, but the temple at Qufu, is the largest and best preserved. Qufu was built in 478 BCE, the year after the death of Confucius, on the site where Confucius’s house stood. The king of

Roof eaves at the Temple of Confucius in Beijing, now the Municipal Museum. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Luguo 鲁国 (kingdom of Lu), Luaigong 鲁哀公, who had often asked Confucius for advice, was grief stricken he died. He ordered Confucius’s three-room house consecrated as a temple to store the great philosopher’s bequests, such as clothes, hats, musical instrument, and books. Thus the three sections became the embryonic form of the Confucian temple.

The original dwelling of Confucius was removed from the Qufu site when the temple was enlarged in the seventh century CE, and the temple was expanded again during the Song dynasty (960–1279) into three sections with some four hundred rooms. Fire and vandals destroyed Qufu in 1210. After more renovations and rebuilding—and nearly three hundred years—a lightning-sparked fire in 1499 destroyed the temple complex once again.

**“Imperial” Qufu**

Visitors to Qufu today are sure to remark on the how much the temple complex resembles the Forbidden City, and not surprisingly. Because the most dramatic transformation of Qufu was begun in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) during the reign of Emperor Hongzhi (明孝宗, 1487–1505), shortly after the construction of the Forbidden City, the two sites share many features of imperial-style architecture and general configuration. The project took about five years to finish.

Hongzhi ordered that the Qufu temple be built in imitation of the Beijing imperial palace, and includes nine courtyards arranged symmetrically along the more than 1,000 meter-long central axis. The temple contains a pavilion, an altar, two wing rooms, two halls, three ancestral

Entrance of the Temple of Confucius in Beijing, currently the Municipal Museum. **Confucian temples served as arenas for Chinese rulers throughout history to express to their subjects the value of culture and education. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.**
Confucian Temples

halls, five palaces, seventeen kiosks with steles (carved or inscribed stone slabs or pillars used for commemorative purposes), and fifty-four memorial gateways. The temple has 104 buildings in all, consisting of 4,666 rooms, and covers 9.6 hectares.

Some of the rooms devoted to Confucius include: Dachengdian 大成殿 (Hall of Great Achievements), where a statue of Confucius is located; Shengjidian 圣迹殿 (Hall of Memories of the Sage), where Confucius’s life story is exhibited; and Qindian 寝殿 (Confucius’s Bedroom), where Confucius’s wife is worshiped. There is also a library named Kuiwenge 奎文阁, meaning “the best literary talent.”

Confucius’s famous students and other famous Confucian thinkers also have their place of honor in the two wing rooms standing to the east and west of the main palace. Although Confucian temples in other places are smaller than Qufu, they are similar in arrangement and pattern.

“Governmental” Temples

In 153 CE the Huandi 汉帝 emperor (132–168) of the Han dynasty 东朝 (206 BCE–220 CE) ordered an official to oversee the installation of a stone memorial inside the temple at Qufu and to designate it as a temple of the state; this was the beginning of the “governmental” Confucian temple. From then on the ruler of every dynasty always repaired a dilapidated temple after it was ruined by war.
or by natural calamity. Thus Confucian temples became destinations for emperors and imperial officials wanting to remind their subjects that moral development of the individual is crucial to the establishment of a state governed by moral rather than coercive laws.

In 539 CE statues of Confucius and his ten famous students were sculpted in the Qufu temple; this was the beginning of the tradition of setting statues in Confucian temples. Not long after the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) was founded, Emperor Li Shimin ordered the building of a Confucian temple in every province and county of China. Temples were also constructed at Guozijian (national colleges), the highest educational institutions during China’s three final dynasties.

**Destruction and Decay**

Because of war and natural calamity, Confucian temples built before the Song dynasty no longer exist: Qufu was not the only “victim” of destruction and decay. Only those built during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and Qing dynasty (1644–1912) remain. and established the pattern of the Qufu Confucian temple today.

In 1724 the Qufu Confucian temple again burned again. The Emperor Yongzheng (雍正, 1722–1735) of the Qing dynasty ordered it rebuilt according to the established Ming pattern. The project took six years. The main architecture of the Qufu Confucian temple today is the legacy of that rebuilding.

At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1977), in November 1966, as many as six thousand artifacts from Qufu were destroyed by two hundred students enlisted by the Red Guard. They also opened Confucius’s tomb, in the town north of Qufu in a cemetery where 100,000 descendants of Confucius are said to be buried, but found no human remains. In the 1980s public worship at Qufu was reinstated, and in 2004 the government organized an official worship ceremony at Qufu, the first since 1948. The Chinese Communist Party, in a gesture perceived to propagandize and expand awareness of traditional Chinese culture, organized an international day of worship centered at Qufu in 2005, with services held simultaneously all over China and in countries abroad; local Chinese officials who organized ceremonies and parades in their cities and town welcomed the additional tourist attention.

**Future Roles**

The temple at Qufu was designated in 1994 as a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site, a status ensuring that the temple will remain a strong symbol of China’s past culture, a boon to its tourist industry, and, perhaps, in light of China’s new interest in reviving Confucian thought, a place to inspire a new generation of Chinese.

LI Yong

**Further Reading**

Confucianism

Rújiào 儒教

The teaching of the philosopher Confucius inspired philosophers and statesmen for more than twenty-five-hundred years. Confucianism stresses the importance of education for moral development of the individual so that the state can be governed by moral virtue rather than coercive laws.

Confucianism is a system of thought based on the teachings of the philosopher Confucius (or Kong Fuzi [Grand Master Kong], 551–479 BCE). Confucianism includes the complete literature, teachings, and practices of the traditions that are aligned with Confucius. Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) bibliographers classified the works of Confucius and his disciples under the heading “literati.”

Syncretism

Scholars often claim that traditional China was a Confucian society or that before the twentieth century Confucianism was the official state religion and philosophy of China. Such claims are overgeneralizations and misleading. First, the syncretic (relating to the combination of different forms of belief or practice) nature of both early and late Confucian thought must be understood. Second, the hybrid syncretic character of later state-sanctioned Confucianism must be understood.

Speaking generally, the cultures, philosophies, and religions of East Asia are syncretic in nature. Because of their practical orientation, they do not place great value on exclusive ideas or practices but instead prefer to absorb and integrate whatever proves to be useful. This practice is particularly true of Chinese culture and philosophy and is in large part the reason why the dynastic system was effective and enduring.

Their syncretic, amalgamated character and content are what have made the teachings of Confucius so attractive to so many thinkers for more than twenty-five hundred years. Confucius, his contemporary followers, and most of his later followers incorporated various forms of literature. They emphasized poetry, legend, history, divination, music, and ritual. They integrated virtue and self-cultivation with the notions of harmony and a political philosophy. The Confucian curriculum was well rounded. It consisted of the six arts: ritual, music, archery, calligraphy, chariot driving, and mathematics. Confucius also stressed that any serious student, even a commoner, should be trained in military arts. Confucians assumed that the masses would be engaged in agriculture and related industry and incorporated agricultural skills into their social program, although they did not place great stress on these skills because they were more concerned with moral cultivation.

Borrowing from statesmen who were concerned about properly naming job titles and evaluating job performances, Confucius and others, especially the philosophers Mencius (385–303/302 BCE) and Xunzi (c. 300–230 BCE), delineated the meaning of the “rectification or attunement of names” (zhengming). This delineation was important because knowing the precise name
for one’s position in the world (as father, son, prince, and so on) let one know one’s responsibilities.

Confucians were at odds with a school of philosophy called the “Legalists” (fajia), who advocated a rigorous notion of the rule of law, as opposed to the Confucians’ notion of rule by virtue. Although Confucius, Xunzi, and Mencius believed that people should be ruled with virtue by setting a moral example, they also certainly recognized the need for law. According to tradition, when Confucius was chief of police, even he had to authorize the execution of a criminal. Confucians, like Legalists, sought to standardize a code of human conduct. Legalists sought to achieve this standardization by instituting public law, whereas Confucians sought to achieve it by placing greater emphasis on instituting a homogeneous system of ethics to govern human interactions, holding the law in reserve for cases of flagrant behavior.

Confucius clearly did not create a pure philosophical system; he borrowed from various approaches. Likewise, his followers absorbed elements from other schools of philosophy to bolster their interpretation of Confucius.

**Xunzi and Mencius**

Mencius is known for advancing the teachings of Confucius. However, whereas Confucius was concerned with the details of proper moral behavior, Mencius advocated a more abstract philosophy, emphasizing the goodness of human nature (xing) and the development of the mind (xin). Although Mencius had syncretic tendencies, he also criticized other philosophers, including the early Daoist Yang Zhu (c. late fourth century BCE); Mozi (479–438 BCE), the founder of Mohism, a philosophy that emphasized universal love; and Xu Xing (c. late fourth century BCE), who argued that a ruler should labor in the fields alongside his subjects. (Mencius answered Xu Xing by saying that the ruler should concentrate on ruling and leave farming to the farmer).

Xunzi a century later revitalized Confucian teachings by invigorating them with practical political measures such as economic means to enrich the state and a greater stress on public law. Xunzi is known for criticizing Mencius’s belief that human nature is basically good. Xunzi argued that people are basically selfish, given limited resources, but that people can be trained to be good through the practice of ritual action and education. Xunzi’s teachings dominated Confucian thinking from the Han dynasty to the Song dynasty (960–1279). During the Song dynasty Mencius’s teachings were used to develop neo-Confucianism.

**State-Sponsored Confucianism and Syncretism**

The syncretic approach to philosophy and the arts of rulership became particularly popular toward the end of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) and the first part of the Han dynasty (the so-called Western Han, 206 BCE–8 CE).

Han emperors struggled with the problem of systematizing political philosophy and the arts of rulership. During the reign of the Han emperor Wu (156–87 BCE) Dong Zhongshu (c. 179–104 BCE) developed a composite form of Confucianism that became the state-sanctioned philosophy. Dong was a Confucian in that he praised Confucius and generally subscribed to the Confucian ideas of rule by virtue and self-cultivation. However, Dong integrated aspects of the Five Phases philosophy (a philosophy of the mystical composition of the universe out of five forces), Legalism, and Daoism into Confucianism.

The intellectual life of Confucianism stagnated after the Han dynasty. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) Han Yu (768–824 CE) revived Confucianism with his study of the moral way (daoxue). He rejected Xunzi and emphasized the basic goodness of human nature.

**Zhou Dunyi, Zhu Xi, and the Cheng Brothers**

During the Song dynasty a Tang dynasty Daoist alchemical document called the “Diagram of the Great Ultimate” (Taijitu) was transmitted to the philosopher Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073). (The term alchemical relates to alchemy, a medieval science aiming to transmute base metals into gold, discover a universal cure for disease, and discover a means of indefinitely prolonging life.) Zhou wrote a profound work based on that document in which he linked the moral nature of humans with the nature of the universe and claimed that the goodness of human nature is part of the moral goodness of the universe.
Zhou Dunyi taught the Cheng brothers. Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and his younger brother Cheng Yi (1033–1107) developed Zhuo’s concept of a universal principle (li) that is inherent in all things, making it the foundation of their respective philosophies and the main concept of Song dynasty neo-Confucianism. They taught that the proper subjects for study are principle (li) and human nature (xing) and that human nature ultimately is identical to principle. For them the investigation of things was crucial for self-cultivation. They claimed that goodness is the life-giving principle of the universe.

The Cheng brothers influenced the neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who systematized the teachings of the Cheng brothers and Zhou Dunyi and argued that reality consists of two components: principle (li) and material force (qi). Principle is the form of everything that exists, whereas material force fills and activates things. Zhu taught that human nature is basically good because it is endowed with the principle (li) that is goodness. People learn to be bad, and thus the purpose of education is to retain the good principle in one’s original nature and to remove acquired pollutants. Zhu Xi sided with the rationalistic (relating to reliance on reason as the basis for establishment of religious truth) tendencies in Cheng Yi’s philosophy, and for several hundred years what is called the “Cheng-Zhu school of neo-Confucianism” dominated China.

Zhu Xi debated with Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193), who supported the idealistic tendencies of Cheng Hao’s philosophy. Lu focused on the mind, teaching that it is one with principle. For Lu the investigation of things meant the study of the mind. He argued for the unity of the Way (dao), opposing the distinction that Zhu made between principle and material force.

Ming and Qing Dynasties

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) Wang Yangming (1472–1529) developed the idealism of Lu Xiangshan. (In philosophy idealism means that reality is in the mind or in the ideas of the mind; it does not denote a perfect [ideal] world). Wang was a champion of the School of Mind (xinxue), as opposed to Zhu’s School of Principle (lixue). Wang argued that anyone can become a sage because everyone has a mind that contains innate knowledge of the good. This innate knowledge of the good extends outward, starting with a natural love for self and family, extending to community, and then outward to all other people, creatures, and things. Wang is known for teaching that knowledge and action form a unity. His philosophy influenced later thinkers such as Tan Sitong (1865–1898) and Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925).

In 1644 the Manchus conquered China and established the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Under foreign occupation Chinese government officials were marginalized. To avoid criticism or punishment by the Manchus, many turned to scholarship and the study of
Confucian philosophy. Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Dai Zhen (1724–1777) are two important Confucians of the Qing dynasty. Dai Zhen devoted his life to studying the Mencius (a book of Mencius’s conversations with kings of his time). Dai Zhen rejected the Chang-Zhu school and taught that human morality had its origin in blood-and-material force and the knowing mind. He taught that principle exists only when the feelings are not mistaken. Kang Youwei accepted a basic tenant of the Lu-Wang school that taught that book learning must be complemented with profound action. Kang was a scholar who advocated political and social reform. He saw Confucius as an innovative institutional reformer and proposed that Confucius was a divine being or god and the founder of a great religion. Kang adapted Dong Zhongshu’s concept of the three, suggesting that human history begins with an Age of Disorder, followed by an Age of Small Peace, culminating in an Age of Great Peace. During the Age of Great Peace everyone and everything will be treated exactly the same; there will be one world order, one humanity, one great unity (datong).

Twentieth Century

Confucian scholars in the twentieth century revived the tradition with what is now known as “New Confucianism.” Feng Youlan (1895–1990) revitalized rationalistic neo-Confucianism and argued that everything in existence is undergoing a continuous process of realizing principle (li) by means of material force (qi). He taught that people live in one of four spheres of life: the innocent sphere, the utilitarian or practical sphere, the moral sphere, and the transcendent sphere. Philosophy helps people to live in the last two higher spheres of life: the moral sphere and the transcendent sphere. Feng’s notion of the transcendent realm was influenced by Daoist mysticism. Xiong Shili (1883–1968) reconstructed idealistic
Confucianism and advocated that reality is change, a perpetual process of production and reproduction or closing and opening. By “closing” Xiong meant that reality has the tendency to integrate, to momentarily be what we call “matter.” By “opening” Xiong meant that reality has the tendency to maintain its own nature, to be its own master, to momentarily be what we call “mind.”

When Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and his followers won the civil war in 1949, Confucius and Confucianism were strongly attacked. Xiong, Feng, and all other scholars were forced to denounce Confucius and their own decadent views. However, after Mao’s death the Communist Party became far more tolerant of Confucianism such that by the 1990s party propaganda began to quote the ideas of Confucius or his followers.

New Confucianism has continued to develop as some scholars in China offer interpretations of the Confucian classics to help people cope with a rapidly changing China. Others are developing what Daniel A. Bell (2008), a scholar who teaches at Beijing’s Tsinghua University, has called “Left Confucianism,” which attempts to revitalize the intellectuals’ role as political and social critic. Some of the New Confucians are seeking to blend the humanitarian ideals of Marxism with those of Confucianism. In addition, in both Taiwan and the West, Confucianists advocate promoting Confucian values in democratic and capitalist societies.

James D. SELLMANN

Further Reading
As twenty-first-century China adjusts to changes brought about by the country’s opening to the West, Chinese are beginning to search for new and inspirational models, both in politics and as a philosophy to guide everyday life. Sinologists have been surprised that government officials, critical intellectuals, and ordinary citizens are turning not to Western liberal democracy for the answer, but to the venerable tradition of Confucianism.

In the late 1980s Chinese culture was viewed as the source of China’s “backwardness” and an impediment to modernity. Today, however, Chinese students often seek inspiration and guidance from Chinese culture, both for engaging in everyday ethics and for thinking about political reform. In this revival of Chinese culture Confucianism stands at the vanguard.

Several reasons exist for the revival of tradition in China. China is a rising economic power, and with economic might comes cultural pride. The view of the German political economist Max Weber, that Confucianism is not conducive to economic development, has come to be widely questioned in light of the economic success of East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage. Unlike Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, Confucianism has never had an organized resistance to economic modernization. It’s China’s turn to affirm its cultural heritage.

But modernity also has a downside: It often leads to a kind of atomism (individualism) and psychological anxiety. The competition for social status and material resources becomes more and more fierce, with declining social responsibility and other-regarding outlooks. Communitarian ways of life and civility break down. Even those who make it to the top ask, “What now?” Making money, people realize, doesn’t necessarily lead to well-being. It is only a means to the good life, but what exactly is the good life? Is it just about fighting for one’s interests?

Most people—in China, at least—do not want to be viewed as individualistic. The idea of simply focusing on individual well-being seems too self-centered. To really feel good about ourselves, we also need to be good to others. Here’s where Confucianism comes in: The tradition is based on the assumption that the good life lies in social relationships. To be fully human involves an ethic of social responsibility and political commitment. In short, Confucian ethics can help fill the moral vacuum that often accompanies modernization.

Of course, a more political reason underpins the revival. Communism has lost its capacity to inspire the Chinese: Hardly anybody believes that Marxism should provide guidelines for thinking about China’s political future. The ideology has been so discredited by its misuses that it has lost almost all legitimacy in society. In reality even the “Communist” government won’t be confined by Marxist theory if it conflicts with the imperatives to remain in power and to provide stability and harmony in society.
Why Confucianism?

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the government is turning to tradition rather than Western-style liberal democracy as a new source of political legitimacy. Government leaders are quoting Confucius and deploying Confucian values such as harmony and civility in their speeches. Political practices also reflect such values: Chinese Communist Party officials in Henan Province are assessed on the basis of Confucian values such as filial piety and family responsibility. The 2008 Beijing Olympics highlighted Confucian themes: A choir at the opening ceremony chanted well-known sayings from the Analects of Confucius, and booklets handed out to visiting journalists were sprinkled with such quotes as well. Abroad the government has been promoting Confucianism via branches of the Confucius Institute, a Chinese language and culture center similar to France’s Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe Institute.

But the revival of Confucianism is not just government sponsored. Many critical intellectuals are also turning to Confucianism to think of ways of dealing with China’s current social and political predicament. For most of the twentieth century both Chinese Marxists and liberals engaged in a comprehensive critique of their own heritage and looked to the West for inspiration. Today many Chinese intellectuals also look to their own traditions for thinking about social and political reform. Without entirely rejecting Westernization, they believe that stable and legitimate political arrangements need to be founded, at least partly, on political ideals from their own traditions. Such ideals as meritocracy, civility, and social harmony are being revived and promoted, not just by the government but also by independent intellectuals and students.

Over the last decade or so the teaching of the Confucian classics has moved back into the mainstream of society. Once dismissed as “feudal,” “hierarchical,” “patriarchal,” and “backward,” the Confucian tradition is being examined more charitably, with lessons being drawn for present-day society. An explosion has taken place in conferences and books on Confucianism in China. Courses on Confucianism are among the most popular on university campuses. The teaching curriculum for secondary schools now includes teaching of the classics, and many experimental schools focus largely on the classics. More than 10 million children are now studying the Confucian classics, many through ad hoc initiatives outside the formal educational system.

Diverse Traditions

In short, this mixture of psychological, economic, political, and philosophical trends helps to explain the revival of Confucianism in China. But Confucianism is a rich and diverse tradition, and more than one type of Confucianism is being revived. The most influential intellectual involved in the revival of Confucianism is Yu Dan, who has written a self-help book on the Analects of Confucius that has sold over 10 million copies (including 6 million pirated copies). She is a national star who often appears on television to lecture about the benefits of Confucianism for everyday life. Yu Dan also visits Chinese prisons and lectures prisoners about Confucian values. From an academic point of view, however, her contribution may not be as significant: She deliberately avoids controversial themes and resorts to ahistorical simplifications to make her points. More problematic, Yu Dan herself is openly committed to a relatively individualistic form of Daoism, and her interpretation of Confucianism neglects key Confucian themes such as social responsibility and political commitment. Her account of the Analects seems apolitical, but it deflects attention from the economic and political conditions that actually cause people’s misery. It is an implicit justification for the status quo.

The more academic revival includes historical studies and interpretations of key figures in the Confucian tradition that are not meant to have direct bearing on contemporary society. Of greater interest for our purposes are the competing interpretations of political Confucianism: interpretations that are meant to affect the way we carry out our social and political lives. Perhaps the most influential form—the form disparaged by twentieth-century critics—is traditional “conservative” or “official” Confucianism. Throughout Chinese imperial history Confucianism was combined with Legalism, China’s other main political tradition, to justify such practices as blind obedience to the ruler, the use of harsh punishments as a tool of social control, and the subordination of women in ways that offend modern sensibilities.
Today the Chinese government emphasizes “harmony” and family values such as “filial piety.” Such values may still be worth promoting—if harmony means the peaceful resolution of social conflicts instead of violent Maoist class revolution, who can object to that?—but they are often used in problematic ways that justify social quietude and submission to the powers-that-be. To be fair, the official promotion of Confucian values has been an improvement compared with the past: Today, few government officials openly invoke Confucian values to justify the subordination of women (and some academics like Chan Sin-yee are reinterpreting Confucianism so that its central values, like the idea that we should all strive to become exemplary persons, do not exclude women). Still, there is a need to consider the more critical interpretations of Confucianism.

One such interpretation is “liberal Confucianism,” promoted largely by scholars outside of China such as Tu Weiming and Theodore de Bary. According to “liberal Confucians,” Confucianism need not conflict with liberal values such as human rights and democracy and can be used to promote those values. But that’s also the problem with “liberal Confucianism”: Liberalism is used as the moral standpoint to evaluate Confucianism. The parts of Confucianism that are consistent with liberalism should be promoted, and the parts that conflict should be rejected. But this sort of approach doesn’t take Confucianism seriously as a tradition that can enrich and challenge the liberal tradition. Is it not possible that Confucianism can offer a compelling alternative to Western liberalism?

Left Confucianism is an attempt to combine the socialist tradition with the Confucian tradition—and in a way that doesn’t just take socialism as the standard but takes Confucianism equally seriously, such that Confucianism enriches and changes socialism during the course of the encounter. But one should address—parallel to the concern that leftists are using the Confucian label simply to promote progressive or socialist ideas that owe their origin to Western roots—a concern that would parallel a critique of “liberal Confucianism.” Granted, such “Western” values as social democracy, solidarity, human rights, and the rule of law need to be adopted in China. But they also need to be adapted in China. They need to be enriched, and sometimes constrained, by Confucian values. The meaning of “left Confucianism” will become more clear by sketching some traditional leftist values and showing how they might incorporate some “Confucian” characteristics. Not each characteristic is distinctly Confucian, but together they may constitute a distinctive package that warrants the label left Confucianism.

Independent Social and Political Criticism

The ancient Greek philosopher Socrates was famous for truth-seeking, and he was merciless in exposing the errors of those who made false claims to the truth. The Socratic model still informs the educational system in Western countries, where students are taught the importance of
developing a critical perspective on what they learn and seeking the truth without worrying about social harmony. The critical perspective also informs Confucianism. One of the most famous lines of the *Analects* of Confucius—that exemplary persons should pursue harmony but not conformity—has clear political implications. The contrast between harmony and conformity owes its origin to the *Zuo Zhuan*, which clearly referred to the idea that the ruler should be open to different political views among his advisers. In imperial Chinese history the ideal of the independent social critic was institutionalized in the institution of the Censorate, consisting of scholar-officials who had the mandate to criticize the government’s mistaken policies. Independent Confucian academies, often located far from the country’s capital so as not to be subject to political control, trained scholars in the art of criticism. Confucian-inspired social critics such as Yang Jisheng and Huang Zongxi penned more radical political criticisms outside of formal channels. Today social critics have drawn on the contrast between harmony and conformity to urge the government to be tolerant of differences and not simply enforce one dominant state ideology on the whole population.

But a Confucian twist, so to speak, is that criticism is best carried out on the basis of social harmony and trust. If two enemies criticize each other, they will question each other’s motives, and the result may be more bad blood. Criticism may be most effective—in the sense that it leads to improvement—if it’s founded on affective ties. Whether in the family or in the political realm, criticisms should be seen as being motivated by affection rather than hostility. In practice, it means that criticisms should be expressed in gentle and humble ways, so as to maintain harmonious relationships. Today the language of “not losing face” is used to express this ideal. The strident and self-righteous criticisms of some Western politicians and Western-based human rights organizations often fall on deaf ears in China because they are viewed as rude and
disrespectful even by those who might agree with the substance of the criticisms. Conversely, the cooperative and long-term-minded approach of such organizations as the Danish Institute of Human Rights is often more effective.

Today, of course, the media are often regarded as an important vehicle for public criticism, with investigative journalists aiming to expose official wrongdoing and social injustices. Left Confucians favor more space for an independent media with the power to tell the truth about social problems and blame the government when it’s at fault. From a Confucian perspective, however, there is also cause to worry about the kind of media model that focuses almost exclusively on bad news. It is fine to encourage private media to report on news as they see fit (so long as they avoid extreme violence and pornography), but an important task of the media would also be to promote social harmony. Such media reporting might involve the portrayal of moral exemplars, appeals to people’s better nature, and sympathy for the disadvantaged. More concretely, a Confucian-inspired model of media regulation might mean space for private media but also funding for public media that seek to promote social harmony rather than loyalty to the party. The publicly funded media might well involve positive portrayal of government leaders when they contribute to social harmony—the television news showing President Hu Jintao singing along with disabled children during the Paralympics was an inspiring moment—because leaders who do good should be seen as setting examples for others. But it is equally important for leaders who do bad to be subject to criticism.

Concern for the Disadvantaged

Socialists and left Confucians can agree that the government’s first obligation is to provide for the disadvantaged in society. To a certain extent they can also agree about what it means to be disadvantaged: It means being deprived of material goods that underpin any decent conception of the good life. But the Confucian would add that being disadvantaged is not just about lacking money. An equally serious harm is being deprived of family members and friends who make up the good life. Hence, when Mencius says the government should give first consideration to “old men without wives, old women without husbands, old people without children, and young children without fathers,” he doesn’t mean just that people are materially poor. For Mencius they are disadvantaged (partly, if not mainly) because they are deprived of key human relations. Such views help to explain why East Asian states with a Confucian heritage often rely on the family to provide welfare services, with the state stepping in to help those without family members. For example, health care insurance in Singapore is family rather than individual based—with family members responsible for each other’s insurance, including the obligation of adult children to take out insurance for elderly parents—and

People pass by beggars on the street in China on their way to temple. PHOTO BY ROBERT EATON.
similar arrangements have also been implemented in China’s rural areas. The state takes responsibility for elderly parents without relatives. Such insurance schemes might seem peculiar in Western countries, but they are not nearly as controversial in East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage.

**Concern for Economic Equality**

Socialists seek to reduce the gap between rich and poor. In Western countries they also tend to favor social equality, that is, a society in which people treat each other as equals regardless of status. To the extent possible, the elderly and the young as well as bosses and assistants should disregard social status when they engage in everyday social behavior: For example, they should address each other on a first-name basis. There may be several reasons why social equality and economic equality are thought to go together. One reason is that an ideal society would do away with all power relationships, whether based on social status or class (modern liberal ideas put forth by some philosophers, such as John Rawls’s original position and Jurgen Habermas’s ideal speech situation, are meant to express the ideal of equal power). Another reason is that social equality is more likely to contribute to economic equality: The more likely people treat each other as social equals, the more likely they are to support measures that reduce the gap between rich and poor.

Confucians do not deny that an ideal society should do away with all power relationships. But such utopian ideals may be appropriate only for small communities of like-minded people, such as Israeli kibbutzim, or advanced technological societies where machines would do almost all of the unwanted labor, as in Marx’s ideal of communism. Confucians are realists in the sense that they take for granted that power relationships will exist in large-scale societies and that the question is how to make those power relationships work for the interests of the powerless. And here’s another Confucian characteristic: Confucians worry less about social hierarchies, particularly hierarchies based on age and achievement. If a choice must be made between social equality and economic equality, then Confucians would choose economic equality, and social inequalities should be made to work for economic equality.

How might that work? The ancient Confucian thinker Xunzi proposed the idea of social rituals that include people of different social statuses. By participating in common rituals, those with more status come to develop feelings of care for the others and thus become more willing to do things in their economic interest. For example, a boss in Japan or South Korea might enjoy singing karaoke with a worker. The ritual is hierarchical—the boss sings first and perhaps for a longer period, but after a period of singing and drinking affective bonds are strengthened, and the boss is less likely to dismiss the worker in difficult economic times. Such rituals help to explain the practice of lifelong employment in large Japanese and Korean corporations. More generally, such inclusive rituals help to explain why Japan and Korea—perhaps the most socially hierarchical societies in East Asia—also have relatively equal distributions of wealth.

A small society such as that of Norway, which is relatively homogeneous and endowed with substantial natural resources, may be able to afford equality all the way through. The Confucian, however, recognizes that the choice for most societies is between a socially egalitarian society like the United States, where the way to express power typically takes the form of wealth, and societies governed by informal rituals that express differences in social status, in which the powerful do not have to rely to the same extent on material wealth to show their “superiority.” For the Confucian the latter society is preferable: The key is to promote rituals involving the powerful and the powerless so that the rich are made to feel a sense of community with the powerless and thus are less likely to seek other forms of domination (such as material wealth).

Another difference between Western socialists and Confucians is that the former are more likely to favor political and civil rights over economic rights (in cases where such rights conflict) as a society seeks to secure material equality. The U.S. Constitution expresses the basic liberal preference for civil and political rights. Even left liberals such as John Rawls stipulate without much argument that civil and political rights outrank principles of economic justice in cases where they conflict. Rawls does allow for very poor societies on the verge of starvation to prioritize the right to food, but that’s about as far
as most leftists in the West are prepared to go in terms of sacrificing civil and political rights in the interests of economic rights.

In East Asia it’s not just the Chinese Communist Party that believes the right to food comes first. The idea that the state has an obligation to deal with material deprivation goes back more than two thousand years—as opposed to Western political history, where poverty was considered a problem for political stability or a matter for charity until the eighteenth century or so. Hence, it shouldn’t be surprising that the obligation to secure a people’s means of subsistence is a widely held value that trumps other political values in cases of conflict. China is probably beyond the “Rawlsian minimum,” meaning that few Chinese are starving or malnourished, and yet the idea that democracy should wait until the economy is more developed is not nearly as controversial as it might be in leftist circles in the West (whether there actually is a conflict between democratic rights and economic development now in China is an empirical question, but where the issues are not so clear cut even independent leftist Chinese intellectuals might prefer not to argue forcefully for democracy now). Another example might be the hukou (household registration) system in China, which limits people’s mobility in the interests of securing a stable and orderly environment for economic development. The hukou system is breaking down now, but there are still restrictions on moving to large cities such as Shanghai and Beijing, and such restrictions are not nearly as controversial as they might be in the West.

**Solidarity with Strangers**

The value of solidarity is central to the socialist tradition (and less central to the liberal tradition). In the West socialists have argued for realizing solidarity by different means. For French revolutionaries the task was to change the political system as well as hierarchical social practices, such as banning the use of the formal personal pronoun vous in favor of the informal tu. For Marxists the path to solidarity lies in violent class revolution that would abolish private ownership of the means of production. Social democrats argue for realizing the value of solidarity by means of a state-enforced system of equal rights for all citizens.

The Confucian way to solidarity is different in both means and ends. The idea is expressed in the opening passage of the Great Learning:

> The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will is sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there is peace throughout the world. (Tian Xia)

The idea is that ties should be extended to others, starting from the family to the state and ultimately to the whole world. But the end is not a universal solidarity by which all treat each other as equals. Rather, ties are extended with diminishing intensity, so that strangers will be treated well but without the same degree of love shared among family members.

And how is this ideal of “graded love” to be realized? Confucians have emphasized two mechanisms. The first is to learn care and compassion within the family and then to extend care to others by applying family-like labels and norms to nonfamily members. In Chinese, for example, students and alumni will refer to each other as younger or older siblings; graduate supervisors will refer to their students as younger siblings; and (in the best cases) employers and employees will use family-like language to refer to each other. The extension of such terms of family endearment to nonfamily members is far more widespread than in most Western languages and contributes to a sense of solidarity in East Asian societies.

Confucian solidarity is also realized by means of rituals that civilize and elevate, particularly in the context of competitive relationships that would otherwise degenerate into hostility and antagonism, if not warfare. Confucians take for granted that human desires can undermine social cooperation, but the task is to civilize those desires rather than suppress them. And it’s particularly important for the “winners”—those with power and social status—to act in civilized ways, to show modesty and courtesy during the course of rituals designed to civilize human desires. These rituals are particularly evident in sporting activities, past and present. Confucius’s account of the
gentleman-archer—“Exemplary persons are not competitive, but they must still compete in archery. Greeting and making way for each other, the archers ascend the hall, and returning they drink a salute. Even during competition, they are exemplary persons” (3.7)—echoes the rituals of sumo wrestlers. Such rituals also inform sports that developed in Western countries—the rituals of helping opponents up after a fall and exchanging sweat-soaked shirts at the end of football games come to mind—but they are more central to sporting traditions that developed in Confucian-influenced East Asian societies. In the 2008 Beijing Olympics the gold medal winners from China often seemed humble and kind to opponents, perhaps due (at least partly) to the civility campaigns conducted prior to the games. In the same vein the Chinese fans were generally respectful of other teams and athletes.

Global Justice

Socialists often take a global perspective on justice. Confucians agree—the ultimate end of politics is a form of government that serves the whole world’s peoples, or at least takes their interests into account: a politics for the people. But which people count? Leftists in the West tend to emphasize the interests of the current generation of the world’s peoples and more recently, in response to the environmental movement, the interests of future generations. But Confucians also take seriously the interests

Rubbings from residence of descendents of Confucius. Qufu, Shandong Province. The Chinese government in the twenty-first century is turning to tradition rather than Western-style liberal democracy as a new source of political legitimacy, quoting Confucius and deploying Confucian values such as harmony and civility in their speeches.

Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
of their dead ancestors. In Confucian-influenced South Korea and southern Chinese provinces such as Fujian, for example, many households and communities still practice ancestor worship. The Confucian scholar Jiang Qing has proposed a house of government (the House of Historical Continuity) with the explicit task of maintaining continuity of various traditions, including the traditions of minority groups such as Tibetan Buddhists. For Confucians, identities are constituted by the values and practices of one’s ancestors, who may still be hovering overhead in some form or other, and it doesn’t seem so far-fetched to think about how to secure the interests of one’s not-so-dead ancestors in social and political life. Put differently, a regime that secures the interests of the current generation of the world’s peoples but neglects those of its descendants and ancestors would be unjust from the perspective of left Confucians.

Another key difference lies in ways of thinking of how to realize politics for the people. Perhaps the most sacred political value in the West is politics by the people in the form of “one person, one vote.” Those who question this democratic mechanism are often thought to have lost their moral bearings. (In the nineteenth century, it was a different story: The British philosopher John Stuart Mill justified democratic mechanisms in terms of their consequences, and he was prepared to contemplate modifications that produce better consequences.)

One clear problem with “one person, one vote” is that equality ends at the boundaries of the political community; those outside the community are neglected. The national focus of the democratically elected political leaders is part of the system, so to speak; they are meant to serve the community of voters, not foreigners living outside the political community. Even democracies that work well tend to focus on the interests of citizens and neglect the interests of foreigners. But political leaders, especially leaders of big countries such as China, make decisions that affect the rest of the world (consider global warming), and they need to consider the interests of the rest of the world when they make decisions.

Hence, left Confucians put forward political models that are meant to work better than Western-style democracy in terms of realizing global justice. The ideal is not necessarily a world where all persons treat each other as an equal—as mentioned, Confucians favor extending care but recognize that care will diminish in intensity as it extends from intimates to strangers—but rather one where the interests of strangers would be taken more seriously than in most nation-centered democracies. And the key value for realizing global justice is meritocracy, meaning equality of opportunity in education and government, with positions of leadership being distributed to the most virtuous and qualified members of the community. The idea here is that everybody has the potential to become morally exemplary, but in real life the capacity to make competent and morally justifiable political judgments varies between people, and an important task of the political system is to identify those with above-average capacity. One idea might be to give extra votes to elderly people. Confucians assume that wisdom normally increases with age as people’s roles change and life experience deepens—the role of an adult child caring for an elderly parent in particular cultivates such virtues as empathy and humility—and as they gather longer experience in particular roles. A doctor with a few years’ experience, for instance, should have better understanding and judgment than a brand new doctor.

Another proposal is for a meritocratic house of government, with deputies selected by such mechanisms as free and fair competitive examinations, which would have the task of securing the interests typically neglected by democratically selected political decision makers such as foreigners, future generations, ancestors, and minority groups. A meritocratic house of government would balance and complement a democratic house, and, however imperfect, the idea is to better approximate the ideal of global justice. The value of political meritocracy is deeply embedded in East Asian political discourse, and political proposals to realize it are not typically seen as eccentric or dangerous (in the West, by contrast, much of the political discourse assumes that states must be either democratic or authoritarian, and alternatives that do not fit neatly within that dichotomy are often dismissed out of hand).

Another characteristic of left Confucianism is support for humanitarian intervention abroad, but only if the aim is to remove tyrants who violate people’s right to life. Even Mencius, the most “soft” of the left Confucians, defended the idea that wars can be launched abroad in order to remove ruthless tyrants who are resistant to morality. Leftists in the West who defend humanitarian intervention have abroad put forward different justifications. For Michael Walzer, perhaps the most influential theorist of
just war, the value of membership in a particular political community is a fundamental human good and helps to underpin judgments regarding the justice of warfare. Other prominent intellectuals such as Michael Ignatieff and Thomas Friedman defended the U.S. invasion of Iraq partly on the grounds that it was supposed to promote democracy in the Middle East. Left Confucians reject both those justifications for humanitarian intervention: Only the relief of human suffering at the hands of a tyrant could justify the use of armed force abroad.

Religious Toleration

Today most leftists recognize the ideal of tolerating different forms of religions. The “fact of pluralism” is a feature of modern societies, and it seems only fair to allow different people to practice the forms of religious life that are most compelling to them. Even those who are convinced of atheism do not argue for banning religion. But some leftists in the West object to any role for religion in public life.

Left Confucians do not take a strong view regarding religion. Following the example of the early Confucian thinkers such as Confucius himself, they leave open metaphysical commitments, focusing their efforts on the problems of earthly life. Hence, it’s not inconceivable to be a Confucian in social and political life and, say, a Buddhist or Christian regarding metaphysical commitments. Early Confucianism was not meant to provide a final answer to existential questions about human suffering and life after death, and it leaves open the idea that religions may do a better job in that respect.

But some left Confucians like Jiang Qing do take Confucianism seriously as a religion with a metaphysical foundation and draw the implication that there should be official state sponsorship of Confucianism as a kind of religion. The idea is that Confucianism needs to be taught in schools and promoted in villages and communities with some sort of financial support from the state. Partly the idea is to train future rulers in Confucian ethics so that they will rule with moral sensitivity. But Jiang Qing emphasizes that other religions would be tolerated, and he compares his ideal with state support for official religions in Sweden and the United Kingdom: Other religions would not be prohibited and would be able to flourish despite state support for one religion. Jiang explicitly makes room for the political representation of other religions in his proposed third house of government, the House of Historical Continuity.

Still, the idea of state support for Confucianism does seem to go well beyond the northern European model, especially in terms of state backing for Confucianism in education and community life. Jiang Qing has also proposed the reintroduction of state-supported Confucian burial rituals after natural disasters such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake (although he allows for the possibility that members of minority groups could follow their own burial rituals). Another way in which “official Confucianism” would influence policy is that civil servants would be able to take paid leave for a limited period of mourning in the event of the death of a parent, similar to the one-month period of mourning leave granted to civil servants in South Korea. It could also be argued that Confucian ideas already influence state policy—for example, elderly parents are entitled to a share of property if an adult child dies intestate in the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, notwithstanding different political and legal systems—and making Confucianism official would make such policies matters of public debate and perhaps lead to improvements. If such proposals for “official Confucianism” are implemented in ways that tolerate and respect other religious practices, they are worth taking seriously. The history of “official Confucianism” in imperial China does offer reason to be wary of state misuses of Confucianism, but it also offers some inspiring moments. In the late sixteenth century, as Yu Ying-shih notes, Matteo Ricci was amazed to discover that the Chinese religious atmosphere was highly tolerant, with Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism all seen as capturing a vision of the same Dao (Day).

Beyond China?

Early Confucian thinkers assumed that their ideals were universally valid: They were meant to be applicable to all human beings, and an ideal world would be composed of people who endorse (and live by) those ideals. A world where different people live in accordance with different values in different parts of the world would have been considered second best. In that sense Confucianism
is put forward as a philosophy with universal validity, similar to liberalism and Christianity. It is inaccurate to say that liberalism is universal whereas Confucianism is particularistic: They are both meant to be universal in scope.

But which interpretation of Confucianism makes most sense in China today depends on particular factors. It depends on what Chinese people actually think now: Any interpretation must be consistent with basic aspirations, though it should also push to improve those aspirations. For example, left Confucianism may be compelling to Chinese because it draws and builds on widely shared values such as concern for the disadvantaged. It also depends on what Chinese intellectuals regard as pressing needs. Jiang Qing, for one, thinks there is a need for a different philosophical foundation for the state. He argues that Marxism no longer appeals to people and that Confucianism is most likely to do so. Hence, he tries to articulate an interpretation of Confucianism that addresses the political need for institutions that are stable in the long term because they are founded partly, if not mainly, on Chinese political traditions. Interpretations of Confucianism also depend upon claims that can be supported by empirical evidence. It would be important, for instance, to test the idea that caring for elderly parents is an important mechanism for developing a sense of empathy extended to others.

Under what conditions is Confucianism likely to be seen as compelling by the rest of the world? One condition is that societies undergo prolonged crises of confidence. It is a sad truth, perhaps, that people are more inclined to learn from others when their own ways prove to be problematic. Chinese intellectuals looked to the West only when traditional ways of social and political life broke down, and it may take a similar crisis of confidence in the West before large numbers of Western intellectuals turn to Confucianism for hope and inspiration. Meanwhile it is important for the West to tolerate, if not respect, areas of morally justifiable areas of difference. Another condition that would aid the project of universalizing Confucianism is that Confucian ideas are widely seen as influencing China's political practices and institutions. The theory has to come alive, so to speak. After the Chinese state acts morally in accordance with Confucian ideas, then it can articulate and promote its soft power to the rest of the world. If it's just talk, nobody will listen.

**Daniel A. BELL**

**Further Reading**

The philosopher Confucius, China’s greatest teacher, stressed such values as moral integrity and empathy and such practices as rule by virtue rather than by law. His teachings continue to influence Chinese and other Asian cultures.

Confucius is recognized as China’s greatest teacher. His family name was “Kong,” and his personal name was “Qiu” (stylized as “Zhongni”), but he was eventually given the title “Kong the grand master” (Kong Fuzi), which has been Latinized as “Confucius.” He was born in the state of Lu (in Shandong Province) in 551 BCE during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). Confucius’s father died when the son was three; by seventeen, Confucius supported his mother. Confucius married at age nineteen, had two daughters and a son, and held a minor office in Lu. He dedicated his life to teaching but believed that he was called to reform the decaying Zhou culture.

At the age of fifty-one Confucius was promoted to magistrate and subsequently to the post of minister of justice. Discouraged by conditions in Lu, when he was fifty-six Confucius and his closest disciples traveled to other states to find a worthy ruler to implement Confucius’s teachings. However, after almost thirteen years Confucius returned to Lu to teach. Tradition says that he wrote or edited the Five Classics (Shujing, Shijing, I Ching [Yijing], Chunqiu, and Liji) and the now-lost classic of Music. Of the three thousand students he is said to have had, only seventy-two mastered his teachings, and only twenty-two were close disciples.

After his death Confucius’s reputation underwent a process of apotheosis (elevation to divine status). By
the time of the philosopher Mencius (371–289 BCE), Confucius was called a sage. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) emperors often made offerings at his tomb, which became a shrine and later a temple. Confucius was given the imperial title “duke” in 1 CE, “foremost teacher” six hundred years later, in 637, “king” in 739, and “perfect sage” in 1013. By 1906, two and a half millennia after his birth, the ritual for the “emperor on high” was performed in the name of Kong Fuzi.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279) the scholar Zhu Xi streamlined Confucian education by compiling the Four Books: Mencius, Analects, Great Learning, and Centrality and Commonality; the Analects is usually considered most important. With typical “Chinese humility,” Confucius claims in the Analects to be a transmitter rather than an innovator. This claim is certainly not the case, but it displays the importance of maintaining historical precedent, namely, following the example of the ancient sages to practice self-cultivation, to sacrifice personal wealth and needs for the good of the community, and to rule by virtue rather than by law.

Confucius indeed was an innovative teacher. He opened his school to all serious students, even commoners, transforming aristocratic values into collective moral values. His teaching methods went beyond vocational training, emphasizing moral cultivation, which institutionalized the literati class and influenced Chinese history.

Confucius stressed literacy (wen) and required that his students be enthusiastic, serious, and self-reflective. His teachings are practical. He taught that all persons, but especially members of the ruling class, must develop their moral integrity by practicing ritual action (li) to express person-to-person care or humanity (ren) to become a consummate person (junzi). Empathy (shu), defined in the Analects as “never do to another what you do not desire,” summarizes his teachings in a single word. With the renewed interest in Confucius, even in the People’s Republic of China, his teachings continue to influence Chinese and other Asian cultures.

James D. SELLMANN

Further Reading

The Confucius Institute is a nonprofit public organization established in 2004 and run by China’s Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) under the Ministry of Education. Its mission is to promote Chinese language and culture throughout the world.

The Chinese government initiated the Confucius Institute in response to the growing interest in China and the international demand for Chinese language instruction. In this way, it is similar to the U.K.’s British Council and Germany’s Goethe Institute.

After establishing a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in June 2004, the first Confucius Institute opened in November 2004 in Seoul, Korea. Today they are found on every continent (except Antarctica); by 2009, there were 307 Confucius Institutes in seventy-eight countries. The most recent opening was at the University of Costa Rica in November of 2008. The Confucius Institutes often have been formed within existing universities and colleges, although according to the official website this is not a prerequisite. Some are also found in public education settings. Regardless of location, they abide by local laws and regulations and are subject to supervision and inspections from the local educational administrative authorities.

The Ministry of Education estimates that by 2010 there will be approximately 100 million people worldwide learning Chinese as a foreign language; it plans to set up more than one hundred additional Confucius Institutes worldwide, according to Xu Lin, director of the Chinese Language Council International (‘China threat’ countered by culture 2006). The Internet will be used in the future as well: Michigan State University’s Confucius Institute has established a Chinese education island in Second Life, the online “virtual meeting environment.”

Public and institutional reactions to the Confucius Institute vary. There is concern about their sponsorship by the Chinese government, with fears that this could lead to undue influence from Beijing on curricula within Asian studies departments of colleges and universities where the institutes are located. On the other hand, they are being widely adopted throughout the world with the hope of teaching the world about China and ultimately fostering mutual collaboration.

Further Reading


Consumerism in China is not a new development; for hundreds of years Chinese have used material goods to convey status and identity. Mass consumerism, however, is a relatively new phenomenon that has both advantages and disadvantages to the social and economic fabric of China.

The development of modern mass consumerism in China and subsequent transformation of most aspects of life has been both beneficial and detrimental to the Chinese. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted from poverty and have the opportunity to enjoy products and services previously unavailable or unaffordable. In the past few decades, China has become the world’s largest consumer of a number of products, including everything from meat to mobile phones. The lives of tens and even hundreds of millions of consumers in urban China increasingly resemble their American, Japanese, and European counterparts. At the same time, China’s rapid increase in per capita consumption threatens its and the world’s environment.

Chinese elites have used luxury goods as a way to create identity and communicate status for hundreds of years. As late as 1800, the wealthiest part of China in the lower Yangzi Valley surrounding Shanghai may have been as wealthy as the richest part of Western Europe. And local elite circles created social capital by exchanging rare gifts, assembling expensive dowries, collecting art objects, and hosting lavish weddings and funerals. Textiles, teas, opium, books, and other commodities were consumed well beyond the regions where they were produced. Consumption habits gradually spread down the social hierarchy and luxuries such as sugar and tea became more widely consumed.

But “modern consumerism,” which refers to the consumption of branded, mass-produced goods and services, and the orientation of social life and rhetoric around consumption, is a more recent phenomenon. The bleak material conditions in China from World War II through the civil war (1945–1949), and throughout the Maoist era (1949–1976) misleadingly suggest that modern Chinese consumerism arrived only after the death of Mao and Maoism. But China has had elements of modern consumerism since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Urban China, particularly the key treaty ports of Guangzhou, Tianjin, and particularly Shanghai, encouraged consumerism through modern retailing, exhibition halls, and advertising. Varying modes of transportation, such as rickshaws, automobiles, and bicycles, established more integrated markets, and new public environments within modern schools and workplaces were used to showcase new products. In addition, urban China supplied the energy sources necessary for the electricity required by new consumer products and lifestyles. During this time, Chinese people, especially but not exclusively urban elites, introduced new objects into their homes and leisure activities. And a growing number of Chinese altered their appearance from head (Western-style hats) to toe (leather shoes and cotton socks).

Understanding the impact of these commodities is challenging, particularly with regard to how people used
and thought about all the products and services they consumed. Unlike Americans and western Europeans, Chinese did not leave detailed probate records revealing exactly what households owned, but the memoirs of foreign travelers readily show that Chinese adapted imports for local and even individual purposes. For instance, fashionable urban women in the early twentieth-century confidently mixed and matched traditional and imported clothing articles to invent their own original styles. This adaptation also was common for Chinese citizens least likely to have access to information about or contact with foreigners and how they used their material artifacts. Often the Chinese weren’t encumbered by the knowledge of a product’s intended use. Urban slum dwellers, for example, built shacks out of discarded iron Standard Oil cans.

Despite these consumptive behaviors, Chinese consumers were not always free to consume whatever they could afford, nor could they determine the social significance of the items they bought. In China, modern consumerism has always been connected with imperialism. During the nineteenth century, Europeans, Americans, and eventually the Japanese demanded access to Chinese markets. Through the First Opium War (1839–1842) the British and subsequently many others achieved access to Chinese markets at a time when the relative superiority of Chinese material culture had declined markedly. That is, the products of the industrializing imperialist powers were appealing, and the Chinese learned to desire imports. In the nineteenth century, the most prominent of these imports were opium and Western military hardware, but by 1900 the desire for imports extended to a vast array of consumer goods, including silk, considered to be the symbolic heart of China. Japanese silk displaced Chinese silk in foreign markets and increasingly penetrated the domestic market. From concepts of male and female beauty, to forms of sport and entertainment, to styles of architecture and personal appearance, Chinese associated the foreign and Western with a better and more fashionable lifestyle.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the rapid increase in imports and the desires they stimulated threatened powerful domestic interest groups. Chinese politicians worried about trade deficits and the new consumer lifestyles. Educated elites, who had begun to read works on Western political economy, feared the loss of sovereignty implicit in the growing foreign dominance of the economy, and manufacturers struggled to produce products to compete against new imports. These concerns ultimately produced a multifaceted “Buy Chinese” campaign.
conducted in cities across the country. Advocates developed countless ways to exhort fellow Chinese to consume China-made goods, including skillfully co-opting foreign commodity spectacles like product exhibitions. Also, as the outbreak of frequent anti-imperialist boycotts demonstrates, they forced consumers to buy Chinese. Nevertheless, in the absence of a powerful state to enforce the nationalistic consumption of Chinese products through tariffs, such efforts had limited success.

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 soon ended the ease with which consumers embraced consumerism for four reasons: Mao Zedong’s well-known anti-urban biases, the initial decision to emulate the Soviet Union’s economic model with its emphasis on state-owned heavy industry and neglect of consumer goods, the elimination of private enterprise, and the appeal of autarkic (self-sufficient) economic growth after a century of imperialism. The Communists gradually forced foreign multinationals to leave China and eliminated most foreign brands from the marketplace by imposing higher tariffs and outright bans. After some initial hesitation, which allowed consumer lifestyles to persist into the mid-1950s, the state appropriated all private enterprises, eliminating the trend-setting consumer class of urban capitalists.

“Consumerism” is not usually associated with Mao’s China because China under Mao radically reshaped consumerism; however Mao’s influence never eliminated consumerism fully from Chinese life. China continued to mass-produce a limited number of branded goods, and consumer goods and services remained objects of everyday discussion and important building blocks for personal and collective identity. The Communists worked tirelessly to eliminate all traces of consumerism, particularly following the shift to ideological over material incentives during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), but even the most extreme attempts to eliminate consumerism may have had unintended consequence of heightening a form of consumer consciousness.

The spread of consumerism in East Asia after World War II culminated in China. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping began depoliticizing daily life and launched economic reforms that led to growth rates equal to Japan’s earlier record levels. Now the Chinese state stakes its political legitimacy on economic growth and encourages citizens to consume, a shift in attitudes and policies toward consumerism embodied in the popular Communist Party slogan of the 1980s: “To get rich is glorious!”

The market reforms of the late 1970s and 1980s...
introduced tremendous uncertainty for consumers. Fixed prices shifted to market prices, creating new consumer issues, including resentment of unfair pricing, the sales of imitations through deceptive packaging, food adulteration, false advertising claims, product liability, and warranty issues. Chinese consumerism was fraught with media scandals and popular panics and rumors surrounding products and services. For instance, in the summer of 1985, a scandal erupted over the sale of supposedly dirty imported used clothing that was sold as new. Furthermore, a Beijing textile and clothing association report concluded that the clothing was not just used but came from people with diseases. That winter at least twenty cities and counties participated in efforts to find and destroy the offending clothing.

This unstable environment led to a “consumer movement” that included academic, bureaucratic, and social dimensions. In 1983, the Chinese government sponsored the creation of the Chinese Consumers’ Association, the country’s central consumer protection association. By 2001, the association had 3,000-plus local branches across China and had received over 6 million consumer complaints. The 1980s also saw the beginnings of the academic study of consumerism and the publication of consumer magazines and newspapers to protect “consumer rights,” as they became known. Finally, the Chinese Communist Party recast itself as a protector of consumers. The party-state established regulatory agencies such as the National Administration of Industry and Commerce, which regulates trademarks and advertisements, and the Commodity Inspection Bureau, which requires companies to add product warnings.

For over a decade but especially after the global financial crisis of 2008, Chinese and world political and business leaders have pinned their hopes for domestic and global economic growth on Chinese consumers. In other words, Chinese must save less and consume more. In 2008, rising political star Vice Premier Li Keqiang voiced the conventional wisdom among top policy makers, “Boosting domestic demand is essential for proping up growth,” (China’s vice premier urges demand boost: state media, 2008) especially in the face of global economic weakness. Chinese leaders have implemented policies designed to address the anxieties behind high savings, which include escalating medical, education, housing, and retirement costs. To counter rising costs of living, Chinese leaders have permitted the establishment of private lending companies, accelerated urbanization, and instituted extended holidays around the lunar New Year, National Day (1 October), and, until 2007, Labor Day.
Day (1 May). They have also deregulated the financial sector to facilitate consumer borrowing through mortgages, credit cards, and car loans.

While some politicians and scholars anxiously wonder whether Chinese will consume enough, others speculate the opposite. The rise of Chinese consumerism with its reliance on a rapidly escalating use of non-renewable resources has created urgent questions about the sustainability of modern consumerism in China and elsewhere. The scale and scope of environmental problems directly related to the production of consumer goods for China and for the world cannot be overstated. Acid rain already falls on a third of the country, three to six hundred million Chinese lack access to clean drinking water and, with sixteen of the world’s twenty most polluted cities, a third of all urban residents breathe polluted air, prematurely killing over 400,000 people a year from asthma, emphysema, and lung cancer. What will happen as Chinese consumers, further urged by their government and the world, to “catch up” with the global North in per capita consumption of energy and other goods and services? Likewise, what’s the responsibility and culpability of the rest of the world for creating this dire situation?

Karl GERTH

Further Reading


Corporate Social Responsibility
Qiyè shèhùi zèrèn 企业社会责任

The history of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in China has as many variations as it has definitions. Understanding those definitions is key to realizing the varied ways that companies and consumers have interacted in the past and how they will do so in the future.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained a critical mass of attention in China in the last half decade. ChinaCSR.com, an online publication started in 2003, reports on a wide variety of CSR programs, conferences, and publications in China for both Western and Chinese companies. But many researchers point either to China’s opening up in the late 1970s or even to the Communist revolution of 1949 as the start of China’s commitment to connecting the ascendancy of industry with the social good. For the former viewpoint, China’s reforms in the 1980s and 1990s created an environment where businesses were held to higher standards and made to comply with new laws. As for the latter rationale that CSR has its roots in the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the creation of the danwei (work unit) was key to harmoniously placing the interests of the people in direct relation with how they produced goods, how they were cared for, and how they were schooled.

Even though these are simplified histories of the genesis of China’s CSR movement, they parallel the disparate ways that companies—and consumers—have come to think of CSR in China. While CSR is generally considered the overarching moniker used for connecting business with its impact on society, other terms like sustainability, corporate citizenship, and green company are frequently used. Under these vague terms comes a layer of more definitive words, such as cleantech, green building, supplier compliance, volunteerism, product safety, and charitable giving. Understanding that these words can mean both everything and nothing is crucial in determining whether a company is engaging in truly responsible behavior or is merely conducting a “greenwashing” campaign in China under the auspices of its misguided public relations firm.

Current Perspectives on CSR

While perhaps there was some fearful hesitancy a few years ago within the Chinese government to fully embrace a more updated idea of CSR, such as additional costs to exports, the situation has now changed. Not only are there new proposed regulations that would require foreign companies to submit their own sustainability reports within China, but various sectors within the Chinese economy have embraced both domestic and international standards to help propel Chinese businesses to greater heights around the world.

There has been a push recently to influence Chinese companies to comply with the international SA8000 standard for ethical workplace conditions, and in 2005, agencies in China worked with the European Union to formulate the China Social Compliance standard (CSC9000T) for the textile industry. On the heels of a tainted medicine scandal in 2007, a massive push was
initiated to provide a transparent mechanism within which Chinese pharmaceutical companies could operate, and at the same time, the Chinese advertising industry was provided better guidelines to give consumers more trustworthy corporate propaganda from these same drug companies. Individuals are empowered too: Chinese media is filled with daily reports of consumers suing companies because of corporate irresponsibility.

These varying initiatives underlie exactly how companies both define their CSR and undertake to make themselves more responsible to their stakeholders. A key difference between a company operating in China and one operating in Europe or North America is the hierarchy in which those companies place their respective stakeholders. Whereas a British company might focus on its customers and investors as its most vital constituencies, the government sits at the top of the CSR pyramid in China as the important stakeholder in a business. And partitioned further, a software company’s primary CSR focus might be education, while a clothing manufacturer might be concerned more with worker safety. Just as every snowflake is slightly different, there is no one way to formulate CSR initiatives across the business spectrum. Any attempt at defining what is and what is not CSR usually comes from the lips of paid “sustainability consultants” who thrive on confusing corporate executives with hollow caveats and hyperbole.

According to ChinaCSR.com, the American chamber of commerce in Shanghai gives awards annually for CSR; a review of award recipients shows the diversity of its projects. In 2008, the award went to FedEx and Orbis for their work in promoting education about and training for the treatment of preventable blindness in China. The overall CSR award for small and medium businesses went to PMI Shanghai International Trading for its efforts in compliance, audit, and environmental initiatives. In addition, a sustainable community development honor was given to acknowledge the partnership between electronics manufacturer Tecsun and Changjiang Civilian Education Foundation.

**Outlooks for CSR**

While it’s important to understand some of the various ideas of how and when CSR developed in China, it is critical to understand where CSR is heading in the future. With Chinese firms like Haier, Lenovo, and Chery making advances into foreign countries, companies who were once reticent about embracing CSR as a business fundamental are now faced with a global supply chain that can easily cause havoc everywhere in the world if one small link is broken. Companies are proactively reaching out to engage government, consumers, investors, and suppliers in multifaceted initiatives to bolster legal compliance, create better brand equity, strengthen financial oversight, and ensure sound manufacturing principles. One employee in China working in a food processing factory who does not wash his hands can infect food shipped around the world and affect the company’s brand over a long period of time. And the Internet now ships bad news around the world faster than companies can react.

Faced with both the opportunity of grabbing new market share around the world and the risk that irresponsibility can impair that growth, Chinese companies are flocking to undertake CSR programs. The United Nations Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative have gained steam within China in recent years with more adherents, and more companies are creating CSR director and CSR manager roles. Hong Kong-based hotel chain Shangri-La recently unveiled a new sustainability manager position, and the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank has a team who work together on enhancing the bank’s CSR functions.

But some worry that the current financial troubles could impact this trend. ChinaCSR.com speculates that as goes the global economic downturn, so goes funding for corporate expenditures deemed nonessential, including some CSR programs. Many are put on hold until an institution regains financial footing, and in China, CSR program managers are worried about losing traction for their initiatives in China.

The biggest CSR hurdles for Chinese companies will continue to be the same problems that plague their Western counterparts. First, as Chinese companies grow they will have more suppliers around the world. Each supplier is a potential weak point, and so continual oversight is necessary. Next, every company runs the risk of greenwashing. After the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, some Chinese companies were ridiculed for not only giving too little in donations, but also for making the act of donating too much of a public relations gimmick. Finally, full
commitment from a company’s executive management and board of directors is intrinsic to encouraging corporate social responsibility to be deeply ingrained in all the business processes. Even during recessions, companies must focus on the long-term benefits of CSR.

Danny LEVINSON

Further Reading


Corruption

Tānwǔ fǔbài 贪污腐败

Corruption has always plagued China, even as it has been frowned on by most of society. Factors embedded in the modern, Communist, system—such as centralization of the economy, state control of resources, lack of a clear division between public and private sectors, and a single political party—seem to promote corruption.

Tanwu, the Chinese word for corruption, comprises characters literally meaning “dirt” and “greed.” When combined with the word fūhuá or fūbài, the meaning is “a corrupt individual, society, or government.” The Chinese people generally regard corruption as a serious social and political problem. Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have realized that the practice has gravely threatened its legitimacy and have repeatedly launched anticorruption campaigns.

Corruption in China has a long history. The writer-philosophers of the early classical documents regarded corruption as a moral depravity, a violation of the prevailing moral code. Even the emperor was accountable. An emperor who was corrupt had betrayed his Mandate of Heaven, which gave him his right to rule. As early as the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), punishment was meted out for public corruption. The Qin criminal code contained a list of severe penalties for offenses related to “dereliction of duty in office.”

Public corruption contributed to the Taiping rebellion (taiping tiengo, “the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace”) of 1851 to 1864, the largest uprising in modern Chinese history. Government mismanagement of public works and a weakening economy, along with military defeats at the hands of Western forces, sparked the rebellion. Leaders of this pivotal event in Chinese history introduced many of the ideas and reforms that helped shape modern China.

In the People’s Republic, the definition of corruption has changed according to the political aims of the period. In more politically radical times, deviation from the prevailing ideology, which was considered antisocialist or bureaucratic behavior, was a sign of corruption. During these times reports of corrupt behavior were seldom made public. Only at the end of the 1970s, as reform policies began to emerge, was the press permitted to report cases of corruption again.

Some cases of corruption became public spectacle. This was the time of the trials of the infamous “Gang of Four,” four officials of the CCP accused of attempting to seize power after Mao’s death. The gang—led by Jiang Qing, Mao’s last wife—and their associates were branded as counterrevolutionary forces and officially held accountable for most of the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.

Despite periodic crackdowns on public corruption, the problem continues. Factors embedded in the system—such as centralization of the economy, state control of resources, lack of a clear division between public and private sectors, and a single political party—seem to promote corruption. Psychological factors, too—such as defects in the revolutionary model, changes in values, shortages of goods and resources, and the division between town and country—contribute to corruption.
To make matters worse, recent reforms such as decentralization, opening to the outside world, a growing market economy, migration, and changes in property structures have led to increases in corruption in some areas. Without reforms that lead to a redistribution of power, officials within and outside of the party continue to control resources and freely line their own pockets.

Thomas HEBERER

Further Reading
COSCO Group
Zhōngguó Yuǎnyáng Yùnshū Gōngsī
中国远洋运输公司

China Ocean Shipping Group Company (COSCO) is one of the world’s largest shipping companies, and the major vehicle supporting China’s manufacturing export economy. COSCO is also one of the largest state-owned enterprises, owned by the central government of the People’s Republic of China, and in recent years has formed many joint ventures with foreign governments and companies.

On 27 April 1961 in Beijing, the China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) was formed from a collection of state-owned shipping enterprises (SOE 国有企业), including the Chinese-Polish Joint-Stock Shipping Company, itself founded in 1950 as one of the first Sino-foreign joint-owned enterprises. During the next two decades COSCO established international liner and container liner services to Europe, Asia, and eventually the United States, reestablishing past transportation and ownership ties to non-Communist countries and reintroducing direct transportation between China and the United States in 1979.

Now known as the “COSCO Group,” the company continued expanding in the 1990s, attracting minority-ownership shares through public listings on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and the Singapore exchange in 2004 and the Hong Kong exchange in 2005. COSCO Group currently comprises more than three hundred subsidiaries operating in all aspects of the shipping and transportation industry, including supporting research and financial services, with a reported combined value of $17 billion in 2008. The company is also a pioneer in supporting oceanographic and shipping research, including an expedition to Antarctica in 2005 and the construction of large semisubmerged container vessels. The group, China’s largest shipping company, operates a fleet of more than six hundred ships, with a shipping capacity of 35 million deadweight tons (DWT), plying trade to more than 1,300 ports in 160 countries and employing 80,000 people, including 5,000 non-Chinese. As with all of the nearly two hundred state-owned enterprises directly owned by the central government of the People’s Republic of China, its officers and directors are appointed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In recent years COSCO leaders have served as delegates to the National Party Congresses and the governmental National People’s Congress.

In bulk shipping COSCO has some two hundred vessels with total carrying capacity of 12 million DWT. In tanker shipping COSCO has eighteen tankers capable of shipping 1.8 million DWT, and among these are five of the “very large crude carriers” class (VLCC), each capable of holding more than 300,000 DWT. The group owns 1,200 land vehicles, 231 barges capable of carrying 187,000 DWT, 2.65 million square meters of stock yards, and warehouse space totaling 250,000 square meters. The group claims to be the eighth-largest container terminal operator in the world, with thirty-four berths around the world with a total annual throughput of 13 million containers. COSCO is a major shareholder in other Chinese state-owned enterprises, including those in ship repair,
ship building, container construction, international finance, second-hand ship sales, and marine bunker construction and operation.

COSCO has often been the target of investigations by foreign governments and shipping industry associations that have accused it of unfair trade practices, including support in the form of subsidized credit and resources from the Chinese government. Nevertheless, foreign governments and corporations have formed many joint ventures with the shipping giant. COSCO estimates that it regularly conducts business with more than five thousand business enterprises globally. The nature of COSCO Group’s relationship with the Chinese government is not clear, however, because its internal ownership and management relationships are, as with many Chinese state-owned enterprise groups, famously unclear.

Steven W. LEWIS

Further Reading


Water can float a boat and sink it as well.

水能载舟，
亦能覆舟

Shuǐ néng zài zhōu,
yīn éng fù zhōu

Courtyard Houses (Siheyuan)
With at least one courtyard enclosed by four single-story buildings that face inward toward the open space, siheyuan represent the quintessential Chinese “courtyard houses.” Throughout China quadrangular courtyard structures come in many configurations, including many that are multistoried and others that have mere “skywells” with shafts of open space instead of broad courtyards. But siheyuan are best known because of their ubiquity in Beijing and other northern cities.

Classic siheyuan associated with Beijing and neighboring cities, where they are found in many configurations, are sometimes quite simple but more often rather complex in terms of layout. Virtually all siheyuan share canonical elements: enclosure behind high gray walls that afford substantial seclusion; a single off-center entry gate that controls access; orientation to the cardinal directions, with main structures facing south or southeast to ensure maximum sunlight and passive solar heating during winter; balanced side-to-side symmetry that represents a balanced aesthetic; and an organization of space along a clear axis that is associated with family hierarchy. Sumptuary regulations during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and Qing dynasty (1644–1912), which were nonetheless often flouted, were supposed to regulate the overall scale of siheyuan dwellings by controlling the dimensions of timbers and thus the width of halls, the nature of entryways, and colors and other ornamentation. As a result, the siheyuan residences of nobles and imperial princes were generally clearly differentiated from those of merchants, who had the resources to build large siheyuan but were constrained by regulations from doing so, and the more modest structures of common people.

Early in the Qing dynasty scores of sprawling siheyuan mansions of imperial princes existed in Beijing, the configurations of which were consistent with the codified sumptuary regulations appropriate to twelve princely ranks. For the most part, except for elements of the entry way, princely mansions could not be distinguished from ordinary siheyuan dwellings from the outside. But inside they replicated to some degree the facilities found in the Forbidden City, reduced, of course, in overall dimensions. Princess Der Ling, first lady-in-waiting to the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908), wrote that “The houses in Peking are built in a very rambling fashion, covering a large amount of ground, and our former house was no exception to the rule. It had sixteen small houses, one stor- ey high, containing about 175 rooms, arranged in quadrangles facing the courtyard, which went to make up the whole; and so placed, that without having to actually go out of doors, you could go from one to the other by verandas built along the front and enclosed in glass” (Der Ling 1911). Manor-type siheyuan of this type became essentially extinct by the middle of the twentieth century: Some deteriorated, others were renovated to become the headquarters of institutions or multi-family dwellings for the poor, and many were demolished to facilitate the building of modern structures and roads. In the hutong lanes (narrow alleyways) surrounding the Shichahai and
Beihai lakes, remnants of some of these manors survive but mostly only in vestigial form.

The only site that is easily visited is just to the north of the Imperial City walls, where elements of the siheyuan manor of Prince Gong, the brother of the eighth Qing emperor Xianfeng, (reigned 1851–1861), the father of China’s last emperor, Puyi, still stand. The gardens of Gong Wang Fu, the palace of Prince Gong, were opened to the public in the late 1980s, displaying impressive rockeries and pavilions. Yet the sprawling old residence itself remained hidden, its manifold alterations and scars resulting from having been used after 1921 to house Furen Catholic University, then Beijing Normal University and the Chinese Music Academy, and finally the Beijing Air-Conditioning Factory during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). On the eve of the Olympics in 2008, the expansive mansion was reopened to the public.

**Typical Layout**

The layout of a relatively conventional siheyuan with its series of gates, open spaces, and independent structures can be seen in the siheyuan on Huguosi hutong, once the residence of Mei Lanfang, one of China’s preeminent Beijing Opera singers. A single entryway with a pair of large doors painted red along the southeast portion of the outer wall leads to a small vestibule with a light gray brick spirit wall, a partition that visually separates the outside from the inside. Turning left leads through another gate into

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**Courtyard in a Garden in Shanghai, 1979.** Virtually all courtyards share similar elements: enclosure behind high gray walls that offer substantial seclusion; a single off-center entry gate that controls access; and an orientation to the cardinal directions, with main structures facing south or southeast to ensure maximum sunlight and passive solar heating during winter. **Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.**
a “public” zone, a narrow rectangular open area used by servants, by visitors waiting to be announced, and by a busy household to store bicycles, briquettes for cooking, and other items. Two large deciduous parasol trees spread their branches over the narrow courtyard. On the south side of the courtyard, in which are planted two large shade trees, is a north-facing building called a daozuō, or “rear-facing” structure. Facing the daozuō is a “festooned gate,” or chuihuamen, that leads to the inner central courtyard, although the view is blocked by a patterned screen wall.

Together the large inner courtyard and the rectangular one at the entry and another slender one on the west side of the residence make up more than 40 percent of the total ground area of this siheyuan. The interior courtyard, with trees and potted shrubs, serves as the center of family life. Tables and chairs from adjacent rooms can be moved into the courtyard for family members and their guests to enjoy sunny days and quiet evenings.

As with any classical siheyuan, the main hall, called a zhengtang, is a low, south-facing, single-story building on the northern side of the courtyard. Within this building the senior generation resides, with space for entertaining guests and family. Bedrooms and studies are also found here. Perpendicular to the main structure is a pair of flanking buildings, one facing east and the other west, normally used to house married sons and their families.

An important element of Beijing siheyuan is the set of narrow covered verandas that serve as all-weather passageways around the courtyards. Because the surrounding individual buildings are structurally separate, each side of
the quadrangle is entered and exited through a door facing the focal courtyard. Since no doorways interconnect any of the adjacent buildings that make up the courtyard complex, movement between buildings is most direct across the courtyard during fine weather.

Decline and Fall

Throughout Beijing after 1949 courtyard houses increasingly came to be shared by many unrelated families rather than continuing to be private dwellings for extended families. Once-commodious spaces were divided up, and courtyards filled in as “temporary” kitchens, bedrooms, and storage sheds. In time the essential organic core of many siheyuan, the courtyard itself, was obliterated by structures. Limits on running water, toilets, drainage, and maintenance in general led to the deterioration of the once-proud structures.

In 1990 authorities began demolition of siheyuan and hutong neighborhoods in general to facilitate the modernization of the city by eliminating substandard housing and rebuilding residential quarters to meet current needs. Quickly many residents raised alarms about the demolition of the city’s architectural patrimony. Residents of many ramshackle siheyuan dubbed them zayuan or “mixed-up courtyards” because of the dilapidated condition they were in and the fact that they were occupied by many households. Efforts by government authorities to conserve individual structures and neighborhoods have been slow and uneven. Private efforts have had some effect. After two decades of sweeping destruction of hutong neighborhoods, less than a thousand siheyuan have been designated for preservation. Even courtyards that seem “safe” because they are listed for preservation have sometimes been summarily demolished to the dismay of residents and preservationists.

Ronald G. KNAPP

Further Reading

China only recently has embraced the modern creative economy. China realizes that to become less dependent on others and to increase domestic consumption, it must create its own value-added goods and services and produce its own brands to sell, not only in China but also worldwide.

One of the most basic trends in the global economy is the growth in economic value attributed to the creative imagination—to art, design, entertainment, and culture in their widest sense. China, by concentrating its growth plans from 1970 to 2000 on manufacturing low-cost exports to foreign specifications, was late to take part in that trend. But the government increasingly realized that in order to become less dependent on others and to increase domestic consumption, it had to create its own value-added goods and services, exploiting Chinese brands and styles. China sees the creative economy as the premium end of manufacturing and services, adding more value than conventional businesses. China is acutely aware of the strength of brands such as Disney, McDonald’s, and Nokia and wants to produce its own Chinese varieties and sell them not only in China but also worldwide. The global economic crisis that started in 2008, and the consequent fall in export demand, gave the new policy added urgency.

The modern creative economy emerged in the United States in the early twentieth century and in Britain and the rest of Europe in the 1990s as part of the switch from manufacturing to services and from standard commodities to value-added, premium novelties. The consumer boom of the late twentieth century as well as the Internet and digital media were major factors. Everywhere the barriers that had segregated arts and business, imagination and profit were falling. Around the mid-1990s governments realized that the disparate and often fragmented arts, culture, and media sectors provided significantly more jobs and a higher proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) than previously acknowledged. Prompted by Britain’s culture minister Chris Smith in 1998, the creative industries began to be seen as “sunrise” industries just as consumer electronics had been championed by Japan and Taiwan thirty years earlier. In this process people became acutely conscious of the role of creativity as a driver of personal growth and of economic development.

The Chinese government formally endorsed the cultural industries (wenhua chanye) at the Ninth People’s Congress in 2001. Within a few years some thinkers had followed international practice by widening the concept to creative industries (wenhua chuangyi chanye). Shanghai launched its International Cultural and Creative Industries Expo in 2005. Beijing and Shenzhen followed in 2006.

Cultural and Creative Industries Linked

The linking of cultural and creative industries reflects a universal ambivalence about the relative roles of art, culture, creativity, and innovation. No theorist has pinned
down these concepts or shown satisfactorily how they relate to each other, leaving governments to pick and choose according to their own circumstances. China sees culture as something historic, collective, materialist (e.g., artifacts), and more easily controllable. It sees creativity as something novel, disruptive, and more abstract. In Beijing the more conservative thinkers divide activities into a cultural box and an innovation box and leave no room for the kind of individual creativity that might drive art, design, and business with equal vigor. But outside Beijing many provinces and cities seem more relaxed about using the term creative industries.

In this attitude China reflects Asian attitudes to creativity and innovation that are largely based on tradition and collectivism, and are fundamentally different from the West’s. It is true that since the 1950s some Asian countries have been open to U.S. ideas, but China is both more resolutely determined to maintain its own national integrity and more ambitious in its international competitiveness.

As a country China has the oldest continuous culture in the world. At times it has also been the world’s most innovative culture, but its inventiveness in arts and technology declined sharply around the 1700s and did not re-surface until the last few decades. The creative economy that now shapes China’s arts, design, media, and entertainment is profoundly influenced by this history.

China exemplifies the Asian values of authority, hierarchy, and tradition. It tends toward centralized rulers, whether an imperial dynasty or the Communist Party. For centuries rulers permitted independent thought only if it supported their worldview and could be administered by local bureaucracies. This authority accumulated tradition. One result is the love of learning by rote and by copying, and of putting the new copy back into the public domain (some Chinese thinkers therefore disdain an author’s intellectual property rights as being antisocial). Some Western commentators have picked up this Asian trait and decided that Asians are not creative, but this conclusion is too crude.

A new idea must be shown in advance to have beneficial social effects before resources are committed. Harmony is all. A Chinese official wanting to launch a new TV channel will refer glowingly to his city’s ancient history and the need for harmony before discussing the business plan. The Chinese tend not to believe that worthwhile ideas might come from people working on their own, especially someone at the margin who does not subscribe to government thinking. Governments do not want individuals creating their own ideas, symbols, and narratives, making their own meanings, or establishing a community of interest with consumers. To this extent China’s creative process is directly opposed to the Western process in which people choose their own path and ask their own questions. This difference, and its effects on both China and the West, will have profound effects on global cultures and international business in future years. China is the only country capable of challenging U.S. assumptions about how to do business. It is hard to foretell the outcome, which will depend on whether and by how much China and the West modify their practices.

**Political Influence**

The influence of local politicians at provincial, city, and district levels is another important factor. In China a local official’s decision to invest public funds, allocate land, and facilitate contracts has considerable impact on which businesses and individuals thrive. The success of Beijing’s initiatives therefore depends on local politicians, who often have little sympathy with or understanding of creative business. These politicians have much more influence than do Chinese entrepreneurs and managers. In the West, in contrast, many new ideas and companies come about because local businesses have raised their own money and taken action.

Although it is difficult to generalize, these principles usually have their greatest effect on mass markets (TV, radio, publishing, the Internet, video games, advertising, and film) and are less constricting in sectors that affect small groups (art, fashion, and high-end architecture, and interior design).

The history of China’s creative economy emerged out of the reform movements of the 1970s. One source was the obvious need for design and advertising to stimulate modernization. China Central TV (CCTV) and Shanghai TV started showing advertisements in 1979. Another source was the spread of systems thinking and digital technology. Chinese intellectuals and artists, often working with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vigorously explored the new theories of knowledge and network thinking and
their role in economic development, leading to intense debates. The slackening of censorship encouraged semi-independent magazines to publish news, stories, and essays (although fiction remains a minority niche). The statistics bureau started to publish data on arts and culture in 1985.

Key events in national policymaking were the Ministry of Culture conference in Qingdao in 1991 and the ministry’s first reference to “cultural industries” in 1993. The Fifteenth National People’s Congress (2000) permitted small-scale businesses, including design, TV, animation, and publishing companies. The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) prioritized knowledge and information and referred to “cultural industries,” by which it envisaged state-led manufacturing innovation rather than independent thinking. In 2002 the Sixteenth National People’s Congress said the Communist Party should enhance the cultural industries’ strength and competitiveness.

The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences began publishing its annual *Blue Book on China’s Cultural Industries* in 2002. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) gave more attention to arts and culture and began to speak of the creative economy. By 2007 cultural and creative industries were common topics in the national dialogue on the future of China, although considerable confusion existed about how creativity fits within the Chinese model of development.

**Creative Cities**

By 2008 the top four municipalities and most second-level cities had proclaimed themselves to be creative cities, albeit with interpretations different from city to city. Although obviously intrigued by Britain’s promotion of its creative industries in 1998, China, like other countries,

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*Theatre is becoming an important part of the economy of major Chinese cities. These ballet dancers are performing at Taiyuan, Pingyao, Shanxi Province.* PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
has been selective in what it imports. Many cities used the phrases “creative cities” and creative industries” loosely to indicate any activity or urban site that has echoes of Western-style branding, retailing, and the arts. Shanghai is notable for converting about seventy warehouses and factories into creative clusters. Many state-owned enterprises that own buildings that are no longer viable want to turn them into a “creative space,” although their reasons are often to follow Beijing and increase their property’s value rather than to meet demand. A few succeed, such as Beijing’s 798 and Shanghai’s M50 art complexes, but many others are less certain of their markets. Too often such development is driven by property speculation rather than the ideas and needs of potential users. The label creative is often applied indiscriminately to both production (e.g., animation production companies) and to retailing (e.g., a shopping mall).

No national census of China’s creative sectors exists. Many cities have published their own research, although unfortunately each city uses a different definition, often driven by its desire to optimize the importance of its own sector relative to that of other cities. Some cities include exhibitions, tourism, and food and beverage. Shanghai uses five categories: (1) culture and media, including art, performance, film, TV, and radio; (2) architectural design, including architecture and related skills such as structural engineering and interior design; (3) research and development design, including industrial design, software design, fashion, and advertising; (4) planning, including market research, some financial services, and conferences and exhibitions; and (5) leisure, including photography, sport, and tourism.

Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing, and Guangzhou (Canton) claim that 7 to 10 percent of their GDP is attributable to the creative economy, which means they are on a level with major Western cities. Elsewhere the figures are smaller.

In terms of markets the creative sectors may be split into four groups: sectors that most visibly express China’s history and culture (traditional art, museums, crafts, poetry, calligraphy, and traditional performance); sectors that reach the mass market (radio, TV, newspapers, and books); sectors that appeal to sophisticated urban populations (design, fashion, and magazines); and the infrastructure industries (architecture, interior design, furnishings, electronic communications, and online services).

The Internet plays a vital role, especially among young people who access it through mobile devices and computers. Chinese youth are as keen as their Western contemporaries to talk, share, blog, and post. Content-creating software is widely available, usually pirated, and numerous websites support online communities such as Neocha 新茶 and Douban 豆瓣. Although the government monitors these sites, it seems generally relaxed so long as users do not challenge Beijing’s politics. The main themes are art, design, music, and fashion, and although the focus is China, the references also cover Europe and the United States.

This analysis of China’s creative economy has to reconcile the country’s enthusiasm for creativity as a magic potion for economic growth and its uncertainty about what creativity is and how to manage it. Some conservative thinkers take refuge in creativity as historic culture, but this usage, however impressive, will never be sufficient to transform a whole economic system, as is China’s ambition. Given China’s social and economic strengths and its vast population, it is likely that domestically its creative economy will grow rapidly and substantially. The more interesting question is this: What will be China’s effect on the West’s understanding of what creativity means and how to use it? The West assumes that its approach is the best one and shows little inclination to change, but the competition between the two models will be fierce.

John HOWKINS and Xu CHEN

Further Reading

China’s first comprehensive legal code was set forth during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and served as the model for many years of imperial rule. Traditionally, Confucianism played a huge role in ensuring a relatively crime-free society. Since the reforms of 1978–79, and the subsequent imbalance between rich and poor, crime has been on the rise.

The Chinese way of life dates back more than five thousand years, and traditions from the past continue to influence life in the twenty-first century. In 1949 China became a Communist nation with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the current political and economic structures and processes are, to a significant degree, the product of dramatic social changes since then. Most important, since 1978 China has undergone economic reforms that started to transform the national economy from one based on state control to one based on market capitalism. These transformations have increased personal freedom and wealth for many Chinese. They have resulted in the concentration of wealth and increases in economic equality—and in crime.

Confucianism and Social Order

Confucianism has been the longest lasting influence and among the most important influences on Chinese values and social order. In Confucius’s view society is hierarchical, with the concept of li being the behavioral norm for people of superior status and inferior status. According to li it is virtuous for the inferior to respect and obey the superior. In an extreme interpretation of li by some later Confucians, “A minister will oblige should the emperor order him to die; a son will oblige should his father ask him to die” (Xia 1995, 16). Confucius (551–479 BCE) maintained that if all individuals acted according to li, order would prevail without conflict. Confucianism fostered an orderly society based on suppression of self-interest and acceptance of authority. Lawsuits, for example, were deemed confrontational and disruptive, and the Chinese continue to prefer to avoid resolving disputes in courts.

Traditional law in ancient China was largely set forth in the criminal code and targeted behaviors that were seen as threatening to the status quo. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) the first comprehensive legal code was set forth, and subsequent dynasties adopted the code without changing its fundamental elements. The use of informal methods of social control was emphasized and remains important today.

After China was politically unified in 221 BCE, centralized government control became the dominant political structure, and all aspects of the judicial system were under government control. The criminal justice system was managed by government officials, and judicial authority was one of the powers delegated to local officials by the central government. The inseparable relation between judicial function and other authority made it impossible for courts to appreciate equity in justice.
The Legal System of the PRC

China’s modern history began with the fall of the Qing dynasty in the revolution of December 1911 and the abdication of the emperor in February 1912. Civil war and foreign aggression fragmented the new Chinese Republic until 1949, when the country was unified under the Communist government of the PRC. The new regime modeled the country’s judicial system after that of the Soviet Union’s. The system consisted of four components; each was under a centralized administration in Beijing:

- The police were responsible for investigation, detention, and preparatory examination of criminal cases. Police are under the command of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).
- Procurates were responsible for approving arrests and initiating public prosecution. Procurates are under the Ministry of the Supreme People’s Procurate.
- Courts were responsible for adjudication. Courts are subject to the administration of the Supreme People’s Court.
- Corrections were under the Ministry of Justice.

Because the Communist Party Central Committee is the true locus of power in China, party ideology and politics determine the nature of the criminal justice and judicial systems.

Lawlessness During the First Three Decades

From 1949 to 1979, the PRC operated a legal system with neither a criminal code nor a criminal procedure code. The major criminal legislation during this time was the Act for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries, promulgated in 1951. The act defined many deeds as counterrevolutionary or subversive. Article 16 established the principle of crime by analogy; behavior unspecified in the act could be punished according to analogous specified crimes in the act. Article 18 enabled a retroactive application of the act to crimes committed before the PRC was established. Conventional crimes, such as murder and rape, and their penalties were allegedly defined in unpublished regulations. Without legal guidelines to follow, the people’s courts often made no reference to the law and specific provisions as the basis of a given judgment. The Arrest and Detention Act of 1954 is the only known document from this time detailing some safeguards against arbitrary arrests or detention. In practice they were frequently ignored.

With political control as the rationale and the absence of criminal law and legal procedure, the government had thousands of individuals arrested and punished for ideological reasons. Many were convicted as Rightists or black (hei, meaning corrupt or illicit) elements, such as former landlords and rich peasants. In 1966 Mao Zedong instigated the Cultural Revolution, encouraging revolutionaries to destroy all establishments in defense of true Marxist socialism. As a result mobs and thugs acted as free agents of justice from 1966 to 1976. They purged, abused, convicted, and executed thousands of innocent people and destroyed numerous homes and personal possessions without having to employ judicial process. During the revolution many senior party leaders were accused of being capitalist followers, reactionary authorities, counterrevolutionaries, and revisionists. Their own victimization and humiliation motivated them to steer the party away from Mao’s obsession with ideological wars after Mao’s death in 1976.

The New Order Since 1979

After thirty years of lawlessness, the PRC initiated efforts to develop a rational system of criminal justice. In 1979 the National People’s Congress (NPC) enacted China’s first criminal code and criminal procedure code. The criminal code had 192 articles and classified crime into eight categories, including crimes of counterrevolution. Most of the laws and decrees promulgated since 1949 remained in force. In 1990 the Standing Committee of the Congress established the prohibition of drugs. In 1997 the NPC amended the first criminal code by abolishing the use of analogy as a general principle—stipulating that a crime must be legally defined before a conviction can be imposed, and abolishing the crime of counterrevolution and replacing it with the crime of harming state security. Although this might seem to be a mere name change, it does provide real progress. For example, superstitious practices are no longer listed as a type of crime. The
criminal code provides five principal penalties, including the death penalty, and three accessory penalties. Article 5 stipulates that all death sentences are to be reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court for approval. The death penalty does not apply to offenders under eighteen and females pregnant at the time of trial or sentence.

Criminal trials in the PRC resemble those based on the civil law legal tradition. Instead of a trial jury, a panel of judges and people’s representatives decides the guilt of the defendant and the sentence if the defendant is found guilty. The number of judges and people’s representatives increases as the administrative level of the court increases. In these people’s courts, people’s representatives have equal rights with judges. If opinions of panel members diverge, the minority defers to the majority. The minority opinion is entered into the court transcript. Law is more than a legal vehicle in the PRC. Criminal trials sometimes are held in public areas to draw large crowds for educational purposes.

**Crimes**

In the PRC police are the only regular source of national crime information. Crime statistics were not available to the public before 1986. Since then, the Ministry of Public Security has provided such information to the annual publications *Social Statistics of China* and the *China Yearbook of Law*. Before 1991, the official statistics covered murder, injury, robbery, rape, larceny, fraud, and counterfeiting. After 1991, statistics are also provided for the three emerging crimes of kidnapping, smuggling, and drug offenses.

China has experienced dramatic increases in crime rates since 1979 when economic reforms were initiated. But changes were distinct before, during, and after the Cultural Revolution, as indicated by the following statistics: Between 1951 and 1965, China’s annual crime rates per 100,000 population varied between 30 and 60. Rates then rose from 56 in 1978 to 89.9 in 1981 and to 200 in 1990. The average annual crime rate increase was 2.2 percent before the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), 10 percent during the revolution, and 12 percent in the reform period between 1979 and 1991. During the more aggressive reform period of 1985 to 1991, the average annual increase was 32 percent. The Cultural Revolution, however, was an unusual time. Because of mob justice, crime statistics for this time may not be comparable to crime statistics for other times. Although there have been increases in traditional crimes, new crimes, and especially drug offenses, account for much of the increase. Court records indicate an average of 21 percent annual increase in drug crimes from 1991 to 1994 nationwide. Regardless of the...
upward trends, China’s crime level is low by international comparison. In the 1994 International Crime Victimization Survey, China’s one-year overall victimization rate was 12.6 percent, which was the lowest in the developing countries surveyed and was lower than the lowest rate in the developed countries surveyed.

The emphasis on economic development has transformed not only the economic lives of the Chinese people but also the country’s cultural ethos as well. Being wealthy, no longer chastised as bourgeois decadence, is now glamorous and desirable. Under the initial reform policy of “let some people get rich first,” many public officials and their family members are certainly among the first to make a fortune. This is often achieved by exchange of power for bribes and personal benefit in various forms. Temptations are particularly irresistible in the public sector where officials have discretion to allocate government-monopolized resources or information, such as goods at undermarket price, loans, and market-entry opportunities. Corruption, as an uninvited guest of the economic reforms, has plagued the reform era. In 1997 150,000 corruption cases were reported to authorities, triple the number of reports in 1993. Studies have shown that while reported corruption cases have been leveling off, more cases after 1993 involved senior party officials and much higher financial values. The rampant corruption problem is a major source of growing domestic discontent and social unrest amidst China’s impressive economic growth.

Punishments

Thought-and-labor reform has been the guiding ethos of the Chinese penal system. China boasted of a 2 percent recidivist rate before economic reforms. The penal system alone, however, could not achieve such success without societal supports. The Chinese population was rather immobile due to the difficulty in changing jobs and residence. After serving time in the penal system, most ex-offenders had to return to their previous workplace, demoted, a requirement that ensured employment. On the other hand, the workplace, where everyone knew the ex-convict, became a powerful force for shaming, rehabilitating, and controlling behavior. The effect of thought-and-labor reform has been weakened since 1978. Economic liberalization has produced a dramatically different world than the one that supported reform-through-labor programs. Employment is no longer guaranteed, even for law-abiding citizens.

Five types of correctional institutions are used in the PRC: prisons; labor reformatories; juvenile reform houses; detention houses for those who have been sentenced in a television show, 1979. Juvenile reform houses are one of five types of correctional institutions in use in the People’s Republic of China. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
sentenced (*juyi*); and detention houses for those awaiting trial (*kanshou*).

In Chinese law, detention is divided into two types. One is administrative detention, in which the detainee goes through labor education in a reformatory institution. The other is criminal, with prisoners undergoing labor reform within the prison sector. The first type is not criminal punishment, and its education is a form of penalty for public disorder offenses, such as prostitution and drug addition. These detention centers are under the direct control of police. They are mostly in no condition to provide real education because of financial strains. As a result police have discretionary power and flexibility over their operation.

The prison system operates through two administrative divisions: the Labor Reformatory Administration, under the Ministry of Justice, and the local labor reformatory bureaus, under the Justice Bureau in the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. The bureaus oversee labor reformatory work. They also oversee prisons in their own jurisdictions.

Prison inmates are offenders given death sentences with a two-year suspension; offenders sentenced to life imprisonment; offenders who must serve at least ten years in prison before release; foreign offenders; and female offenders. Offenders given other sentences are held in reform-through-labor teams. Juvenile reformatories provide special correction services to juvenile offenders.

In 1991 there were 684 prisons, including labor reformatory teams and juvenile reformatories. The daily average population in correctional institutions was more than 1.2 million, 2.15 percent females and 8.4 percent minorities. The estimated annual admission was 250 per 100,000 population. Violent offenses accounted for 34.4 percent, property crimes for 60.6 percent, and drug crimes for 0.8 percent. The remaining 4.2 percent were other crimes. By 1993 those who committed other crimes had increased to 18.7 percent, with 33.6 percent convicted of violent crimes and 48 percent of property crimes.

Chinese correctional policy holds that all offenders can be reformed. Work is believed to be the most effective reform method. By law, all inmates capable of working must work. Those who are not capable of working because of age or illness or unfitness are spared from work. In 1990 about 10 percent of the prison population did not engage in work activities.

Education is one of the most emphasized prison programs. In 1981 the government included prison education in its national education program. By 1991, 72.8 percent of prisons and labor reformatory branches had established special education programs with a dean, a faculty office, and a curriculum. (The branches are operating units that house and supervise individuals going through labor reform.) Some teachers are chosen from those prisoners with a higher education level. The curriculum includes cultural, moral, legal, and technical education. Inmate students study two hours a day. After passing locally administered exams, students receive an educational certificate equivalent to those issued by educational institutions outside the prison. Some prisoners enroll in distance-learning programs and take higher-education exams for self-study.

An important part of prison education is vocational programs. In 1991 more than 561,000 participated in vocational courses, representing 83 percent of the total number of eligible prisoners. Labor departments issued 546,000 proficiency certificates for various technical skills.

A 1992 national study of 159,177 adult offenders released from prison from 1982 to 1986 indicated the success of China’s correctional policies. It showed an overall recidivism rate of 8.28 percent in a three-year follow-up period. Offenders holding temporary jobs had a 5.13 percent recidivism rate, whereas those unemployed had a 15.9 percent rate. Offenders returning to their original workplace or being employed in private enterprises had the lowest recidivism, with 1.9 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. Compared to the rates in industrialized countries, including Japan, these are much lower rates.

**A Continuing Problem**

The Chinese government acknowledges alarm at the increase in crime. It attributes such increases to the capitalist influence of the Western world and to changing values in the Chinese people in a new economy. The growing privatization and social mobility have stimulated individualism and increased the emphasis on profits. Also, an increase in social inequality and the loss of a guarantee of lifetime employment have become major causes of social instability.
China has made efforts to strengthen informal social control at the grassroots level. Neighborhood committees are an example. Private citizens in these committees watch for problems, mediate disputes in and between families, and work with neighborhood police. But there is a steady weakening of other informal mechanisms, such as control through job stability and immobile residency. Reducing informal social control will inevitably lead to an increased use of police and punishment, as has occurred in many developed societies. The Chinese government periodically launches campaign-style crackdowns on both street crime and official corruption. A major campaign measure is increasing the use of police and capital punishment. While the public approves of this get-tough policy, the effectiveness of such a strategy is questionable because it does not tackle the social conditions that breed crime and recidivism.

Olivia YU

**Further Reading**


Although China is one of the world’s oldest civilizations, its criminal justice system has fallen behind that of other nations. The complicated system is plagued by lack of education, serious corruption, and new and more serious crimes than in the past. Often, criminal suspects are denied basic rights taken for granted in the West. Reformation of the Chinese criminal justice system remains on the horizon.

Viewing China’s criminal justice system through a Western lens, it is easy to see only its deficiencies. The system is marked by long periods of confinement before trial and a high rate of confessions. Criminal suspects have no right to refuse interrogation, enjoy no presumption of innocence, and have no right to confront their accusers or force witnesses to testify in their defense. The right to counsel is extremely limited in the investigation phase of a case, and although there is a right to counsel at trial, that right is restricted by limited opportunity of the defense to conduct its own investigation.

While these are major deficiencies in the system, it should be noted that China’s current criminal justice system is still developing. Since the 1980s, as it has moved toward a socialist free market economy, China has experienced new types of crimes as well as crimes of a magnitude that did not exist under the more totalitarian communist rule. Public corruption, economic crime, computer crime, narcotics trafficking, robbery, and murder are all more prevalent than they once were. China’s criminal justice system is burdened with the dual challenges of increased crime and the need for modernization.

A New System

China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) went into effect in 1980, during the early days of the reform era led by Deng Xiaoping. Further amendments went into effect in 1997. Since 1980, legal and judicial institutions have been reestablished and law schools have reopened. The CPL forms the basic framework of criminal law in China, yet, in many ways, the criminal justice system remains a work in progress.

Prosecuting Authority

The Chinese agency responsible for prosecuting criminal cases is the People’s Procuratorate (Renmin Jiancha Yuan). The procuratorate’s historical roots go back 2,000 years to imperial China. Chinese emperors employed an official with the title of imperial censor or imperial secretary (yu shi), who acted as the eyes and ears of the emperor and reported any misconduct or corruption by government officials. Gradually, this position evolved to the role of public prosecutor in cases involving crimes committed by government officials. The yu shi also exercised a supervisory role over the judiciary, ensuring that judges acted according to the law.

Today, the procuratorate is one of five branches of
government. In theory, the procuratorate is charged with ensuring that the other civil branches of government act according to the law. Procurators are responsible for deciding whether someone should be formally arrested (daibu) and formally charged (qi song).

Like most Chinese government bodies, the procuratorate consists of a hierarchy, with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) at the top. The SPP handles matters in the Supreme People’s Court and reports directly to the National People’s Congress. Beneath the SPP are lower procuratorates that correspond to the lower levels of local government.

These procuratorate offices interact according to hierarchy. The CPL permits two trials and an appeal by either side from the verdict of the second trial. Generally, each successive proceeding must be brought at the next highest level. For example, a case initiated at the county level will be handled by the county procurator’s office in the basic people’s court of that county. If there is a second trial, it will be heard by an intermediate people’s court, where the case will be handled by the city procuratorate. An appeal would be handled by the provincial procuratorate. Any further proceeding would be in the Supreme People’s Court, with the prosecution handled by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. There are also special procuratorates for the military and for railway transportation.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

Most criminal offenses in China are investigated by the Public Security Bureau, which is part of the executive branch of government. Criminal offenses committed by government officials, employees, and agencies, however, are investigated directly by the procuratorate. The procuratorate’s anticorruption unit conducts investigations of bribery, embezzlement, and other public corruption. The procuratorate also has a government employees’ misconduct unit, which investigates other criminal conduct committed by government workers in their official capacity. Cases of abuse of power, dereliction of duty, and police brutality are investigated directly by this unit of the procuratorate. In addition to these two units, each procurator’s office also has units that handle arrest approval (usually reviewing daibu requests made by the police), criminal prosecution, citizen complaints, appeals and petitions, research, internal discipline, and administration.

A private citizen also has the right to bring a criminal case directly to the people’s court.

The first stage in any criminal case is the preliminary investigation, which begins after a criminal activity is reported. The police and the procuratorate receive these reports. Citizens have the right and the duty to make such reports.

A criminal case begins when the police or the procurator files a case. The standard for filing a case is somewhat vague. The CPL provides that a case should be filed for investigation when the responsible official discovers facts of a crime or criminal suspects or, after examining a citizen report or complaint, the official believes that there are “the facts of a crime and criminal responsibility.” The CPL proceeds on the assumption that it is possible, even at this early stage, to learn whether there are the facts of a crime. The CPL does not even entertain the possibility that there may be some evidence of a crime and some evidence to the contrary and thus a need to investigate further.

Filing a case is both a symbolic and practical step. The act of filing provides some official acknowledgement that a crime has been committed. The practical significance is that only after a case is filed are investigators permitted to use the investigative techniques set out in the criminal procedure code, which include detention of the suspect.

Once a case is filed, the investigating authority may use the full range of investigative techniques available, including compulsory measures, which restrict the liberty of the suspect. Chinese law seems to favor confining anyone suspected of a crime, even before criminal charges are filed. The investigating authority has the right to determine whether a suspect should be incarcerated or released. (This is in contrast to the American system, which requires probable cause before the issuance of search and arrest warrants.)

These compulsory measures can take several forms. The first is a compelled appearance (ju chuan). Once a case file is opened, the police may order the suspect to the police station for up to twelve hours of questioning. During this period the suspect has no right to consult with anyone.

After the initial police interrogation, the suspect is notified of his or her right to contact a legal representative or family member. If the suspect has a legal representative, the police have a duty to notify that representative. During this stage the representative, who can be either an
attorney or a lay representative, has a right to be present but may only advise the suspect generally about the case and suspects’ rights.

Before the 1997 reforms, the time limit for holding a suspect for interrogation was twenty-four hours. However, the police routinely initiated a new twenty-four-hour period as soon as the previous one expired, rendering the time limit meaningless and permitting unlimited interrogation. Under the current law, if the police choose to hold a suspect beyond the initial twelve-hour period, they must use another compulsory measure, detention (juliu).

Juliу provides that the police may detain a suspect from three to thirty-seven days if the suspect is

1 preparing to, in the process of, or discovered immediately after committing a crime;
2 is identified as having committed a crime by a victim or an eyewitness;
3 is found with criminal evidence on his or her person or residence;
4 attempts suicide or escape after committing a crime;
5 is likely to destroy or falsify evidence or tally confessions;
6 does not provide a true name and address, and identity is unknown; or
7 is strongly suspected of committing crimes from one place to another, repeatedly, or in a gang.

An estimated 90 percent of suspects are detained during investigation.

After the initial period of detention expires, the only way investigators can lawfully continue detaining a suspect is by obtaining permission to formally arrest the suspect. Technically, only the chief procurator can approve a formal arrest. In practice, however, each procurator’s office has a special section designated to handle daibu requests from investigators.

**Formal Arrest**

Daibu has a different meaning in Chinese than it has in English. Daibu refers not to placing a suspect in custody but rather to lodging a formal charge against him or her. And unlike in the United States, in China criminal suspects or defendants have no substantive rights.

To approve a formal arrest, the procuratorate must find that there is evidence to support the facts of a crime; that the suspect could be sentenced to imprisonment; and that being free the suspect poses a danger to society. Exceptions are made for suspects who are seriously ill, pregnant, or nursing.

Once the case is transferred from the police to the procuratorate for prosecution, the procuratorate has one month to decide whether to prosecute, a period that can be extended two weeks in a complex or major case. But if the procuratorate cannot decide within this time, or if it decides that further investigation is warranted, it can send the case back to the police for further investigation. In that case the police have up to an additional month to complete their investigation. If the procuratorate decides to bring the case after the second presentation by the police, it is conceivable that four months will have passed by the time that decision has been made.

Even after the second presentation, the procuratorate may decide that further investigation is warranted, but it may not send the case back more than twice. Thus a total of up to seven and a half months may pass before a decision to prosecute is made.

The 1997 amendments to the CPL allow for two other measures short of detention: release on bail and residential surveillance. Within twenty-four hours of detention, the police must notify the suspect’s family, lawyer, or representative. These representatives may then apply for bail (qu bao hou shen) or house arrest (jian shi ju zhu) on the suspect’s behalf. The decision to allow a suspect out on bail or house arrest is made by the investigating agency, typically either the police or the procuratorate. The Chinese system of bail places a great deal of risk on the guarantor. If the suspect does not appear as required, the guarantor not only forfeits whatever property has been posted as security but also may be subject to arrest. A suspect may be on bail awaiting trial for up to twelve months or under house arrest for up to six months.

The basic method of investigation after arrest in China is for the police to interrogate a suspect and then investigate whether the suspect’s information is true or false. After the investigation, the police may resume interrogation of the suspect and, if necessary, investigate further. All suspects must be interrogated within twenty-four hours.
of detention or arrest. Interrogation conducted following a forced appearance is limited to twelve hours.

Two investigators must be present during interrogations, and a written statement must be prepared and signed by the suspect. When interrogating a suspect, the investigators must first ask whether the suspect has committed any crime. Then they may ask other questions. The suspect must answer truthfully. No right to remain silent exists, and confession is an important component of a criminal investigation. The CPL forbids extorting confessions by torture and prohibits collecting evidence by threat, enticement, deceit, or other unlawful means, but there is no procedure for the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence.

A suspect may hire a lawyer only after the initial interrogation. At this stage the lawyer’s role is limited to providing the suspect with legal advice and filing petitions and complaints on his or her behalf. The lawyer may not yet assist the suspect in preparing a defense. If the case involves state secrets, a vague and adaptable concept under Chinese law, the suspect may need the approval of the investigating authority before hiring a lawyer.

Investigators are authorized to conduct searches without judicial approval or the approval of any outside agency and without reference to any standard of proof indicating the presence of evidence of a crime. Other investigative techniques expressly sanctioned by the CPL include the questioning of witnesses, inquests and examinations, seizure of evidence, and expert evaluation. Chinese law prohibits the use of torture, threats, enticement, or deceit to obtain evidence.

Although procurators have the authority to conduct wiretaps and mail searches, such methods are used infrequently and require high-level approval within the agency conducting the investigation. Judicial approval is not needed. They also rarely used the testimony of one

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**A performance of Queen of the Jade Brothel.** In this scene the unfairly accused concubine appeals her case to provincial court, in front of the magistrate and two judges. One of the judges is dressed in black and has a beard. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
criminal to convict another, in part, because they do not like to provide leniency in exchange for cooperation. Police might use undercover techniques if illegal products such as drugs or pirated compact discs are offered for sale to the public. In those circumstances a police officer posing as a member of the public might make an undercover purchase.

After gathering evidence, the investigators submit the evidence to the procuratorate section in charge of approving prosecutions. At this stage, the suspect is entitled to consult with his or her attorney fully and confidentially.

After determining the facts of a crime, the procurator must interrogate the suspect and his or her representative, and consult with the victim and his or her representative. If during this review the procurator discovers that any illegal method was used during the investigation, the procurator may refer the conduct of the investigator to the appropriate disciplinary authority. If the misconduct rises to the level of a criminal offense, it is referred to the appropriate section of the procuratorate for criminal investigation. The procurator is also charged with ensuring that all crimes and all criminals have been charged, ensuring that the investigation was lawfully conducted, and deciding whether the case has incidental civil actions.

Once the procurator decides to initiate prosecution, the case comes under the jurisdiction of the appropriate level of the people’s court.

**Trial Procedures**

*Shenpan,* commonly translated as “trial” should more accurately be translated as “adjudication,” as Chinese trials generally do not have live witnesses subject to cross-examination and defendants do not enjoy a right to remain silent. The word trial sometimes leads to misunderstandings and disappointed expectations.

Trials are generally conducted before a panel of three decision makers, made up of at least one professional judge, who may or may not have received legal training, and two citizen assessors, or, in some cases, three professional judges. Cases are decided by majority vote.

Trials begin with the court questioning the defendant about his or her identity, status, and the basic progress of the case to that point. The defendant is also given an opportunity to request the removal of a judge or prosecutor because of a conflict of interest or prejudice. The prosecutor then reads the charges, and the court asks the defendant for a response. The prosecutor then reads off each piece of evidence, and the court asks the defendant and the defense lawyer if they have any opinions concerning the evidence. If the prosecutor calls a witness, or if the victim is a party to the case, the defendant and the defense attorney may each question the witness and the victim, and the victim may question the defendant.

After the prosecution has presented its evidence, the defense presents its evidence. Then the prosecution, the defendant, the victim (if any), and the defense attorney all have an opportunity to argue the case. The defendant is given the last opportunity to speak. Finally, the judicial panel retires briefly and returns to announce a verdict and sentence.

**Sentencing**

The court generally reaches a verdict and announces a sentence as part of the same trial proceeding. This makes for a difficult defense argument. On the one hand, the defense may want to contest the facts. On the other hand, the defense does not want to appear to have anything but a remorseful attitude to receive more lenient treatment in the likely event of a conviction. The standard of proof at trial is that the facts are clear and the evidence is sufficient and reliable. The defendant may be found innocent outright or because of insufficient evidence. If a defendant is acquitted, Chinese law provides for compensation to be paid to the defendant for any period of incarceration found to have been unlawful.

Procurators have the authority to request an adjournment midtrial to obtain additional evidence. Judges may also, on their own, adjourn the trial and conduct their own investigation outside the courtroom. In difficult cases the court may consult with the chief judge, who may turn the case over to a judicial committee for a decision.

The Chinese Criminal Procedure Law has no concept of a trial as a proceeding to assess credibility and determine the truth based upon an open court evaluation of all the evidence. Witnesses are not required to appear in person. The ultimate decision makers may be authorities who did not personally preside at the trial to hear the evidence. The standard of proof, the lack of a requirement for live testimony, and the lack of a right to silence, coupled with long
periods of precharge incarceration and the opportunity for those who did not hear the evidence to make a decision, all make trials into less a search for the truth than an opportunity to eliminate all conflict before the trial. There is no notion that the procedures are designed to allow a fair determination of the truth by allowing each side to attack the other’s evidence. Instead, the truth is considered knowable, and it is the responsibility of the police and prosecutors to determine the truth and present it in court.

Chinese sentences can be extremely harsh by Western standards. For example, Chinese law authorizes the death penalty as a punishment for a host of crimes in addition to murder, including rape, narcotics trafficking, embezzlement, bribery, and financial fraud.

Reforms in Store

Although outright challenges to the Communist Party are not tolerated, many people are working within the existing political structure in China to accelerate the speed and broaden the scope of legal reform. In fact, official policy encourages reform. However, the road to reform is a difficult one.

Although the number of qualified legal experts in China is growing, there is still a shortage of trained legal talent throughout the system. Most procurators are not even college graduates, let alone law-school graduates. The same is true of judges and lawyers. Moreover, trained legal specialists face strong economic incentives to apply their talents in more lucrative fields, such as international trade and finance. Any significant legal reform is bound to make the job of prosecuting, defending, and judging cases more difficult, complicated, and challenging. Without sufficient numbers of trained legal experts, any legislative reform would be futile.

Corruption represents perhaps the biggest obstacle to reform. Corruption is also the number one political issue on the minds of the Chinese people. All the reforms in the world will be of no effect if the system is corrupt and lacks the confidence of the people.

Despite uncertainty surrounding the speed and shape of reform, one fact remains clear: there will be reform. The reforms may be deemed insufficient when measured against American standards of due process, but when compared to the arbitrariness and anarchy of earlier times, they are quite significant. China now has a tradition of legal reform, with many new reforms on the drawing table. The criminal justice system is very much a work in progress.

Ira BELKIN

Further Reading


CUI Jian

Cūn Jiàn 崔健

b. 1961  Singer and musician

Cui Jian is China’s first rock and roll star. His song “Nothing to My Name” has become an anthem of loss for the Tiananmen generation who witnessed the crackdown on student dissidents in 1989.

Cui Jian, China’s first rock and roll star, was born to musician parents of Korean descent and raised in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). He began learning trumpet at age fourteen and in 1981 joined the Beijing Philharmonic Orchestra. In his spare time he explored popular music.

Although Cui’s first album was a largely unnoticed collection of pop music covers (Lanzigui, 1984), he soon began writing his own music and lyrics and developing his trademark gravel-voiced style, drawing inspiration from Western rock bands such as the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, and the Police. In Beijing in May 1985 Cui performed one of his first rock songs, “Nothing to My Name,” a disconsolate ballad melding Western rock with traditional Chinese melodies and instrumentation. The performance rocketed him to stardom, and the song remains his signature hit and an anthem of loss for the Tiananmen generation, the youth who witnessed the bloody crackdown on student democracy activists on 4 June 1989.


Alexa OLESEN

Further Reading


Cuisines

Pêngrèn 烹饪

Chinese cuisines were developed partly as ways of maximizing security in a world of scarcity and frequent famine, but also responded to the desires of the well-to-do to show off wealth and sophistication. Grain staples are basic, but the distinctive elements are flavorings, including soy sauces, Chinese “wine,” ginger, onion relatives, and peppers. Regional variation is enormous, with four to five major culinary areas and many minority cuisines.

To one-fifth of the people in the world, Chinese food is not something they order from a menu in a restaurant or have delivered to their front door in little white cartons—it’s home cooking.

Chinese cooking is of notably high quality and diversity. However, China was also the “land of famine,” as Walter Mallory called it in 1926, and the cooking has been shaped by scarcity. For thousands of years the vast population of Chinese people lived on grain, with small amounts of vegetables and soybean products. People ate small amounts of meat; many tasted it only on major festival days such as Chinese New Year. Tea and “wine” (in China it is made from grain rather than grapes) were equally rare luxuries. Famine was frequent, and malnutrition widespread, with endemic deficiencies of iron, calcium, and vitamins B and C. As early as 1406 the government issued a manual on how to use roadside weeds and the like during famines. Even now hundreds of millions of people in the rural interior of China live on little more than boiled grain with a few vegetables and little meat.

Foods are cooked quickly at high heat because fuel was always scarce and expensive; stove design and cooking techniques combine to allow a family to cook a full three-course meal on a handful of dry grass. Cooking techniques also spared oil.

However, in much of the Chinese world a spectacular rise to affluence has profoundly changed the cooking, and people often go to opposite extremes, especially those who remember the old days.

China’s population is 93 percent Han Chinese, speaking one or another language of the Chinese language family. Fifty-five officially recognized minority groups also exist, each with its own language (or languages) and culinary traditions. A few generalizations apply throughout. The overwhelming majority of Chinese depend largely on grain, usually wheat and rice. Other foods usually serve as toppings or accompaniments for the grain staple. In the vast majority of meals the grain is either simply boiled (fan) or made into noodles (mian). Bread is common in the north and dominates in the west but is not a major food for most Chinese. Until recently vegetables were the most common accompaniment; cai means both “vegetables” and “dishes in general” in Mandarin (Putonghua), the majority language of China. Chinese cabbages (Brassica spp., in countless varieties) are the most commonly used and widespread; other vegetables include cucumbers, giant radishes, spinach, tomatoes, and many kinds of beans. The meat of choice is usually pork in most of China, but lamb replaces it in the west and northwest, and
fish dominates along the coasts. Fruit was the only common sweet until recently; China has an enormous range of fruits. Today sugar is common and cheap, leading to more diverse but less-healthy desserts.

Native to China, and characteristic of its cooking, is the soybean. Soybeans became important largely within the last 2,000 to 2,200 years because of the invention of bean curd (doufu, tofu) and of fermented bean products such as soy sauce. Bean curd production and soybean fermentation both release more protein, vitamin, and mineral value in the beans. The yeast used in fermentation adds vitamin B-12, an essential nutrient that is otherwise often lacking in Chinese diets.

Throughout China by far the most common cooking method is boiling. Grain and noodles are usually boiled. Soup is the most common dish to eat with grain staples. Drinks, such as tea, are normally boiled. Boiling is usually quick—soups are not simmered long—but complex stews often require hours of cooking. One major boiling type, most common in central China, is red-cooking: cooking meat slowly in a rich stock with much soy sauce, ginger, star anise, and other flavorings so the meat becomes dark red and tender. Second comes steaming: cooking in a closed pot or bamboo steamer above boiling water. Third is stir-frying (chao), the characteristically “Chinese” cooking method in which thinly sliced food is stirred for a short time in a small amount of extremely hot oil. This saves fuel and oil. More fuel-intensive methods like deep-fat frying, baking, and roasting were rare until recently.

The food of the Han Chinese—and minority groups influenced by them—is sharply distinguished by a specific spicing pattern: garlic, green onions, fermented soybean products, ginger, and, often, Chinese “wine.” (Chinese “wine” is made from grain, thus technically a beer or ale, but it is strong and noncarbonated and thus resembles wine, hence the usual translation.) To these are often added chili peppers (especially in the south and west), white pepper (black is rare), and sometimes other spices. Until recently unrefined vegetable oils—rapeseed (similar to canola), maize, peanut, sesame—provided distinctive flavors, completing a flavor mix that was uniquely and distinctively Chinese. These oils are now replaced by refined oil, frequently from soybeans.
Regional Cuisines

Cuisines in China vary by regions. The country’s most important culinary divide is between north and south.

The North

North of the Yangzi (Chang) River valley, wheat generally dominates, but other grains have been important. In early historic times foxtail millet (*Setaria italica*), domesticated almost as early as rice, was the staple. Other millets and sorghums were grown. Wheat reached north China from the Near East by 2000 BCE and began to displace millet some two thousand years later with the coming of good flour-milling technology. After New World food crops reached China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, maize also gained at millet’s expense. Maize is now used largely for animal feed; millet has almost vanished. Rice has been bred to grow in shorter, cooler summers and has spread far north of its historic range. Thus today north China depends largely on wheat, with rice a strong second. Vegetables are less diverse and often were almost limited to Chinese cabbages and radishes among the poor until diversification campaigns began around 1980. The favored fruit was melons, especially watermelons and melons of the Persian (Iranian) type. Jujubes, apples, and pears were locally common. Lamb was as common as, or more common than, pork in the drier areas.

Grain in the north is much less apt to be simply boiled. Rice and millet are treated that way, but wheat is ground into flour and then made into noodles, bread, or dumplings. Baked loaves of the sort known in Europe did not exist in traditional times. Baked bread was of the Persian form: flat, often layered sheets, often sprinkled with sesame seeds, and baked in a large jar or much larger underground oven. Today bakers burn firewood, clear out the ash, and bake the bread (usually stuck to the walls) in the residual heat. Large breads baked on racks are typical in the northwest, but elsewhere the breads are small—miniaturized Persian flatbreads known as *shaobing* (roasted cakes). More common in most of the north are large unfilled dumplings, steamed instead of baked. These are the staple foods in some areas. They are known as *mantou*, a word formerly used for smaller filled dumplings and cognate (of the same or similar nature) with words for these latter items in neighboring languages (e.g.,

Dumplings, a favorite Chinese food and a specialty of southern China, are being steamed in a stack of bamboo containers over a fire in a metal brazier. Dumplings are made of wheat or rice flour skins stuffed with meat, vegetables, and sweets. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
but is most popular in the colder parts, where the stews are ideal for long, cold nights.

Within the north regional differences are conspicuous. The far northwest relies heavily on lamb, large baked breads, and onions. Shaanxi eats relatively straightforward, less-complex dishes. Beijing is, naturally, a center of major sophistication, with a huge range of local specialties. These include the famous Beijing duck, for which ducks used to be raised specially, with their feeding and care specified from hatching onward. A more recent, world-popular creation is Mongolian barbecue, which is neither Mongolian nor a barbecue but rather a Beijing creation that involves stir-frying meat on a grill with the usual flavorings. Further southeast Shandong has an ancient cuisine more influenced by its locally fertile soil and its long coastline; more fruits, vegetables, and seafood are available.

**SOUTHERN CUISINES IN GENERAL**

From the Yangzi Valley southward rice is overwhelmingly dominant as the staple food. It provided 90 percent of calories in the far south until the last generation. It still provides about two-thirds of grain calories in China. Rice was domesticated in or near the Yangzi Valley; farmers have grown it there for at least ten thousand years. Maize and root crops are far behind. The south has a wide variety of vegetables and fruits. It is much wetter than the north, with many rivers and lakes, and it has a long coastline; thus, fish and other aquatic foods—ranging from frogs to jellyfish—have always been extremely important, providing most of the animal protein wherever people live near water. Elsewhere, animal protein is almost entirely pork, chicken, and duck.

Major ingredients are thus fairly standard across the south. Dividing up the two great regions according to actual cooking styles is more controversial. Some authorities recognize four regions by keeping the north as one but dividing the south into west, far south, and east. Others recognize five (the north split into northwest and northeast), others eight, and still others see all of China’s historic “eighteen provinces” as having unique cuisines. The conservative position is taken here: Four are recognized, with some major subdivisions noted.

**THE WEST**

Classic west Chinese cuisine apparently developed largely in Hunan and spread through Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. This is famous as China’s truly spicy cuisine. In ancient times hotness came from herbs such as smartweed (*Polygonum* spp.), white and other peppers, and Chinese brown “pepper,” actually the small fruits of a citrus relative (*Zanthoxylum* spp., used quite widely in China and Southeast Asia but primarily in west China). With the coming of New World food crops, chilis appeared and were soon recognized as the ultimate in *la* (piquancy, “hot” spiciness). Sichuan and Hunan food has
toned down in recent years, but formerly some Sichuan dishes contained more chilis than meat, and sometimes almost half the dish was chilis. A range of extremely hot seasoning pastes, made with chilis, fermented beans, and flour, adds yet more to the diet. More common here than elsewhere in China is “aged peel,” which is dried tangerine peel that imparts a powerful citrus perfume to the food; it is considered to have important medicinal value.

Hunan and Sichuan are far inland, with access to river fish but not much seafood, so they tend to focus more on meat, bean curd, mushrooms, bamboo shoots, and forest products. Sichuan is mountainous and draws heavily on montane (relating to the biogeographic zone of relatively moist cool upland slopes below timberline dominated by large coniferous trees) mushrooms and greens. Yunnan has a simpler cuisine with heavy use of beans and noodles.

Yunnan hams are famous throughout China; they are similar to salt-cured mountain hams from elsewhere in the world (Virginia, Spain, Switzerland).

THE FAR SOUTH

China’s far southeast consists of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Guangdong Province; Guangdong’s capital, Guangzhou, is the center of China’s most complex and elaborate Cuisine, the Cantonese. There is a Chinese proverb that Cantonese “eat everything with legs except a table, everything that swims except a submarine, and everything that flies except an airplane.” This is exaggerated, but hundreds of species are common in markets, and a small neighborhood restaurant is likely to have over four hundred dishes on the menu. Summary is

A Chinese proverb reflects the diversity of Cantonese cuisine, which caters to those willing to eat “everything with legs except a table, everything that swims except a submarine, and everything that flies except an airplane.” Before cooking, these fish were kept alive in clean water. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
impossible, but some distinctive flavors give coherence to the cuisine. Foremost of these are fermented soybeans that turn black in the fermentation process; they have a unique, meaty flavor especially valued with strongly flavored meats and fish. Fast cooking at high heat is particularly common in the south. Sweet and sour flavors are often combined (but “sweet-sour pork” is generally a sad travesty of true Cantonese sweet-sour dishes). Cantonese food depends on extreme freshness and quality of ingredients. Fish are kept alive—ideally in clean water—until needed. Chickens and pigeons get special feed and care. Vegetables are picked when young and tender, not when full-grown and woody.

The urban cooking of Guangzhou is sophisticated and innovative. Simpler but highly quality-conscious and distinctive variants of southern cuisine flourish in Guangxi Province and in isolated parts of Guangdong, such as the Taishan area.

Cantonese have always tended to migrate from China to find a living elsewhere, and thus Cantonese food has spread worldwide. Simple rural forms of it are ancestral to the “Chinese food” familiar from Peru to England and from Italy to Canada. It has not always traveled well, and naive audiences can be subjected to dishes in which Cantonese ideals of freshness and quality are lost and cheaper ingredients are vastly increased relative to expensive ones. However, many gourmet restaurants in major cities around the world now provide Cantonese and other Chinese foods equivalent to those in the homeland.

Minority Cuisines

China’s minority peoples have distinctive cuisines of their own. Most of those in south and southeast China now eat more or less as their Cantonese and Mandarin neighbors do, although some exotic items such as water bugs may persist. In Yunnan, China’s most diverse province with over thirty minority peoples, specialties range from maize and chilis to the “boneless pig,” a method of storing lard—the meat and bones are carefully removed, the lard salted, and the hide sewed back up. The lard cures in the high mountain air. Some Yi peoples of Yunnan and Sichuan lived until recently on maize and buckwheat; one group, the Nuosu, were famous for their large buckwheat cakes. Rice is now available and more popular.

Tibetan food traditionally was based on roasted barley ground to flour (tsamba) and often beaten up in tea with yak butter. More elaborate foods, including pork, vegetables, and dumplings similar to jiaozi, have tended to replace this diet recently.

More distinctive, with links westward, is the cuisine of China’s far west, the huge province of Xinjiang. Until recently most of the population spoke Turkic languages and ate foods typical of central Asia and the Iranian world. Rice was often cooked as pilaf—stir-fried before boiling, purely a west Asian style. (Chinese fried rice is boiled, dried, and then stir-fried.) Bread is similar to Persian bread and is often a staple. Lamb or mutton is the major meat. Fruit, including apricots, melons, and grapes, is much more important than it is eastward; pilafs often include apricots or raisins. Spicing is sparse or may be influenced by west Asian cuisine (coriander, cumin, cinnamon); absent are the distinctive Chinese flavorings such as soy sauce, brown pepper, and Chinese “wine.” Noodle
dishes and dumplings, similar in appearance to Chinese counterparts, thus taste very different.

Mongolia borders China on the northwest, and Inner Mongolia is Chinese territory. Mongol peoples have become a minority here; 90 percent of the population is now Han Chinese. However, Mongol food survives in remote areas. It is based on small amounts of grain with a great deal of dairy products, usually fermented or made into cheeses. Fermented mare’s milk (kumiss) is popular. (Other milks do not have enough sugar to ferment, unless sugar is added, which was impractical in the old days when sugar was expensive and hard to get.) Mutton is the usual meat. Until recently wild products—game, wild greens, mushrooms, roots—were important, but these are now depleted.

Recent Changes

Chinese food has changed rapidly with the coming of affluence. Change began in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1950s and in mainland China in the 1970s and 1980s. East Asia’s economic “miracle” brought meat, tea, wine, sugar, and even more exotic items such as game and rare fungi into almost everyone’s reach. This released a great deal of consumption, partly because of years of “deferred gratification,” partly because food is crucially important in every aspect of social life from festivals and reunions to marriages and business deals.

Also, foods have come from around the world, and American muscovy ducks are as familiar and localized as native Chinese delicacies. Chinese diners are adopting—and adapting—yogurt, hamburgers, and pizza.

Today the Chinese diet is more varied and vitamin-rich but disturbingly high in fat, refined sugar, highly milled grain products, and—for many—alcohol. This trend has had a predictably negative effect on health; deficiency diseases have been replaced by diabetes and heart disease. The future will probably bring balance. The still-inadequate diets of the rural poor will improve, while the affluent will modify their tastes in the direction of simpler, lower-calorie, higher-quality food.

E. N. ANDERSON

Further Reading

In early medieval China the cult of Maitreya was an important focus of Buddhist belief. The cult originally was associated with the goal of monk-scholars to be reborn in “Tusita heaven” and to hear the dharma directly from the future Buddha Maitreya.

The cult of Maitreya (Mile) in China originally was associated with the vows of monk-scholars to be reborn in what they called “Tusita heaven.” Their goal was to hear the dharma (divine law) directly from the mouth of the future Buddha Maitreya and thus attain Buddhahood. These elite monk-scholars and the royalty and aristocrats who patronized them commissioned images of Maitreya, both sitting and standing in meditation, as objects of worship and as aids for contemplation and visualization. Images of Maitreya standing were indicative of his preaching in Ketumati (generally thought to be modern Varanasi, India) and images of Maitreya sitting were indicative of his waiting in Tusita. The styles were closely connected in the art of the North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE) and the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and show that these two aspects of the cult of Maitreya were related in early medieval China.

The beginnings of the monastic aspect of the cult of Maitreya in China can be traced to the exegete (relating to exposition) Daoan (312–385), whose worship was focused on his desire to be reborn in Tusita heaven in the presence of Maitreya so that Daoan’s doubts about the scriptures could be resolved. The Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang (Hsuan-tsang, c. 596–664) was a devout devotee of Maitreya who wished to be reborn in Tusita, thus the cult became closely associated with his school of Chinese Yogacara.

In early medieval China the cult of Maitreya was an important focus of Buddhist belief. Because the sutras (precepts summarizing Vedic teaching) about Maitreya suggested that he would descend from Tusita to being a peaceful Buddhist millennium after years of warfare and the decline of the Buddhist teaching (mofa), worship of Maitreya spread throughout Chinese society. During the chaos that reigned at the end of the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) and the rise of the Tang dynasty, a few Buddhist monks and laymen justified their rebellions by claiming to be Maitreya, thus drawing upon the beliefs and imagery common to the cult. The Empress Wu Zetian (624–705) later justified her usurpation of the Tang dynasty throne by identifying herself with Maitreya. Throughout the Song dynasty (960–1279) followers of Maitreya rebelled frequently, and rebels drew upon Maitreya cult imagery to lend religious fervor and authority to their rebellions.

The cult of Maitreya and his image have gone through many transformations in Chinese society. He eventually was reinterpreted iconographically, changing from a slim and sleek figure in earlier dynasties to the rotund Budai (Pu-tai) of the Song dynasty. The “Laughing Buddha,” as he is commonly known, spread throughout Chinese popular culture during the late imperial period (1368–1912).
It is a staple image of traditional Chinese culture that has been exported to the West through immigrant Chinese.

Richard D. McBRIDE II

Further Reading

Istituto Universitario Orientale Seminario di Studi Asiatici.

Maitreya carved into a mountain, Gansu Province. The iconography of Maitreya and his cult have gone through many transformations in Chinese society, from slim and sleek in the Northern Dynasties period to roly-poly in the Song era. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Cultural Revolution
Wénhuà Dà Gémìng 文化大革命

A mass movement occurring during the final decade of Mao Zedong's life from 1966 onward, the Cultural Revolution caused massive political, social, and cultural disruption, and saw an onslaught on the rule of the Communist Party by rebellious groups and radicals. For the central government, the main issue was who was to succeed Mao Zedong as leader of China after his death. This was not resolved during his lifetime.

The Cultural Revolution (CR), officially known as the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," was a complex political-social movement that occurred in China during the last decade of Communist Party-leader Mao Zedong’s life from 1966 onward. Indeed, it is almost certain that without Mao Zedong the movement would never have taken place. It was evidence of Mao’s increasing radicalism in the final stages of his life, showing him subverting the very institutions and structures he had created after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 in order to achieve ambitious utopian political goals.

While limited in its economic impact, the CR was to have devastating social consequences, resulting in injury and death to many hundreds of thousands of people and traumatizing large parts of the urban Chinese population such that, in the words of the writer Ba Jin, it might be remembered as China’s "spiritual holocaust." Despite the word Cultural in its title, the revolution was a period during which literary and artistic production was ruthlessly repressed (only eight model operas were recognized and performed during the CR, and novel production ground to a halt). Universities were effectively closed for the first five years, and many prominent intellectuals were sent to the countryside to what were called "May Seventh Cadre schools," named after the date of the edict from the central government that established them. These schools were effectively concentration camps. The great Chinese writer Yang Jiang was to write about the grim, reductive experience of intellectuals in these camps in her book A Cadre School Life — Six Chapters.

One way of understanding the CR in PRC history is to see it as the culmination of several battles that Mao had fought with intellectuals since becoming leader of the Communist Party in the 1930s. In the revolutionary base of Yan'an (a city in Sichuan Province) during the 1940s and then in the early 1950s during the “Five Antis” campaign, Mao had instigated purges of writers, economists, and political scientists. The Hundred Flowers movement of 1957, in which people had been encouraged to voice criticisms of the government’s performance, had brought a deluge of negative feeling, which Mao had responded to by a much greater purge and which in many ways confirmed his suspicions that, within the classes of Chinese society, the intellectuals were among the least reliable. However, larger political issues, inside and outside China, contributed to the CR and made the movement what it was. These issues were:
tensions with the Soviet Union from the late 1950s onward after Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, a denunciation with which Mao profoundly disagreed, leading to the withdrawal of Soviet expertise and aid by 1961 and rising military tensions;

2 deep disagreements in the top leadership over the role of economic reform and the need to open up the Chinese economy and engage with the West; and

3 unresolved historical tensions between groups within China, ranging from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to those who had been rehabilitated in the 1950s but were still suspect because of the positions they had taken when the Communists were coming to power in the 1930s and 1940s. This situation created a devastating, complex mixture of outcomes that reached its culmination in the years after 1967.

The first signs of the CR came in 1965 from an unexpected direction. By this time Mao Zedong had effectively withdrawn from frontline day-to-day politics after criticisms at the Lushun forum in 1959 about the tragic impact of the Great Leap Forward (Mao’s campaign to quickly catch up with Great Britain and the United States in agriculture and industry). President Liu Shaoqi and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Deng Xiaoping were in charge and had started initial economic reforms allowing greater freedom to farmers in 1964. In 1965 the Shanghai-based writer Yao Wenyuan wrote an attack
on a play, *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office*, written by Beijing vice mayor and Ming scholar Wu Han. In his attack Yao claimed that Wu Han’s play—about the Ming dynasty scholar and official Hai Rui and his unfair dismissal by the emperor—had been an allegorical reference to Mao Zedong’s dismissal of Peng Dehuai, former defense minister, who had been one of the most outspoken critics of Mao at the Lushun forum. This attack clearly had come with some sanction from Mao himself. There was also a clear link to the newly politically active wife of Mao, Jiang Qing, an actress in 1930s Shanghai, who had harbored political aspirations for a number of years but had to repress them on orders from the party. After 1966 she came into her own. The first major victims of the CR began to fall in 1966, among them Beijing mayor Peng Zhen. However, institutionally the movement began with establishment of the Cultural Revolutionary Group as a result of the Sixteenth May Circular, an order issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The group reported directly to the standing committee and was a clear sign that parallel power structures were now directly competing with, and openly confronting, party structures.

**Revisionist Road**

After this development events happened rapidly. On 25 May 1966 Nie Yuanzi, an academic in the philosophy
department at Beijing University, posted a big-character poster (a political poster with large Chinese characters) in which she demanded that people “defend the centre, defend Mao Zedong, and defend the dictatorship of the Proletariat,” which launched an all-out attack on those in the party taking the revisionist road. These sentiments were echoed on 16 August when the “16 Point Decision on the CR” was issued by the central government, threatening to “overthrow those in authority taking the capitalist road.” At the end of 1966 eight large rallies were held in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in which Mao appeared before a radicalized new audience, many members of whom belonged to the newly formed and initially informal “Red Guard” rebellious groups.

On one level the CR can be seen as a power struggle between members of the top leadership in Beijing. It had little impact on the vast majority of the Chinese population, who still lived in the countryside (about 80 percent of China’s population then). Mao saw his greatest threat coming from people around Liu Shaoqi, who had been experimenting with new, more flexible economic ideas and had drifted away from adherence to Maoism with its stress on class struggle. Naturally Mao looked toward the PLA, one of his main sources of power, and to its leader, Marshal Lin Biao, who was a hero of the struggle against the Japanese and of the civil war in the 1930s and 1940s but who had kept a low profile until 1964. In the early 1960s Lin had authorized the collection of key sayings by Mao in a booklet (what was to be named in the West, famously, the “Little Red Book,” although its formal title in Chinese translates as “Quotations from Chairman Mao”). The “Little Red Book” was to become one of the key props of the CR movement, with over 800 million copies printed. Lin Biao was Mao’s key partner in the opening part of the CR, ensuring that the army was Mao’s most dependable ally.

In January 1967 the CR further intensified with CR groups in Shanghai, seizing power from the local party committee. This tussle was representative of the tensions between the new CR organs and the traditional party organs that had been the main holders of power until then. CR committees were organized in cities throughout China, and in Beijing the central CR committee became one of the major decision-making bodies, with members such as Jiang Qing, the sinister Kang Sheng (Mao’s head of secret security), and the Shanghai radicals Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. By February 1967, after the establishment of a “Paris Commune model” in Shanghai, key figures within the party issued open attacks on what they saw as the excesses of the CR. They expressed dismay at the increasing disorder in China’s urban centers and at the violence that had started to be vented toward groups in China’s population. In the most representative event of this period, the Wuhan Incident in central China on 20 July 1967, radical factions in the city clashed, causing the army to intervene and the central government to send in leaders. In the second half of 1967 the CR made increasingly open attacks on Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who were labeled initially the “Numbers One and Two in the Party taking the capitalist road” but who were then openly attacked by name and dismissed from their party posts in December 1967. Liu was to die tragically in Kaifeng, Henan Province, reportedly of untreated cancer, in 1969, although he was posthumously rehabilitated in 1980, four years after Mao’s death. Other figures such as Peng Dehuai were to receive similar violent treatment, being paraded through the streets of Beijing and publicly humiliated and attacked dozens of times throughout the summer and autumn of 1967. Such violence fanned out to the provinces. In Sichuan Province, radical rebellious groups struggled against the party secretary. A similar thing happened in Heilongjiang in the northeast.

**Violence Peaks**

The violence peaked in 1968. Events in Inner Mongolia can be seen as representative of this violence, with the local party secretary, the ethnic Mongolian Ulanfu, being dismissed and removed to Beijing for his safely in mid-1967 and replaced by General Teng Haiqing, a Han from outside the province. From late 1967 increasingly virulent attacks against what was labeled the “Inner Mongolian People’s Party” led to the deaths of 22,000 people and injuries to over 200,000 people, the vast majority of Mongolian ethnicity. In Xinjiang Muslims were forced to eat pork, all mosques were closed, and violent purges occurred in the party. They were under particular suspicion of harboring separatist sentiments as the region had been an independent country from 1945 to 1949. In Tibet cultural sites, temples, and lamaseries (monasteries of lamas) were attacked, and religious life effectively stopped. It would be an oversimplification to say that the CR was
predominantly a Han movement. Some of the most enthusiastic followers in Tibet and Inner Mongolia were ethnically non-Han. The CR’s call to “root out and smash the old” and create a new world because “without destruction there could be no construction” (two popular slogans at the time) reached out to a large constituency. The “Purify the Ranks” campaign that continued into early 1969 attempted to dig out “class traitors” in most of China’s provinces, in some areas leading to massive skirmishes and even to acts of cannibalism and mass suicide.

Such internal turbulence inevitably affected China internationally, causing the withdrawal of most of its ambassadors abroad (all except one, Huang Hua in Egypt, were recalled to China) and the paralysis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, which was torn in a struggle between radical officials and the more moderate minister, Chen Yi. The burning of the British mission in Beijing in the summer of 1967 did little to help China’s international image, although this act at least brought China’s leaders to their senses. Premier Zhou Enlai, seen as a moderating influence, was to be instrumental in gaining the release of the British journalist Anthony Grey—who had been taken as a government hostage from 1967 to 1969. Paradoxically, from the end of 1968 onward China clearly was increasingly interested in resuming dialogue with the United States, culminating in the visit of President Richard Nixon in 1972. This development perhaps is easier to understand when seen against the background of the real deterioration of Chinese relations with the USSR, which led to bitter clashes on the northeast border in 1969, resulting in several hundred casualties on both sides and the threat of war.

The period from 1966 to 1969 was the most violent and unpredictable of the whole CR decade. During that decade a new leadership, more dominated by the military, was elevated; Lin Biao’s influence reached its peak; and his rapid and dramatic fall began. The decade was marked at the end by the Ninth Party Congress in Beijing, held in April 1969. Part of the argument at the Congress was about how Lin should be marked as Mao’s heir apparent. A more arcane, but still significant, point was Lin’s attempt to enshrine the recognition of the genius of Mao Zedong Thought (i.e., Maoist doctrine) into the party constitution, an act that Mao resisted, along with the attempt by Lin to name himself president, a position vacant since the fall of Liu Shaoqi. By 1970 Lin’s position had become more precarious, with clear signs that, in the top-level rapprochement with the United States, he had been sidelined. The facts surrounding his fleeing China on a plane and its crashing in the Republic of Mongolia in September 1971 are still unclear. Reports by the Chinese government afterward claimed that Lin and a group around him had been plotting either to assassinate Mao (a plot thwarted by Mao’s earlier-than-expected return to Beijing after a trip around central China) or to flee to south China and set up an independent state in Canton. That Lin chose to head to the USSR for refuge is puzzling and has fueled claims ever since that he was, in fact, murdered on Mao’s orders. The impact of his death bewildered the Chinese people, who were slowly informed by the authorities that the man once hailed as the “closest comrade in arms” and successor to Mao was, in fact, “a renegade, scab, and traitor.”

After 1972 Mao was reduced to relying increasingly on his premier, Zhou Enlai, a man who himself was ill with cancer and reportedly had suffered heart problems during the late 1960s. The group that came to be known as the “Gang of Four,” centered around Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, was a constant source of radicalization within politics during this period. The group was instrumental in launching highly indirect campaigns to attack Zhou and, upon his surprise rehabilitation in 1974, Deng Xiaoping. However, the gang was increasingly loathed within the party, and as Mao grew weaker and less active, groups within the party actively opposed what they saw as the gang’s pernicious influence. The gang still had enough clout, however, to cause Deng Xiaoping to be removed from his position as vice premier in 1976 on the grounds that he was a “reactionary” and opposed to the “correct line.” The death of Zhou Enlai in early 1976, with the attempt to conduct his funeral in private, proved to be the last straw. The Qingming festival in April 1976 was dominated by popular protests and attempts to lay wreaths in memory of Zhou, along with increasing demands that Deng Xiaoping be returned to power. The Tangshan earthquake in the summer, which resulted in over a quarter million deaths, was seen popularly as the augur that a period of Chinese history was coming to a close. On 9 September 1976 Mao Zedong died at the age of eighty-three. His death effectively marked the end of his revolution and of the CR.
Legacy Debated

Mao was to claim, toward the end of his life, that his two greatest achievements had been the Cultural Revolution and the defeats of the Japanese and the Nationalists, respectively, in the Sino-Japanese War (1937 to 1945) and the Civil War (1945 to 1949). He argued that the CR should be repeated every few decades. He told foreign visitors that his attempt to radically change Chinese society had been sincere, although he had evidently failed. The weight of history had been too great. Throwing off feudalism, attacking bureaucratism, and reining in the party were all widely appreciated as worthy objectives and made the CR, at least at its start, a genuinely popular movement, even though it is largely condemned in hindsight. Some writers, such as the Australian-based academic Mobo Gao, argue eloquently that the CR brought major gains to Chinese society, challenging and denting its conservatism, empowering disenfranchised people, and creating genuine equality. They point to the huge imbalances in the Chinese population now and refer back to that period with something approaching nostalgia.

One could argue that the CR was a bitter medicine—a painful process of national self-discovery that needed to be endured for China to get to where it is today. Even so, the price was horribly high, and the Communist Party itself, in its reevaluation of the CR period in 1981, declared that the movement had been a mistake, a calamity that had been visited upon the Chinese people by Mao and the radical leaders around him and that had inflicted the worst damages on the party and country since 1949.
The Cultural Revolution certainly framed the worldview of the people occupying key positions in China now—people such as the current president, Hu Jintao, who had been at Qinghua University in Beijing during the period of the most radical activities in 1966 and 1967, and Bo Xilai, former minister of trade and son of party immortal Bo Yibo, who had been a member of radical groups in the same period. Mao had intended that part of the CR's rationale was to teach young Chinese how to struggle and to understand the importance of politics—to “put politics in command.” In that he succeeded. The CR radicalized and politicized a new generation of Chinese.

The legacy of the movement in China is less easy to summarize. The trial of the Gang of Four in 1981 and the convictions of its members were widely seen as being insignificant because the “fifth member,” Mao Zedong, without whom the others would have had no influence at all, was now dead. The Cultural Revolution remains a sensitive topic in China even today, with many aspects of it little understood. There is, to this day, no openly available Chinese-language account of the period, although one appeared in the 1980s by Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao but was quickly banned. To some the CR was perhaps the only period in Chinese history when the Chinese were affected by something like mass religious fervor—idolization of Mao reached delirious heights. To others the CR was a period of darkness and suffering. For still others it was a time of liberation. What can be said for certain is that it was a highly complex movement, one that will take many decades to understand and that still influences the superficially very different China of today.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading


Virtual Museum and resource centre for the Cultural Revolution at http://www.cnd.org/CR/english/
Cunguan

College graduates employed by rural villages have been named *cunguan*, for the Chinese words meaning “village” and “manager.” The program is designed to alleviate high unemployment of urban college graduates and to aid in rural development and sustainability. The *cunguan* program has some features in common with the relocation of urban youth to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution.

*Cunguan* is a new term that describes college graduates who are employed by the Chinese government to help organize villages and provide various services and support to village members. College graduates and the Chinese government have a common interest in the *cunguan* post: the former needs it to secure employment while the latter hopes it will enhance rural community organizations.

**Creation of Cunguan Program**

The *cunguan* program in rural China is designed to meet two needs in Chinese society. First, tens of thousands of recent Chinese college graduates have failed to find a suitable job in urban China. This is a result of the expansion of China’s higher education sector since 1999, creating more graduates, and China’s economic downturn that began in 2008, creating fewer jobs. This job scarcity affects not just the college graduates, but their parents as well. Parents have invested in their children’s education; with no social security as a safety net, they depend on their children to support them in their old age. Many college graduates have to take low-paying or unskilled work to avoid unemployment. A three-year contract as a *cunguan* can be an attractive alternative: it can provide the post holder with a reasonable salary in a government job, recognized work experience, and potentially a leg up for future civil service work.

Second, there is a need for new knowledge, skills, and leadership in rural communities to cope with the stagnation and decline of rural economic and social development. As village leaders in China are getting older (most are now over fifty years old), the Chinese government hopes that *cunguan* will bring new momentum and innovative ideas into rural societies. Chinese officials say that having well-educated graduates work at village-level government positions is a Communist Party strategy to implement the “scientific outlook” on development and accelerate the creation of a new socialist countryside.

Jiangsu Province hired the first *cunguan* in 1995. Since then, more and more local authorities have become interested in the program; by 2005, seventeen provincial governments had put it into practice. In 2008, the central government made a decision to recruit over 100,000 *cunguan* nationwide. If the program grows as planned, there could be 600,000 new jobs, one *cunguan* per village, by 2018. Chinese vice president Xi Jinping has said the country urgently needs more grassroots officials who can lead farmers to get rich and make the countryside more stable.
**Cunguan and Zhiqing**

As a national strategy for the career development of young people, the cunguan phenomenon resembles the policy of zhiqing ("reeducated youth") during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when millions of urban graduates from high or middle schools were sent to the countryside to work and live with rural residents. Both cunguan and zhiqing provided relief from urban unemployment, and both resulted in migration from urban to rural areas, giving the urban youth knowledge and experience of rural life.

Although both programs were described as ways to “drive socialism,” there are many differences between the two programs. Cunguan are expected to help with rural development: Their knowledge and education should benefit rural communities through regulation and policy dissemination, project planning, community information, agricultural extension, or public relations, for example. The cunguan program is voluntary and often highly competitive; it is an alternative to unemployment or poor-paying, menial urban jobs. Cunguan are rewarded: They are paid a salary; other expected benefits may be the chance to be recruited or promoted as civil servants later or a residence permit for an urban area. In any case, they may make the choice to leave the countryside after their contract ends. Zhiqing, on the other hand, were expected to learn from the rural populace by doing rural work; their formal education was a detriment, not a plus. Zhiqing were often forced to relocate; neither they nor their parents had a choice. They were certainly not paid by the government, but were expected to earn a basic living working beside village natives. Zhiqing had little chance of promotion or leaving the countryside.

**Outlook**

Opinions differ as to the lasting value of the cunguan program. Supporters of the government policy say it provides a unique opportunity for college graduates to gain life experience and learn about the complexity of the rural reality. Those in favor also believe graduates with cunguan experience will have greater chances for career development than those without it. Villages, especially poorer ones, are optimistic that the cunguans will help them. For example, Internet-savvy grads can help promote village products to online customers. Others, however, have doubts about the effectiveness of the program. It is very difficult for cunguan to gain the trust of rural residents unless they can prove their commitment to village members. Some village leaders, proud of their village and their work, believe the village needs no further improvement.

It is too early to predict the long term impact of the cunguan program. Cunguan are expected to mediate between local government and village members in order to deliver governmental services. This dual nature of the cunguan post will make it difficult for them to balance the different roles of villager and officer, and different interests and needs of farmers and governments.

Bin Wu

**Further Reading**


China’s currency, the renminbi, is getting stronger with the Chinese economy. It is gaining worldwide attention because it has appreciated greatly due to China’s significant trade surplus, foreign reserves, and other factors. Whether the value of the renminbi will continue to grow or fluctuate are questions catching Chinese and others’ ears.

The renminbi is the monetary currency of the People’s Republic of China, with RMB or CNY (China yuan) as its abbreviation and ¥ or 元 as its symbol.

Since the founding in 1948 of Renmin Bank of China (the central bank of China), which is in charge of issuing, printing, and managing renminbi, five editions of renminbi have been issued: 1948, 1955, 1962, 1987, and 1999, with the fifth edition and part of the fourth edition still in circulation. Each edition has a theme, such as agricultural and industrial development for edition three and harmonious development involving economy, culture, and environment for edition five. Denominations of renminbi are 1, 2, and 5 cents, 10, 20, and 50 cents, and 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 yuan (1, 2, 5, 10, and 50 cents and 1 yuan are coins, and other denominations are paper).

The renminbi has experienced several exchange rate fluctuations in the past half century. From 1949 to 1952, when the renminbi was first issued as China’s legal currency, a floating exchange rate was used. From 1953 to 1973 the renminbi was officially tied to the U.S. dollar at 1:¥2.46. At the same time China operated a planned (government regulated, as opposed to a market) economy, so the exchange rate did not make much difference because little foreign trade went on between China and other countries. In 1973 the first oil crisis broke out, together with worldwide inflation and fluctuations in exchange rates. Most Western countries adopted a floating exchange rate. China at this time started to connect the renminbi to a basket of currencies rather than just the U.S. dollar to avoid instability caused by fluctuations in the dollar’s exchange rate. The exchange rate between the

Illustration of a coin from a treasure hidden at Xiangyang during the siege in 1268-73.
U.S. dollar and the renminbi was gradually adjusted to $1:¥1.50, which was 39.2 percent appreciation for renminbi until 1980.

From 1980 to 1994, when China started its open-door policies and China's economy and foreign trade grew rapidly, a dual exchange rate was adopted: the official exchange rate and the domestic balance price (an exchange rate calculated according to the balance of foreign trade by Chinese companies). During this period the official exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and renminbi fluctuated between $1:¥1.50 and $1:¥5.70, and the domestic balance price fluctuated over a wider range: from $1:¥1.50 to $1:¥8.70 because of rapidly growing foreign trade. From 1994 to 2005 the renminbi was again connected more directly to the U.S. dollar (although not officially), and the exchange rate between the two was allowed to fluctuate only within a narrow range of $1:¥8.27 to $1:¥8.28, with strict regulation.

On 21 July 2005, The People's Bank of China announced that the renminbi, for the second time, was to be connected to a basket of currencies rather than directly to the U.S. dollar, and the exchange rate was changed to $1:¥8.11, a 2 percent appreciation for the renminbi. The daily fluctuating range of the renminbi was doubled from 0.15 percent to 0.3 percent and rose to 0.5 percent on 18 May 2007. From this time the renminbi has continued to appreciate (as of 31 July 2008, the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the renminbi was $1:¥6.8205).

The appreciation of the renminbi is a two-edged sword. On one hand, this gradual and steady appreciation can make the formerly overvalued renminbi go back to its real value, which would effectively avoid sharp fluctuations in exchange rates and variations in the national economy. Meanwhile, China's foreign surplus will decrease, and its consuming power will be greatly
in this respect China’s production will be strongly stimulated. On the other hand, with a higher “international price,” many of China’s exporters are losing their competitive edge because they are increasingly unable to offer low prices, the basis of their competitiveness. In addition, uncertain factors, such as unemployment, domestic inflation, and currency speculation, are emerging.

Managing a currency is key to establishing a stable economy, but such management remains a challenge for China and the rest of the world, since all currencies in today’s global market are interconnected.

ZHOU Guanqi

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Zhao Daping. (2007). Renminbi hui lv bian dui Zhongguo wai mao de ying xiang [The impact of renminbi exchange rate on China’s trade balance]. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publisher.
Some foreign critics, especially in the United States, have claimed that China has manipulated the value of its currency, keeping the yuan at an artificially low rate and not allowing proper market functions to operate.

The valuation of the Chinese yuan (or renminbi) has become a highly sensitive and politicized issue between China and the United States and, perhaps less pointedly, between China and the European Union. Since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has run increasingly large trade surpluses with both of these trading partners. The prominence (and symbolism) of these deficits has become something of a battleground between those who believe the prominence represents a deliberate policy to distort and control world trade patterns in China’s favor and those who believe that the prominence is a natural outcome of globalization, and that to argue against China embracing this prominence, after so many years when it was criticized for holding itself apart, seems contradictory.

Criticism of the potential manipulation began to surface in the late 1990s, but with the accrual of massive amounts of foreign reserves by the Chinese central bank from 2001 onward, these criticisms became more focused and politically problematic. In early 2006 China overtook Japan as the holder of the world’s largest foreign exchanges. It had achieved this ranking through almost twenty-five years of exports and over $700 billion of foreign investment coming into China. Becoming one of the world’s most open economies was achieved while the central government still maintained two important levers of economic control. It maintained the nonconvertibility of the Chinese currency, and it exercised, largely through the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), tight controls over capital outflows. Those purchasing goods in China (Wal-Mart or Tesco, for instance) for export to overseas markets had to pay in dollars, euros, or another convertible currency, and this money went into the central bank. The supplier was finally paid in local currency. Those Chinese companies that wished to invest or purchase abroad had to apply to the Bank of China—or, for large amounts, SAFE—for foreign currency to do this. There is, therefore, a wall between Chinese currency and foreign currencies. The Chinese government defends this wall by pointing out that without it the Asian economic crisis in 1998 would have ravaged the Chinese economy as much as those of Indonesia and Malaysia.

The value of Chinese yuan and the U.S. dollar have been pegged for a number of years, although partly because of U.S. pressure and partly because of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization and increasing internationalization of the Chinese economy, the exchange rate has been given some room to move within a tightly regulated value range. As the trade deficit with the United States in particular increased dramatically, particularly after 2003, there were complaints among U.S. policymakers and manufacturers that the Chinese yuan was being held at an artificially low rate and that the Chinese government was not allowing proper market functions to operate. The claimed degree of undervaluation varied from 15 percent to 40 percent.
An undervalued Chinese yuan would give Chinese manufacturers an unfair advantage because it would mean that they were able to export their goods at a much cheaper price than local producers in the destination country. But proving that currency manipulation has been going on has proved difficult. The Economist magazine has introduced the “Big Mac” measure by which the local price of a Big Mac hamburger is used as the benchmark across different kinds of economies and other goods compared with it. On this measure Chinese goods have been claimed to be 20 to 30 percent below value over most of the last twenty years. Even so, this measure has been criticized as crude.

In fact, complex reasons exist for the increase in Chinese exports abroad, some of them internal, some of them external. And although currency values might be an easy target, the story is not so straightforward. China has generally controlled the factors of production (the factors that contribute to the making of goods, such as electricity, labor, land for factories, human labor costs) strictly in the last quarter of a century. In that sense, China has subsidized the costs of manufacturing, starting to introduce a proper free market similar to ones that exist in developed economies only in the last few years. The costs of borrowing capital and employing people have been kept artificially low until recently. The Chinese government argued that it did this in order to help China build up capacity in a hugely competitive and complex international market. Although some analysts say that the most important advantage China has had in its ascent to becoming the “world’s factory” has been cheap and plentiful labor, this was one among several advantages.

A further contributing factor has been the extreme liberalization of foreign investment regulations into China, meaning that manufacturing in particular has benefited from the opening up of hundreds of thousands of joint ventures and the creation, particularly in south China around the Pearl River delta, of a massive manufacturing and industrial area. China has become such a large and successful exporter because of the benefits it has offered to foreign investors. Its export success, therefore, has also led to advantages and help for foreign partners.

Unique among major economic powers, China maintains this control over its currency. But this means that, especially in a period of economic downturn, it remains a lightning rod for foreign critics and for those who see protectionism as a valid response to international trade competition. This issue is likely to remain as long as China continues with this macroeconomic measure. The real reasons for the deficits, however, are far more complex and would remain in place even were the Chinese yuan to be revalued.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading
Cyberspace

Diànnǎo kōngjiān 电脑空间

Cyberspace refers to a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. In China the word Internet is used in lieu of the word cyberspace. By early 2009 the number of Internet users in China increased to 298 million, second only to the number of Internet users in the United States.

The word cyberspace is a combination of the words cybernetics and space. It was created by the sci-fi novelist William Gibson in his short story Burning Chrome published in Omni magazine in 1982 and popularized by his 1984 novel Neuromancer. Today cyberspace is a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. Because the word cyber itself connotes computerization, digitalization, multidimension, and the like, the word cyberspace does not have a unified Chinese transliteration and is usually translated as “Saibo space” or is called “network space” or “virtual space.”

Cyberspace in China

In China the word Internet is used in lieu of the word cyberspace; the word cyberspace is seldom used in official documents or unofficial communication. In few Chinese research articles about the Internet is the word cyberspace mentioned. According to the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), by the end of 2007 the number of netizens (active participants in the Internet community) in China increased to 210 million, second only to the number in the United States. China’s total is expected to surpass that of the United States in 2008.

The gender breakdown of netizens in China is 57.2 male and 42.8 female; 69 percent of netizens are younger than thirty years of age; 41 percent are older than fifty; 72.2 percent have high school or higher educations; 75 percent live in urban areas and 25 percent in rural areas. In general, the Internet is expanding its influence to people younger than eighteen and older than thirty, to groups with junior middle school and lower educations, to rural residents, and to low-income residents. Regarding location, 67.3 percent of netizens use the Internet at home, 33.9 percent in Internet cafes, and 24.3 percent in the office. The average online time is 16.1 hours a week. Netizens who access the Internet via mobile phones number 50.4 million. Regarding reasons for logging onto the Internet, 66.6 percent use it to get information, 47.9 percent to communicate, 39.2 percent to read news, and 38.4 percent to be entertained. The top seven uses of the Internet are gain access to music, instant messaging, online video, news, search engines, games, and e-mail. Netizen satisfaction with the Internet is not high, just more than 60 percent, and only 33 percent of netizens trust information found on the Internet. Such a lack of trust possibly restrains the further development of the Internet in China.
Functions of Cyberspace in China

During the development of the Internet in China, its functions have been expanded into four aspects: entertainment media, communication tools, information channels, and life assistance.

According to the 21st Report on China Internet Development by the CNNIC, the recreational function of the Internet is utilized on a large scale in China. During a half-year period 86.6 percent of netizens listened to online music; 71.2 percent downloaded audio files; 76.9 percent watched online video; and 40.5 percent downloaded video files. Online games took 59.3 percent of total online recreational time. A netizen on average spent 7.3 hours per week on online games.

For communication Chinese netizens mainly use the Internet for instant messaging and e-mail. In China 56.5 percent of Internet usage is for e-mail, and 81.4 percent of Chinese netizens use instant messaging.

Almost three-quarters of netizens use the Internet as an information-searching engine; a similar number use it to read news, and one-quarter have their own blog. Consequently, cyberspace changes the habits of Chinese people as they gather and absorb information, especially breaking news and investigative news reporting. Cyberspace is also a place to foster public communication and put forth efforts to build a civil society. Cyberspace is widening and deepening the process of China’s informationalization and globalization. Internet job-seeking, Internet education, Internet shopping, and Internet banking and stock brokerage make up the main part of life assistance for netizens.

Internet Supervision

To supervise use of the Internet in China the central government has established rules, including Regulations on the Protection of the Right of Communication through Information Network (2006), which clearly define the rights of citizens, businesses, and social groups to communicate information through the Internet.

In addition, regulations on domain name supervision and Internet security have been implemented. The most distinguishing feature of the regulations is strengthening supervision over Internet news and the content of information, bringing them into the orbit of legal management and therefore ending the previous disorder in Internet news and communication. At the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007 the Central Committee proposed the slogan “Cultural Prosperity” and guidelines for promoting the development of Internet media and Internet industrialization.

The principles of the Chinese government on supervising the Internet are as follows: develop the Internet actively and use it fully, strengthen supervision, promote its benefits, abolish its harm, and bring its advantages into full play. The government has passed a series of laws on Internet supervision since the middle and late 1990s. During the Seventeenth National Representative Conference of the Chinese Communist Party (15–22 October 2007), the Central Committee of the party promoted the policy of thriving culture, which contains guidelines on developing Internet media and Internet industries. One can safely predict that the Internet will continue to have a profound influence on China.

Junhao HONG and Wenfa HE

Further Reading


The Dalai Lama is the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibetan Buddhists. The present Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, is the fourteenth in a line of succession. He leads a Tibetan government-in-exile in India and is a spokesman for nonviolence and Buddhist ideals.

The Dalai Lama is the temporal and spiritual leader of the Tibetan Buddhist people, who regard him as the earthly manifestation of Chenrezi, the bodhisattva (incarnating deity) of compassion. Each Dalai Lama is regarded as the reincarnation of his predecessor, and after a Dalai Lama dies, a search is conducted for the young boy in whom the Dalai Lama is considered to have been reborn. The present Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), is the fourteenth in a line of succession that originated in a fourteenth-century disciple of the founder of the Gelugpa sect, the leading school of Tibetan Buddhism.

The fourteenth Dalai Lama, commonly referred to in English by the title “His Holiness,” was born into a peasant family in the village of Takster in northeastern Amdo Province of Tibet (now part of China’s Qinghai Province). His predecessor had “passed to the heavenly fields” in 1933, and in 1937 Tenzin Gyatso was recognized as his reincarnation. Tenzin Gyatso was taken to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, in 1939 and in February 1940 was enthroned in the Potala Palace. While a regent ruled Tibet in his name, Tenzin Gyatso began the course of studies that culminated in his being awarded the Lharampa Geshe degree (roughly equivalent to a doctorate in Buddhist studies) in 1959.

Because of the crisis caused by Communist China’s invasion of Tibet in October 1950, Tenzin Gyatso, then...
sixteen years old, assumed temporal power in Tibet on 17 November 1950. He remained there under Chinese authority until the activities of the Communist regime prompted him to flee Lhasa in March 1959. Although he was pursued by Chinese forces, he reached India. There, with about one hundred thousand of his followers, the Dalai Lama established a Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala in the Himalayan foothills of northern India. He has since become the primary ambassador of the Tibetan exile movement as well as a spokesman for nonviolence and for the Buddhist ideal of universal compassion. In October 1989 he won the Nobel Peace Prize.

A charming and modest man with a great appeal in the West, the fourteenth Dalai Lama prefers to be known as “a simple Buddhist monk.” He remains the focus of Tibetan identity in the world. His leadership has been characterized by an openness to change, a steadfast belief in the principles of nonviolence, and the promotion of dialogue between religions and science.

Since 1959 the Chinese have argued that the Dalai Lama is a “tool of Western imperialism,” working against the Chinese Communist state. They claim his demands for Tibetan autonomy mask the desire for Tibetan independence—and thus portray him as a threat to the unity of China. Talks between representatives of China and the Dalai Lama have been held on occasions, most recently in 2008, but have always ended without any measurable progress being made. With the present Dalai Lama now seventy-five years old and subject to bouts of ill-health, the question of his next incarnation arises. The Dalai Lama has stated that his next incarnation will not appear in China, but as it has done in the case of other important Tibetan Buddhist incarnations, the Chinese

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**Dalai Lama on Living in Exile**

_In his autobiography published in 1990, the Dalai Lama relates first hand his feelings on being exiled from his homeland of Tibet, and recalls his former life there._

I fled Tibet on 31 March 1959. Since then I have lived in exile in India. During the period 1949–50, the People’s Republic of China sent an army to invade my country. For almost a decade I remained as political as well as spiritual leader of my people and tried to re-establish peaceful relations between our two nations. But the task proved impossible, I came to the unhappy conclusion that I could serve my people better from outside.

When I look back to the time when Tibet was still a free country, I realize that those were the best years of my life. Today I am definitely happy, but inevitably the existence I now lead is very different from the one I was brought up to. And although there is clearly no use indulging in feelings of nostalgia, still I cannot help feeling sad whenever I think of the past. It reminds me of the terrible suffering of my people. The old Tibet was not perfect. Yet, it is true to say that our way of life was something quite remarkable. Certainly there was much that was worth preserving that is now lost forever.

...Of course, whilst I lived in Tibet, being Dalai Lama meant a great deal. It meant that I lived a life far removed from the toil and discomfort of the vast majority of my people. Everywhere I went, I was accompanied by a retinue of servants. I was surrounded by government ministers and advisors clad in sumptuous silk robes, men drawn from the most exalted and aristocratic families in the land. My daily companions were brilliant scholars and highly realized religious adepts. And every time I left the Potala, the magnificent, 1,000-chambered winter palace of the Dalai Lamas, I was escorted by a procession of hundreds of people. Invariably almost the entire population of Lhasa, the capital, came to try to catch a glimpse of me whenever I went out. There was an awed silence and often there were tears as people lowered their heads or prostrated themselves on the ground when I passed.

state will oversee the search for a new Dalai Lama among the Tibetan Buddhist population of China. Thus two candidates will compete for popular acceptance as the next Dalai Lama.

Alex McKay

Further Reading

Dalian

Dàlián 大连

6.2 million est. 2007 pop.

Perched at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula on China’s northeast coast, the city of Dalian has undergone many changes through the years. It became a major seaport during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and has since been occupied by the British, the Russians, and the Japanese. Today it is both a popular and thriving tourist destination in Liaoning Province and China’s largest oil and gas port.

In many ways the history of Dalian (urban area 12,574 square kilometers) and its adjacent district of Lushunkou (Port Arthur) represents the tumultuous history of most of coastal China over the last 150 years—from dynastic decline and colonial occupation during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to Cold War stagnation under Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1949–1976) and finally to economic resurgence under the policies introduced by party leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978.

The site has been populated for more than two thousand years, but its mention in dynastic records as a major seaport during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) really begins the modern era. Since then the city’s excellent natural harbor and strategic coastal location as the “Gateway to Manchuria” have brought both tragedy and prosperity. Incomes and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) are some of the highest in China due to a fortuitous location for trade with China’s increasingly important northeast Asian neighbors—Japan, South Korea, and Russia—combined with a diverse and balanced economy.

During the dynastic era the city’s location at the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula allowed quick commercial and naval access to the rest of coastal China via the Yellow Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese were not alone in appreciating this location. Interest in the harbor led to a first brief foreign occupation by the British during the Second Opium War (also called the “Arrow War,” 1856–1860). Returned to the Chinese at the end of the war, the site was rented, under pressure, to the Russian empire (1898–1904) and renamed “Dalny,” only to be lost to Japan as a concession under the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Occupation by the Japanese—first directly and later as a portion of the Japanese “puppet state” of Manchukuo—lasted until 1945. Dalian citizens continue to have quite mixed emotions about this era and the Japanese. While
a few historic buildings are all that remain from the Russian era, Japanese influences on the city, then renamed “Dairen,” remain profound. Until post-1978 reform-era investment drastically expanded and modernized infrastructure, much of the city’s industrial infrastructure as well as the port and transportation network must be credited to Japanese occupation-era development. Dairen was the terminus of the rail network that brought iron, coal, and oil from Manchuria to feed the great wartime factories of the Japanese empire. In 1937 Japanese planners rebuilt and expanded the entire city, which was then considered one of the most beautiful in the empire. Of course, everything—the parks, the roads, the railroads, the warehouses, and the port—was built on the backs of Chinese conscripted laborers. At the end of World War II Dalian had one of the highest proportional concentrations of Japanese outside of the home islands. Ironically, the expatriate Japanese population at the present time is also one of the largest among the cities of China.

Before the city was restored to full Chinese sovereignty in 1955, it was jointly governed for a decade by the Russians and Chinese as the city of Luda. Little of note changed until after 1978, when the policies of the reform era and commensurate growth in international trade brought newfound prosperity. Renamed (again) “Dalian” in 1979, it was one of the first fourteen “Open Door” cities selected in 1984 for foreign investment opportunities. The industrial sector remains focused on petrochemical processing, but there is also recent growth in electronics and semiconductors. The city is China’s largest oil/gas port and the country’s third-largest seaport in terms of gross tonnage. It is one of a few Chinese cities that is both an important industrial center and a tourist destination. With a beautiful, rugged coastline, many historic Russian and Japanese buildings, excellent seafood, and more than seventy spacious, landscaped parks, Dalian bases an increasing portion of its economy on tourism.

Gregory VEECK

Further Reading


Aerial view of Dalian, the second largest city in Liaoning Province. The city’s former mayor, Bo Xilai, inaugurated the “Green Storm,” a campaign that resulted in the numerous city gardens, forest parks, squares, and scenic spots on the seaside.
The *danwei* (unit) was for many years after the creation of the People’s Republic of China the all-inclusive work unit for urban Chinese, encompassing everything from a lifetime social welfare system to a network of work, home, and political relationships. The reforms of the last three decades have considerably weakened the traditional *danwei* system, where the price of security was often a lack of social mobility.

The *danwei* (unit) dominated the workplace in urban China after 1949. At its peak the *danwei* was ubiquitous: Government and party organizations, state-owned enterprises, financial institutions, and educational establishments were all designated as *danwei*. With relatively few exceptions *danwei* employees were entitled to lifetime employment. Typically a *danwei* provided its employees with housing, health care, recreational activities, rationed goods, pensions, and so forth. For many the distinguishing features of a *danwei* were a lifetime social welfare system from cradle to grave and a network of relationships encompassing work, home, neighborhood, and political membership. Thus, many scholars trace the origins of the *danwei* variously to the Communist free-supply system of the 1930s, the heritage of labor protest, and the evolution of labor management institutions.

Still, the *danwei* is best understood as a part of the prevailing administrative system embracing virtually all government, business, and financial, as well as educational institutions in urban China after 1949. Such a definition emphasizes that these institutional entities were integral parts of the overall state administrative structure, a character that cannot be explained by any of the specific traditions or institutions scholars have heretofore examined. The evidence suggests that the origins of the *danwei* in the sense of the prevailing administrative system can be traced to the Nationalist struggle to rationalize the administrative bureaucracy during the War of Resistance against Japan (Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945), when the Nationalists used the term *danwei* to designate political, economic, and administrative organizations. Beginning in the early 1940s the government and state-owned enterprises routinely used the term *danwei* to identify various organizations as well as units within those organizations. Even the term *work unit*, which for decades has been the standard although erroneous transliteration for the term *danwei*, was carefully defined in 1943 and thereafter used regularly in Dadukou Iron and Steel Works (DISW), the largest state-owned enterprise in Nationalist-controlled areas during the war.

These same *danwei* also acquired some of their defining characteristics during the War of Resistance against Japan, including *danwei* provision of social services and welfare. Studies have shown, for example, that during
the war self-contained enterprise-run service and welfare communities were formed. Employees lived in factory apartments and dormitories, bought their daily necessities at factory cooperatives, purchased vegetables grown at factory farms, and went to factory clinics and hospitals for medical treatment. Employees’ children received their education in factory schools. When employees died, they sometimes were buried in factory cemeteries.

To put it differently, the danwei designation of political, economic, and administrative organizations and danwei provision of social services and welfare predates the Communists’ rise to power. After 1949 the danwei became part of urban China’s administrative system, expanded its function as the provider of social services and welfare, and developed new characteristics such as party control, permanent employment, and labor immobility. As a part of the prevailing urban administrative system, a typical danwei had administrative departments or divisions that matched their counterparts in pertinent administrative bureaucracies at a higher level. For example, a typical danwei had a finance department or division that coordinated with the finance department or division of a municipality and ultimately with the ministry of finance of the central government.

Loss of Autonomy

An inevitable consequence of the incorporation of danwei into the overall administrative structure was the loss of autonomy on the part of danwei leaders or managers over issues such as wages and personnel. In addition, a typical danwei offered its employees housing, recreation and health-care facilities, schooling for their children, ration coupons for food, and pensions and burial funds. The danwei also engaged in a variety of political activities under party leadership and supervision, such as political campaigns as they were typically carried out danwei by danwei. In fact, the danwei represented an extension of the Communist Party because the danwei had within it either a party committee or commission, depending on the danwei’s size. Under the party committee or commission were the party secretary’s office, the organization department, the propaganda department, and the discipline inspection department. Such an organizational structure was designed to match the organizational structure of the Communist Party organization at a higher level. Finally, the danwei was characterized by not only permanent employment but also labor immobility. Few employees obtained permission to transfer from one danwei to another.

The reforms initiated by the Communist Party toward the end of the 1970s significantly affected the danwei system. Within the danwei the labor contract has replaced permanent employment as the basis of employment for a majority of employees. Material incentives have replaced ideological and psychological ones in an effort to promote labor productivity. Most danwei no longer provide employees comprehensive social services and welfare. The party-state has relaxed what had been rigid administrative and political controls that various danwei exercised over their employees. Employees can transfer from one danwei to another with relative ease. At the same time, the reforms have permitted development of joint-venture, collective, and privately owned enterprises, which are not extensions of the government apparatus. Within those new enterprises entrepreneurs and managers have introduced practices of scientific management designed to enforce labor discipline and maximize profits, although recent studies suggest that some of the enterprises have reproduced many features of the danwei system.

System Weakened

The reforms of the last three decades have not only weakened the traditional danwei system but also have had profound implications for the reconfiguration of urban Chinese society. In response to the tremendous social and economic changes, including the massive unemployment resulting from the reform and privatization of state-owned enterprise danwei and the presence of millions of migrant workers, the party-state introduced in the 1990s experiments that led to the creation of new urban communities (shequ) under government control and supervision and with jurisdiction over clearly demarcated urban space. The responsibility of those communities was no longer confined to the provision of
social services and welfare; it included functions ranging from social service and welfare provision to culture, health, education, morality, policing, and grassroots democracy. Although the future of those communities is unclear at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it appears that the communities may eventually replace the danwei as the basic social and administrative organization in urban China.

Morris L. BIAN

Further Reading

Love my house, love the crow on it.

爱屋及乌

Ài wū jí wū
Dao (the Way)

Dao denotes a road, path, or way. Every ancient Chinese thinker interpreted the concept of dao to suit his philosophical system. For the Confucians, dao refers to the way of the early sage kings. For the Daoist, it refers to the way of nature.

Dao (the Way) is one of the most important concepts in Chinese philosophy. Almost every Chinese philosophy employed its own operational definition of dao, which denotes a road or a way. (The character dao is a pictograph representing a head on a path.) Anything that has a consistent course or specific direction is called a dao. Dao is used to connote a process, a method, or an art. In Chinese philosophy dao has two main foci: the dao of nature, or heaven in the Confucian context (tian zhi dao), and the dao of humans (ren zhi dao).

Daoists emphasize the way of nature. They are concerned about living in harmony with the way of nature, believing that social harmony flows spontaneously from nature. They recognize the importance of the human way, the way of the sage ruler, for keeping the community on the path of living in harmony with nature. The way of humans became the focus of Confucianism. Confucians are more concerned about the social norms that promote harmony within the family, community, and state.

Most Primitive Reality

Daoists abstracted the concept of dao, transforming it into the most general concept that simultaneously generates, maintains, and diminishes the universe. Some Daoists, such as Master Lao (Laozi, sixth or fourth century BCE), focus on the dao itself as the most primitive reality from Daoist texts discuss the dao of heaven or nature, but Confucians are more concerned about the social norms that promote harmony within the family, community, and state.

The yin–yang and bagua symbols, both significant to the philosophy of Daoism.
which all things and thoughts unfold. *Dao* was abstracted from nature. For Laozi the *dao* became the empty void from which all things arise and return. *Dao* is the primal unity that generates all diversity, and it is the great diversity of the myriad things that return to undifferentiated unity. Laozi raises the concept of the *dao* to new heights, making it the primordial cosmic force. Consider poem 25 of the *Laozi: Daodejing (Master Lao’s: The Way and Its Power)*:

There is something chaotic and yet completely formed;  
Generated before the heavens and earth.  
Solitary! Silent!  
Standing alone, not changing.  
Pervading all without limit.  
Regard it to be the mother of all under heaven.  
I do not know its name.  
Call it *dao*.  
Compelled to name it.  
Call it great.  
To be great means to pass on.  
To pass on means to go far.  
To go far means to return.  
So it is said, “The *dao* is great.  
The heavens are great.  
The earth is great.  
And the king is also great.”  
Is not the king one of the four great things in the world?  
Humans model the earth.  
The earth models the heavens.  
The heavens model the *dao*.  
The *dao* models its own self. ( modifying Addiss and Lombardo 1993, 25)

The concept *dao* is understood to be an independent, objective reality that begins and returns. The reality of *dao* is unlike anything in this world. As the primordial origin, *dao* is the nexus of undulating opposites. It is empty but generates and fills things. It has no creator and is prior to the supreme ancestor or god (*Laozi*, poem 4). *Dao* is vague and unclear but a reality. It is obscure and dark yet contains the vital source of life (*Laozi*, 21). A person cannot see, hear, or touch it. *Dao* is the shapeless shape, the formless reality (*Laozi*, 14). *Dao* has various modes of operation. It generates the primordial unity (*Laozi*, 42).

It does not engage in any particular activity, yet nothing is left undone (*Laozi*, 37). It operates by returning, and being soft, weak, and flexible; it is useful (*Laozi*, 40). For Laozi the operations of the *dao* are a model for the sage ruler to emulate.

In contrast, Confucians note that the disciples of the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) did not receive instruction concerning the way of heaven (Ames and Rosemont 1998, 5/13). Despite that passage, Confucius believed in the way of heaven and that his life mission was condescended by heaven (Ames and Rosemont 1998, 9/3). Confucius was not a speculative thinker. He was concerned about the decay of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) culture. He felt that people were losing the *dao* of the early sage kings, the social norms that bound people together in their extended families, communities, and states.
Proper Way of Life

This pragmatic approach led Confucius and his followers to focus on the proper way for maintaining social and political life. So Confucius said, “Set your intention on the dao, sustain yourself with virtue, rely on human kindness, and relax in the arts” (modifying Ames and Rosemont 1998, 7/6). These are closely linked. The arts refer to ritual and music. Listening to the right music was believed to civilize people. Ritual action was the basic norm for controlling behavior and the correct way to express kindness. For the Confucians kindness or benevolence is the most important virtue. Living in accord with the virtues is the means to put the cultural way of the ancient sage kings into practice. The dao for Confucius was the way of the cultural tradition. It was the way of the founders of the Zhou dynasty, King Wen and the duke of Zhou.

Chinese philosophers employed the term dao to describe their own approach. For example, the dao of Mozi (flourished 479–438 BCE) is the way of promoting social harmony by loving each and every person equally. The dao of Zou Yan (305–240 BCE) is to follow the natural cycles of the five phases, namely, wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. The dao of the militarists is to practice martial arts. The dao of the legalists is to codify laws and standards. For the most part, every philosopher made reference to the way of the ancient sage rulers, the kingly way, and the ways of specific people, such as ministers or craftsmen. Because of these more common expressions, the term dao comes to mean a teaching, a philosophy, or a religion.

James SELLMAN

Further Reading


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The ancient Chinese philosophy known as Daoism is a complex cultural phenomena. Inspired by ancient shamanic breathing practices, Daoism is a philosophy that focuses on self-cultivation and finding value and purpose in this life. It developed into a philosophy of nature, a political philosophy, and a religion. While Daoism changed and developed, it maintained its original position as a way of life.

When people recognize that death finalizes life, they develop a philosophy to construct meaning, value, or self-esteem in the face of death. The problem of death is compounded by two closely related concerns, namely, living in harmony with nature and living in harmony with other people. Confucian philosophy emphasizes the manner in which people could live in harmony with each other. Daoist philosophy emphasizes how people could live in harmony with nature.

Daoism as a philosophy has its roots in ancient shamanic practices of south China. Shamans are known for their ecstatic journeys and visions achieved through altered states of consciousness. Over time shamanic practices were transformed into meditation and breath-control techniques that became the basis for self-cultivation practices. These self-cultivation practices form the core of early Daoist philosophy. Daoist cosmology (a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe) and political philosophy developed around these self-cultivation techniques.

Inward Training

For centuries scholars were aware that the composite work known as the Guanzi contained Daoist essays. Roth provides a translation and analysis of the “Inward Training” chapter of the Guanzi, arguing that it is an example of an early Daoist meditation manual. The “Inward Training” chapter discusses the vital essence (jing), the vital energy (qi), and the means by which humans can gain control over these life-giving forces through meditation. For example, the chapter begins:

The vital essence of all things: it is this that brings them to life. It generates the five grains below and becomes the constellated stars above. When flowing amid the heavens and the earth we call it ghostly and numinous. When stored within the chests of human beings, we call them sages.

Therefore the vital energy is: Bright!—as if ascending the heavens; Dark!—as if entering an abyss; Vast!—as if dwelling in an ocean; Lofty!—as if dwelling on a mountain peak. Therefore this vital energy cannot be halted by force, yet can be secured by inner power. Cannot be summoned by speech, yet can be welcomed by the awareness. Reverently hold onto it and do not lose it: This is called “developing inner power.”
All the forms of the mind are naturally infused and filled with it [the vital essence], are naturally generated and developed [because of] it. It is lost inevitably because of sorrow, happiness, joy, anger, desire, and profit-seeking. If you are able to cast off sorrow, happiness, joy, anger, desire, and profit-seeking, your mind will just revert to equanimity. The true condition of the mind is that it finds calmness beneficial and, by it, attains repose. Do not disturb it, do not disrupt it and harmony will naturally develop. (Roth 1999, 46–50)

Daoists seek a natural life lived in harmony with nature free from anxiety and distress. Contentment or equanimity can be achieved if a person is able to get beyond selfishness, greed, and the emotional exchange between being sad versus being happy and being joyful versus being angry. Inward training instructs the reader in breath control, focusing the mind in concentration to lead the practitioner to a mystical experience of union with the dao (the way of nature), also referred to as the one. Sitting in the correct posture, making the mind tranquil, and controlling the breath to contain the vital essence are the means to hold fast to the one. Holding fast to the one is the key for controlling the myriad things and not being controlled by them. When this kind of thinking is applied to the political arena, the Daoist sage ruler uses his grasp of the dao to bring peace and harmony to the masses without micromanaging the affairs of state by emulating the forces of nature. As chapter 78 of the Laozi advises:

There is nothing in the world softer and weaker than water, but for attacking the solid and strong, there is nothing better. Nothing can substitute for it. That the weak can overcome the strong and the soft can overcome the solid, everyone in the world knows this, but none can put it into practice. Therefore the sage has said, “To receive the dirt of a country is to be the lord of its altars of soil and grain. To bear the suffering of a country is to be the king of the world.” Truth sounds contradictory. (Ivanhoe 2002, 81)

Chapter 80 of the Laozi describes a simple agrarian community as the ideal:

Ah! For a small country with few people! Though there are many contrivances, the people have no use for them. The people weigh death heavily, and won’t consider distant travel. Boats and chariots, weapons and armor they have, but there is no reason to display them. Let the people return to tying knots for keeping records. Make sure they consider their food sweet, their clothes beautiful, their homes peaceful, and their customs delightful. Although the neighboring countries are so close you
can hear their chickens and dogs, nevertheless, the people grow old and die without traveling between them.

These passages serve to show how the ruler’s self-cultivation allows him to bring peace and order to his state.

Zhuang Zhou (c. 370–301 BCE) is believed to be the author of the first seven or inner chapters of the text that bears his name, the Zhuangzi. According to his biography in the historian Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian (c. 99–98 BCE), Zhuang served as a minor official in Meng in the state of Song, overseeing the lacquer garden. He declined the invitation of King Wei of Chu (reigned 339–329 BCE) to serve as prime minister. The text consists of short narrative stories, anecdotes, descriptions, aphorisms, and dialogues.

One of those stories provides some insight into Zhuangzi and his philosophy, relating how one day he is hunting in the forest when a large and odd bird swoops by, almost hitting him. Intrigued by the bird he follows it. When the bird alights on a branch, he takes aim to shoot it. Then he notices that the bird is about to catch a preying mantis, which is about to eat a cicada. Seeing himself in the interconnected web of life and death, he runs from the forest. His disciple observes that Zhuangzi is depressed for a few days and asks him why. Zhuangzi notes that he had not been seeing things clearly and had forgotten about what could happen to him. This story may relate the basis of Zhuangzi’s conversion to Daoism. Through it we gain insight into how people look at the world in their habitual and complacent manner, wrongly believing that they are in control and disconnected from the interrelatedness with other creatures in the web of life and death.

One theme of the Zhuangzi is that life is in a constant state of flux. Transformation and the ultimate transformation of death are inevitable. According to Zhuangzi, people misuse their bodies and especially their hearts. They distress their bodies in physical labor, and they put unnecessary emotional stress on the heart both as a physical organ and as the symbolic seat of thought and feeling by worrying and fretting about social expectations and conventions. The Zhuangzi contains descriptions of Daoist masters who are able to enter into deep levels of meditation, who can practice various types of deep breathing exercises and forms of concentration or “fasting the heart” (chapter 4), by which they can merge with the cosmic way.

Zhuangzi’s teachings are designed to stimulate people to see things differently, to reframe their perspectives or make a paradigm shift so they see things the way they really are. When people have a proper understanding of the world and their place in it, then they can free themselves from the burdens of social conventions and bad habits that cause them stress and shorten life. Zhuangzi’s philosophy is designed to make people challenge their basic assumptions about themselves, others, and the world. Coupled with breathing exercises and meditation, the renewed outlook on life allows people to cut loose (jie) from binding restrictions, opening them to clarity or enlightenment.

Toward the end of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) Daoism began to take on more of a political focus, resulting in the development of a political Daoism.

Huang-Lao Daoism

Some legalist-minded philosophers such as Shen Dao (flourished 350–275 BCE) and later Han Fei (d. 233 BCE) saw an affinity between Daoist cosmological ideas and the art of rulership. A political movement began that drew from both legalism (strict, literal, or excessive conformity to the law or to a religious or moral code) and Daoism; a political form of Daoism arose that was based on the teachings of the legendary Yellow Emperor (Huangdi) and Laozi that became known as “Huang-Lao.” One copy of the Laozi that was excavated from the tomb of a minor official at Mawangdui in 1973 has four essays attached to it. Because those four essays contain dialogues with the Yellow Emperor, some scholars consider them to be the lost Four Classics of the Yellow Emperor. In keeping with the eclectic character of political philosophy at the end of the Warring States period, these four essays present composite and amalgamated theories of rulership. They exhibit a family resemblance to the Laozi. For example, the Laozi emphasizes being like water, being flexible and practicing female characteristics, and staying behind to take the lead. The Four Classics display similar concerns. The “Sixteen Classics” section of the Four Classics proposes that those who take the lead have bad luck and that
those who stay behind have good luck. The text proposes that if people adhere to the feminine model, they can act first and have good luck. If they adhere to the masculine model and stay behind, they will have bad luck.

Other texts from the end of the Warring States period and the early Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) employ the eclectic, amalgamated political philosophy that has been labeled “Huang-Lao,” such as the Lushi chunqiu (c. 241 BCE) and the Huainanzi (c. 122 BCE). Daoist and yin/yang ideas were also borrowed by the early Han Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu (flourished 179–104 BCE). Under Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (reigned 141–87 BCE), Dong Zhongshu help make an eclectic and practical form of Confucianism the state ideology. During Emperor Wu’s reign the Laozi was chanted in court ritual. After philosophical Daoism had been absorbed into Han Confucianism, toward the end of the Han dynasty a minor official, Zhang Ling, claimed to have received revelations from the deified Lord Lao in 142 CE. Zhang’s teachings are called the “Sworn Oath of the Orthodox One,” and he began a liturgical tradition of the Celestial Masters that continues to this day. This tradition expanded on the sparse moral teaching found in the Laozi, making morality an important factor in a person’s ability to merge with the dao, attaining physical immortality.

**Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove**

After the Han dynasty collapsed the geographical area of China was fragmented and ruled by fourteen minor dynasties, beginning with the Wei dynasty (220–265 CE) and ending with the Northern Zhou (557–581 CE). During this period of political fragmentation philosophical Daoism experienced a revival. As the aristocratic families and the scholar-officials came into or fell out of favor with the ruling family, people’s livelihoods and even their lives were constantly in jeopardy. Especially when scholars fell out of favor with the court, they often turned to Daoist teachings and self-cultivation practices to both occupy their time and to find a way to cope with political changes or disasters and to avoid being executed. Like the Warring States period, the Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE) and the North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE) were a time of cultural creativity and philosophical development. Buddhism was taking root in China. The uniquely Chinese sect of Buddhism known as “Chan”—or in Japanese “Zen”—Buddhism developed under the influence of the Zhuangzi. In large part the iconoclastic and shock-effect teaching style of the Zen masters is drawn from Zhuangzi’s philosophy. Whereas the Zen monks sought enlightenment in the monastery, and the Daoist priests performed elaborate esoteric rituals, the Daoist philosophers entertained themselves with pure conversations (qingtian) and profound metaphysical studies (xuanxue) while engaging in heavy drinking in their favorite bamboo groves. Inspired by Zhuangzi’s mystical union with nature, seven philosophers known as the “seven worthies of the bamboo grove” rejected the trappings of society and removed themselves from the fetters of politics. One worthy, Liu Ling (d. 265 CE), was noted for his love of wine. His poem, entitled “In Praise of the Power of Wine,” draws images and expressions from the Zhuangzi. Two other worthies, Xiang Xi (d. 300 CE) and Guo Xiang (d. 312 CE), wrote commentaries on the Zhuangzi. Guo Xiang further developed Zhuangzi’s philosophy. He especially expanded the concepts of spontaneous nature (ziran) and unperceivable existence (wu) and getting beyond the purposive mind (wuxin) and acting without purposive action (wei wuwei). Wang Bi (226–249 CE) was a Confucian scholar by training, but his commentary on the Laozi has left a lasting impression on the way people read that text. Wang Bi helped readers understand the significance of spontaneous nature and the concepts of emptiness (wu) and unperceivable existence (wu). He Yan (d. 249 CE) was also a Confucian by training and, like Wang Bi, celebrated Confucius, not Laozi, as the sage. He Yan helped develop the notion that the dao is beyond language and nameless. Ruan Ji (210–263 CE) promoted the Daoist concept of nature mysticism, becoming one with nature. He argued that people are held back by social conventions, especially passing value judgments on others and themselves. The last member of the seven worthies was Xi Kang (223–262 CE). Like Ruan Ji he advocated cutting loose from the fetters of social convention, especially the distinctions of right and wrong, wealth and poverty, and noble and humble status in society.

During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) Daoism received imperial patronage. The Laozi and the Zhuangzi, along with the Confucian classics, were accepted as
official texts for the civil service examination. Religious Daoism and Daoist alchemical practices were popular. A Tang text and diagram called the "Diagram of the Great Ultimate" (Taiji tu) was developed as an alchemical document. This text was transmitted through a series of Daoist masters until it was given to Zhou Dunyi (1012–1073). Zhou Dunyi was considered to be the father of Song dynasty (960–1279) neo-Confucianism by the neo-Confucian synthesizer Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Both Zhou and Zhu wrote commentaries on the "Diagram of the Great Ultimate." In this way important Daoist philosophical ideas influenced the subsequent development of neo-Confucianism. Daoism continued to offer inspiration and solace to disenfranchised scholar-officials during the final dynasties. Today Daoism continues to inspire philosophers around the globe. Aside from popular books on topics such as the dao of cooking or the dao of pleasure, scholars continue to seek inspiration from Daoism to develop theories of linguistic meaning, environmental ethics, political theory, cosmology, and astrophysics. Daoism is a philosophy of change, and it has continued to change itself and survive.

James D. SELLMANN

Further Reading

Daoism is an important Chinese philosophical and religious tradition. Its doctrines, institutions and practices have had a profound impact on cultural, social, and religious life in China through the ages.

Daoism (Taoism) is an indigenous Chinese religion that has had a great impact on Chinese philosophy, art, literature, science, medicine, and martial arts. The word dao 道 (often tao) literally means “the road, the path,” yet it is translated as “the Way” in Western-language scholarship. Along with Confucianism and Buddhism, Daoism is often viewed as one of three institutionalized or organized religious traditions in imperial Chinese society. Contemporary scholars still debate the similarities and differences between Daoism and popular religion.

Daoism as a religion (Daojiao 道教) has its root in Daoism as a philosophical tradition (Daojia 道家). Two classics, The Book of the Way and Its Virtue (Daodejing 道德經) and Zhuangzi (莊子), serve the textual foundations for Daoist philosophy and religion. The Daoist philosophical tradition originated from The Book of the Way and Its Virtue (Daodejing), commonly dated to around 400 BCE. This book is also entitled Laozi, which indicates that it is attributed to the fourth-century BCE philosopher Laozi (Old Master). (Some scholars argue that Laozi lived as early as the sixth century BCE, while others consider him to be a fictional figure despite a record of his life written by Han dynasty [206 BCE – 220 CE] court biographer Sima Qian [c. 145 – 86 BCE].) Nevertheless this book was compiled and revised with clarity and coherence during a long period and probably by many authors. Historically, the rise of Daoism as a religion occurred in the later Han dynasty, around the second century CE, when Laozi was deified as “Most High Old Lord” (Taishang laojun).

The Book of the Way and Its Virtue contains roughly five thousand Chinese characters and is organized into eighty-one chapters. In this work the Daoist cosmology (a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe) is centered on the concept of chaos (hundun). According to The Book of the Way and Its Virtue, dao is not definable. It exists in all things (wanwu, ten thousand things). The Way is present in the process of the change and transformation of all things in nature and in society. The Way cannot be named, and it is also beyond human perception because it is said that, “The Tao (Way) that can be told is not the Eternal Tao; the Name that can be named is not the Eternal Name.” (Chan 1963, 139). If one comprehends the Way and acts naturally, it is wuwei, literally nonaction, nonwillful action in Daoism. Wuwei is viewed as the right way of life. The Book of the Way and Its Virtue also teaches correlatives as the expression of the movement of the Way, representing some pairs of forces such as yin and yang, male and female, active and passive, as well as excess and defect. It manifests the ideal portrait of the holy person (shengren), who empties himself, living naturally and staying with plainness. A holy person is the one who achieves harmony. Zhuangzi, on the other hand, is a book that was written by Zhuang Zhou, also known as Zhuangzi, Master Zhuang (c. 370 – 301 BCE). It reveals some other important concepts in Daoism, such

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as that of immortals. In Zhuangzi people are said to exist in the process of constant change and transformation. It also teaches some techniques, including meditating and breathing to facilitate this transformation.

Besides the intellectual resources of Daoist philosophy, in its long history the Daoist religion borrowed many elements from Chinese popular religion such as yin and yang, the Five Elements (wuxing), shamanism, and methods of esoterica (fangshu). Although Daoist philosophy appeared around the fifth century BCE, the rise of Daoist religion occurred in the later Han dynasty.

Divine Figure

In Daoist religion the Way becomes a mystical concept. Echoing The Book of the Way and Its Virtue, The Scripture of Great Peace (Taiping jing) states that the Way is the origin of all things and cannot be named, and that the Way is the root and master of the great transformation. It also claims that the Way is too profound to be perceived. By the second century CE Laozi was considered a divine figure who was believed to be the incarnation of the Way. The Way was the One, and the One could diffuse to be ether. The ether gathered to become the Most High Old Lord. This figure was the parent of the heaven and earth, the authority of the yin and yang and the ruler of all deities. In the North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE, also known as the Six Dynasties), The Way became the Celestial Venerable of the Primordial Beginning (Yuanshi tianzun), the highest god in Daoism. With Daoism’s rise as a religion during the Han dynasty it inherited some popular techniques for pursuing longevity. The techniques for achieving longevity and nourishing life also helped practitioners escape danger when under attack by beasts and engaged in war. These techniques attracted many followers who suffered during the period when the Han dynasty nearly collapsed.

Immortals are celestial beings in Daoism. They are also called “transcendent beings” because they are physically and spiritually immortal and beyond this world. They enjoy the longevity of life and immortality. In some texts they also appear as divine immortals (shenxian), divine persons (shenren), and immortal sages (xiansheng). The idea of immortals can be found in two early Daoist texts, Zhuangzi and Liezi. However, the most famous work about immortals is a collection entitled Biographies of Divine Immortals or Traditions of Divine Transcendents, (Shenxianzhuan). This work contains more than one hundred hagiographical (relating to the biography of saints or venerated persons) stories about divine immortals. It was attributed to Ge Hong (283–343 CE); yet, most of the stories were likely to have been written after the sixth century CE. These stories teach that immortality can be achieved by bodily and spiritual cultivation. Ge Hong suggests that three forms of immortality exist: celestial, earthly, and corpse liberated. In order to achieve immortality, one should practice ether (qi) techniques. Other practices, such as meditation, visualization, and rituals, are also vital in the pursuit of immortality.

Daoist Canon

The Daoist canon, like the Buddhist canon in the Mahayana tradition, is an expandable corpus of Daoist scriptural, scholastic, and historical texts. The canon also frequently appears as the Complete Scriptures of Daoism (Daojiao yiqie jing) because it includes both scriptures and other genres. The current Daoist canon commonly used in the scholarly world is called the Daoist Canon of the Zhengtong Reign Period (Zhengtong daozang), which was compiled in 1444–45. This canon has 5,485 fascicles (the divisions of a book published in parts). In the North and South Dynasties, Daoist masters Ge Hong and Lu Xiujing (406–477 CE) laid the foundation for cataloguing early Daoist texts. Later the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) emperor, Xuanzong, ordered compilation of the first complete set of the Daoist canon. This version was enriched during the Song dynasty (960–1279), Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234), and Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Nevertheless, the Daoist Canon of the Zhengtong Reign Period is the latest version. In the twentieth century numerous Daoist manuscripts from the city of Dunhuang in Gansu Province were compiled by scholars from all over the world.

The Daoist Canon of the Zhengtong Reign Period comprises seven sections: the Three Caverns (sandong) and the Four Supplements (sifu). The Three Caverns are three divisions of Daoist texts: the True Cavern (Dongzhen, the Superior Cavern), the Mystical Cavern (Dongxuan, the Middle Cavern), and the Spiritual Cavern (Dongshen,
the Lesser Cavern). Each division has a group of original Daoist texts. The Scriptures of Upper Purity (Shangqing jing) constitutes the core of the True Cavern. The Scriptures of Numinous Treasure (Lingbao jing) constitutes the core of the Mystical Cavern. And the third division was developed based on the Scripture of Three Sovereigns (Sanhuang jing).

In Daoism the Three Caverns are linked with Three Purities and Three Vehicles. The True Cavern and the Jade Purity are the Great Vehicle, the Mystical Cavern and the Upper Purity are the Middle Vehicle, and the Spiritual Cavern and the Great Purity are the Small Vehicle. The Four Supplements are four portions of the Daoist canon with the titles of the Great Mystic (Taixuan), the Great Peace (Taiping), the Great Purity (Taiqing) and the Orthodox Unity (Zhengyi). The Great Mystic is based on Laozi. The Scripture of Great Peace is the central text in the section of the Great Peace. The Great Purity contains a group of texts on alchemy. The canonical texts of the Way of Celestial Masters constitute the core of the section of Orthodox Unity.

Earliest Traditions

Unlike with many of the world religions, such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, with Daoism it is difficult to tell when it became a religious tradition and precisely who founded it. Generally speaking, the earliest traditions of Daoism were the Way of the Yellow Emperor and the Old Master (Huanglaodao) and the Way of Five-Pecked Rice (Wudoumidao) in the Han dynasty. In the tombs of Mawangdui 馬王堆, a site near present Changsha, Hunan Province, some silk scrolls of Daodejing were uncovered, revealing the ideas of Qixia Academy of the Ji kingdom associated with the Way of the Yellow Emperor and the Old Master. This tradition promotes the ideas of renunciation of wealth and the pursuit of longevity.

In the later Han dynasty the Way of Celestial Masters (Tianshidao) was developed from two movements: the Yellow Turbans (Huangjiao) movement in central and eastern China and the Way of Five-Pecked Rice movement in the Hanzhong area (modern southern Shaanxi Province). The first movement was also called the "Way of Great Peace" (Taipingdao), and under the leadership of Zhang Jue this movement rose up against the Han central government in 184 CE. Its followers venerated the Yellow God and believed that a new era under the reign of Yellow Heaven was coming. They sought a kingdom with harmony, peace, wisdom, and equality—a utopian reign. The Daoist text Scripture of Great Peace (Taiping jing) played a crucial role in inspiring this movement. The Scripture of Great Peace mixes Daoist cosmology and yin and yang as well as Five Elements (wuxing) theories. It teaches that divine messengers, celestial masters (jianshi), would bring revelations to this world for the sake of people who suffered under the Han regime. By movement toward a state of nonaction, the great peace would be achieved. The Way of Five-Pecked Rice was established by Zhang Ling (Zhang Daolin, the Celestial Master Zhang), who was a leader of a group of small landowners in the southern Shaanxi area. This group aimed to establish a religious ideology through which the mandate of the Han court would be removed by the god Most High Old Lord. And the celestial masters would rule the people by the will of this Most High Old Lord. The members were required to contribute five-pecked rice to the group, which was the practice of the origin of the name of the group. After Zhang Ling died, his son Zhang Lu continued to lead the group as a local autonomous power. Yet, in 215 CE he...
handed over his power to the central government but retained his tradition.

During the period of the North and South Dynasties, especially during the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420 CE), Daoism flourished, especially in southeastern China. The aristocratic class was involved in writing and practicing Daoism, thereby contributing to the formation of the early Daoist canon and Daoist rituals. Two traditions, Upper Purity (Shangqing) and Numinous Treasure (Lingbao), appeared to be significant during this period. The Upper Purity tradition is named after the Scriptures of Upper Purity. This tradition focuses on the cultivation of essence (jing), ether (qi), and spirit (shen) by which one can cultivate his or her body. This practice was particularly favored by elite literati. The Numinous Treasure tradition is named after the Scriptures of Numinous Treasure. It is said that this section of Daoist scriptures was initiated by Ge Xuan (164–244). Ge Xuan then transmitted it to his disciple Zheng Yin (215–302). Zheng Yin taught it to Ge Hong (284–364), who promoted this tradition to a new stage. Liu Xiujing during the Liu Song period (420–479 CE) enriched it with many rituals and precepts. This tradition focused on rituals and precepts rather than alchemy and sexual technique. It may be closer to the former Way of Celestial Masters than to the Upper Purity tradition. Later Tao Hongjing (456–536) became another important contributor to the development of Daoism in Southern dynasties (420–589 CE). Tao Hongjing helped create a mature Daoist pantheon based on worldly hierarchical structure. He also compiled a work entitled the Perfected Declaration (Zhengao), which preserved abundant sources about the early history of Daoism. He also developed some new techniques for Daoist cultivation.

During the Northern dynasties (386–581 CE) some remarkable developments occurred into Daoism. For instance, Daoist religion as a tradition was guarded and protected by the Kou clan. The most distinguished Daoist in this clan was Kou Qianzhi (365–448), who claimed that he received revelations from the Most High Old Lord and his offspring in the Mountain Song in 415 and 423. He reformed the old Daoist tradition inherited from the Zhang family in the later Han dynasty. His innovations enhanced aspects of the creating rites, the observing precepts, and the creating cinnabar (artificial red mercuric sulfide used especially as a pigment). He also composed scriptures. Later he served the court of the Northern Wei (386–534 CE) emperor, Taiwudi. Because of Kou Qianzhi’s influence, in 446 the emperor issued an edict ordering the suppression of Buddhism. During the later Northern dynasty, Daoism, along with Buddhism, as an important religious tradition was given a section in an official history, the History of Wei (Weishu) by Wei Shou (506–572).

After the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) Daoism was challenged, first by the flourishing of Buddhism during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and then by the revival of Confucianism during the Song dynasty (960–1279). During the late Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) Daoism became a subject in the civil examination. From the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) to the Jurchen Jin and Yuan dynasties Daoism experienced what contemporary scholars called the “revival of new Daoism.” During this revival three new movements—Great Unity (Taiyi), True Great (Zhenda), and Complete Perfection (Quanzhen) appeared.

During the Yuan dynasty emperors particularly favored the Complete Perfection movement. One of its leaders, Qiu Chuji (1148–1227), even accompanied Mongol conqueror Chinggis Khan (often spelled Genghis Khan) in his travels to the western regions in central Asia. During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties the new trend in religious development was the unification of the three religions, Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. During the late Qing dynasty and the early Republican period (1912–1927) all three religions experienced a crisis with the political decline of the Chinese empire. The revival of Daoism appeared only after the 1980s, yet it remained far behind Buddhism.

**Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism**

People often view Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism as the three organized religions in China. However, historically Confucianism was always seen as heading the three religions during most regimes through the ages. Daoism absorbed many Confucian ethical ideas during its early development, ideas such as seeking self-cultivation in morality and serving family and country, as Ge Hong
Daoism—Religion  ■  Dàojiào  ■ 道教

Daoist Rituals, Festivals, and Mountains

The term inner alchemy is a translation of the Daoist term neidan, referring to a series of ways in which one can achieve the transcendent state or a return to the original order of the cosmos. The practice of inner alchemy creates inner elixir and controls the motion of the mind, the breath, and the body in order to pursue longevity. In Daoist philosophy inner alchemy combines naturality (xing) and fate (ming). Xing, in Daoist terms, means the original inactive state of a being. Yet, ming refers to fate, the destiny of a being, which is the perfect nonaction. In the practice of inner alchemy three ingredients occupy the central positions: essence (jing), ether (qi), and spirit (shen). Essence might be brought up by one’s birth or might be derived from the digestion of food. Essence, ether, and spirit might appear as the forms of human bodily fluids. Two types of ether exist: primal ether and true ether. Primal ether arose from the creation of the universe; true ether arose from breath, from drinks and food. Two types of spirits exist: the original spirit and the spirit of knowing. The former is the unconscious functions of the nervous system, and the latter is the consciousness and thought in the learning process.

Spells and talismans are also commonly used in Daoist practice. They might have been derived from the influence of Buddhism and traditional Chinese religion, but later Daoism certainly revised them. Clearly spells might have been borrowed from esoteric Buddhism; however, talismans were borrowed from shamanism. The adaptation of Daoist talismans was also inspired by the Book of Changes (Zhouyi). It used modified Chinese characters and consecrated them with divine powers based on Daoist precepts. In Daoist practice talismans authorized the actions of the deities and the demons, healed illness, and bestowed the good sign to believers. Yin Yang and Five Elements also played important roles in the application of talismans and spells. The four cardinal directions in Daoism are represented by four symbolic animals and figures: Blue Dragon of the East (Qinglong), Red Phoenix of the South (Zhuque), White Tiger of the West (Baihu), and Dark Warrior of the North (Xuanwu).

Daoism observes many celebrations and festivals. The ninth day of the first month in the lunar calendar is the birthday of the Jade Emperor, with prescribed rituals and offerings. Three important festivals in Daoism are the Three Primes (Sanyuan). The Upper Prime Festival (Shangyuan Festival, now Yuanxiao Festival or Lantern Festival) is held on the fifteenth day of the first month in the lunar calendar. On the night of this festival lanterns are displayed, and people come out to watch the lantern show. The Middle Prime Festival (Zhongyuan Festival) is held on the fifteenth day of the seventh month in the lunar calendar. On this day people feed the spirits of deceased ones. The Lower Prime Festival (Xiayuan Festival) is held on the fifteenth day of the tenth month.

As do other religions, Daoism views some mountains as sacred. The most famous four sacred mountains for Daoists are Mount Wudang in Hubei Province, Mount Longhu in Jiangxi Province, Mount Qiyun in Anhui Province, and Mount Qingcheng in Sichuan Province. Mount Wudang is famous in recent years for its long tradition in Chinese martial arts. It has appeared in action movies, for instance, in the Oscar-winning film Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. Mount Longhu
(Mount Dragon and Tiger) is the seat of the Way of Celestial Masters.

Huaiyu CHEN

Further Reading


Daoist Temples have been found throughout China since 25 CE. They provide a place for spiritual improvement and training, as well as a place to take part in Daoist religious activities. Only a handful of Daoist temples remain as cultural heritage sites for Daoists and tourists alike.

Daoism was founded during the early Han dynasty (206 BCE—220 CE). At this time believers needed a simple place to gather for meetings or to conduct religious practices. Because there were no set requirements for a Daoist temple, the architecture tended to be plain: simple buildings with simple furniture inside. Taipindao, one sect of Daoism, called these kinds of places “thatched cottages,” whereas Wudoumidao, another sect, called them “quiet houses.”

During the Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE) and the North and South dynasties (220–589 CE), as Daoism gradually became more active with more adherents, Daoist worshippers began to call Daoist structures jing or “peaceful houses.” Daoism eventually grew to become the official religion of the imperial family, who worshiped Laozi, one of the main figures in Daoism, as an ancestor. Between 386 and 581 CE, Daoist structures could be found in nearly all parts of China. The general configuration of Daoist temples was established during the Tang and Song dynasties. When the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) came to power, Daoist architecture included structures

A Daoist Temple. In the third century Daoist worshippers began to call their temples jing or “peaceful houses.” PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
such as “peaceful houses” in which ordinary people could worship; temples, for priests and officials; and palaces, for members of the imperial family. These structures could be found close to the imperial palace. By the end of the Tang dynasty in 907 CE, China had sixteen hundred Daoist temples and palaces. The emperor of the Song dynasty (960–1279) continued to praise Daoism. Emperor Huizong even ordered the building of a Daoist temple in every province and prefecture.

Daoist temples are built according to the law of symmetric arrangement along a center axis, but they also are designed according to the terrain if the temple is on a mountain. Daoist temples differ in scale and composition. They also differ in usage: Some are palaces for gods’ statutes, some are houses for priests to practice Daoism, some are places for ritual, and some are libraries.

Daoist temples remaining in China today belong to different sects of Daoism. Those belonging to the Quanzhen sect are the most popular in northern China; Louguan Temple in southeast Zhouzhi County, Shaanxi Province, is the oldest Daoist temple in China. It is said that Yinxi, an official of Hanguguan Pass during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), even welcomed Laozi to this temple, where Laozi related the Daodejing to Yinxi before leaving the central plains for the west. Because the Quanzhen sect gained power during the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234) and Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) in this area, Louguan Temple was incorporated into the Quanzhen sect.

Another famous temple of the Quanzhen sect is the White Cloud Temple in Beijing. It was founded in 739, enlarged in 1174, and became the largest Daoist temple in northern China. Because Mongol conqueror Chinggis
Khan (also called Genghis Khan, 1162–1227) of the Yuan dynasty invited Qiu Chuji, a famous Daoist priest of the Quanzhen sect, to live in this temple, and because the director of this temple, Wang Changyue, was given the title of bishop during the early Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the Quanzhen sect regarded this temple as its central temple.

Yonglegong Temple, located in Yongji County, Shanxi Province, also belongs to the Quanzhen sect. It was founded during the Tang dynasty to memorialize Lu Dongbin, one of the famous eight Daoist immortals, and enlarged in 1262. Its main architecture—such as the Daoist Trinity Palace, Chunyang Palace, and Chongyang Palace—has many wonderful frescoes.

Another important group of Daoist temples is on Wudang Mountain in Hubei Province. These temples were built during the early Tang dynasty. However, the largest construction in the history of Daoism in China was in 1413. The project required the labor of 300,000 people for eleven years. It included eight palaces, two temples, thirty-six halls, and seventy-two shrines. Thus, the Wudang Daoist temples are rare in scale in China.

**Li Yong**

**Further Reading**


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**He who stays near vermilion gets stained red; he who stays near ink gets stained black.**

近朱者赤，近墨者黑

Jin zhú zhě chì, jìn mò zhě hēi
Daqing, a city in northeast China, was formally founded in 1959 to develop the country’s largest oil fields. For many years a model of efficiency and national industrial practice, Daqing was the site of huge protests in 2002 after the central government applied pressure to cut back the workforce in the oil fields and trim some of the social benefits offered to current and former employees.

In the mythology of contemporary China, Daqing holds a particular place, both as a city held up as a model of efficiency in the 1960s and 1970s and as the location of the heroic deeds of model worker Wang Jinxin (1923–1970), known as “Iron Man Wang.” Since 1964, Daqing has also been linked with Dazhai, a national agricultural model, in the central northern province of Shanxi. Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong’s statement in 1964—“In agriculture learn from Dazhai, in industry learn from Daqing”—was endlessly repeated and set down as cast-iron truth until his death in 1976.

Daqing has continued to be important to China’s development, however, whereas Dazhai has proven to be a tragic fraud, its party secretary, the barely literate peasant Chen Yongui, felled from the positions he had been elected to as a result of Dazhai’s elevation in the late 1970s and the whole project exposed and discredited.

Daqing is a city in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, bordering Russia. Prospecting for crude oil began in the area in 1959 but was energized by a call by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to greatly expand production in February 1960. This development occurred against the backdrop of arguments with the USSR and an increased need for China to be self-sufficient in energy production. In the propaganda carefully constructed afterward, “Iron Man Wang” was summoned from oil fields in the western province of Gansu with the brigade he headed, Drilling Team 1205, to open up Daqing. Wang was rewarded for his efforts by becoming a national labor model in 1967 and being elected to the Ninth Central Congress in 1968. He was a figure familiar to followers of Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) iconography and hagiography (biography of saints or venerated persons), in which he was often said...
to battle against class enemies and revisionists. Daqing, in fact, was built by more than forty thousand workers, using 700,000 metric tons of equipment, becoming fully operational in 1963.

Daqing would eventually produce almost 2 billion metric tons of crude oil and become the world’s fourth-largest oil field and the largest in China. Other potential sources, such as Xinjiang and the Bohai Sea, were to prove either too remote or too difficult to exploit economically. Although for twenty-seven years (up to 2005) Daqing produced 50 million metric tons of oil a year, predictions showed that by 2010 production would fall to 30 million metric tons and to 20 million metric tons by the end of 2020, despite efforts to locate another 500 million metric tons in the area. This decrease in production has occurred as China’s own energy needs have burgeoned, making it the world’s second-largest user of crude oil after the United States and, beginning in 1993, a net importer of oil. China’s attempts to acquire long-term supplies in the Middle East and Africa have caused considerable geopolitical problems, despite plans between Russia and China in 2002 to construct a pipeline between Siberia and Daqing. Daqing still accounts for one-third of China’s oil production.

The slogan to “learn from Daqing” was revised in the 1980s, particularly after the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, where Daqing was once again held up as a model of efficiency and national industrial practice. However, in the 1990s, with many of the state-owned industries around it in the northeastern “rustbelt” region, it came under pressure from the central government to trim its workforce and cut back some of the social benefits that it gave to current and former workers. By 2002 this action had resulted in mass protests in the city that attracted international attention both for their size (one commentator claimed they were the largest industrial protests in China since 1949) and for the fact that they were occurring in a place once held up as a model commune. Although the protests were quelled, officials made no further attempts to revive the “learn from Daqing” campaign. However, as perhaps a tribute to the city’s role in the development of China, in summer 2008 Daqing was one of the cities through which the Olympic torch passed on its way to Beijing for the games.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading


Dayan Pagoda

Dàyàn Tǎ 大雁塔

One of the oldest extant Chinese pagodas, the Dayan (Big Wild Goose) Pagoda in the temple complex of Da Ci’en monastery in Xi’an city, has been a repository of Buddhist relics and an historic example of Tang architecture and art since it was built in 652 CE.

The Dayan (Big Wild Goose) Pagoda is located in the southeastern sector of present-day Xi’an city, Shaanxi Province. Completed in 652 CE in Chang’an, the capital city of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the pagoda became part of the Da Ci’en monastery (Temple of Great Maternal Grace). Da Ci’en temple had been established earlier by the Tang crown prince, who later became Emperor Gaozong (628–683 CE), in memory of his deceased mother. The temple also served as the home monastery for the monk Xuanzang (c. 602–664 CE) after his return to Chang’an in 645 CE from the Indic regions of Asia. The Dayan Pagoda was used to store the Sanskrit texts and Buddhist relics Xuanzang transported from that journey, and it was the place where he carried on the project of translating Buddhist sutras. (Xuanzhang’s travels to India were the basis for the adventures of the monk and his monkey guide in the Ming-era’s Journey to the West, to this day one of China’s most popular novels.)

This multi-tiered building (64.839 meters in height) is a result of a series of restorations and renovations over the original five-story, brick-layered earthen structure, which collapsed soon after its completion. The damaged structure was refurbished (from 701 to 704 CE) to become a seven-story building, presumably reaching its current height. It came to be known as the Big Wild Goose Pagoda, a name borrowed from a stupa in Central Asia, a huge, dome-shaped Buddhist shrine where Buddha was said to be present in the form of a flying goose (hamsa in Sanskrit).

The Dayan Pagoda was the sole surviving structure within the Da Ci’en complex when the temple was reduced to ruins during the incessant military conflicts in the Chang’an region toward the end of the Tang dynasty, but its basic features were preserved with a brick veneer over its old outer walls made during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The enduring pagoda subsequently suffered minor damages due to severe earthquakes (in particular those of 1556 and 2008), and recent threats from a growing number of subterranean termites also have become a concern for preservation.

The clean-lined, massive structure is built in Chinese louge style (a combination of multi-story structure and pavilion)—and can be simply described as a tower made from a tapering stack of graduated squat “blocks” sitting on top of a square platform (4.2 meters in height and 48 meters long on each side). The roofs protruding from all four sides of each story have tiled eaves and corbelled cornices characteristic of Tang masonry structures; the outer walls of the tower are embellished with brick works featuring arched doors, simulated timber designs of flat pilasters, simple brackets, and inter-columnar struts, all of which recall the usual attributes of carpentry works on timber-framed buildings most prevalent in ancient Chinese architectural tradition. Inside are steps that provide
access to the top of the pagoda and to the wooden land-nings on each of the square tiers; a central vertical void symbolizes the Heavenly Pillar, an imagined passageway to the celestial world.

The stone carvings on the Big Wild Goose Pagoda represent some rare examples of the talents of Tang artists. Inscriptions on stone tablets at the base of the building are said to have represented works of famous calligrapher Zhu Suiliang (596–658 CE), and Tang-style Buddhist imageries are carved on the lintels on the first floor. The fine linear designs on top of the western door, depicting the seated Buddha and his entourage in a wooden hall, have remained legible enough to shed important light on representational art of Tang era. These carvings are regarded as major sources of reference to Tang and pre-Tang architectural styles that can hardly be visualized today, as well as for studying the evolution of ancient Chinese architectural styles in general.

The Dayan Pagoda has remained a symbol of the history and literature of Buddhism in China for twelve centuries and is one of the oldest and most enduring members of the Chinese pagoda tradition.

TzeHuey CHIOU-PENG

Further Reading


Dazangjing (Great Treasury Scriptures)

Dàzàngjīng 大藏經

Dazangjing 大藏經 refers to Chinese Buddhist canon known as the Great Treasury Scriptures. The canon was expanded and modified through the ages for more than one thousand years.

The word Dazangjing 大藏經 literally means “Great Treasury Scriptures” and refers to the Chinese Buddhist canon. In Chinese the word zang 藏 renders the Sanskrit word pitaka (basket), which refers to the vessel that contained the scriptures, resting on palm leaves, in the early Buddhist tradition. The Chinese word jing 经 renders the Sanskrit word sūtra (scripture). The early Buddhist canon is called “Tripitaka” in Sanskrit, which literally means “three baskets,” and comprises three categories: the Sūtra pitaka (jing 经 scriptures), the Vinaya pitaka (lü 律 monastic code), and the Abhidharma pitaka (lun 论 treatises). These texts were originally written in Sanskrit and other central Asian languages. The earliest Tripitaka was the Pali canon, which developed out of three Buddhist councils held from the fifth to the second centuries BCE.

Although the early Tripitaka was endorsed by Buddhist councils, the Chinese canon itself was usually authorized by the imperial government. As a result, the early Tripitaka was never completely translated into Chinese. The Chinese Buddhist canon was known by a number of other terms in addition to Dazangjing. These terms include Zhongjing (Assembly of Scriptures), yiqiejing (All Scriptures), and neidian (Inner Scriptures). The earliest appearance of the term Dazangjing was in a biography of Tiantai School founder Zhiyi (538–597), written in the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) by Zhiyi’s disciple Guanding (561–632). However, as a term referring to the Chinese Buddhist canon, Dazangjing gained popularity only in the Song dynasty (960–1279), when a special official unit, the dazangjingsi 大藏經司 (Bureau of the Great Treasury Scriptures), was established to take charge of the canon’s printing and circulation.

While the early Buddhist canon consisted exclusively of the three categories mentioned earlier, the Chinese version followed the Mahayana tradition, whose flexible canon was one of its distinguishing features. Thus, the Chinese canon expanded beyond translations from the original three “baskets” to include texts written by Chinese monks and laypeople. These texts represent numerous genres, including commentaries, histories, biographies, gazetteers, travel accounts, temple records, and inscriptions.

The late Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) witnessed dramatic innovations in wood-block printing, ushering in the golden age of Chinese Buddhist scripture. In the Kaibao period (971–983 CE) of the Song dynasty the first printed edition of the Chinese Buddhist canon was completed. This edition used 130,000 wood blocks; a complete set of the pages consists of 5,048 fascicles (small or slender “installments”). In later dynasties many updated editions emerged. In the Liao dynasty (907–1125) the canon was even carved on stones, which have been preserved in the Yunjusi Temple (Cloud Dwelling Temple) at Fangshan. During Japan’s Taisho period (1912–1926) Japanese Buddhists printed the most comprehensive edition of the Chinese Buddhist canon ever produced. This critical edition Taisho shinshu daizokyō (usually referred to as
Confucian Views on Suicide

Unlike common Western views, suicide in Confucian China was often viewed as praiseworthy rather than sinful.

On June 2, 1927, a famous professor of Qing Hua University, Wang Guowei, drowned himself in a lake of the former imperial garden in Beijing. His suicide proved extremely controversial and evoked much discussion. His colleague and famous intellectual, Liang Qichao, wrote several eulogies in his honor. In one of these eulogies Liang reminded his colleagues and students, who lived in a culture which had just entered the modern age and was under heavy western influence, not to use western perspectives to evaluate Wang’s suicide. Europeans, Liang asserted, used to regard suicide as an act of cowardice, and Christianity made it a sin. In ancient China, however, notwithstanding some petty suicides committed by common people, many eminent figures used suicide to express their countercultural aspirations. These were praiseworthy suicides, Liang concluded, and should by no means be rashly reproached by alien European values.


Huaiyu CHEN

Further Reading


Dazhai

A small rural community in northern China, Dazhai was known as Mao’s model village. Acclaimed for its transformation to a prosperous area that turned barren hills into fertile terraced farmland, it was immortalized in the Chinese slogan “Learn from Dazhai in agriculture.”

Dazhai, located at the foot of Hutou Hill within the Taihang Mountains, is a village in Xiyang County, Shanxi Province. Before 1964, Dazhai was just a poor rural community of four hundred people, unknown to the outside world. But during the 1960s and 1970s, Dazhai attracted world attention because of the public recognition given by Mao Zedong (1893–1976) for its efforts to transform barren rugged hills into productive terraced farmlands. In 1964 Chairman Mao directed the whole nation to "learn from Dazhai in agriculture" (nongye xue dazhai, 农业学大寨), praising its production model as well as its great courage against hardship. The high yield produced on poor land was hailed as a miracle of agricultural development, and the spirit of “taming and fighting nature” (zhantian doudi, 战天斗地) was highly praised. "Learn from Dazhai in agriculture" soon became a national slogan, and in the following fifteen years, Dazhai served as a rural development model for practicing cooperation and self-reliance.

During 1940s and 1950s Dazhai had undergone land privatization and collectivization. It was liberated in 1945 from Japanese occupiers. In 1946 the village established mutual-aid teams 互助组 and later organized producers’ cooperatives 合作社 in 1953 to enhance agricultural productivity and equitable distribution of resources. In mutual-aid teams, members assisted each other during planting and harvesting, and in slack seasons, they worked on their own plots. The cooperatives system was considered an advanced form of collectivization; members gave up their land and livestock as ownership changed from private household to collective, and they worked together in the fields and shared the produce equitably. Collective farming was considered better than the single-household farming system as it was able to unify village resources and wisdom for combating the adverse conditions facing farming and living.

All the farmland in Dazhai was scattered over the ditches, patches, and slopes of Hutou Hill, and the harsh natural conditions were aggravated by natural disasters such as floods and droughts. Soil erosion had beset them for years. From 1953 to 1962 the farmers in Dazhai used rocks and soil to build stretches and then terraces. By using this method they were able to turn 120 acres of barren hillside into fertile grain fields. Even with the absence of irrigation and mechanical plowing, the grain yield increased over that ten-year period from approximately 400 kilograms to 2400 kilograms per acre. People were fed, and at the same time, they sold the surplus to the state.

In 1963 Dazhai was hit hard by a nonstop seven-day torrential rain, and the storm destroyed crops and residential homes. The residents also lost some grain in storage; the governments and neighboring villages offered help, but the people of Dazhai refused to take aid as they...
believed they could rise up again through collective power and self-reliance.

From 1964 to 1978, a time period that closely paralleled the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Dazhai was a highlight in media outlets and political propaganda, and it attracted millions of visitors from home and abroad, including China’s premier Zhou Enlai and many other state leaders. Dazhai drew about 5,000 to 10,000 visitors daily, which affected the villagers’ normal lives significantly. They had to organize Red Guards to maintain the order of production, which fortunately was not interrupted too much. The people knew their livelihood relied on the land and farming, and they could not afford to take it lightly.

The standard of living in Dazhai continued to improve even during the chaotic Cultural Revolution. Dazhai built better housing for each family and provided education and medical care for all using revenues generated from farming and other sources.

When China initiated reform and an open-door policy in 1978, rural areas were in the forefront of its implementation. With land reform, farm ownership changed from collective to individual households, or the so-called single household responsibility system. In the 1980s, many villages in China were undertaking huge changes due to economic reform policy, but Dazhai seemed lost and left out of the mainstream economic development. Dazhai’s “glorious history” seemed just a memory.

After a decade of silence and no major development, Dazhai was back in the spotlight with the return of Guo Fenglian 郭凤莲 in 1991. Guo had been a member of Dazhai’s famous “iron girls” work team, leading the village during the 1960s, building terraced fields and harvesting crops, defying hardships, and overcoming poor farming conditions; she became the village head in 1965 at the age of eighteen but left Dazhai in 1980 for an administrative position in the Xiyang County commission. After Guo returned in 1991 and again became the village head, she worked to improve infrastructure, the water system, and the efficient use of collectively owned machinery in the village. Under Guo’s leadership, Dazhai established a number of enterprises to absorb the agricultural labor force freed up by mechanization, including coal mining and the manufacture of construction materials, clothing, and chemicals. The village’s revenue in 2005 totaled 116 million yuan, and the yearly per-capita income reached 5,500 yuan, higher than the average rural income of the country.

If Guo Fenglian is considered a contributing factor to Dazhai’s current prosperity, then Chen Yonggui 陈永贵 should be regarded for its past glory. Chen was the Dazhai village head during 1950s and the commissary with Xiyang County in the 1960s. He led the people in Dazhai to “remake” nature; Chen was the national model farmer (laodong mofan 劳动模范) several times and made huge advances in his political career because of his work in Dazhai. In 1973, Chen became a member of national political bureau committee of the Central Communist Party, and in 1975, he was promoted to vice-premier in charge of agricultural and rural development. But he had little formal education, and the job was just too difficult; he resigned from the post in 1980. But in all his years, Chen appeared never to forget he was a farmer; he returned often to Dazhai to work together with the people in the fields, even after he became vice-premier. Chen died in 1986 at the age of seventy-three. His life and what he accomplished for Dazhai are still remembered by people today.

SHAO Xiaorong

Further readings
The forty-one sites in Dazu County in Sichuan Province contain over fifty thousand religious and secular sculptures that were carved into cliffs and caves over a 250-year period from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries.

A United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site since 1999, the rock carvings of Dazu consist of sculpted imageries and inscriptions on cliff faces widely dispersed at hillsides in Dazu County in the Chongqing area of Sichuan Province. The majority of more than fifty thousand sculptures were created by Buddhist clergy and devotees over the course of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the Five Dynasties era (907–960 CE), and the Song dynasty (960–1279). They mainly pertain to Buddhist themes, although some additionally synthesize Daoist metaphysics and Confucian moralities. These carvings are noted for unique artistic temperament and rich diversity of subject matter integral to understanding the eclectic nature of visual art and the belief system of ancient Sichuan.

Of all the masterpieces of Dazu, the decorated grottos and niches at Beishan (North Hill) and Baodingshan (Treasure-Summit Hill) complexes are the most important. Artistically and iconographically, the combined works at these two locales delineate the successive phases of a blossoming religious art.

The greatest concentration of the earlier group (Tang and Five Dynasties) is located at the Fowan (Buddha Bend) site of Beishan complex, seen at cave numbers 1–98 and numbers 213–285. They constitute part of the total of 290 sets of carvings on rocky outcroppings stretching across nearly 300 meters, representing a pantheon of awe-inspiring deities and vivacious flying apsaras (celestials) familiar in pre-Tang and Tang Buddhist art. Among the visual interpretations of Tantric and Pure Land spirituality at Beishan, caves numbers 5, 9, and 10 are believed to have been pioneering works engineered around 892, at the time when a fortress was set up in the Beishan area in response to regional insurgence that had become rampant in a declining empire.

Additional specimens in the middle sections of the Fowan cliffs are the more evolved and secularized carvings of the later Song era. The finest includes an assembly of gracefully jeweled bodhisattvas, realistic portraiture of saints, donors, and wrathful guardian kings in cave number 136 (dated 1142–1146). These naturalistic representations were contemporaneous with thirty-one sets of monumental works at the Dafowan (Great Buddha Bend) site of the Baodingshan complex. The Dafowan tableaux of gilded and painted imageries are set on a horseshoe-shaped rock formation 280 meters long, conceived as a life-long project of a Tantric monk named Zhao Zhifeng (b. 1159). They convey messages of esoteric learning interwoven with Huayan, Pure Land, and Ch’an doctrines. Among the images are reminders of karmic retributions, including a diagram explaining the reincarnation process for sentient beings, along with vivid and at times grotesque scenes of sinners’ torments in hell.

Many of the carvings demonstrate unique innovation in organizing carved designs over flat surfaces or in three-
dimensional forms. For example, the genre scenes at cave number 19 are juxtaposed with inscribed texts to underscore the instructive overtone in the narratives. The elongated, oversized figures at cave number 5 are deliberately tilted to maximize perception from below. The half-busts at cave number 11 are used as substitutes for full figures in a kind of artistic cost-effectiveness. And above all, the idiosyncratic natural rock formations at cave number 29 are structurally and iconographically integrated into the sculpted designs to resolve drainage and lighting issues in a deeply cut grotto.

The rock carvings of Dazu County are an expansive and superlative display of the artistic devotion, interpretive skills, and technical ingenuity of the Buddhists of ancient Sichuan.

TzeHuey CHIOU-PENG

Further Reading


Amassing foreign debt is one strategy for acquiring capital needed for investment. China’s foreign debt, among the highest worldwide at $331 billion in 2007, has been the impetus for the country’s emergence as an economic power in the twenty-first century.

Foreign (or external) debt is the total amount of money a country owes to foreigners or other countries. Ordinarily a consequence of loans and/or a negative balance of trade, China’s foreign debt in the past has also been the result of huge indemnities forced upon the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) by “unequal treaties” signed with foreign nations.

The impact of foreign debt on China has evolved. During the nineteenth century it devastated Qing authority, in the twentieth century it aided development and modernization projects for the Republic of China, and for Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) reform-minded leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, it has provided the impetus for China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse in the twenty-first century.

China’s defeat by the British in the First Opium War (1839–1842) introduced the precedent for demands of indemnity by victorious powers. The Treaty of Nanjing (1842) required a 21 million silver dollar indemnity to the British government in addition to 6 million silver dollars paid for the destruction of opium stockpiles. Qing resources, while depleted from an additional 16 million silver dollar indemnity following the Second Opium War (1856–1860), had been sufficient to cover most debts until the start of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). In preparation for the war, the Qing government borrowed 10 million taels (one ounce silver pieces) from British banks, but after its defeat, the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) forced an indemnity of 230 million taels. Loans drawn to pay the Japanese came from British, German, and French banks as well as foreign governments. After the Qing dynasty ended, two thirds of this debt remained outstanding.

The Boxer Rebellion (1900) caused the Chinese government to incur even greater foreign debt. European nations, the United States, and Japan forced the dynasty to pay the costs of the invasion as well as reimburse all foreigners for losses during the uprising. The total “Boxer Indemnity” reached 450 million taels, which the Chinese agreed to pay over the next thirty-nine years at an interest rate of four percent. Collateral for debt obligations came from revenue of the Imperial Maritime Customs, internal revenue taxes, salt taxes, and various sales taxes resulting in a loss of control by Beijing over many of China’s financial resources. In addition, the worldwide decline in silver prices at the turn of the twentieth century decreased the value of the tael relative to international currencies.

The establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1911 brought with it institutional changes including the creation of the Central Bank of China, directly under Guomindang control. Its first manager, T. V. Soong, was also finance minister from 1928 to 1933 and brother-in-law of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The ROC worked to reduce foreign debt left over from the Qing dynasty through both repayment and loan restructuring.
Debt, Foreign

while simultaneously incurring new debt used to fund development projects. China under the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) never achieved a healthy economy before it faced the devastation of World War II. With the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, China’s government refused liability for foreign debt from previous administrations.

According to The World Factbook, China’s estimated foreign debt for 2006 was US$305.3 billion. By early 2007 it had grown to US$331.56 billion, according to Chinese government sources. Accumulating foreign debt is one strategy of acquiring needed capital for investment, especially for developing countries where standards of living are comparatively low and capital is scarce. Foreign debt is one consequence of foreign direct investment (FDI) in a nation’s industrial development. FDI accelerates economic growth by bringing technology and market access to a developing country. China’s ruling Communist Party has tolerated foreign debt owed to capitalists since the advent of economic reforms associated with the leadership of Premier Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). Deng’s “Second Communist Revolution,” an economic program based on capitalist principles beginning in 1979, rejected the left-wing socialist policies associated with Mao Zedong and embraced a more pragmatic approach to modernization. One result has been the remarkable growth of China’s economy.

In 1980 the first four SEZs were established along the southeast coastal areas of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. A second group of ten additional coastal cites, the province of Hainan, and the Pudong area of Shanghai were designated SEZs by 1988. Encouraged by the success of the SEZs, between 1984 and 1988 the Chinese government created smaller, more specialized Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZ), located along China’s coast or in cities already open for international trade, where high-tech industries are encouraged over more traditional manufacturing firms. By 2006 there were fifty-four national government-sponsored ETDZs, thirty-three located in coastal areas and twenty-one in central China, and hundreds more supported by provincial and municipal authorities throughout China.

A primary purpose of the SEZs and ETDZs is to absorb foreign direct investment. The initial surge of investment in the early 1980s mostly came from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, whose Chinese expatriates were eager to tap into China’s potential for growth. By the late 1990s, the West and Japan had entered the scene. After China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, FDI skyrocketed, reaching US$60 billion annually in 2005. Chinese government sources report that the fifty-four ETDZs, totaling a land area of approximately 500 square kilometers, received 15 percent of China’s total FDI for 2006 when over two hundred multinational high-tech companies invested in four hundred industrial projects.

Economists have questioned whether China’s foreign debt should be a concern for the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Many have concluded that it should pose no short- or long-term threat to China’s future development. On the contrary, it reflects an active flow of international capital. Although China’s total foreign debt ranks among the highest worldwide, it is relatively small compared to the gross domestic product (GDP) estimated in 2006 at US$10.17 trillion. Moreover, China’s foreign exchange reserves, in excess of US$800 million, remain higher than the total foreign debt. On the other hand, the politics surrounding foreign debt, FDI, and SEZs are more complicated. The “Fourth Generation” of Communist Party leadership under President Hu Jintao (b. 1942) remains committed to free market economics and capitalism as “temporary” necessities to achieve modernization. Yet they must answer critics within the Party who
decry the inflation, “foreign exploitation,” corruption, and increased stratification in Chinese society that have accompanied phenomenal economic growth. The Communist Party’s official position is that China’s economic achievements should serve as models for other developing nations in the twenty-first century.

June GRASSO

Further Reading
The defense industry is an essential pillar of China’s industrial development and military modernization, producing everything from warships to washing machines. Although it has made significant achievements in structural rearrangement, technological advancement, and weaponry development in recent years, it still faces considerable challenges, such as adapting to a huge labor surplus and the gradual shift from government planning.

Upon its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China was faced with a hostile Western world and came to rely on the Soviet Union for military and technological assistance. This resulted in adopting for China’s defense industry the Soviet organizational model, which dictated that each factory and industrial sector should be as self-sufficient as possible, even at the expense of efficiency. In 1960, the abrupt end of Soviet assistance forced China’s defense research and production to stand alone, adversely affecting the country’s overall industrial development.

Perceived threats from abroad between 1965 and 1971 led to a massive “third-front” (or third-line) construction model, an effort to build a huge self-sufficient industrial base in the remote southwestern and western regions. (The “first front” usually refers to coastal areas, which would be hard to defend; the “second front,” inland from the first front, might have to give way to the “third front,” still farther inland and thus more suitably defended in a protracted war.) Approximately 50 to 55 percent of China’s defense industry was located in provinces such as Sichuan, Shanxi, Hubei, Yunnan, and Guizhou. By 1975, the percentage of domestically manufactured weapons was 71, 75, 89, and 97, respectively, for tanks, aircraft, naval ships, and cannons.

In 1977, after the Cultural Revolution, the defense industry adopted the policy of “combining the military with the civilian” and “using the civilian to support the military” to fulfill the overall goal of economic reform and modernization. Under the joint supervision of the Central Military Commission and the State Council, the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) was established in 1982 to ensure better coordination in defense-industry leadership. In that year as well, the machine-building ministries were renamed to indicate their functional responsibilities. For example, the Second Machine Building Ministry became the Ministry of Nuclear Industry. The 1980s also witnessed the production of civilian goods by the defense industry, thus involving it in dual functions and profit-making activities.

The significance of high-tech weapons during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) renewed China’s interest in technological development. In March 1998, COSTIND was headed for the first time by a civilian bureaucrat, a change regarded as an attempt to avoid the military’s heavy-handed interference in the operation of China’s
defense industry. While the General Armaments Department (GAD), newly created within the People’s Liberation Army, oversaw weapons research, the military was expected to pay more for weapons and equipment from COSTIND’s defense factories, due to further involvement in the market economy. On 1 July 1999, corporations in the main defense industrial sectors were split for further specialization. For example, the nuclear industry was divided into the China National Nuclear Corporation and the China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group Corporation.

**Achievements**

The defense industry’s nearly unrivaled access to supplies and its rarely challenged methods of marketing have gradually responded to market trends following China’s economic reforms. In the 1980s, a shift in emphasis from preparation for war to preservation of peace necessitated the reorganization of the defense industry. Conversion to civilian production mitigated the pain caused by the cuts in military spending and symbolically showed China’s willingness to contribute to global peace. The Chinese government claimed that its military-industrial complex produced and exported $7 billion worth of goods in 1997. Thirty thousand state-owned defense factories engaged in the aerospace, aviation, ordnance, shipbuilding, and nuclear industrial sectors and built everything from warships to washing machines.

While data varies for different sectors, civilian goods in the late 1990s approached 80 percent of the gross output value of China’s defense industry. In 1997, for example, China’s defense industry claimed credit for producing 50 percent of motorcycles and 30 percent of color televisions in the domestic market. The goal was for the defense industry to be increasingly self-sustaining, efficient, and innovative. In addition, loosening state control has given defense factories flexibility in interaction with foreign business communities.

*A Chinese military submarine in Shanghai. Besides making efforts to modernize its naval fleet, China’s defense industry has been working on advanced weapons systems such as cruise missiles and satellite-positioning systems. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.*
for dual-use technology acquisition in various category-neutral areas such as information and communications technologies.

Another phenomenon of the 1990s was the formation of big-business conglomerates to link firms vertically and horizontally so that they could participate in economies of scale. One such conglomerate is the China North Industries Corporation, reported in 1997 to have more than three hundred affiliated units with fixed assets of at least $7.5 billion. Another example is China Poly Group, a diversified conglomerate actively engaging in a variety of activities such as tourism, real estate, infrastructure construction, arms exports, and technology acquisition.

Indigenous efforts and access to foreign know-how may enable the defense industry to close technological gaps between China and the world’s other major powers. China’s defense industry has been working on advanced weapons systems such as cruise missiles and satellite-positioning systems. In 1999, China successfully launched and recovered an unmanned spacecraft. As long as China’s economic boom continues and the government increases the budget for military procurement, the defense industry has great potential for growth.

In the 2000s, as a result of the emphasis on selective modernization in key industries based on China’s own assessment of the technological advantage and gradual adoption of market mechanisms, China’s defense industry has indeed begun to show its qualitative achievements in several industrial sectors. In the shipbuilding industry, Chinese destroyers (“Luzhou” class and “Luyang II” class), conventional submarines (e.g., “Song” class and “Yuan” class), and nuclear-fueled attack submarines (e.g., “Shang” class and “Jin” class) built in the 2000s have been more seaworthy and better prepared for surface and undersea warfare, for regional area denial capability (the ability to prevent adversaries from accessing a region), and for the pursuit of long-term objectives of global interest. In addition to the official introduction of the “homemade” J-10 fighter plane and domestically assembled SU-27SKs, China’s aerospace industry rolled out a regional jet, the ARJ21, in 2007. The successful launching and landing of the “Shenzhou 5” spaceship (2003) and “Shenzhou 6” spaceship (2005) demonstrated China’s ability to send astronauts into space. These spaceflights also offered significant insight about China’s missile technology and space-related weapons systems. Meanwhile, China’s nuclear industry has developed and deployed more than ten varieties of ballistic missiles, such as JL-2 (“Julang-2”), submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs), and Dongfeng (DF)-31A ICBMs with an estimated capability of reaching the North American continent. Finally, the joint force of China’s booming information technologies (IT) companies, state research institutes, and ambitious national defense science and technology funding like the National High-tech R&D Program (863 Program, 1986) and the National Basic Research Program (973 Program, 1997) has benefited both the civilian IT sector and the defense industrial establishment. With significant advancement in the production of fiber-optic cable, small-size reconnaissance satellites, and other microelectronic technologies, the military has strengthened Chinese military’s C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capability at different levels of the “battle-space” management system. Given China’s rapid economic growth and significant improvement in military equipment and weaponry, a broad overview and sweeping generalization about China’s defense industries would not give a judicious evaluation of their technological capability. Future studies of China’s defense industry will require sector-by-sector examination.

China’s close linkage to the world economy under various trade regimes regulated by the WTO has enabled the defense factory to gain access to a vast array of new civilian dual-use technology spin-offs for the innovation of weapons. Several EU members have found ways to deliver dual-use or “non-lethal” military equipment and parts to China. For instance, tanks and armored vehicles manufactured in China have been mostly powered by German-designed engines manufactured under the licensed production right. The same applies to Chinese submarines, which have adopted German diesel engines and a French sonar system. The policy of “combining the military with the civilian” and “using the civilian to support the military” still persist in the twenty-first century. The Chinese government reported that the sector for civilian goods contributed 78 percent of the revenues of the defense industry in 2007. Meanwhile, China’s White Paper on National Defense issued in 2006 asserted that patent applications by China’s military industrial complex...
Challenges

The legacy of central planning has hurt the economic vitality of China’s defense factories. Many defense plants have found themselves with duplicate production, over-supply, and brain drain to lucrative private enterprises. For the “third-front” defense factories, inconvenient sites and worn-out infrastructure have scared off new investors. Although defense factories have been successful in joint-venture deals with companies like Mercedes-Benz (now Daimler Chrysler), Suzuki, and McDonnell Douglas, by 1998 fewer than six hundred joint ventures had been forged, despite years of courtship.

Overall, the viability of China’s defense industry relies as much on public-policy design, the political will of leaders, and military circumstances as on economic development. Problems like a bloated labor force and ever-increasing costs for technological innovation must be solved. Most important, a defense industry long accustomed to government planning must make a difficult shift to a market mentality in consolidating and rationalizing its industrial layout and operation.

Even with the 1998 structural separation of COSTIND from the military, the image of the defense industry’s symbiotic association with China’s military persists. This mammoth military-industrial complex poses a hindrance to the central authority. Eventual loosening of military control over the defense industry and the stipulation for more transparent arms-transfer procedures seem to be two main tasks for a robust development of the defense industry. The COSTIND’s decision in 2007 on military-enterprises shareholding reform—allowing state-owned companies and qualified foreign investors to acquire or merge military factories—was the latest drive to encourage further civilianization of the defense industry in the market economy. It will be interesting to evaluate how China can achieve a balance between the civilian sector and defense industry and the integration of civilian technology into weaponry R&D as the nation strives to enhance its military capability.
In order to ensure its economic subsistence, the Chinese defense industry needs to rely on income from arms exports. With recipients like Iran and Pakistan, China's aggressive arms-transfer policy made China the eighth largest supplier for the 2002–2006 period. Arms exported by China during this period were estimated at $2.1 billion, approximately 6.6 percent of that of the United States. In carrying out normal arms trade, China stressed its compliance with three basic principles—the enhancement of the self-defense capability of importing countries, noninterference of importing countries, and nonimpairment of regional and global peace, security, and stability. It also promulgated the Law on Control of Guns in 1996, issued regulations on the administration of arms export in 1997, and started to revise arms export regulations in 2002. Nevertheless, its nontransparent practices have frequently led to international accusations and diplomatic disputes for exporting weaponry to some sensitive and unstable areas, such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar in recent years. Establishment of a stronger monitoring mechanism to prohibit its weaponry from transferring to controversial destinations will be a major challenge for the healthy development of China's defense industry in the future.

Wei-chin LEE

Further Reading
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan was established on 28 September 1986, when martial law was lifted in Taiwan, allowing the formation of political parties.

The origins of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can be traced to two main groups: political prisoners jailed in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party in Taiwan) government, and exiled dissidents living in Japan and the United States who were members of Taiwan independence movements. Together the two groups were referred to as Dang wai (Outside the [Kuomintang] Party) before they established the DPP.

The DPP's ideology was formulated by the intellectual dissident Peng Ming-min, who drafted a number of manifestos. Peng in 1961 became the young chairman of the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University. In 1964 Peng was arrested for trying to circulate a manifesto calling for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's exiled government in Taiwan. The main points of his manifesto can be summarized as follows:

1. Historical relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China should be minimized.
2. Taiwan is more “modern” than old China.
3. Taiwan’s experience with Japan is more beneficial than its experience with China.
4. Taiwan’s history has mainly been the record of Taiwanese seeking self-determination and self-rule.
5. Taiwan needs a complete change of government.
6. Taiwan’s independence movement is in accordance with the prevailing tendencies in the world.

Taiwan’s leader at that time, Chiang Kai-shek, had, of course, always maintained that Taiwan is a province of China.

In January 1970 Taiwanese dissidents in Japan, Europe, and the United States formed the Taiwan Independence Alliance. The founding members included Tsai Tung-jung, Chang Tsan-hung, Wang Yu-te, and Huang Yu-jen. Growing impatient with Chiang’s authoritarian, one-party rule in Taiwan, they practiced terrorism in an attempt to overthrow Chiang in the 1970s. One example was the assassination attempt on Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, the powerful vice premier, by alliance member Huang Wen-hsiung, when Chiang Ching-kuo was visiting New York City on 24 April 1970. Other examples include the attempted murder of Kuomintang representative Teng Yung-kong in Paris on 29 March 1973; sabotage of a power plant in Taiwan, causing minor damage, in January 1976; and the attempted assassination of the Kuomintang governor of Taiwan, Hsieh Tung-min, in October 1976.

After the so-called Kaohsiung Incident (a demonstration by dissidents to commemorate Human Rights Day, 10 December 1979, which led to violence and the alleged
injury of 183 police officers), dissident activists in the United States launched massive attacks against Kuomintang offices in the United States. These attacks included ransacking Kuomintang government offices in Los Angeles (14 December 1979), Seattle (15 December 1979), and Washington, D.C. (19 December 1979), as well as the headquarters of the Kuomintang newspaper Shi Jie Ri Bao (World Journal) in New York City (22 December 1979). Other violent incidents were reported in San Francisco, Chicago, and other major cities with Kuomintang offices. Finally, Li Chiang-lin, the brother-in-law of Kaohsiung city mayor Wang Yu-yun, was murdered in Los Angeles on 28 July 1980. No clear evidence links the DPP directly to any of these terrorist activities. However, many participants were welcomed back to Taiwan during President Chen Shui-bian’s administration (2000–2008).

Major Factions
The DPP is a complex organization with a variety of members and factions. Some are well known, the first being the Formosa Group, which began publishing Formosa Magazine in the 1970s to advocate democracy and Taiwan’s independence as well as to criticize the Kuomintang for its authoritarian rule. Second major is the New Tide Faction, founded by Chou I-jen. Chou helped organize many demonstrations and protests, including large farmers’ protests on 20 May 1988. The New Tide Faction is considered one of the more radical groups within the DPP; many of its members advocated using the concept of the Philippines’ “People’s Power” to overthrow the Kuomintang government. In addition to these two largest factions, numerous small interest groups are centered around various DPP personalities.

However, the Formosa Group members seem to have had the most influence within the DPP in terms of political positions. After Chen Shui-bian was elected president, one prominent former Formosa Group member, Yao Chia-wen, became head of the Examination Yuan, one of the five coequal branches of Taiwan’s government. He had also been elected to Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan in 1992. Another member, Chang Chun-hung, was the DPP’s secretary-general and a member of Taiwan’s Legislature (2000–2005). He had been the editor of two prominent magazines, The Intellectual and Taiwan Political Review, during the 1970s.
Another important member, Huang Hsin-chieh, was, in fact, at one time during the 1960s a member of the Kuomintang. (He left the Kuomintang in 1964 to support the independent candidate Kao Yu-shu for mayor of Taipei.) Huang became chairman of the DPP for three terms from 1988 to 1991. He had been arrested after the Kaohsiung Incident and was sentenced to more than seven years in jail. In the summer of 1997 Huang accepted Kuomintang president Lee Teng-hui’s appointment as vice chairman of the National Unification Council, ironic for a man who in his earlier years had supported Taiwanese independence. Some DPP members called without success for Huang to be expelled from the DPP. He died in 1999 and thus did not live to see the DPP win the presidency of Taiwan.

Former Formosa Group member Hsu Hsin-liang, also a former Kuomintang member, served as the DPP’s chairman from 1996 to 1997. After the Chung Li Incident—a protest that Hsu was involved in and that led to violence in the city of Chung Li in 1977—Hsu fled to the United States, where he established a DPP branch in San Francisco. He returned to Taiwan in 1988. However, he resigned from the DPP in 1999 in order to run for president as an independent. Later he became especially critical of Chen Shui-bian’s policies toward China and led a popular sit-down demonstration in front of the Taiwan presidential office in 2007.

Lin Yi-hsiung, yet another former Formosa Group member, became the eighth chairman of the DPP in 1998. He began his political career in the provincial assembly of Taiwan in 1977 and previously served time in jail for his role in the Kaohsiung Incident. He went into exile in Japan and also lived in both the United Kingdom and the United States before returning to Taiwan in 1989. He ran Chen Shui-bian’s successful presidential campaign in 2000. However, in 2006 he left the DPP and criticized Chen publicly for causing worsening ethnic relations within Taiwan.

**Nationalistic Platform**

In terms of its organizational structure, the DPP followed the Kuomintang model, with power concentrated in the Central Committee, which has a party chairman as its leader. In 1991 it adopted a nationalistic platform proposing a new draft of the Constitution for the renamed “Republic of Taiwan” (as opposed to Republic of China on Taiwan). The DPP has tried to unite its factions around a distinctively Taiwanese identity, using as bait the ultimate goal of an independent Taiwan nation in its efforts to consolidate intraparty debates and disagreements on other political issues.

However, fierce infighting has been a mainstay of the DPP since its founding. For example, during the Third Plenary Conference of the DPP in October 1988 competition by the Formosa and New Tide factions for the position of party chairmanship led to outright violence, including not only quarrels and personal attacks on members’ character but also physical attacks. Although the Formosa Group won the chairmanship, the bitter infighting almost split the DPP. Other serious intraparty squabbling has continued to the present.

The DPP also suffered credibility problems from the outside. Vote-buying, gift-giving, and lavish “free” banquets and all-expenses-paid trips for politicians were widespread during the period of Kuomintang rule in Taiwan (1949–2000). Although the DPP promised voter reform, the DPP, in fact, found itself accused of using many of the same tactics, known as “black gold politics” in Taiwan.

As a result, although at one point the DPP had offered itself as a “fresh” alternative to the corruption of the Kuomintang, the DPP ultimately suffered a loss of voter confidence. In the 2000 election, when Chen Shui-bian was elected to the presidency, he won a mere 39.3 percent of the votes cast—and mostly from traditional DPP strongholds in southern and central Taiwan (Kaohsiung County, Kaohsiung City, Tainan City, Tainan County, Pingtung County, Chiayi City, Chiayi County, Yunlin County, and Changhua County). In fact, the DPP could not have won the presidency if the Kuomintang, in a case of its own infighting, had not split into two parties just before the election: the Kuomintang (with its candidate, former vice president Lien Chan, receiving 23.1 percent of the vote) and the Independent Party (former Taiwan governor James Soong receiving 36.8 percent).

The future strength of the DPP will be dependent on several factors, perhaps most important being able to convince the Taiwanese public that it can improve Taiwan’s economic woes as well as distancing itself from corrupt elements within the party in order to again be able to present itself as a fresh alternative to the Kuomintang.
However, the results of the January 2008 legislative elections suggested the DPP had a long way to go before it would regain its previous popularity.

**Legislators at Large**

The January 2008 legislative election was the first time Taiwan used the “single constituency, two ballots” electoral system. Under this system voters from Taiwan’s seventy-three constituencies cast one vote to choose the candidate they prefer to represent their district in the Legislative Yuan and another vote for their preferred political party, which determines the seat of the so-called legislators at large. This second category of legislator is elected in numbers proportional to the votes that each party wins. However, only parties that win more than 5 percent of all valid ballots can win one of these at-large seats.

The DPP nominated seventy-one candidates for the legislative election, while the Kuomintang nominated seventy-four candidates (not including at-large seats). In addition, 109 candidates from smaller parties plus 42 independent candidates ran for seats. The DPP and the Kuomintang each nominated thirty-four candidates for the legislator-at-large vacancies. Before the election DPP officials hoped to win some fifty district seats, whereas the Kuomintang was expected to win sixty-eight seats. Pundits expected that the scandal-plagued DPP would thus become a minority in the Legislature. However, the actual results ran counter to even the most cynical pundits and the most optimistic Kuomintang predictions.

In fact, the 2008 legislative election proved to be a national referendum on the DPP and Chen Shui-bian. The DPP suffered a resounding defeat, winning a mere 27 seats, whereas the Kuomintang gained 81 seats in the 113-seat Legislative Yuan. Taking responsibility for his party’s defeat, Chen resigned his position as party chair. DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh assumed the chairmanship. Analysts felt that the chances for the DPP to win the March presidential election were greatly damaged by this defeat and blamed Chen’s increasingly bellicose and provocative calls for Taiwanese independence in the waning days of his presidency as well as the declining Taiwanese economy as major factors in the DPP’s spectacular defeat. Ma Ying-jeou, the Kuomintang candidate, won the presidential election with a landslide 54.5 percent of the vote, compared to Frank Hsieh’s 41.6 percent.

As of 2006—the last time such figures were made public—the DPP reported that it had a membership of 530,000, made up almost exclusively of Taiwanese with origins in Fujian Province and with only 50 percent paying their party dues. At the same time the Kuomintang reported a membership of 1.1 million. The majority of Taiwanese are independents, with only a small percentage of the remaining citizens officially affiliated with other minor parties.

Winberg CHAI

**Further Reading**


DENG Xiaoping

Dèng Xiǎopíng 邓小平

1904–1997  Statesman

Deng Xiaoping survived upheavals in the Chinese Communist Party and in his own career to become the paramount leader of China during the 1980s. He helped China become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and kickstarted the process of Opening Up and Reform, from 1978 which continues to the present day. After years of autocratic rule under Mao Zedong, Deng moved China in a new economic direction while avoiding a complete rupture with the past.

Deng Xiaoping, eldest son of a prosperous landlord, was born in Paifang village, Sichuan Province in 1904. But by 16, he had already left home. He joined the Communist Party soon after its formal founding in China, in 1923, and, like many of his contemporaries, used a work-study program to go to France, living there for six years, and working, for a period, at the Renault Factory on the outskirts of Paris. He was to spend most of his time here, however, preoccupied with political activism, becoming familiar with many future leaders of the CCP when it came to power. After his stay in France Deng went to Moscow, where he trained further as a political activist and organizer, though he only spent a brief period there.

After working as a Communist Party organizer in southwestern China, Deng moved to the Jiangsi Soviet (1931–1934) to be with Mao Zedong. (The Jiangsi Soviet was an independent government established by Mao and Zhu De, one of the early Red Army military rulers, in Jiangxi Province in southeastern China, after the Guomindang [GMD] led purge of Communist activists in Shanghai in 1927.) During the war against the Japanese from 1937 to 1945, Deng occupied a number of positions as political commissar in the Eight Route Army, one of the Communist’s main forces. He continued his military career during the Civil War against the GMD from 1946 to 1949.

After the civil war Deng’s loyalty to the party was rewarded when he was appointed vice premier. He primarily worked in the ministry of finance, where he formulated economic policy. During a period in the 1950s now widely regarded as one of reconstruction and consolidation, he proved himself as a capable administrator. He worked, in particular, with Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier from 1949, to improve productivity in the countryside, still the home to the vast majority of Chinese people. But a more assertive role by Mao Zedong in economic policy making from 1957 onwards, followed by a fall out with the USSR, and a purge of intellectuals and rightists, led to the disastrous period of the Great Leap Forward. Deng was to be one of the main leaders, after this policy was admitted to be a mistake, in 1962–1963 in clearing up the mess that had been created, instigating, under President Liu Shaoqi, a series of reforms that looked remarkably like those which reappeared from 1978, a system of farmers having more freedom to grow different kinds of crops; something approaching a primitive agricultural
produce free market even made a brief appearance. But by 1965, Mao’s unease at what he regarded as capitalist tendencies in Liu, and by association in Deng, meant that they were already under a cloud. Deng was one of highest ranking victims of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 onwards, condemned for being a revisionist and capitalist roader, and removed from his position as General Secretary of the Party in 1967. While spared Liu Shaoqi’s grim fate of literally being deprived of medical treatment till he died of cancer, Deng’s son, Deng Pufang, at that time a student at Qinghua University, was thrown from the third story of a building and disabled for life. Deng himself was sent down to the countryside, spending much of the early 1970s in a tractor factory in Jiangsu. But in 1973, after the Tenth Party Congress, and the fall of Mao’s own chosen successor Lin Biao in 1971, Deng was rehabilitated. The Party needed his administrative skills too much, and his great mentor, Zhou Enlai, who was already ill with the cancer that would finally kill him in 1975, needed Deng at his side.

One of the most remarkable features of Deng’s career was his being unique in returning from the political graveyard not once, but twice. Savagely attacked by the group of extreme leftist leaders around Mao during his final days, the Gang of Four, he was removed from office again in 1975. But the death of Mao in 1976, and the decision by the then Chairman of the Party, and Mao’s chosen successor Hua Guofeng to arrest the radical leaders, meant that once more Deng was returned to power, this time making a reappearance during a football match in 1977. He was appointed a Vice Premier the same year, a position he served in until 1982. But despite his lacking the formal titles of leadership, he was, from the 1978 Third Plenum of the Tenth Party Congress, to all intents and purposes the paramount leader of China. He worked, within a group of senior leaders, to steer China away from the ideological and economic excesses of Maoism, dismantling in the early 1980s most of the apparatus of Maoist rule, and centralized economic control, and ushering in a period of bold reform. Such moves had him on the front page of *Time* Magazine twice as Man of the Year. His influence in causing China to liberalize its economy while remaining a Communist Party controlled state are still being worked through to this day, with China, as a direct result of his reforms, becoming one of the world’s major economies.

This era was to end in June 1989 with the Tiananmen Square Incident. Deng was many things, but he remained a faithful Communist Party servant to the last, and he saw the attempts to topple the Party from power as akin
to treason. Even though he had ostensibly retired from all formal positions of power by 1989, including Chair of the Central Military Commission, it is clear from papers reportedly showing the deliberations of the Central Leaders during the period, and subsequently smuggled out of China and published in the West, that Deng's say was decisive in ordering the put down of the demonstrators, many of them students, by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It was a role for which he was to be internationally condemned, and which changed the rest of the world's attitude towards him.

Deng's final political contribution was to undertake the Southern Tour in 1992, at a time when the liberalization of China's economy, and its openness to foreign investment, looked under threat. His defense of the need to continue and deepen the reforms, which were to culminate in China's entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001, saved China slipping back into a more introspective, isolated position. From 1992 to 1997, Deng was largely invisible, making one final brief public appearance at a Party meeting in 1994, and dying in 1997, only a few months before one of his other major contributions, the successful return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty to the PRC, occurred in June that year. Deng is now called the "chief architect of China's economic reforms" and although his historic contribution is not as dramatic as that of Mao Zedong's, it may well prove to be both more profound in its historic effects, and a great deal longer lived.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading
In 1992, during a period of economic sluggishness, the eighty-eight-year-old former Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping embarked on a Southern Tour, the final large political act of his career. During Deng’s surprise visit to some of the key Special Economic Zones he had established in the early 1980s, he confirmed China’s commitment to economic liberalization and the implementation of radical free market methods.

Former Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour occurred in the early part of 1992 when Deng, who had retired from all his party and government positions, made an impromptu trip to the special economic zones (SEZs) of Zhuhai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou in Guangdong Province that he had been instrumental in setting up in the early 1980s. The tour occurred at a time of sluggishness in the Chinese economy and at a time of political uncertainty. Because Deng was by far the most influential political figure still alive from his generation, the symbolic impact of his tour was immense, and one can claim that it revitalized China’s second phase of reform and opening up, which had begun in 1978 and 1979. This was to be Deng’s last major contribution to China’s development, and he later would die after five years of political inactivity.

The Southern Tour took place at a difficult time for China and was provoked by several problems. Although China had enjoyed a decade of good growth in the 1980s, implementing radical market-based reforms into its economy, a combination of political stasis, corruption, and inflation had led to the disturbances in 1989 and to the June 4th Massacres, in which crack troops from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had entered Tiananmen Square after several weeks of student and popular protest and had killed many hundreds of demonstrators. That this tragedy had taken place before the world’s eyes and at a time shortly before uprisings in eastern Europe led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the toppling of dictators such as Romania’s Ceausescu only added to the opprobrium pulled down on the Chinese government’s head. Foreign companies withdrew, political leaders from Europe and the United States condemned what had happened, and China found itself edging closer to the isolationism that it had experienced during the final decades of Mao Zedong’s rule up to 1976.

Chinese leaders, under first Hu Yaobang and then Zhao Ziyang, both general secretaries of the Communist Party, had supported research in the mid-1980s into forms of political reform, some of them modeled on north European social democratic democracies such as Sweden and Denmark. However, the consensus was that moves in this direction were too soon and too unpredictable. China, it was argued, needed firm, central leadership to avoid slipping back into the chaos it had experienced in the period before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Foreign observers were sufficiently excited by the possibility of seeing radical political reform in China to match the startling economic changes. Deng Xiaoping even became
Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” (1985) during the decade and was seen, despite all the evidence to the contrary, as a closet democrat, a man like Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (himself a man with whom—in the words of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher—“we could do business”). The events of June 1989 effectively rid people of their illusions. Deng was to starkly state immediately after the crushing of the student demonstrators that although there was an inevitability about what had happened, in view of the national and international context, the party would not compromise in its aim to implement economic reforms but rather would stand fast to the monopoly on power of the CCP. This harsh response, however, made many observers believe that China would turn its back again on economic reform and close its doors. Beginning at the end of 1989 many foreign companies withdrew from China, and the amounts of trade decreased.

**Special Economic Zones**

The signs that the central government was still deeply committed to continuing the path it had followed up to 1989, albeit in a slightly modified form, came in 1990 when Shanghai was unexpectedly added to the five SEZs that already existed, meaning that it would enjoy preferential policies in attracting and accommodating foreign direct investment. At about this time Deng admitted that not making Shanghai, perhaps the most entrepreneurial and capitalist of all China’s major cities, an SEZ at the same time as the others in the early 1980s had been a mistake. Also in 1990 company and investment laws were passed to provide greater protection for foreigners. These laws were passed at the same time as the United States, under President George H. W. Bush, finally decided against imposing sanctions on China for the events of 1989 but instead put in place a military embargo, allowing other trade contact to continue.

Even so, 1990 and 1991 brought only sluggish growth. Foreign direct investment dipped. The new leadership of the party was nervous and uncertain under Jiang Zemin, previously party secretary of Shanghai and then pulled up to replace the felled Zhao Ziyang, who was to take the majority of the blame for the events of June 1989. Jiang lacked any real power base in the party and had been as surprised by his elevation as those around him. However, despite having reservations, Deng, who was key in the decision, had few alternatives.

Deng’s position in the late 1980s and early 1990s was unusual. In 1989 he had resigned from his last formal position of power, that of chair of the Central Military Commission. Beyond being president of the Chinese Bridge Playing Association (he was a world-class bridge player), he held no public positions whatsoever. However, as the “chief architect of the reform process,” as he was labeled in internal Chinese parlance, and as “paramount leader,” as he was labeled outside of China, Deng clearly wielded final say on all important strategic matters. Without Deng’s support important policies would not be implemented nor get passed through the newly constructed machinery of government, nor would personnel changes of any significance be made. Deng also was held in immense esteem by the PLA, who in June 1989 had proved itself once more the final trump in any power struggle or conflict.

Although barely visible during 1990 and 1991, Deng had commented on his frustration with the slowness of the reforms and on the fact that they had encountered a lean period. He had commented in the late 1980s that he was retiring to let the younger generation develop and did not intend to interfere. In doing so he must have had in mind the final period of Maoist rule, when the aging and increasingly erratic Mao had fiercely held on to power, dragging the country deeper and deeper into crisis and poverty. However, in China such well-intended abnegation was easier to say than to do. By late 1991 it was clear that there was policy drift at the top of the central government; no clear messages were getting out about the need to continue deepening reform; and no signs were clear to the rest of the world that China was putting June 1989 behind it and now ready to move forward.

Deng’s Southern Tour, which occurred during January and into February 1992, can be interpreted as belonging to the tradition of Chinese leaders going above the heads of government to appeal directly to the people. Mao himself had frequently waged campaigns in which he had circumvented the bureaucracy and even the party in order to speak directly to the people. At the age of eighty-eight, therefore, and with his immense prestige, Deng was willing to speak directly one final time. He was also able to reach a wide audience through television and radio coverage and print media. News of his surprise appearance in southern China was widely covered in the international
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour

media. The term in Chinese for his visit, *nan xun*, gave his visit an almost imperial flavor because it was a term used in the past about imperial visits to Chinese provinces. In Shenzhen and Zhuhai Deng was able to appear at the places most closely identified with the economic reforms of the last decade, one facing Hong Kong and the other Macau, both places for which he had negotiated successful returns to Chinese sovereignty.

Deng’s message on the tour was simple and repeated in each of the places he visited: China’s continuing opening up and reform were inevitable and could not be stopped. Those in the party who blamed the events of 1989 on foreign influences and ideas that had polluted the atmosphere of China because of the opening-up policy were wrong. Foreign investment and foreign enterprise were needed in China because they brought badly needed technology and expertise. Without them China’s attempts to modernize were blighted. Problems would arise from time to time, but a government that did not deliver prosperity to its people was no good. The Communist Party would continue to support the reform process and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, a form of Marxism-Leninism adapted and suitable for China’s specific circumstances. Foreign companies were encouraged to continue coming to China and were reassured that as long as they complied by the rules and paid the appropriate taxes, China would be a safe place for them to work.

**From Words to Deeds**

The impact of Deng’s words was almost immediate. Although China had enjoyed reasonable levels of foreign direct investment in the years leading up to this time, the real floodgates opened in 1992, with foreign direct investment climbing year after year to the total of almost $700 billion at the end of 2006. A surge in Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and Japanese investment lay behind this increase, with U.S. and European investment closely following. Deng’s impromptu remarks in each of the cities he had visited on his tour were immediately printed and distributed to party members throughout China. China continued its negotiations to enter the World Trade Organization (it succeeded in 2000) and made two attempts (the first failing, the second succeeding) to host the Olympics. Although groups broadly described as “new leftists” continued to question China’s reform path and the need for such heavy foreign involvement, in the decade that followed Deng’s intervention made it much easier for supporters such as Zhu Rongji or Jiang Zemin to justify what they were doing. It also made crystal clear that economic reform did not mean political reform and that the situation would stay that way for the foreseeable future. Overheating of the economy in the years immediately after 1992, along with the pain caused by state-owned enterprise reform and the mass layoffs this caused, was dealt with by the central government in such a way that major turbulence and disruption were avoided.

Deng’s international image had been badly tarnished by the events of 1989. However, what he had achieved as an old man in 1992 went some way toward rehabilitating his image and reminding people inside and outside China of why he had been so important in China’s development. He made few appearances after 1992 and no more interjections (beyond indicating that he regarded Hu Jintao as a possible successor to Jiang Zemin, a succession that was to happen in 2002–2003). His death in 1997 was marked by genuine grief. The Southern Tour was Deng’s final return to political activity after several falls from power throughout his lifetime.

Although this return to power was not as spectacular as the previous ones, it was, in impact, as great, if not greater, and contributed to the immense economic success of China in the twenty-first century.

Kerry BROWN

**Further Reading**


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Development Zones
Kāifāqū 开发区

Development zones—special areas for international trade and investment, export processing, and technology evolution—are thriving and driving China’s economy. Administered locally, development zones are the pride and, in many cases, the future of a growing number of Chinese townships, small cities, and counties as they jump on the economic bandwagon.

China created its first development zones in 1984. Their formation intensified the country’s open-door policy and engagement with the outside world. By 1988 China had designated fourteen development zones: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Ningbo, Qingdao, Yantai, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Nantong, Lianyungang, Fuzhou, Minxing, Hongqiao, and Caohejing. All fourteen zones were near coastal cities and placed major emphasis on export processing, technology development, and foreign investment. Operating with tax incentives and entitlements, such as modern infrastructure and high-standard business services, development zones are growing and helping drive the economy.

Concept and Characteristics

The Chinese did not invent the development zone, but they have made better use of the concept than most countries have. Development zones were operating in South America in the early twentieth century. They became more common after World War II in such forms as free ports, free-trade zone, export-processing zones, science and industry parks, and border trade zones. One purpose of these zones was to help rebuild national economies destroyed by war. China modeled its development zones on other countries’ experiences, treating the zones as a new means to open to the outside world. China’s goal was to create an attractive business environment to encourage foreign investment, joint ventures, and technology development and transfer, and to learn advanced management skills.

China’s development zones are similar to its special economic zones (SEZs) but have distinct features. SEZs are relatively independent; their administrative status is equivalent to that of a province’s. Development zones, by contrast, are administered by local governments through a special committee. While SEZs are encouraged to develop into diversified economic structures, development zones focus on exporting, technology, or other special sectors. In SEZs all types of businesses enjoy tax incentives; in development zones tax incentives are offered only for investment in industry and technology or in other designated sectors.

Development zones are usually in or close to areas with well-developed industrial foundations, an advanced economy, and easy access to transport networks. Economic and technological development zones and tax-free zones are normally established in coastal cities and ports, which are advantageous locations for these sectors. Border cooperative zones operate in inland border trade areas. High-tech-development zones are in large or medium-sized cities throughout the country.
Creation and Growth

In 1983 China opened up fourteen coastal cities. In late 1984 and early 1985, the government designated eleven development zones in eleven coastal cities. Two development zones were established in Shanghai in 1986 and another in 1988. During this start-up stage, from 1984 to 1988, the main tasks were to establish an administrative committee to oversee the development zones, as well as the establishment of the Economic and Technological Development Corporation; plan the development zones; prepare and create regulations and policies relating to the development zones; and construct the physical infrastructure.

Different types of development zones have been established since the original type. The first high-tech-development zone was established in Beijing in 1988. Tax-free zones were created in 1990. Development zones have undergone rapid growth, boosted by Deng Xiaoping’s (1904–1997) call in 1992 for further opening up of China’s economy. Since then even small cities, counties, and townships have set up their own development zones.

Achievements and Problems

Although development zones occupy only 0.004 percent of land in China, they account for about 10 percent of the total national foreign investment. More than two hundred international corporations have invested in China’s development zones, effectively advancing technology development and facilitating national economic restructuring. In most development zones, more than 60 percent of the industrial projects are high-tech or new technology projects.

Development zones have helped create rapid growth and high productivity. The gross industrial product in the first thirteen development zones increased about 450 times within their first ten years and had grown to 135 billion yuan (about $20 billion) in 1996.

Some of the early problems associated with development zones included a lack of strategic coordination and effective control in their development. For example, 1992 saw the sudden creation of more than two thousand new development zones, more than twenty times the number created before 1992. Among these, only 1.1 percent were approved by state, province, or city governments. A number of counties, small cities, and townships also established development zones, resulting in uncontrolled expansion and the occupation of some 33 billion square meters (about 13,000 square miles) of land, of which 80 percent was arable.

Change and Challenge

Development zones have played a leading role in China’s economic growth since the 1980s. All types of development zones have generated the highest output in their areas and have become the economic engines for various cities and entire regions. In 2006, 68 percent of the gross domestic produce and 87 percent of the exports in China came from development zones at different levels. But as the global economy began to change in 2008, so did China’s development zones.

Tax standardization for both domestic and foreign enterprises, the strength of the yuan, a tight monetary policy, and stricter land-use policies have all had a direct impact on the big and small enterprises within the zones. Land use, in particular, is a major issue, as more land is needed to grow food for China’s rapidly increasing population and as many development zones have been hard on the land. Some economists believe that the first development zones, although having lived up to their promise, have run their course and a new model is needed to meet the new challenges. The new development zones will have to focus on industrial upgrades and technology, with an eye to environmental concerns.

ZHANG Xing Quan

Further Reading


Ding Ling was one of China’s most popular and productive authors of the twentieth century. She wrote short stories, novels, essays, plays, and parables, totaling more than three hundred works. Her major works described the best and worst of Chinese society. Always popular with the reading public, Ding was both praised and vilified by government leaders during her long lifetime.

Ding Ling, the pen name of Jiang Bingzhi, was born on 12 October 1904 in Linli, Hunan Province. As author and activist, Ding always maintained a deep interest in the struggles of Chinese women. One of the country’s most productive and popular authors of the twentieth century, she was the first writer to portray women liberating themselves in Chinese society. Her collection of short stories, Miss Sophie’s Diary and Other Stories, published in 1927, featured unorthodox young women questioning the feudal attitudes of China, in particular rules governing women’s behavior. Some of her short works are available under a collection titled I Myself Am a Woman: Selected Writings of Ding Ling.

Later, in the 1930s, she switched to novels and became one of the leaders of the new school of leftist literature. One of her best known novels (although unfinished) is Mother. This book is based on her mother’s experiences as a widow raising three children. Ding’s mother was an educator and activist and Ding’s main role model.

Ding’s writings and activism often got her in trouble with the leaders of China. Shortly after joining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1932, she was arrested by the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) government and held in detention for three years. Her husband Hu Yepin, a poet and communist activist, was killed by the Guomindang in 1931.

In 1936 she traveled to Yan’an, the headquarters of the CCP at that time. There she published the well-known essay “Thoughts on the March 8 Festival (Women’s Day),” in which she examined women’s situation and sharply criticized discrimination against them. This made her a target of the Communist Party’s Yanan Forum on Literature and Art in 1942, part of a spirited effort by the party to bring Marxist ideas to the Chinese masses.

Even though she held senior official positions for several years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, she was once again criticized in 1955, and her novels and essays were banned. From then until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, she was either in jail or in labor camps. Nevertheless, she continued to write.

In 1981 Ding Ling, along with other prominent Chinese authors, were allowed to participate in the International Writing Center at the University of Iowa. For four months she wrote, lectured, and met with writers from the United States and other countries. This helped to cement her international reputation.
Despite suffering from diabetes and other ailments, Ding Ling continued writing up to her death in Shanxi Province on 4 March 1986.

SHE Xiaojie

Further Reading

Disability
Cánzhàng 残障

Approximately 83 million individuals in China have one or more disabilities. Much progress has taken place over the past thirty years for China’s disabled population, with the establishment of organizations and networks as well as mechanisms of operation. While individuals with disabilities have started receiving more respect than in the past, services and resources need to be expanded.

In China, individuals said to have disabilities are those who have suffered since birth or who have subsequently completely or partially lost physical, mental, or physiological and psychological functions, which therefore prevents them from performing some or all daily activities normally. Disabilities in China are currently categorized as sensory impairments (seeing, hearing, and speaking impairments), physical impairments, cognitive impairments, and psychological and mental impairments; some individuals have multiple impairments.

Development of Services
Development of services to individuals with disabilities can be roughly divided into three stages: The first stage (1949–1966), from the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, established a system for administering and managing matters such as housing, education, employment, and rehabilitation services for individuals with disabilities. For example, after the founding of PRC in 1949, local governments adopted most homeless individuals with disabilities and housed them in orphanages, social-welfare institutions, or nursing homes, depending on their age and degree of disability. Those who were living in urban areas and who were still capable of working were employed at community and neighborhood workshops and welfare factories (*fu li gong chang* 福利工厂). Welfare factories are organizations that employ specifically individuals with disabilities or individuals who are unable to seek competitive employment as their counterparts in the society. These organizations in return receive government subsidies. Individuals in rural areas were enrolled in collaborative groups (*hu zhu zu* 互助组 *he zuo she* 合作社) in their villages. These groups were administrative units in the 1950s and 1960s in the rural communities that managed daily farming and other activities. The head of these units was usually elected by local villagers in the early days and later was appointed by the supervising government. During this period the second generation of the Chinese version of the Braille system was designed and implemented (the first generation was created in the late nineteenth century), special schools for people with hearing and speaking impairments increased from 41 before 1949 to 266 by 1966, and students receiving special education increased from two thousand to twenty-three thousand at the same time. In addition, associations were formed for individuals who had no or low vision, hearing impairments, and speaking impairments. Government agencies for rehabilitation
services were set up as well as, special sports events, national conferences on disabilities, and a journal for blind or vision-impaired individuals.

During the ten years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the whole country was in chaos and facilities that provided services to individuals with disabilities stopped functioning.

Since 1978 rapid economic reform has brought profound social changes to China, leading to tremendous changes for people with disabilities. Individuals with disabilities are no longer considered useless or a burden to the family or society; they have been recognized for their creativity and spiritual capabilities. The public has shown more understanding, acceptance, and, most of all, respect for individuals with disabilities. At the same time, individuals with disabilities have had more opportunities to show their abilities and their unique and valuable contributions to society. A series of milestone laws and regulations has been passed since 1985 to guarantee the rights of disabled individuals regarding education, employment, housing, accessibility, and services. The creation of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF) in 1988 united associations designated for different disabilities; CDPF became the most powerful voice for addressing the interests of individuals with disabilities and for providing them with program management and services.

Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), China’s leader of economic reform, deserves a special place in the history of the development of disability programs due to his irreplaceable impact on the awareness of disabilities and his contributions to the cause of improving the well-being of the disability population in China. Because of his father, Deng junior was persecuted in 1968 during the Cultural Revolution when he was still a physics student at Beijing University and suffered injuries that left him paralyzed from the chest down. Since the economic reform, he used his special family influence and tax waiver benefits to establish the largest private enterprise of disabilities in China and attracted billions of dollars investment. In 1988, he assumed the first chairmanship of CDPF and stayed in the position for consecutive four terms until November 2008. During his twenty-year long tenure Deng made full use of his special status to promote services and legal rights for individuals with disabilities. Under Deng’s leadership, CDPF has extended and expanded significantly its services and assistance that benefited millions of individuals with disabilities. Meanwhile, the organization also established a national network that can provide effective management and perform advocacy functions for the individuals with disabilities.

Current Demographics

Because of the work of Deng Pufang and his colleagues, disability programs have flourished nationwide along with economic reform in China. According to the preliminary results of the Second National Survey on Disabled Persons (2006), China’s population of people with disabilities was estimated as 82.96 million, which was 6.3 percent of the total population, based on a 2005 census of 1,309.48 million people in China. Out of this

A blind man plays an erhu on the streets of Beijing. A girl, also blind, sits beside him. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN
population with disabilities, individuals with physical impairments made up the largest group (29.1 percent), followed by those with hearing impairments (24.2 percent), visual impairments (14.9 percent), mental or psychological impairments (7.4 percent), cognitive impairments (6.7 percent), and speech impairments (1.5 percent). Individuals with multiple impairments accounted for 16.3 percent.

Among these 82.96 million individuals with disabilities, 51.5 percent were males, and 48.5 percent were females. In terms of age, 4.7 percent of the population was under fourteen (3.87 million), 42.1 percent between the ages of fifteen and fifty-nine (34.93 million), and the remaining 53.2 percent sixty or more years old (44.16 million). Of individuals age fifteen and above, 48.11 million (60.8 percent) were married, 9.82 million (12.4 percent) were unmarried, and 21.16 million (26.8 percent) were divorced or widowed. Regarding place of residence, about a quarter of the disabled population lived in urban areas and three quarters in rural areas. Considering the degree of disability, less than a third (29.6 percent) of the population had first- or second-degree disabilities (more significant) and the majority (70 percent) had third- or fourth-degree disabilities (less significant).

The education levels for the population with disabilities were not proportional to the levels in the general population. Out of the 82.96 million individuals with disabilities, only 1.1 percent received college education, 4.9 percent obtained high school education, 15 percent had junior high education, and about 31.8 percent of the population had only elementary education. Illiteracy was very high, about 43.3 percent.

The 2006 survey estimated that 2.46 million children with disabilities (slightly less than 3 percent of the total population with disabilities) were of school age (ages six to fourteen). Statistics for children receiving education by disability type are presented in table 1.

Regarding employment, in urban areas 2.97 million disabled individuals were employed, and 4.7 million were not; 2.75 million (13.3 percent of total individuals with disabilities in urban areas) received minimum social security benefits, averaging 4,864 yuan a person. In rural areas 3.19 million received minimum social security benefits, averaging 2,260 yuan a person, with 13 percent of this subpopulation having an average annual income below 683 yuan.

### Table 1 Percent of School-Age Children with Disabilities Receiving Formal Education in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disability Type</th>
<th>Total Number with Type of Disability</th>
<th>Percent of the Disability Type Receiving School Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visual Impairments</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing Impairments</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech Impairments</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Impairments</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Impairments</td>
<td>760,000</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental/Psychological Impairments</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Impairments</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,460,000</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The calculation of percentage is based on the 63.2 percent of all children enrolled.


### Services and Outcomes

Programs for disabled individuals in China have been working in the following nine areas of services over the past thirty years: rehabilitation, education, employment and social security, alleviation of poverty, cultural and sports activities, social support, protection of rights, development of information network, and organization construction. According to the report on the implementation of China’s tenth five-year work plan in disability, by 2005 China had 1,662 special education schools, more than 2,700 special classes in regular schools, 3,250 vocational education institutions, 3,048 employment agencies, more than 19,000 rehabilitation service centers, and 2,574 law service centers. As for delivery of services to individuals with disabilities, 6.42 million received rehabilitation services to different degrees, 80 percent of children were enrolled in schools (this percent refers to the individuals who received services), close to 0.6 million received vocational education, 7 million rural individuals came out of poverty, and 5.16 million urban individuals continued to have their basic needs met. In addition, individuals with disabilities have achieved outstanding results in cultural and sports activities in the world.
At the fifth China Disabled Persons’ Federation national congress in November 2008, Deng Pufang updated the figures by reporting that, according to China Daily, the country has 1,655 special education schools, 3,127 employment agencies, and 5,998 law service stops (维权岗, local offices that help individuals with disabilities to protect their rights.) for the physically disabled.

The remarkable performance of Chinese athletes with disabilities in both the 2007 Shanghai Special Olympics and the 2008 Beijing Paralympics demonstrated convincingly the progress of disability programs in China. For the 2008 Beijing Paralympics, a total of 332 Chinese athletes participated in all twenty fields and won eighty-nine gold, seventy silver, and fifty-two bronze medals. The success has motivated millions of individuals with disabilities in China.

### Challenges

The population of disabilities has been widely treated with bias in employment, education, communication and social life. Their average living standard has been below that of the general public. They have been considered one of the disadvantaged groups in China for many years. While great achievements and progresses have been made since 1949, individuals with disabilities still remain one of the most disadvantaged populations in China due to lack of resources and escalating competition in the labor market. For example, the four most wanted services by individuals with disabilities have not been universally delivered. (See table 2.)

How to narrow the gap between the population with disabilities and the general population, how to overcome the barriers to rehabilitation, education, accessibility, communication, and employment; and how to improve the mechanism that helps individuals with disabilities merge into the mainstream are serious challenges that the Chinese government faces in the years to come.

Jean W. Yan

### Further Reading

- The State Council of The People’s Republic of China. (2006). Outline of the work for persons with disabilities during the 11th five-year development program period

### Table 2: Four Services Most Wanted by Individuals with Disabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Percentage Wanting Service</th>
<th>Percentage Receiving Service</th>
<th>Percentage Not Receiving Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Financial Support</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistive Technology</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation Training &amp;</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deng Pufang (son of Deng Xiaoping, who was crippled by the Red Guards) meeting with Ted Kennedy, Jr., then a lawyer advocating for disability rights. Deng Pufang is known for his work protecting the disabled; in 1984 he established the China Welfare Fund for the Disabled. Then he founded and became the chairman of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation in 1988. In 2003, he was awarded the United Nations Human Rights prize for his work. PHOTO BY GEORGE TAME.

Disasters in China, whether natural or man-made, are amplified in magnitude by the size and density of its population. Historically, the Chinese have been reticent to publicize the seriousness and scope of its disasters. Contemporary China is taking greater steps to minimize the effects of disasters through stringent building and environmental regulations while accepting greater amounts of external aid and expert advice.

Described as "a land of floods, fault lines, and food crises," China is certainly not immune to disasters. A quick glance at any top-ten list of historical disasters will reveal China's unfortunate prominence. Whether it is flooding along the Huang (Yellow) or Yangzi (Chang) rivers, earthquakes in Tangshan or Shaanxi, a dam failure at Banqiao, or an industrial accident at Jilin, China has had its share of devastating disasters both natural and human caused. Because of China's geology, geography, and huge population, the country's disasters often take on monumental proportions.

China is also renowned for its secretiveness, which means that often the extent of disasters is unknown as the Chinese government is reluctant to disclose details. Chinese officials, dating far back into history, have craved order, fearing that situations could spin into chaos and result in unintended consequences, especially for political leaders. In 1351 and 1644, the Chinese people rose in revolt against their leaders in the face of severe famine and floods, resulting in the establishment of two of China's greatest dynasties, the Ming and Qing. In the past, Chinese officials, both public and private, have also attempted to deny or cover up disasters, especially the human-caused variety, as was the case following the Jilin chemical plant explosion in 2005. Nevertheless, as the frequency and scope of disasters have increased in the past century, China has had to increasingly allow for greater international scrutiny and assistance not only in its attempts to predict or minimize disasters but also to clean up from them.

Natural Disasters

1556 Shaanxi Earthquake

In the early morning of 23 January 1556, Hua County in Shaanxi Province became the epicenter of an earthquake estimated to have measured 8.0–8.3 on the Richter scale. The quake was so strong that observers witnessed plateaus and plains cracking, mountains moving, trees becoming inverted, hills rising, and valleys sinking. Some witnesses reported that rivers changed direction. Schools, temples, city walls, and government buildings collapsed. The eight provinces surrounding the epicenter were most devastated; however, the effects of the quake were felt in a hundred counties across ten provinces. The stricken area experienced three to five aftershocks during the next
six months, although other reports suggest that the after- 
shocks lingered for nearly three years.

Occurring in a densely populated area with poorly 
constructed houses, the Shaanxi earthquake wreaked 
destruction over an area of 804 square kilometers. Few 
people survived in the 400-square-mile area from the 
epicenter (estimates suggest that three-quarters of the 
people at the epicenter perished). People died not only 
from the quake itself but also from resultant floods, land-
slides, lootings, and from fires that burned for days. Al-
though the method of counting the dead and injured was 
not reliable, estimates put the dead at 830,000, making 
the Shaanxi earthquake the most destructive quake in 
history and the third-most destructive natural disaster in 
history. Many people lived outdoors and were killed by 
falling debris. Many people died when landslides caused 
the collapse of the loess cave dwellings (yaodongs) in the 
Shensi Cliffs (loess is a grayish silt/clay that is not strong 
enough to resist such a powerful movement of the earth). 
People were buried alive.

The best description of the quake was written by a wit-
tness, the scholar Qin Keda, in A Chronicle of the Violent 
Earthquake. Keda not only paints a despairing picture 
of the catastrophe but also provides the earliest sugges-
tions of how people should react to an earthquake— 
suggestions still stressed today. Keda recommended that 
people find a place inside a dwelling or other structure 
that is sturdy and safe so that nothing can fall on them 
and remain indoors after the initial jolt to avoid injury 
from aftershocks.

In the aftermath of the quake people began to rebuild 
their homes, but the construction materials used were 
bamboo and wood—materials that are more flexible and 
better able to withstand the jarring movements of an 
earthquake and that are also less likely to collapse. And 
if they do collapse, they are less dangerous to people who 
are struck by them.

1876 North China Famine

Beginning in 1876 and lasting three years, the worst natu-
ral famine in world history struck five provinces in north 
China: Shantung, Chihli, Honan, Shansi, and Shensi. The 
famine had been preceded by a drought in the previous two 
years and was aggravated by the depletion of grain stocks 
and the provision of grain to the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) 
military campaigns of the 1860s and 1870s, reducing the 
peasants’ ability to deal with drought when it struck.

Experts estimate that in China famine occurred in 
at least one province every year from 108 BCE to 1911 CE. 
Often the famines occurred because of drought or flood. 
This pattern has caused China to be known as the “Land 
of Famine.” The frequent occurrences of famine have 
placed a tremendous burden on the Chinese state, whose 
historical role has been to provide for the general welfare 
of the populace. The state goes to great lengths to promote 
agricultural production while ensuring that the people 
possess both the tools and skills necessary to till the land. 
Unlike the more modern mind-set regarding population 
size, the Chinese have never viewed population growth 
as an impediment to development but rather as a sign of 
prosperity. The Chinese state’s inability to maintain the 
basic needs of the people generally has indicated a failure 
of its fundamental nature.

The Chinese often refer to disasters as tianzai (heav-
enly calamities) except for famine, which is referred to as 
zaihuang, a disaster that results from human interactions 
with nature. A combination of disasters—for example, 
flood-famine, drought-famine—is often interpreted by 
the Chinese to mean that the state has lost the Mandate 
of Heaven.

Compounding the severity of the 1876 famine was the 
rise of European imperialism and its negative effects 
on the Chinese state and agriculture as well as the Qing 
dynasty’s limited response to the unfolding disaster. For 
centuries the Chinese economy had been built on an “in-
dependent peasant economy and smallholder agriculture 
along with exchanges within local markets,” which was 
dermined by “imperial bankruptcy and British aggres-
sions” (Raghavan 2008), not to mention the substitution 
of grain production for opium production, which caused 
food prices to soar. The Qing dynasty was further preoc-
cupied “with international issues [especially European 
encroachment], rising military costs, local disturbances 
in many provinces and the high cost of transferring grain 
via the backward transport system” (Myers 1985, 370) of 
the country. Additionally, the earlier Taiping Rebellion 
(1850–1864) had destroyed some of China’s best farmlands, 
so it is no surprise that the Chinese people regarded 
the series of events leading to the great famine as “Heav-
en’s anger at human misdeeds as the underlying cause” of 
the famine (Edgerton-Tarpley, 2004).
“Heaven’s Anger”
Indeed, “Heaven’s anger” was ferocious. During a two-year period the famine claimed nearly twelve thousand lives per day. The three-year drought affected 100 million people, killing 9–13 million (although official Chinese estimates placed the death toll nearer 20 million). In the five provinces affected, with a total population of 108 million, some areas reported death rates of 60–90 percent. Although the major cause of the famine was drought, the major cause of death was not starvation but rather epidemic disease, particularly cholera and malaria. In a sad irony, the outbreak of disease coincided with improving drought conditions.

The famine challenged the Qing dynasty’s ability to provide for the welfare of its people, methods of relief for famine victims, and long-held Confucian values. At the national level, the government issued little news of the famine and tried to cover up its existence. The government went so far as to forbid foreigners from entering the affected area for the duration of the famine. Nonetheless, foreign accounts and commentaries, made available through translations in local papers, detailed China’s inability to assist its own citizens. These accounts resulted in a growing sense among the Chinese that their civilization, long believed to be at the center of the universe, had failed.

The Qing dynasty had established in the eighteenth century a famine relief system that worked quite well and underpinned the legitimacy of the Qing dynasty. However, by the nineteenth century people began to sense that the government was no longer capable of caring for its people because of the continuous cycles of flood and famine. Adding to the government’s problems in providing relief were bad roads, poor transportation systems, insufficient amounts of relief aid, and corruption. The government also resorted to using the army to massacre peasants attempting to flee rural areas to cities in order to escape the famine. As the government dealt with external preoccupations, the famine was worsened by “the rapid decline in state capacity and popular welfare followed in lockstep with the Chinese Empire’s forced ‘opening’ to modernity by Britain and other countries” (Raghavan, 2). Aid for famine victims would come from the outside and from distant Chinese elites.

However, local leaders resisted outside aid, convinced that such aid and the presence of foreigners to deliver such aid would further undermine government legitimacy, leading to the possibility of rebellion. Nonetheless, foreigners in the affected areas began to organize relief efforts. Those efforts began in London in 1878 and represented the first attempt by foreigners to assist the Chinese people afflicted by famine. Guo Songtao, Chinese ambassador to Great Britain, acknowledged those efforts in a short article published in The Times of London. Foreign missionaries, most notably Timothy Richard of the Baptist Missionary Society, used the relief systems to proselytize and spread the gospel. Foreign relief activity was crucial to establishing the China Famine Relief Fund Committee, designed not only to provide relief in times of famine but also to address the underlying issues of rural poverty and lack of modernization in China.

First Broad-Based Aid Campaign
The relief efforts were the first broad-based public campaign to raise money and provide relief to victims of famine in China. The campaign spurred on foreigners and local elites in China to assist the victims. Criticizing the imperial government’s efforts, local elites assisted others outside of their local territories, putting them in direct competition with foreign efforts. The intersection of relief efforts by a myriad of competing groups in Chinese society—for example, the government, elites, and foreigners—provided an impetus for the emergence of modern Chinese nationalism. However, that nationalism clashed with historical Confucian values.

Extreme disasters, such as prolonged famine, challenge long-held value systems. Traditional Chinese Confucian values, especially the notions of filial piety and female chastity, strained under the immense suffering. As Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley has pointed out, the famine challenged the “definitions of moral & immoral responses” (Edgerton-Tarpley 2008, 121) to disaster. The role of women in Chinese society was either upended or confirmed in the affected areas. Knowledge of people starving, people committing suicide, women selling themselves to obtain money to purchase food, and people sacrificing wives and children for older mothers (and older female in-laws) strained social relationships. Edgerton-Tarpley cites an example of “Shanghai’s merchants and elites using female images of famine to motivate the Chinese to rescue women in order to prevent the Chinese from national humiliation” (Edgerton-Tarpley,
2005). Ultimately the famine would deal another blow to traditional Confucian values in a country already under attack from the modernizing forces of the outside world.

1931 Yangzi & Huang River Floods

“The deadliest natural disaster ever,” “the worst disaster of the 20th century,” “the greatest disaster in China’s history,” “the deadliest water-related disasters in human history” (Harnsberger, 2002): All of these labels have been attached to the massive flooding of the Yangzi and Huang rivers in central China that occurred from July to November 1931. Central to Chinese life and economy, the Yangzi and Huang rivers have also been central to the history of Chinese disasters. The Yangzi, flowing 6,300 kilometers and literally dividing China in half geographically, has been at the center of a debate about flood control since the beginning of the twentieth century.

The most controversial response to the flooding problem has been construction of the Three Gorges Dam, which began in 1994 and will be completed in 2011 with installation of the final electrical generators. The Huang River, whose length is more than 6,100 kilometers, has produced more than fifteen hundred floods in 3,500 years and is responsible for killing the most human beings in natural disasters, thus its nickname “China’s Sorrow.” At the time the 1931 floods received scant attention from the world press because they occurred within the context of a civil war raging in China between the Communists and nationalists, an invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese, and a world gripped by the Great Depression.

A confluence of weather-related incidents preceded the floods. A drought in the region, combined with heavy snows in the winter of 1930–31, severe thawing in the spring of 1931, and rains in the summer of 1931 that dropped nearly one-half of central China’s annual precipitation in one month, caused extreme rises in the rivers’ waters. More important, the region was struck by seven cyclones in July alone, a month that generally averages only two cyclones. The additional waters not only caused the main rivers to rise but also caused the nearly seven hundred tributaries to swell, setting the stage for a calamity. The flooding affected an area of 112,000 square kilometers, covering some of China’s most fertile farmland. In places the flood waters were 3–4.5 meters deep and kept the affected area flooded for three to six months. Damage estimates ranged from $1.4 billion to $2 billion (in 1931 dollars). The floods left 40 million people homeless and an estimated 400,000 to 4 million people dead. There were also unconfirmed reports of people selling their wives and daughters and practicing infanticide and cannibalism. The worst tragedy of the floods occurred on August 25, when the water in the Grand Canal collapsed the dikes around Gaoyou Lake, drowning 200,000 people.
In response to the disaster the Chinese government committed $600,000 in relief aid, while the American Red Cross offered $100,000. Emperor Hirohito of Japan personally donated $27,000 to aid survivors; two months later, on 18 September, his armed forces invaded Manchuria. The League of Nations offered the use of its epidemiologists to stem the resultant spread of diseases, while the U.S. Navy helped to reestablish communications between the city of Hankow and Shanghai. The famed U.S. aviator Charles Lindbergh assisted in relief operations. The Chinese government’s National Flood Relief Commission embarked on a rebuilding program that included constructing new dikes, levees, and retention basins, although the work took nearly twenty years to complete. After 1950 the government also undertook programs to improve the main river protection systems, including flood warning and evacuation plans as well as better controls to minimize the spread of diseases.

1976 TANGSHAN EARTHQUAKE

On 28 July 1976, coal miner Li Yulin drove an ambulance for six hours to Beijing to inform leaders of the central government that the city of Tangshan had been destroyed by an earthquake. Scattered throughout the country were five thousand earthquake-monitoring locations, installed after the 1966 Xingtai earthquake to detect seismic activity and to alert officials. However, the system failed on this day in 1976. Lasting about fifteen seconds, the earthquake struck Tangshan in the early morning when nearly all of its inhabitants were asleep. Chinese officials initially remained silent about the disaster, although the international community was aware, because of seismographic readings, that a devastating quake had occurred.

A city of 1 million people located in Hebei Province 160 kilometers southeast of Beijing, Tangshan was China’s largest producer of coal as well as a steel center manufacturing engines, trains, and heavy machinery. The Tangshan quake is believed to have been the worst earthquake in the twentieth century and the second-worst earthquake in history behind the Shaanxi quake of 1556.

The Tangshan quake registered 7.8–8.3 on the Richter scale. The calamity was described as follows: “the ground turned clockwise for a few seconds, then counterclockwise, then thrust upward” (Spignesi 2005, 48). Almost immediately 650,000 homes were destroyed, along with hospitals, train tracks, bridges, industrial plants, reservoirs, electrical lines, water pumping stations, and factories. The loss of the city’s infrastructure hampered rescue efforts. The damage was compounded the next day by an aftershock measuring 7.1. The damage occurred within a 30,000-kilometer area and was felt over one-third of the country. As it had in the Shaanxi earthquake, the quality of building construction played a major role in the Tangshan devastation. The quake intensity measured XI on the Mercali scale—another scale, with a range from I to XII, used to measure earthquake force—but the buildings were designed to withstand shocks of only VI on the scale. Nearly 85 percent of Tangshan’s buildings were located on the unstable Luanhe River’s floodplain. The ground underneath the buildings was literally liquefied by the tremors.

Death Count Disputed

Deaths were largely caused by injuries and disease. Approximately 80 percent of the deaths occurred because victims were buried under debris, unable to dig themselves out or to survive until rescued. To this day there is not an accurate total of the dead because the Chinese government refuses to release a final tally. Officials initially calculated the number of dead at 655,000 but in 1979 lowered the number to between 240,000 and 250,000. In The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976: An Anatomy of Disaster, the authors, officials of the State Seismological Bureau, pinpointed the number of dead at 242,919. Outside experts have disputed the government’s numbers, arguing that the total may have been closer to 750,000. Regardless, the government, after a few days’ delay, mounted a massive rescue and relief operation. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sent 150,000 troops to the area; however, the troops were improperly equipped and were forced to dig with their bare hands, thus slowing rescue operations. Nearly four hundred aircraft per day operated in and out of the quake zone, and 160 special health-care trains provided medical assistance. The government even sprayed disinfectant to stem the spread of disease.

The overall damage was estimated at $1.25 billion (10 billion yuan). Ultimately officials decided to rebuild the city on the same location at a cost of nearly $8 million. The project took nearly ten years. The rebuilt Tangshan reflected the overall design of the city and the construction...
of buildings suitable to an earthquake zone. Buildings were constructed of materials such as reinforced concrete to better withstand earthquake forces. The better building practices were incorporated into an updated seismic design code released in 1978. The updated code was designed to reduce deaths and injuries in the event of another earthquake by creating wider and safer spaces between buildings, reducing congestion to facilitate access by rescue vehicles and heavy machinery needed for rescue operations, and creating more parks and open spaces that can accommodate temporary shelters or hospitals for the displaced or injured. Guidelines for rescue and recovery operations also were updated. Planners recognized that rescue workers need appropriate equipment, that the control of the flow of traffic is essential to permit heavy equipment access to a disaster zone, and that city planning needs redundancy in the “lifelines”—for example, roads, bridges, water, and electrical supplies—to avoid the shutdown of infrastructure needed for relief and rescue operations.

**Improved Response**

New policies also called for moving the displaced population into permanent dwellings as early as possible to minimize the economic, social, and psychological effects from a quake. Lastly, the bureaucratic processes for warning local populations of an impending quake were revised. Last-minute warnings had preceded the Tangshan quake, but officials had too little time to process the information and warn citizens. For future disasters local revolutionary committees were given the authority to warn citizens directly without the delay of channeling information through China’s vast state bureaucracy.

Socially, the Tangshan quake reinforced in the minds of many Chinese the traditional notion that natural disasters foretell the death of emperors and political leaders. Occurring in late July, the earthquake preceded the death of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong by seven weeks (Mao died 9 September 1976). Politically, the quake hastened the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The death of Premier Zhou Enlai in January 1976 and the feebleness of Mao set off a power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party. Leaders attempted to use the disaster in Tangshan to demonstrate the strength of their leadership. They refused international assistance, instead choosing to organize a “Resist the Earthquake, Rescue Ourselves” campaign to assist victims of the quake. The Gang of Four saw the disaster as an opportunity to “display the socialist system’s superiority of being self-reliant” (Xinhua News Agency, “30 years after the Tangshan Earthquake”). Jiang Qing (Madame Mao), a member of the Gang of Four, spoke on state radio not to remind the Chinese people that China’s immediate priority was Tangshan but rather to denounce Deng Xiaoping, one of the leading reformers calling for modernization. Deng would become China’s premier in the 1980s and 1990s.

Upon Mao’s death Hua Guofeng ascended to the chairmanship of the Communist Party. Hua received overwhelming public support largely because he made a personal visit to the Tangshan disaster area. Hua had the Gang of Four arrested, put on trial, and imprisoned, effectively ending the Cultural Revolution and ushering in a new era of openness and economic growth for the country.

**2008 SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE**

China’s deadliest earthquake since the 1976 Tangshan earthquake struck at 2:28 p.m. on 12 May 2008, in Sichuan Province. Nearly 15 million people lived in the quake zone, which is also home to the Wolong Nature Preserve, the largest panda bear reserve in China. The reserve was nearly 80 percent destroyed or damaged, threatening China’s national symbol. Registering 8.0 on the Richter scale, the quake was felt as far as 1,500 kilometers away in Beijing as well as in the neighboring countries of Taiwan, Vietnam, and Thailand. More than 21,000 aftershocks were reported as of June 2008, according to the China Earthquake Administration. The hardest-hit area was within 100 kilometers of the epicenter, with nearly 80 percent of structures destroyed in smaller cities and villages. Bridges collapsed, dams cracked, schools crumbled, and 3.5 million homes were destroyed. The Chinese government mobilized 130,000 soldiers, police officers, and relief workers to assist those most affected by the destruction.

The State Council of Information reported that as of early July 2008 the toll stood at 69,195 dead, 374,176 wounded, and 18,389 missing. The number of people evacuated from the quake zone reached 1.5 million, but 14 million survivors needed to rebuild their homes.
Transparent and Personal

As has been the case after previous disasters, Chinese society underwent political and social transformations after the Sichuan earthquake. The official response to the disaster was more transparent and personal than responses of the past. Media coverage of the quake was immediate, ongoing, and open. The state news agency, Xinhua, not only broke the story but also regularly updated the casualty figures and news on rescue and relief operations. The news agency also provided the first-ever announcement of the number of estimated dead. Chinese Central Television initiated live, nonstop coverage—an unprecedented action for a natural disaster in China. Home videos, cell phone pictures, and personal commentary flowed unrestricted onto websites. The State Central Propaganda Department initially ordered that journalists could not enter the quake zone; however, two Chinese journalists from The Oriental Morning Post, Yu Song and Wang Jialang, ignored the order and filed the first unofficial accounts of the quake along with images. Their actions forced the propaganda department to rescind its order.

In another surprising action, albeit on a more personal note, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, China’s leading political figure, flew immediately to the earthquake zone to direct rescue and relief operations. “Grandpa Wen” declared a “people first” policy in stark contrast to official response to the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, when Communist Party officials first denied the quake, then attempted to cover up its severity, instead focusing the Chinese people’s attention on denouncing Deng Xiaoping, one of the leading reformers calling for modernization. However, Wen’s action is not unprecedented: Prime Minister Hua Guofeng had made a personal appearance at the site of the 1976 Tangshan quake.

Police set up roadblocks outside the Sichuan zone to facilitate the donation of cash and other gifts for the survivors as well as to monitor the flow of “volunteers (upwards of 10 million people) from as far away as Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou” (Xinhua News Agency, “From Tangshan to Wenchuan”) who streamed into the disaster area. Foreign and domestic donations to aid quake victims surpassed $6.4 billion. The government established the biggest charity fund ever to handle the stream of donations. Xinhua reported that “the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) announced ... that it has provided 8.06 billion yuan (1.17 billion U.S. dollars) in loans to companies and public utilities for reconstruction ... The ICBC, the country’s largest lender, also said it had signed a financing agreement for supporting reconstruction projects with the municipal government of Chengdu,
the capital of Sichuan Province. China’s financial agencies had issued a total of 52.95 billion yuan in reconstruction loans for quake-stricken areas by Sunday, of which 44.6 billion yuan went to the hardest-hit Sichuan. Meanwhile, the government allocated 54.82 billion yuan to a disaster relief fund, including 49.71 billion yuan from the central budget and the rest from local budgets” (Xinhua News Agency, “ICBC provides . . .”).

In another first, the nation’s blood banks filled to capacity, and additional donors were instructed to wait before donating.

**Foreign Rescuers Admitted**

In addition to cash donations, the Chinese government accepted rescue teams from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, thus reaping the additional consequence of improved relations between the donor countries and Beijing.

In response to the disaster the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development released new standards for school construction. The government also imposed price controls on food and transportation within the quake zone to prevent profiteering. The government also agreed to pay the medical expenses of those injured or affected by the quake. Communist Party officials organized mental-health case workers in a first-ever attempt to provide mental and psychological services to victims of a disaster. The government also ordered that flags be flown at half-staff throughout the country to honor the victims of the quake—the first time that ordinary people have been honored in this fashion. A period of national mourning was declared from 19–21 May, and all public events, including the 2008 Olympic Games torch relay, were suspended.

The most closely followed story resulting from the quake’s destruction was the fallout after ten thousand schoolchildren were killed when more than seven thousand schools collapsed. The deaths of so many children led to public protests against faulty school building construction, negligence, and allegations of corruption. (Since 2001 the Chinese government has allocated more than $1.5 billion to repair and upgrade schools; however, school construction codes are rarely enforced.) The Chinese government launched an investigation into the charges but attempted to keep the investigation low profile. The government, aware that rural schools are highly susceptible to damage from quakes, asked Chinese news organizations to discontinue their reporting on unsafe schools. The unusual public demonstrations by parent-protesters resulted in violent clashes with police and arrests. In response to protests by parents who lost their children when schools collapsed, the government issued checks for $144 to parents whose children were killed. This payment is the usual subsidy provided under China’s “one-child policy,” a subsidy distributed when parents reach age sixty. The government promised additional monies when the government investigation establishes additional human negligence regarding school construction. The government also agreed to provide compensation for any children injured in the quake. These monies are crucial because without children Chinese parents, lacking an old-age safety net, face potentially heavy burdens of care in their old age. China has been forced to suspend its “one-child policy,” a policy begun in the late 1970s to address China’s population explosion. The government updated the policy to exempt families with children who were killed or injured by the earthquake, and that these families would need only to obtain a certificate permitting them to have another child. Furthermore, families who lost a child in the quake are now permitted to adopt, without limitations, any of the four thousand estimated orphans whose parents were killed in the quake. The adoption of quake orphans will not affect any future births under the one-child policy, which is still in place for families not affected by the quake.

**Man-Made Disasters**

**1975 Banqiao Dam Collapse**

Rain began falling in Henan Province on 5 August 1975, the result of a typhoon that had swept in from the South China Sea. In the next three days 1,060 millimeters of rain fell. At 1 a.m. on 8 August the Banqiao Dam, located on the Ru He River, collapsed, caused in large part by the lack of excess capacity in the reservoirs of the Huai River basin to handle the additional water. Seven hundred million cubic meters of water were released, creating a wall of water 6 meters high and 12 kilometers wide, sweeping away entire villages such as the Daowencheng commune, where 9,600 people were killed. Banqiao’s sister dam, the Shimantan on the Hong He River, had collapsed a half

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hour earlier, its reservoir emptied of 120 million cubic meters of water in five hours. Creating a domino effect, these twin walls of water caused sixty-two other dams downstream to fail. The worst dam disaster in human history had begun.

Built in the 1950s after an episode of severe floods, the Banqiao Dam was designed to control flooding in the Huai River basin. "Harness the Huai River" became the official motto for the building program, which was intended not only to control the river and flooding but also to create a reservoir for irrigation and electrical generation. The dam was built where colliding weather systems from north-central Asia and the South China Sea meet. Along with the Shimantan Dam and a series of smaller dams, the Banqiao Dam was designed to withstand a flood the volume of which might occur once every one thousand years. The dam project would serve as the model for the Great Leap Forward campaign to create a large-scale water conservancy program, one whose primary priority was water accumulation and irrigation and whose secondary priority was drainage and flood control. Unfortunately for residents of the Huai River basin, the typhoon that swept into the area was of a magnitude expected to be experienced once every two thousand years. However, despite the confluence of remarkable weather events, the collapse of the Banqiao Dam was attributable largely to human error.

Rainfall Underestimated

The first human error occurred in rainfall prediction. Accurate rainfall prediction by Chinese meteorologists was limited by their lack of scientific knowledge. In early August the Central Meteorological Observatory in Beijing had forecast 100 millimeters of rain. In fact, the rainfall total was 1,060 millimeters. The water levels in reservoirs in the Huai River basin had been kept too high, thus providing little excess capacity to contain the greater rainfall. However, despite the confluence of remarkable weather events, the collapse of the Banqiao Dam was attributable largely to human error.

Experts have concluded that the design of the dam—built (and repaired) with Soviet assistance—was to blame for its collapse. The dam’s construction did not include crucial flood-control devices, such as diversion channels and dikes. During its initial construction cracks in the dam and spillways had appeared, forcing engineers to make repairs. Chinese officials believed that the repairs had allowed for the construction of what they termed an “iron dam”: a dam that would not collapse regardless of the situation. Furthermore, the construction of the dam was hurried in order to meet official target dates. However, one of China’s senior hydrologists and dam designers, Chen Xing, warned officials of dangers to the dam. Most important, in the original design the Banqiao Dam was to include twelve sluice gates (artificial channels that allow control of the flow of water). However, a local Chinese official overruled Chen, declaring him to be “too conservative,” and lowered the number of sluice gates to five. Ultimately, Chen would be removed from the project because of his constant criticism. As the water levels behind the dam began to rise during 5–7 August, the sluice gates were opened to relieve the pressure of the additional water, but all five were partially blocked by silt and sediment buildup. The rapidly rising water levels, compounded by the inadequate functioning of the spillways, caused the level of the reservoir to exceed the capacity, or height, of the dam, resulting in a condition referred to by dam experts as “overtopping.” The results of this phenomenon are twofold: Either the structural integrity of the dam becomes compromised, or the land on either side of the dam erodes, effectively separating the dam from its earthen anchors. In the case of the Banqiao Dam collapse, the former result occurred. As the millions of cubic feet of water crashed through the dam, one of the dam workers, part of a gang of workers engaged in a futile effort to prevent the dam’s collapse, exclaimed that “the River Dragon has come!” (Qing 1998, 33).

No Warning System

The structural failure of the dam was compounded by the lack of an early warning system and comprehensive evacuation plans. One of the immediate results of the dam’s collapse was the failure of the region’s communication and transportation networks. That failure contributed to the loss of life and the inability of the relief workers, especially troops of the People’s Liberation Army, to reach survivors for nearly two weeks. The floods from the collapse of both dams and the supporting series of dams affected twenty-nine counties and municipalities. The floodwaters spread over 1 million hectares of farmland, causing more than 1 billion yuan ($525,600,000) in damage. A week after the
initial disaster several smaller dams in Henan Province were dynamited to allow the floodwaters to escape farther downriver. The dead resulting from the immediate floods totaled 26,000, while an additional 145,000 died from resultant disease and famine. In all, 11–12 million people were affected by the floods. Six million buildings were destroyed. The absolute numbers may someday be revised after a more careful study of the official documents, according to Wang Yaurong, then an official with the Henan Province Department of Water Resources. The Chinese government suppressed all news of the disaster, in line with a longstanding policy not to publicize disasters because they fall under the category of state secrets. Not even external news agencies reported on the disaster; not until February 1995 did the world learn of the disaster in the Huai River basin when Human Rights Watch published news of the Banqiao Dam collapse in a report on the Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangzi River in Hubei Province.

Exactly what Chinese officials, engineers, and dam designers learned from the Banqiao Dam collapse is difficult to tell. Clearly there was the need for some form of early warning system with safer communication networks and a level of redundancy built into the system in the event of a catastrophic collapse. An academician, Li Zechuan, recommended that a database containing “meteorological, hydrological, environmental protection, forestry and agricultural departments be established to form a uniform environment monitoring network” (People’s Daily Online, 2005). An examination of the design, construction, and support systems of the Three Gorges Dam might offer clues to what was learned from the collapse of the dams. Not to be deterred by the dams’ failures, by 1993 China had rebuilt many of them, including the Banqiao.

2005 JILIN CHEMICAL PLANT EXPLOSION

Nearly 300 million of China’s 1.3 billion people do not have access to clean water. Approximately 70 percent of Chinese waterways are contaminated, and 90 percent of urban water supplies are severely polluted. The safety of water supplies is even more comprised by pollution from China’s factories, especially in the chemical industry. Accidents in the chemical industry were brought into sharp focus in 2005 when an explosion occurred at the Jilin chemical plant.

On 13 November 2005, a blockage formed in a processing tower used in the manufacture of benzene at the Jilin Petrochemical Company, a subsidiary of the government-owned China National Petroleum Corporation in northeastern Jilin Province. An explosion followed, accompanied by a series of smaller explosions, and a cloud of smoke appeared over the plant. Storage tanks erupted, spilling 90 metric tons of toxic chemicals into the Songhua River. The chemicals released were primarily benzene, phenylamine, nitrobenzene, and aniline, which are used in the manufacture of plastics, detergents, pesticides, shoe and floor polishes, and paint solvents. If humans are exposed to them at unsafe levels, dizziness, drowsiness, unconsciousness, and even death can result.

The spill affected not only Chinese citizens living along the Songhua but also millions of others living along the connecting rivers, especially Russians living along the Amur River, which empties into the Sea of Okhotsk. Most immediately in danger were the residents of Harbin, China’s eighth-largest city with 3.5 million residents. Harbin is located 350 kilometers downstream from the Jilin plant and draws nearly 90 percent of its drinking water from the Songhua River. According to the Russian Far East Emergency Department, the spill endangered seventy population centers—a total of 1 million people—along the Amur. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which investigated the accident, the Jilin spill was “probably one of the largest transboundary chemical spill incidents in a river system in recent years” (United Nations Environment Programme 2006, 16).

Plant managers and local political officials initially attempted to keep the spill a secret. As they attempted to dilute the spill by releasing additional waters from a local reservoir, they waited for five days before informing officials in the neighboring province of Heilongjiang and the central government in Beijing. An anonymous source in the Jilin provincial government leaked word of the spill to the China Business News. Eight days passed before Harbin city officials received notification and shut down the city’s water supply, explaining to residents that the pipes were undergoing maintenance. Ultimately, after they had been told that a toxic spill had polluted the river, Harbin officials informed city residents that the water supply would be unavailable for four days; this represented the largest shutdown of a municipal water
supply in recent Chinese history. Chinese Communist Party officials organized water trucks, decorated with banners reading “Love the people—deliver water,” to provide potable water to city residents while soldiers began to dig new wells.

**Notification Delayed Again**

Eleven days after the spill the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) finally notified Russian officials of the spill and of the threat posed to 600,000 Russian citizens living in Khabarovsk, which also depends on the Songhua River for drinking water, as well as the exposure to residents living along the Amur River. Tensions between the two nations rose. The mishandling and denials by business and political officials at all levels highlighted a long-standing practice of placing industry concerns above that of public health. The UNEP report on the accident criticized the Chinese government for its failure to communicate appropriate information to the public, which delayed an adequate response to the catastrophe.

The fallout was swift. Xie Zhenhua, head of SEPA, resigned 2 December 2005. His resignation marked the first time a high-ranking Chinese official was forced out of office because of an environmental disaster. Yu Li, general manager of the Jilin Petrochemical Company, was dismissed on 4 December. Wang Wei, deputy mayor of Jilin who denied that the accident had caused any environmental damage, committed suicide by hanging on 7 December. The Chinese government issued a formal apology to the Russian Federation for the accident. Six people died, and nearly seventy were injured in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.

However, a number of positive developments resulted from the Jilin accident. China and Russia established a joint monitoring program to assess the long-term repercussions from the spill. SEPA invited a team of investigators from UNEP to tour the affected areas, meet with local and national officials to discuss measures taken to address the spill and protect public health, and, according to the final UNEP report, “provide possible advice to the government of China on the environmental disaster prevention in the future” (United Nations Environment Programme 2006, 4). The report assessed the spill and the local response while providing a number of recommendations including: environmental impact studies on water, soil, and air contamination of the affected areas; a comprehensive investigation to determine causes of the spill and assess ways to prevent future disasters; a recommendation that China and Russia provide independent access to the river spill for testing; regular monitoring of water quality; upgraded policy and enforcement of regulations; and acceptance of an offer of continued support from UNEP. Missing from the UNEP report were measures to deal with public health because SEPA objected to including a public health expert on the investigation team. However, SEPA initiated unprecedented actions to investigate businesses, government officials, and individuals responsible for the spill.

**Sanctions Threatened**

In addition, the National Bureau of Production Safety Supervision Administration threatened all chemical plants and state-owned companies with stiff fines for environmental violations. Additionally, any officials who do not cooperate with investigations or are found to have covered up accidents will face severe punishments. China committed to spending $3.3 billion to clean up the spill as well as additional sums to upgrade municipal and wastewater treatment plants to improve water quality. Beijing also issued a directive to local officials to create emergency plans for future environmental incidents. The directive also ordered factories to improve environmental safety standards, stepped up government monitoring of environmental safety at factories along rivers, and required that all new chemical plants be built inland far from waterways and that existing plants near waterways construct holding ponds for contaminated water. Zhou Shengxian, director of SEPA, in a report to the National People’s Congress urged China to improve environmental safety or face catastrophes similar to Jilin. Zhou said China’s astounding economic growth in recent years has polluted the country’s air, water, and soil. His comments focused on the chemical industry because one-half of the 21,000 chemical plants in China are located along the Yangzi River and Huang River, which provide drinking water to millions of Chinese.

However, the new regulations have some flaws. The fines for noncompliance with environmental regulations are so low that offenders are not deterred from engaging in harmful activities (Jilin Petrochemical Company received the maximum fine of $125,000 for the 2005 spill). Local officials are responsible for issuing permits, but
their performance evaluations are still largely based on economic output, so local officials are more likely to keep plants running even if those plants are environmentally suspect. Multinational corporations in China are hiring the better environmental officials away from local companies. Encouragingly, government testing in spring 2006 indicated that water in the Songhua and Heilongjiang rivers had returned to normal levels, although the Russians indicated higher-than-normal levels of chemicals in the Amur River because the spring thaw washed contaminated water into the river. Nevertheless, Worldwatch Institute, an international independent research organization focusing on sustainability issues, concluded that since early 2006 the Chinese central government “shifted its rhetoric from a focus on economic growth at all costs to stressing a ‘harmonious society’ where considerations of development and environment coexist” (Mastney et al., 2006). The Chinese government is engaging in more than mere rhetoric. In a survey conducted in 2006 SEPA investigated 7,555 chemical plants for environmental risk; 45 percent were found to be sources of pollution, while 3,745 plants were ordered to adopt stricter pollution controls, and 49 plants were ordered to move. The problems that confront China in terms of development and environmental safety lie not in the realm of regulations (China has some of the best environmental laws in the world) but instead lie in lax enforcement and outdated plants in the chemical industry. However, Chinese companies, along with government officials, are working to improve plant safety and adherence to environmental standards.

Conclusion

Disasters have been a recurring phenomenon throughout Chinese history. All Chinese, both officials and citizens, have usually mobilized to respond to the crises. The various responses, first established in the classical period, have been based on historical precedents. State responses appear never to have been the same, nor have the consequences of those actions been similar. Regardless of the form or type of disaster, the consequences have usually been accompanied by social and political change. Despite attempts by the Chinese government to keep disasters secret, the outside world has become increasingly aware of China’s disasters and ready to respond and provide assistance. In the contemporary age, the scale of disasters and the inability of the Chinese to keep such disasters from being publicized has caused the Chinese government to be more accepting of foreign aid and relief assistance. The Chinese have also reformed and upgraded their technological know-how to better meet the challenges posed by the reality of continuing catastrophes.

John C. HORGAN

Further Reading


### Natural Disasters and the Mandate of Heaven

In ancient Chinese beliefs, natural disasters were seen as a warning from Heaven that the reign of a ruler was on the verge of collapse. An emperor’s ability to rule was said to reflect the cosmic sanction bestowed on his reign by tianming, or the “mandate of heaven,” which Chinese believed was signified by peace and harmony within his realm. Traditional political philosophers held that moral legitimacy was a vital component of tianming and that if the moral bonds between ruler and ruled were irrevocably violated, the all-embracing forces of “heaven” from which an emperor drew his “mandate” to rule as “the son of heaven” would be withheld and his dynasty would collapse. Before such a fall, it was believed that “heaven” would signal its displeasure with such portents as natural disasters and popular rebellions. “We are informed that when heaven gave life to the human race it instituted rulers to look after its members and to keep them in order,” explains the Han-shu, a first-century history of the former Han Dynasty. “When a ruler of mankind is not possessed of appropriate qualities, or when his administrative measures are not fair, heaven points out these failings by means of calamity so as to give warning of disorders.”


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Since prehistoric times Chinese have tried to predict the future by interpreting oracle bones, signs in the sky, and stalks of plants. The newest form of divination practiced in China is feng shui.

Divination (practices that seek to predict the future) seems to have been common everywhere among human societies since prehistoric times. Primitive hunters presumably used some form of divination to determine which animals to hunt and when, whereas agricultural communities relied on divination to decide when and what to plant. Within recorded history divination has long been important in both China and the Western world.

Chinese practices of divination can be traced back to the oracle bones of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). Animal shoulder blades and, later, turtles’ lower shells (plastrons) were inscribed and heated until they showed cracks, which were then interpreted by a diviner or Shang king. Surviving fragments indicate a belief in a but not personified powers, some identified with forces in nature, such as “the Huang (Yellow) River,” others representing honored ancestors established as spirits.

Collectively, these powers are associated with a celestial force called Tian 天. They were seen to possess power to control all things, as manifested in natural phenomena. Rulers depended on observations of signs in the sky in order to infer the will of Tian. As a result, Chinese astronomical observations were extraordinarily accurate from an early
time, starting in the Shang dynasty, notably recording an
eclipse in 1302 BCE that modern scientists have confirmed.
Around that time the Chinese diviners began dividing the
sky into twenty-eight segments or lunar mansions.

By the time of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) ap-
peals to Tian seemed increasingly impersonal, perhaps
in part because the Zhou usurpers were not likely to look
for favor from the Shang ancestors they had defeated.
Turtle-shell divinations declined because of the use
of new techniques, most notably the divination of stalks of
the yarrow or milfoil plant. This divination yielded six-
line hexagrams to be interpreted via the text Zhouyi 周
易, which in its earliest form seems to have been in use
before 801 BCE. In all these circumstances humans had to
interpret the results.

As of about two thousand years ago, the I Ching 易经,
the outgrowth of the Zhouyi, clarifies the enduring pre-
sumptions on which the traditional Chinese worldview
is based. This text presumes that things are not regular
and predictable but always open to change, a vision of
existence basic to Chinese civilization. As this world-
view posits a world of endlessly shifting forces, it encour-
ages humans to focus very much the strategy and tactics
needed to position themselves fruitfully in such a world.

Divination through the I Ching focuses on two aspects
of a situation: how it is to be interpreted and how it is to
be negotiated. Interpretation is important because things
are never deemed to be perfectly clear; thus the Chinese
tolerate a certain degree of ambiguity in the way they con-
strue any given reading of a situation. Furthermore, divina-
tion through the I Ching not only assumes that everything
changes, but also that everything is connected, so that when
one factor changes, other, related things will also change.

Compared with traditional techniques of divination,
modern science approaches the study of the future by
trusting that what caused events in the past will continue
to do so in the future. Therefore, science interprets events
in a search for general rules that will always apply because
they are presumed to be universal natural laws. The I Ching
classical text follows an opposite expectation. It presumes
that the determining forces in the world are not regular
and predictable but rather are always open to change, a
vision of existence basic to Chinese civilization.

The third and newest form of divination to be prac-
ticed in China is feng shui 风水. This form inspects the
landscape and its prominent features (orientation in
relation to heights of land, water, magnetic fields, points
of the compass) in order to discern places and positions
favorable for human implantations (cities, buildings,
tombs). Traces of such practices are found as early as the
Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), but they became estab-
lished during the Song dynasty (960–1279), when mag-
netic compasses emerged as functional instruments. In
feng shui the diviner sets out to determine emplacements
favorable for the movement of vital energy (qi moves most
naturally along winding paths) and to protect against de-
structive forces (sha, 影, is at its worst when moving along
straight lines). In recent centuries diviners have produced
elaborate compasses that bring together many kinds of
Chinese cycles (yin/yang, 5 phases, 8 trigrams, 12 zodiac
animals, 28 lunar mansions, 64 hexagrams, and so on).
The function of these different divinatory contexts was to help read the current cyclical situation of any particular place in Chinese space.

Although feng shui was publicly discouraged in the middle of the twentieth century, it has not disappeared, finding new acceptance in Western society as well as flourishing in Singapore and elsewhere Chinese have emigrated. Now, there are signs of a revival of interest in feng shui in the People’s Republic of China.

Another form of divination that traces its roots back to ancient China is less formal, but perhaps more widespread than any of the others mentioned above. The phenomenon of “luck-language” is a linguistic feature of Chinese and is based on a survival of classical Chinese isomorphism concerning the relation of words to the world. In that relationship, words are seen as activating energies that may influence what actually happens in the world. This effect is launched through similarities in sound. In Chinese, there are many words that sound alike but have different meanings (homophones). For example, the number 4 四 is pronounced sì, with a pronunciation that varies only in tone from the word for death (sǐ, 死), therefore relating, at least orally, the number 4 to death. In such a worldview, any unnecessary evocation of the word for death, even if only in the mind’s ear, may seem to increase the likelihood of death-related events. Hence it would be prudent to avoid these words whenever possible.

The same implication holds on the positive side of luck-language: the fish as a traditional motif in New Year celebrations depends on the identical pronunciation of fish (yu, 魚) and surplus (yu, 余). If there is even a slight chance that associating one’s festivities with fish will encourage prosperity in the new year, why not?

All these Chinese word-world associations can be understood in a very different way as implicit expressions of respect for the fact that there are limits to what humans can control in a world that is defined in terms of larger, invisible forces shaping what happens to and around them. Indeed such a worldview is central to the I Ching and may be said to constitute a fundamental presumption of Chinese divination tradition in general.

John G. Blair and Jerusha McCormack

Further Reading
DONG Qichang

Dǒng Qíchāng 董其昌

1555–1636  Ming dynasty painter, art critic, and official

Dong Qichang, born in Huating (present-day Songjiang, Shanghai), was a distinguished Ming painter, calligrapher, art critic, and official whose landscape paintings were noted for their simplicity and elegance. Both his art theory and his practice would have a lasting impact on the development of Chinese art.

Dong Qichang studied from 1570 to 1580 with a circle of scholar-officials, artists, and collectors in and around his hometown of Huating (now Songjiang, Shanghai). In 1589 Dong placed second in the national huishi (metropolitan exam). Subsequently he was appointed as a bachelor of the imperial Hanlin Academy, a membership that was virtually a prerequisite for those ambitious scholars, including Dong, to rise to high political positions. Eventually Dong was promoted to be the court libushangshu (director of the Department of Rituals). He also briefly tutored the crown prince of the Ming emperor Wanli (reigned 1573–1620).

Dong's acquaintanceship with other high scholar-officials helped him gain access to fine collections of ancient Chinese art, particularly landscape paintings of the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE). Dong, painting with ink on a paper scroll, gradually developed his own style, alternating a dry brush for shading and rubbing to contrast the effects of a wet brush. Dong's favorite subject was landscape. He painted scenes that were not true to life but rather showed deliberate dissonances in the relationship between foreground, middle ground, and background; he effectively flattened space so that mountains, trees, and rocks functioned less as representational forms than as semi-abstractions. Using fresh, moist ink he accentuated the diagonal lines of a composition to evoke the varied texture of rocks and mountains. Although Dong would occasionally include a hut or studio in his paintings, he avoided human figures.

Dong's overall painting style could be divided into earlier and later paintings. The early paintings often contained monumental mountains that rose almost to the top of the scroll. The meandering ridges of the central mountains directed the viewer's eyes upward toward the apex. An emphasis on gaoyuan (high extension) was obvious. Dong's later paintings, by comparison, reduced the contrast of height between the central mountain in the background and the lower mountain in the foreground. The broadness of the solid mountains suggested the vastness of nature. Led by Dong Qichang, the circle around him was later called the “Huating school of painting.”

Dong was also accomplished in calligraphy, long considered the highest form of artistic expression in China. He excelled in cursive and running scripts. His calligraphy synthesized styles of the Tang (618–907 CE), Song (960–1279), Jurchen Jin (1125–1234), and Yuan (1279–1368) dynasties but was unique in its simplicity, elegance, and straightforwardness. Dong introduced certain terms that had evolved to discuss the expressive properties of brushstroke and composition in calligraphy into the criticism of painting, such as opening and closing, rising and falling, and the balance between solid and void.

Dong preferred learning from the ancient masters to copying from nature. He argued that the literati painting
(a style that melded poetry and calligraphy with painting) satisfied "scholarly taste." In his view literati painting expressed the painter’s personality. Focusing on the mind rather than on the skill (and echoing Ming philosophy—which held that the mind, not the physical world, is the basis of reality), literati painting paralleled the spontaneity of the Southern Chan Buddhist school. Dong downplayed often decorative court painting, with its emphasis on technical skill, which according to him fell into the category of "sweet vulgarity." This twofold division correlated with the Chan Buddhist distinction of the Northern and Southern schools (conservative and progressive, respectively; their classifications had nothing to do with geography).

Dong Qichang’s artistic theory and practice had a lasting impact on the development of Chinese painting and calligraphy until modern times.

**Yu JIANG**

**Further Reading**


DONG Zhongshu
Dǒng Zhòngshū 董仲舒

C. 195–105 BCE  Han dynasty philosopher and statesman

Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 was the most influential exponent of Confucian thought during the Han 漢 dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). For almost two millennia, Confucianism was sustained by the textual canon, educational institutions, and spiritual ethos developed by Dong and elaborated upon by his successors.

Dong Zhongshu was the most influential force in proliferating Confucian thought during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and beyond. He created a religious rationale for the authority and structure of the then new imperial Chinese state, thus renewing a tradition of theological justification for dynastic power begun when the Zhou conquered the Shang in the eleventh century BCE. For almost two millennia, Confucianism was sustained by the textual canon, educational institutions, and spiritual ethos developed by Dong and elaborated upon by his successors. Without Confucius (551–479 BCE) there would be no Confucianism; but without Dong there would be no Confucianism as it has been known for the past two thousand years.

Ill-Fated Times
Dong was born in what is now Hengshui in modern Hebei Province, a region previously known as the kingdoms of Yan and Zhao. Before the unification of China by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), Yan, Zhao, and other warring states were embroiled in a prolonged struggle for mastery of the empire lost by the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE) to “barbarian” invasions. During this time “one hundred schools” (baijia) of thought proliferated, laying the foundation for every major philosophical and religious tradition in China except Buddhism. While baijia thinkers disagreed intensely on nearly everything, they were in agreement on two points: that the lost empire of the Zhou must be reunified under a single regime and that intellectual and spiritual pluralism was a sign of living in ill-fated times. Ironically, it was the profound cultural ferment of this era that later facilitated the emergence of a new imperial order as well as Dong’s accompanying intellectual synthesis.

Classical Scholarship
Later writers credit Dong with phenomenal dedication to learning, citing the example of his having shut his windows for three years to study indoors without distraction. Dong was an assiduous student who absorbed both Confucian and non-Confucian influences.

These included the yinyang school, which claimed that all cosmic processes were deeply interconnected and could be understood in terms of the interplay between dynamic forces of yin (characterized as dark, female, moist, and receptive) and yang (characterized as lucid, male, arid, and active) at all levels of being. Other theories presented a similar cosmology but argued for the interaction of five agents, or elements or phases (wuxing)—fire, water, earth, wood, and metal—as determinative of cosmic
processes. Such correlative cosmologies implied that the smallest of human actions could affect cosmic processes and vice versa. Many baijia thinkers used such cosmologies to appeal to rulers, who, they argued, could exploit cosmic forces for the benefit of the state. At the time most Confucians eschewed such thought.

Like his forerunners at the Han court, Lu Jia (?–170 BCE) and Jia Yi (201–168? BCE), Dong won favor with the Han regime not for his Confucian convictions but by writing scathing critiques of the preceding Qin dynasty. At that time Confucianism never had received state support and, in fact, was viewed with suspicion. Like their Qin predecessors, the early Han rulers favored a combination of political philosophy and mystical spirituality known as Huang-Lao (a name taken from Huangdi, the mythical Yellow Emperor, and Laozi 老子, the legendary sage) and thus repressed Confucianism. Nonetheless, during the reign of the sixth Han emperor, Jingdi (reigned 156–141 BCE), Dong received official preferment. Jingdi was enamored of the so-called Daoist text known as the Laozi and thus resistant to Dong’s Confucian agenda. At one point Dong’s writings were interpreted by Jingdi as seditious, and he was imprisoned and sentenced to death but pardoned and released soon afterward.

**Revival of Confucianism**

Dong found his patron in Jingdi’s successor, Emperor Wudi (reigned 140–87 BCE). Wudi’s predecessors had faced challenges to their power from various rebel movements, and their own dynasty won power by rebelling against the Qin regime. At the same time, Confucians and other baijia thinkers argued that Heaven (Tian) not only brought down the Qin but also elevated previous regimes (particularly that of the Western Zhou) to power. Young, insecure, and new to the throne, Wudi was eager to demonstrate not only that Tian had given its mandate (ming) to the Han but also that Tian’s blessing still guided the dynasty.

Dong responded to this politicoreligious challenge by turning to a text, supposedly authored by Confucius, known as the Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn Annals), which purports to chronicle events in Confucius’s home state of Lu between 722 and 481 BCE. In the Chunqiu Dong discerned Tian working hand in hand with various human actors (typically virtuous rulers, moral ministers, and other Confucian exemplars) to keep the cosmos in balance by harmonizing its constitutive powers and processes (yinyang, wuxing). In effect, Dong reread pre-Han chronicles through a cosmological lens, such that heavenly norms could be seen interacting with human history, with crucial lessons for his own time. When one reads...
Dong’s description of the ideal ruler, it is not difficult to understand why Dong’s interpretation won imperial support: “As for the one who appropriates the mean of Tian, Earth, and humankind and takes this as the thread that joins and connects them, if it is not one who acts as a king, then who can be equal to this task?”

Dong’s arguments persuaded Wudi to terminate imperial sponsorship of non-Confucian traditions and appoint Dong to various high offices. Between the 130s and 120s BCE, Dong was able to recommend several pro-Confucian policies, which Wudi promptly implemented: the canonization of ancient texts favored by Confucians as the Five Classics (wujing), the state subsidy of Confucian scholarship, and the establishment of a Grand Academy (taixue) dedicated to the training of Confucian bureaucrats for service in the imperial government. By the end of the first century BCE, approximately three thousand students were enrolled in the academy, and the number exceeded thirty thousand by the end of the dynasty. Both the first-century CE Qian Hanshu (History of the Former Han Dynasty) and the third-to-sixth centuries CE compilation Chunqiu Fanlu (Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals) preserve some of Dong’s most important writings.

Dong’s Surviving Vision

In 1330 a tablet displaying Dong’s name was installed in state-sponsored Confucian temples alongside the tablets of other Confucian exemplars. Texts and tablets both serve to underscore the monumental significance of Dong within Chinese cultural history. His vision of harmony between cosmos, morality, and government lives on today in contemporary Chinese political discourse.

Jeffrey L. RICHEY

Further Reading


Having had many names in history, Duanwujie 端午节, known as the Dragon Boat Festival in the West, is celebrated by racing in boats shaped like dragons and by eating a special dumpling called zongzi. The festival is now popular in many countries in Asia and in Chinese communities elsewhere; dragon boat racing has become a favorite sport around the world.

What Westerners know as the Dragon Boat Festival is one of the most important traditional Chinese festivals. The date of the festival is determined by the Chinese lunar calendar and falls on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month. On 18 December 2007, the Chinese government made the festival an official three-day holiday with paid leave.

Custom

The festival has had more than two dozen names throughout history, including Duanyangjie (First Yang Festival), Wurijie (Festival of the Fifth Day), Aijie (Festival of Wormwood), Chongwu (Double Five), Wuri (The Fifth Day), Xiajie (Summer Festival), Duanwu (Fifth of the Month), and Wuyuejie (Festival of the Fifth Moon). Only two names are used today, Duanwujie and Wuyuejie, the former being literal and the latter colloquial.

The celebration of Duanwujie involves a number of activities, varying from region to region, the most prevalent of which is racing colorful boats shaped like dragons. Others include making and eating zongzi (a glutinous rice dumpling wrapped in bamboo or reed leaves) and contests that involve standing eggs on their ends on the ground. In addition, to ward off disease, people decorate their houses with aromatic herbs like sweet flag and wormwood leaves, drink realgar wine (a reddish-orange ore of arsenic common in traditional Chinese medicine), take a walk in the country, wear scented sachets, and put up exercising signs inside and outside their houses. In the region where the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi meet, there is a tradition of parading land dragon boats from village to village. The villagers believe that the boats are capable of expelling plagues. Eating zongzi and racing dragon boats have become the most popular activities throughout the Chinese-speaking world, and the egg-standing contest has turned into a popular game for children.

Zongzi is a dumpling whose glutinous rice stuffing can be sweet (usually with jujubes or red bean paste, favored in North China) or salty (with preserved ham or braised pork, well-liked in the south). A zongzi was initially contained in a bamboo tube but is now wrapped in leaves of bamboo, reed, lotus, or banana. Varieties of zongzi, with different stuffings and shapes, are found in supermarkets throughout the country.

Dragon boat racing is the centerpiece of the Duanwujie Festival and is held as a large community event. Different villages send their teams to compete. When the signal to start is given, each team paddles its individually designed dragon boat as hard as it can while its leader rhythmically
beats a drum to coordinate the paddling. Wave after wave of cheers from onlookers on the bank adds to the excitement. In 1980 China listed dragon boat racing as an official national sport.

**Origin**

The name *Duanwu* was first documented sometime in the third century, but the origin of the festival is unknown. There are at least five theories: to commemorate Wu Zixu, (526–484 BCE) a senior official of the state of Wu during the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE); to commemorate Qu Yuan, (340–278 BCE) a poet and statesman of the Chu state in the Warring States period (475–221 BCE); to celebrate the Chinese dragon; to fend off plagues; and to observe the summer solstice.

Wu Zixu constantly admonished the King of Wu for neglecting the danger presented by his long-time rival, the King of Yue. The wrathful King of Wu forced Wu Zixu to commit suicide and had his body thrown into a river. According to a legend mostly circulating in Suzhou, people raced their boats to where the body fell and tried to save it from the mouths of fish by throwing *zongzi* dumplings into the water.

Qu Yuan was a poet and statesman who, like Wu Zixu, foresaw the danger of his state being overrun, this time by the state of Qin, and never hesitated to warn the King of Chu against the imminent peril. He, too, incurred the wrath of his king, who banished him from the court. In despair Qu Yuan threw himself into the Miluo River. As told by popular legend in what are today the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Hunan, people did the same thing they did for Wu Zixu—threw dumplings in the water—in the hopes of saving Qu Yuan’s body from the nibbling fish.

Though living two centuries apart, Wu Zixu and Qu Yuan died on the same day, the fifth day of the fifth lunar month. The date of Wu Zixu’s death might be accidental, but some believe that Qu Yuan’s was intentional, including Liu Shilin, associate director of the Miluo Municipal Qu Yuan Memorial. He argues that the Duanwu Festival was originally a day to worship dragons, which were believed to have the power either to cause or to prevent natural disasters. Qu Yuan, who was so proud of his birth in the year of the dragon, would most probably choose a day of dragon worshiping to die so he could be carried into heaven by this magic animal.

The tradition of dragon boat racing is said to be 2,500 years old. The first written record of a dragon boat was excavated from the tomb of King Xiang (reigned 318–296 BCE).
The Legend of Duanwu jie

Qu Yuan’s patriotism deeply touched his people, and his death equally saddened them. Now the only thing they could do to pay their tribute was fish his body out for a proper burial. The Chinese believe that without a body, the soul will have no place to rest in. They raced against time, hoping to retrieve Qu’s body before fish could get hold of it. Suddenly someone came up with the idea of throwing cooked rice wrapped in bamboo leaves into the river so that fish would no longer feed on the body.

The day Qu Yuan died fell on the fifth day of the fifth Chinese lunar month, which has become a festival commemorating him. The rice dumpling, known as zongzi, has become part of the festival’s observance. The act of fishing Qu Yuan’s body has evolved into a tradition of boat racing, and for this reason the day is also called the Dragon Boat Festival.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading


Drama

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Drama
Xiqū 戏曲

Chinese drama—the combination of song, dance, and music creating a whole greater than the sum of the parts—first appeared in the courts of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) and has evolved steadily ever since, employing comedy and tragedy for the enjoyment of rich and poor alike.

The key Chinese theatrical aesthetic of melding into a singular whole the skills of singing, dance-acting, stage combat, and speech techniques with the use of costuming, props, and dramatic storytelling began in court ritual as early as the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). Drawing on the primary theatrical developments—variety shows (baixi 百戯) in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), popular skits and Buddhist storytelling (bianwen 变文) in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), and variety plays (zaju 鐵劇) in the Song (960–1279) and especially in the Yuan (1279–1368), when multi-act plays of literary richness and newly-honed actor skills came to the stage—traditional Chinese opera (xiqū 戏曲) developed in the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties to produce nearly 400 regionally-distinct forms. Spoken drama (huaju 話劇) and “New Theatre” (xinju 新劇) reflected Western influences on dramatic form at the beginning of the twentieth century; the years since 1976...
have seen multiple theatrical exchanges between China and other nations.

Chinese drama has a long tradition. Generally, the highly developed structure of dramatic text created in the Yuan dynasty is considered to have influenced later traditional theater literature. The Yuan dynasty is often cited as the age in which Chinese drama began. Dramatic influences on Yuan drama, however, go back many centuries, beginning in the earliest courts of record during the Zhou (1045–256 BCE).

Drama during the Zhou Dynasty

One of the most important elements of Chinese drama—the performance synthesis of song, dance, and music—first appeared in the Zhou courts. The Liji (Book of Rites) describes performance synthesis as the inherent, correlative relationship between music, movement, emotion, and other aspects of performance wherein the sum of the parts creates a greater whole. Throughout Chinese theatrical history, the aesthetic of melding into a singular whole the skills of singing, dancing, acrobatics, special speaking techniques, and use of costuming, props, and dramatic storytelling has been an identifying feature. Both the Zhou court ritual dance dramas and some of the acts staged by court jesters featured performance synthesis as an inherent element of the dramatic basis of their presentations.

Drama during the Qin and Han Dynasties

In the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) eras, the court ritual of the Zhou was assumed for new purposes, although quite likely revised, and new forms of dramatic entertainment arose in both the countryside and urban areas. Two of the most important forms were based on popular stories. In the dramatically enacted combat scenario of chiyouxi, or Chi You theater, one finds the epic myth of the cosmic battle between the demonic rogue Chi You and the Yellow Emperor (the legendary founder of the Chinese empire). In the second skit, Donghai Huanggong (Duke Huang of the Eastern Sea), a drunken shaman is overpowered by a tiger and killed after displaying a series of magical acts. These dramatic pieces, as well as others, were often performed as part of enormous variety shows (baixi, hundred acts) staged by the courts as part of expensive displays intended to impress foreign envoys. They took the form of circus-like entertainments with costumed performers singing, dancing, and playing musical instruments among equestrian, acrobatic, and magic acts.

Drama during the Tang Dynasty

During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), such skits as Donghai Huanggong continued to be popular presentations in the marketplaces, at court, in temples, and in the homes of patrons. Other favorite dramatic sketches of the Tang included Tayaoniang (Singing-Stepping Woman), in which male and female actors employed song and dance to comically portray the plight of a battered woman married to a drunken, egotistical official. In another favorite, Botou (Setting Matters Right), a son mourns his father, killed by a tiger while journeying through some mountains, using a mixture of monologue and conventionalized movement patterns to portray the father’s ill-fated trip. Similar to these entertainments was canjunxi (adjutant theater), wherein two actors enacted a comic scenario about a corrupt official who steals bolts of silk.

Also during the Tang period, Buddhist monks began to dramatize sermons with the aid of scrolls illustrating Buddhist teachings. This form was called bianwen, or transformational tales, and exhibited not only religious but also historical and social or political contemporary themes. All topics were presented through a mix of literary and vernacular styles, using song, prose, verse, and idiomatic speech. Additionally, chuanqi, or marvel tales, a more literary form composed of short stories with dialogue, originated during the Tang dynasty and initiated a greater interest in using literary stylization in the dramas of developing theatrical forms. Puppet performances may have also played a significant role in the evolution of drama at this time.
Drama during the Song Dynasty

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), dramatic developments began to take place that would distinguish northern from southern forms until the present day. Song zaju (miscellaneous theater), popular in both the north and south, included on a much smaller scale some of the variety-show characteristics found previously in Han baixi. But the primary focus of the presentation was on a central play or sketch. By the time of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), Song zaju was composed of three parts: a curtain raiser, the main comedy, and a comic or variety-show act. A variation of early zaju, known as southern theater (nanxi), also developed at this time, as did ballad forms such as daqu (great song set) and zhugongdiao (various palace tones), which, using direct speech rather than description, alternated song and speech. The Mongol Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234), operating in the north while the Southern Song continued in the south, developed yuanben (courtyard literature), instigating a tradition of crafting texts through writing guilds that collectively worked to craft their scripts of words, song, and music.

Drama during the Yuan Dynasty

Drama flourished during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Some historians theorize that this resulted when the many unemployed literati, ousted from court office in the Mongol conquest and the subsequent political shift against Confucianism, used their free time to write dramas to attack the new government. Yuanben continued in the northern courts, but the most important form to evolve was that of Yuan zaju. The writing guilds of the court infused tremendous literary breadth into zaju, and the compositional form encouraged further development of actor technique, especially in singing. Yuan zaju was divided into four acts, each featuring a soloist. Every act contained several songs, all in a single key, giving the acts a musical unity. Metrical rules were set for the alternation of prose and poetry, with over 80 percent of the ends of lines rhyming. Each act, however, had a rhyme scheme differing from that of the other acts in the play. Additionally, a wedge (a simple song of one or two stanzas) could be placed between acts. Although the song sets (qu) were a primary element, the plots and dramatic dialogue were also rich. Plays often contained forty or more acts and could have been staged in their entirety only over several days. The length of such scripts has strongly influenced presentation until this day. Most modern performances stage only highlights of a drama instead of performing the whole story. In the south, nanxi continued to develop, employing duets and trios to present the alternating lines of sung and spoken dialogue.

Drama during the Ming and Qing Dynasties

In the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), various forms of music were combined with dramatic features of pronunciation, rhyming patterns, and regional singing fashions (alternating song and speech was a common motif), producing new forms. The dramatic texts for these forms included song and musical scores. Some plays were shared, but altered, between forms. Kunqu (Kunshan opera) evolved in this age and is still performed by five
major troupes located in both the north and south of modern China.

In the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), musical systems continued to be melded with regional songs and stories to produce forms such as Beijing Opera, now performed by hundreds of professional and amateur troupes. Between 1895 and 1905, plays using Western themes and traditional Chinese performance forms were introduced and called New Theater (xinju or xinqu). An example is Liang Qichao’s Xin Luoma (New Rome) staged in kunqu form with a theme relating the contemporary government to that of the Italian risorgimento (the nineteenth-century political movement toward Italian unity and the formation of a nation state), with the characters of Dante and Cavour quoting Confucius and Tang poetry. Huaju (spoken drama), essentially Western nonmusical drama, was then imported and translated into Chinese, with favorites being works of Brecht, Shakespeare, and Chekhov. Chinese authors, such as Cao Yu and Lao She, wrote their own plays using this dramatic style.

**Drama in the People’s Republic of China**

During much of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), theater was banished except for eight plays and one ballet. The plays, focused on concerns of workers, were performed in the style of traditional opera but without its elegant costuming. In 1972 the ban on theater was lifted, with traditional and new performances again becoming significant aspects of Chinese culture.

After the 1976 fall of the Gang of Four (the four administrators held responsible for implementing the Cultural Revolution, including Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong’s wife), the “model” operas of the Cultural Revolution were no longer performed. During the next ten years, an open-door policy initiated an influx of foreign drama and theatrical personnel into China as well as an opportunity for Chinese artists to bring Chinese opera to America and Europe. Arthur Miller directed Death of a Salesman in Beijing in 1983, and the Shanghai Kunqu Troupe toured Europe with a kunqu-styled production of Macbeth in 1988. Dramatic developments focused on experimental and social-problem plays. A Jia and other theorists began to elaborate on the result of combining Western schools of acting, especially the Stanislavsky method, with traditional Chinese drama form and with artistic elements taken from ancient Chinese poetics and painting. The result is an evolving style of drama, uniquely Chinese, combining realism and well-defined characters with performance techniques that focus on the actor’s presence.

Many of China’s new works have developed under the auspices of major institutions, such as the Beijing People’s Art Theater. Outside the opera centers in Beijing and Shanghai, Wei Minglun’s absurdist chuanju (Sichuan opera) production of Pan Jianlian, which reexamines the eponymous, traditionally evil heroine through the varying viewpoints of several historical figures, has won international recognition as well as exerting considerable domestic influence. China’s minority groups have also actively produced works of their own. Two well-recognized productions are The Battle of Potala Palace, by the Tibet Autonomous Regional Drama Troupe, and Hello, Standard Bearer, by the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Drama Troupe.

**Dallas L. McCURLEY**

**Further Reading**


Dream of the Red Chamber is universally recognized as China’s greatest novel. Written primarily by Cao Xueqin (c. 1715–1764), this semi-autobiographical novel combines deep psychological insight with sharp social satire, all set in a Buddhist-Daoist mythological framework that emphasizes the futility of human desire, the impermanence of all things, and the complex interplay of illusion and reality.

Cao Xueqin was born into a Chinese family of bond servants for the Manchu rulers. His great-grandfather, Cao Yin, was a personal servant of Emperor Kangxi (reigned 1662–1722), one of the highest officials of the land. However, early in Xueqin’s youth the emperor died, and his successor, the Yongzheng emperor (reigned 1722–1736), turned against the Cao family, stripped its members of their official posts, and confiscated their wealth. The family fortunes took a brief turn upward after the death of the Yongzheng emperor but suffered another purge in 1739. From that time on Cao Xueqin lived in obscurity and poverty in Beijing, where he soon began working on his novel.

Creation of the Novel

Cao Xueqin had a few close friends who appreciated his gift for vivid description and imaginative writing, and he circulated chapter drafts to some of them as he wrote (the novel in its earliest version was called Story of the Stone). One of his relatives, who identified himself as “Red Inkstone Studio” (Zhiyan zhai), made extensive marginal comments on Cao’s manuscript, which Cao himself revised five times before he died in 1764, by which time he had completed at least eighty chapters. Almost three decades later, in 1792 Gao E and Cheng Weiyuan published the first printed version of the newly titled novel, Dream of the Red Chamber, in 120 chapters. They claimed they had found a draft of the last forty chapters and had simply edited them into their final form. There has long been a controversy over the authorship of these last forty chapters, but since the late eighteenth century the 120-chapter version as published by Gao E has been the generally accepted version of the novel. The identity of Cao Xueqin as the novel’s principal author was established only in the twentieth century.

Jia Family: Prosperous but Precarious

Cao placed his novel in a mythological framework emphasizing the Buddhist message of the impermanence of all things, the dangers of emotional attachments, and the illusory nature of wealth and high rank. The story focuses on the large, prosperous, and prominent Jia family, whose high position is threatened because most of the men in the younger generation are wastrels with little or no chance to succeed in the all-important civil service examinations. The main protagonist of the story is a young boy who was
named Baoyu (Precious Jade 寶玉) for the precious jade stone found in his mouth when he was born (hence Cao’s original title). Baoyu is often chastised by his stern Confucian father, Jia Zheng 賈政, who desperately wants him to grow up, succeed in the examinations, and continue the family tradition of service in officialdom. Baoyu hates the insipid eight-legged essays (named after the rigid format of eight sections in parallel prose) required in the examinations, and he is literally sickened by the pressures placed on him to memorize the Confucian classics all for the sake of examination success and an official career. Most of the time he manages to avoid studying the classics because he is constantly indulged by his doting grandmother, the matriarch and dominant personality of the Jia family.

Idyllic Life in Grand-View Garden

Baoyu is an odd boy (most likely a self-portrait of the author) who much prefers the company of girls over boys, and he spends most of his time playing with his beautiful young female sisters and cousins and their many personal maids. When Baoyu’s eldest sister, Yuanchun 元春, an imperial concubine, is allowed to visit her family for the one time in her adult life, the family builds a beautiful “Grand-View Garden” — full of rocks, streams, trees, and pavilions — to welcome her. (This parallels events in the Cao family, who once built an elaborate garden to welcome the Kangxi emperor himself on one of his southern tours.) On her visit Yuanchun urges Jia Zheng to let Baoyu and his sisters and female cousins make their home in the idyllic garden. Many chapters in the novel are devoted to lovingly detailed descriptions of the carefree lives of these young people in the garden, where they observe the beautiful changes of the seasons and entertain themselves with frivolous games, poetry, drama troupes, painting, embroidery, and the finest food and drink that money can buy.

Tragic Love and Decline of the Jia Family Fortunes

Over time the charmed lives of these young people are spoiled by the intrusions of cold reality. Baoyu falls in love with one of his cousins, Lin Daiyu 林黛玉 (Black Jade), who moves into his family compound after her mother dies. These two are portrayed as reincarnated divine beings whose love is predestined, but their love is tragic as they are not allowed to marry because Daiyu is judged by the senior women in the family to be too frail (she suffers from what appears to be tuberculosis) and too temperamental to be considered a good wife for Baoyu. Instead he is married to another beautiful cousin, Xue Baochai 薛寶釵 (Precious Clasp), who is much more robust and cheerful than the morose but talented Daiyu. The young maids and servants of the household meet their demises through disastrous arranged marriages, suicide, or even kidnapping.
Multilayered Complexity

While the romantic triangle of Baoyu and his two lovely cousins is a central theme of the novel, it by no means dominates the story, which includes over four hundred vividly drawn characters. No novel in the Chinese tradition portrays so many characters with such psychological depth and intimacy as Dream of the Red Chamber—servants are as lifelike and individualized as their masters. Dream of the Red Chamber is a paragon of philosophical ambition and multilayered complexity. The complexity begins with the language of the novel in which puns are ubiquitous and multiple meanings can be found on every page. Great tension exists between the Buddhist-Daoist framework of the novel, which emphasizes the illusory quality of sensory experience and emotional attachments, and the strong emotional commitment of the author to his characters and their loves, hopes, and vulnerabilities.

Interpretations and Significance

Dream of the Red Chamber has been variously read as: a stinging critique of Chinese society; the anti-Manchu cry of a Chinese patriot; a demonstration of the wisdom of the ancient Chinese classic divination text, The Book of Changes (I Ching 易經), as seen through the ceaseless cyclical alteration of opposites; a tribute to romantic love however tragic; a demonstration of Buddhist-Daoist awakening to the illusory nature of sensory experience and the dangers of emotional attachments; and a profound affirmation of the power of art to give shape and meaning to the chaos and disappointments of life that might otherwise end in despair and meaninglessness.

In the twenty-first century many critics have championed each of these views and more. No other Chinese novel has inspired half as much discussion and debate as Dream of the Red Chamber. The field of Red Studies or “Redology” (Hongxue 紅學) has spawned hundreds of books, thousands of articles, and even an encyclopedia devoted to the novel. As with Shakespeare in the English-speaking world, Proust in French literature, or The Tale of Genji in Japan, Dream of the Red Chamber has achieved an iconic status as the greatest and most illuminating work of fiction in all of Chinese culture.

Paul S. ROPP

Further Reading

DU Fu

Dù Fǔ 杜甫

712–770 CE  Tang dynasty poet

One of the most prominent and influential of Chinese poets, Du Fu expanded the reach of poetic expression to include morality and history, along with literary concerns. He is often referred to as the “Chinese Shakespeare.”

The “golden age” of China is often associated with the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), especially with the reign of Emperor Xuanzong and three eminent poets: Wang Wei, Li Bai (also Li Bo, Li Po), and Du Fu. Whereas Wang Wei and Li Bai wrote during the apex of the Tang period, Du Fu lived through the eventual destruction of this golden era.

Du Fu was born in Luoyang, in Henan Province, to a family of scholar-officials. From his earliest days, as was typical for a young man of his class, his education involved the rigorous study of the works of Confucius, the honing of writing skills, and the perfecting of poetry composed in various formal meters.

Once such an education was deemed complete, the student was faced with the challenge of taking the imperial civil service examination. Those who passed became the younger generation of scholar-officials. At this time few people were literate, given the complexity of the classical Chinese writing system; thus the pool of scholar-officials was small. Because their skills were greatly needed, scholar-officials were often found at the center of courtly life. However, such was not to be Du Fu’s life. He took the official examinations twice and failed both times. This made life difficult for him, since he was trained in a vocation that had its proper function within courtly life. So he took up literary pursuits, supported by family and friends.

Evidence from his poems suggests that it was during this period that he met Li Bai, who was a renowned poet by this time. However, Li Bai appears not to have assisted...
in furthering Du Fu’s career at court. At the age of thirty-four, Du Fu married and would eventually have five children. His hardships continued until at last he succeeded in securing a minor court position. But political turmoil soon engulfed his world.

In 755 the An Lushan rebellion, which would last for eight long years, began. The Emperor Xuanzong abdicated and fled to Sichuan. Du Fu and his family were captured by the rebels but managed to escape to Yin-chuan, in Ningxia, where Suzong, the son of Xuanzong, had been declared emperor by the royal army. But the new emperor cared little for Du Fu and gave him a very minor post. This led to much resentment on the part of Du Fu, who eventually left the emperor’s service in 760.

He spent time wandering about until he came to Chengdu, in the Sichaun province, where he took up residence in his famed “thatched cottage,” where he wrote many of his poems. His poetry is unique in that it is filled with Confucian ideals, as well as personal concerns. This allowed him to examine the plight of the individual in the wider flow of history.

His financial woes were allayed by the kindness of friends, chief among them the governor of Chengdu. When the rebels were finally driven from his native city of Luoyang by the royal army in 762, Du Fu eagerly set out, intending to return and live there once again. But his life of deprivation had taken its toll, and he suffered from various ailments, making travel slow and often impossible. He died in 768 at Changsha, in Hunan province, just as he set out once more for Luoyang.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading

**Man struggles upwards; water flows downwards.**

水往低处流，
人往高处走

*Shuǐ wǎng dīchù liú, rén wǎng gāochù zǒu*
Duilian (antithetical couplet, or two lines created in opposition to each other) is a Chinese literary form that follows rigid rules and has a capacity for great variety. While writing duilian requires a high level of literary skill, matching the first line of the couplet with the second can be very entertaining.

Couples are used in many cultures, such as the English sonnet, the Arabic gasida, and the Chinese lüshi (regulated verse). A couplet is a pair of lines of rhymed verse, usually having the same meter. It can be used either alone or as part of a poem. Duilian, nicknamed duizi, is an antithetical couplet peculiar to the Chinese culture and made possible by the special properties of hanzi, or Chinese characters, which are tonal and single-syllabic.

Duilian must satisfy a series of rigorous requirements in addition to rhyming and metering. Firstly, the juxtaposed lines of a duilian must have exactly the same number of Chinese characters and be punctuated in the same place. Secondly, the corresponding characters in both lines must have the same parts of speech. That is, a notional word must correspond to a notional word (such as noun and verb), and a function word must match a function word (such as a conjunction or preposition). Thirdly, level and oblique tones of the corresponding characters must not be the same. By convention, the first line must end with a character with the oblique tone while the second ends with the level tone. Lastly, not only are the meanings of both lines related, but the meaning of each matching character must be related as well. The following is an example of a duilian that meets all the requirements.

Hái (sea) kuò (vast) píng (allows) yú (fish) yuè (jump);
Tiān (sky) gāo (high) rèn (enables) niǎo (bird) fēi (fly).

The meaning of this duilian is “A vast sea allows fish to jump as freely as the deep sky enables birds to fly.” The connotation is “The only limit is oneself.”

There is no limit to the length of a duilian. It can be eight characters short or hundreds of characters long. The longer it is, the more difficult it is to write. The most famous is the 180-character duilian found in the Da Guan Garden of Kunming in Yunnan Province, China. Duilian is also found in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam due to cultural diffusion.

Origin and History

Prototypes of couplets appeared in China as early as 3,000 years ago. Dui’ōnju (antithetical sentences) of the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and its subsequent dynasties, pianliju (parallel and ornate sentences) of the Cao Wei (220–265 CE) and the following dynasties, and gelüshi (metered poems) of the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE) all had a part in nurturing the growth of duilian.

Duilian became chunjian, or Spring Festival couplets, with the intervention of the early Chinese belief in the exorcizing power of the peach tree. Liji (Classic of Rites),
one of the five classics of Confucian canon, compiled in the first century CE, first mentioned the use of the peach tree to expel evil ghosts at a funeral. According to mythology, a huge peach tree on an island extended its branches a few thousand miles to the gate of a cave where devils lived. Under the tree were two god generals named Shen Shu and Yu Lü. Whenever they caught a devil hurting people, they would tie it up and feed it to a tiger. From the Zhou Dynasty (1045–256 BCE) on, Chinese began to hang a peach-wood board a few inches long on each side of their doors. Written records of the Tang Dynasty show that these boards were called taofu (peach signs). Later, the names of the two god generals were written on the wood boards and their images were drawn on them. From this practice, there came the tradition of worshiping God of Gates—a practice that still persists today in rural China.

At the same time, the evolution of the purportedly potent peach-wood board took another turn with duilian (antithetical couplets) inscribed on it. This transformation was attributed to Meng Chang, King of Later Shu of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period (907–960 CE). He wrote a couplet on the wood boards, which reads, “A New Year welcomes more happiness; A good festival greets a long spring:”

Xīn (new) nián (year) nà (receives) yú (more) qìng (happiness);
Jiā (fine) jié (festival) hào (calls) cháng (long) chūn (spring).

Though not a perfect antithetical couplet, it was allegedly the start of duilian in Chinese history.

Credit for putting duilian on paper is given to Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE). It is recorded that after he chose Jinling (today’s Nanjing) as the site of the dynasty’s capital, he decreed that all his subjects put up paper duilian (known as chuntie at the time) on their doors so that he could have the fun of inspecting them from door to door.

**Types of Duilian**

The name of a duilian has to do with where it is used: Yinglian is hung from the principal column of a hall; menlian, or mendai, is pasted on the door; and zhongtanglian is suspended in a parlor. As far as the occasion is concerned, helian is used for congratulation; zenglian, for eulogy; wanlian, for mourning; and chunlian for the Spring Festival, or Chinese New Year. Usually pasted vertically on the doorframes, chunlian is also menlian (door couplet) in nature. And chunlian is always complemented with a four character hengpi (horizontal scroll) pasted on the beam over the door. It serves as a summary of the couplet.

In terms of its artistic quality, there are about a dozen kinds of duilian. Diezilian has the same character occurring continuously; fuzilian has the same character repeating
itself every other character(s); dingzhenlian has the first character of the second line repeating the last of the first line; qianzilian embeds some proper nouns, such as the name of a person or a place; chaizilian has compound characters split into individual characters that form them; yinyunlian employs homophones, homographs, and words of assonance; xiequlian contains a lot of humor; wuqingdui has rigorously antithetical lines not at all related to each other in meaning; and huiwenlian is like a palindrome, meaningfully readable from either end.

**Duilian and Knowledge**

The creation of a good *duilian* requires great learning and wisdom. It also brings enjoyment to the creator as well as the reader. There are many anecdotes and legends like this:

When one of China’s greatest scholars, Ji Xiaolan (1724–1805) was young, he had an unpleasant private teacher whose surname was Shi (stone). One day, Xiaolan pulled out a brick from a wall and hid a sparrow in the hole, feeding it between class meetings. When the teacher found his secret, he killed the bird and replaced the brick in the wall, where he inscribed a line of verse:

“Xi (thin) yù (feather) jiā (domestic) qín (fowl) zhuān (brick) hòu (behind) sì (die),” meaning “A fine-feathered domestic bird is dead behind a brick.”

Seeing the dead bird and the verse, Ji Xiaolan realized what had happened. He added a second line beside his teacher’s:

“Cū (thick) máo (hair) yě (wild) shòu (beast) shí (stone) xiàn (front) shēng (live),” which means “A coarse-haired wild beast is alive before a stone.”

Seeing this, the teacher was furious, because “is alive before a stone” was a pun for “Master Shi.” Ji Xiaolan argued that he had no alternative but to match his verse word for word, as the rule of writing a *duilian* required. In his witty and learned way, the young Xiaolan avenged his lost sparrow.

Reading and writing *duilian* is part of the curriculum of Chinese schools. Providing the second line of a potential *duilian* to match the first line given is a fun game to play and is a feature of many Chinese entertainment shows, including the annual Chinese New Year celebration TV gala, which is watched by a billion viewers.

**Further Reading:**


*China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.*
Dujiangyan (The Weir on the Capital River) is a 2,300-year-old hydrological engineering works situated in the middle reaches of the Min River, the largest and longest of the Yangzi (Chang) headwaters. It is the oldest surviving water management system in the world, initially built by the Qin kingdom as a strategic element in defeating its rivals to the north and south.

Dujiangyan (The Weir on the Capital River) is a huge irrigation system located at the western edge of the Chengdu Plain, where the waters of the Min flow from a gorge to an alluvial fan plain. The Dujiangyan system is located at the highest point of the plain, allowing the whole irrigation network to run by gravity. Prior to the construction of Dujiangyan in the fourth century BCE, the natural course of the Min River followed the edge of the western foothills, and its unregulated spring flow caused massive floods. Dujiangyan regulated the floodwaters and diverted the river into the middle of the Chengdu Plain. Its canal system irrigated 126,000 ha during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), and that capacity has expanded to almost 660,000 ha in thirty-six counties today. It has made the Chengdu Plain into one of the most dependably fertile and densely populated agricultural regions in the world. Still functioning as designed in the third century BCE, the Dujiangyan system consists of three primary and interrelated components that regulate the flow of water into the Chengdu Plain while preventing flooding and silt buildup.

As the Min River flows downstream, the Yuzui (Fish’s Mouth) levee splits it into an inner and an outer channel. The outer channel, following the original course of the river, discharges excess water, while the inner channel leads to the irrigation canals. Surface water flows into the concave inner channel, while the deeper silt-carrying water flows into the convex outer channel and can be easily dredged. The Baopingkou (Precious Bottleneck) culvert cuts through the rock face of Mount Yulei and is the gate to the inner channel. It prevents excessive water from entering the Chengdu Plain by diverting it over the Feisha (Flying Sands) spillway and into the outer channel. The Feisha spillway is located at the downstream end of the Yuzui levee. During flood season, when the water level in the inner channel exceeds a fixed point, surplus water and silt flow over the Feisha spillway and into the outer channel. The spillway discharges more than 90 percent of the silt carried in the river. During the peak farming months, when water flow in the inner channel is low, the Feisha spillway blocks water from entering the outer channel and ensures that it is available for irrigation.

Annual dredging and maintenance has been essential to the operation of Dujiangyan since its construction. During autumn, when the flow of water is at a minimum and the farm season is slack, workers create temporary diversion dams to direct all of the water into the inner channel. The bed of the channel is cleared, and any necessary repairs are carried out. In February, the dams are erected in the inner channel, and the outer channel is dredged. Branch canals are maintained by the farmers themselves. The entire
Dujiangyan system has historically been built from locally accessible and easily assembled materials, though these have been replaced by concrete since the 1960s.

**Dujiangyan and Chinese History**

It is no exaggeration to say that the creation of Dujiangyan allowed the Chinese Empire to be unified for the first time. In 316 BCE, the armies of the kingdom of Qin, one of several contenders for dominance in north China, drove the state of Chu out of Sichuan. The Qin rulers recognized that in order to prevail against their northern rivals, they would have to produce enough food to field vast armies capable of wearing down their opponents; while to eliminate Chu in the south, they should mount attacks by riverboat. The construction of Dujiangyan was the key to both of these strategies.

In 277 BCE, Sichuan governor Li Bing was commissioned to conduct an extensive hydraulic survey and build a waterworks on the Min. Tens of thousands of workers hauled bamboo baskets filled with rocks into the middle of the river, and the Yuzui levee was completed in four years. It took eight more years to cut through the mountain to create the Baopingkou culvert, using controlled fires to heat the rocks, and then dousing them with cold water to crack them. Dujiangyan was completed after fourteen years of labor by local residents, Qin colonists, and subjects of defeated Qin rivals. Timber was floated down the newly navigable river to a shipyard in Chengdu to construct warships. Additional irrigation canals transformed the Chengdu Plain into fertile farmland, and more than 100,000 people from the Qin heartland moved to Sichuan, which quickly became China’s largest granary. In 223 BCE, Qin troops sailed down the Min River from Chengdu, defeating the state of Chu. Two years later, Qin armies in the north, bellies full of Sichuan rice, unified the north. The king of Qin renamed himself as the First Emperor, initiating China’s imperial era.

The system continued to expand throughout the imperial era. As governor, Li Bing staged a ritual confrontation with the dragon spirit of the Min River, long revered by locals. By the Han dynasty, some people came to believe that Li Bing himself had become a god, commemorated for vanquishing the dragon spirit and ending human sacrifices to it. During the Song dynasty (960–1279), civil officials, committed to extending cultural
conformity throughout the empire, reinvented Guankou Erlang, an ancient Min River water-taming god who still commanded sacrifices of 40,000 sheep each year, as a Confucian official and son of Li Bing. Finally, it was at Qingcheng Mountain overlooking Dujiangyan that centenarian hermit Zhang Daoling is said to have ascended to heaven as an immortal in 143 CE. His successors transformed Daoism from a set of philosophical principles into a sectarian religion under the Heavenly Master school. Most of the original twenty-four dioceses of Heavenly Master Daoism are located in and around the watershed of the Dujiangyan irrigation system.

Dujiangyan Today

Since 2000, Dujiangyan and Mount Qingcheng have together been inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage site drawing almost a million visitors each year. Dujiangyan remains the key to intensive agriculture in the Chengdu Plain, which supports an urban and rural population of more than 15 million people and boasts one of the world’s highest rural population densities. In recent years, a number of hydroelectric projects have been completed on the Min River. There are currently fifteen dams in operation or under construction on the river. These dams, which critics believe may constrain urban and agricultural access to water and threaten the continued viability of Dujiangyan, are controversial both in China and internationally.

Ruth MOSTERN

Further Reading


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The Dunhuang Caves include three sites of Buddhist cave shrines located near the desert oasis city of Dunhuang. Decorated with spectacular wall paintings and sculpture, and once the repositories for a treasure trove of Buddhist texts (such as the Diamond Sutra, now in the British Museum), the caves were added to the list of UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites in 1987.

The Dunhuang Caves are three sites of Buddhist cave shrines located near the city of Dunhuang, a desert oasis lying on the ancient Silk Roads: the Western Qianfodong 西千佛洞 (Western Caves of the Thousand Buddhas), located approximately 3.2 kilometers west of Dunhuang; the Yulin Caves 榆林窟, located approximately 168 kilometers east of Dunhuang; and the Mogao Caves 莫高窟, the most important site, located approximately 40 kilometers southeast of Dunhuang.

The most extensive surviving early Chinese Buddhist material culture is found at the cave temples of Mogao. Here, beginning in the early fourth century and continuing for the next one thousand years, more than one thousand caves were hollowed out of the cliff face at the edge of Mingsha (Dunes of the Singing Sands). Nearly five hundred of the caves are decorated with spectacular sculptures and wall paintings. In 1900 a hidden cache of nearly fifty thousand documents was discovered in what came to be known as the Library Cave, which had been sealed in the early eleventh century. Found in this treasure trove of material was a copy of the Diamond Sutra; its date of 868 makes it the world’s oldest printed text (a sutra is one of the discourses of the Buddha that constitutes the basic text of Buddhist scripture). Also found in the Library Cave was a variety of art forms that includes paintings on silk, woodblock prints on paper, calligraphy, and embroidery.

The site for the Mogao Caves was selected by the wandering monk Yuezun, who set out to excavate the first caves in 366 after beholding the golden glow of one thousand Buddhas floating there, giving rise to the site’s alternate name of Qianfodong (Cave of the Thousand Buddhas). These early caves were used for meditation, but in time they also served as a monastery and a religious center. Decorating of some of the caves came soon after Yuezun’s initial work. The caves contain wall paintings of spectacular beauty. Life-size sculptures were added, but because the stone at Dunhuang is too friable (easily crumbled) and not suitable for sculpture, they were fashioned from clay formed over a wooden armature and then painted.

The history of the caves is also a history of invasions. Central Asian influence on the caves was the result of Arab conquests in the mid-eighth century. The occupation by Tibet, beginning in 781 and lasting until 848, resulted in new caves painted with Tibetan Buddhist iconography. The Tibetans also protected the site from the strong anti-Buddhist persecution in 845 that had a profound effect on the rest of China. In 1006, when Islamic armies from Kashgar conquered the Buddhist city of Khotan, fear that Mogao would soon be next likely prompted the monks to seal thousands of manuscripts in the cave. However,
Islamic culture would not reach Dunhuang until after the invasion of the Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan’s army in 1227, which destroyed the city. Artistic activity continued under the Mongols until at least 1357 owing to favor that Tibetan monks had at court. After the fall of the Mongols, Arab armies controlled central Asia, and Islam became the dominant religion, effectively ending work at the caves. As traffic along the Silk Roads declined when sea travel replaced overland routes, the caves were all but forgotten and would remain so until the first years of the twentieth century.

Library Cave Found

In the 1890s the Daoist monk Wang Yuanlu (c. 1849–1931) settled at the Mogao Caves and became the self-appointed guardian of the site. While overseeing restoration work in Cave 16, he found a crack in the wall that revealed a hidden entrance to another cave. Here was the so-called Library Cave (Cave 17), which contained a wealth of manuscripts, paintings, embroideries, and banners filling the cave from floor to ceiling. In 1902 the collection was to be relocated to the provincial capital, Lanzhou, but because of the high cost of moving it, Wang was ordered to put the material back into the cave and reseal it.

In March 1907 Sir Aurel Stein (1862–1943), an archaeologist and explorer of central Asia, arrived at the site. Acting on behalf of the British Museum, Stein was awestruck by the vivid color of the murals and painted statues and referred to the site as a “wonderful beehive of temples.” Wang was at first reluctant to allow any of the Library Cave materials to be removed, but he was soon swayed by Stein, who offered contributions to the restoration of the site in exchange for the scrolls. In all, Stein left with twenty-four cases that contained thousands of manuscripts and fragments and five cases of paintings and embroideries, all of which he purchased for £130. Among his finds was the Diamond Sutra, which is now in the British Library.

After Stein came the French sinologist Paul Pelliot (1878–1943) in 1908. Owing to his ability to read Chinese, Pelliot was able to select the most scholarly and historically significant items from the material Stein had left behind. He paid £90 for the thousands of manuscripts that now rest in the Musée Guimet in Paris. Although the Chinese made an effort to limit the dissemination of Dunhuang material to foreigners, nearly six hundred documents were sold to the Japanese in 1911, two hundred to the Russians in 1914, five cases again to Stein in 1914, and twelve sections of wall paintings to Langdon Warner of the Fogg Museum at Harvard in the 1920s. Thus, the contents of the Library Cave have been scattered worldwide. In 1993 the British Library began a project to unite these objects on the Internet. The International Dunhuang Project is designed to promote the research and preservation of the Dunhuang material in an international arena.

Preservation Efforts

Today the site is in remarkable condition, given its age. The cliff face has weathered over the centuries, and the instability of the sandstone has resulted in the collapse of some sections of the caves. The wall paintings are cracked and peeling. Smoke from fires set in the caves left a layer of soot on the walls. Vandals have defaced some portions, and the presence of Stein and the others has left its mark. Still, the wall paintings and sculptures retain their brilliance. In 1944 the Dunhuang Research Institute (now the Dunhuang Academy) was established to focus on research and conservation of the site. In 1980 the caves were opened to the public. In 1988 the Getty Conservation Institute joined the Chinese in studying the deterioration of the caves and methods to preserve them. In 1987 the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designated Dunhuang as a World Heritage Site.

Catherine PAGANI

Further Reading

During most of the recorded history of East Asia (Japan and Korea), China was the dominant force and exerted a great influence on the culture—religion, government, art, communication—of the other two nations.

In the seventeenth century, when European scholars presented their latest maps to the Chinese court, the Chinese were impressed with the scholars’ skill and technological sophistication. However, court officials were offended because China was not depicted at the center of the world. After all, historically China viewed itself as the Middle Kingdom; its centrist worldview was based on objective criteria. As late as the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), China continued to be the world’s most powerful nation in terms of population, commerce, size, wealth, technology, learning, fine arts, and literature. For most of the recorded history of East Asia (Japan and Korea) China was supreme. China was the source, not the recipient, of culture.

Periods of time have come and gone, like the waxing and waning of the moon, when Japan and Korea have resembled "little Chinas" because of their deliberate imitation of China, whereas other periods have had minimal interaction between these nations. China’s most significant influence on East Asian nations came during the early years of their recorded histories. For that reason Chinese culture remains at the root of East Asian society. Just as people are more influenced by experiences in their early years, Korea’s and Japan’s early years were marked by their acceptance of Chinese political, economic, ideological,
and social patterns. What Korea and Japan adopted during their early civilizations became the foundation for their more mature civilizations.

Migrants from northern China were among the first inhabitants of Japan and Korea, where during the first millennium BCE these migrants developed a hunter-gatherer culture. The religion of the region was animistic (relating to the doctrine that the vital principle of organic development is immaterial spirit) and had an apparent reverence for nature and ancestors. Because Korea was attached to the continent, it (more than Japan) was influenced by the political machinations of China. During its Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) China directly ruled the Korean peninsula. However, early on a pattern between China and East Asia developed: When China faced internal crisis, its political influence in Japan and Korea diminished. Thus, the fall of the Han dynasty coincided with the increased power of the indigenous Korean kingdoms of Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), and Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE).

Economic stability, spurred by the development of rice agriculture, shifted the social structure of East Asia from a nomadic existence to a sedentary existence with geographical boundaries. As East Asian clans competed for supremacy over a particular state, they sought legitimacy for their positions by their affiliation with China. The political tug-of-war among the three native states in Korea and the emerging Japanese state of Yamato (300–552 CE) produced political hierarchies and centralized powers. The development of dominant states in East Asia coincided with the increased power of the indigenous Korean kingdoms of Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), and Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE).

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Spread of Buddhism

India is the homeland of the Buddha. However, by the Han dynasty Buddhism was beginning to flourish in the Middle Kingdom as its influence declined in India. Buddhism continued to move eastward. In 372 CE Buddhism was introduced to the Koguryo court in Korea. The religion spread throughout the peninsula as Chinese monks proselytized throughout Korea. At the same time Koreans traveled to China to study at influential monasteries. The implications of the Korean states’ acceptance of Buddhism as the metaphysical explanation of reality were great. The ties between China and Korea were now cemented by a shared religion. The sacred scriptures of Buddhism were written in Chinese characters, and the Koreans’ wish to understand Buddhism solidified the use of Chinese as the means of written communication throughout Korea. In addition to adopting the Chinese written language (which is a significant measure of Chinese influence) the Korean states adopted the architecture and art that accompanied Buddhism. Dominant Korean art forms reflected Chinese works—palaces and temples were built according to popular styles in China.

Elements of Buddhism migrated from Korea to Japan during the fifth century, but Buddhism’s official introduction did not occur until 552. Historians note that during the first half of the sixth century the state of Paekche was at war with Koguryo and Shilla and that, in an effort to bring Japan into the war, Paekche offered to introduce a glorious new truth to the islands if Japan offered its assistance. Thus, Buddhism was introduced to the Japanese court officially through Korea. The religion was adopted by the most powerful families at the court, who were relatively recent emigrants from the peninsula. As in Korea, Japan’s adoption of Buddhism affected art, language, and architecture in Japan. Chinese written language was the modes of written communication throughout the islands; Japanese art was hardly distinguishable from Chinese art.

Buddhism’s influence on East Asia occurred from the top down. The elite families first adopted it, although eventually it moved into all social classes. The prominent states sponsored the spread of Buddhism by building monasteries and providing economic relief to those people tending the temples. The state paid artisans to create Chinese-style Buddhist art pieces, and these media filtered down to the general population. Buddhism spread throughout East Asia because indigenous religions were still evolving and lacked the sophistication of Buddhism. The elaborate rituals, scriptures, art, and mantras that Buddhism offered were accompanied by other cultural influences from China.

Mere decades after Buddhism was introduced to Japan, China was united under the glorious Tang dynasty. The states of East Asia imitated the economic and political grandeur of Tang China. In politics Korea and Japan adopted the Tang concept of the state’s supremacy and the emperor’s complete authority. In Japan this concept firmly established the still-extant imperial throne. Korea and Japan also adopted the Tang form of taxation, which
necessitated a more sophisticated way of assessing the land’s resources. The rulers of Japan and Korea partitioned their land into provinces, prefectures, and districts with the assumption that all land belonged to the state and that taxes were needed from those who worked the land. In Japan and Korea, as in China, rice was the currency of the day, and approximately 40 percent of a harvest was paid to the state. The adoption of Chinese economic and political patterns increased the political stability in East Asia. Korea and Japan, increasingly sinicized, continued to look to China for legitimacy, learning, and culture.

The degree of China’s influence during this time is shown in Japan’s so-called seventeen-point constitution, which was developed during the seventh century. The first point was the Confucian injunction that the goal of the state is to establish harmony above and friendliness below. The second point asserted that conversion to Buddhism would straighten everything crooked. In Korea academies were established just to teach the Confucian classics, and similar academies were established in Japan. The Confucian principles of filial piety and the rigid rules that govern relationships were spread through these institutions.

**Transformation of Political Institutions**

During the Tang dynasty political institutions were transformed in Korea and Japan. In Korea the government adapted the six ministries of the Tang government. In Japan the ministries of a central secretariat and the imperial household were added to the conventional six ministries of the Tang government. Chang’ an, the capital of China, was the most cosmopolitan city of the eighth century. Korea and Japan sent ambassadors to Chang’an. Not only did Korea and Japan borrow the art and architecture of Chang’an but also they laid out their capitals in the checkerboard fashion of the Tang capital. Japan during the eighth century established Nara in the
fashion of Chang’an. On the northern end of the Kyoto Plain the city of Heian was founded in 794 with dimensions of just over 5 by 5 kilometers, a bit more modest than the Chang’an dimensions of approximately 9.5 by 8 kilometers.

Japan and Korea also sought to establish a bureaucracy based on merit, as was the case in China. Japan and Korea set up positions in government structures with the understanding that the positions would be filled by men of rank. In 958 the Korean civil service exam was based on the Confucian classics, and a man advanced through knowledge of these Chinese works. However, by the tenth century an atrophy of Chinese influence was occurring in Korea and Japan. This atrophy was caused by the hard times that faced China after the fall of the Tang dynasty as well as by a fundamental shift in China’s state revenue system.

Although Korea and Japan emulated Tang China, aspects of the Chinese world did not quite fit the Korean and Japanese models. For example, China’s neighbors never fully integrated the merit-based bureaucracy system. Aristocratic families dominated the economic and political worlds of Japan and Korea, and an exam to level the playing field did negate the dominant role of the aristocrats. However, the true breakdown of the Chinese system in East Asia was caused by the increase of tax-free lands. In Japan and Korea parcels of land were given to monasteries and to families to whom the court owed favors. At the beginning these tax-free lands were minimal in size. However, they grew into enormous tax-free estates. The state could do nothing about its declining tax revenues because the estate owners either were under the patronage of the elite families or were from the elite families themselves. By the twelfth century tax-free religious or estate zones perhaps accounted for more than 50 percent of the land in Japan and Korea. With the steady decrease of revenue, the states found it difficult to respond to internal crises, particularly in trying to maintain peace in an time when marauding gangs preyed on farming villages. Villagers and estate owners turned away from the impotent state and to the warrior class for protection. Thus, the pattern of state control and a scholar-led bureaucracy subtly changed. In Japan true power moved from the imperial family to the bakufu (tent government) or military government led by the sei taishogun (barbarian-suppressing generalissimo, commonly called simply “shogun”), who was headquartered with his retainers and advisors.

Japan’s and Korea’s departure from the Chinese model in politics coincided with their adoption of indigenous written languages. The Chinese character-based written language was always a difficult fit in the Japanese and Korean polysyllabic and inflected languages. One compromise was to use Chinese characters to represent sounds rather than words. During the tenth century in Korea a system called idu—in which Chinese characters represented sounds—became the means of written communication. By the fifteenth century a Korean phonetic system known today as “hangul” replaced the Chinese character-based written language on the peninsula. In Japan the women of the eleventh-century court led the way in writing Japanese, whereas the men continued to use Chinese characters. Moreover, the literature that the men produced was inferior to that of the more adaptable, but new, Japanese written language.

During the Yuan (1279–1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties Korea and Japan continued to acknowledge the supremacy of China in East Asia. Granted, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598) of Japan dreamed of invading China at the end of the sixteenth century, but his irreverent approach to China was the exception, not the rule. Buddhism, especially the Chan sect from China (called “Son” in Korean and “Zen” in Japanese), greatly influenced society in art, architecture, and philosophy during the premodern era of Korean and Japan. During the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868) of Japan the prevailing ideology was neo-Confucian thought because it validated the division among the elite, farmers, artisans, and merchants. In Korea the Choson dynasty (1392–1910) continued to defer to China. Three times a year the “little brother” sent tributary missions (goods or money paid in deference to and with respect for China), to the “elder brother.” During the time Confucian ideology was more thoroughly integrated into Korean society than it was in China.

**Confirmation of China’s Weakness**

However, East Asian nations noticed that during two of its last three dynasties China was ruled by outsiders: first the Mongols of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and then the Manchus of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). China’s weakness was confirmed by humiliating defeats in its wars against the British during the nineteenth century. China made concessions to foreigners, and China’s undisputed leadership of East Asia was soon just a
memory. During the last half of the nineteenth century both China and Japan sought to strengthen themselves. China wanted to stave off the Western imperial countries, and Japan wanted to be a first-class nation. Japan’s lack of respect for the once-proud leader of East Asia was shown in the 1894–1895 First Sino-Japanese War and subsequent severe Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895). Korea, the pawn in the game, was forced to recognize Japanese dominion.

The First Sino-Japanese War was a precursor to a much bloodier war between the two nations. Between 1937 and 1945 China and Japan fought in the War of Resistance against Japan, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War. The tragedy at Nanjing—often referred to as the “Rape of Nanjing,” where Japanese soldiers butchered Chinese civilians—showed the animosity that Japan felt toward its old tutor. Some scholars speculate that this animosity was rooted in the Japanese embarrassment and disgust that the source of Japan’s culture had sunk so low. By contrast, Korea was made part of the Japanese empire (1910–1945). The Koreans, too, were treated harshly by their new colonial ruler.

East Asia after World War II can be understood only in the light of the Cold War. Sino-Japanese relations remained sour because of the memory of Japanese brutality during the war and because the United States for decades insisted that Japan not have relations with Communist China. The Korean Peninsula was partitioned into two countries, with North Korea having warmer relations with China. However, as China emerged as a free-market state, its relations with South Korea improved, whereas North Korea continued to flounder because of its large military budget and the collapse of its once-powerful ally, the Soviet Union.

Korea and Japan have experienced a sweet-and-sour relationship with China. However, China’s influence on the two countries is beyond estimation because of the adoption of the Chinese pattern by the early civilizations of East Asia.

**L. Shelton WOODS**

**Further Reading**


Transfer of Chinese Sugar-Making Technology to East and South-East Asia

Using the Chinese sugar-making technology as an example, China scholar Joseph Needham relates the importance of the transfer of technology from China to other countries in East and Southeast Asia.

In recent times concern with the transfer of Western technology to Third World countries seems to have diverted the attention of scholars away from the significant role played by technology transfer in the economic and social development of pre-modern Asia. In the following pages I will consider East and South-East Asia, demonstrating how individual States borrowed or received, a single agro-industrial sugar technology from China to aide their economic development.

As remarked earlier, domestic sugar production in China began to increase from the 16th century and expanded greatly with the immigration of Fukienese peasants to Taiwan, Chiang-Hsi and Kuang-Tung during the 17th century. Individuals or groups of people with knowledge of, or access to, all the component elements of the technological package effected the transfer and diffusion. Chinese immigrants took the package overseas from the late 16th century, and laid the technological foundations of pre-modern East and South-East Asian sugar production that lasted until the 20th century.


The East China Sea—part of the western Pacific Ocean—is China’s most important marine fishing area. The sea also has rich oil and gas reserves, but China’s exploitation of such reserves is complicated by a Sino-Japanese territorial dispute.

The East China Sea (Dong Hai) is part of the western Pacific Ocean. It is 1,296 kilometers long from north to south and 740 kilometers wide from east to west. It covers an area of 790,000 square kilometers. In the north it borders on the Yellow Sea (Huang Hai), and in the east it borders on Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian provinces of the Chinese mainland. In the south the East China Sea is connected to the South China Sea (Nan Hai) through the Taiwan Strait. The southern Japanese archipelago with the Ryukyu Islands constitutes the eastern border.

Except for an area around the Ryukyu Islands, where depths of 2,700 meters have been measured, the East China Sea is on a shallow continental shelf, most of which is less than 200 meters deep. The Yangzi (Chang) River flows into the East China Sea, leaving huge deposits of sediment. The climate is subtropical, and monsoon winds with summer rain predominate.

The East China Sea is China’s most important marine fishing area, and the catches of hairtail, small and large yellow croaker, and cuttlefish account for two-thirds of China’s total catch. Shanghai, just south of the mouth of the Yangzi River, is the largest port on the sea and also is the center for food processing.

The sea has rich oil and gas reserves, but China’s exploitation of such reserves has been complicated by a Sino-Japanese territorial dispute—sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. China, Taiwan, and Japan claim the eight uninhabited islets. In recent years piracy also has become a problem in the East China Sea.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading

East China Sea Oil Exploitation

Oil exploitation of the East China Sea is one of several complicated issues between Japan and China stemming from Sino-Japanese territorial disputes over the Diaoyu Islands. Although a tentative agreement about oil exploitation in the East China Sea has been reached by Beijing and Tokyo, the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands is still unresolved.

China’s exploitation of oil in the East China Sea has been complicated by a Sino-Japanese territorial issue—sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands).

The Diaoyu Islands are located about 193 kilometers northeast of Taiwan, approximately 289 kilometers west of Okinawa, Japan, and approximately 402 kilometers east of China’s mainland. The islands are made up of eight uninhabited islets, including three barren rocks, which are claimed by China (People’s Republic of China or PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China or ROC), and Japan. Currently Japan controls the islands, which officially are under the jurisdiction of Ishigaki city of Okinawa Prefecture. Until 1968 the Diaoyu Islands were essentially worthless to China and Japan, and neither country appreciated their value. However, that changed after the Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), reported substantial energy deposits under the East China Sea.

Based on a geological survey, experts estimated that the continental shelf surrounding the Diaoyu Islands contains 10–100 billion barrels of oil. As of 2008 neither China nor Japan has actually drilled in the disputed area as they make overlapping claims to the islands and their surrounding waters. Nor has an international solution been possible. Neither country is willing to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. In the current debate two competing views have emerged: A pro-China group emphasizes the use of historical evidence from the archives of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. A pro-Japan group emphasizes the “discovery” theory in international law, arguing that the Japanese “rediscovered” the islands in 1884 as terra nullius (i.e., unadministered territory or no-man’s-land). In reality, the Diaoyu Islands have become “hostage” to the disputing parties, Japan and China, since the 1970s.

On 28 May 2004 the Japanese media dropped a bombshell on already shaky Sino-Japanese relations. The media reported that, starting in August 2003, China began to develop a natural gas field exploration project in the East China Sea—the Chunxiao oil and gas fields. The Japanese government worries that this drilling will enable China to siphon off the 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas buried under China’s side of the disputed islands. Thus, the Chunxiao oil and gas fields loom as another bone of contention between Tokyo and Beijing.

Starting in May 2004, Japan and China held several rounds of bureau-chief-level talks and occasional informal negotiations in Beijing and Tokyo. Finally, on 18 June, two superpowers in the East Asian region finally settled...
the oil/gas development situation in eastern China. Two major points in this agreement:

1. both countries agreed to explore jointly a 2,700-square-kilometer area south of the Longjing oil field, stretching across the Japanese-claimed median line.

2. regarding the Chunxiao gas field, which the Chinese have already operated for years, Beijing welcomed investment by Japanese corporations in the project in accordance with Chinese laws.

However, the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the demarcation of the international boundary in the East China Sea, such as the Japanese-claimed median line and the Chinese-claimed natural prolongation line, were not addressed by this agreement.

Basically China claims sovereignty over the area of the Chunxiao oil and gas fields, which are located immediately outside the median line or the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by Japan, and has rejected Japanese requests to hand over all data about Chunxiao and to suspend drilling. Even though China proposed joint development of the disputed territory, Japan insists that it has sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and refuses the joint development proposal. However, Japan proposed joint development of four oil fields—Chunxiao, Duanqiao, Tianwaitian, and Longjing—which are only 10 kilometers northeast of the Diaoyu Islands. China rejected this proposal. As the Japanese government argues, one of the four oil fields crosses the median line claimed by Japan, and the remaining three are completely inside Japan’s EEZ. Yet, Beijing has refused to accept the median line set by Tokyo. Instead China has argued that its EEZ extends to the far reaches of its continental shelf, which ends west of Okinawa Prefecture. Hence, the Japanese and Chinese claims of sovereignty overlap over a large area in the East China Sea. During the fourth round of talks Beijing proposed joint development of the Longjing field, but Tokyo did not accept. Furthermore, in 2005 the Japanese government granted Teikoku Oil Co. the right to perform exploratory oil drilling in an area opposite the Chunxiao oil and gas fields.

In early 2007, after a Chinese surveillance ship was detected about 32 kilometers from the islands, territorial disputes escalated; later that year Japan formally protested China’s gas exploration in the contentious EEZ area. At landmark summit talks in Tokyo in May 2008 Chinese president Hu Jintao and Japanese president Yasuo Fukuda signed a deal that agreed to establish a “new starting point” in relations between the two nations; settling the disputes over gas deposits in the East China Sea was one of their priorities. But efforts to resolve this issue have yet to be successful and continue to complicate the nations’ other negotiations. In December 2008, shortly before Japan, China, and South Korea were scheduled to participate in an economic summit in the Japanese city of Fukuoka, Japan accused China of sending research ships to visit the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and called the alleged violations “extremely regrettable.”

**Further Reading**


China abandoned a Soviet-style command economy in favor of a mixed economy late in the twentieth century, and the economic system overall contains a complex set of enterprise designations: state ownership, shareholding, private ownership, collective ownership, foreign direct investment, and public ownership through shareholding. In spite of many reforms and impressive growth during the past two decades, the economy faces major hurdles.

China’s economic system during the last two decades of the twentieth century changed from a command economy, which dated to shortly after the Communists took control in 1949 and was based on the Soviet economic system, to a mixed economy with complex set of economic relationships between enterprises and the state.

Command Economy

In a command economy the means of production are publicly owned, and economic activity is controlled by a central authority that assigns quantitative production targets and allots raw materials to production units. A command economy entails comprehensive economic planning on the basis of targets and balancing of materials.

China’s command economy was established in 1950 and 1951 and was followed by a Soviet-style five-year plan, the First Five-Year Plan, for the years of 1953 to 1957. The Soviet model was ideologically sound in the Marxist theory that supported it, but, more important, the Chinese deemed it a necessity when they had to face the decline of the economy after a century of wars and turmoil. With the capacity to mobilize resources quickly on a national scale, this administrative approach was effective in its initial phase.

Beginning in the early 1950s Chinese central industrial ministries and administrative regions were required to assign production targets to enterprises under their jurisdiction. Each group of enterprises was then required to formulate annual production, labor, and cost plans and to submit them to the higher echelons—that is, the industrial ministries or bureaus—for approval. During this period procedures for making annual plans “from the bottom to the top” and “from the top to the bottom” were introduced and standardized. Frequent consultations and exchanges of information took place at various levels of the hierarchy. Moreover, China established a centralized system of supplying raw materials.

The central bureaucracy played a major role in the economy. For example, in the industrial sector the state owned outright enterprises that produced more than 60 percent of the gross value of industrial output, and all but a small portion of the remainder was collectively owned. In the urban sector the government not only prescribed output targets and allocated energy resources but also set the prices for key commodities, ran the wholesale and retail networks, determined the level and general
distribution of investment funds, set wage levels and employment targets, and controlled financial policy and the banking system. The foreign trade system also became a government monopoly during the early 1950s. Similarly, in the countryside beginning in the mid-1950s the government prescribed the level of prices, set cropping patterns, and fixed output targets for all major crops. Most rural commercial transactions were undertaken by the Supply and Marketing Cooperatives—nominally an organization of farming cooperatives but in fact a heavily bureaucratized organization that operated as the rural branch of the Ministry of Commerce.

In 1952, in order to run the command economy, the chief organ of planning, the State Planning Commission, was established and placed under the State Council when the council was made the supreme executive body by the 1954 constitution. At the same time the State Construction Commission was established to oversee capital investment under the five-year plans in 1956; the State Economic Commission was formed to take over short-term—up to annual—plan responsibilities, leaving the State Planning Commission to concentrate on long-term and perspective planning. Also established in 1956 were the State Technological Commission to plan long-term technical development and the General Bureau for Supply of Raw Materials to handle material allocation. The State Statistical Bureau was formed in 1952, its provincial and municipal statistical departments in 1953, and below them administrative and special district officers in 1954.

**FIRST CENTRALIZED, THEN DECENTRALIZED**

The organization of planning grew more centralized, reaching a peak during 1955 and 1956. China had nearly 200,000 enterprises, operating with widely varying technologies, levels of efficiency, and product assortments, even within the same industry. However, the data gathered, transmitted, and processed for central planning were irregular, sometimes incomplete, and often overestimated. As the number of commodities and the number of enterprises for which the central planning bodies assumed responsibility increased rapidly, the maintenance of such a great degree of centralization of both planning and management...
became ever more cumbersome. In 1957 and 1958 the government adopted decentralization measures to shift some responsibilities to the localities, increase the scope for local initiative, and strengthen central control of the most important plan targets and enterprises.

During this round of decentralization most planning tasks were transferred to officials closer to the scene of production in an effort to shorten the lines of communication and to reduce absentee management. This transfer took place when the ministries passed most of the enterprises they had controlled to regional authorities, which gained more rights to allocate scarce resources. Most planning tasks then became the responsibility of regional and local authorities. This move was also a regionalization of planning by which several industrial ministries were abolished after losing a majority of their enterprises. The sixty thousand communes subsequently received an administrative and planning role in rural areas. They replaced the xiang (township governments) in 1958. In principle only the most important enterprises remained under direct ministerial control; even many of these were supposed to come under dual subordination to ministries and regional authorities. However, in practice ministerial control came to dominate. The decentralization of 1957 and 1958 was never entirely reversed.

The command economy traditionally operated with a strong centralized monopoly over commerce. Monopoly purchase of grain actually preceded agricultural collectivization, and even during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when much of the industrial management system was being decentralized, central control of agricultural procurement and distribution of key consumer goods continued. Although around thirty thousand rural and suburban periodic markets (that is, markets that opened periodically) existed, they were rigidly controlled, and people were forbidden to transact goods, such as grain and cotton, over which the Ministry of Commerce had a monopoly.

The shortages seemed to come from three sources. First, the government simply channeled so many resources into investment and heavy industry that there were few left for households. Second, the soft budget constraints of enterprises caused shortages. Most enterprises were profitable, and they faced no risk of bankruptcy. As a result, they pursued unrestrained growth and had an almost unlimited desire for investment. Each planning unit of an enterprise typically tried to make sure it would have the inputs it needed to fulfill its plan targets plus a margin for insurance. Therefore, each unit tended to overstate its needs and to treat the requirements of other planning jurisdictions as residual. Third (and related to the second), when managers were promoted based on their ability to meet the state-set output volume, their demand for inputs tended to expand until total demand ran up against the total available supply of resources. The over-demand for production inputs, without much concern for quality of output or efficiency, led to constant shortage of the supply of resources. Thus command economies have a built-in tendency to become “shortage economies.”

**Social-Welfare Policy**

China’s command economy, in addition to the features mentioned earlier, adopted an urban-biased social-welfare policy to spur industrial development. The policy provided not only lifetime full employment but also virtually free housing, free health care, and free retirement benefits. However, nonurban residents were excluded, and the government controlled obtaining permits for urban residency.

The government also controlled internal migration and job assignment in the urban sector through a house-registration system, which largely replaced the free labor market after 1957, although the reforms after the rule of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong have attempted to revive it.

**Economic Reforms after Mao and a Mixed Economy**

Since the death of Mao in 1976 China has tried to reform its economy with gradual but somewhat parallel changes in the urban and rural sectors. The reforms by Communist Party general secretary Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) have
been accompanied by complaints about the inefficiency of Soviet-style central planning and, in particular, about China’s overlapping and inefficient administrative bureaucracy, along with the excessive dependence of enterprises on their planning apparatus. In an effort to end the latter, post-Mao leaders have sought to establish a system of managerial and production responsibility under which producers become more responsible for procuring supplies, marketing their output, operating in a cost-effective manner, and financing their investments from their own earnings or repayable bank loans. In these post-Mao reforms the government has stressed raising personal income and consumption and introducing new management systems to help increase productivity. It also has concentrated on foreign trade as a major vehicle for economic growth.

China in the late 1970s began to pursue agricultural reforms, dismantling the commune system and introducing the household responsibility system, which gave peasants greater decision making in agricultural activities. Evolution of the household responsibility system can be roughly divided into three phases: the work-quota contract phase, the output-quota contract phase, and the responsibility contract phase. During the work-quota contract phase the household was responsible for the hours of work contracted on the collective land with the production input from the collective. During the output-quota contract phase the household was responsible for the quantity of output contracted given the production input from the collective. During the responsibility contract phase the household was responsible for everything from input to output. The government has also encouraged nonagricultural activities, such as township and village enterprises (TVEs), in rural areas. Thus agriculture has been decollectivized; small-scale private trade and workshops have
been legalized; and the role of market forces has been considerably increased.

In the urban sector the goal of enterprise reform becomes ever loftier. Its original goal was to solve the problems of low incentive and inefficiency in state enterprises. However, as the reform has progressed, the goal has become changing the managerial mechanism to make state enterprises competitive in the market.

**FOUR PHASES OF ECONOMIC REFORM**


Reformers in China, as in other socialist countries, have followed a dual approach. In addition to the state sector, they have allowed the more marketized sector—consisting largely of small- to mid-sized private and collective firms—to expand explosively in both rural and urban areas. In some cases the enterprise capital is still state owned, but the facilities are leased to individuals or groups who operate them on a profit-or-loss basis. Stock and bond markets have also sprung up since the mid-1990s, and more than 400,000 enterprises have incorporated themselves.

Within the planning network many large enterprises still have a primary responsibility to meet plan targets, but the targets are supposed to be set low enough to allow a margin of overfulfillment. Production that exceeds state targets or is not covered by targets is to be sold in competitive markets, and enterprises that do this successfully are supposed to be able to keep part of the resulting profit for bonuses and investment under their control. Prices have also been deregulated gradually and are now mostly free of controls for output not subject to mandatory planning, although subsidies and production quotas in agriculture still keep down grain prices.

Price ceilings for consumer goods historically were supported by formal rationing of some staple foodstuffs and other daily necessities as well as of a number of consumer durables. However, this system has been virtually replaced by market allocation, together with far higher prices, although housing may still be purchased through work units at a much lower price.

In recent years a dual market for urban housing has developed. Some apartments of relatively high quality are leased through the market at some of the world’s highest rents. For example, Shanghai has rents much higher than those in New York City and nearly as high as those in Tokyo.

**LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRIAL REFORM**

Although larger-scale industry has remained subject to central planning controls, similar market-type reforms have long been implemented as reformers have expanded market links within the state-planning network while reducing control by government agencies. The number of ministries and commissions directly under the State Council was cut in 1982 from ninety-eight to fifty-two and subsequently to forty-one, and their total staff was cut from 49,000 to 32,000. As their decision-making rights grow, enterprises are supposed to become more profit oriented in order to be stimulated to reduce waste, raise quality and labor productivity, upgrade production, and better tailor their products to user needs. They are supposed to move away from the one-sided emphasis on output volume—a hallmark of the command economy. In addition, provincial governments and more than nine hundred enterprises now have the right to conduct foreign trade on their own.

The economy by the late 1980s had become overheated with increasing rates of inflation. The economy regained momentum during the early 1990s after Deng Xiaoping’s Chinese New Year’s visit to southern China in 1992 gave economic reforms new impetus. The Fourteenth Party Congress later in that year confirmed Deng’s renewed push for market reforms, declaring that China’s key task in the 1990s was to establish a “socialist market economy,” an economy that would accommodate a variety of forms of ownership and permit coexistence of government planning and market mechanisms. Continuity in the political
system but bolder reforms in the economic system were proclaimed as the hallmarks of the ten-year development plan for the 1990s.

**Twenty-First-Century Challenges**

In spite of China’s impressive economic growth during the past two decades, reforming the state-enterprises sector, creating a social-welfare system, and modernizing the banking system remain major hurdles. Many small, unprofitable enterprises have been closed or sold, but larger money-losing enterprises are usually merged with viable state enterprises or simply continue to be subsidized. Most workers who have been discharged have continued to receive minimum compensation, including early retirement and opportunities to go into business for themselves.

China has three types of economic activities: those that are stipulated by mandatory planning, those that are done according to indicative planning (in which central planning of economic outcomes is indirectly implemented), and those that are governed by market forces. The second and third types have grown at the expense of the first type, but goods of national importance and almost all large-scale construction come under the mandatory planning system. Operational supervision over economic projects has devolved primarily to governments at the provincial, municipal, and county levels. The market economy generally involves small-scale or highly perishable items that circulate only within local market areas. In addition, enterprises themselves are gaining more independence in a range of activities. Almost every year brings changes in the lists of goods that fall under each of the three types of planning. The Chinese economic system overall contains a complex mixture of relationships: state ownership, shareholding, private ownership, collective ownership, foreign direct investment, and public ownership through shareholding. Indeed, the nonstate investment in fixed assets in China at the beginning of the twenty-first century reached 47 percent of its total and has continued to grow. China continues to search for an optimal balance between plan and market, although the Communist Party reserves the right to make broad decisions on economic priorities and policies.

Xiaobo HU

**Further Reading**


Education System

Jiàoyù zhìdù 教育制度

China’s educational system, the largest in the world, achieved remarkable gains from 1949 to 2009, despite political upheaval and relatively low levels of funding—resulting in dramatically improved literacy rates, sky-rocketing enrollment in colleges, and the focus on developing internationally competitive universities. How China faces the next decade’s set of challenges will be the focus of educators worldwide.

When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, 20 percent of school-age children attended primary school. Sixty years later enrollment is over 99 percent, and the national illiteracy rate has plummeted from 80 to below 10 percent. China’s schools serve more than 200 million primary and secondary school students, nearly 19 million college students, and well over 5 million adult higher education students. Educational quality rather than quantity now preoccupies policy makers, educators, and the public, all of whom desire education that is effective, equitable, innovative, and life-long.

During the next decade educational reform will remain challenging. Slowing economic growth, rising expectations for educational access through college, increasing unemployment among high school and college graduates, lack of accreditation and quality control systems in higher education, rapid urban-rural migration, and a persistent gap in educational quality and opportunity between rural and urban communities require urgent attention. In this context, China’s first education educational reform plan of the twenty-first century charts a twelve-year course for education aligned with the goals of social and economic development for a “harmonious, moderately prosperous society,” technology innovation, improvement of rural education and teachers’ welfare, and systemic reform of elementary, vocational, and higher education.

Achieving Universal Basic Education

China’s education system is anchored by the belief in the power of schooling. Surveys show that family budgets give top priority to educational expenses, followed by health and housing. Reforms in education through much of the 1990s brought a shift of financial responsibility from the central government to local communities. State funding of education dropped from 84.5 percent of total costs in 1991 to 64.7 percent in 2006, and tuition as a source of funding increased from 4.42 to 15.8 percent in 2006. The decrease in national funding forced schools at all levels to generate income from school businesses, services, and fee-paying students, worsening educational gaps between rich and poor counties. During the last ten years the state has recentralized some financial responsibility primarily through poverty-relief and basic education support programs. Nevertheless, school funding remains a point of controversy. Although national policy...
prescribes government expenditures of 4 percent of GDP (gross domestic product) on education, current estimates range from 2.2 to 3 percent, a figure virtually unchanged since the 1950s.

To address educational disparity between rural and urban regions in particular the state has relied primarily on school finance reform. Beginning in 1986, funding was decentralized, and county- and village-level education offices gained a greater degree of decision-making power. While elite urban schools received considerable public support, financial responsibility for rural schools was left largely to local communities that relied heavily on surcharges. The current bright spot in enhancing educational equity is the Two Exemptions and One Subsidy (TEOS) policy that provides students financial support for school fees, textbooks, and boarding costs. Along with the establishment in 2005 of the Rural Compulsory Education Assured Funding Mechanism, which has rationalized and re-centralized to the central and provincial levels universal support for rural and urban compulsory schooling, the state has finally made central to its efforts to “build a socialist new countryside” genuinely free basic education.

Since the 1980s a majority of urban children have attended preschool, reflecting the mobilization of women outside the household and China’s one-child-per-family policy. By 2006 gross preschool enrollment rates reached 39 percent for three- to five-year-olds. In 2007 China’s 320,061 primary schools enrolled 105.64 million pupils. Net enrollment rates reached 99.49 and promotion rates were 100 percent. Declining primary-school enrollments have allowed officials to close poor schools, in some cases decrease class size, and increase teaching standards. Revised standards for the primary school curriculum, instituted on a trial basis in 2001, have enabled well-rounded training in language arts, mathematics and sciences, social studies, physical education, and music and art. English-language and information-technology instruction begin in third grade in schools with sufficient resources.

Since the mid-2000s China has put in place policies, largely fiscal, that ensure free compulsory schooling. In 2007 China’s gross enrollment rate for pupils in junior secondary school (grades seven through nine), a part of the compulsory education system since 1985, was 98 percent. Coastal cities that have universalized junior secondary schooling have eliminated selective entrance examinations in favor of neighborhood schooling. Junior secondary schools enrolled approximately 57.36 million pupils nationally in 2007.

Graduation from junior secondary school represents the transition of adolescents to stratified senior secondary schools, work, or unemployment. Although junior secondary school dropout rates remain worrisome, between 1990 and 2007 promotion rates to senior secondary school increased from 40.6 to 75.7 percent. Senior secondary schooling is nearly universalized in metropolitan areas such as Shanghai, where 98 percent of junior secondary graduates continued their education in 2007. Reforms in senior secondary school have included new textbooks, elective courses, information technology, credit systems, and an approach to moral education that stresses community participation, “healthy leisure,” and discovery learning. New curricular standards established in 2001 give individual schools more flexibility in deciding how their teachers can best engage students in a well-rounded course of study in Chinese, English, mathematics, biology, chemistry, physics, computer sciences, social studies, geography, arts, music, and physical sciences. College preparatory courses, criticized by some as being too difficult, have been streamlined to offer students time for co-curricular pursuits. Systems of accreditation are being established for advanced teachers and private schools; in-service training and increased educational qualifications are required for teachers and principals.

The content, guidelines, and structure for competency and matriculation examinations are also adapting to meet changing curricular standards. Many cities and provinces have adopted a college entrance examination system that requires examinations in Chinese, English, and mathematics plus one or two optional subjects, usually chosen from history, physics, politics, and chemistry. High-achieving students sometimes are exempted from exams. Expanding college enrollment drives such reforms. The chances for students in metropolitan centers to enter college have never been greater (but college has never cost more). Living in educational centers greatly improves a student’s chance for higher education; such centers have more resources to spend on education and consequently have more desks available in high schools and colleges. Of Beijing’s senior secondary graduates, 75.9 percent entered higher education in 2008.
In spite of state efforts to make compulsory schooling accessible for all children, rural education faces significant challenges. Most recently the devastation of schools and the deaths of over 10,000 school children as a result of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake became a lightning rod for public outcry at the lack of attention to rural schooling, in spite of improved supervision at the national level. Pressures for junior middle school students to become migrant workers explain drop-out rates that reach 30 percent or higher. Nearly 70 million children of migrant parents are “left behind” in homes with one or no parents, leaving rural schools overwhelmed with custodial responsibilities. At least until the economic downturn of 2008 as many as twenty million migrant children under 18 years of age were living in cities and working as laborers, many without access to schooling (Ministry of Education 2005; China Statistical Yearbook 2006).

Admission to senior high school is difficult for rural students who have proportionately fewer high school options than their urban counterparts. Many rural students who are successful in college preparatory high schools cannot take full advantage of the dramatic expansion of higher education, whose gross enrolment rates were 23 percent in 2007 compared to 3 percent in the early 1990s. High college tuition on top of heavy high school fees creates a financial burden beyond the means of poor rural families. Likewise, midwestern and western provinces have far fewer quotas than their eastern counterparts for entrance of their students into prestigious institutions of higher education.

Expanding Tertiary Education

Until the last ten years the base of China’s educational pyramid, relative to that of other developing countries, has been broad whereas the top has been narrow. In 1990 3 percent of Chinese eighteen- through twenty-two-year-olds were studying in tertiary institutions, compared with 8 percent in India; fewer than one out of every one hundred citizens was a college graduate. Since China’s integration into the global economy, higher education has entered a phase of unprecedented expansion. During the first decade of the twenty-first century the proportion of eighteen- through twenty-two-year-olds in higher education has increased from 9 to 23 percent.

In 2007 enrollment in 1,908 regular tertiary institutions was 18.85 million. Enrollment in adult higher education was well over 5 million. The continuous rise in the number of people pursuing bachelor and master degrees has offered an enormous market for education and training but also has lead to a mismatch between college degree holders and the labor market.

Along with expansion comes the desire to build world class schools—in mid-1990s the 211 Project, to strengthen programs and disciplines in one hundred key universities for the twenty-first century, and in the late 1990s the 985 Works, to build up several universities to an internationally advanced competitive level—and the need to prioritize state funding for the very top-ranked colleges.

Reforms in higher education have been aimed at decentralized and/or diversifying funding and increasing institutional accountability and quality. While even elite institutions have grown substantially, primarily due to consolidation, second and third tier institutions have increased dramatically in number and size. Majors and disciplines are being redefined. Some colleges allow qualified students to graduate early. At the same time benefits such as housing, education, and health services for college staff and faculty have decreased as colleges contract out services. Whereas the number of college students grew from 2,184,000 in 1992 to 18,850,000 in 2007 the number of support staff grew much more slowly from 1 million to just under 2 million.

Financial aid and student services stand at the forefront of change. Measures at the national, provincial, city, and institutional levels to help students afford college have accompanied striking increases in tuition, which in Beijing in 2007 ranged from 5,000 yuan for ordinary majors at second-tier institutions to 10,000 yuan for performing arts and arts design courses at elite institutions. Colleges that offer teaching and research assistantships, the banking industry, and the Ministries of Education and Finance support national student loan programs. Questions of equity remain. First, a sound system of financial aid is still underdeveloped. Since 1997, Chinese higher education funding has been increasingly tuition-driven and expensive. Meanwhile, accompanying the increasing gap between the rich and the poor and the massification of higher education, families from more diverse socio-economic backgrounds have become involved in higher
education (Ding, 2006). According to official statistics, there are now 2,400,000 impoverished college students in China, accounting for 20 percent of the undergraduate population. Furthermore, these students from lower-income families are more inclined to choose normal or agriculture universities, which provide free education or education at low rates of tuition. First-tier universities are inclined to accept students from wealthier families, while second tier universities are inclined to accept more poor students (Ding, 2006). How to provide enough need-based financial aid to achieve equality in access to higher education has emerged as a huge educational problem in China. In addition, students from the hinterland have much less chances

Raising Teaching Standards

Efforts have been underway for well over a decade to require teachers in primary and secondary schools to have four-year college degrees. A national continuing education mandate requires in-service training of 240 to 520 hours every five years. Such efforts to raise standards, coupled with expansion in secondary and tertiary education, have created a shortage of qualified teachers. The teacher-student ratio in colleges increased sharply; at the same time a record number of faculty members was on the verge of retirement, up from 5.6 percent in 1992 to 15.5 percent in 2004. Colleges now are compelled to attract teachers by increasing salaries and opportunities for foreign travel. Competition has also developed among colleges in the training of teachers. Comprehensive colleges are encouraged to institute teacher-training programs, and normal colleges are responding with more specialized and flexible training options.

Improving the stability and quality of the teaching force is critical in rural areas where primary school teachers until recently were not state employees but instead were hired by local communities as minban (community managed) teachers. Minban teachers work in public and community schools but are paid by subsidies and non-budgetary allocations from villages. Because such teachers do not receive a regular salary from the government, they have difficulty maintaining an adequate standard of living. In response, several ministries recognized qualified minban teachers as state employees. In impoverished counties in rural and western China regional variations in the quality of the teaching force have also inspired distance education programs for female and ethnic minority teachers.

In the sixty years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China the national illiteracy rate has plummeted from 80 percent to below 10 percent. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Private Schools Filling the Gap in Capacity

Private schooling reemerged at all levels of the education system during the 1990s. In 2007 more than 95,000 non-state educational institutions existed, reflecting a diversity of programs and administrative and fiscal autonomy. Non-state preschools and kindergartens accounted for 60 percent of the total. In addition, China had more than 16,000 non-state primary and secondary schools, 297 nationally accredited non-state colleges, and 318 independent colleges affiliated with state universities, and more than 900 pilot non-state colleges offering diploma courses.

Among the reasons for the increase in private schools have been lack of state funding, rigidity in the public sector, and restricted entrance to public schools. The state’s policy of encouraging, guiding, and effectively administering private schools was also intended to boost the economy by prompting families to use their savings on the one “commodity” they desire—education for their children.

As private education has become a major force in reform, many private schools are short-term or proprietary institutions. Others provide a forum for experimentation in teaching and community-government relations. For example, private girls’ schools experiment with an array of curricula—in music, drawing, martial arts, driver’s training, information technology, and psychology—that is designed to meet the needs of healthy female development. Such schools fill educational gaps left by a state that has not been able or willing to provide sufficient schooling to meet public demand. Because private schools face opposition from local authorities who are protective of scarce funds, many such schools are enmeshed in community-level conflicts. As state schools or branch schools run by public institutions have expanded, many private schools have also been forced out of business.
Educating the Margins

Inequalities in access to a good education in China are a result of complex patterns of historical regional, ethnic, and gender discrimination. Primarily, China’s best-educated and worst-educated regions reflect the economic disparities between the coastal and interior regions.

China has been a high-profile participant in international efforts to eliminate illiteracy and exploitative child labor and to universalize basic schooling. Outside aid from organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank and domestic support from programs such as Project Hope, the China Youth Development Foundation’s social welfare program, have focused on these goals, especially in areas where the poorest 20 percent of China’s population live. Efforts in the 1990s and 2000s have primarily been directed at the two-thirds of illiterates and school dropouts who were poor, minority, rural females.

China has reintroduced all-girls’ schools and classrooms in both rural and urban communities.

As noted above, female students comprise an increasing proportion of the enrollment of non-compulsory schools. However, their location within the system (disproportionately weighted in the humanities, foreign languages, and teacher education) is still largely determined by gender. As of 2006 nationwide, 48.06 percent of students in regular higher education institutions were female. Female full-time teachers made up 44.42 percent of college teaching staff, 45.64 and 54.79 percent of the general secondary and primary staff, respectively, and 92.72 percent of kindergarten staff. Females made up 50.38 percent of students in senior vocational high schools, 46.83 percent in senior high, and around 45 percent in regular and vocational junior high schools.

China’s campaign to universalize basic education has also shined a spotlight on ethnic minority regions, which span 60 percent of China’s territory and lag behind in education and economic indicators. Although minority students usually attend primary schools at Han Chinese levels, literacy rates for twenty-eight of the fifty-five minority groups are below that of the Han majority; minority students are considerably underrepresented in secondary and higher education. A system of two-track schools that teaches in either Mandarin or the local minority language perpetuates discrimination. The system, designed to protect minority cultures, places minority students at a disadvantage in competing for jobs in business and government, which require Chinese-language skills.

China’s disabled population arguably is the group that is most marginalized by the practices of formal and non-formal education. The government in 1990 enacted legislation to protect the rights of China’s 60 million disabled citizens, 25 percent of whom live in poverty. That same year the Ministry of Education signed the Special Education Project Task Agreement with twenty-one provinces to universalize compulsory education among disabled children. At that time 358,372 disabled children were enrolled in all types of schools, almost exclusively outside mainstream education. The numbers had increased slightly to 374,500 by 2002. Special education provision remains hampered by China’s lack of qualified special educators and facilities.

Education and Globalization

China’s eleventh five year plan, 2006–2010, has shifted the nation’s overall priorities from rapid growth and the creation of wealth to “common prosperity” and sustainable social and economic development for the creation of a harmonious society. The educational system is linked to this cause through policies designed to increase educational opportunity and excellence. All schools are to offer accessible, high-quality, student-centered education, and a top tier are to become world class institutions promoting scientific innovation and creativity. These “world-class” aspirants are part of a global educational culture, exchanging students, teachers, and knowledge with counterparts around the world.

How China deals with the challenges of its education system matters well beyond its national boundaries. Teachers and scholars worldwide look to China’s education system for inspiration. Students who are emerging from China’s schools are shaping global patterns of the production of knowledge, particularly in science and technology. Lastly, collaborative scholarly networks, improved as more Chinese intellectuals participate in international scholarly and professional organizations, have resulted in an explosion of research on Chinese education. These trends suggest that China will be a leader in educational reform in the twenty-first century.

Heidi A. ROSS
The Girls “Left Behind”

I was born into a poor farming family. I have several sisters, and parents aged and weakened by years of hard work. Three years ago we had a most unfortunate surprise. Father’s liver had hardened to an advanced stage. This added substantially to the family’s burden. Mother bravely hid her constant tears, but we knew things needed to change. Older sister quit school to earn money to help pay for father’s treatments. To lessen the financial strains on the family, I also left school to help out at home. The instant I stepped out of the schoolyard for what I thought was forever, tears streamed down my face. (A left-behind girl, fourteen years old).


Further Reading


Adult education in China evolved from simply eliminating illiteracy (between the 1950s and 1970s) to serving the public as an alternative to the conventional school education (since the 1980s). Student populations grew to include others besides workers and peasants, while the types of programs and subjects increased to serve the needs of the general population wanting to expand the breadth of their knowledge.

When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, about 80 percent of its population was illiterate. The immediate task of the new government in need of a skilled labor force was to provide literacy education. The Council of Government Affairs (now the State Council) issued an executive order that specified that the top priority in education was to eliminate illiteracy among workers and peasants. The order called on the public to launch a literacy movement nationwide in an attempt to gradually decrease illiteracy. This wave of literacy education shaped adult education in China.

Adult education was first labeled as worker-peasant education or after-work education between the 1950s and 1970s. The designation adult education came about in the early 1980s with the development of economic reform, an increase in the need for learning, a wider audience receptive to education, and the enrichment of this type of education in format and content. The central government issued the Development Outline of Education Reform in China (1993), which specified that adult education would serve the public as an alternative to the conventional school education.

**Student Populations**

China's adult education provides educational opportunities mainly to the following:

- Illiterates who need basic reading and writing skills
- Employed workers who need training to advance their skills or to transfer to a different position
- Job seekers who need training to meet the requirements of knowledge and skills in the professions in which they seek employment
- School dropouts who want to complete their secondary or college education and earn diplomas or degrees
- College graduates and professionals who want to update and advance their knowledge and skills in their professions
- Members of the general public who want to learn about topics such as health, finance, law, and family planning, or want to enrich their lives with various hobbies
Instructional Models

Adult education in China can be roughly divided into four categories:

- Adult primary education for workers and peasants, or literacy classes that offer basic reading and writing skills.
- Adult secondary education, which also includes training in vocational, agricultural, and technical programs, courses taught by radio and closed-circuit television broadcasts, and tutoring for individuals who want to pass an examination to earn a diploma or certificate through self-study.
- Adult higher education, which includes university-level courses taught by radio and closed-circuit television broadcasts, administrative cadres institutes, teacher-education colleges, and distance-learning colleges.
- General distance learning using online or correspondence courses.

All these categories of adult education are under the authority of the Department of Adult Education and Vocational Education at China's Ministry of Education. Offices implementing adult education are under the education authorities in provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and prefectures, counties, or townships.

The industries involved in adult education range from mechanics, electronics, civil engineering, environmental protection, chemical engineering, light industry, coal, and metallurgy to railway, transportation, agriculture, and forestry. The public organizations involved in implementing adult education include democratic parties, public organizations, academic organizations, trade unions, and Communist Youth League offices at different levels; independent enterprises and individuals often advocate for adult education programs as well. Another important partner of the Ministry of Education in adult education is the Chinese Association for Adult Education. Founded in 1981, it is a social organization for all members of participating in adult education in China. Its main functions are to publicize, organize, and coordinate the activities of adult education; provide consultation and training; and carry out international exchange relating to adult education affairs.

Adult education can be pursued full-time or part-time in the classroom, by taking online courses, and through individual tutoring. The curricula have expanded to include liberal arts, natural sciences, engineering, medical science, agriculture, finance, political science and law, education, and sports. The programs can result in a diploma, a degree, or a certificate or be simply for pleasure and personal enrichment. Most diploma or degree programs can be completed in two or three years. A few offer a four-year regular undergraduate curriculum.

### Table 1: Number of Student Enrollment of Adult Education Programs Providing Formal Programs (Unit: 10,000 students)

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<td><strong>I. Higher Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Undergraduates in Adult Higher Education Institutes</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>41.30</td>
<td>140.80</td>
<td>155.40</td>
<td>172.50</td>
<td>353.64</td>
<td>559.16</td>
<td>419.80</td>
<td>436.07</td>
<td>524.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adult Senior High Schools</td>
<td>75.12</td>
<td>138.98</td>
<td>32.40</td>
<td>52.82</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>51.27</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>51.27</td>
<td>50.44</td>
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<td>Adult Vocational Secondary Schools</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>351.80</td>
<td>123.90</td>
<td>155.40</td>
<td>172.50</td>
<td>353.64</td>
<td>559.16</td>
<td>419.80</td>
<td>436.07</td>
<td>524.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adult Junior High Schools</td>
<td>302.57</td>
<td>273.30</td>
<td>18.77</td>
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<td>Adult Primary Schools</td>
<td>1326.80</td>
<td>823.70</td>
<td>6467.20</td>
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<td>Of which: Literacy Classes</td>
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Further Development

Strategies to develop or improve adult education in China focus on job training, continuing education, and community education. One focus is to establish an adult education network among counties, townships, and villages in the countryside to help promote education in literacy, applied technology, democracy and legal systems, environmental protection, family planning, and other areas. Another priority is to encourage corporate sponsorship systems, vocational certificate and licensure systems, and other flexible approaches to adult education. It is also important that laid-off workers and workers needing job transfers will have opportunities to receive vocational training or formal education at different levels and be prepared for re-employment, and that improvements are made to the examination system for those pursuing self-study. Establishing a network of adult education that is accessible to the whole society will certainly impact China’s future for the better, as will initiating experimentation in community education and fostering the concept of lifetime education.

Jean W. YAN

Further Reading

Beginning with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, and in the thirty years since, China has put forth great efforts to provide compulsory, free and universal education to children from grades one through nine cross the nation.

After Deng Xiaoping resumed his political career for the third time in 1978, one of his first acts as China’s paramount leader was to redirect the nation’s focus toward economic development. Deng recognized that it was important to raise the population’s education level if China were to realize the Four Modernizations 四个现代化 in agriculture, industry, technology, and defense.

In 1984 authorities began to formulate major laws affecting education. One notable idea of 1985 was to provide nine years of compulsory education. On 1 July 1986, the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国九年义务教育法 was enacted. The law provides three components: compulsory, free, and universal education. Compulsory means an obligation of the school, parents, and society to guarantee all school-age children the right to receive nine years of basic education. Free refers to no charge for tuition and miscellaneous fees to pupils. Universal indicates setting standards for textbooks, curricula, financial management, and construction. The administrative model had the central government overseeing, local governments executing, and a multilevel government structure managing education.

Illustration of a nineteenth-century school. Deng Xiaoping recognized the importance of raising the population’s education level so that China could realize the “Four Modernizations” in agriculture, industry, technology, and defense.
The funding structure was pyramid-like. Lower-level governments—that is, towns, villages, and counties—shouldered most of the costs of basic education.

In 2004 the Economy Research Office at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China conducted a study to evaluate the implementation of the 1986 law in sixteen provinces in rural China. The findings were disappointing. The government’s so-called basically popularized compulsory education impacted only 85 percent of the country. The remaining 15 percent—mainly the impoverished regions—was far from achieving the goal of compulsory education. Even in the areas that did meet the goal, the outcomes and quality of compulsory education were tenuous, evidenced by a comeback of high dropout rates and a lack of instructional instruments and qualified teachers. The officially published dropout rate was about 5 percent, with some areas reaching 10 percent. Findings from the field investigation, however, revealed a rate of 20 percent or higher. Factors such as poverty, transportation, teacher quality, funding resources, and the public’s understanding of educational benefits all contributed to the failure of implementation.

Given this reality, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted at its twenty-second plenum session an amendment to the Compulsory Education Law, which went into effect on 1 September 2006. The amendment generated the following improvements:

- further assurances of compulsory, free, and universal education
- a new funding structure that guarantees funding propositions at different government levels,
with the central government shouldering the major burden of funding

- clear specifications of the administrative infrastructure in which both the central and local governments jointly share the management responsibilities of compulsory education

- various strategies to ensure equal opportunity to receive an education for all school-age children and children with disabilities

- further enforcement of efforts to promote quality-based education

- a written social status and compensation structure for primary and secondary school teachers

- an emphasis on no key schools or key classes and the prohibition of changing the nature of public schools by any government above the county level and its education department

Starting on 1 September 2008, all the Chinese students within the compulsory education grades in the cities began to receive their schooling free of charge. Fees and tuitions for the students of the same group in the country had been eliminated since 2007. This means that China has now realized its goal of free education to all students of the compulsory education grades.

Jean W. YAN

Further Reading


China is making strides in providing education for special-needs students who have communicative, sensory, and physical disabilities, but a shortage of special-education teachers poses a challenge China’s educational system must face. Although the needs of children with other types of impairments are beginning to be addressed, China has yet to pay much attention to some other special-needs students, such as the gifted and talented.

Special education in China historically refers to education for children with disabilities—mainly, with communicative, sensory, and physical impairments. With the development of special-education theories and practice, the field of special education has expanded to include education for children with developmental, psychological, mental, cognitive, and social impairments. Other special-needs children, such as the gifted and talented, have yet to receive more attention in China.

History through 1987

Formal special education was first introduced into China by Western missionaries and charitable organizations around the 1870s and was limited to children with hearing, seeing, and speaking impairments. The missionaries to China brought Braille and sign language; later they developed the first generation of the reading system of Chinese characters. This generation of Braille had more than one version to accommodate different dialects in southern regions, especially Fujian dialect, Cantonese, and Nanjing dialect. In addition, this Braille system was limited to areas other than northeastern regions and was in use until the publication of the second generation in 1953. The curricula during that time focused on basic academic knowledge, living skills, and religion.

The first schools of special education run by the Chinese were not founded until the early twentieth century, initially by philanthropists and charitable organizations and later by the government. The curricula included academic knowledge and vocational skills from elementary level to senior high school level. Some students with disabilities pursued college education after graduation from high school. The disabled populations served by the Chinese during that era were mostly the blind and deaf. By the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, there were about forty special-education schools that served about 2,380 blind or deaf students.

From 1949 to 1965 special education developed gradually but steadily. During this period the central government developed and executed a series of laws, regulations, and policies related to special education. To implement these law, regulations, and policies, the government allotted funds; enrolled students with sensory, communicative, developmental, and mental impairments into special schools; and arranged for graduates to work in “welfare factories” (fu li gong chang 福利工厂), or the factories designated specifically for disabled populations.
Then special education was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) for more than ten years. Despite the earlier efforts, by 1984 less than 2 percent of all eligible children nationwide went through this progression, and most of that number were children in the cities, while the majority of children with disabilities were left as each family’s responsibility. Special education remained a low priority on the government agenda until China launched its economic reforms in the early 1980s.

The National Conference on Education held in 1985 started recognizing the importance of special education, and the Compulsory Education Law (yi wu jiao yu fa 义务教育法), enacted in 1986, formally called for equal education rights for children with disabilities or special needs. Partially due to this law and partially due to the high costs of special-education schools and to the promotional efforts of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF), change set in. A nonprofit organization headed by the son of Deng Xiaoping, Deng Pufang (disabled himself due to violence he experienced during the Cultural Revolution), began taking shape to accommodate disabled children in schools. Depending on the resources available, students might study in special-education schools, in special-education classes in regular schools (fu she te jiao ban 附设特教班), or in regular classes in regular schools (sui ban jiu du 随班就读). Given the scarcity of special-education resources—notably, qualified special-education teachers and facilities—most children with disabilities or special needs had to attend regular classrooms at general public schools.

According to the First China National Sample Survey on Disability in 1987, China had a population of 51.64 million individuals with disabilities, about 5 percent of the population at that time. Of this number, children under eighteen accounted for 10.74 million, and those between six and fourteen numbered about 6.25 million.

More Recent Statistics

The Second China National Sample Survey on Disability was conducted in the spring of 2006; the preliminary results estimated that the population of people with disabilities had increased to 82.96 million, which was 6.3 percent of the total population, based on the 2005 year-end statistics (1,309.48 million). Out of this number, 12.33 million (15 percent) have a visual disability, 20.04 million (24.2 percent) have a hearing disability, 1.3 million (1.53 percent) have a speaking disability, 24.12 million (29.1 percent) have a physical disability, 5.54 million (6.7 percent) have mental retardation, 6.14 million (7.4 percent) have mental disability, and 13.52 million (16.3 percent) have multiple disabilities.

With the implementation of the Compulsory Education Law, the Protective Act of the Disabled (can ji ren zhang fa 残疾人保障法), and the Regulations for Education of the Disabled (can ji ren jiao yu tiao li 残疾人教育条例), the enrollment of children with seeing, hearing, and mental impairments increased from less than 6 percent in 1987 to 77.2 percent in 2000. In addition, 4,567 special classes were established in regular schools, and three special colleges were founded during this period. Furthermore, according to a U.N. Economic and Social Commission report, more than 2.51 million individuals with disabilities had received vocational training by 2003. According to the 2002 statistics of the China Ministry of Education, there were 1,540 registered special-education schools that together employed 40,400 teachers and other staff, with 29,800 of them working full time in the schools. In the same year, about 374,500 students enrolled in these schools, and 44,200 students graduated from their programs. But it was reported that in 2003 about 323,000 school-aged children with disabilities still lacked access to education (China Statistics Press, 2004). Statistics from China’s Ministry of Education show that, by 2006, 362,946 students with disabilities, in grade 1 to grade 10, were enrolled in 1,605 schools of various kinds. Of the 1,605 schools, 672 are in the cities, 857 are in county or town seats, and the remaining 76 are scattered around rural areas. (See table 1.)

A shortage of special-education teachers has been a pressing issue for many years in China. By 2006 there were 33,396 full-time special-education teachers, with 72 percent female and less than 6 percent minority. By 2006 there were twenty-two universities and colleges in the nation (including schools in Hong Kong) that offered four-year or advanced degrees in teaching or administering special-education programs. But the number of graduates from these schools is far from meeting the demand for special-education teachers in the whole country.
Of the special-education teachers in these schools 78 percent hold an associate or higher degree, and 21 percent hold a high school diploma. The remaining less than 1 percent do not have a high school diploma. Regarding grade placement, 48 percent qualify to teach grades 4–6, and about 36 percent grade 1. Less than 4 percent qualify for teaching senior-high grades, and 6 percent do not have a teaching-grade qualification. As for facilities in the special-education schools, by 2006 the total floor space was 4,222,436 square meters, out of which 1,797,910 square meters were allotted to instruction and related services and 489,883 square meters were for administration and teacher offices.

Jean W. YAN
Further Reading


Butcher the donkey after it finished his job on the mill.

卸磨杀驴

Xìe mò shā lǘ
Eight Revolutionary Model Dramas

巴歌《革命样板戏》

The eight revolutionary model dramas, consisting of five Beijing Operas, two ballet dance dramas, and one symphonic work, were composed during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Under the supervision of Mao Zedong’s wife Jiang Qing, these eight pieces were transformed into a vehicle for propagating Maoist ideology.

Traditional Beijing Opera, since it began in the late eighteenth century, evolved naturally, its development little affected by political changes. However, this state of affairs was not to last. Although some people called for its reform during the May Fourth Movement (an intellectual movement that swept through China between 1915 and 1923), only after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 did this artistic genre undergo the most radical transformation in its history. This transformation came about because Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) wanted literature and art to serve political goals. Beijing Opera was not fit to perform this function with its age-old stage conventions and its repertoire of stories about ancient emperors and generals, scholars and beautiful ladies. During the Cultural Revolution Jiang Qing seized this opportunity to remake Beijing Opera to serve a political purpose. The results were the so-called eight revolutionary model dramas (革命样板戏).

Synopses

The eight model dramas consist of the following pieces:

(1) On the Docks (Hai gang) portrays a group of dockworkers rushing to load grain bound for Africa before an approaching typhoon. The good workers, armed with Mao Zedong’s thought and the proletarian internationalist spirit, expose a dispatcher’s sabotage. (2) Raid on the White Tiger Regiment (Qixi Baihu Tuan 奇袭白虎团) depicts how a unit of the Chinese People’s Volunteers wipes out a South Korean regiment and captures its U.S. advisors during the Korean War. (3) Shajiabang 沙家浜 was adapted from the Shanghai Opera Sparks amid the Reeds (Ludang huozhong 芦塘火种). It describes how the soldiers of the New Fourth Army smash the encirclement campaigns of the Japanese invaders and their Chinese puppets with the help of a clever teahouse proprietor, who is an underground Communist Party member. (4) Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (Zhiqu Weihushan 贼取威虎山) was based on Qu Bo’s well-known novel, An Ocean of Forest and a Plain of Snow (Linhai xueyuan 林海雪原). This opera depicts a battle during the Chinese civil war in which the Communist forces wipe out a bandit chieftain and Guomindang 国民党 (Chinese Nationalist Party) brigadier in his mountain stronghold in northeast China. In (5) The Red Lantern (Hongdeng jī 红灯记) a railroad worker tries to deliver a secret code to the Communist guerrillas in the mountains. He and his mother are arrested by the Japanese police and executed, but his daughter succeeds in delivering the code. The red lantern is used as a signal...
by the Communist underground and is also a symbol of revolutionary spirit. (6) Set on Hainan Island 海南岛 in the 1930s, the ballet Red Detachment of Women (Hongse niangzijun 红色娘子军) dramatizes how a group of peasant women defeat a local despot and joins the Communist army. (7) The ballet The White-Haired Girl (Bamao nu 白毛女) was adapted from a well-known opera of the same name with lyrics by the poet He Jingzhi 贺敬之. He based his opera on a folk story about a peasant girl who flees from an evil landlord to a mountain and after living in a cave for several years has her hair turn white. She is finally rescued by the Eighth Route Army that liberated her village. (8) The symphonic work included in the group is also called Shajiabang.

Themes and Theories

As can be seen from the synopses, most of these model dramas deal with wars (the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese civil war, the Korean War). Closely related to the war theme is the theme of class struggle between oppressive landlords and poor peasants. To enact past wars and struggles is to spur the Chinese people to continue revolution in the present. In On the Docks (1963), the only opera not set in wartime, class struggle is broadened into a global power struggle between East and West in which China supports Third World countries in their struggles against imperialists. The dispatcher, who tries to prevent a shipment of seed rice to Africa, is an agent of the imperialists, who do not want the African people to become self-sufficient in food supplies. Another characteristic of the model dramas is the prominence of women characters, who are portrayed as loyal and capable party members (Sister A-qing 阿庆嫂 in Shajiabang, Fang Haizhen 方海珍 in On the Docks) or as oppressed peasants transformed into revolutionary warriors (Xi’er 喜儿 in The White-Haired Girl, Wu Qinghua 吴清华 in Red Detachment of Women). However, women’s gains in social status are achieved at the loss of their feminine attributes. These women characters have no husband, no family, and no intimate relationships. The budding love between Xi’er and the PLA soldier who rescued her, the affection between Wu Qinghua and a leader of the militia, and the love affair between a regimental chief of staff and an army nurse (Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy) in the original sources were all eliminated in the adaptations to emphasize class struggle and revolution. In the model dramas there is no room for love except love for the Communist Party and Chairman Mao. The traditional Chinese family is also conspicuously absent. The only family that appears in these works is the surrogate family in The Red Lantern. The three members of the railroad worker LI Yuhe’s 李玉和 family (Li and his adopted mother and daughter) are not related by blood ties but rather by their shared belief in the Communist revolution. Likewise, Sister A-Qing and the eighteen wounded soldiers from the New Fourth Army form a revolutionary family. Even grandmothers (Grandma Li in The Red Lantern, Auntie Sha in Shajiabang, the Korean woman Auntie Choe in Raid on the White Tiger Regiment) actively support the revolution.

The content and composition of the model dramas were guided by Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” (1942), which Jiang Qing claimed to be her source of authority. To implement Mao’s guidelines, she formed a “tri-unification” (san jie he 三结合) work team: party leadership, professional personnel, and the masses. As a representative of the party, she set the themes and guided the selection and revision of the texts for use. A team of playwrights, composers, and performers then produced the operas and ballets, which presumably reflected the revolutionary experiences of the masses (workers, peasants, and soldiers). The masses were invited to offer their opinions for any revisions, but the final decision rested with the party leadership. In addition to this tripartite production team, the principle of “three prominences” (san tuchu 三突出) was adopted and resulted in this formula: Give prominence to positive characters, heroic characters, and the main heroic character, in ascending order. As a result of this principle, the main heroes appear as superhumans without any blemishes. On the opposite spectrum the negative characters are all stupid, cowardly, and ugly. Both the heroes and villains are cardboard figures without any depth. This kind of stereotypical characterization conformed to another ideal of Mao, that is, revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism. This ideal means that literature and art should not passively reflect reality but rather should actively impel reality forward.
and transform it. In other words, the characters in the model dramas are not found in real life; they are found only in theory and concepts. Another slogan that was applied to the production of these dramas was “Make the ancient serve the present, the foreign serve the Chinese.” Jiang Qing’s model works employed an old art form (the Beijing Opera) and Western art forms (ballet and symphony) to launch the Cultural Revolution.

**Impact and Influence**

During the Cultural Revolution model dramas dominated the Chinese stage because all other forms of performance were banned and actors of the old school persecuted. The saying “eight model dramas for 800 million people” aptly described the cultural situation at the time. Not only Beijing Opera troupes were required to perform these operas; regional theater troupes throughout the country also were required to do the same. Minority peoples’ theaters were no exception, either. For example, in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Uygur actors translated Red Lantern into their language and set their traditional music to it. As the power of the original eight model dramas reached a peak, several revolutionary operas were created in the early 1970s, such as Azalea Mountain (Dujuanshan 杜鹃山), Song of the Dragon River (Longjiang song 龙江颂), and Fighting in the Plain (Pingyuan zuozhan 平原作战). However, the fortune of the model dramas changed with the end of the Cultural Revolution; their decline came as quickly as their ascendance. The new party leadership declared the Cultural Revolution a national disaster and distanced itself from anything that evoked the memory of that period. In recent years, as the Cultural
Revolution has receded into history, the model dramas have become popular again, and some of them have been restaged. This renewed interest reflects the Chinese people’s desire to preserve these dramas as a part of their cultural memory, now that they can enjoy them from a safe distance. The experiments of the model dramas, minus the political propaganda, can also be useful in producing new operas on contemporary themes in order to make the old drama more relevant to contemporary audiences.

Shiaoling YU

Further Reading

You won’t help the new plants grow by pulling them up higher.

揠苗助长

Yà miáo zhù zhǎng
Eight-Legged Essay

Bāgūwén 八股文

Starting during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and continuing for hundreds of years, the “Eight-Legged Essay” was the required eight-part response to civil service examination questions based on Confucian thought. The extremely formulaic essay, which had both critics and defenders over the years, evolved as a way for official examiners to impartially evaluate the work of tens of thousands of candidates.

Most accounts of the development of the late imperial examination essay begin with modernist apologies. The twentieth-century cultural assault on the infamous Eight-Legged Essay (bagu wen)—as the classical essay on the Confucian texts, the Four Books and Five Classics, was called since the fifteenth century—has included accusations that the essay became a byword for petrifaction in Chinese literature or that the essay itself was one of the reasons for China’s cultural stagnation and economic backwardness in the nineteenth century.

Origins of the Eight-Legged Essay “Grid”

Whatever the literary verdict, the late imperial examination essay had its most immediate roots conceptually in the epochal transition from medieval belles-lettres (literature that is an end in itself and not merely informative) to the classical essay (jingyi) championed by Wang Anshi (1021–1086) in the eleventh century. The classical essay, however, was not firmly in place empire-wide in civil examinations as the key literary form until the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644). When the Eight-Legged Essay was still the rage, before 1850, many efforts were made to trace a history of ideas about its literary pedigree. In fact, when it was still fashionable to do so, champions of both parallel-prose and ancient-style prose essays each claimed the Eight-Legged Essay as a kindred genre to legitimate their competing literary traditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The eight “legs” (ku, bones) of the classical essay referred to the parallel and balanced lines that made up its structure.

The examination essay style that was specifically called the “Eight-Legged” style appeared for the first time in the early years of the Chenghua reign, 1465–1487. Consequently, the tendency to construct the historical genealogy of the Eight-Legged Essay from the earlier dynasties tends to elide its sudden appearance in the 1480s as the accepted form for an examination essay. Later claims that the form derived from earlier styles served to legitimate the Eight-Legged Essay as the harvest of past literature and classical learning. As in earlier such cases the literati themselves, not the imperial court, initially produced this new trend in classical writing.

Although detractors of the Eight-Legged Essay genre have received a more sympathetic hearing in the twentieth century, its late imperial advocates were numerous and came from a broad spectrum of literati. Li Zhi (1527–1602), a late Ming iconoclast on so many issues, saw in
the evolution of classical essay genres a cultural dynamic that was commentary to the ongoing literati search for values in antiquity. The Eight-Legged Essay represented a “contemporary-style essay” for Li and was a genuine genre that had proven its worth by producing famous officials. Their moral achievements, he thought, were because of the use of an orthodox genre for the classical essay in civil examinations.

The Hanlin academician Liang Zhangju's (1775–1849) early nineteenth-century work entitled Zhiyi conghua (Collected Comments on the Crafting of Eight-Legged Civil Examination Essays), while mentioning the accruing flaws in the selection process, praised the artistic and cultural levels that the examination essays fostered in Chinese life. Liang noted that no one to date had come up with an acceptable alternative. Qing dynasty (1644–1912) literati who prepared prefaces for the work, which was designed to place the examination essay in full cultural relief, wrote in praise of their dynasty's contributions to the further evolution of the Ming genre.

In the late seventeenth century Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) dated the Eight-Legged Essay with more historical precision to the mid-fifteenth century, when essays began to appear in a clear sequence of eight parts:

1. breaking open the topic (poti),
2. receiving the topic (chengti),
3. beginning discussion (qijiang),
4. initial leg (qigu),
5. transition leg (xugu),
6. middle leg (zhonggu),
7. later leg (hougu),
8. conclusion (dajie)

One of the most renowned early composers of Eight-Legged Essays was the scholar-official Wang Ao (1450–1524), who passed the 1474 Nanjing provincial examination ranked number one out of 2,300 candidates and 135 graduates. Wang then passed the 1477 metropolitan examination in Beijing, also ranking number one. In the palace examination, however, Wang Ao had the misfortune of having as his chief reader Shang Lu (1414–1486), who was at that point the only Ming literatus who had achieved “three firsts” (sanyuan) on the Ming civil examinations. He made sure that Wang would not be the second by ranking Wang’s final policy answer third overall after other readers had initially ranked it first. Shang Lu could identify Wang Ao’s paper because the palace examination, unlike the provincial and metropolitan examinations, was not graded anonymously.

Despite this downclassing, Wang Ao’s classical essays won the day outside the examination compound and beyond the reach of the imperial court. Although official rankings could be tampered with by jealous men such as Shang Lu, the latter’s writings never measured up to Wang Ao’s in the evolution of the genre that would become the Eight-Legged Essay grid. Wang Ao served frequently as a metropolitan examiner in the late fifteenth century, during which his classical essays occasionally served as models for thousands of candidates in the compounds he supervised. Accordingly, the first glimpse we have of the early emergence of the Eight-Legged form of the classical essay, before its explicit declaration as the official examination style in 1487, can be traced to Wang Ao’s 1475 essay on a passage from the Mencius: “The Duke of Zhou subjugated the northern and southern barbarians, drove away the wild animals, and brought security to the people” (Elman 2000, 387).

Cognitive Issues in Eight-Legged Essays

Many of Wang Ao’s Eight-Legged Essays were later cited in Ming and Qing examination essay collections as models for the form. One was based on a passage in the Analects: “When the people have enough, how can the ruler alone have too little?” (Elman 2000, 389). It became perhaps Wang’s most famous essay. It dealt with the ruler’s responsibilities to provide a livelihood for his people and was copied, printed, and studied by generations of civil examination candidates.

What is immediately striking about Wang Ao’s essays is their exaggerated structural commitment to formal parallelism and thinking by analogy. Strict adherence to balanced clauses (duiju) and balanced pairs of characters (shudui) was required, but this feature becomes particularly rule-like in Wang’s framing of his arguments. As the classical essay’s length requirement increased from the five hundred characters common in late Ming times to more than seven hundred during the eighteenth century,
the basic structure of the essay remained unchanged. However, a dispute in the 1543 Shandong provincial examination over the veiled criticism of the throne in the “conclusion” of an Eight-Legged Essay led to a decline in the practice of ending the essay with rhetorical flourish.

The form of chain arguments used in such essays was built around pairs of complementary propositions, which derived their cogency from rich literary traditions that over the centuries had drawn on both the parallel-prose and ancient-style prose traditions of early and medieval China. Balanced prose presupposed that an argument should advance via pairs of complementary clauses and sections that, when formalized and disciplined by analogies, avoided an unfocused narrative. Accordingly, the Eight-Legged Essay represented an effort to confirm the vision of the sages in the Four Books and Five Classics from a “double angle of vision,” which strictly correlated with the parallel syntax of the legs of the examination essay.

In the first leg of Wang Ao’s essay on the prince’s responsibilities, mentioned earlier, the ruler’s actions were directly related to a series of positive economic consequences that would ensue if he followed the way of sagely governance. In the middle leg Wang Ao’s personal assessment was delivered within a balanced sequence that analogized the households of farmers to the prince’s treasury in the first half and compared the farmers’ fields with the prince’s vaults in the second half. The final leg presented the same conclusion in light of the prince’s ritual and culinary needs, all the while stressing the priority of the people in any equation between taxes and wealth. From these three balanced legs it therefore followed that raising taxes of itself was not the sage’s method for governance.

The first leg was almost Aristotelian in its explicit rhetorical linkage of cause (low taxes) and effect (the people’s prosperity). The second leg elaborated on the first by showing how low taxes would increase the overall wealth of the realm if it remained in the hands of the people. And the final leg clinched the argument by responding to questions of how low taxes would directly benefit the dynasty and not just the people. In this manner a conclusion that ran counterintuitively to statist discourse about the wealth and power of the dynasty, which drew on legalist (relating to strict, literal, or excessive conformity to the law or to a religious or moral code) traditions, was successfully channeled into a literati discourse built around the Chinese philosopher Confucius’s (551–479 BCE) vision of a polity pegged to the interests of the people.

Based on the specific Eight-Legged grid, examiners and tutors literally followed the number of legs and counted the number of characters in an essay based on the requirements of balanced clauses, phrases, and characters. In marked-up examination essays that have survived, scholars always find numerous small circles marking exactly the balanced and antithetical clauses in each of the legs of the essay. Examiners used a set pattern of markings to distinguish the main points. This classical grid provided examiners with a simple, impartial standard for ranking essays, which has rightly been labeled “a kind of stylistically formalized classicism” (Elman 2000, 395). The grid also included rules for presentation of the essay form on paper that necessitated proper spacing of characters from top to bottom and left to right. References to the reigning emperor, for instance, had to be highlighted by raising that column of characters higher and avoiding taboo names, while the body of the essay began at a lower level in each column. Essay drafts that survive reveal that Eight-Legged Essays were copied onto paper that was divided into columns and rows to make it easier for examiners to keep track of the parallel legs of the essay.

If a candidate could not follow these strict rules of length, balance, and complementarities, then his essay was judged inferior. One misplaced character, or one character too many or too few, in building a clause in one of the legs of the essay could result in failure. Given the tens of thousands of civil candidates in the compounds where local and provincial examinations were held, the official examiners rightly felt that with a stylized and formulaic Eight-Legged grid as a requirement, their job of reading and evaluating thousands of essays in a brief time was made easier and more impartial.

Printing and Publishing Examination Essays

Civil examination papers were first compiled in the publishing rooms inside the provincial and metropolitan examination compounds, where a host of copyists, woodblock carvers, and printers worked under the
examiners. Essays were printed out with the examiner’s comments and bound according to rank. These official collections of examination essays were based on the original, anonymous essays that the examiners actually had read. Those originals were returned to examinees who requested them after the examination. In addition, the best essay on each quotation or question in all three sessions of both provincial and metropolitan examinations was included in the official examiners’ report and sent to the court for review.

The public printing of essay collections increased during the late Ming publishing boom, when the commoditization of culture intensified. The sixteenth-century increase in private, commercial collections of examination essays can be attributed to the formalization of the Eight-Legged Essay during the last half of the fifteenth century into the official essay style. The expansion of the examination market, which during the Ming and Qing dynasties added a third tier of 1,300 local county and 140 prefectural examinations, thus dramatically increased the empire-wide pool of candidates who would be interested in such collections.

Benjamin A. Elman

Further Reading
Encyclopedias and Dictionaries

Bǎikēquánshù yù zìdiǎn 百科全书与字典

The first Chinese encyclopedia, Huang lan (Book for the Emperors) was printed during the reign of the Weiwen emperor (187–226 CE). China’s first dictionary was compiled in the second century. Encyclopedic writing has played a significant role in Chinese scholarship and culture, valued as the ultimate assembly of traditional knowledge. Today China publishes both comprehensive and specialized encyclopedias and dictionaries.

In China, as elsewhere, encyclopedias are reference books that cover either all branches of human knowledge or all the knowledge of a specific branch. Dictionaries in Chinese are reference books devoted to either characters or words, and in which individual components are arranged by certain methods of indexing, marked with correct pronunciations and tones, and provided with their proper forms and meanings.

Encyclopedias

The English term encyclopedia is Greek in origin, meaning “general knowledge.” The Chinese term baike quanshu comes from Japan. Baike (a hundred subjects) refers to the extent of knowledge, whereas quanshu (all books) refers to comprehensiveness. An encyclopedia provides facts and other information. At the same time, it meets educational purposes by broadening the user’s horizon and providing him or her with a systematic way of acquiring knowledge.

Encyclopedias originated from people’s desire to generalize and classify the knowledge they had acquired. The ancient Greek scholar Aristotle developed many kinds of teaching materials that broadly encompassed the knowledge available at his time. Thus he is known in the West as the father of the encyclopedia. The Chinese book Erya (Approaching What Is Proper), appearing during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), covers the natural and social sciences and is considered the prototype of the Chinese encyclopedia. There are various traditions suggesting a much earlier origin, and the book’s significance through early Chinese history is evident since it was included among the twelve Confucian classics during the Tang period (618–907 CE). The first Chinese encyclopedia, or leishu (a book with material taken from various sources and arranged according to subjects), was Huang lan (Book for the Emperors), edited by Liu Shao, Wang Xiang, and others during the Weiwen emperor’s reign (187–226). Unfortunately, none of the several hundred leishu produced between the third and the eighteenth centuries was an encyclopedia in the truest sense. All were compilations of books already published. In a 1966 article on the Chinese encyclopedia, Wolfgang Bauer discussed the fluid boundaries between a dictionary and an encyclopedia and explained, “A longer commentary delving into history and culture and provided with extensive quotations of sources is . . . more characteristic of the encyclopaedia.” He also wrote, “Although they may include an opinion on the subject, they
rarely contain an original opinion. As countless other works of Chinese literature the encyclopaedia was usually compiled by the ‘scissor and paste’ method and not really written.”

Western Encyclopedias Explained to Chinese Readers

Encyclopedias of ancient times, such as the ancient Greek and Roman encyclopedias intended for education, were authored by individuals who used medieval methods of classification. The thirty-seven-volume *Naturalis Historia*, written by the Roman scholar Pliny the Elder during the first century, is typical of such ancient encyclopedias. Encyclopedias of the Middle Ages, bearing the theological and religious marks of the time, were mostly compiled as textbooks for clergymen serving in monasteries during the fifth to sixteenth centuries. Most of them were still based on the medieval seven-liberal-arts classification system. The eighty-volume *Speculum majus* (*Bigger Mirror*), written by Vincent de Beauvais of France, was the epitome of encyclopedias of this period. Under the influence of the English philosopher Francis Bacon, a more scientific classification system began to be adopted by encyclopedists of the late Middle Ages and has since become the basis for the compilation of modern encyclopedias.

Encyclopedias of modern times date since the eighteenth century. The pioneer was the French philosopher Denis Diderot, who led French encyclopedists in producing the twenty-eight-volume *Encyclopédie* (*Systematic Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Crafts*) from 1751 to 1772. Modern encyclopedias enlighten the reader with knowledge of modern science and technologies and arrange entries in alphabetical order, like dictionaries, for convenience. Between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, Great Britain, Germany, United States, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan produced authoritative encyclopedias, of which the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (published in Great Reference Works about China Published Abroad

Until the China Great Encyclopedia (*Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu* 中国大百科全书) began to appear in 1978 from Encyclopedia of China Publishing House in Beijing, the most comprehensive references on Chinese culture were published outside China. The earliest of such works was probably the *Encyclopaedia Sinica*, written by an English missionary named Samuel Couling and published in 1917. Morohashi Tetsuji’s *The Great Chinese-Japanese Dictionary* (*Dai Kan–Wa jiten 大漢和辭典*) appeared in thirteen volumes from 1955 to 1959. A wide variety of European and American reference works about Chinese history, culture, and biography appeared in the twentieth century, some of them single-volume compilations designed for students, and others—like the *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Chinese History*, published by Cambridge University Press in ten volumes—are a collection of the work of many scholars. The famous reference series *Science and Civilisation in China*, also published by Cambridge University Press, had a primary author, Joseph Needham, but some later volumes were written by other scholars.

The *Encyclopedia of China Today*, a 1980 volume, was arranged in topical chapters like a textbook, not arranged alphabetically. It was the first general resource published to help Americans get up to speed on a country that they had been cut off from for nearly thirty years. The foreword—by John Service, the most prominent of the U.S. China experts to be pursued by the McCarthy Commission—is in itself evidence of the change that was taking place in the United States after the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC in March 1979.

In March 2009, exactly thirty years after normalization, the first comprehensive scholarly English-language encyclopedia, the five-volume *Berkshire Encyclopedia of China* was published by Berkshire Publishing Group, a U.S. company specializing in global information that had developed the six-volume *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* published by Charles Scribers Sons in 2002.
Britain before the fourteenth edition and subsequently in the United States) is generally considered the outstanding example.

**China’s First Modern Encyclopedia**

The *Encyclopedia of China* (or *China Great Encyclopedia, Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu* 中国大百科全书) is the first large-scale comprehensive modern encyclopedia in the Chinese language. The compilation began in 1978. Published by the Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, the encyclopedia was issued one volume at a time, beginning in 1980 with a volume on astronomy. The final volume was completed in 1993. It comprised seventy-four volumes, with more than 80,000 entries divided into sixty-six subject categories. Within each category entries were arranged by pinyin, as are many modern Chinese dictionaries. Its second edition was published in 2008. The Encyclopedia of China Publishing House has also translated and published the *Concise Encyclopedia Britannica* (ten volumes), which was originally compiled and printed by American Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., and the *Soviet Encyclopedia Dictionary*, originally compiled and published by the former Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House.

**Types**

Contemporary encyclopedias come in all types to satisfy the needs of readers of different professions and educational backgrounds. The encyclopedias fall into three major types: comprehensive, specialized, and regional.

Comprehensive encyclopedias cover all the branches of knowledge and are used to access basic knowledge. In accordance with readership, they are further divided into scholarly encyclopedias, such as *Encyclopedia Britannica* and *Encyclopedia of China*; popular or secondary school encyclopedias, such as *Compton’s Encyclopedia* and *Xin shijii zhongxuesheng baike quanshu* (New Century Middle School Students’ Encyclopedia); and young adult and children’s encyclopedias, such as *Oxford Children’s Encyclopedia* and *Zhongguo ertong baike quanshu* (China’s Children Encyclopedia).

Specialized encyclopedias focus on one branch or subject of knowledge, and their coverage can be as broad as that of the U.S. *Encyclopedia of Science and Technology* or as narrow as that of the *Zhongguo jiyou baike quanshu* (Chinese Encyclopedia of Stamp Collection).

Regional encyclopedias are limited to a certain region, country, or even a city, such as the *Encyclopedia of Asia, Jianming Zhonghua baike quanshu* (Concise Encyclopedia of China), and *Aomen baike quanshu* (Encyclopedia of Macao).

**Structures and Processes**

Encyclopedias are arranged mainly by entries that are systematically ordered for easy access. After the editors of an encyclopedia analyze and process the knowledge available—either general knowledge in a comprehensive work, or specific scholarship on the particular subject the work will cover—the headings are designated in such a way as way as to make the encyclopedia “user friendly.” The subjects are then assigned to various scholars or authorities who will prepare the text of the entries. A contemporary encyclopedia can have as few as 1,000 or as many as 100,000 entries. Related entries are often connected with cross-references so that overlapping subjects can be treated without redundancy and related subjects can be associated to each other. Entries often include diagrams, if diagrams, tables and graphics when appropriate, and suggested readings.

Entries are compiled in three ways: by alphabetical order of the first letter of entries, by subject, and by a combination of the first two ways (and with each branch of knowledge contained in a different volume). Encyclopedias of the West often adopt the first method. The *Encyclopedia of China*, nevertheless, employs the last method, the benefit of which is that users find it easy to use and affordable to purchase because they can buy separate volumes as they need.

Apart from the entries that form the main body of text, an encyclopedia also has appendixes to make it more useful. Indexes and appendixes that provide additional information and data, such as maps and chronological tables of important events, are the most important pages of what is called the “back matter.”

**New Media**

Traditional encyclopedias printed on paper have existed for more than a thousand years. With the advent of computer-based information technology in the 1980s, electronic versions of encyclopedias emerged. The early
electronic encyclopedias used a different medium, compact discs. In no time a new type of electronic encyclopedia came into being, one that was interactive and multimedia. This meant that users could not only “talk” to the computer (book) but also could enjoy pictures, audios, and videos alongside the texts. An encyclopedia thus becomes alive and active. If a traditional paper-based encyclopedia is seen as “a university without walls,” then an interactive and multimedia encyclopedia is “a window to a university at home,” which, teaching with three-dimensional demonstrations, gives users enjoyment as they learn.

**Evaluation**

All kinds of encyclopedias with different qualities serve various purposes. A reader must know how to evaluate them and select those that are most helpful. The evaluation should concentrate on four areas: types, functions, readership, and quality. When assessing the quality of an encyclopedia, six criteria should be followed:

- Authority of the writers, editors (editorial board), and publishers responsible for the entries
- Careful selection of complete and up-to-date information
- Objective presentation of views and facts that allows no political, religious, and social biases
- Concise and understandable language
- An easy and precise searching system (the placement of entries and cross-references as well as the creation of indexes)
- Binding and layout, such as the design format, printing, and the quality of paper and binding

**Dictionaries**

Ancient Chinese dictionaries did not differentiate between *zi* (single characters) and *ci* (words with multiple characters). The Chinese called dictionaries of this nature *zishu* (books of characters). Not until publication of *Kangxi zidian* (*The Kangxi Emperor’s Dictionary of Characters*) in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the emergence of the term *cidian* (dictionary of words) in modern China did the Chinese begin to distinguish the concept of *zidian* (dictionaries of characters) from that of *cidian* (dictionaries of words). Nevertheless, the difference between *zidian* and *cidian* is blurred in that a *zidian* may have words as its entries, whereas a *cidian* may also have single characters as its entries. They differ only in their focuses. The English term *dictionary* is, however, indiscriminative of characters and words. There is no such thing as an English *zidian*, or dictionary of characters. The Japanese *ziyin* (pronounced “ziyin” in Chinese) is mostly akin to the Chinese *zidian*. 

A page from a fifteenth-century Chinese encyclopedia. The first modern comprehensive encyclopedia in the Chinese language was compiled and published one volume at a time, beginning in 1978 with a volume on astronomy. Library of Congress.
Pioneering Publications

As early as the second century, Xu Shen compiled his Shuowen jiezi (Explaining Simple and Analyzing Compound Characters), a dictionary arranged in accordance with the structures of each character, which numbered more than nine thousand. It was one of the world’s earliest dictionaries. Then around the time of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) Yupian (Jade Chapters) appeared. It consisted of more than twenty thousand characters. Between the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and the period before the First Opium War (1839–1842) during the Qing dynasty, Kangxi zidian appeared along with another compilation, Zihui (Character Collection), which comprised 33,179 characters. With forty-seven thousand characters, Kangxi zidian is typical of the Chinese dictionaries of characters and remained the largest Chinese dictionary for a long time.

Modern Chinese zidian have been written on the basis of ancient dictionaries of this nature. The most outstanding is the Zhonghua da zidian (Comprehensive Chinese Character Dictionary), compiled by Lu Feikui and others during early Republican China (1912–1949). It not only included more than forty-eight thousand characters, more than the Kangxi zidian did, but also corrected more than two thousand errors in the latter. In 1986 Hanyu da zidian (Comprehensive Chinese Character Dictionary), containing as many as fifty-six thousand Chinese characters, was published. The Zhonghua zihai (Sea of Chinese Characters), published in 1994, records a staggering 85,568 characters.

Comprehensive and Specialized

Because of the different purposes they serve and the different users they target, modern Chinese zidian fall roughly into two major categories. One is the comprehensive zidian, like the Xinhua zidian (New China Character Dictionary), used chiefly for learning and reading the Chinese language. The other is the specialized zidian, such as the Jingdian shiwen (Textual Explanations of Classics and Canons), Gu Han yu changyongzi zidian (Dictionary of Frequently Used Classic Chinese Characters), and Zhongguo shufa da zidian (Comprehensive Chinese Dictionary of Calligraphy). They are written for those who specialize in the study of the forms and pronunciations of Chinese characters.

Commonly used zidian are arranged in three ways: according to the pronunciation of the characters, of their radicals, and of the strokes at each of the four corners of a character in coded numbers. Some zidian use one of the three ways, whereas others use two or all of them at the same time.

Because language constantly changes and new knowledge is continually gained, dictionaries and encyclopedias are destined to be important documents, no matter what their form.

LIU Hang

Translated and used, with permission, from the Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu 中国大百科全书 (China Great Encyclopedia), with the addition of the “Encyclopedias about China Published Abroad” sidebar.

Further Reading


Energy Industry

Coal has been used in China since at least the fourth century; the country has been mainly dependent on it as a source of energy since around 1,000 CE. Today China is the biggest producer and consumer of coal in the world. With increasing demand for energy as Chinese industry grows, the country has been investigating and developing other sources: gas liquefaction, hydroelectricity, renewable power, and nuclear power.

Chinese industry requires energy for commercial purposes such as mining and ore processing; iron, steel, and aluminum production; machine building; manufacturing transportation vehicles such as automobiles, rail cars, locomotives, ships, and aircraft; and for producing or processing textiles and apparel, cement, chemicals, fertilizers, consumer products, food, telecommunications equipment, and armaments. Increasingly, as industries shift manufacturing to China—and China has become the world’s factory—there is also an accompanying shift in energy demand. Energy consumption has been growing 1.4 times faster than the gross domestic product (GDP) since 2001, a growth rate that—barring the impacts of the 2008 global credit and financial crisis—has shown no signs of changing. In some provinces the demand for energy outpaces the supply of coal, oil, and other sources of power leading to imposed brownouts to conserve energy. China is confronted by an energy crisis of enormous proportions: its strategic economic goal of quadrupling GDP by 2020 while only doubling energy growth during the same period is clearly in jeopardy.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the total primary energy supply in thousand metric tons of oil equivalent (ktoe) was 1,717,153 in 2005. On this basis the breakdown of supply consists of: coal, 63.4 percent; oil, 18.5 percent; combustible renewables and waste, 13 percent; gas, 2.3 percent; hydroelectric, 2 percent; and nuclear, 0.8 percent. Geothermal and solar supply is a tiny fraction, not reported in these figures.

Energy Resources

While energy resources are extensive, they will not be sufficient to keep pace with China’s energy needs. The most abundant resource, coal, has a long history of use in China, including heating buildings and smelting metals—going back at least to the fourth century, when coal was simply excavated from surface deposits. Coal was a leading fuel by the year 1000, a time when settlements in Europe still preferred to use wood and charcoal (a fuel made from wood). Coal dominated energy use in China for the next thousand years and continues to do so: China is the biggest producer and consumer of coal in the world. In 2005 China’s coal consumption surpassed 2.2 billion tons.

Eighty-two percent of China’s energy supply comes from coal-fired power plants. Demand for more energy supply reputedly results in the building of a new thousand-megawatt coal-fired power plant every seven to ten days. This reality means that coal industries, rather
than petroleum or natural gas industries, have played the most significant role in energy production and industrial development to date. Apart from the economic benefits, however, much of the coal has high sulfur content, creating widespread atmospheric pollution and health problems, particularly in urban areas. In addition, burning coal contributes to China’s carbon footprint.

The dependence on coal, combined with ample known coal reserves, has led to initiatives in coal gasification and liquefaction to replace coal combustion and oil imports. Coal gasification, which appears to be a promising technology, can lead to production of synthetic gas for power, domestic and industrial heat, and clean fuels for transportation and cooking. Coal liquefaction, a more recent technology, involves coal-to-liquid conversion. Two coal liquefaction plants are scheduled to go into production by 2011, though others have been canceled because of concerns about high capital costs.

In the 1960s increasing concerns about the security of the domestic energy supply, as well as market demands for alternatives to coal, led to major initiatives in oil and gas exploration including the development of the famous Daqing oil field in northeastern China’s Heilongjiang Province. While China does not have significant natural reserves of oil, there are significant domestic reserves of natural gas. For example, the west–east natural gas transmission pipeline, four thousand kilometers long, connects gas fields in Xinjiang and Shaanxi with the Shanghai market. This development will contribute to China’s stated goal of increasing natural gas to 8 percent of total supply by 2010. A second west–east pipeline, running 4,945 kilometers from Khorgos in the northwestern Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to Guangzhou (Canton), the capital of Guangdong Province in southeast China, was announced in 2008. Proven oil and gas reserves on the mainland and offshore, however, will not meet increasing domestic demand. China has become and will continue to be a net importer of oil and gas.

Initiatives to develop untapped hydroelectric potential are underway, of which the Three Gorges hydroelectric dam, created by blocking the Yangzi (Chang) River, the world’s third-largest river after the Amazon and the Nile, has been the most controversial. Not only have there been questions about the economics of the project, its

Workers shovel coal, China’s most abundant energy resource, in Datong, Shanxi Province. Coal has been used in China since the fourth century, when it was simply excavated from surface deposits. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
costs and benefits but also reservations have been raised on environmental and social grounds. The impacts on the riverine environment and ecology as well as the effects of resettling millions of people away from the location of the reservoir and power stations have been massive.

Sources of renewable power—such as biomass, wind, solar, geothermal, and tidal power—are minor in China compared with levels of 3 percent in nations such as Denmark and the United States. Their potential for development, however, is considerable. In recognition of this, the strategic goal for renewable sources is for 15 percent of all energy from wind, biomass, solar, and hydropower energy by 2020, compared with its present 8.5 percent.

Nuclear-power capacity is also expanding. In 2008 there were eleven nuclear-power reactors in commercial operation and another six under construction. Ultimately Chinese authorities seek to be self-sufficient in reactor design, construction, and financing so that they can expand electricity production from nuclear power to 3 percent of total supply in the short term and to 4 percent by 2020.

**Industry Structure**

The shift toward a market economy in energy in China has been fraught with difficulties. National-security concerns over the control of energy supplies and the difficulty of separating government and private enterprise functions in the energy sector represent two overarching challenges at the domestic level. At the international level, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, combined with low prices for oil and coal in the late 1990s, made the economic climate for reforms more difficult at that time. China’s economic reforms since that period have been considerable and include accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.

The restructuring of the energy industry varies by sector—that is, the type of resource: coal sector, nuclear sector, renewable sector, and so on—with the level of competition significantly less than that in the United States, Canada, and Europe. In January 1994 coal prices were deregulated and gradually allowed to float. This change led to closing thirty-one thousand unprofitable mines in 1999 and another eighteen thousand mines in 2000. Some 420,000 miners were laid off in 1998 alone. Restructuring continues with the planned closure of thousands of small mines, many with poor safety records, before 2010. Mounting opposition from local authorities, however, has delayed the implementation of many closures. Global financial shocks such as the 2008 collapse in credit markets and the prospects of a protracted recession in the United States and the European Union will inevitably lead to less demand for energy by Chinese manufacturers.
The oil and gas industries, like other industries, were once centrally controlled by government. Since the economic reforms of the 1980s, however, state-owned oil and gas companies have been created to increase productive capacity through joint ventures with foreign oil companies. The fact that oil consumption has outpaced domestic production since 1993 has further spurred efforts to increase domestic production. To this end, exploration licenses are now awarded to state-owned (but slightly privatized) companies on a competitive basis to meet national production targets.

The sources of electricity production provide one key insight into the Chinese energy industry. Of the 3.256 trillion kilowatt-hours produced in 2007, about 78 percent was supplied by highly polluting coal-burning plants. The balance came from hydroelectric and nuclear-power industries at about 18 percent and 1 percent, respectively. Other sources, including renewable sources, are not currently significant. The amount of coal used in electricity production is about 24 percent of total coal consumption. Industries such as iron and steel, armaments, cement, and chemical fertilizers also use significant amounts of coal.

The energy reforms that have taken place include the creation of two vertically integrated and publicly traded companies from government-controlled organizations that previously had to serve public-policy and regulatory functions. By creating two “market-based” companies, PetroChina and Sinopec, the Chinese government sought to have greater efficiency in energy production and to prepare the way for the competitive pressures that would arise from greater foreign direct investment in domestic energy projects.

PetroChina was created from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1999 with 480,000 of its 1.5 million workers. CNPC allocated the majority of its best assets to PetroChina while retaining the excess workforce and welfare obligations. At the outset PetroChina ranked fifth in the world in estimated reserves, produced 68 percent of China's total oil, operated 3,400 gas stations, and owned pipelines transporting 84 percent of China's natural gas. A second company, Sinopec (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation), followed in 2000. This company operates more than 20,000 gas stations, 1,100 bulk-storage facilities, and a number of refineries. A significant aspect of this restructuring has been the dismissal of 'excess' staff. A 5 percent cut in employment—attributed to soaring labor costs—was announced in 2008, to take effect over a three year period. Given that staff totaled 1.67 million in 2007, this decision would result in 80,000 people losing their jobs. Although information on downsizing is unreliable, it appears that PetroChina laid off 38,000 employees by January 2001 and that Sinopec has cut its workforce of 500,000 by at least 20 percent.

While privatization initiatives are modest given that the state maintains a majority stake in each company, a growing dependence on foreign oil supplies has led Chinese oil companies to a “going-out” or "zou chu qu" policy of overseas investments in oil assets since 2001.

**Challenges**

China’s reliance on coal has led to serious concerns about energy efficiency and environmental problems and makes the development of less harmful sources of energy a pressing challenge. First, energy production is no longer a simple matter of economic efficiency, narrowly defined. Because energy production can have significant impacts on employment and the environment, capital markets are increasingly required to consider environmental, labor, and human-rights ramifications before they make their investment decisions. Second, environmental problems created by burning coal include acid rain, smog, and greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. Each of these problems has specific impacts on the environment and human health. Sulfur dioxide causes acid rain, for example, and damages forests, croplands, and lakes. Smog, made up of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide emissions, covers many cities and affects people’s health. In certain parts of China, the concentration of total suspended particles is two to three times the level specified as safe under World Health Organization guidelines. Carbon dioxide emissions (the main cause of climate change through the greenhouse effect) in China are second only to emissions in the United States. The average American creates 7.5 times more carbon dioxide, however, than the average Chinese.

Energy industries, whether they are publicly or privately owned, have not only to produce more energy from existing natural resources; increasingly they also have to produce energy in environmentally responsible ways.

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Improving energy efficiency while linking energy production to environmental goals is part of a larger challenge China shares with other nations. Economic efficiency goals have thus become an established aspect of energy strategy. In 2003 China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP was 11.5 times more than Japan’s, 4.3 times that of the United States, and nearly 4 times the world average. The opportunity to reduce the amount of energy and materials consumed is thus enormous. China’s economic efficiency goal, to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20 percent between 2005 and 2010, was in 2008 the world’s most aggressive energy efficiency target. If China is successful, it will reduce not only the amount of energy required to produce goods and services but also the amount of environmental pollution. As part of this initiative, energy efficiency targets have been set for the thousand largest enterprises that together consume one-third of all China’s primary energy. Benchmarking performance through audits of energy action plans is a key component in measuring whether the enterprises are meeting their energy-saving targets and hence cutting energy use.

The Chinese government’s expectation that GDP per capita will quadruple between 2000 and 2020 poses challenges for the security of energy supply. Rapid economic growth of 8 to 10 percent each year could be thwarted by supply bottlenecks creating energy supply shortages. Whereas 90 percent of the current energy demand can be met from internal supplies, not all the energy required is in a readily available form. This situation is particularly the case for oil, which is mainly imported to fuel transportation vehicles. The imports of crude oil, petroleum products, and some coal are more than twice the exports of the same products and natural gas. Sourcing supplies has thus become a major focus of attention and a diplomatic initiative in its own right. The Persian Gulf, Africa, and Latin America are three geographic areas for future oil and natural-gas imports via maritime shipping. The Russian Federation and central Asia are potential sources of supply for overland pipelines. With regard to coal, when domestic demand is strong, China imports coal from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Australia. In many instances, the sources of supply can be interrupted by “pirates,” armed conflict, or trade disputes, suggesting that China needs to follow a diversification policy to spread the risk of interruptions to supply. A shortage of energy is considered not only a threat to economic development but also a potential threat to social stability and national security. Therefore, China adopted a policy goal to build by 2010 strategic oil reserves equivalent to thirty days’ worth of imported oil.

Another aspect of energy security is the control the Chinese government exerts on oil prices. Setting prices lower than those of the international market creates losses for the Chinese oil-refining industry. For example, government-controlled oil prices in the domestic market might create a shortfall in supply as refineries cut production to avoid the losses that arise in buying oil at international prices only to sell at lower government-controlled prices. Producers and dealers might also hoard oil to gain profits in the case of a rise in domestic oil prices. The benefits to consumers can be viewed not only as subsidies but also as the absence of a signal to change consumption behavior.

As a consequence of a variety of concerns, the pressing energy challenge is being addressed through four approaches: structural adjustment, technical improvement, enhancement of management, and focusing on reform. Structural adjustment involves restructuring the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors, particularly through economic efficiency initiatives and the development of non-energy-intensive industries. Technical improvement refers to accelerated research and development of energy conservation technologies as well as technical transfer of new techniques. Improving energy efficiency through enhanced management involves strengthening legal regulations and standards, and energy efficiency labeling and product certification. Focusing on reform involves examining the role of the energy market in regulating supply and demand through more accurate price signals. It also includes implementing preferential tax policies and incentives concerning energy efficiency.

The twin challenges of increasing energy use and reducing environmental pollution pose a serious policy dilemma for China’s continuing economic development and energy industries, a dilemma that is inevitably a driving force behind significant, though possibly rhetorical, commitments to more renewable energy sources and efficiency gains through technological enhancements.

Robert GALE
Further Reading


Economic growth, especially as a result of investment in heavy industry, has rapidly increased China’s share of global energy use. Weak enforcement from Beijing and local authorities who appear to opt for profit over environmental efforts emphasize the need for a stronger energy policy in twenty-first-century China.

Between 1978 and 2000, the Chinese economy grew approximately 9 percent annually while energy demand increased 4 percent. At the turn of the twenty-first century, China accounted for 10 percent of global energy demand but met 96 percent of this demand with domestic energy supplies. After 2001, however, economic growth continued apace, but changes in the structure of the economy pushed energy demand up. By 2006, China’s share of global energy use swelled to over 16 percent, forcing the country to rely on international markets for more of the oil, gas, and coal it consumes.

This fundamental shift in China’s energy profile has created both shortages at home and market volatility abroad and raised questions about the sustainability of China’s growth curve. According to the International Energy Agency, China is now the world’s second-largest energy consumer and has likely become the leading source of greenhouse gas emissions.

Evolution of Energy Demand in China

Decades of state planning and ideological aspiration prior to reform in the late 1970s had distorted China’s energy demand profile. Rather than embracing a development strategy compatible with its natural endowments as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and others had done, Chinese leaders ignored a comparative advantage (that China is rich in labor but poor in capital, arable land, and technology) and dragged China—kicking, screaming, and sometimes starving—toward Soviet-style industrialization. For thirty years, resources sporadically were shifted out of agriculture and into energy-intensive industries like steel and cement. Data from within China claims that between 1949 and 1978, industry’s share of economic output grew from 18 to 44 percent, and the amount of energy required to produce each unit of output tripled.

This command-and-control fiasco resulted in severe inefficiency. In 1978 leaders began to unleash China’s potential. Beijing reformed agricultural production targets and let prices rise, with dramatic results. Farm output increased, and the early 1980s saw rural residents with more time on their hands, cash in their pockets, and freedom to use it as they chose. Much of this new wealth was invested into township and village enterprises (TVEs) set up to exploit what China was best suited for: labor-intensive light manufacturing.

Reform also brought changes within heavy industry, which reduced the energy intensity of Chinese growth.
Economic incentives—such as the right to keep profits—were introduced, and awareness of bottom-line profits made enterprises focus more on top-line expenses, including energy. As enterprises were becoming more aware of the impact of energy costs on profitability, their energy bills were growing as a result of the partial relaxation of oil, gas, and coal prices. The introduction of limited competition for both customers and capital, not just from other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also from a growing private sector, made energy cost management all the more important. Domestic competition was accompanied by a gradual integration with world markets; lower trade barriers not only exerted pressure on SOEs from energy-efficient foreign companies but also allowed them to acquire the more energy-efficient technology their competitors enjoyed. China’s small existing base of modern plants and equipment enabled it to absorb new technology quickly, significantly improving the efficiency of the country’s capital stock.

By 2000, Chinese economic activity required two-thirds less energy per unit of output than in 1978. Energy intensity improvement on this scale was unprecedented for a large developing country, and it meant that in 2001, China accounted for 10 percent of global energy demand rather than the 25 percent that had been projected based on its 1978 energy performance.

**Investment-Led Energy Surprise**

At the start of the new millennium in 2001, China’s leaders expected the energy intensity improvements that had been taking place since 1978 to continue. Most energy forecasters at home and abroad assumed that the structural shift away from energy-intensive heavy industry would persist; at least, no one expected the evolution to reverse quickly.
In 2001 both the Chinese government and the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted 3 to 4 percent energy demand growth between 2000 and 2010.

In actuality, both wildly missed the mark. The economy grew much quicker than anticipated from 2001 to 2006, but the real surprise was a change in the energy intensity of economic growth: Energy demand elasticity (the ratio of energy demand growth to gross domestic product, or GDP, growth) increased from 0.4 (during 1978–2001) to 1.1 (2001–2006). In 2006, energy consumption in China grew to 16 percent of global demand, four times faster than predicted. And yet on a per capita basis, China’s energy demand remains one-sixth that of the United States, triggering anxiety about how much more growth is yet to come.

This discovery not only shocked domestic and international energy markets but also prompted a fundamental reassessment of China’s energy future—and hence the world’s. In its 2007 World Energy Outlook, the IEA raised its 2030 forecast for China’s energy demand to 3.8 billion tons of oil equivalent, up from the 2.1 billion tons it had predicted in its 2002 outlook—a 79 percent upward revision. Under this scenario, China will account for 22 percent of global energy demand, more than Europe, Russia, and Japan combined, easily surpassing the United States as the world’s largest energy consumer.

What caused China’s two-decade history of energy intensity improvements to change course? Many authorities assume that the recent evolution of China’s energy profile reflects growth in consumption and transportation—for instance, air conditioning and personal cars—but this is not correct. Consumption-led energy demand will be a major force in the future, and it is already significant in absolute terms, but the main source of current growth is energy-intensive heavy industry. Industrial energy efficiency has continued to improve over the past six years; every new steel mill is more efficient than the last one. But the late-twentieth-century structural shift away from heavy industry toward light industry has reversed, and a new steel plant—no matter how much more efficient than its predecessor—uses substantially more energy than a garment factory. The IEA asserts that industry accounts

Technicians in an observation booth at a heavy machinery plant in Beijing.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
for two-thirds of final energy consumption in China today, while the residential, commercial, and transportation sectors account for 12, 5, and 13 percent, respectively.

This industrial energy consumption is high by either developed or developing country standards. (See Table 1.) But when pundits express shock at how much more energy intensive China is than Japan, for example, they usually ignore the important factor of what the country makes. High energy-intensity partly reflects the role of industry in the Chinese development model, as opposed to India, which has taken a more services-heavy approach, or Japan, which has lowered its energy intensity in part by relocating its energy-intensive sectors to China. According to Chinese statistics, industry accounts for 48 percent of all economic activity in China, compared with India at 29 percent and Japan at 26 percent. So the fact that one unit of economic output requires five times as much energy in China as in Japan says more about the type of economic activity taking place in China than the efficiency with which it occurs.

Increasingly, economic activity in China is slanted toward capital investment, and from an energy standpoint, the current investment cycle is different than in the past. Rather than importing, China is now producing domestically more of the energy-intensive basic products (such as steel and aluminum) used to construct the roads and buildings for which investment pays. China now accounts for 49 percent of global flat glass production, 48 percent of global cement production, 35 percent of global steel production, and 28 percent of global aluminum production. Some of this production also reflects the migration of industry from other parts of the world not only to meet domestic demand in China but also for export. Whereas China used to be a net importer, it has now become a major global exporter of steel, aluminum, and cement.

The changing composition of China’s industrial structure is also a result of competition among provinces and localities to grow GDP, tax revenue, and corporate profits. Not just Beijing but also local interests (including industrial enterprises) set the rules of competition. And regardless of who sets the rules, implementation is a local matter. Within this context of competition, short-term economic incentives—specifically low operating costs and profits—explain much of the increase in heavy industrial activity.

After-tax earnings in energy-hungry industries have been good, rising from near zero in the late 1990s to a level comparable to that of their light-industry counterparts—ranging from 4 to 7 percent in steel, glass, chemicals, and cement in recent years. With China modernizing over 170 cities of more than 1 million people, certainly there is a large domestic market for basic materials; supply was squeezed by breakneck growth after 2001. But with over-capacity arising almost as soon as the first profits come in, the ability of firms to sell surplus production in international markets has been critical to remaining profitable.

China’s energy-intensive industry enjoys low operating costs, which has allowed for rising profit margins and a dramatic growth in capacity that is at the center of China’s overinvestment in heavy industry.

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**Table 1: Energy demand by sector, 2005 (percent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>890</strong></td>
<td><strong>199</strong></td>
<td><strong>417</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>348</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,249</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,546</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,893</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* This table excludes biomass but includes nonenergy use of energy commodities.

governments often provide deeply discounted land, and they often do not enforce regulations to protect air and water. Construction time is short, and labor costs are low. These benefits apply to all industries, however, they are particularly valuable in the energy-intensive sector, where capital costs are large.

**Energy Prices and Environmental Costs**

Energy prices in China, once highly subsidized, have gradually converged with world prices over the past thirty years. Yet, it can be difficult to accurately assess the price a specific firm pays for coal, gas, oil, or electricity. Chinese prices for raw energy commodities (including coal and natural gas), particularly in interior provinces close to resource deposits, can be significantly cheaper than elsewhere in the world. For coal, low prices result not from subsidization but rather from low extraction costs in areas isolated from international markets; as obstacles to transportation ease, coal prices will rise toward world prices. Beijing also directly controls natural gas prices, attempting to keep them competitive with the Middle East. But this approach has failed to encourage development and delivery of sufficient quantities of natural gas to meet demand, and authorities are allowing domestic prices to increase.

China’s industry increasingly receives its energy in electrical form, and reported prices of electricity are high compared with those in developing and some developed countries; only in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan are costs greater. However, based on conversations with Chinese business leaders and industry analysts, it is likely that many industrial enterprises do not bear the full cost provided by national average figures from the Statistical Bureau. China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) sets electricity tariffs province-by-province based on the recommendations of local pricing bureaus, which answer to local officials. While the NDRC would like to see energy pricing rationalized to reduce overall energy consumption, it is sensitive to local social and economic development concerns.

Energy prices in China have not reflected environmental costs historically. Over 80 percent of the country’s electricity is generated from coal. But at the end of 2006, less than 15 percent of coal power plants had flue gas desulphurization (FGD) systems (used to remove sulfur dioxide from emissions streams) installed and even fewer had them running. Operating an FGD system reduces production efficiency by 4 to 8 percent and therefore contributes to higher electricity prices. If all the power plants in China installed and operated FGD systems, average electricity tariffs could rise by 10 to 20 percent. Industries that burn coal directly (such as steel and cement) are subject to sulfur taxes, but these are generally too low to reduce pollution. Other air pollutants, such as nitrogen dioxide and mercury, are largely unregulated. Regulated or not, enforcement generally falls to the provincial and local governments, which must balance environmental concerns against economic growth priorities. In the absence of a strong environmental regulator, like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, that balance is skewed toward near-term economic growth, as industry threatens to cut jobs and tax revenue if enforcement of environmental regulations is increased.

While it is a daunting and subjective challenge to compute the external impacts of China’s penchant for heavy industry, it is important to recognize that they exist: China does not necessarily do the world a favor by overproducing. Moreover, there are other effects to be considered. A rebalanced China, better aligned with its natural endowment of labor, could be a bigger economy, grow faster, and be less prone to collapse; hence it would be a better engine of world growth. Also, heavy industry in China is less likely to attract innovation and technological change due to weaknesses in intellectual property protection and the difficulty of recovering research-and-development investments. Similarly, institutional weaknesses in regulation and enforcement of pollution controls undermine the process of finding innovative ways to remedy environmental damage.

**Trevor HOUSER and Daniel H. ROSEN**

Further Reading


Never harbor the intent to victimize others; but never let guard down against being victimized.

害人之心不可有，
防人之心不可无

Hài rén zhī xīn bù kě yǒu, fǎn rén zhī xīn bù kě wú
Like the United States, China needs oil to fuel its economy, but with the United States now in a position of influence in Iraq, China has had to turn to countries such as Sudan and Iran to meet its needs—precisely when the United States has sought to isolate these nations.

Like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other security issues facing nations today, energy supplies—especially oil supplies—have become a major security challenge. This challenge is especially important to China because of the country’s rapid growth and urbanizing population and because competition—or potential competition—with China for energy resources and control of them has become a serious concern for the United States.

China’s competition with the West for the global supply of oil is the latest addition to the list of factors comprising a “China threat.” Older factors include China’s aggressive drive for industrial and economic power, its rapid military buildup, and its authoritarian regime’s determination to maintain its grip on power and continued disregard for human rights. Many consumers in the United States believe that China’s voracious demand for oil has contributed to the increases in U.S. gasoline prices. Those who advance this claim argue that China’s ambitious energy policy is part of a plan to become a superpower and ultimately to replace the United States as the next hegemon (influence) of East Asia and the world.

But the alternative claim is that China survives by keeping its economy growing and its huge population working—and oil is necessary for that.

China has averaged 9.4 percent annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) since 1978. At that rate China’s economy doubles every ten years. China’s combined share of world consumption of steel, cement, aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled between 1990 and 2000 (from 7 percent to 15 percent). Only twenty years ago China was Asia’s largest oil exporter. In 1993 it became a net importer of oil, and in 2004 it became the world’s second-largest oil importer and consumer after the United States. Since 2000 China has accounted for 40 percent of the world’s growth in demand for crude oil.

Several factors have contributed to the explosion in China’s demand for oil: rapid industrialization, growing automobile ownership, increasing air travel in and outside of China, expanding export processing, to mention a few. China’s domestic oil production provides about two-thirds of its crude oil consumption; the balance must come from imports. Studies predict that by 2050 at the latest and perhaps even by as early as 2025 China will import 80 percent of its oil.

Beijing has developed several strategies to cope with its growing need for oil. These strategies include increasing exploration at home, diversifying its sources of energy and developing alternative or renewable sources of energy (China would like to be the world’s largest producer of nuclear energy by 2050), rationing, developing energy-friendly technologies such as hydrogen-powered fuel cells, building strategic petroleum reserves, and acquiring new stocks and oil fields overseas.
China’s focus has been on acquiring foreign oil assets. China’s quest for sources of oil beyond its borders has four main characteristics. First, the occupation of Iraq by the United States has forced China to consider sources of oil beyond the Middle East. Second, because China cannot afford not to consider all sources of oil, it does business with “rogue regimes” and has intruded on regions that fall under U.S. hemispheric influence. Third, China’s global energy networks demand that China develop naval power in the long term to secure its sea lanes. Fourth, however, because China lacks that naval power, Beijing’s intermediate security strategy is to pursue a “go west” policy in central Asia and to invest in a “string of pearls”: countries that are geographically contiguous to China.

**China’s Oil Needs and the Iraq War**

Until recently 60 percent of China’s oil imports came from the Middle East, which contains two-thirds of the world’s reserves. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, is China’s largest oil supplier. China’s largest oil company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), had been waiting to develop the Al-Ahdab reserves in central Iraq as well as the even larger Halfayah oil field. These two oil fields would have supplied 13 percent of China’s domestic consumption. But the 2003 Iraq War and the continued occupation of Iraq by the United States have dashed the hopes of CNPC. In addition, Iraq borders five of the world’s largest oil producers. This fact of geography means that the United States has greater leverage in the Persian Gulf than ever and that China’s future in Middle East oil has become more tenuous.

To China’s detractors Beijing has been indiscriminate in doing business with those regimes that Washington has identified as “rogue” or “pariah”—Iran, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Myanmar (Burma), for example. China’s initiatives conflict with U.S. attempts to contain these regimes. For instance, when the United States severed ties with Sudan after the 1997 genocidal war against Christians in the Darfur region, Beijing made Sudan its largest oil producer. This fact of geography means that the United States has greater leverage in the Persian Gulf than ever and that China’s future in Middle East oil has become more tenuous.

In short the competition for oil has accented and increased the differences in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy objectives and stances on how the international system should be run. In exchange for oil China supplies economic assistance with no political strings attached and in so doing has begun to rewrite the rules of the system.
Not only Latin America but also Africa (where, in addition to Sudan, China has invested in oil-rich nations such as Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria, among others) has benefited from China's economic growth in terms of investment and trade. China is now the main stimulus for export growth in those regions. In general Chinese investments in infrastructure and developmental aid are raising standards of living in the developing world. That has been China's ambition since the 1950s.

Necessity of Naval Power

China, because its drive for oil security has taken it to every corner of the Earth, eventually will have to develop a world-class navy to secure its sea lanes to ship oil. China will have to develop a blue-water navy (that is, a navy that can operate freely in the deep ocean away from the Chinese mainland) with global reach, and that navy must match U.S. naval capabilities in the long run. The current situation, with the United States having naval supremacy and controlling the global sea lanes of communication, is dangerous to China because the United States can easily threaten China's security. For instance, the United States could impose an oil embargo on China in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and the PRC.

Opinions vary on how rapidly China is transforming its mainly coastal navy into an oceangoing navy. China is attempting to acquire strategic nuclear submarines, attack submarines, modern surface vessels, and so forth both through purchases (primarily from Russia but also from Europe and Israel) and through a domestic shipbuilding program. However, China knows that it is so far behind the United States in naval capability that it is also investing in oil pipelines that carry oil via land from Southeast and central Asia.

Two Alternative Geostrategic Plans

China is relying on two medium-term strategies to compensate for its lack of a blue-water navy. The first strategy is its "go west" policy of acquiring assets in central Asia. China's longest pipeline, the 4,200-kilometer Tarim Basin-to-Shanghai gas pipeline, began operating in 2004. Construction of a 988-kilometer pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang is almost finished. China also is helping to develop oil fields in Uzbekistan. But the success of the "go west" policy has been mitigated by an increased U.S. military presence in the area because of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, greater competition from India, and various overlapping power blocs.

The second strategy is to build a series of strategic bases—a "string of pearls"—along the major sea lanes from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea. The goal is to construct an alternate oil importation route that avoids the Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent of China's oil imports flow. China is fortifying bases in the South China Sea to allow large-scale deployment of air force and naval units on Hainan Island as well as constructing facilities on the Spratly and Paracel Islands to accommodate strategic bombers. In essence China is building a group of unsinkable aircraft carriers in the South China Sea.

Farther west China is constructing container port facilities at Chittagong in Bangladesh and intelligence-gathering facilities and naval bases on Myanmar's islands in the Gulf of Bengal. China also is constructing a pipeline from Sittwe in Myanmar to its own Yunnan Province. China has other projects under way in Pakistan and Thailand. Unfortunately for China, it is not without rivals in these regions either. In Southeast Asia China has to compete with India; in the South and East China Seas it has to compete with Japan.

A Unique Predicament

If China's oil supply were cut, its economy probably would come to a standstill. That likelihood increases as China's dependency on imported oil increases. China's predicament is difficult for two reasons. First, China is undergoing the equivalent of the Industrial Revolution—150 years late. China, as a relative latecomer among the pantheon of global powers, has had to play by some of the rules established by Western powers. But China is beginning to rewrite other rules. In a world where there is no arbiter of conflicts over limited natural resources, China, like all other nations, must defend its national security and interests.
Second, China’s population and size make its geostrategic problems unique. Its energy concerns cannot easily be shared with others. Japan and the United States have sufficient military capabilities to protect their supplies. Moreover, the United States enjoys an insular continental position, whereas China borders fourteen countries. If the United States, given that insular position, is concerned about terrorist infiltration, imagine China’s concern for its situation. China’s landmass is third largest in the world (after Russia and Canada), but China’s population is greater than that of Russia, the United States, Japan, and the European Union combined.

Chinese manufactured goods are enhancing the lives of countless people on the planet. To a large extent the United States and other countries depend on the continued health and growth of the Chinese economy. China needs to have the natural resources to continue to produce its goods. No one benefits if China’s economy collapses due to the lack of oil. The global community should keep these facts in mind as it faces the challenge of China’s rising demand for oil.

Anthony A. LOH

Further Reading


With increasing energy demand and limited conventional energy resources, China is recognizing the need to develop renewable energy. In 2007, the consumption of renewable energy accounted for 8.5 percent of the country’s total primary energy consumption. In order to improve renewable energy development, the government has taken a series of countermeasures and has issued some related regulations.

China is one of the largest energy production countries in the world; it is also one of the largest energy consumption countries in the world. In 2007, China’s total commercial energy production reached 2.35 billion tce (ton-of-coal equivalent) among which coal production accounted for 76.6 percent; crude oil 11.3 percent; natural gas 3.9 percent; and the aggregation of nuclear power, hydropower, and wind power generation 8.2 percent. In terms of consumption, in 2007, China’s aggregate energy consumption reached 2.66 billion tce, 7.8 percent more than in 2006. Of the total consumption, coal accounted for 69.5 percent, while petroleum accounted for 19.7 percent; natural gas accounted for 3.5 percent; and the aggregation of nuclear power, hydropower, and wind power accounted for 7.3 percent (NBSC, 2008). The net imported petroleum reached 184.8 million tons in 2007; the rate of dependence on import reached 50 percent. As a result of increasing energy demand, the share of coal in total energy consumption was increased by 0.1 percent from 2006 to 2007.

The United States is the world’s largest energy producer, consumer, and net importer. It also ranks eleventh worldwide in reserves of oil, sixth in natural gas, and first in coal (EIA, 2008c). In 2007, primary energy production in the United States reached 2.58 billion tce: coal accounted for 32.8 percent, natural gas 27.7 percent, crude oil 15 percent, NGPL (Natural gas plant liquids) 3.4 percent, nuclear electric power 11.7 percent, renewable energy (including hydropower, geothermal, solar/PV, wind and biomass) only 9.5 percent. Primary energy consumption reached 3.66 billion tce: coal accounted for 22.4 percent, natural gas 23.3 percent, petroleum 39.2 percent, nuclear electric power 8.3 percent, renewable energy (including hydropower, geothermal, solar/PV, wind and biomass) 6.7 percent (EIA, 2008b). The United States imported about 58 percent of the petroleum, which includes crude oil and refined petroleum products, that it consumed during 2007 (EIA, 2008a).

Challenges and Opportunities

China is facing many challenges concerning the production and use of traditional energy, which in turn are yielding great opportunities for expanding sources of renewable energy (Asif and Muneer, 2007). Energy, on one hand, is an important foundation for the development of China’s socio-economy. Since implementing the reform and expanding...
market policies in the early 1980s, the nation’s energy sector has made great achievements. Over past three decades, China’s energy supply has generally kept pace with the demands of the growing national economy.

The long-term energy bottleneck issues, on the other hand, have always existed in China. Since the sixteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress (CCPC) put forward the goal of building a well-off society, the initiative of all communities to promote economic development rose to an unprecedented level, and the pace of national economic development accelerated. As a result, since 2002, energy supply-and-demand problems have emerged again. For example, the coordination between the transportation, supply, and the demand for coal, electricity, and oil have become a great challenge. The phenomenon of “limited power supply” is occurring over large areas around the country owing to the shortage of coal power. Oil imports have increased greatly. It is widely acknowledged that the energy shortage has become a critical factor, limiting the nation’s socioeconomic development. In the long term, the energy issue will be one of the most serious problems facing China.

In terms of the current energy supply and demand, China is facing three main problems:

1. Extremely limited energy resources: China’s total proven reserves of conventional energy sources is about 820 billion tce. Its proven remaining exploitable reserves are 150 billion tce, about 10 percent of proven remaining exploitable reserves in the world. In terms of average energy consumed per capita, the China uses only 70 percent of the world average, while the petroleum consumed per capita is 10 percent of the world average, and natural gas consumed per capita is 5 percent of the world average. China’s hydropower resources are relatively abundant. Both the total theoretical capacity and economically exploitable capacity of hydropower are the largest in the world. It should be noted, however, that the exploration of hydropower resources is tremendously restrained due to the environmental impacts, floods loss, migration, and many other issues.

2. Dependence on coal, which is causing serious environmental problems: China is the world’s largest coal consumer, accounting for 40 percent of world consumption in 2007 (EIA, 2008b). Coal meets nearly 70 percent of China’s primary energy needs. At present, the coal-dominated energy structure has caused substantial impacts on the ecological environment. China ranks second in the world to the United States in carbon dioxide emission, while China’s emission of sulfur dioxide is estimated to be first in the world. Clean-coal power-generation technologies must be developed to gradually reduce the proportion of coal consumption in the overall energy structure.

Coal mined in China produces more of China’s energy than any other fuel, but it is not a renewable resource. Hillsides have been stripped by coal mining, depleting the supply, and China’s coal-dominated energy structure has caused substantial impacts on the environment. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
3 Low technical levels in energy utilization and low efficiency of energy use: China’s fast economic growth is, to a large extent, dependent upon the great amount of consumption of various physical resources. The energy consumption per unit output in China is clearly much higher than international advanced levels. Coal consumption from coal-fired power plants per unit output, for example, is 22.5 percent higher than other advanced levels in the world.

China, of course, will have a continuing thirst for energy. The World Energy Outlook 2007 published by the International Energy Agency forecasts that total energy consumption in China in 2015 will be about 2.85 billion toe (tons of oil) and about 3.82 billion toe in 2030 (IEA, 2008). In addition to restructuring its economic growth, increasing energy efficiency, and building an energy-conserving society, special attention continues to be given to the development and use of China’s abundant, inexhaustible, and environmentally friendly renewable energy resources.

Development

In 2007, the consumption of renewable energy in China totaled 220 million tce, accounting for 8.5 percent in the total primary energy consumption (Zhao et al., 2008). But China has abundant renewable energy resources, and the potential for developing and utilizing these resources is very great. The main types of renewable energies in China include hydropower, wind power, biomass energy, solar energy, geothermal energy, ocean energy, and others. Despite disagreement about hydropower internationally, it is widely agreed that small hydropower (SHP) is a valid source of renewable energy. In the case of China, those hydropower stations with a capacity of less than 50 megawatts fall into the SHP category.

China has the theoretical potential for ranking number one in small hydropower development, with resources located in 1,600 counties (or cities) across thirty-one of China’s provinces (and provincial level municipalities, excluding the Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao). Small hydropower resources are particularly plentiful in southwest China, where over 50 percent of the total SHP
resource base is located. China’s technology for hydropower station design, installation, and operation is quite mature, and it has installed more than 80 percent of its hydropower capabilities, with roughly a third coming from small hydropower sources (Shi, 2008), (REN21, 2008).

Wind resources are particularly rich in northeastern China, northern China, northwestern China, and the eastern coastal regions. By the end of 2007, Germany had the largest wind power capacity in world, while China ranked fifth, with over 158 wind power farms on the mainland. The manufacturing technology and capabilities of China’s wind power equipment have also greatly improved, as has the volume of their production.

China enjoys the availability of plenty of solar energy. Most of China’s land area is located south of 45°N latitude. Over two-thirds of China’s land area receives over 2,200 hours of sunshine per year, with a total solar radiation received by China’s land areas annually being equivalent to 1.7 trillion tce. At present, solar energy is mainly applied in two areas, solar thermal and photovoltaic (PV). By the end of 2007, China had installed PV power to supply electricity for residents in remote rural areas and for transport and communication stations.

In recent years, China’s solar water heater (SWH) industry has been developing very quickly and has already become quite competitive. China’s export of solar water heaters, boosted by demand in the international market, also rose. In 2007, China’s export value of solar water heater increased by 28 percent from 2006 to equal US$65 million (CBI, 2008).

Biomass energy resources mainly consist of wastes from agriculture and forest industries, industrial wastewater, animal and human manure, and municipal solid wastes. China is a major agricultural producer, and biomass wastes from agriculture are widely distributed, especially those from crop stalks. Fuel-wood forests, timber-processing industries, and other forestry sectors generate biomass waste of over 600 million tons annually, of which 300 million tons can be used in energy applications. The industrial wastewater and manure from livestock and poultry farms are a substantial source of biogas. China’s cities are predicted to produce about 210 million tons of municipal solid waste by 2020. Once land-filled and waste-combustion power generation technologies are implemented, the annual energy produced could be 15 million tce. According to preliminary estimates, the total exploitable annual capacity of biomass energy in China is 500–800 million tce from now to 2030 (NDRC, 2007).

Incentives

Realizing the great importance and huge potentials of renewable energy, the Chinese governments have implemented a series of policies to promote sustainable development. At the level of macro-policies, the National People’s Congress had already promulgated China’s Renewable Energy Law by February 2005. Critical systems were established in the law: (1) a system of government responsibility, requiring the government to formulate development targets and strategic plans, and to guarantee measures for renewable energy; (2) a system of public cost-sharing (realized by a cost-sharing system of the grid), whereby all citizens will be required to share the extra costs associated with developing renewable energy; and (3) a system of punishment and reward, which was designed to encourage the entire society, particularly companies, to develop and use renewable energy, and has financially punished those companies and individuals that have not met the obligations set out for them in the law (NPC, 2005). In addition, some specific regulations, legislation, and standards to implement the law have been constituted. In particular, the medium- and long-term
development plan of renewable energy in China was issued in 2007. Clearly, the legal system to develop renewable energy has built a preliminary foundation.

Some direct economic incentives have also been implemented to encourage the development of renewable energy industry in China. First, is the customs tariff relief. Customs duties on imported complete wind turbines are 6 percent, whereas duties charged on imported components of wind turbines is 3 percent. Second, some value-added tax (VAT) is waived. Currently, most renewable energy products are taxed at the full VAT value (unified VAT rate is 17 percent). The exceptions are rates of 13 percent for biogas generation, 8.5 percent for wind power, 6 percent for SHP, and 0 percent for municipal solid-waste power generation. A third incentive is loan savings. Discounted loans were aimed to support biogas projects, solar-thermal applications and wind-power generation technologies. The government offered a 50 percent discount on regular commercial bank-loan interest. In addition, the government made a limited number of low-interest loans available for SHP. Some wind companies have benefited from the discount loans for the first 1 to 3 years. Fourth, central authorities offered subsidies in research and development (R&D) and marketing demonstration, as well as some local subsidies for solar energy systems for homes and for small wind systems in rural regions.

In addition to the central governments incentives, local governments have also formulated their own preferable measures. For example, income tax from wind companies was waved for the first two years in Inner Mongolia, and from 50 to 200 yuan was subsidized to each home PV system or small wind turbine.

Obstacles

Ironically speaking, some barriers to renewable energy development have indeed existed in China. Although the Chinese government has issued some policies to promote the development of renewable energy over the past ten years, the share of renewable energy in the total primary energy consumption is still low. Breaking the barriers that obstruct renewable energy development in China will be significant to China’s energy future.

First, the government must apply some incentive measurements to promote renewable energy in its initial stage. At present, the policy system to support renewable energy such as wind energy, bio-energy and solar energy is imperfect; the incentive measure is not enough, the implementing of policies is poor, and policies are unconnected. The absence of effective investment and financing mechanisms greatly restrain the R&D processes. Owing to the characteristics of high cost, diffuse distribution, small-scale and discontinuous production, most renewable energy still lacks competitive capability in comparison with conventional energy technologies. Therefore, an integrated, powerful, stable, effective stimulus combined with incentive mechanisms based in law is necessary for further development.

Second, the market mechanism is imperfect. As a result of the above-mentioned characteristics and the absence of a definite long-term target to develop renewable energy, a continuous and stable demand for renewable energy in China has not yet emerged. The driving force of the market is so limited that technological innovation of advanced renewable energy has moved slowly. A few technologies, such as SHP and solar water heater, have to some extent, realized commercialization after years of improvement, though their market share is still very small compared to their entire potential and total energy demand. To further expand the market, there is a need to decrease the production cost and improve technology reliability.

Finally, the technology and industrial system is still fragile. Excluding hydropower, solar water heaters, and biogas, the investment in R&D in most renewable energy remains low, and China’s production capacity is inferior to that of developed countries. In addition, some key technology and devices have depended on imports for many years, such as the PV module production lines and large wind turbines. Moreover, there are no professional, accurate and integrated evaluation systems, and there is no quality control system. The human resource training system and technology service systems are imperfect due to the shortage of communication, and dissemination of information about renewable energy.

It is clearly expected that the development of renewable energy has stepped into a crucial phase in China. In next twenty years, whether renewable energy can be developed on an industrial scale will depends on support of further preferable policies and market expansion.

SHEN Lei, CHENG Shengkui, and XU Zengrang
Further Reading


Solar panels harvest the sun’s energy at Beidahe. Over two-thirds of China’s land area receives over 2,200 hours of sunshine per year. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Enterprise Income Tax
Qǐyè suǒdéshuì 企业所得税

The Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) is a tax law that came into effect in China on 8 January 2008. The law replaces an earlier, more complicated system that used a Western-style tax system for foreign-owned firms and another system for Chinese-owned firms. The State Administration of Taxation’s regulations of the law are available to the public.

Following the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s tax system was based on a Soviet-style economic model since there was no private business sector to speak of. Industry and commerce were controlled by publicly owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises delivered all their profits to the central government. The only real tax was a type of sales tax that was used to facilitate the transfer of funds from enterprises to the central government.

Tax Reform
Starting in the 1980s, as China began its move toward a socialist market economy, a number of major tax reforms were introduced. Today the Chinese tax system looks like many other countries’ tax systems, although many uniquely Chinese features remain. For instance, there is a two-track system, the foreign track and domestic track, each with different regulations and types of administration. With respect to deductible expenses, for example, foreign enterprises can deduct the cost of wages, salaries, and employee benefits, whereas domestic enterprises can deduct only the amount of wages in accordance with the standard set by the government.

China’s tax system consists of various consumption taxes, income taxes, property taxes, and miscellaneous taxes. One such income tax is the enterprise income tax. China implemented a dual-track system of enterprise income taxation from 1979 to 2007: a Western-style tax system for foreign-owned firms and another system for Chinese-owned firms. As of 1 January 2008, this dual-track tax system ended and a new Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) law became effective for all forms of enterprises.

The process that culminated in the promulgation of the EIT took thirteen years but was relatively transparent compared to most policy changes in China. Early drafts of this tax law were widely debated and commented upon. The structure and substantive provisions of the EIT legislation are more sophisticated than its predecessors were; for example, the threshold of tax incentives is more detailed. Explanatory notes on EIT regulations by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) are detailed and insightful but, more importantly, available to the public.

Objectives
In addition to the obvious goal of raising government revenues, the EIT legislation was introduced to achieve the following objectives: to ensure equitable taxation of all businesses by ending systematic and serious discrimination against Chinese-owned businesses; to promote sustainable economic development of China’s economy; to
be consistent with international tax norms and practices; and to improve efficiency in tax administration.

The EIT has become an important instrument in China’s plans to promote sustainable economic development. Attracting direct foreign investment to China remains a key policy concern. Instead of providing specific tax incentives, as do tax policies in other countries, the EIT has adopted an internationally competitive tax rate. The tax incentives are targeted at investments in small and high-tech businesses, as well as projects in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, job creation, public infrastructure, environmental protection, water and energy conservation, research and development, and technology transfer.

Fundamental Principles

The EIT is based on a set of fundamental principles enforced by the EIT Law and its regulations. Administrative matters related to the EIT are contained in the Tax Administration and Collection Law. EIT legislation states that a taxation year is the calendar year and that no consolidation is allowed for enterprise groups unless specifically authorized by the State Council.

The determination of taxable income is primarily a legal question. Although financial accounting is the basis for the computation of income or loss, the ultimate determination must be governed by the provisions of the EIT Law. These legal provisions override any inconsistent financial accounting principles. Revenues and expenses must be recognized in accordance with the accrual method of accounting, which recognizes income when earned and expenses when incurred regardless of when cash is received or disbursed. The principle of truthfulness requires that revenues and expenses be supported by evidence, typically invoices or receipts. The principle of substance over form requires that transactions be characterized for tax purposes in accordance with economic substance, not the legal form. The principle of realization requires that income be recognized only when it is realized, that is, when the income-earning transaction is completed.

International Tax Norms

The Chinese enterprise income tax system has undergone major reforms since the 1980s. A Western-style income tax, known as the Chinese–Foreign Joint Venture Income Tax (JVIT), was first introduced in 1980. Foreign tax terminology, structures, and concepts found their way into the JVIT, but the Chinese characteristics were overwhelmingly present. For instance, tax expenditures for social programs and subsidies are much less than they are in the West. Most taxes go toward government expenditures. China’s financial system is highly decentralized. Expenditures by local governments account for 71 percent of government expenditures. The central government has exclusive taxing powers in terms of legislation. All taxes
are introduced by the central government. However, revenue from specific taxes is assigned to local governments. Overall, local governments receive about 50 percent of total tax revenues. Since 1980, the trend has been more toward internationalization as the Chinese economy has moved closer to a market system.

The Chinese have always adapted foreign ideas to meet Chinese needs. To the Chinese, because the market economy originated in the West and the market demands rational laws, which are predominantly Western laws, it was important to transplant Western laws to China and to harmonize Chinese laws with international norms. Tax laws directly affect the market, and enterprise income taxes were seen as less politically and culturally sensitive than income or sales taxes, so the process of internationalization was relatively quick.

**TAX ADMINISTRATION**

The new EIT legislation significantly improves the efficiency of tax administration. It provides more certainty and predictability through more detailed and clearer rules for qualifications for tax incentives. In contrast, the previous system authorized the tax authorities to preapprove the qualification of eligible enterprises for tax incentives, leaving a great deal of discretion to local tax officials. The EIT also introduces new anti-avoidance rules that send a signal to taxpayers about unacceptable tax avoidance transactions. The typical examples of anti-avoidance rules involve transfer pricing and thin capitalization.

**Features of the EIT Tax Law**

Not surprisingly, the EIT system contains many regulations and requirements, exemptions and exceptions. Following are some of the key features of the EIT legislation.

**TAX LIABILITY**

Enterprises are subject to the EIT if they are residents or nonresidents earning income from a Chinese source. Resident enterprises are subject to tax on their income from inside and outside China, whereas nonresident enterprises are subject to tax only on their Chinese-source income.

**TAXABLE ENTERPRISES**

Under the EIT Law, all enterprises, regardless of ownership, are subject to the same tax rules. The term enterprise, however, is somewhat vague in the EIT legislation. According to the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), enterprise includes, but is not limited to, a corporation. The key is whether an enterprise is a legal person under Chinese civil law. (In legal terms a legal person is an individual, a group of individuals, or even the state that can make claims against other legal persons and have those claims resolved in court.) In addition, some nonprofit entities are treated as enterprises under the EIT legislation. On the other hand, a sole proprietorship or a partnership established in China is specifically excluded from the meaning of enterprise; sole proprietors are subject to the individual income tax. A Chinese partnership is treated as a flow-through entity; that is, its income is taxable to the investors or owners. A foreign partnership, in contrast, is taxable as an enterprise under the EIT law.

According to the SAT, this rule is needed to prevent double taxation and to protect the Chinese tax base. In the case of a Chinese partnership, the assumption is that Chinese partners are taxable under the individual income tax (in the case of an individual partner) or the EIT (in the case of an enterprise partner). Treating a Chinese partnership as a conduit eliminates double taxation of the income earned through the partnership. If a foreign partnership is not taxed as an enterprise, then its income would be free from the EIT and the foreign partners would not be taxable in China.

In addition, for the first time residence is officially used as a basis for determining tax jurisdiction in the EIT Law. The term resident enterprise is defined as "an enterprise established in China or an enterprise created under foreign laws but with a place of effective management in China." An enterprise established in China refers to "an enterprise, nonprofit entity, social organization, and other type of entity that earns income and is created in accordance with Chinese laws or administrative regulations." As such, the test of residency is a combination of place of incorporation and place of effective management.

**TAXABLE INCOME**

The basic formula for computing taxable income stipulates that taxable income equals total revenue minus ex-
included income minus exempt income minus deductions minus loss carryover.

The taxable income of a nonresident conducting business in China through an establishment or site is the net of deductible costs and expenses. The taxable income of other nonresident enterprises, however, is gross income.

Taxable income earned from Chinese-source dividends, interest, rent, or royalties is the full amount received. According to the SAT, a nonresident enterprise is also liable to Chinese tax on the gross amount of fees for services provided to enterprises or individuals inside China, or for providing foreign insurance to enterprises or individuals in China. The service fees and insurance premiums are treated as Chinese-source income because the payer is in China and taxable on a gross basis.

TAX RATES

The standard rate of the EIT is 25 percent. This rate was believed to be internationally competitive. A lower rate of 20 percent applies to qualified small, low-profit enterprises. These enterprises are believed to be strategically important in creating jobs and stimulating economic growth in China, but their tax capacity is limited. To support such enterprises, a lower rate is available to them. A further lower rate of 15 percent applies to key state-supported, new, and high-tech enterprises. This reduced rate is now applicable to all qualifying enterprises, irrespective of ownership or location.

TAX DEDUCTIONS

Costs, expenses, taxes, losses, and other outlays are deductible in computing taxable income. This reflects the principle that income is a net concept. According to the SAT, for an item to be deductible, it must be truthful, or real (zhenshi xing), legal, and reasonable. The expense must have been incurred and supported by evidence. Any unlawful expenditure, even if deductible under accounting principles, cannot be deducted in computing taxable income. The reasonable test requires that the expense be “normal” and “necessary” for the purpose of earning income. For mixed business and personal expenses, a reasonable allocation must be made.

Deductible costs and expenses are generally self-explanatory. These include the cost of wages, salaries, bonuses, as well as contributions to basic mandatory retirement plans, basic medial insurance plans, basic unemployment insurance plans, workers’ compensation plans, family-planning insurance plans, housing provident funds, and other social insurance plans. Contributions to supplementary insurance plans, medical insurance plans, and other plans approved by State Council are also deductible.

Nondeductible items include dividends, taxes paid under the EIT law, late-payment penalties, fines and other penalties, sponsorships, unverified reserves, and other amounts incurred for nonincome-earning purposes.
For capital assets and inventories, generally speaking, it is the historical cost, or the laid-out cost, that is deductible. The cost of fixed assets is depreciated under a straight-line method: twenty years for buildings; ten years for aircraft, trains, marine vessels, machinery, and other production equipment; five years for other instruments, tools, furniture, and other assets used in production and business activities; four years for aircraft, trains, and marine vessels used in transportation; and three years for electronic equipment.

The period of amortization is ten years for biological assets in forestry production and three years for those used in livestock production. The cost of acquiring intangible assets—such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, land-use rights, nonpatented technologies, and goodwill—is generally amortized over not less than ten years. But the cost of purchasing goodwill, such as a customer list, is deductible when the business is sold or liquidated. (Goodwill, in this case, refers to the value of a business based on expected continued customer patronage because of its name or reputation.)

**TAX CREDITS**

A credit is a yuan-for-yuan deduction in computing tax liability. There are two types of credits recognized by the EIT law: a foreign tax credit to prevent international double taxation, and tax credits as a form of subsidies for preferred investments, such as venture capital and investment in environmental protection, energy and water conservation, and production safety.

**TAX INCENTIVES**

The EIT legislation provides tax incentives to industries and projects that are specifically supported and encouraged by the state. Tax incentives take a variety of forms, including full or partial exemption, tax rate reduction, accelerated depreciation, imputed additional deductions, and tax credits.

Tax-preferred enterprises include small, low-profit enterprises; high-tech enterprises; and nonprofit organizations. Tax-favored investments are those in agriculture and fishing, infrastructure, venture capital, environmental protection, and production safety, and investments in ethnic minority regions, which are often less developed.

High-tech enterprises receive several types of tax incentives, including a reduced tax rate of 15 percent; exemption of income from technology transfer; additional deduction for research and development expenses; accelerated depreciation; and special deductions for eligible investors of high-tech enterprises.

So-called green industries or projects sometimes qualify as high-tech enterprises. In addition, 10 percent of the income is excluded from taxable income if it is derived from products made by way of “comprehensive utilization of resources” in accordance with the standard published by the central government. In addition, 10 percent of the expenditures on purchasing qualified equipment specifically for the purpose of protecting the environment are creditable against income tax. This credit can be carried forward for five years.

**TAX CERTAINTY**

All things considered, the EIT is an improvement over earlier corporate taxes in China. Even though the tax law contains many regulations and conditions, these regulations and conditions are published as administrative rules and available to the public. The EIT regime clearly provides taxpayers with more certainty and predictability, and the new rules are far more detailed and transparent than any other tax rules in modern Chinese history.

**LI Jinyan and HUANG He**

**Further Reading**


The interrelationship between humans and nature has been strong for millennia in China. Factors such as climate, landscape, and natural resources have shaped the culture of China since the seventh century BCE. Reinforced by Confucian and Daoist philosophies, the ancient Chinese stressed the need for balance and order between humans and nature.

China is a huge country with a great variety of terrain as well as different climates; this makes it difficult to speak of a single ecology or environment in the region. Nevertheless, there are four issues relevant to the environment that a majority of ancient Chinese had to contend with, regardless of their location: water, deforestation, farming, and regional interdependence.

**Water Issues**

The area above the Yangzi (Chang) River Valley and the high mountain barriers north of Guangdong Province is considered northern China; here the climate is dry and subject to the effects of cold-air blocks from Mongolia and Siberia. The conservation of water for domestic use and irrigation was one of the most precarious tasks that individuals and communities in this region had to undertake. Summer’s torrential rains and spring’s huge flows of melted snow and ice from high mountains could create nearly instantaneous floods, sometimes lasting for very long periods of time. Fields and houses would be washed away, topsoil carried off, and thick deposits of silt left after the waters receded. No simple water-control project could manage this many difficult conditions. It is not surprising that the legend of Emperor Yu, the founder of China’s mythical first dynasty, the Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE), claims that Yu had channeled the overflowing waters of the Huang (Yellow) River back into their proper course. Yu’s father, according to the same legend, had previously attempted a dike-building project that failed, resulting in renewed flooding—and Yu’s father’s execution. However, this legend actually may express a collective memory of great deluges that, unlike the flood in the story of Noah, did not occur only once.

In southern China, monsoon rains regularly bring in tremendous quantities of water. Torrential rains can generate raging downpours in moments. For these reasons, Chinese farmers worried constantly about water conditions that could bring ruin to their lives. But lack of rain in the south could be just as disastrous as a flood: Rice paddies require huge amounts of water, and a short period—only a few days even—of severe drought could wipe out an entire season’s crop. Thus, water issues were just as worrisome in the south as they were in the north.

The most common way to deal with the problem of managing water for irrigation and daily use was to try first to preserve surplus rainfall by sinking wells and using small ponds. Every Chinese village in ancient days had a public well, and larger households might have their own in the backyard or kitchen. Ancient Chinese hydraulic
engineers also created marvels of technology such as the Du Jiang Dam, built in 256 BCE in western China’s Sichuan Province, which divided an entire river in two to irrigate the Chengdu basin. A water gate built from basic materials—bamboo, pebbles, and timber—could be opened and closed to adjust the water flow that irrigated several tens of thousands of hectares of land there. Amazingly, it still works today, with only minor adjustments, 2,200 years after it was built.

Chinese hydraulic engineers also built many canals to link lakes and rivers of different systems into wider networks. One canal system in Liangqu (in the present-day Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, in the far south of China) joined two river systems at their origins high in the mountains. This mini-prototype of the Panama Canal had its own dam and reservoirs and an intricate system of locks to raise and lower the water level so that ships literally could move up and down mountains. As with Du Jiang Dam, this project is still in operation two thousand years later.

**Deforestation**

The Chinese used wood as a building material to construct houses as early as the Neolithic Age (7000–2000 BCE), especially in the south. The frames were wood, and mud brick and stamped earth were used to complete the walls. Since wooden materials do not last as long as stone (which why very little ancient architecture survives in China), eventually a house would need to be repaired, or replaced completely, and more timber was thus consumed. Also, the Chinese originally cooked over open fires fueled with firewood, a practice that evolved into the use of stoves. Wood-burning kilns for the production of pottery and ceramics and foundries for bronze and iron also consumed enormous amounts of wood.

In northern China, the arid and cold weather meant that new trees grew slowly on formerly forested land; this new growth had no chance of matching the speed with which trees were cut down for construction and fuel. Barren hills and fields therefore became commonplace in the
northern countryside. As early as the fourth century BCE, the great philosopher Mencius (371–289 BCE) remarked that cities all seemed to be surrounded by landscape resembling bald heads freshly washed. Soil in the north was a fine yellow powder that simply could not be conserved without vegetation, and the phenomenon of rapid desertification had been prevalent in China since very early days. Loose sand carried away by river systems eventually came to rest as heavy silt deposits that raised riverbeds higher and higher, until the dikes and banks bordering them literally lifted some of China’s northern rivers into the air. The waters of these so-called hanging rivers flowed at a higher level than the surrounding lands; the Huang (Yellow) River is the most notorious of these.

In southern China, warm and humid weather allowed cut vegetation to grow back more quickly than in the north, but still the speed with which trees were cut down was even faster. Southern hills were normally covered with dwarf trees and bushes whose shallow root systems were completely inadequate to hold the soil in place during the torrential rains of the monsoon. Firewood became so expensive that eventually the Chinese had to find creative ways of conserving fuel; they invented a fuel-efficient stove as early as the second century BCE in which a small amount of straw, hay stalks, or the stalks of crops could be burned and generate a short but intense heat. The Chinese method of stir-fry cooking was extremely fuel-efficient, as the ingredients were prepared and chopped ahead of time, and needed only minimal time on the fire to be cooked thoroughly. The stove was built in such a way that, after cooking two or three stir-fry dishes, the residue heat in the stove and ash could be used to boil water or cook rice. Indeed, the art of Chinese gourmet cooking is the direct result of a conservation-minded lifestyle.

In northern China, where animal husbandry was more common, people used dried animal dung (either in cakes or powder form) and grain husks as basic fuels for cooking and heating the home on winter days. Although these fuels burned at a lower temperature than wood, they produced a sustained heat that made the houses comfortable. While there is no literary record nor archeological evidence that indicates precise dates, heat channels under floors and beds that conducted heat from the stove throughout the home are believed to have been invented no later than the second century BCE; they became commonplace in northern China no later than the ninth century BCE. In contrast to the south, northern Chinese cuisine relies heavily on steamed breads, fried pancakes, and boiled noodle soups, all of which can be produced economically by using just a small portion of such long-lasting heat.

Farming

Chinese agriculture emerged in northern China as early as 7000 to 6000 BCE, when millet was domesticated. The main crop in the south was rice, which was cultivated at about the same time. Early on, Chinese farmers practiced slash-and-burn agriculture (which burns or fells forests to create fields for crops or livestock) to open new fields; they also knew to leave some fields unplanted to preserve the richness of already opened land. By the third or fourth century BCE, population pressures in the highly crowded central plain (around the middle reaches of the Yangzi River) led to an extremely high population density that put a great burden on what little agricultural land was available. Farmers had to use relatively small patches of land to produce enough food to feed a large population, and as noted above, environmental conditions already were not favorable. Under such challenging conditions, Chinese farmers developed practices that were highly labor-intensive. Chinese farming required an enormous amount of human labor to produce food, and it had to draw upon extra labor during the busy harvest seasons. Farmers had to develop labor-consuming field management in order to utilize the soil, and the population, to their maximum capacities. The soil needed more workers, and the working population thus needed an increasing supply of food. It was a vicious circle.

To maximize the use of limited resources, Chinese farmers carefully calculated their timing in order to catch all available moisture when the winter snows melted, and they would cover the snow with mats in order to prevent it—and the water it would provide in the spring—from being blown away. They found various methods of shortening the growing seasons, such as interpolating crops. This planting of different crops alternately on a plot of land meant that nutrients that had been removed from the soil by one crop could be replenished by the one planted subsequently, thereby conserving the soil’s fertility. Rice farmers also used concentrated fields as nurseries, growing densely-planted sprouts in a very small

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area while another crop reached maturity in the larger fields; after the mature crop was harvested, the partially grown sprouts could be painstakingly transplanted into the larger field. Beginning in the second century CE, the size of China’s population meant that the country could no longer afford to leave more than a very few fields fallow. Most were in constant use for food production, and their soils came to depend entirely on fertilizers, as the original topsoil was completely exhausted. For fertilizers, they used burned ash, silt dredged from the bottoms of ponds, crumbled earthen walls, and the excrement of animals and humans. The skills necessary to use the intensely crowded land area most effectively eventually spread throughout China, even finding their way into neighboring countries.

This need for intensive cultivation also meant that there was little or no open pasture in which domestic animals could graze. The Chinese countryside was dotted with pigs and chickens, however these animals did not run wild. Rather, they were kept in enclosed yards or cages, and their waste was collected for use as fertilizer. Fish grew in hatcheries surrounded by fruit trees and other plants. Ducks were kept in ponds. The silt that collected at the bottom could be dredged up periodically and used to fertilize the fields. Thus a small, nearly independent ecosystem could develop around a pond next to a village.

Regional Interdependence

These local farming ecosystems were not completely independent of each other; they were part of a much larger system that brought together regional labor, land, and crops into an exchange network that constantly sought the most economic and efficient way to utilize local conditions and resources to produce essential goods. These products were not made for subsistence (that is, for personal use), but rather for trade, and might include staple goods, preserved or cooked foods, clothing, furniture, utensils, or tools. They were gathered by itinerant merchants to be sold in other areas. A network of hierarchically arranged market centers based in towns and cities spread throughout China and siphoned local products from rural areas, redistributing them elsewhere. Even when China suffered the chaos of internal division and civil war, the interregional economy was so tightly integrated that political divisions could not stop the exchange of goods and wealth.

A sustained and ongoing process of debate in which several schools of philosophy, most notably Confucianism and Daoism, eventually shaped the Chinese way of thinking took place during the sixth century BCE in China. In the emergent Chinese worldview, the cosmic order, the natural world, human society, and human individuals were all integrated into a comprehensive system in which energy and resources constantly circulated. The parts are inseparable from the whole. Consider, for example, the term mai, which means the veins and arteries of the human body; the very same term is also used to denote a river’s course, mountain ranges, a network of human relationships, a family’s lines of descent, or even a system of highways. The constant and unimpeded flow and circulation of energy, or Qi, through such systems—in the sky as atmosphere, in a person as spirit—is the very definition of vitality. Without a proper circulation of Qi, there is death. Chinese acupuncturists use the term xue, which signifies an important point of connection in which the human body’s circulating Qi gathers and disseminates; the same term xue is also applied in feng shui (Chinese geomancy) to describe a favorable site on which to construct a city, a house, or a grave.

The Chinese mentality, as reflected in the Confucian and Daoist philosophies, strives to achieve and maintain a balance between the order of the cosmos and nature on the one hand, and the order of human society on the other. Human effort should not be used for the conquest or exploitation of nature, but rather it should blend as much as possible with the movements of natural forces. Therefore, the ancient Chinese formed in their minds an interactive network between and among the cosmos, nature, human society, and the human individual; these various levels are understood to be interconnected and constantly engaging with one another in a carefully maintained dynamic equilibrium. To upset any part of the balance is to tempt adverse repercussions throughout the entire system. Hence, the Chinese believe that the misuse of nature by humans will return in the form of nature’s retaliation. In the same mode, the Confucian motto of forbearance states: “Do not do unto others what you do not wish them to do to you.” For the Chinese, the system of interrelations and balances includes the small ecosystem around a pond, the larger farmstead and its natural surroundings, and the enormous marketing network for the exchange of resources. Feng
Coal-laden camels in Beijing. Coal has played a role as a major fuel source in China’s history from the fourth century.

Further Reading

shui, literally translated, means “wind and water.” The terminology is quite telling, in that it reveals the fundamental belief that human life is heavily influenced by the blowing winds and the flow of the waters.

Cho-yun Hsu
By the early twentieth century, China’s population growth had placed great demands on natural resources. Increasing industrialization and modern technology continued the devastation and caused many types of environmental pollution. China’s awareness of the need to curb pollution came about initially in the 1970s; in the twenty-first century China still struggles with balancing environmental concerns and economic progress.

Under the rule of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) the Chinese empire more than doubled the size of its territory, and its geographical and cultural diversity were greater than those of any other country. In the rural northern and western regions peopled by ethnic minorities, yaks filled the stables of Buddhist monasteries on the plateau of Tibet, horses and deer roamed the plains and forests of Manchuria, camels passed through the inner Asian desert oases in Xinjiang, and goats grazed the pastures of Mongolia. In the southwestern and southern regions native peoples had fought losing battles against the invasions of Han Chinese colonists, miners, traders, and soldiers who came to exploit the riches of the tropical rain forests, timber, mineral resources (including copper, iron, tin), and eventually their farming soils. In the fertile river valleys and plains in the eastern half of China, the Han Chinese population had grown from about 150 million in 1700 to maybe 350 million in 1800 and to 450 million in 1900, creating an enormous need for resources including metals, timber, cotton, wool, fuel, pork, and many other products. Spurred on by the new American crops (such as maize, potatoes, and tobacco) and a growing demand for tea, many farmers relocated to take advantage of the hills and mountains of central and southern China, and millions even went overseas. Wherever people moved, the demand on natural resources increased. But economic growth was uneven, and so were its environmental effects on different regions.

A Landscape Made by the Human Hand

After the eighteenth century forests were cut down with increasing speed and the land was reclaimed for agriculture. Farmers and other settlers ruthlessly misused the shrinking natural vegetation and other resources of the hills and upstream areas. Many mountain soils, unable to sustain a long period of farming, rapidly eroded and became too thin and stony for raising crops. On gentler slopes and along river valleys, terraces were built to conserve water, soil, and nutritional elements. Lakes and low-lying land in river floodplains were restored for irrigated agriculture. These resulting anthropogenic (or human-created) soils became stable and gave high yields of rice. Thus much of China’s landscape was created by the human hand. But land and people became vulnerable to floods and droughts as riverbeds were raised and flood retention capacities and natural vegetation were reduced. Along the coast, the silt-laden rivers deposited much sediment, and
land was reclaimed from the sea on a large scale, not only at the mouth of the Huang (Yellow) River, but also near those of the Yangzi (Chang) and other rivers.

**Dry and Irrigated Farming: North and South**

Water is in short supply in northern China but ample in southern China, where the monsoon climate brings an uneven distribution of rainfall, with spring droughts and summer floods. Some land along the rivers of northern China and near mountains was irrigated by surface water, but most farming was dry. Shallow wells supplied water for agriculture and drinking. Wheat, millet, sorghum, and maize were dominant crops; as a result diets were poor and particularly lacking in animal protein. Constrained by poverty and difficult transport, few farmers could afford to grow cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, and peanuts, or to keep pigs for manure and pork. In contrast, in the Yangzi River basin in central and southern China, water was abundant and, where necessary, was caught in tanks and reservoirs in the hills and subsequently stored in paddy fields. Rice yields were high, transport was convenient, and income was supplemented by sericulture (silk production), tea growing, weaving, and other industries. With these advantages, population was dense, crowding the cities, market towns, and villages that stretched along rivers, roads, and canals.

**New Factors of Change**

During the final years of the Manchu dynasty, four new elements began to change China’s traditional environment.

First was modern transport. Government concessions were given to build railroads; as Chinese and foreign railway companies began to develop land and to exploit mines and forests, new cities sprang up. Because of improved railway transport, millions of colonists moved into Manchuria and other outlying regions. Famines were much reduced; great droughts in northern China (1876–1878) and in northwestern China (1899–1900 and 1929–1930) had cost millions of lives, but in 1922 the North China Plain was saved by its railroads. By the 1930s China had over 20,000 kilometers of railways. Modern tar roads and rubber-tired carts and trucks greatly reduced short-distance transport.
cost. Old city walls were torn down to make way for new development. Nevertheless, political strife between war-lords continued to tear China apart. Other than areas that supported mining, modern development remained concentrated in the coastal areas, particularly in Taiwan, Japanese-controlled Manchuria, and a few cities.

Second, after 1870 modern mining and other industries developed, such as the Pingyuan coal mines near Beijing, the Hanye iron works in Hubei, the Shuikoushan lead mines in Hunan, and the Dongchuan copper mines in Yunnan. Traditionally, mines and kilns for porcelain and bricks had used much wood fuel from their immediate surroundings, but the new large-scale mines needed even more and soon were served by railways, which imported additional supplies from other areas. After 1895 foreign industries were introduced into the western treaty ports. Under foreign protection, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou (Canton), and other cities rapidly developed into industrial and commercial centers. The 1931 industrial survey reported 3,800 modern factories located primarily in urban areas. New wide-ranging technologies were adopted in textiles, coal mining, iron melting, oil pressing, and flour milling. New products were introduced, and electricity and machinery changed people’s lives. The urban population expanded rapidly, leading to crowded housing, crime, and unsanitary conditions. Even so, city life was more secure than life in the countryside. But the political crisis between the Communists and the Nationalists (Guomindang) and the Japanese invasion of the 1930s, World War II, and the subsequent civil war retarded China’s modern industrial development; in 1949 only some coastal cities and Manchuria had modern industry.

Third, new crops, animal breeds, and cultivation techniques were brought into China by Chinese entrepreneurs living overseas, Western missionaries, and agricultural scientists. American cotton, Italian wheat, British pigs, Swiss goats, and Russian and Dutch dairy cattle gave higher returns than most local varieties; eventually many local varieties disappeared, although some qualities were maintained in crossbreeds. Chinese cotton growers and soybean growers began to produce for the Japanese market and native factories. Through increasing commercialization, the standard of living improved slightly in most regions, including rural areas.

Fourth, China’s government became more economically exploitative and socially invasive. Traditional property regimes (or the consistent, stable pattern of their management) were replaced by new legal arrangements that allowed fuller exploitation of land and other natural resources. For instance, traditional Mongolian land rights were revoked and sold to Japanese, Russian, and Chinese chartered companies. Improved communications, modern arms, and new bureaucracies strengthened the reach of the State. Nationalism and other ideologies demanded that China should be strong and its people lifted from poverty. Rising expectations led to revolutionary movements and civil wars, in which warring parties mobilized available natural and human resources on an unprecedented scale.

Rural Misery

In spite of such efforts to modernize China, its image as a country plagued by bandits, soldiers, opium, and natural disasters remained valid. The 1931 and 1935 floods of the Yangzi River and the deliberate dike breaks in Shandong to force the Huang River into a southern course in 1938 destroyed millions of people, cattle, and homes. The Japanese invasion and atrocities such as the mass murders in Nanjing made millions flee to the interior, from where the Nationalist government continued its struggle. Stark poverty, high infant and child mortality, and many epidemic diseases were constant. About 1 million Chinese, mostly urban young adults working indoors, died of tuberculosis every year; cholera and malaria were common. Most farmers, working barefoot in the fields, spreading human excrement over their vegetables, living with their pigs, and drinking unsanitary water, were infested with parasites, affected by viruses, and often died before the age of sixty. Few families managed to attain the Confucian ideal of three generations living under one roof.

Loss of Forests and Vegetation Cover

By 1800 most of China’s original forests had already been cut down; some remained in the northeast and southwest. China’s forest cover decreased more rapidly because railroads made commercial exploitation feasible and also because land was reclaimed for agricultural use. By 1940
Manchuria’s forest cover and timber stocks had been halved, and by 1985 they were halved again. By 1962, in the upper basin of the Yangzi River, forest cover shrank from 50 percent to less than 20 percent, and in Sichuan it decreased from 34 percent to 12 percent. In particular the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961, an unsuccessful attempt to decentralize the economy by establishing a nationwide system of people’s communes) has been blamed for extensive felling of forests to acquire building material and fuel for new rural industries, most of which was wanton. Commercial logging, agricultural land reclamation, household fuel use, and desiccation all had great impact on China’s environment, and the consequent changes in river activity caused greater vulnerability to floods and droughts.

Under Communism’s establishment of nationwide communes during the Great Leap Forward, afforestation campaigns were organized on a massive scale. Villages were obliged to plant a hundred trees per inhabitant to provide fuel and to combat erosion, mostly along roads but also on waste hills. Often done without sustained follow-up, tree planting failed more often than it succeeded. For instance, along the northern deserts where pastures had been restored to create farmland, a giant shelterbelt (a barrier of planted trees and shrubs) was created to reduce wind velocity and protect the new farmland against desertification—an almost futile effort. Planting tea or fruit trees on wasteland did not always help against erosion either. The forest area grew to 125 million hectares in 1988 and to 160 million hectares in 2004, but most forests today are young and the timber of poor quality. In 1988 the government raised the price of timber, severely restricting its use for building purposes and railway sleepers, and began importing pulp and paper. Reserving land for forest growth (by now 1 million square kilometers)

Terraced wheat fields in China. Over the centuries, forests have been cut down to make way for arable land, but the deforestation has led to soil erosion and flooding. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
and selling long-term land leases of local forests, pastures, and wasteland to individual farmers have been adopted as solutions for collective squandering of resources and failing common property regimes, but with mixed success. China’s timber stock seems to be rising again, and some erosion-prone farmland in the hills has been taken out of cultivation. But global warming has intensified droughts in the north and floods in the south.

### Population and Birth Control Measures

China’s population increased from 583 million in 1953 (the first census) to 1 billion in 1982 and more slowly to 1.2 billion in 2000. According to the World Factbook, natural growth is down to 0.6 percent per year now. Remarkably, as the Chinese people became more affluent and resource constraints lessened, birth control policies became stricter. In 1958 new household registration rules were adopted that required rural migrants to metropolitan areas to have urban work or school permits or settlement permits from authorities; this started the formal separation of rural and urban households. Strict urban rationing of food, cloth, and housing and strict controls on population movement succeeded in reducing the flow from rural to urban areas. Consequently, urbanization rates remained low, and the rural population increase had to be accommodated within each village, regardless of the availability of land and other economic resources. The Communist regime made great efforts in health care and education. Vaccination programs put an end to most childhood diseases, and primary school enrollment increased from 50 percent in 1952 to 85 percent in 1965 and became almost universal after 1975. Life expectancy at birth increased dramatically after the early 1960s, also because of improved diets and medical care, and during the 1990s it continued to rise (although more slowly) by another two years to 69.1 for men and 73.5 for women, which is close to levels in the industrialized world.

Many factors contributed to China’s fertility decline during the period from 1950 to 1990. Total Fertility Rates (TFR) dropped from 5.8 in the late 1960s to less than 3 by 1980 and below replacement value (or the number of children each woman must bear to maintain current population levels) in the 1990s (TFR is always measured per woman over her entire life time). Women’s liberation, education, full female employment in rural collectives and cities, cramped urban housing, decreases in child mortality, and greater availability and knowledge of contraceptive methods were contributing factors to the decline. But the presence of severe state measures, with heavy penalties and collective pressure and different policies for urban and rural areas, was also an influence. Politicians
were and still are prompted by Malthusian (relating to the theories of English economist Thomas Malthus) concerns about limited natural resources and food supply. During the 1980s scientists calculated an “optimal” population of 700–800 million people. Chinese government at all levels feared the social burden of having more children. State family-planning policies started in 1971 with the slogan “late, sparse, and few,” meaning late marriages and only two children per couple. The rule of only one child was instituted for the urban population and state employees in 1978 and later spread to suburban and affluent rural areas. A “one-child certificate,” a contract that rewarded complying mothers but carried severe penalties for offenders, upheld the rule.

In many rural areas a second child is allowed only if the first is a girl. Consequently, after ultrasound scans became widely available, the incidence of sex-selective abortion escalated. The birth ratio of boys to girls for second children rose from 1.2 in 1990 to over 1.5 in 2000. Popular acceptance of the one-child policy has increased in urban areas but not in rural areas. The 2001 family-planning law severely restricts citizens’ reproductive rights while extending legal protection and quality health services to mothers and infants who abide by the law. Its prohibition against using coercion to enforce birth control is mainly cosmetic because the law gives local governments unlimited powers to impose severe sanctions on offenders, upheld the rule.

Effects of Socialist Planning in Agriculture and Industry

Central socialist planning is known for its great successes and even greater failures. Communist leader Mao Zedong’s megalomaniacal Great Leap Forward was different in that it combined central targets and directives with local autocracy and mass campaigns, but the results were still disastrous. In 1958 large communes organized farming along military style and started a mass campaign to produce iron in 600,000 small “backyard” furnaces. Urban population increased from 90 million in 1957 to 130 million in 1960. The cities could not accommodate this influx, and food shortages followed. The idea to open up new land, terrace hills, and build reservoirs everywhere proved counterproductive and environmentally destructive. Distribution networks broke down, grain output dropped, and the resulting famine cost 25 million lives during 1960 and 1961. There were long-lasting effects on natural resources; for instance, the decimated fish population of China’s largest lake, Qinghai, still has not recovered. It also created an obsession with local self-reliance in food grain.

The large fields created under collective farming, although more efficient in the use of oxen, machinery, irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides, were more vulnerable to erosion and salt saturation, or salinization. Since 1958 about 35 million hectares (one-third of China’s farm acreage) have been lost or diverted to other uses. Twice as much was reclaimed for agriculture, but much of it was poor soil in remote areas or on steep hill slopes. Chinese colonists were settled in border regions, from the Sanjiang marshes in the extreme north to the tropical forests of Hainan and the deserts of Xinjiang. Their irrigated agriculture destroyed the pastures and livelihood of native people. By the 1970s land reclamation, overgrazing, and reduced precipitation—another consequence of deforestation—had turned a half-million square kilometers of northern prairies into deserts and reduced grasslands by one-third to one-half on the remaining prairies. One-sixth of China suffered from serious soil erosion. One-quarter of China’s reservoir capacity had silted up, and natural lakes such as Dongtinghu had lost most of their flood-retention capacity. During the 1990s, on average, 5–15 million hectares were seriously stricken by flood every year, and 5–20 million hectares were affected by drought. Nevertheless, continuous increases in grain yield since the late 1960s were achieved with improved varieties, expanded irrigation, liberal applications of chemical fertilizers, and the use of electric pumps. Recently China has promoted bioengineering, and now half of its cotton and much of its soybeans and maize have been genetically modified to increase pest resistance.

Fearing foreign invasion, China set up many heavy industries in remote mountain areas after 1965. In socialism,
although big was beautiful, all provinces and cities had to, or tried to, become self-reliant. Socialist planning invited local governments and factories to maximize output and distribute according to plan, regardless of efficiency or cost. Resources such as land, water, and ores had no value in their own right; only product and output were important. This led to wasteful use of energy, hoarding of raw materials, and blind production. Moreover, China was isolated, and without access to foreign technology most industries continued to copy or adapt the outdated Soviet technology of the 1950s. When China finally woke up to the demands of the market in the 1980s, it found poor locations had been chosen for large parts of its industrial apparatus, and that almost all were antiquated. Thus traditional industries could not compete with the new industries established with foreign technology (and increasingly with foreign capital) in the coastal regions.

As direct state involvement in the economy declined, the central government concentrated on planning and implementing large projects. In spite of government efforts to restrict urban inflow, increasing differentials in development and income made tens of millions of poor farmers migrate to nearby cities or to eastern China. Average rural income in poor provinces was only one-tenth (or less) of that in large cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. Although government subsidization of antipoverty programs in rural villages was effective in providing a minimal sustenance of life, primary education, and health care, the rural population still depended entirely on the collective provisions of its own villages and was not entitled to any urban employment or social security. However, as agriculture became less and less rewarding, more was needed. At the end of the 1990s the government tried to redirect the rural outflow toward rural towns and to create employment there instead. Urbanization is now accepted as inevitable and even positive for socioeconomic development. More recent political priorities are urban housing, drinking water, sanitation, and improved indoor air quality with a transition from coal to gas use.

A monumental plan to “develop the west” (The Great West Development Plan) is attempting to expand the physical and social infrastructure of twelve western provinces and integrate them into China’s economy; the government hopes to have the west fully caught up with the east by 2050. New railroads, highways, mines, and factories will lead to fuller utilization of the resources of western China. Coal-fired power plants send their electricity to the east, pipelines began transporting gas and oil from Xinjiang to Shanghai in 2004, and a railway from Lhasa to Qinghai finally connected Tibet with China in 2006. Reducing the negative environmental consequences of forced rapid development will be a great challenge to local governments. The giant Sanxia (Three Gorges) hydroelectric station on the Yangzi River is nearing completion, and, over 1 million people must be relocated from its reservoir. Original plans for resettlement of farmers in upland areas have been modified after the 1998 Yangzi River flood disaster alerted authorities to the dangers of water and soil erosion because of farming the hills. Another grand scheme transfers water from the Yangzi River basin to dry northern China; this is a cherished dream but it poses enormous problems. So far pumping water north through the Grand Canal has proven rather costly. In 2000 engineering work started on a middle route to transport water from the Hanshui River at Danjiangkou to Henan and across the Huang River.

**Industrial Pollution and Remedial Measures**

In 1972 pollution accidents affected Beijing’s fish supply from the Guanting Reservoir and the shellfish from Dalian Bay. The government disclosed that mercury and other heavy metals dumped into the Sungari and Nenni rivers were poisoning both fish and people. Such an admission reflected a beginning awareness of the need to check pollution and prepared China for participation in the 1972 United Nations conference on the environment and adoption of its first environmental regulations. A 1977 survey of sea pollution found high industrial discharges of heavy metals and serious oil spills; 15,000 square kilometers of oil covered the Bo Hai (an arm of the Yellow Sea), a traditional source of shrimp and fish for the banquets of China’s politicians and administrators.

Early corrective policies focused on management of river systems, waste-release standards for new or expanding large industries, cleanup of major cities, reduction in pesticide use, food safety inspection, and research and monitoring. After 1979 industrial expansion plans were screened for their discharge standards; regulators first focused on the metallurgy, oil, textile, paper, food, building
materials, and machinery industries. However, compliance was uneven and depended on the development level and financial resources of the responsible local government.

A trial environmental law was passed in 1979. It focused on prevention, along with the principle of “the polluter pays.” Surface water-quality standards were introduced in 1983 and 1986, and local governments were made responsible for monitoring water quality and preventing further degradation. Three standards of ambient air quality were set for different types of areas, and polluting businesses were charged for emissions above the acceptable level. Laws for conservation of forests, grasslands, fisheries, and wild animals were passed during the mid-1980s, and by 2000 over twelve hundred nature reserves occupied 10 percent of China’s territory, one-half of which were in Tibet and Xinjiang. Environmental laws were introduced for the marine environment (1982), water pollution (1984), air pollution (1987), solid waste (1995), and noise (1996). Environmental impact assessments were required for a growing number of construction projects. In 2000 a total emission-control permit system was introduced for certain areas, whereby emission quotas are distributed or traded.

The 1980s were a period of rapid, visible, and cost-effective early advances in pollution prevention and treatment efforts. From 1982 to 1984 the State Council ruled that 6 or 7 percent of investments in capital construction and renovation projects should go to pollution prevention and treatment. Environmental protection became a standard part of the government’s five-year plans. By 1987, 0.8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) was spent on environmental protection, and its proponents demanded that this eventually should rise to 1.5 to 2 percent. But subsequently this percentage fell, and only at the end of the 1990s did it increase to a level of around 1 percent. In 2003, the State Council pledged to invest 1.35 percent of China’s GDP in environmental protection from 2006 to 2010.

**Weak Enforcement of Rules**

Because the actual sanctions against enterprises that polluted were weak, the follow-up to early advances in prevention was difficult. And with pollution fines less than treatment costs, it paid to pollute. State-owned businesses saw pollution charges (which totaled 6 billion yuan in 2001) as just one more state tax. Management was lax, inspections were few and sloppy, and treatment installations were turned off at times to save costs. As in other socialist countries, in China local governments were the owners of the enterprise, the monitors of its environmental performance, and the judges at the same time, and they feared that investments in the environment might come at the expense of employment and profits. The staffs of local environmental-protection bureaus were increased, but much of the time their hands were tied; decisions were made by bureaucracies rather than by law or public opinion. The differences in technological levels and scale within many industrial branches in China further complicated an imposition of uniform standards. China set ambitious targets for reduction of emissions by its industries,
but monitoring has been uneven, and small industries and farmers are hardly covered.

Industrial pollution has been spreading. By the mid-1990s one-half of China’s industrial production came from township and village enterprises, largely outside of the control of local environmental protection bureaus. It took time, considerable political effort, and concentrated action to close down the worst-polluting industries in the most affected areas of eastern China. Prompted by unacceptable levels of water pollution and drinking water disasters, cleanup programs were started for major cities, Taihu Lake, and medium-size river basins. As of 2004, more than 80 percent of the industrial wastewater discharged by urban industries was up to standard, compared with 50 percent in 1990. Polluting industries were driven to interior provinces and rural areas.

Problems are greatest in dry northern China, where industries and households make great demands on shrinking water resources. Economically, the most logical solution is to raise water prices and reduce the allocation to farmers, but this solution has met with political and practical objections. Since the 1990s the lower reaches of the Huang River run dry for several months a year and have become a sandy sewer. All main lakes and one-half of the sections of the Huai River, the Hai River, the Liao River, and several other rivers in eastern China are worse than the lowest quality standard. Northern and western China also burn much coal. In spite of greater energy efficiency and coal washing, rapid industrial growth (around 10 percent a year) pushed China’s total sulfur dioxide and soot emissions to 18 and 9.9 billion metric tons, respectively, in 2000.
Highest levels are found in the interior coal-burning cities in Shaanxi, Hebei, Chongqing, Guizhou, and Sichuan provinces.

China’s fast economic growth, improvements in education, foreign investment, and increased environmental awareness (leading to greater political pressure on municipal leaders to clean up their cities) were eventually the more important contributors—rather than legislation or punitive sanctions—to technological innovation, improved efficiency, and cleaner production of China’s industries. Shortages in energy (in particular electricity and oil) and water during the past two decades led to a more economic use of resources and a shift to more efficient technology. China has become an importer of raw materials such as cotton, pulp, steel, and oil and an exporter of finished industrial products.

Natural Disasters

The worst natural disaster in China in recent decades was the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, which by some estimates killed 240,000 people and destroyed somewhere between 600,000 and 10 million homes; some estimates place the number of dead as high as 750,000. (The death toll from the earthquake of 12 May 2008 was estimated to be about 70,000 and the number of homes destroyed about 3.5 million.) The annual death toll from earthquakes and landslides is about one thousand; severe droughts affect 10 million hectares of farmland every year, and serious floods about 5 million hectares, with one to three thousand lives lost and 3 million homes destroyed. Although the death toll of these natural disasters pales in comparison to the traffic death toll (which is almost 100,000 per year), their economic costs are enormous due to the damage to homes and other buildings, infrastructure, crops, and domestic farm animals. Official estimates report that annual direct economic damages have increased from 50 billion yuan in the 1950s to 60 billion yuan in the 1970s and over 100 billion yuan in the 1990s. But if one includes indirect losses because of deforestation, desiccation, pollution, and natural resource degradation, annual economic losses quadrupled to almost 20 percent of China’s GDP in the 1990s.

The vulnerability to destruction from floods will be reduced as people move out of low-lying areas along major rivers and as stricter building limits are imposed. China’s eighty-four thousand reservoirs have helped to reduce floods and store water for irrigation, but many reservoirs have become old, silted up, and outright dangerous. Dikes along main rivers have offered greater protection, but riverbeds have been raised by sediments and constricted by bridges and other structures. Increased afforestation programs and decreased grain cultivation in erosion-prone areas will help reduce both flood and drought damage.

International Cooperation

China’s environmental efforts have received considerable support—both institutional support, such as in legislation and training programs, and support for investment projects—from foreign countries and international organizations such as the World Bank. Other countries, for instance, have largely financed the elimination of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) coolants in China’s refrigerator industry.

China’s principles in global environmental issues were laid down in 1990: the environment should be considered in the process of economic development; developed countries are largely responsible for current pollution; the interests of developing countries should not be hampered by so-called green demands; the world economic order should promote the participation of developing countries in solving global problems; and China as a large country will contribute to the global effort by reducing its own environmental problems.

China has supported most international treaties, and its membership in the World Trade Organization has brought it closer to international product standards. Its international stand is a clever combination of global concerns and self-interest in continued economic growth, which invites Western countries and companies to contribute to and participate in environmental improvements in China.

Eduard B. VERMEER

Further Reading


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Controlling the dragon: Confucian engineers and the Yellow River in the late imperial China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Environmental Movements

China’s increasingly industrialized economy has had a profound impact on the environment. Non-governmental groups and branches of international environmental groups have supplemented government efforts to gather information, to educate the public and industry to the effects of environmental degradation, and to monitor changes to the environment. Specialized functions of these organizations include technical support and legal advocacy for those harmed by pollution.

The environmental or green movement in China has experienced a steady evolution since the early 1990s, from the burgeoning of a few groups with limited goals to the flowering of a “green” civil sector with diverse focus and expertise. The number of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has shot up from a handful to over thirty-five hundred in less than two decades. These groups have become increasingly specialized in their operations and sphere of influence. But funding constraints, insufficient government facilitation, and lack of internal resources are major challenges to their future development.

The progress of China’s green movement has been coupled with the gradual increase in the complexity of China’s social and political structures as a consequence of the country’s fast economic development. Further expansion of the sector is likely to remain complex as the country’s economic, social, and political progress breaks down remaining barriers, giving the movement greater opportunity for influence. The movement itself will also serve as a catalyst to accelerate and facilitate change.

Beginnings of Green Movement

China’s green movement was galvanized by a special initiative of the central government. In the late 1970s the Chinese government introduced a series of environmental policies that laid the foundation for more sophisticated environmental laws and regulations to come. The Environmental Protection Bureau was established in 1982 under the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection. In 1993 a pivotal event furthered China’s green movement: The country set up a powerful agency, the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee of the National People’s Congress (China’s legislature). Qu Geping, a veteran environmental expert who headed the Environmental Protection Bureau, became the committee’s director. Qu, revered as China’s “Father of Environmental Protection,” coordinated the effort by thirteen other government agencies and twenty-five media organizations to launch an annual nationwide campaign to publicize laws and regulations related to environmental and resources protection and to review progress of local governments in their implementation. Groups of journalists are dispatched each year to do on-site environmental investigations, and their findings are published throughout the media. The 1993 campaign...
brought environmental protection to wide public attention for the first time, and many participating journalists later became leaders and supporters of green NGOs. Those investigations still occur annually. Their influence, though declining as the sources for environmental information diversify, continues to be far reaching in bringing to the public attention the environmental woes that China faces.

Non-Governmental Organizations

China’s first independent environmental group was registered in 1994, shortly after the country enacted a law requiring legal registration of social organizations. The number of green groups mushroomed to 3,539 by October 2008. Limitations in the registration law, however, have resulted in a unique feature of the composition of environmental NGOs in China. The registration law requires all social NGOs to have a government sponsor that supervises their operations. As a result, of these 3,539 groups, 1,309 are organized by various government agencies who serve as their sponsors, several of which has been in existence long before the first independent green group got registered. Such groups are called government-organized NGOs, or GONGOs. There are also 1,382 student groups that are supervised by their respective university authorities and do not need legal registration.

Independent green groups, that is, grassroots NGOs, normally have difficulty finding a government sponsor, and international environmental groups do not have the right to register in China according to the current law. In order to circumvent the registration hurdle, the majority of these groups either register as businesses or as affiliates of universities or research centers. Some groups simply operate in a gray area without registration. The number of independent green groups is considerably smaller than GONGOs and student groups, with only 508 grassroots NGOs and ninety international environmental NGO branches.

Most environmental groups in China are concentrated in big cities on the east coast including Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, or in ecologically strategic areas, such as Sichuan, Chongqing, and Yunnan in southwest China, that harbor intact forests, headwaters of major rivers, and rich biodiversity; others focus on Hubei and Hunan provinces, which contain the often heavily polluted middle and lower reaches of the Yangzi (Chang) River, or Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regions, which experience serious grassland degradation.


**Relationship of Economic Growth to Environmental Movement**

The robust emergence of China’s green NGOs is the direct consequence of the country’s breathtaking economic development. Almost three decades of near double-digit annual economic growth, which has lifted millions out of poverty, led to mounting environmental woes. Environmental protection, constantly at loggerheads with economic growth, has been losing out due to the paramount priority put on the economy by the government at all levels. Since China’s economy has progressed within three decades from a rudimentary rural economy to one of current heavy industrialization—one with such intensity, scale, and influence—environmental ills have become pervasive and acute, causing public health tolls without discrimination. China’s economic reforms have accompanied the sophistication of its economic and social structures, which sometimes renders the tight control from the central government ineffective, requiring it to invite help from outside of the government system, albeit with caution, to address issues pertinent to environmental protection.

**Growth of Environmental Movement**

Several factors have facilitated and accelerated the environmental movement in China. Its growth has been expedited by a series of milestone laws and regulations enacted by the central government. Those include the Rules for Registering Social Organizations in 1994 that grants legal status to NGOs, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law in 2003 that encourages broader public participation in policy decisions, and the Guidelines for Full Implementation of the Law of State Secrets in 2004 that forces government agencies to disclose unclassified information for public review. As such policy tools encourage public participation in environmental issues, advancement of modern communication technologies, such as the Internet and cell phones, have aided in information sharing and in organizational endeavors. Decades of dedicated public education by green NGOs have raised the general public’s awareness of environmental issues and have created a large, well-trained staff and volunteer pool.

Because the government still has the paramount power in addressing environmental problems, green NGOs in China tend to cooperate with the government instead of taking a confrontational approach against it. Initially, green groups engaged mainly in simple educational activities, such as encouraging water saving, animal protection, and promoting environmental education in schools. With the increase both in the number of NGOs and in their expertise, NGOs expanded their operations in the late 1990s to include forest, water, and wetland conservation, smoking prohibition, green consumption, energy saving and emissions reduction, and climate change. They nurtured public awareness and volunteer spirit through education and activities. They also provided studies and surveys for environmental policy making, cooperated with the government to supervise the implementation of environmental policies, and served as a watchdog to check powerful local governments and industries in environmental offenses.

The expanding scope of NGO activities has continued in China in recent years. Some NGOs have specialized in providing technical support, such as structuring a database for water and air pollution mapping, a green choice public interaction platform, and biodiversity protection mapping. Some focus on encouraging public participation
in environmental issues; others provide capacity building for civil groups or carry out surveys and investigations on specific issues. Several green groups have engaged in safeguarding public interests by providing pollution victims access to courts. Two such groups, the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims and the Center for Environmental Legal Service under the All China Environment Federation, have more than one hundred volunteer environmental lawyers among them and have helped millions of people who asked for legal assistance from 2005 to 2008.

A new operational mode has become popular as well. Confronted by the perennial shortages of funding, personnel, and other resources, green groups began to collaborate in recent years, integrating resources and dramatically enhancing their influence on policy making and attitudes of the general public. In July 2007, several green groups in Beijing initiated a campaign of “Public Action on 20 Percent Energy Saving”; more than forty groups nationwide participated in the efforts. Such alliances also advanced campaigns for reducing air pollution by driving less and coordinated emergency rescue and relief efforts after the massive earthquake in Sichuan in May 2008. These trends are likely to continue into the future.

**Challenges to Growth of Environmental Movement**

Despite the drastic advancement of the environmental movement in China, several key barriers constrain its future development. A major challenge lies in the government’s dubious attitudes towards green NGOs. Although the government needs the extra exposure from the environmental groups to address rampant environmental woes, it is still wary of their power. As a consequence, many government agencies are reluctant to share information with and to invite help from green NGOs, and the current registration limits will continue to quench the zeal of new independent grassroots groups.

Another major hurdle is the shortage of funds; more than half of all environmental NGOs see this as the greatest challenge to their future development. Philanthropic awareness has been very low in China. While business and individual donations are mainstream practices in developed countries, they are still minimal in China. Corporate social responsibility is a novel concept in the country, and businesses lack incentive to make donations for philanthropic endeavors. Individual donations are meager as well. Per capita donation in China is less than one yuan (one U.S. dollar is equivalent to about seven yuan), while in the United States that figure is $460 per capita. Individual donations in the United States account for 2.1 percent of its national gross domestic product, compared to only 0.01 percent in China. Thus funding channels for environmental groups are very limited, and they must rely on personal connections and international foundations or branches of international organizations. Green groups themselves are weak in fundraising capacity, and those registered as businesses lose their legal standing to raise funds. Funding from international foundations or branches of international environmental organizations, one of the major current funding sources for China's green groups, tends to be unreliable in amounts, terms, and specific objectives.

Those hurdles are likely to be overcome in time if the current rate of progress by government and other stakeholders continues. The central government has given higher priority to the environment and has incorporated environmental protection in its national development plan. Environmental performance has also become a benchmark in evaluating the performance of local officials, and success or failure in this area will directly influence their political careers. The institutional structure has been further upgraded: The Environmental Protection Bureau has become the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), an independent agency below ministry level. SEPA was formally reorganized as the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008. The advancement of environmental protection on the government’s agenda will create greater opportunity for the green movement in China.

**Prospects for the Future**

In recent years, the business sector in China has gradually begun to cooperate with green NGOs. Although enterprises are the major targets of green groups, some have helped environmental groups in campaign activities for public welfare, social surveys, and exhibitions. Approximately one hundred entrepreneurs launched the Alxa SEE (Society, Entrepreneur, and Ecology) Ecological
The Alxa SEE Environmental Award was created a year later; at RMB¥3 million, it is the highest such award in China. Green groups in China will continue to get international assistance and cooperation. International environmental NGOs started to enter China in the 1980s, and now many major groups operate in China, including the World Wildlife Fund, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, the Worldwatch Institute, and the World Resources Institute. American and European foundations along with bilateral, multilateral, and regional development aid agencies have been increasingly active in supporting the work of environmental groups. One influential donor is the Blue Moon Fund, which has provided the seed money for the creation of the Beijing-based Global Environment Institute, an independent research institute. Such cooperation and partnership also helps capacity building and personnel training for local green groups.

Governmental and non-governmental organizations have arisen to deal with the environmental degradation that is a byproduct of China’s increasingly industrial economy. Governmental and civil structures have changed to accommodate operations of these green groups. While funding and administrative hurdles exist, the continued advancement of the effectiveness of these groups seems assured.

Yingling LIU

Further Reading
Whether from the pursuit of political and military power or from population pressure, China has suffered from unsustainable development for most of the past 3,000 years. The study of environmental issues in China is a relatively recent but rapidly growing science benefiting from the participation of scholars across several disciplines.

Since the later half of the twentieth century, environmental problems have become a major concern of the international community. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is even more evident that these problems must be solved to ensure the survival of humankind. China, a country that has suffered from unsustainable development for most of the past three thousand years, and which is now one of the most rapidly growing consumers of energy on the globe, will play an increasingly crucial role as both a subject of and player in the field of environmental studies.

Voices in a New Field

The environmental history of China emerged as a new field of historical study in the 1970s in response to contemporary environmental crises. Environmentalists,
social theorists, historians and other scholars in cross-disciplinary fields then began to write books on the subject and publish articles in journals, some of which devoted entire issues to the topic: In August 1972, the Pacific Historical Review concentrated on environmental history, and in June 1974, the Annales: Économie, société, civilisations published a special issue on the subject. Richard H. Grove traced the origin of environmental history to works of historical geographers dating from the mid-nineteenth century on. The social theorist James O’Connor argued that the socioeconomic and environmental crises of our time are interconnected and, going further, that capitalism was much to blame for current environmental problems.

In a 1993 article, Mark Elvin contended that unsustainable growth was observed in the past 3,000 years of Chinese history. He pointed out that in the early phase of this long period, the major impact on the environment came mainly from the pursuit of political and military powers, and in the later phase, from population pressure. He also described the process of deforestation and analyzed the over-development of irrigation systems. In 2004, Elvin published his major works on the environmental history of China in a huge volume, The Retreat of Elephants.

Elvin also organized the first conference on the environmental history of China, held in Hong Kong in December 1993, and invited scholars from multiple disciplines to participate. This conference produced two symposiums titled Sediments of Time, one published in 1995 with twenty-four Chinese articles and the other in 1998 with twenty-one English articles; they dealt with issues related to physical environment, human settlement, frontier, water, climate, disease, official representations of the environment, literary and popular sensibility, as well as case studies on the environment and modern economic growth in Taiwan and Japan. Following the 1993 conference, other conferences on the subject were held at Academia Sinica in Taipei in 2002 and 2006, and at Nankai University in Tianjin in 2005. The selected papers of the 2005 conference were published in 2007 and those of 2006 are forthcoming.

In the 1990s and 2000s, many works on the environmental history of China were written by younger scholars. Wang Xingguang explored the ecological and environmental changes and the rise of the Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE) with data discovered by archaeologists and palynologists (scientists who study pollen and spores), and as well with materials contained in ancient texts. Motoko Hara analyzed various ancient texts on the development and environment in ancient China, focusing on types of soil, trees and grasses, hills and mountains, dry land agriculture, irrigation, and cultivated crops. Robert Marks traced the development of the Lingnan region in south China from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) to the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), focusing on settlement and ecological changes, population increase, climate change and agricultural production, grain trade and granary, land reclamation and development of mulberry fields, exploitation of the mountain areas, and the disappearance of tigers. Wang Lihua studied the dietary culture of northern China in the medieval period by focusing on climate, water, forest, food production and processing, as well as carrying capacity and population. Chao Xiaohong studied social and ecological changes in southern Shanxi during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties by focusing on climate change, deforestation, soil erosion, water control systems, and management. James Reardon-Anderson discussed land use in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia during the Qing dynasty with an emphasis on migration and deforestation. John Richards described deforestation and intensified land use in China’s internal frontiers, including Hunan Province, the Yangzi (Chang) highlands, Guizhou Province, and Manchuria. Zhao Zhen studied the ecological changes in northwest China during the Qing dynasty by emphasizing migration, deforestation, and water resources. Bao Maohong gave a quite thorough review of studies of Chinese environmental history and pointed out four major aspects to be strengthened in the future:

- The theoretical basis of research
- The knowledge of ecology and environmental science and the moral concerns of contemporary environmentalism among historians
- The research on modern and contemporary environmental history of China
- The research on other countries for enhancing comparisons and academic exchanges.
Environmental Issues Explored

Since the 1980s, foreign researchers have bluntly disclosed environmental degradation and pollution in China. For instance, Vaclav Smil’s book *The Bad Earth* was finished in 1983 and was soon translated into Chinese as a restricted publication available only to an inner circle of scholars. Ten years later Smil published *China’s Environmental Crisis*, which discussed the environmental implications of population growth, land degradation reflected in soil erosion, desertification and toxification, highly unequal distribution of water resources, massive deforestation, unsustainable farming, economic modernization and the quest for a higher quality of life, rural energy shortage, and air pollution in cities. After assessing the gains and losses brought forth by China’s modernization plans, Smil (1993, 192) wrote: “China is obviously not alone in facing a prospect of continuing decline in the quality of its environment, nor is it alone in having to deal with it from a position of relative poverty and limited technical, research, and managerial capabilities. But its relatively limited natural resource endowment, the already dismal state of its environment, its huge and far from stabilized population, and the magnitude of its modernization plans present a uniquely incompatible combination.”

Reeitsu Kojima traced the development of industrializing Asia during the four decades between the 1950s and the 1990s and contended that mainland China had grown into the world’s largest source of environmental pollution. Kojima pointed out the following negative environmental conditions of China. First, China’s precipitation is comparatively much lower and its coastal stretch much shorter than that of Japan, implying its weak capacity to cleanse pollution. Second, China depends on coal as its primary source of energy and this implies lower energy efficiency, larger sulfur content, and the problem of cinder disposal. Third, the lavish use of chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals has caused soil and water pollution which, in turns, affects the growth of aquatic plants and fish. Fourth, the development of small- and medium-size industries in rural areas implies the danger of spreading pollution all over the country. Fifth, rapid urbanization has a consequence of rapid increase of household waste and sewage. Moreover, Kojima pointed out that in the early 1980s the advanced industrial countries made relatively large investments into environmental protection. For instance, the share of environmental investment in gross national product (GNP) was 1.85 percent in West Germany, 1.8 percent in the United States, 1.3 percent in Japan, and 1.1 percent in France. In 1990, the government statistics of China claimed that 0.7 percent of GNP was invested for environmental protection. This environment investment/GNP ratio was exaggerated, however, compared with the adjusted estimate of 0.28 percent. Thus, Kojima suggested that unless the ratio was raised by 2.5–3.0 percent, no environmental improvement would actually take place in China.

Elizabeth Economy, the author of *The River Runs Black*, mentioned the following indicators to show the seriousness of China’s environmental degradation:

- Sixteen of the twenty most polluted cities in the world were in China.
- Air pollution alone caused 300,000 premature deaths per year.
- More than 70 percent of the water in five of the seven major river systems was unsuitable for human contact.
- More than 25 percent of land had become desert, with the desertification rates twice those of the 1970s.
- Approximately 8 to 12 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has been lost due to environmental degradation.

The sinologist Judith Shapiro has analyzed the dynamics of anthropogenic environmental degradation in China during the era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976) in many journal articles as well as in her 2001 book *Mao’s War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China*. Shapiro contended that problems such as population explosion, arable land limits, poverty, misguided policies and mistaken beliefs, and irrational price structures due to state ownership were often linked to environmental degradation; however, the underlying dynamics of such degradation lay in a nationwide war.
against nature. Shapiro analyzed this war against nature through four themes: political repression, utopian urgency, uniformity that ignored regional variation and time-tested local practices, and state-sponsored relocation into wilderness areas. This militarization of Chinese society in a war against nature had helped promote modernization projects that transformed the landscape and degraded the environment.

Shapiro also pointed out that, with the legacy of the Mao-era still at work, China’s explosive economic growth and the rush to industrialization since the 1980s were obvious sources of unfolding environmental crisis. Yet some signs of hope also appeared: Environmental nongovernmental organizations, student environmental clubs, and activist groups started to function and share information with overseas counterparts. For example, Global Village Beijing was awarded a major international environmental prize; Friends of Nature in Beijing and the Shaanxi Mothers Environmental Protection Association organized public cleanups and efforts to save endangered species. The traditional Chinese concept of “harmony between the heavens and the humankind” was also reemphasized by people from all walks of life. It seems that China’s government is determined to wash off the country’s reputation as one of the most polluted in the world.

Training a New Generation of Environmentalists

Since the 1970s, many Chinese universities have recognized the importance of training students in environmental sciences; since the 1990s, several have established Colleges of Environmental Sciences and Engineering (CESE). Peking University in Beijing started air pollution research in the 1970s and invited Professor C. S. Kiang of the Georgia Institute of Technology to be the Founding Dean of the College of Environmental Sciences in 2002; they further established the CESE in 2007 with an emphasis on interdisciplinary training and research. Nankai University in Tianjin started a course on environmental protection in 1973, set up the Department of Environmental Sciences in 1983, and established their CESE in 1998. Tongji University in Shanghai started to do research on industrial waste water in the 1960s, with an emphasis on water pollution; they established the College of Environmental Engineering in 1988 and their CESE in 1998. Zongshan University in Guangzhou (Canton) started research and teaching on environmental sciences and established their CESE in 2002, with emphases on water pollution control and wetland ecology. Chang’an University in Xi’an set up their CESE in 2003 with emphases on water control and geological resources. Kunming University of Science and Technology set up the Department of Environmental Engineering in 1978 and further developed the CESE in 1999 with a stress on pollution control in Yunnan Province. The Southwest Jiaotong University in Chengdu established the Environmental Engineering Department in 1998 with emphases on water pollution control, treatment of solid waste, and protection of built environment. Undoubtedly, these university programs have trained a number of experts to undertake the task of environmental protection and control in China.

The Official Approach

Since 1972, Chinese officials have participated in international environmental meetings, familiarizing themselves with world scientific knowledge and concern about growing environmental problems. At the same time,
they began to link with international environmental organizations and donor institutions, such as the World Resources Institutes, Resources for the Future, and the Ford Foundation, which were seeking permission to conduct projects in China. Moreover, persisting environmental problems forced them to reevaluate China’s development path. They also wished to leverage environmental issues to achieve other foreign policy goals. For instance, in 1994 the State Council approved China’s Agenda 21—a document aimed at guiding China’s sustainable development in the twentieth-first century in four major aspects: the overall strategy for sustainable development, social sustainable development, economic sustainable development, and rational utilization of resources and environmental protection—to echo that resolution of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. These factors have contributed to the central government’s strong commitment to environmental protection.

During the 1980s and 1990s, China developed a large body of environmental laws, and in 1998 the National Environmental Protection Agency was elevated to a ministry-level administration and renamed the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). The SEPA was renamed Ministry of Environment Protection at the 2008 National People’s Congress. Although the post-Mao decentralization of power to the provinces and the emphasis on economic growth at the local level has prevented certain environmental policies from being implemented efficiently, China’s integration into the global economy has permitted the country to feel secure about its food supply, and this has allowed policy makers to think more about slowing down aggressive land reclamation. Moreover, floods in 1998 and 1999 encouraged Chinese scientists to analyze the role of logging, erosion, dikes, and the filling in of wetlands in promoting floods, leading the government toward a new appreciation of the environmental benefits of forests and wetlands. China’s central government now understands that environmental sustainability should be integrated into the country’s economic development.

Progress and the Future

What are the official viewpoints regarding China’s achievements in environment protection from the 1950s to the early 2000s? According to Jiang Chunyun, the editor of a team-compiled report on China’s environmental changes and controlling strategies, the achievements...
can be quantified from six aspects. First, in 2003 the planted area of forest reached 1.59 billion hectares and the forestry coverage rate was 16.6 percent, compared to 8.6 percent in the 1950s. Second, the annual area of grassland increased from 1.05 million hectares (1981–1985) to 2.6 million hectares (1991–1995), and from 1996 onward, the average annual increase of grassland was more than 2.7 million hectares. Third, the program of protecting biodiversity was initiated in the early 1980s, and by the end of 2003, the government had established 1,999 nature conservation sites with a total area of 14.4 million square kilometers, of which 13.8 million were on the land, which account for 14.37 percent of China’s total land area. Fourth, there was already some progress in controlling desertification since 1991, and a law controlling desertification was published on 1 January 2002. Fifth, a law controlling water and soil erosion was published in 1991, and by the end of 2000, there were 380,000 square kilometers brought under control. And finally, the pollution control in various aspects started to show recognizable effects. By the end of 2000, the total amount of pollutants was reduced by about 15 percent from 1995 levels.

Regardless of these achievements, environmental degradation has not been brought to a standstill. There are still several issues are of particular concern:

- The shortage of water resources
- The total disappearance of natural forests
- The expansion of desert area
- The aggravated erosion in certain localities
- The continued decrease of biodiversity
- The increasing frequency of natural disasters
- The lack of effective control of environmental pollution

Given these concerns, the impacts of environmental degradation on human health and national security are well recognized by the government.

According to the 2000 plan of the State Council, environmental programs in China will proceed in the first half of the twenty-first century with the following goals: to hold back environmental degradation from 2000 to 2010; to ensure ecological and environmental security from 2011 to 2030; and to establish an ecological civilization from 2031 to 2050. In order to reach these goals, nine strategies have been proposed:

- Overall planning and coordination
- Transformation of production mode
- Adoption of recycling economy
- Ecological rehabilitation
- Utilizing alternative energy
- Innovation in science and technology
- Development of ecological industry
- Building industrial demonstration belt
- Regional multiple renovation

In short, “If we do not solve the environmental problem in China, the world is going to be in a very bad way,” said Professor C. S. Kiang in 2007, reflecting the seriousness of the situation. There is no doubt that China’s environmental choices impact the world, and, as one of the most rapidly growing consumers of energy on the globe, China will play an increasingly crucial role as both a subject of and player in the field of environmental studies.

Ts’ui-jung LIU

Further Reading


The erhu is a bowed, fiddle-like stringed instrument that originally came from Central Asia; it can be played solo as well as in an ensemble or an orchestra performance. The erhu’s sound box is usually hexagonal or octagonal in shape, while the front is covered with python skin which—since a 2005 government law—must come from farm-raised pythons.

The erhu is a fiddle-like musical instrument popular among the Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in China; it is renowned for its versatile timbre. It can be sad and serene as well as exciting and vivacious. The range of the erhu is about three octaves, with its strings tuned a fifth apart to D and A. When an erhu musician uses the fingers of his or her left hand to press or slide on the strings, it creates sounds such as vibratos, trills, and harmonic tones. When the musician uses his or her right hand to push and pull the bow, it creates legato, staccato, and tremolo.

The first Chinese character of the instrument’s name, er, refers to the fact that it has two strings, although a variant has three. The second character, hu, indicates that this instrument belongs to the huqin family of bowed string instruments. In addition, the character Hu is a generic name for the non-Han ethnic peoples who lived north and west of China in ancient times. Indeed, according to Yue Shu (“Book of Music”), a classic of the Song dynasty (960–1279), erhu originated from xiqin, a two-stringed lute introduced by the Xi people in Central Asia around the tenth century. Other less popular names for erhu include nanhu and wengzi.

The erhu consists of three major parts: qingan (neck), qintong (resonator), and gong (bow), each made of different hardwoods. The neck has a qintou (curved tip).

A blind man plays an erhu on the streets of Beijing. Players hold the erhu in their laps and pull the bow between the strings. Photo by Tom Christensen.
with two qinzhou (tuning pegs) inserted on the side. The resonator, or sound box, usually takes a hexagonal or octagonal shape, and its front is covered with python skin, which gives the erhu its characteristic sound. In 2005 the State Forestry Administration of China began to require that the skin come from farm-raised pythons only. Two strings, originally of silk and now usually of metal, stretch between the pegs and the base at the bottom of the resonator. A qianjin (nut), a hoop of string or a hook of metal, either fixed or unixed, holds the strings to the neck somewhere in the middle. A qinma (bridge) of wood is placed between the strings and the python skin on the resonator. A typical erhu measures 81 centimeters (about 32 inches) from top to bottom. The bow, about the same length, consists of a stick and horsehair, whose tension is adjustable with screws. The player usually sits, resting the erhu on the lap, and pushes and pulls the bow horizontally between, instead of outside, the strings. Capable of creating the sound of human voices and imitating other natural sounds, the instrument can be very expressive.

Since the 1950s, a complete set of erhu variants has been developed for orchestra performance. The set includes the gaohu (high-pitched fiddle), which sounds higher than the erhu; zhonghu (middle-pitched fiddle), which plays the role of a viola; and dihu (low-pitched fiddle), which performs like a cello. Liu Tianhua (1895–1932), famous for his Bing zhong yin (“A Moaning Sick Woman”) melody, and Hua Yanjun (aka Abing, 1893–1950), celebrated for his Erquan ying yue (“A Moon in Two Springs”), played pivotal roles in uplifting erhu from a tool merely for accompaniment to its current status as a major instrument to be played solo, in a small ensemble, or in an orchestra.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading


Erlitou Culture
Èrlìtóu wénhuà 二里头文化

c. 1900–1500 BCE

Erlitou culture, often identified with the semi-legendary Xia dynasty, is the earliest state-level culture in ancient China and the earliest Chinese archaeological culture in which bronze was used extensively, primarily for the casting of ritual vessels.

Erlitou culture (c. 1900–1500 BCE) existed in early Bronze Age (the period of human culture characterized by the use of bronze) with its center in western Henan and southern Shanxi provinces. The culture is named after the archaeological site at Erlitou, Yanshi County, Henan Province. Some archaeologists divide the culture into two phases, with Dengxiafeng in Henan Province as the type site of the eastern phase and Erlitou as the type site of the western phase. A Chinese national project to determine the chronology of the Xia (c. 2100–c. 1766 BCE), Shang (1766–1045 BCE), and Zhou (1045–256 BCE) dynasties dated the Erlitou site from about 1860 to 1545 BCE, but some more recent analyses of the radiocarbon samples suggest that the site began to be extensively occupied only after 1750 BCE.

Remains associated with the city-settlement at Erlitou cover an area of 300,000 hectares, making it the largest known site of this period in China. It lay at the core of a network of smaller settlements and villages in a “four-tiered” hierarchy. Thus, many archaeologists regard Erlitou culture as representing the earliest state in ancient China. This state would have been limited geographically to the region occupied by Erlitou culture in Henan and Shanxi provinces, but the cultural influence of Erlitou culture spread well beyond its immediate borders.

Many historians identify Erlitou culture with the Xia dynasty mentioned in the traditional histories. But no contemporaneous writing has yet been discovered, and the earliest references to the Xia are from the Zhou dynasty. Chronological problems also remain in matching the historical records to the archaeological culture. Thus the identification of Erlitou with the Xia dynasty remains a matter of dispute.

The Erlitou settlement was not walled, but it was well protected by its position between the Yi and Luo rivers, and traces of a boundary ditch to the north and west have been discovered. The city was large and neatly laid out, including a central walled “palace” precinct that enclosed the tamped-earth foundations of large-scale wooden buildings. This precinct occupies an area of about 10.8 hectares and is enclosed by a grid of wide roads (10–20 meters across) on all four sides. The roads have traces of carriage wheels.

At least eight foundations of large structures have already been identified or excavated. The first two discovered have been reported the most extensively; the larger is 100 by 108 meters (Foundation 1), and the smaller (Foundation 2) is 58 by 73 meters. Foundation 2 is aligned on a central axis with the more recently discovered Foundation 4 and must have been contemporaneous with it. The shape of the precinct is a vertical rectangle, and it is cosmologically (relating to a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe) oriented along a north-south axis, as are the building foundations.

These large-scale buildings are usually described as...
palaces because of their size and because they are arranged in the courtyard architectural style characteristic of later Chinese palaces and temples. Some of them may not have been residences but rather ancestral halls or other ritual structures. The city, with its palace precinct and cosmological orientation, had already taken the form that characterized later Chinese capitals, which were political and ritual centers. Moreover, the courtyard architectural style for major buildings is that of elite architecture in traditional China through the ages.

Erlitou culture marked the beginning of the Bronze Age in China. Although small pieces of bronze dating to the third millennium BCE have been found at many sites in China, a bronze foundry has been found at Erlitou, and bronze ritual vessels were first cast there. The characteristic segmented (piece) mold method that is unique to the Chinese bronze-casting tradition was already in use. Vessels of the Erlitou culture are small and if decorated at all only in a rudimentary manner. The jue—a tripod with a long spout and side handle—is the most common vessel type, but other vessel types with legs and handles (called jia, he, and ding) have also been found. The complexity of their shapes suggests that the technology had already undergone a period of development. Turquoise, bone, and pottery workshops have also found at Erlitou.

Most of the bronze ritual vessels of the Erlitou culture are wine vessels. Other bronze artifacts include bronze plaques inlaid in turquoise with a two-eyed motif. Where excavated scientifically, these were found in tombs in the chest position, suggesting that they may have been sewn on clothing. A dragon-like figure made of small pieces of turquoise that must have been attached to some perishable material has also been excavated. Its position in the tomb was the same and probably served the same purpose. This complex of mortuary artifacts also includes bronze bells near the waist (or hand) and jade baton-like objects. Thus, these tombs may have been those of a special class of religious practitioners.

Bronze plaques similar to those found at Erlitou have also been found in the Guanghan region in Sichuan Province, which had developed its own bronze culture (Sanxingdui) by the late Shang dynasty.

Sarah ALLAN

Further Reading
The fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minorities, numbering about 110 million people, inhabit virtually all parts of China, though they are more numerous in the west. Ethnic minority homelands make up more than half of China’s land area. Government programs to bring some of eastern China’s prosperity to the west have met with mixed results.

China refers to itself as a multiethnic state. The government recognizes fifty-five ethnic minority groups (shaoshu minzu), in addition to the majority Han. They account for about 110 million people, less than 10 percent of the national population. Nonetheless, China’s minority population size surpasses all but ten countries. Due to a relaxed policy in sparsely populated areas of the country, where most minorities reside, ethnic minority birth rates slightly exceed the national average. Ethnic minority homelands are known as “nationality autonomous areas,” and include 5 province level regions, 31 prefectures, and 105 counties. Taken together, these areas cover more than half of China’s land, including 90 percent of its border area, and provide the nation with much of its forest reserves, animal meat products, minerals, and medicinal herbs. However, in most cases the indigenous ethnic minority population of each autonomous area accounts for less than half of its total population. Moreover, immigration into some of these areas by Han Chinese has
increased. This is especially true for the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).

The largest minority group is the Zhuang with over 15 million members who inhabit the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and areas of Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, and Guangdong provinces. The smallest minority group is the Lhoba with about two thousand members who live in the southwestern part of the TAR. Only the Mongolians, Zhuang, Hui, Tibetans, and Uygur ethnic groups reside in province-level entities that are specifically designated as their respective autonomous regions. Eighteen national minorities have over one million members. Twenty-two have fewer than 100,000 members and seven have fewer than 10,000 members. Ethnic minorities inhabit virtually all parts of the country, including rural, urban, mountain, coastal, and border areas, though they are more numerous in western China. The proportion of minority inhabitants in an autonomous area varies greatly. For example, Tibetans account for over 90 percent of the TAR but Mongols are only about 16 percent of the population of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). In the case of Tibetans, more reside outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region in adjoining Chinese provinces (Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan and Sichuan), which together with the TAR, is often referred to as ethnic Tibet. Smaller groups like the Qiang or Dongxiang have only one county-level territorial jurisdiction. The Muslim Hui are somewhat unique among China’s ethnic minority groups in that they are scattered throughout China, though they also have the jurisdiction of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.

Mongols, Koreans, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirgis, Dais, and Russians are the principal ethnic nationality of nations adjoining China. Other groups such as the Miao, Lhoba, and Deang are not only minorities in China, but also on the other side of the border in neighboring countries. Finally, some groups have had a separate tradition of relations with religious brethren in other parts of the world. The Hui, Dongxiang, Uygurs, and other Islamic groups have religious ties with areas of the Middle East, and many attend the hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, prescribed as a religious duty for Muslims) at some time in their lives. Groups such as the Miao and Tibetans maintain strong ties with their overseas refugee communities. Global trade, easier air travel, and the Internet have strengthened ethnic networks across national borders.

China’s concern with its multiethnic borders, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, led to the formation of a five-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization to secure stability across its border regions with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China.

Although fifty-five ethnic groups live as minorities within a Han Chinese dominated nation, some ethnic groups could be considered as double minorities. For example, the Xibe, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tatar are ethnic minorities within the XUAR, as are the Luoba and Moinba in the TAR. Other ethnic minorities such as the Miao and Yao, who have lived in close proximity to one another for hundreds of years, have forged their own special relationship. Migration has also influenced the context of ethnic minority relations. Many Han migrate...
to ethnic minority regions due to higher pay for work in hardship areas, other opportunities to prosper, crowded conditions in their former areas, being stationed in army units, and job assignments after graduation from college and university. Whereas the Han composed 6.2 percent of the population of the XUAR in 1953, they numbered close to 40 percent by 1973. Such trends are also occurring in the TAR, where Tibetans have come to account for only half the population in the capital city, Lhasa.

Religion is pervasive among most of China’s minorities, and has traditionally been the main form of organized education outside of the family. Monasteries, mosques, and churches, which predate state schooling, remain repositories of traditional values and learning, and continue to flourish, although within tight government restrictions. State schools sometimes compete with religious institutions when it comes to education, especially in terms of financial contributions from minority households and attendance rates. After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when ethnic values were criticized and class struggle predominated in politics and social relations, the government attempted to win back the support of ethnic minorities by increased autonomy in cultural expression, including in language and religious practices. Nevertheless, religious autonomy in the context of a socialist authoritarian government has been more a matter of degree. Religion is increasingly tolerated, and even encouraged when it helps tourism, yet severely limited when it threatens the authority of the Communist Party.

Most of China’s minorities have a strong religious tradition. Some, such as the Hui, are identified largely on the basis of their religion. Members of the Hui, Uygur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tatar, Uzbek, Tajik, Dongxiang, Salar, and Bonan are adherents of the Islamic faith. The Tibetans, Mongolians, Yugurs, and Tus are adherents of Lamaism. The Dai, Bulang, and Benglong are adherents of Hinayana Buddhism. The Oroqen, Daur, and Ewenki practice shamanism. The Drung, Nu, Va, Jingpo, and Gaoshan are adherents of polytheism as well as totemism and ancestral worship. A small number of Catholics and other Christians can be found among the Koreans, Miao, Yao, Lahu and Yi. Moreover, some ethnic groups, including Bai and Tibetan, have a long standing sub-community of believers of Islam, though they strongly identify with their respective ethnic group.

With the exception of the Hui and Manchu, who generally speak Mandarin, all minorities have their own spoken language, with some having more than one. Most of the languages belong to the Sino-Tibetan and Altaic families, while some belong to the South Asian, Austronesian, and Indo-European families. Before 1949 only twenty minorities had their own written language. Those in most common use were the Mongol, Tibetan, Uygur, Kazakh, Korean, Xibe, Dai, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tatar, and Russian scripts. Others included Yi, Miao, Naxi, Jingpo, Lisu, Lahu, and Va. The government helped to derive a written script for nine ethnic minorities formerly without one. Still, many minorities remain without a written script, such as the 300,000-strong Dongxiang, and 300,000-strong Qiang minorities. While most of the Manchu have long since abandoned their script and commonly use Chinese, others groups such as the Jingpo speak a variety of languages. Some are trilingual, speaking their native tongue, the language of the ethnic minority group in closest proximity, and Mandarin Chinese. For example, many Xibe and Kazakh in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region would learn to speak the Uygur language before Chinese.

The Constitution, Regional Autonomy, Government Organs, and Policies

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states:

Article 4. All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal.

The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited. The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of the
different minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs. (Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 1982).

The Law on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities, adopted in 1984 at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, includes provisions for autonomous organizations; rights of self-government organizations; help from higher-level organizations; training and assignment of cadres, specialists, and skilled workers among the minority peoples; and the strengthening of socialist relations among ethnic groups. In short, the policy has been characterized as one state but many ethnic groups. Problems remain regarding autonomy and self-determination. Although the 1984 law is far-reaching, it lacks any bite as long as the law is subject to the power monopoly of the Communist Party. The idea of “autonomy within a unified state” is defined by the principle of “democratic centralism,” wherein there is subordination of the individual to the organization, subordination of the minority to the majority, subordination of the lower levels to the upper levels, and subordination of the whole party to the central committee (Heberer 1989). In theory this idea still permits ethnic minorities to enjoy an “equality of status.” In reality the autonomy may be severely restricted. A greater degree of autonomy would require a broader separation of party and state. Also, autonomy is tied to a territory; it comes by virtue of residing within a designated national minority autonomous area. More than ten million ethnic minorities live outside of their respective autonomous areas.

Ethnic minority work at the national level is carried out through various government bodies. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission is under the State Council—the highest administrative organ in the country, and is charged with the authority to supervise and inspect the implementation of policy in ethnic minority regions. This includes ensuring a degree of equality among ethnic groups, strengthening interethnic unity, training minority cadres, and managing ethnic minority work in general. At the local level the People’s Congresses of some provinces and autonomous regions have an ethnic affairs committee or section. Many minority cadres are trained at one of about thirteen nationality colleges, six of which are administered by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission.

A variety of general policies toward ethnic minorities have been in effect since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Initial efforts were directed at recruiting ethnic minority elites into the government and ruling Party. The 1950–1957 period was marked by the formulation of national-level policies directed at unification and consolidation on the one hand and at ethnic solidarity on the other. However, the formation of nationwide cooperatives strained relations between the Han and the ethnic minorities. The failure of the Great Leap Forward (1957–58), an economic and social plan to rapidly transform China from an agrarian economy of peasant farmers into a modern, industrialized Communist state, led to a difficult period of ethnic relations. After the Great Leap Forward the government moved back to a position of granting more autonomy to ethnic minorities. This position was short-lived, however, as the excesses of the Cultural Revolution led to extreme suffering among minority groups in China. Temples were destroyed, religious customs were violated, and language systems were changed.

During the Cultural Revolution, leaders declared that ethnic minority policy was no longer needed because China was not a multiethnic country. Minorities and their territories were no longer considered special. The autonomous units in many regions were dissolved. Officials used ideologically driven economic policies and faulty logic such as the ordering that certain types of rice be planted regardless of the area's special agricultural conditions. Literacy in minority languages decreased, and almost all ethnic minority schools and colleges were closed. Ethnic minority languages were condemned. The wearing of national costumes was prohibited, and ethnic songs and dances were viewed as feudal or capitalistic. Some ethnic minority health practices were viewed as superstitious and curtailed.

China's economic reforms and opening to the outside world, which began in late 1978, ushered in a period
of renewed emphasis on the cultural distinctiveness of minorities and promoted a respect for their traditional cultures. However, economic policy was directed more toward a rapid development of the coastal regions of eastern China, thus opening up an economic gap between the prosperous east and the poorer western parts of the country where most ethnic minority groups lived. A special series of policies was developed and implemented beginning in the 1990s to rectify this problem by promoting investment in western China, but it has met with mixed results.

Historical Perspectives
The origins of the Han majority can be traced far back in Chinese history. The Yellow Emperor of the twenty-seventh century BCE, chief of the league of tribes that ruled northwestern China, brought the ethnic groups of the Huang (Yellow) River under unified control. This unification led to the gradual formation of the Xia people, said to be the ancestors of the present-day Han. Several thousand years of Chinese history have left evidence of hundreds if not thousands of separate groups.

The scholarly discourse in China depicts the Han majority as a group that resulted from an intermixing and fusion of many peoples over several thousand years. Relations between the minorities and the Han are viewed as having gone through many stages. During the feudal period the dominant ethnic group often held other groups in contempt, and the distance of a people from cultural center of China could determine their level of subjugation. All groups were permitted to pay homage to the emperor, given a lower place within the scheme of social status, and sometimes allocated defense from others by the Han militia. Confucianism, the doctrine that ruled China for centuries, supported this view toward outsiders and promoted nonviolent assimilation rather than the extermination of other groups. The major means of nonviolent assimilation was through an education that stressed the conventions of behavior and morality as prescribed by the Confucian classics.

In early times the Chinese territory was in the north plain of what is present-day China. The Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) unified the group of warring states and groups were either assimilated into the empire or moved out of the area. The Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), is commonly considered to be one of the greatest periods of Chinese history, and the Han Chinese came to represent the cultural majority.

Throughout Chinese history, the Han and other ethnic groups fought wars in which an intricate web of relations evolved. Moreover, two of China’s fifty-five ethnic minorities, the Mongol and the Manchu, actually ruled China for hundreds of years. After emerging victorious, these groups ruled by assimilating themselves into Han Chinese ways associated with dynastic rule. The cultural assimilation of the Manchu, who ruled for 267 years (during the Qing dynasty, 1644–1912), is viewed as more complete than for the Mongol who ruled for the 97 years of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368). While the Mongol of China maintained their written script, the Manchu have long
abandoned theirs, though some Manchu have recently developed a renewed consciousness of their ethnicity.

The Qing dynasty employed a full range of methods to control ethnic minority groups. It used force against the Yi rebellion in the seventeenth century and the two Muslim rebellions of the nineteenth century. Other methods of persuasion during the Qing dynasty included the tribute system (board of rights); court of colonial affairs (mainly for Mongol, Tibetan, Hui and several other Muslim groups); native official system; Han migration to minority areas; and the incorporation of minority areas into the state administrative system. The Asian scholar June Dryer notes that the “goal of the Qing and other dynasties was a pluralistic form of integration that aimed at little more than control” (1976, 12–13). The minimum requirement was a vague commitment of loyalty to the emperor and abstention from aggression. Traditional customs that did not pose a threat to the Chinese state were not interfered with. The imperial bureaucracy seldom if ever penetrated the county level to the countryside and villages. Minority areas came under Chinese control not only through their absorption of Chinese values, as in the case of the Naxi, but also through Han migration to those areas.

In the early part of the twentieth century, when the Nationalist government ruled China beginning in 1911 (although the Qing emperor did not abdicate until 1912), minority territories often changed hands, and ethnic relations were relatively unstable. Decision-making processes became diffused among warlords, foreign powers, and numerous factions of the Nationalist Party. The ethnic minorities mistrusted the Nationalist government due to arrogant officialdom and the expropriation of ethnic minority lands. Except possibly somewhat in the case of the Zhuang and the Bai, efforts toward assimilation failed. However, aside from the loss of Outer Mongolia, China’s territorial claims since the Qing dynasty were maintained. After their victory in the Civil War, the Communists promulgated policies toward minorities that stressed equality among all ethnic groups, the right of autonomy within a unified state, a united front with cooperation between the Chinese state and upper-class ethnic and religious leaders, respect for ethnic minority cultural ways, the right to education in one’s native language, and the development of a higher standard of living for ethnic minorities.

China was not always unified, and the concept of nation is a relatively recent notion in China. The Chinese concept of nation was unlike the European one with its subjective-legal meaning. Rather, the Chinese concept was territorial and historical and reflected the similarity among Chinese terms for people (minzu), nation (minzu), and nationality (minzu).

Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, regarded China as a republic of five nationalities: Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongol), Zang (Tibetan), and Hui (including the many Muslim nationalities). In the 1930s the Nationalist government denied that ethnic minorities
Ethnic Minorities

existed in China, claiming that all groups were branches of the Han. Soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, some four hundred groups answered the call to register as ethnic minorities, a number of whom became classified as members of the same group or were considered as Han Chinese. Over 700,000 people remained ethnically unclassified.

China has long relied on Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s recognition of an ethnic group as a community of people that share a common language, territory, economic life, and common culture. However, this presented difficulties because some groups in China lacked a common language or territory. For example, the Hui were spread across the country and largely defined only on the basis of their Muslim religion and the Manchu no longer had a common language. Therefore, the definition came to be employed with some flexibility in China. In 1922 the Second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supported Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin’s formulation for the establishment of republics for non-Han Chinese ethnic nationalities. Theoretically these republics would have the authority to become independent if they chose. However, in 1935 the Communist Party moved in the direction of regional autonomy instead of federalism. While the CCP used the Soviet Union’s nationalities policy as a model, it was tempered by the Chinese Communist Party’s view that the right of session was incompatible with China’s situation. In short, the notion of regional autonomy was circumscribed such that it could not act contrary to prescriptions of the central government.

The persistent tendency of adherence to many of the basic principles underlying the policies borrowed from the former USSR in the 1950s has left China with a highly political approach to ethnic relations. The politicization approach is increasingly viewed as being out of step with a globally emergent China. There is a resurgent interest in the culturalization approach that is said to have characterized China over thousands of years and resulted in a united-pluralistic society through cultural assimilation across a massive and diverse population.

The early years of the PRC were characterized by moderation and flexibility, with the provision of infrastructure for building, legislation for achieving equality, and efforts to improve the economic position of ethnic minorities. Ethnic minority cadres were trained and efforts were made to promote the idea that each ethnic group had something to learn from and contribute to the others. However, since that time minority policies have gone through changes based on shifting political campaigns, economic development policies, and degrees of nationalism expressed by majority and minority groups. China’s stress on national unity, not only with respect to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, but also with the TAR and XUAR, has been pervasive. The uniqueness of being the only country on the face of the earth with an unbroken civilization of four thousand years has intensified the mission to protect national unity. China’s reappearance as a global power has also reinforced this mission. Unfortunately, the notion that the Han Chinese are culturally superior to other ethnic groups is ubiquitous.

Gerard POSTIGLIONE

Lijiang Naxi girl wears a silver headdress.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Further Reading


Ethnic Relations
Zúqún guānxì 族群关系

China is a multiethnic country with fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups: fifty-five minorities and the majority Han. But this understates the divisions within the Chinese population, especially the variety of culturally and ethnically diverse groups within the Han population. For the many peoples of the People's Republic to participate fully in building a strong and prosperous future, China's ethnic communities need to be appreciated, officially and unofficially, for fostering a rich multicultural heritage.

Foreigners and the Chinese themselves typically picture China's population as a vast monolithic Han majority with a sprinkling of exotic minorities living along the country's borders. This understates China's tremendous cultural, geographic, and linguistic diversity. China is officially a multiethnic country with fifty-

“Long Live the Great Unity of All Nationalities,” 1960. A poster showing Mao leading a merry group of people representing China’s different ethnic nationalities. COLLECTION STEFAN LANDSBERGER.
six recognized ethnic groups: fifty-five minority groups, and the majority Han. China boasts that its minorities are involved in local and national governance, in the effort to prove that China has a socialist system representing the many peoples of the People’s Republic democratically.

**Nationality in China**

Officially, China is made up of fifty-six nationalities: one majority nationality, the Han, and fifty-five minority groups. Results from the 2000 census suggest a total official minority population of nearly 104 million, or approximately 9 percent of the total population. The peoples identified as Han comprise 91 percent of the population from Beijing in the north to Guangzhou (Canton) in the south and include the Hakka, Fujianese, Cantonese as well as the Sichuanese, Hunanese, Yunnanese, and Hainanese.

The rest of the population is divided into fifty-five official minority nationalities that are mostly concentrated along the borders, such as the Mongolians and Uygurs in the north and the Zhuang, Yi, and Bai in southern China, near Southeast Asia. Other groups, such as the Hui and Manchus, are scattered throughout the nation, and there are minorities in every province, region, and county. An active state-sponsored program assists these official minority cultures and promotes their economic development. The outcome, according to China’s preeminent sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, is a unified multinational state.

**Divisions within the Majority**

But even this recognition of diversity understates the divisions within the Chinese population, especially the wide variety of culturally and ethnically diverse groups within the majority Han population. Although presented as a unified culture—an idea also accepted by many Western researchers—Han peoples differ in many ways, most obviously in their languages.

The Han speak eight mutually unintelligible languages: Mandarin, Wu, Yue, Xiang, Hakka, Gan, Southern Min, and Northern Min. Even these subgroups show marked linguistic and cultural diversity. In the Yue language family, for example, Cantonese speakers are barely intelligible to Taishan speakers, and the Southern Min dialects of Quanzhou, Changzhou, and Xiamen are equally difficult to communicate across. The Chinese linguist Y. R. Chao has shown that the mutual unintelligibility of, say, Cantonese and Mandarin is as great as that of Dutch and English or French and Italian. Mandarin was imposed as the national language early in the twentieth century and has become the lingua franca (common language), but it must often be learned in school and is rarely used in everyday life in many areas.

The notion of a *Han ren* (Han person) dates back centuries and refers to descendants of the Han dynasty that flourished at about the same time as the Roman Empire. But the concept of *Han minzu* (Han nationality) is a modern phenomenon that arose with the shift from the Chinese Empire to the modern nation-state. In the early part of the twentieth century, Chinese reformers had been concerned that the Chinese people lacked a sense of nationhood, unlike Westerners and even China’s other peoples, such as Tibetans and Manchus. In the view of these reformers, Chinese unity stopped at the clan or community level rather than extending to the nation as a whole.

The great republican leader Sun Yat-sen was a Cantonese. In his plans to depose the Manchu-ruled Qing state (1644–1912), the last imperial dynasty, Sun sought to unite and mobilize the Han and all other non-Manchu groups in China—including Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims—into a modern multiethnic nationalist movement. He succeeded in the revolution of 1911–1912 and established Republican China (1912–1949). The Han were seen as a unified group distinct from the internal foreigners—Manchus, Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui—as well as the external foreigners, Westerners and Japanese. Some scholars have argued a racial basis for this notion of a unified Han *minzu*. Other scholars have suggested the rationality was more strategic and nationalistic: the need to build national security around the concept of one national people, with a small percentage of minorities supporting that idea.

**North–South Divide**

Cultural perceptions among the Han often involve broad stereotypical contrasts between north and south. Northerners tend to be thought of as large, broad faced, and light skinned. Southerners are depicted as small and dark.
Cultural practices involving birth, marriage, and burial differ widely. For example, the Fujianese, southerners, are known for vibrant folk-religion practices and ritualized reburial of corpses. Hakka people are thought to be hard-working and their women independent minded, so much so that they refused to bind their feet. Many of these customs are nonexistent in the north. Northerners and southerners have radically different eating habits. Northerners eat noodles from wheat (and other grains), meats like lamb and beef, and prefer spicy foods. Southerners’ diet is based on rice and less meat in favor of seafood, and the food is generally milder than in the north, especially along the coast.

With the dramatic economic explosion in South China in recent years, southerners have begun to assert cultural and political differences. Cantonese rock music, videos, movies, and television programs, all heavily influenced by Hong Kong, are now popular throughout China. Whereas comedians used to poke fun of southern ways and accents, southerners now scorn northerners for their lack of sophistication and business acumen. As any Mandarin-speaking Beijing resident will admit, bargaining for vegetables or cellular telephones in Guangzhou or Shanghai markets is becoming more difficult for them because of the growing pride in the local languages: non-native speakers always pay a higher price.

National Unity

Sun Yat-sen popularized the idea that there were five peoples of China: the majority Han, Manchus, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Hui (a term that included all Muslims in China, now divided into Uygurs, Kazakhs, Hui, Uzbeks, Tatars, Salars, Dongxiang, Bonan, and Tajiks).

The Communists expanded the number of peoples from five to fifty-six but kept the idea of a unified Han group. The Communists were, in fact, disposed to accommodate these internal minority groups for several reasons. The Long March (1934–1935), a 6,000-mile trek across China from southwest to northwest to escape the threat of annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang, forces, took the Communists through some of the most heavily populated minority areas in China. Harried on one side by the Guomindang and on the other by fierce “barbarian” tribesmen, the Communists were faced with a choice between extermination and promising special treatment to minorities—especially the Miao, Yi (Lolo), Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui—should the party come to national power. The Communists even offered the possibility of true independence for minorities. Chairman Mao frequently referred to Article 14 of the 1931 Chinese Communist Party constitution, which recognized the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to separation from China, and their right to the formation of an independent state for each minority.

This commitment was not kept after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. Instead, the party stressed maintaining the unity of the new nation at all costs. The recognition of minorities, however, also helped the Communists’ long-term goal of forging a united Chinese nation by solidifying the recognition of the Han as a unified majority. Emphasizing the difference between Han and the minorities helped to de-emphasize the differences within the Han community. The Communists incorporated the idea of Han unity into a Marxist ideology of progress with the Han in the forefront of development and civilization, the vanguard of the people’s revolution. The more backward or primitive the minorities seemed, the more advanced and civilized the Han seemed and the greater the need for a unified national identity. Cultural diversity within the Han is seldom mentioned because of a fear of the country breaking up into feuding warlord-run kingdoms, as happened in the 1910s and 1920s.

China has historically been divided along north/south lines or into five kingdoms, warring states, or areas controlled by local warlords as often as it has been united. China as it currently exists—including large pieces of territory occupied by Mongols, Turkic peoples, Tibetans, and others—is three times larger than China was under the last Chinese dynasty, the Ming, which fell in 1644. Ironically, geographic China, as defined by the People’s Republic, was actually established by foreign conquest dynasties, first by the Mongols and finally by the Manchus. A strong, centralizing Chinese government (whether of foreign or internal origin) has often tried to impose ritualistic, linguistic, and political uniformity within its borders. The modern state has tried to unite its various peoples with transportation and communications networks and an extensive civil service. In recent years
Minority Recognition

China’s policy toward minorities involves official recognition, limited autonomy, and unofficial efforts at control. The official minorities hold an importance for China’s long-term development that is disproportionate to their population. Although totaling only 8.04 percent of the population, they are concentrated in resource-rich areas spanning nearly 60 percent of the country’s landmass and exceed 90 percent of the population in counties and villages along many border areas of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan. While the 1990 census recorded 91 million minorities, the 2000 census is estimated to report an increase of the minority population to be 104 million.

Shortly after taking power, Communist leaders sent teams of researchers, social scientists, and party cadres to the border regions to identify groups as official nationalities. Only forty-one of the more than four hundred groups that applied were recognized, and that number had reached fifty-six by 1982. For political reasons, most of the nearly 350 other groups were identified as Han or lumped together with other minorities with whom they shared some features. Some are still applying for recognition. The 2000 census listed almost 750,000 people as still unidentified and awaiting recognition, meaning they are regarded as ethnically different but do not fit into any of the recognized categories.

In recognition of the minorities’ official status as well as their strategic importance, various levels of nominally
autonomous administration were created: five regions, thirty-one prefectures, ninety-six counties (or, in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, banners), and countless villages. Such autonomous areas do not have true local political control, although they may have increased local control over the administration of resources, taxes, family planning, education, legal jurisdiction, and religious expression. These areas have minority government leaders, but the real source of power is still the Han-dominated Communist Party. As a result, they may actually come under closer scrutiny than other provinces with large minority populations, such as Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan, which are home to the Hui, Tibetan, and Yi minorities. While autonomy seems not to be all the word might imply, it is still apparently a desirable attainment for minorities in China.

Between the 1982 and 1990 censuses, eighteen new autonomous counties were established, three of them in Liaoning Province for the Manchus, who previously had no autonomous administrative districts. Although the government is clearly trying to limit the recognition of new nationalities, there seems to be an avalanche of new autonomous administrative districts. Besides the eighteen new counties and many villages whose total numbers have never been published, at least eight more new autonomous counties are to be set up. Five will go to the Tujia, a group widely dispersed throughout the southwest that doubled in population from 2.8 to 5.8 million from 1982 to 1990.

The increase in the number of groups seeking minority status reflects what may be described as an explosion of ethnicity in contemporary China. It has become popular, especially in Beijing, for people to reveal themselves as Manchus or other ethnic groups, admitting they were not Han all along. While the Han population grew 10 percent between 1982 and 1990, the minority population grew 35 percent overall, from 67 million to 91 million, and another 10 percent in the year 2000, to 104 million. The Manchus, a group long thought to have been assimilated into the Han majority, added three autonomous districts and increased their population by 128 percent from 4.3 to 10.6 million, while the population of the Gelao people in Guizhou shot up from just 53,000 in 1982 to over 579,000 in just 18 years.

In addition to a high birth rate, these figures also indicate category shifting, as people redefine their nationality from Han to a minority or from one minority to another. In interethnic marriages, parents can decide the nationality of their children, and the children themselves can choose their nationality at age eighteen. One scholar predicted that if the minority populations’ growth rate continues, they will total 100 million in the year 2,000 and 864 million in 2080.

**RISING ETHNIC AWARENESS**

By the mid-1980s, those groups identified as official minorities were beginning to receive real benefits from the implementation of several affirmative action programs. The most significant privileges included permission to have more children (except in urban areas, minorities are generally not bound by the one-child policy), pay fewer taxes, obtain better (albeit Chinese) education for their children, have greater access to public office, speak and learn their native languages, worship and practice their religion (often including practices such as shamanism, which are still banned among the Han), and express their cultural differences through the arts and popular culture.

In recent years various minority and ethnic groups have begun to rediscover and reassert their different cultures, languages, and history. The official minorities in China have begun to assert their identities more strongly, pressing the government for more recognition, autonomy, and special privileges. In addition, within the Han majority, groups have begun to rediscover, reinvent, and reassert their ethnic differences.

Rising self-awareness among the Cantonese is paralleled by the reassertion of identity among the Hakka, the southern Fujianese Min, the Swatow, and other peoples. Most of these southern groups traditionally regarded themselves not as Han but as Tang people, descendants of the great Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and its southern bases. Most Chinatowns in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia are inhabited by descendants of Chinese immigrants from the mainly Tang areas of southern China and built around tang ren jie (Tang person streets).

There is also a newfound interest in the ancient southern Chu kingdom as a key to modern southern success. Some southern scholars have departed from the traditional Chinese view of history and argue that, by the sixth
century BCE, the bronze culture of the Chu spread north and influenced the development of Chinese civilization, rather than this culture originating in the north and spreading southward. Many southerners now see Chu as essential to Chinese culture, to be distinguished from the less important northern dynasties, with implications for the nation’s economic and geopolitical future. Museums to the glory of Chu have been established throughout southern China. There is also a growing belief that northerners and southerners had separate racial origins based on different histories and contrasting physiogenetic types, a belief influenced by nineteenth-century notions of race and Social Darwinism.

There has also been an outpouring of interest in Hakka origins, language, and culture on Taiwan, which may be spreading to the mainland. The Hakka, or guest people, are thought to have moved southward in successive migrations from northern China as early as the Eastern Jin (317–420 CE) or the late Song dynasty (960–1279), according to many Hakka, who claim to be Song people as well as Tang people. The Hakka have the same language and many of the same cultural practices as the She minority but never sought minority status themselves, perhaps because of a desire to overcome their long-term stigmatization by Cantonese and other southerners as uncivilized barbarians. This low status may stem from the unique Hakka language (which is unintelligible to other southerners), the isolated and walled Hakka living compounds, or the refusal of Hakka women during the imperial period to bind their feet. The popular press in China is beginning to note more frequently the widely perceived Hakka origins of important political figures, which include Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, Sun Yat-sen, former party general secretary Hu Yaobang, and former president Ye Jianying. People often praise Zhou Enlai by stressing his Jiangnan linkages and Lee Kuan-yew as a prominent Hakka statesman.

One might say it has become popular to be ethnic in today’s China. Mongolian hot pot, Muslim noodle, and Korean barbecue restaurants proliferate in every city. Minority clothing, artistic motifs, and cultural styles adorn Chinese bodies and private homes. In Beijing, one of the most popular new restaurants is the Thai Family Village (Dai Jia Cun). It offers a cultural experience of the Thai minority (known in China as the Dai), complete with beautiful waitresses in revealing Dai-style sarongs and short tops, sensually singing and dancing while exotic foods such as snake’s blood are enjoyed by the young Han nouveau riche.

Awareness of China’s ethnic groups has spread beyond its borders. Foreign policy considerations argue for better treatment of Korean minorities because South Korean investment, tourism, and natural resources have given China’s Koreans in Liaoning and Manchuria a booming economy and the best educational level of all nationalities, including the Han. International tourism to minority areas has been on the rise, including the Silk Roads tourism to Xinjiang and the marketing of package tours to the colorful minority regions of Yunnan and Guizhou for Japanese, Taiwanese, and Southeast Asian Chinese tour groups. Hmong tourists from the United States have begun to visit Miao (Hmong) areas in Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi in increasing numbers, creating linkages to their early ancestral origins that link China, Vietnam, and now the United States together.

Since the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, China has become more exposed to the outside world, and yet the complexity of its cultural and ethnic diversity is still difficult to grasp. Although China’s official ethnic populations are still relatively small in number, increasing globalization has not only meant greater awareness of these heretofore rather isolated populations, but also contributed to further communication with the outside world. While China’s extraordinary economic growth and promotion of tourism in minority areas has assisted economic development in many minority areas, it has also hastened the loss of many ethnic traditions that had been preserved for generations largely through isolation. Appreciation of the tremendous contributions that China’s many ethnic communities, both official and unofficial, have made to China rich multicultural heritage is critical if the many peoples of the People’s Republic are going to fully participate in building a strong and prosperous future.

Dru GLADNEY

Further Reading


Eunuchs
Tàijǐān 太监
Huànguān 宦官

Often at odds with Confucian officialdom, eunuchs were castrated male servants employed in the imperial household. The emperors, especially those who were mistrustful of their Confucian officials, relied on veritable armies of eunuchs (at one point numbering up to 100,000) for many critical decisions, appointing them to positions of high authority. The last known eunuch died in Beijing in 1996.

Eunuchs (taijian or huanguan) were castrated male servants employed in the imperial household from the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) through the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). As individuals, eunuchs were charged with various responsibilities, such as guarding gates and attending to the personal care of the emperor, his harem, and the imperial relatives. As an institution, eunuchs collectively functioned as an imperial structure in the inner court alongside the officialdom in the outer court, and during certain periods emperors relied on eunuchs for critical decision making and appointed them as army supervisors, tax collectors, military commanders, special commissioners, and other positions whose authority rivaled that of the officialdom.

As individuals and as an imperial structure eunuchs held a fluctuating level of political and military powers through special intimacy with the emperor, princes, and palace women. The Confucian officials in the outer court often targeted them as enemies, but the institution of eunuchs survived massacres and the change of dynasties until the last century. In 1912 the constitution of the Republic of China banned castration, but a small number of boys continued to undergo the procedure. Sun Yaoting, the last known eunuch, died in Beijing on 17 December 1996 at the age of ninety-four.

Political History

The primary sources on eunuchs are the biographies of mostly notorious eunuchs included in the standard histories of each dynasty, which contain the Confucian historians’ vitriolic commentaries on eunuchs as scoundrels who overstepped their original role as menial servants. Except for Later Liang (907–922) and Tangut Xi Xia (1038–1227), all dynasties had eunuchs serving in the palaces as servants and intermediaries between the emperor and the officialdom. Eunuchs in the indigenous dynasties, Han (206 BCE–220 CE), Tang (618–907 CE), and Ming (1368–1644), were most destructive and were blamed for the fall of these dynasties. Even when large numbers of eunuchs were evicted from the palaces and massacred by the thousands in 189 CE and 890 CE, the survivors were soon recalled and new recruits brought into the palaces. In the Han and Tang dynasties many eunuchs acquired offices, became estate owners, and terrorized the populace, interfering in court and military affairs to the point of usurping the operative powers of the bureaucracy and dethroning and enthroning emperors. The number of eunuchs varied...
from several dozen in short-lived dynasties to 100,000 in
the Ming dynasty, during which the emperors, who dis-
trusted the Confucian officialdom, entrusted eunuchs to
lead major military and diplomatic campaigns.

Foreign peoples who founded dynasties on Chi-
nese territory did not have eunuchs during their no-
madic stages, but they adopted this Chinese institution
as part of the state-forming and sinicization process
when they set up these dynasties—the Tabgach Northern
Wei (386–534 CE), Khitan Liao (907–1125), Jurchen
Jin (1125–1234), Mongol Yuan (1279–1368), and Manchu
Qing (1644–1912). The Northern Wei eunuchs gained as
much power as their counterparts in the indigenous dy-
nasties, but eunuchs in the Liao, Jin, and Yuan periods
were relatively insignificant. In the Qing dynasty some
eunuchs were manipulative, but they did not have the
institutionalized political and military powers associated
with the eunuchs of the earlier periods, as in the cases of
Zhao Gao (d. 207 BCE) and Wei Zhongxian (1568–1620).
Zhao Gao held an iron grip on the Second Generation
emperor of the Qin dynasty (reigned 209–207 BCE) after
removing his rival and silencing the officialdom. Simi-
larly, in the Ming dynasty Wei Zhongxian tyrannized
the officialdom and population and created a cabal of
corrupt eunuch and non-eunuch officials who flattered
him by setting up more than forty shrines to worship
him as a living god.

Social History

Literary works supplement traditional historical sources
in constructing a social history of the eunuchs. The mak-
ing of eunuchs involved removing the male reproductive
organs, a procedure described as either coerced or vol-
untary castration. Coerced castration provided the main
supply of eunuchs until the seventh century, during which
castration was the punishment meted out to criminals,
with a severity second only to execution. Castration was
forced on prisoners of war in the Shang dynasty and on
male children and relatives of political criminals in the
Northern Wei. Provincial tributes to the central govern-
ment often included a quota of castrated boys who had
been captured for that purpose.

In voluntary castration a boy had himself castrated
in order to be eligible for eunuch recruitment into the

The Empress Dowager
Cixi in a sedan chair sur-
rounded by eunuchs in
front of Renshoudian,
Summer Palace, Beijing,
circa 1903–1905. Left front,
Second Chief Eunuch Cui
Yugui; right front, First
Chief Eunuch Li Lianying.
SMITHSONIAN PHOTOGRAP-
HY INITIATIVE.
palaces (as Wei Zhongxian did). Poverty-stricken parents who “volunteered” their young boys for castration actually coerced them to undergo the procedure, hoping that they would be recruited into the palaces and supplement the family income.

With only several exceptions, the eunuchs through the dynasties were healthy males before castration, and after the procedure they retained their male gender identity and sexuality. They married palace women and adopted both eunuchs and non-eunuchs who perpetuated their lineage. Despite the eunuchs’ marriage and adoption practices, the Confucian society that valued biological heirs and social standing still treated eunuchs with contempt, berating them for being unfilial and immoral. Eunuchs suffered a lifetime of physical torture from emperors, palace women, and senior eunuchs, who beat them to death for minor violations. Indeed, the majority of the eunuchs in the standard histories were executed for court intrigues or alleged crimes of murder and corruption.

In this culture of sanctioned violence were rare cases of eunuchs who escaped the historian’s negative appraisal. Cai Lun (50–121 CE) is praised as the inventor of the paper-making process; he was falsely accused and executed on trumped-up charges. Zheng He (1371–1433) is acclaimed as an admiral who led seven maritime voyages across the oceans, reaching the east coast of Africa. Born in a Muslim community in Kunming, Yunnan Province, he was captured and castrated as a young boy and taken to Nanjing and Beijing, thousands of miles from his family and culture.

The eunuch institution has been seen as an icon of the Chinese imperial system from which East Asian civilizations borrowed. Confucianism and eunuchs both became entrenched in premodern Korea and Vietnam, which even exported eunuchs to Yuan and Ming China. It is interesting to note that Japan adopted Confucianism but rejected the practice of eunuchs.

Jennifer W. Jay

Further Reading


Examinations, Imperial

Kejū 科举

The term bureaucrat did not always have the same pejorative attachment it has today. Before the twentieth century, China was administered by highly respected, and thoroughly tested, professional bureaucrats, or civil servants.

China was the first civilization to develop a civil service recruited on the basis of merit, not birth. This led to the development of a meritocracy (social esteem and position based on learning) millennia earlier than any other civilization. This system was reported in glowing and admiring terms by Jesuit missionaries who came to China in the seventeenth century. It was later copied by European nations. Thus the recruitment of a civil service based on learning and tested through the civil service examinations was one of the glories of the Chinese civilization.

Foundations

The notion of a professional bureaucracy based on merit rather than birth began late in the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) during the Warring States era (770–221 BCE). Its adoption by the Qin state contributed to Qin triumph in 221 BCE. The succeeding Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) adapted the practice and combined recommendation, testing, and performance rating to recruit a civil service. These practices persisted until the early twentieth century. But it was the reunified Sui (581–618 CE) and Tang empires (618–907 CE) that made civil service examinations a full-fledged system.

Tang Contributions

Like the Han before it, the Tang government established two state universities, one at Chang’ān, the principal capital city, the other at Luoyang, the auxiliary capital. The universities admitted mainly sons of the nobility and bureaucracy, and prepared them for the doctoral exams held at the capital. But men educated in private academies and recommended by local officials after preliminary screening exams could also participate in these prestigious exams. Five types of exams were administered, two of them, for literary composition and for knowledge of the classics, were the most prestigious. Those who passed were called presented scholars, a degree equivalent to the modern doctorate. The remaining three exams—for law, mathematics, and calligraphy—were less esteemed.

The exams were initially administered by the Ministry of Personnel because many of the passing candidates became government officials. After 736 CE, the Ministry of Rites became responsible for administering the exams, making them a ritual of the Confucian state and adding to their prestige. Men who passed the doctoral exams underwent further testing on their practical skills, appearance, and speaking abilities and had their personal files checked for moral uprightness. Only then were they eligible for suitable appointments when vacancies occurred. Appointments were made in the name of the emperor. Civil service positions and civil servants were ranked by nine grades, with ascending salaries as one rose on the bureaucratic ladder. All civil servants were subject to annual ratings by their superiors.
Song Refinements

The greater egalitarianism of Song dynasty (960–1279) society was reflected in the opening of the examination system and the civil service to men of more varied social backgrounds. With a printing press in operation, books became cheaper and more widely available. Objective procedures were also adopted, for example, having three examiners read each paper and having a piece of paper pasted over the candidate’s name to prevent favoritism. Men who passed the metropolitan exams then underwent a palace exam presided over by the emperor, in theory, to confirm the results. Other innovations the Song government undertook were to give the exams every three years and to narrow the scope of the exams to literary composition and interpreting the classics. About two hundred men received the doctoral degree annually during the Song dynasty. These men filled about half of the top government positions. Lower government posts were increasingly filled by the prefectural graduates.

Ming and Qing Bureaucracy

During the nomadic Liao, Jurchen Jin, and Yuan dynasties (916–1368) rulers relied on ethnic minorities and military force to rule China. Although they were compelled to institute the examinations to recruit officials to rule the Chinese, the Chinese so recruited had only limited career opportunities open to them and served only in subordinate positions.

The Ming (1368–1644) government sponsored the most extensive educational system in premodern China. The state sponsored at least one school in every county and prefectural city with a quota of state-supported students. Beginning in 1370 the Ming government held regular exams so that by the 1400s degree holders again dominated the bureaucratic elite. There was a great increase in enrollment in both private academies and family schools during the prosperous Ming and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, which produced an ever-increasing number of educated men. Neo-Confucianism of the Zhu Xi School had become orthodox around the end of the Song, and this was...
the basis of the school curriculum and the exams. Students were taught to write their essays according to a standard form that organized them in an eight-part structure. This form became known as the Eight-Legged Essay.

Triennial examinations at three levels became the rule. Aspiring young men first had to pass the county-level exams. Those who did earned the cultivated talent degree, equivalent to a bachelor of arts degree in modern terms. This entitled them to wear a designating sash, exempted them from unpaid labor owed to the emperor (corvee), and made them eligible to teach in minor government posts. They could also take the three-day-long provincial examinations on the classics and history, in which they had to be able to relate philosophical principles to current political issues. Those who passed became elevated men, equivalent to master of arts degree. They were eligible to enter government service, teach, or compete in the metropolitan exams held at the capital. About 1,200 men received this degree triennially in early Ming times; the figure had risen to approximately 1,800 by mid-Qing. Those who passed the difficult metropolitan exams took a final palace exam that ranked them in order of excellence. They were called presented scholars, or doctors. These men became national celebrities equivalent to modern sports heroes. Many entered the civil service, starting at relatively high positions.

The Ming government also set a geographic quota for the number of passing doctoral candidates: 35 percent was reserved for northerners, 10 percent for westerners (mainly for candidates from Sichuan), and 55 percent for southerners. The Qing refined the quota on a provincial basis. The quota system was aimed at producing a bureaucracy that was nationally based. Without a quota southerners would have dominated because since the Song dynasty, southern China had become economically more prosperous than the north and, as a result, had better schools that produced better prepared students.

The Qing government founded by the Manchus, an ethnic minority from northeastern China, did not discriminate against the Han Chinese to nearly the same degree as previous nomadic dynasties had. The Qing bureaucracy relied almost entirely on the examination system for its recruits. Sinicized Manchus took the exams as everyone else did. However, at the metropolitan, or presented-scholar, level, a special and easier exam was also scheduled for the Manchu, Mongol, and Han bannermen. The rise of the Manchus was due to a military organization called the banner system, which enrolled Manchus, Mongols, and Han Chinese who joined the Manchu cause prior to 1644 into separate, elite hereditary military units. Although Manchu, Mongol, and Han Chinese bannermen were eligible to take an easier exam, many Chinese chose not to do so because the more easily earned degrees were perceived as less prestigious.

The personnel administration practices established by the Tang continued during the later dynasties. They included annual merit ratings, triennial appointments, reappointments that could extend a term for up to nine years in a single post, the principle of seniority, and the law of avoidance, which precluded any man from serving in his home province.

The traditional exam system lasted until the early twentieth century. The exams became less relevant in the late nineteenth century as China struggled to adapt to the modern world. Modern schools, introduced by Chinese missionaries, began teaching the sciences, foreign languages, and world history, and were followed by Chinese public and private schools and universities that adopted modern, Western curricula. The exam system was abolished in the last years of the Qing dynasty. Schools for girls proliferated after the establishment of the Republic in 1911. Universities became coeducational after 1920.

Jiu-hwa Lo UPSHUR

Further Reading
Exploration by sea started the process of globalization in the early modern era of world history. The best-recorded case of Chinese maritime exploration was that of Admiral Zheng He during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). By the mid-fifteenth century the Chinese were among the most knowledgeable, best-equipped, and widest-traveled sailors in the world.

Although seafaring Western explorers have received much attention for their travels, the Chinese were also active in maritime exploration. (Because China as an empire either absorbed already established settlement regions or sent soldiers to its frontiers to settle them, little, if any, overland “exploration” per se occurred.) Chinese explorations at sea reached their peak under Admiral Zheng He (1371–1433) in the mid-fifteenth century and show, by their sheer scale, China’s organizational skills and accomplishments in the maritime sector.

Two pages from the I Yu Thu Chih (Illustrated Record of Strange Countries) circa 1430, attributed to Chu Chuan, a prince of the Ming dynasty, and likely influenced by the knowledge gained from the expeditions of Cheng Ho. Zebras and denizens of Muslim culture are among the “exotic” sights such explorers encountered.
Resource Endowment and Early Achievements

A land-based nation, China nonetheless is surrounded by four seas—the Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—which link China to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Favorable conditions for sailing from mainland China occur in terms of the climatic patterns, sea and ocean currents, tidal patterns, and inland transportation to the coast.

China’s maritime activities underwent a long evolution. Although scholars have debated when and how Chinese maritime exploration began and how much Chinese sailors achieved in their premodern era (ending around 1840), the extent of China’s maritime undertakings can be understood by examining the three types of sea routes that Chinese sailors used: local short-range routes along China’s own coast; medium-range routes to East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; and long-range routes to West Asia and East Africa.

By the western Han dynasty period (206 BCE–8 CE) Chinese ships reached Simhala (now Sri Lanka). In the eastern Han dynasty period (25–220 CE) Chinese ships went beyond Sri Lanka to reach destinations in West Asia. In 97 CE Gan Ying, the Chinese envoy to the Roman Empire, went as far as the edge of the Persian Gulf. From the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) onward, some of these sea routes were frequently used by the Chinese, the Indians, and Arabs; they formed the so-called Silk Routes (as compared with the overland Silk Roads).

Maritime Growth during and after the Song Economic Revolution

By the tenth century most of the sea routes used by the Chinese followed coastlines. Major maritime progress was made during the Song dynasty (960–1279), when China experienced its medieval economic revolution. For the first time Chinese ships were able to cross some 2,300 kilometers of open waters in the Indian Ocean from Malacca to Sri Lanka, avoiding the coastal detour in the Bay of Bengal. They even sailed from Sri Lanka to Ghubbat al Qamar, an inlet of the Arabian Sea on the Arabian Peninsula, across another 4,000 kilometers of ocean. This was a huge leap in Chinese maritime advancement.

With ongoing incremental improvements in technology, the Chinese sailed faster and more accurately. As a result, sea voyages became progressively shorter. During western Han times a trip to the vicinity of Singapore took some 150 days, but the same trip took only 40 days during the Song dynasty. During the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) and the Tang dynasty, it took more than a month to travel from Sri Lanka to the Persian Gulf, whereas by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), to cover a similar distance took just twenty or so days.

At the center of the Chinese progress in sailing was improvement in navigation and shipbuilding. Astronomical navigation became well established in China by the end of the ninth century, and it was enhanced during the tenth century by the use of the compass, which led to the stage of partial dead reckoning, that is, navigating in part without reliance on the stars, using measured travel distance and compass positions instead. Later sophisticated seaway compass charts became available among Chinese navigators; these contained information on main landmarks, star elevations at chosen locations in different seasons, travel distances, and compass readings for various sea routes. A good example is Zheng He hanghai tu (Navigation Chart of Zheng He’s Voyages) from the fifteenth century.

In terms of shipbuilding, Chinese technology reached its maturity by the twelfth century with the Fuzhou-type ship (fuchuan), which was used exclusively for sea voyages. Its main features were a ballasted keel and bilge keels together with a low deck length-beam ratio for stability; a V-shaped bottom and multiple sails and jibs (three to twelve as recorded) for speed; multiple stern rudders for steering; and a hull of clinker-arranged planks with multiple holds for a stronger structure. During the same period the versatile “shallow-water ship” (shachuan), commonly known as the “Chinese junk,” was also invented; its distinctive features were a keel-less hull and a U-shaped bottom. The Fuzhou-type was the standard for the Ming fleet.

By the mid-fifteenth century the Chinese were among the most knowledgeable, best-equipped, and widest-traveled sailors in the world, having traveled by 1440 to a total of 153 new places in such geographically disperse...
regions as Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the east African coast, and even the Mediterranean region.

**Ming Voyages: Glory and Outcome**

Undoubtedly the best-recorded case of Chinese exploration was that of Admiral Zheng He. Without Zheng He and his publicized seven voyages to the Indian Ocean, much of Chinese maritime ability and achievements may have been obscured in history, as happened with the Polynesians.

Recruited as a young eunuch to enter the inner circle of the Ming court, Zheng was appointed in his early thirties to command a long oceangoing voyage in 1405 despite the fact that he had no apparent sailing experience. Zheng’s constant sailing for the next three decades (until 1433) apparently served for the Ming court the purpose of keeping him away from state politics—a dignified way to achieve his exile after his involvement in a court coup. In this context an element of sailing for the sake of sailing was associated with Zheng’s journeys, all of which resulted in economic losses for the Ming dynasty. Nor did Zheng He’s voyages lead to greater prosperity in foreign trade, which might have let the court recoup the cost of the voyages.

In reality, the sole purpose of the ill-defined voyages was as a public relations campaign to win friends for China overseas. Indeed, Zheng and his men behaved like philanthropists, distributing gifts wherever they went. Even so, the actual effectiveness of the campaign remains highly questionable. The number of countries that paid tribute to the Ming court increased little during and after Zheng’s voyages. The main evidence that “international peace” was promoted by Zheng’s visits comes from the fact that Zheng set up four regular stopovers in Champa (in present-day southern Vietnam), Sumatra, Sri Lanka, and Guli (Calicut in present-day India) instead of turning these places into China’s colonies.

Spectacular as his voyages were, these multiple-legged trips were by no means unprecedented in Chinese diplomacy: Twelve centuries earlier, during the Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE), Sun Quan, the king of Wu, sent Zhu Ying and Kang Tai overseas for a twenty-year-long diplomatic mission, during which time they visited Southeast Asia, the South Asian subcontinent, and the Arabian Sea region. Similar efforts were made during Yuan dynasty rule (1279–1368). And Zheng He was not alone in his adventuring during the Ming dynasty: Another navigator, Shi Jinqing (?–1421), toured Asia as imperial commissioner, traveling at least as far as Sumatra, Java, and Japan.

Because of the unclear motives, extravagant nature, and doubtful impact of Zheng’s voyages, the Confucian literati during the Ming dynasty did their best to ignore them. Zheng’s records survived only in the hands of his closest aides, Ma Huan and Fei Xin, in the form of travelogues entitled *Yingya shenglan* (Tours to Great Sites Overseas) and *Xingcha shenglan* (Voyages on Heavenly Rafts), written in 1451 and 1460, respectively. Since then most of Zheng’s findings have remained unknown to the large majority of the Chinese population.

However, the sheer scale of Zheng’s operation shows China’s organizational skills and accomplishments in the maritime sector: As many as 208 vessels and 28,640 marines were involved in a single voyage, taking multiple sea routes simultaneously with detachments in order to maximize geographic coverage. Scholars have suggested that Zheng’s detachments may have visited even Australia and part of North America across the Atlantic Ocean.

In the end, Zheng’s voyages proved to be unsustainable. Cool-headed cost-benefit calculation finally prevailed among Confucian decision makers, and such wasteful voyages were never undertaken again. Chinese sailors during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) were content to remain within the China seas. In a twist of historical fate, this made Zheng a legend and his journeys the pinnacle of Chinese maritime history; Zheng achieved a worldwide record that was broken only by Europeans with different political and economic institutions and agendas, as seen from the activities of Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama.

**Historical Perspective**

China’s achievements in exploration over the long run (from the beginning of the Han dynasty in 206 BCE until the end of Zheng’s journeys in 1433 CE) were significant by premodern standards. However, as in many other areas, the Chinese were ruthlessly surpassed by the post-
Renaissance Europeans, who enjoyed the fruit of the science revolution, the military revolution, and, finally, the Industrial Revolution. All these revolutions took place after Zheng’s era.

Ironically, during the late nineteenth century when Chinese took to the sea again in large numbers, they were no longer accomplished mariners on showy Chinese treasure ships. Rather, they were helpless coolie laborers on foreign ships on the way to sell their cheap labor to the West, showing just how poor and weak China became after Zheng’s time.

Kent G. Deng

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A crane standing amidst a flock of chickens.

鹤立鸡群

Hè lì jī qún
The United States controls exports with China to mitigate trade, address security concerns, and communicate foreign policy. The Export Administration works within the U.S. Department of Commerce; its function is legislated by Congress. A globalized world economy, the magnitude of China’s manufacturing production, and China’s role as both an import and export partner makes this complex business relationship one of the most important of our time.

Control of exports from the United States helps to limit China’s access to products and technologies that can be used for military purposes. But export controls also restrict American businesses from competing fully in the global marketplace.

In 2007 the White House revived a push for a renewal of the Export Administration Act (EAA). The EAA regulates the export and re-export of many commercial goods and most goods that have both commercial and military applications, known as dual-use items. China is one of the main targets of this legislation not only because China’s military continues to grow and modernize but also because of the Chinese government’s willingness to trade with nations the United States finds objectionable. China is described as one of the major players in cloak-and-dagger black-market efforts to take highly sensitive U.S. technology and trade it or share it with such nations as Russia, Pakistan, North Korea, and certain countries in Africa.

Export Control Laws

The United States government considers export control laws a vital tool to strengthen national security. Even though the EAA lapsed in 2001, it has been renewed in large part by executive order since then. In April 2007 new legislation was introduced to renew the EAA in its entirety.

Export control laws, first enacted in 1979, give the U.S. Department of Commerce authority to control so-called dual-use items, products that could have military as well as civilian applications. But this causes a problem. With the growing globalization of the economy, business and trade groups do not want to see money-making possibilities hampered by restrictions on what they can and cannot ship to one of the world’s most important markets. At their most extreme, export controls ban certain transactions with certain foreign countries; at the very least, they require proof and certification that advanced or sensitive items shipped overseas will stay in the hands of the person or entity they are sent to.

Trade versus Security

In 2002 Vann H. Van Diepen, then acting deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation control, said that China was the focus of U.S. export control policy because of its growing regional military power and because
certain Chinese entities had been involved in military proliferation. He acknowledged, however, that because of the size of China’s market, there was a need for balance. Companies generally accept and understand the restrictions on trading actual munitions and armaments to foreign countries that are not allied with the United States, but there have been disagreements over dual-use items and technologies.

Standards are in place to try to determine whether an item can be controlled, including whether it is available on the mass market and from a friendly foreign country and if the sale of the item would pose a national security threat to the United States. For example, a bullet is always a weapon. But a computer could be a necessary component in a missile system and, at the same time, have a definite civilian purpose. In deciding what to do about the export of computers, the U.S. government established how many millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) a computer would have to perform to qualify as a high-performance computer. Those are the computers whose sales the government regulates because only computers of that caliber are useful in a missile system. But it is increasingly difficult for the government’s regulations to keep pace with improvements in computer performance.

Policymakers have difficulty reaching consensus on dual-use items. Some support less restrictive measures that would allow the export of many technologies and would ban only those that could easily be used for military purposes. Others would ban export of any item that could have any function militarily, a category that includes items as various as trucks and vans that could be used as personnel transports and metal fittings that might possibly be used in military equipment. For example, machine tools such as lathes are subject to export restrictions because they are critical to the production of missiles. But not allowing U.S. companies to sell these machines to China cuts U.S. companies off from a huge market of Chinese manufacturers who could also use these dual-use items to create nonmilitary products.

In addition to their concerns over being excluded from China’s lucrative market, U.S. firms are also concerned about possible confusion over legislated constraints if new export controls increase rapidly. They fear that eventually the system of controls will become so complex that businesses will not be able to determine whether a transaction is above board.

Since 2001

When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, the gates were opened for an immense flow of trade between China and the rest of the world. This was a positive development for the United

China’s export-driven economy feels the pain of a global recession during the holiday season. The magnitude of China’s manufactured goods, and China’s role as both an import and export partner of the United States, makes the business relationship between the two countries especially complex. PHOTO BY ROBERT EATON.
States because, in becoming a member of the WTO, China accepted standard international trading regulations. At the same time, it meant that the United States had to compete with the rest of the world for a share of the Chinese market. Competition means that any trade restrictions pose both favorable and unfavorable consequences.

In a May 2005 update of The Export Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and Debate, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the CRS described the challenge of controlling exports in a globalized world economy and suggested that export controls are not the best option. The report stated that unilateral export controls were becoming increasingly unworkable in a global economy. The report further noted that earlier export controls were based on products being manufactured or assembled in one country, but now goods are often manufactured and assembled in several countries.

Another challenge to unilateral export controls is the mass-market provision of the EAA. A product can be regulated as a dual-use item only if it is not available on the mass market or from a foreign country that does legitimate business. These provisions limiting the applicability of dual-use regulations were designed to help keep U.S. companies competitive by allowing them to trade in any product that is available from another country and by limiting the U.S. government’s ability to keep U.S. companies out of markets. But in practice, according to the CRS, those provisions are not sufficient to offset the competitive handicap that the EAA regulations force U.S. companies to operate under. The challenge to U.S. competitiveness comes from the complexity of the controls; from the arduous process of seeking licenses, approvals, and permits for exports of potentially sensitive items; and from the length of time involved in updating restrictions.

An example of the complexity of export controls comes from 1998 and 1999, when President Bill Clinton was pushing for an update to the MTOPS standard for controls on high-performance computers. A higher MTOPS standard, which would take into account advances in the computing abilities of general-use computers, would, theoretically, have allowed more machines to avoid being classified as high-performance computers and, therefore, would have allowed them to avoid being subject to dual-use regulation. But computer trade groups testified that the change would not have allowed U.S. companies to keep pace with foreign suppliers, who, unhindered by similar legislation in their home countries, could offer more powerful general-use computers on the world market.

Although the EAA expired in 2001, President George W. Bush maintained much of the export control legislation by executive order during his time in office. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) gave the president the authority to declare something originating in a foreign country an unusual and extraordinary threat to the nation’s security, foreign policy, or economy and to deal with that threat through blocking transactions and freezing assets. IEEPA penalties are not as strong as EAA penalties, however. The Export Enforcement Act of 2007, a bill to extend the EAA for five years, was introduced in the U.S. Senate in 2007. The proposed legislation would have increased penalties for export control violations and would have expanded the authority of the Department of Commerce to investigate potential violations of EAA overseas. No further action was taken on the bill in the 110th Congress. Should the bill come up for consideration in the future, the battle is sure to be fierce with supporters of the EAA worried about national security and opponents worried about the economic well-being of U.S. companies.

Scott ELDRIDGE II

Further Reading


Extraterritoriality ▶
Extraterritoriality, the principle that allows foreigners to be governed by the laws of their own land, was prevalent in China during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Although the principle needed clarification through several treaties, both the Qing dynasty and the foreign countries with a presence in China kept the practice in place until the Nationalists came into power in 1927.

Extraterritoriality was the principle by which foreigners in China were governed by the laws of their own country, as enforced by their consuls, rather than by Chinese law. In the early nineteenth century Britain was reluctant to allow its subjects to be tried or punished under Chinese law (which allowed judicial torture), and exemption from Chinese justice was one of the British goals in fighting the First Opium War (1839–1842). Extraterritoriality was first included in the 1843 Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue between China and Britain and then expanded to other foreign powers in later treaties.

For both the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and foreigners extraterritoriality was a familiar way of dealing with different legal systems. Europeans in the Ottoman Empire had long enjoyed immunity from Ottoman law under the Capitulations—a series of agreements that governed the treatment of foreigners in the Ottoman Empire. Chinese governments had a long history of encouraging foreign merchants in China to govern their own affairs, and treaties with the Russians had granted mutual extraterritoriality since the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. Extraterritoriality was at first fairly uncontroversial, and later treaties expanded and clarified how it was to work.

But the Chinese became increasingly unhappy with extraterritoriality and the treaty system in general as nationalist sentiment grew in the twentieth century. Foreigners had worked to expand the authority of the Mixed Court, which handled cases involving both Chinese and foreigners, since its establishment, and after the 1911 revolution it became effectively autonomous. At the same time Chinese popular opinion was demanding the end of foreign privileges. After the Russian Revolution the new Soviet government renounced its treaty rights as a way of winning support in China.

Treaty revision, changing the basis of China’s relationship with foreign powers, was a major part of China’s diplomacy in the first part of the twentieth century. Extraterritoriality was one of the most offensive parts of the treaties for Chinese Nationalists because many Chinese came to see it as part of an assertion of cultural superiority of non-Chinese. Chinese governments made abolition of extraterritoriality one of their main goals in negotiations with foreign powers. Chinese legal reforms were driven in part by a desire to make extraterritoriality seem unnecessary to foreigners. Chinese governments drew attention to the many abuses of extraterritoriality, including Chinese gangsters’ fondness for taking Portuguese citizenship to avoid Chinese law and the widespread smuggling of opium.
and morphine by Japanese and Koreans protected by extraterritoriality.

After 1927 the new Nationalist government rapidly convinced the minor powers to give up extraterritoriality, and many of the smaller foreign concessions were returned. Although negotiations toward the end of extraterritoriality with Britain and the United States made progress, Japan’s unwillingness to relinquish its position made a general settlement impossible. Extraterritoriality was finally abolished in 1943 as part of the wartime alliance between China and the United States.

Alan BAUMLER

Further Reading

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Descriptions of famine punctuate China’s historical records. Conditions such as drought, flood, or war caused famine conditions, but official response (or lack of it) often exacerbated their severity. Since the late 1970s, death from famine conditions has all but disappeared from China, to be replaced by disorders more akin to those of modern developed nations, such as obesity, diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart disease.

Famine is a result of multiple political, economic, social, and ecological disorders that combine to produce an overwhelming number of deaths from starvation and epidemic disease. An examination of Chinese famines and Chinese official responses to famine conditions reveals universal features that apply to both traditional and modern times. Famine descriptions punctuate China’s historical records, with one survey noting that eighteen hundred famines were recorded between 108 BCE and 1929. Chinese record keepers were careful to document that, in most cases, actual famine conditions did not result directly from drought, flood, war, or neglected infrastructure, but rather from failures of official intervention in the face of widespread distress of the population.

Traditional Relief and Prevention

Famine relief and prevention traditionally formed an inherent part of China’s official responsibility for the welfare of its population. Historical literature describes different episodes of famine and explains direct, indirect,
and long-term measures for dealing with famine conditions. Lists of precipitating events point to differences between so-called heavenly calamities, such as drought or flood, and calamities linked to human causes, such as political ineptitude, rebellion, or war. Scarcities produced by transferring or removing grain from distribution centers and failure to maintain irrigation works, dikes, and transport networks are classified as human causes.

A guiding principle in dealing with famine called for relief efforts to be administered according to circumstances. Local investigators described famine conditions in terms of degrees of hunger or the amount of food available per person during a given period. Immediate, or direct, relief measures included food and cash distributions to halt starvation. Indirect measures included tax relief, seed distributions to restore agricultural productivity, and work-relief projects to repair famine-related damage. Long-term relief measures included plans for water conservancy and programs to help settle famine refugees on unused land. Officials often planned projects ahead of actual needs so that they could be implemented quickly and without controversy.

An examination of Chinese official responses to famine conditions reveals that, overall, relief efforts succeeded best when China had a strong central order to mobilize physical and economic resources on behalf of popular welfare. When the central order was weak, millions were doomed. A hallmark of Chinese famine intervention called for grain storage to protect against the dangers of crop failures. China's “ever normal granaries” served the dual goals of price stabilization and food relief by permitting officials to sell grain at reduced prices and to arrange grain transfers to avert hoarding and price gouging.

Historical data reveal that, by the mid-nineteenth century, the Chinese state could not mobilize resources necessary to carry out effective famine relief and that famine conditions occurred somewhere in China almost every year throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

**Foreign Intervention**

Foreigners in China during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries made repeated attempts to provide famine relief, but they confronted a system in decline and their efforts never evolved into coherent programs. Foreign efforts did, however, address issues to confront a variety of relief agents and agencies in China with ways of handling the problem. One was foreign insistence that China needed long-term physical and economic improvements before the constant threat of famine could be eliminated. A second proposed that the necessary improvements be instituted and run by foreign agencies and personnel. A third issue concerned negative reports that discouraged foreign donors and governments from contributing to Chinese official relief efforts.

Chinese officials regularly accepted foreign food and money for short-term relief and, with equal regularity, rejected long-term relief proposals for projects designed to be owned and run by foreigners. Ultimately, foreign relief efforts emulated Chinese trends. They succeeded best when they had strong external political support. They failed when foreign governments determined that conditions for relief were hopeless and resisted supporting agents and agencies operating in China.

**China and the Great Leap Famine**

Establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 brought dramatic improvements in medical care, disease prevention, and agricultural production. For a time it seemed as if official priority given to eliminating famine would bring positive results. Food production and distribution came under strict central controls, and the state gave high priority to increasing food supplies and improving transport networks. But changing state policies produced disaster as outside assistance was halted, agriculture became collectivized, demands for huge quotas could not be met, and limited resources could not be distributed equitably. An estimated 30 million people died of starvation and disease during the Great Leap Famine of 1958–1962. It is now referred to as the worst famine in human history. A consensus holds that it was human made and that it resulted primarily from political failures associated with the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s abortive effort to encourage rural industrialization at the expense of agriculture.

The years following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 heralded rapid transformations in all sectors of China’s economy, including food security. The specter of famine faded. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, China demonstrated adequate food supply, positive economic
growth, and official policies supporting appropriate responses to both chronic and emergency food needs.

China’s enormous success in ending the threat of famine had a negative side. Twenty-first-century Chinese food consumption patterns began to emulate Western practices. Chinese levels of obesity, diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart disease rose to levels formerly found only in modern developed nations.

Instead of facing the dread issues associated with widespread death from starvation, twenty-first-century Chinese leaders confronted new issues associated with feeding the population, including policy research, public education in nutrition, and official support for programs to combat the causes and effects of obesity.

Arlene GOLKIN-KADONAGA

Further Reading


The founder of several businesses in Republican China (1912–1949), Fan Xudong was one of the first to raise capital and manage local markets by adopting the principles of network capitalism, including the concepts of shareholders, hierarchical management, and cartels.

Fan Xudong was born in Changsha, Hunan Province, in 1883; he was a descendant of the Song dynasty (960–1279) official Fan Zhongyin (989–1052). Fan’s father died when he was six, leaving the family impoverished. Fan and his elder brother Yuanlian, along with Liang Qichao (1873–1929), a major intellectual and political leader of China, were all exiled to Japan in 1901 due to revolutionary activities. While there, with Liang’s financial assistance, Fan studied applied chemistry at Kyoto University. In 1912, after the fall of the corrupt Qing dynasty, which had been in power since 1644, he returned to China and served briefly at the Currency Bureau as an assayer-inspector before being dispatched by the new Nationalist government on a European tour to study salt administration and production that might be used as models for the Chinese.

But the plan for a state-owned salt refinery never materialized because of opposition by revenue farmers and salt works, who held the hereditary privilege to produce, transport, and market salt. In July 1914, Fan founded Jiuda Salt Industries, Ltd. (renamed Jiuda Salt Refining Company in 1936 to reflect the company’s diverse interests) with the support of Liang Qichao and his associates. Despite the obstruction of Zhou Xuexi, the minister of finance, Jiuda prospered with the help of its shareholder network, breaking the revenue farmers’ hold on the salt market in various trade ports in Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangxi provinces.

Much of Jiuda’s new capital, however, was diverted to the Pacific Alkali Co., which was founded in 1917 and renamed Yongli Chemical Industries in 1935 to refer to both the Tanggu plant and another plant in Nanjing. The British-based chemical company Brunner Mond, as part of the cartel led by Solvay and ICI, had long held secret the industrial process and dominated the import market of China soda ash (i.e., sodium carbonate, used in baking, laundry detergent, and industries such as glass-making). Fan, in pursuit of China’s self-sufficiency, founded the Yongli Soda Plant with a capital of 400,000 yuan. A set of factory plans was purchased in the United States, although adapting to conditions in Tanggu—and solving the engineering problems encountered after constructing the production facility according to the blueprints—proved daunting. To support the new enterprise, Fan founded the Golden Sea (Huanghai) Research Institute in 1922. But despite 2 million yuan in diverted capital from Jiuda and bank loans, work at the plant stopped in 1924. Fan was forced to sign an agreement in 1925 selling half of the company to Brunner Mond in return for a capital infusion of 1.07 million yuan and technical assistance. The national boycott of British goods later that year, however, a result of British police shooting striking workers in the Shanghai International Concession, allowed both sides to nullify the agreement. Finally, the chemical engineer Hou
Debang of Yongli Chemical Industries returned from the United States with new equipment and ideas, and Yongli began regular production in 1926.

More trouble, however, awaited Fan. A price war broke out with Brunner Mond (now part of the reorganized Imperial Chemical Industries) just as warlords in north China imposed their own levies and forced the shutdown of Jiuda. An attempt by the salt refineries, on and off, from 1926 to 1934 to organize the fast-growing number of salt refineries into a national cartel also failed.

**Not So Golden**

While economic historians have characterized the Nanjing Decade—the ten years under the Nationalist Party rule from 1927 to 1937—as the golden age of the modern Chinese bourgeoisie, Fan’s experience suggests a more complicated story. With his production facilities and social network based in north China, he had a difficult time adjusting to the new regime. In 1928, when the Nationalist government proposed the construction of a state-owned soda ash plant with a production capacity that would supply the country’s needs, Fan Xudong negotiated to convert Yongli into a joint state-and-private enterprise. Nationalist politics and budget realities, however, prevented the state infusion of capital, and the company remained private by placing 2.5 million yuan in bonds to finance its expansion. By 1934, Yongli had surpassed Brunner Mond in sales in China. Similarly, the Nationalist plan for a state-owned ammonium sulfate plant in 1931 attracted a proposal from Imperial Chemical Industries and the German I. G. Farbenindustrie AG; both were leading members of the Convention Internationale de l’Azote, an international cartel controlling the world’s production and sales of nitrogen-fixing chemical fertilizer. To prevent such a vital industry from being controlled by foreigners or the state, Fan mobilized his bank network to issue 15 million yuan in company bonds collateralized against the assets of Yongli Chemical Industries, Ltd. in 1935. The new plant in Nanjing came online in 1937, a testament to Fan’s dedication and skill in navigating between foreign and state capitalism.

World War II, however, forced Fan and his colleagues to evacuate, leaving behind over 30 million yuan in factories and inventory. Arriving in Sichuan in 1938 with only 400,000 yuan in capital and equipment, he vowed to begin anew with a comprehensive plan to industrialize the interior of the country, especially southwestern China, with emphasis on hydroelectric stations, transportation, and construction of plants for steel, soda ash, ammonium sulfate, coke, and synthetic gasoline. A 3 million yuan relocation subsidy from the government and a state-guaranteed 20 million yuan bank loan allowed Fan to keep his core group of engineers busy with the construction of a new soda ash plant in Jianwei, while Jiuda continued production by taking over the site of a model salt refinery at Ziliujing, Sichuan Province. Fan’s relationship with the Nationalist state, however, remained tenuous. Repeatedly the Nationalist government sought to convert its relocation subsidy into Yongli company shares, thus making it the largest single shareholder. Drawing on the support of a handful of friends in government service and as a member of the National Political Council, Fan rebuffed these annexation attempts, twice calling on Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in person for his support.

**Overseas Delegate**

Chiang also valued Fan’s support. In late 1944, he appointed Fan as a delegate to the International Business Conference in New York; one item on the conference agenda was how to preserve and promote private enterprise, especially in developing countries. As a staunch advocate of private enterprise in China, Fan Xudong proved a reassuring voice to U.S. officials concerned with the state-run economy that the Nationalist government espoused. Fan also took the opportunity to negotiate with the U.S. Import-Export Bank for a $15 million line of credit to finance the importation of equipment for his ambitious postwar reconstruction plan. Returning to China in June 1945, however, Fan found out belatedly that the Nationalist government would not guarantee the loan. Technocrats and economic planners already had developed their own competing plans for U.S. aid. A frustrated Fan died after a brief illness. He was eulogized by Mao Zedong as one of the four who made major contributions to the industrialization of the country (the other three being Zhang Zhidong for heavy industry, Zhang Jian for light industry, and Lu Zuofu for shipping). Yongli and Jiuda were among the first major privately held industrial
conglomerates to undergo the socialist transformation to becoming state-owned enterprises.


Further Reading


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A person cannot be judged by his appearance in the same token as the sea cannot be measured with a bucket.

人不可貌相，海水不可斗量

rén bù kě mào xiàng, hǎi shuǐ bù kě dòu liàng
February 28th Incident
Èr Èrbā Shijiàn 二二八事件

A momentous event in Taiwan’s history took place on 28 February 1947 when a demonstration in Taipei spurred Chiang Kai-shek to send troops from the mainland. The ensuing massacre sparked Taiwan’s further resentment of the corrupt governor Chiang had installed in 1945, when Taiwan was returned to China after years of Japanese rule, and marked the beginning of tensions between opposing factions on the island.

The February 28th Incident, known in Taiwan as “2-2-8” (èr èr ba in Chinese), is perhaps one of the most important political events in the history of Taiwan. The incident—a street protest that escalated into a full rebellion, resulting in Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) troops from the Chinese mainland killing thousands of Taiwanese—was a forbidden subject for decades under the authoritarian rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo. Only in 1995 did President Lee Teng-hui finally officially acknowledge this long-festering wound in Taiwan’s history and apologize on behalf of the government.

The incident began in the evening of 27 February 1947 when an angry crowd gathered in front of Taipei’s Police Bureau on Taiping Street. The crowd was upset the manner in which police and Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) officials treated an elderly woman, who reportedly had been roughed up for selling black-market cigarettes, an activity that was illegal but one that was essential for many people to survive in those early years after the end of the Japanese occupation. The ill-trained and panicked police fired what was supposed to be a warning shot at the crowd but ended up striking and killing a bystander. The crowd then became incensed, and the police fled into a nearby sub-station while the crowd grew in size and surrounded the building. When the crowd discovered that the police involved in the initial acts of violence had fled the building through a back door, the crowd grew only angrier. As word spread of violence, more Taiwanese came onto the street to protest.

This incident was the spark that ignited the powder keg of resentment that had been growing on the island ever since Chiang Kai-shek had sent Chen Yi to be the newly appointed governor-general of Taiwan in 1945 after Japan’s defeat and the return of Taiwan to the Republic of China. Chen’s administration had been plagued with accusations of graft, heavy-handedness toward the local population, and even violence. Many of the GMD troops sent to serve under Chen Yi were ill-trained and unprepared to rebuild Taiwan after forty-seven years of Japanese rule. The local populace had been forced to learn Japanese, and some did not speak Mandarin. The Nationalist forces had just finished fighting a bitter war on the mainland with Japan and had witnessed atrocities committed by the Japanese. As a result, some of the GMD forces came to view the Taiwanese as “collaborators” with the Japanese rather than as an occupied people who had adapted to their new rulers in order to survive. Also, Chen Yi’s policies on Taiwan did nothing to alleviate the tension between the GMD troops and the island’s population. Chen took over thousands of Japanese-owned businesses and factories but also private
Taiwanese homes and businesses. A thriving black market emerged. Some impoverished soldiers allegedly broke into private homes and businesses, looting and stealing to supplement their own paltry salaries and poor rations.

**Escalation**

On February 28 the crowds demonstrating in the streets gathered around Governor-General Chen Yi's office, demanding redress and punishment for the police involved in the previous day's violence. Chen Yi called out the military, who fired indiscriminately into the crowds in an effort to disperse them. Although the violent crackdown on the protesters did end the immediate problem, it led to an even greater one—an all-out attempt at insurrection to overthrow Chen Yi and the Guomindang government on Taiwan.

In the weeks after the February 28 Incident rebels took control of many parts of the island. By 4 March many of the rebels had taken over local radio stations as well as the administration of small towns away from the capital. Chen Yi declared martial law and ordered his troops to shoot anyone caught on the streets after curfew.

The rebels were not unified in their demands; some wanted simply to negotiate more equitable treatment from Chen Yi and the new Guomindang government, whereas others wanted to take control of the island for themselves. A small subgroup even wanted to establish Communist control over Taiwan, siding with Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong's forces on the mainland rather than Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang government.

But by 8 March Chen Yi with his superior armed forces managed to breach the rebel strongholds, and most of the rebel groups were jailed or killed. The subsequent crackdown became known as the start of the period of "White Terror" on Taiwan as the government hunted down suspected rebel "sympathizers." Some of the people arrested might indeed have had ties to the rebels, but others were merely local elites, people who happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time; others arrested included a disproportionately high number of high school and middle school students because many students had volunteered to serve on temporary police forces in the towns that had been taken over by the rebels.

No one was completely safe from suspicion. Mainland refugees as well as Taiwanese who had lived under Japanese occupation could be arrested, and some locals started killing so-called Mainlanders out of revenge. In fact, many of the original rebels fled to Hong Kong and escaped punishment. They soon split into two main factions: pro-Communist groups (who eventually went to mainland China after Mao's victory in 1949) and pro-independence groups (many of whom fled to Tokyo).

When Chiang Kai-shek arrived on Taiwan, he ordered Chen Yi's execution for mishandling the February 28th Incident. Chen was executed on 18 June 1950.

**Silence Is Broken**

For decades under the rule of the two Chiangs, no mention of the February 28th Incident was allowed in any textbooks, nor was public discussion of the event and its bloody aftermath permitted. After Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, citizen groups formed to formally seek a reversal of the government's policy of silence on the incident.

A 1992 government report on the incident estimated that between eighteen thousand and twenty-eight thousand people were killed. In February 1995 Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui made a public apology to the Taiwanese people on behalf of the government, and the Legislative Yuan passed a bill to pay compensation to victims' families. A monument was built in Taipei to honor those who had died, and 28 February was made a national memorial day in 1997. Every 28 February a bell is rung in Taipei in honor of the dead, and the president apologizes to their families and descendants.

Winberg CHAI

**Further Reading**


FEI Xiaotong
Fei Xiaotong, educated at the London School of Economics, was China’s most important anthropologist/sociologist and the author of a prodigious number of books and articles in Chinese. Although during the period of Maoist radicalism he was virulently attacked, in his later years he became one of China’s most popular and prominent intellectuals.

Fei Xiaotong was born to a cultivated family in the lower Yangzi (Chang) River region. After completing a B.A. in sociology and an M.A. in anthropology in Beijing, he earned a Ph.D. under Bronislaw Malinowski at the London School of Economics. His 1938 Ph.D. thesis, published as Peasant Life in China, argued that Chinese villagers had too little land to subsist on agriculture alone; they needed supplemental income from rural industry. As an anthropologist, Fei always directed his work toward improving his subjects’ lives; he said he wanted to be a “plaintiff for the Chinese peasants.” Returning from England in 1938 to a China partly occupied by Japan, Fei went to the wartime intellectual center of Kunming in Yunnan in the far southwest, where he had a university post, students, and a rural research station. While in the United States for a year from 1943 to 1944, Margaret Park Redfield helped him translate three of these Yunnan studies into English as Earthbound China.

But in China Fei is not known for his ethnographies: Peasant Life in China appeared in Chinese only in 1986. Fei’s Chinese fame was as a master of lively and engaging articles, accessible to a broad public, on society and current affairs. Many series of articles were collected into books, of which he published at least sixteen in Chinese in the 1940s, with a readership reaching far beyond the profession to high school students and government clerks. His most popular book, the often reprinted Xiangtu Zhongguo (translated as From the Soil) generalized about rural culture, explaining to urban readers why old rustic patterns functioned. Other books and articles were more somber, stating that cities and towns were parasites bringing economic distress to villages left defenseless by twentieth-century social erosion of human talent from the countryside. Along the way he brought in a good deal of Western social science theory. A year in the United States in 1943-44 resulted in three books, and a later visit to England produced another. In the late 1940s, he wrote regular articles on international relations, thanks to weekly packets of news materials airmailed from friends in England.

The central tragedy of Fei’s life shows all too sadly the vulnerability of intellectual endeavors to political power. The “plaintiff for the Chinese peasants” could hardly avoid the Nationalist government’s failure to address rural poverty. In late 1945, while Fei spoke at a university rally in opposition to the civil war, government troops fired over his head, and he was rumored to be targeted for assassination. Still, Fei was never much interested in Communism, the Soviet Union, or Marxism; his political values were Anglo-American law and democracy. But the Nationalists had made an enemy of Fei, and when the Communists took over his university campus, he chose to stay on, thinking they would use his expertise in modernizing rural China.
For a while Fei’s famous name was useful in legitimizing Communist power, but soon his tone became constricted, and sociology as a subject was abolished. During the "Hundred Flowers" thaw of 1956 and 1957, he began to speak out again and worked to build a party for intellectuals. When the climate suddenly changed in late 1957, Fei was a major target. He stood with bowed head before the National People’s Congress and countless other assemblies to confess his “crimes against the people.” Hundreds of articles attacked him, not a few by colleagues, and many were viciously dishonest. Fei became an outcast, humiliated and isolated. Twenty-three years, which should have been his most productive, were wasted. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, physically attacked by Red Guards and forced to clean toilets, he contemplated suicide.

The next twenty-three years, in sharp contrast, were an astonishing whirlwind of activity. Following President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, Fei, by then internationally known, received foreign visitors. In 1979, after Mao’s death, he was asked to direct the restoration of Chinese sociology. He was highly visible as the public intellectual with important political posts and contact with policymakers. His name appeared in the newspapers and his round smiling face was seen on television virtually every week in the 1990s. He traveled all over China and wrote about it in a large book with the charming title Travel, Travel, and More Travel. He went abroad and was showered with international honors in the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, and Australia.

Above all, it was as a writer that Fei flourished in his second life. Virtually all of his old books were republished, and he turned out new books and articles in even greater quantity. Of the fifteen volumes of his Works (1999–2001), over half were new writings from the 1980s and 1990s. Many of the themes were familiar. He repeatedly and forcefully set forth the case for sociology and anthropology if modernization were to succeed in China. He reminisced about his village fieldwork, his studies, and
his teachers. He wrote on rural industrialization, small towns, national minorities, and developing frontier areas. He championed the cause of intellectuals. He discussed his trips abroad, and made some new translations from English to Chinese. He even wrote a small volume of poetry. What was different in all this new writing was political caution; there was no more pushing for democracy as he had done in the 1940s and mid-1950s. Fei had too little time and too much to do in these last decades to risk playing with fire again.

Fei died in Beijing on 24 April 2005; his body was cremated after a ceremony at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery.

R. David ARKUSH

Further Reading
FENG Guifen

Féng Guīfēn 冯桂芬

1809–1874 Chinese intellectual and official

Feng Guifen was a scholar-official of Qing China responsible for launching the Self-Strengthening Movement. Arguing for a comprehensive reform of the country along Western lines, he envisioned the selective adoption of Western ideas as a way to supplement traditional Chinese civilization. Despite the failure of the movement, Feng’s vision was important to succeeding reform movements.

Born to a merchant family in October 1809 in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, Feng Guifen was determined to become a civil servant of the imperial Qing government. During his study Feng encountered Commissioner Lin Zexu, who resented foreign penetration into China. After several attempts, Feng successfully earned the Jinshi degree (a rank in the imperial civil service) and joined the Hanlin Academy in 1840. In 1850 Feng went to Yangzhou to revise and enforce the salt law. Meanwhile, Feng wrote a number of works urging tax relief for the masses.

In 1853 Feng was transferred back to his native province to assist the anti-Taiping resistance, where he met Li Hongzhang. Feng remained in Jiangsu, during which time he wrote numerous manuscripts, later compiled as Jiaobinlu Kangyi (Protest from the Jiaobin Studio), arguing for self-strengthening to defend against domestic and foreign enemies. Feng’s works attracted the attention of Li in Beijing.

Under Li’s lead the Qing government launched the Self-Strengthening Movement in 1861, which ended in 1895. Li recruited Feng for assistance and advice. Some of Feng’s measures were adopted, and some were left aside. Following Feng’s advice to acquire Western knowledge, a number of Tongwenguan, academies focusing on Western publications, were established, and Feng was charged to run the Shanghai branch, which opened in 1863. To strengthen the nation’s wealth and power, Li adopted Feng’s proposals to develop the Chinese economy and to manufacture modern weaponry along Western lines. Learning from Britain and Prussia, factories and arsenals were constructed during the 1860s and 1870s. Yet Feng’s proposal to revise the civil service examination—namely, replacement of the Eight-Legged Essays with a more practical content—was left unrealized, primarily because of opposition from the conservatives for fear of losing their influence in the government.

Feng was not the first scholar-official to call for reform, yet his contributions had far-reaching consequences. Unlike senior officials such as Lin and Li and earlier reformers such as Wei Yuan, Feng believed that mere borrowing and adaptation of Western techniques, primarily weaponry and military technologies, was not sufficient to strengthen China. Feng argued for a comprehensive reform in many areas, including the economy, education, politics, and customs. To accomplish this, Feng believed, China should learn Western ideas and systems. At the same time, Feng was aware that this proposal of learning from the West would inevitably arouse suspicion from the Confucian-trained officials and intellectuals, for it embodied the issue as to which civilization—Chinese or
Western—was superior. To resolve this Feng reiterated the superiority of China’s cultural heritage to the West. This remained the essence of his proposed reform. He then clarified that reform did not mean complete Westernization; only those practices deemed beneficial to China would be selectively adopted. Feng argued that Western ideas and techniques were merely supplemental, to be used for utilitarian purpose with no intention to displace the glorious Chinese civilization, thereby diluting the controversial issue of Sino-Western cultural conflicts.

Feng died of illness on 13 April 1874. Although Feng did not live long enough to ensure that all his reform measures would be implemented, his contributions were widely recognized and had far-reaching consequences. To honor his contribution, Li requested the construction of a memorial hall for Feng. Feng’s proposal for the abolition of the Eight-Legged Essay in the civil service examination was endorsed in the next reform movement of 1898.

**Further Reading**


Feng Shui

**Fengshui 风水**

Feng shui is the Chinese art of site orientation, which is based on the belief that the house (the dwelling of the living) or the tomb (the dwelling of the dead) can be situated physically to take advantage of the flow of qi within the environment.

In a holistic view of the cosmos, the human anatomy is a microcosm of the earth, and the blood veins of one correspond to rivers and streams of the other. The Chinese art of feng shui (literally meaning “wind water”) seeks to take advantage of this state of affairs. When the ground is broken and the well is dug for a new house, or when the excavation for a tomb is conducted, such action taps the qi meridians of the earth—called “dragon veins.” There are two major schools of feng shui—the Form School, where the physical aspects of the landscape are the focus, and the Compass School, where the astrological or cosmological orientation of the site is the focus of examination. Regardless of the type of feng shui, all site orientation methods purport to locate and characterize qi in the physical plane.

**Form School of Feng Shui**

The earliest Chinese text to discuss the physical environment of Form School feng shui is the *Book of Burial*, written in the fourth century C.E. It describes the environment as follows:

Arteries spring from low land terrain; bones spring from mountain terrain. They wind sinuously from east to west and from south to north. Thousands of feet high is called forces; hundreds of feet high is called features. Forces advance and finish in features. . . . Where forces cease and features soar high, with a stream in front and a hill behind, here hides the head of the dragon. . . . Where terrain winds about and collects at the center, this is called the belly of the dragon.

This is the geophysical character of the optimum site—called the dragon lair, but there is also a very important meteorological element in the physical description of the site. The following passage from the *Book of Burial* is the first time in recorded history that the term feng shui is used:

Qi rides the wind (feng) and scatters, but is retained when encountering water (shui). The ancients collected it to prevent its dissipation, and guided it to assure its retention. Thus it was called feng shui. According to the laws of feng shui, the site that attracts water is optimal, followed by the site that catches wind.

Wind and water are the means by which qi is controlled. Wind scatters qi, so its ingress should be blocked. Water collects qi, so its presence should be encouraged. This will ensure that sufficient qi surrounds the tomb or house. A proper translation of feng shui therefore is “(hinder the) wind (and hoard the) water.”
LOCATING QI IN THE ENVIRONMENT

It is the duty of the feng shui master to search the physical environment of the dwelling to locate the flow of qi. The Book of Burial describes how to find the elusive flow. “Where the ground holds auspicious qi, the earth conforms and rises. When ridges hold accumulated qi, water conforms and accompanies them.” “Ridges” in this passage is a physiological term referring to the arterial branches or vessels of the dragon veins. Where water flows on the surface, qi flows beneath the surface. In another passage, the relationship between earth, water, and qi is made even more explicit: “Earth is the body of qi—where there is earth there is qi. Qi is the mother of water—where there is qi there is water.” As mother and offspring, qi and water exhibit a natural attraction. Obtaining one is the means of acquiring the other.

When the flow of qi is discovered, then the feng shui master must look for the location where that flow slows down and pools or accumulates. The Book of Burial clarifies in this fashion:

Where the earth takes shape, qi flows accordingly; thereby things are born. For qi courses within the ground, its flow follows the contour of the ground, and its accumulation results from the halt of terrain.

This pooling or concentration of qi is an ancient concept that also began as an explanation of human physiology. The following passage is from a fourth century BCE Daoist book of philosophy called the Zhuangzi: “Man’s life is the assembling of qi. The assembling is deemed birth; the dispersal is deemed death.” This is why a pool of qi is advantageous for the burial site. According to the Book of Burial: “Life is accumulated qi. It solidifies into bone, which alone remains after death. Burial returns qi to the bones, which is how the living are endowed.” Somehow the pooling of qi around the interred bones affects the lives of the descendants of the deceased. This final passage reveals the metaphysical power of qi—its ability to enhance the lives of people in its proximity.

Mutual Resonance of Qi

The process whereby the bones are energized is called “mutual resonance.” According to the Huainanzi, a second century BCE text:

All things are the same as their qi; all things respond to their own class. . . . Things within the same class mutually move each other; root and twig mutually respond to each other.

The standard proof of mutual resonance given by the ancient philosophers is this: If a string on one lute is plucked, the same string on a nearby lute will simultaneously vibrate. It follows, then, that the qi of the interred corpse and the qi of the living descendants are identical. Therefore, when the vital, life-giving qi of the burial site surrounds the bones, they are energized like a dead battery being recharged, and the lives of the descendants are thereby endowed. The fact that the unplucked lute string vibrates because it is tuned to the sound waves produced by the plucked string was certainly not known by the ancient Chinese, although it is tempting to identify qi as a type of energy wave based on this analogy.
Qi and Magnetism

It is tempting to base scientific conclusions upon another analogy. The Chinese believe that qi flows through meridians within the human body just like it flows within ridges and branches in the earth. The acupuncture point on the human body is also called a cave or lair, so we can say that the mountain lair is simply the acupuncture point on the earth. When the grave is excavated or the foundation of the house is dug, the geophysical meridians are tapped just like those reached by the acupuncture needle in the human body. Certainly there are forces at work within the earth that cannot be seen or consciously felt by humans—especially magnetic fields. Some creatures do have an affinity for magnetic waves—dolphins, whales, sea turtles, and homing pigeons all have magnetite molecules in their brains that give them a magnetic sense of direction. The fact that hemoglobin contains a certain concentration of ferrous atoms leads some to conclude that the magnetic poles of the earth influence the directional orientation of the human body. Some modern feng shui adherents therefore claim that an electromagnetic radiation of some kind is the focus of feng shui. They base their claim on the fact that the compass was invented by the Chinese specifically to assist in the reading of terrestrial feng shui. While the Chinese may have believed early on that the unseen force called qi was responsible for the function of the compass needle, modern science has been unable to determine the influence of such energy on the well-being of humans. If qi could be proven to exist, or if magnetic fields could be proven to influence human life, then feng shui might be taken more seriously by the scientific community. Until then, its practice might be considered folk ecology rather than an environmental science.

So what exactly is qi? Thousands of pages of commentary have been dedicated to the explication of this term and no English translation can do it justice. While “energy” may capture some of its physical characteristics, such a word does not address its metaphysical qualities. While it originally meant steam or vapor (as in clouds), by the time of Confucius it had come to mean an animating force in the atmosphere (manifested in weather phenomena) that actively influenced the human body (manifested in fever, chills, delusions, etc.). The proto-science of Form School feng shui analyzed this force in the environment with the intention of controlling its manifestations in the individual. Such analysis was scientific only insofar as it was based on empirical observation. When other factors such as numerology and astrology were consulted by adherents of Compass School feng shui, the practice became less a science and more an art.

Compass School of Feng Shui

As we have seen in the Book of Burial, mountainous landscape is the optimum environment in which to trace the flow of qi. But not all landscape is mountainous, so there had to be a way to detect qi when the topographical forms and features did not protrude sufficiently to locate the hidden dragon veins. The Chinese believed that the realms of heaven, earth, and man were infinitely correlated, making it possible to read in the stars the qi of any given locale or any given person on earth. Furthermore, ancient Chinese thinkers believed that numbers underlie the operations of the phenomenal world. By knowing how these numbers change and transform, they could know how the spirits move. The numbers might be thought of as numerical equivalents of metaphysical entities like star spirits (especially the “Nine Stars,” but also including the five “moving stars,” or planets, the probable origin of the Five Elements) or other manifestations of natural forces, such as celestial and earthly conjunctions. One of the most important of such conjunctions was direction, not only the direction toward which a person faced on earth, but more importantly, the direction from which celestial influences were received by those on earth.

The Cosmograph

In ancient China there was no distinction between astronomy and astrology, because the stars in the night sky were celestial deities. Those with an understanding of the movement of stars therefore gained an understanding of the will of heavenly spirits. This was crucial information for the emperor, who was the center of the human realm, as Shang Di, or God on High, was the center of the heavenly realm. Shang Di’s celestial throne was the Big Dipper, around which all other stars revolved. The handle of the Dipper was the focus of his power, and was capable of dealing death and destruction in the direction to which it pointed. The Chinese accordingly created an instrument that was capable of determining the configuration of the
Big Dipper in the sky at any time of day or night. This was the *shipan*, or cosmograph, models of which have been discovered in early Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) tombs.

The instrument consists of a square fixed earth plate on bottom and a rotating heaven disc on top. Around the circumference of both plate and disc are arranged the names of the twenty-eight constellations of the Chinese zodiac as well as the twelve Earthly Branches, representing the twelve months and the twelve double-hours of the day and night. In the center of the dial is a representation of the Big Dipper. The function of the instrument is similar to a planisphere—which allows the user to locate any star or constellation in the sky at any moment of the year, except that it is only the stars of the zodiac and the Big Dipper that are represented on the cosmograph.

While the Big Dipper in the center of the heaven plate is clearly the focus of the instrument, each of the four sides of the earth plate is marked with one of four greater constellations, each made of seven of the lesser constellations. There is the Green Dragon (composed of the Horn, the Neck, the Heart, and the Tail, for example), the Red Bird (composed of the Beak, the Gullet, the Crop, and the Wings, for example), the White Tiger, and the Dark Turtle. In any given season only one of these macro-constellations can be observed in its entirety in the night sky. In the ancient period the central constellation of each of the four deities occupied the center of the southern sky on the solstices and equinoxes. For example, on the summer solstice the Fire Star, the central star of the Heart of the Green Dragon, culminated at dusk. These great macro-constellations are also mentioned in the *Book of Burial*:

The Dark Turtle hangs its head,  
The Red Bird hovers in dance,  
The Green Dragon coils sinuously,  
The White Tiger crouches down.

But in this manual of burial feng shui the deities represent topographical formations surrounding the lair or tomb site—the coiled dragon toward the east, the crouching tiger toward the west, the hovering bird in the south, and hanging turtle in the north.

**THE FENG SHUI COMPASS**

The *shipan* cosmograph was the direct ancestor of the magnetic compass, and its earliest use by the Chinese was not for navigation but for properly orienting the dwelling site. The Big Dipper rotating on the heaven dial transformed into the needle of the compass as the *shipan* evolved into the *luopan*, or feng shui compass. The *luopan* is still the standard tool of the feng shui master. In the most popular type of Compass School feng shui the cardinal directions of the square, its four corners, and the center (a total of nine “directions”) are all assigned characteristics based on Chinese correlative cosmology. This is the so-called Nine Star feng shui (after the seven stars of the Big Dipper plus two companion stars) or Palace of Nine Halls (based on the 3-by-3 grid that represents the ideal dwelling).

The Chinese are masters of correlations based on the microcosm of man and the macrocosm of heaven and earth. For example, there is the two-term system of yin and yang; the four-term system of cardinal directions and seasons; the five-term system of the Five Elements or Phases—wood, fire, earth, metal, and water; the eight-term system of the *bagua*, or eight trigrams of the *Book of Changes*; the nine-term system of the Nine Stars; the ten Heavenly Stems and twelve Earthly Branches of the sixty-term sexagenary numbering system; the twenty-eight constellations of the zodiac; and so on. Each ring of the *luopan* represents one or more of these correlative systems. When a particular location is oriented by means of the compass, its various elevations could then be correlated according to any number of factors.

**THE FIVE ELEMENTS AND FENG SHUI**

Correlative cosmology can be quite complicated. For example, in the Nine Star system, each year is governed by one of the Nine Stars and is therefore characterized by a direction, a number in the Palace of Nine Halls, and a trigram of the *Book of Changes*. Most importantly, it has a particular phase or elemental character. Thus, based on the year of birth, every individual has his or her own characteristic element, number, direction and trigram. However, of all of the enumerated correlations, it is the element that is supposedly the key to good fortune. According to the concept of the Five Elements, qi naturally progresses through five different phases as time progresses. There are two primary systems of phase shift—the production order and conquest order—exemplified as follows. (See table 1.)
In Nine Star feng shui, any process that can be considered generative or productive will create good fortune. Destructive processes, on the other hand, create bad luck. For example, a person born under the element of metal would not want to live in a house facing the direction south, because south belongs to the element fire, and fire melts metal in the destruction order of the elements. A good direction for this person’s house to face would be southwest, because southwest belongs to the element earth, which harbors ores, thus producing metal. While the phase shift orders of the five elements are fascinating explanations of phenomenal change, like the Aristotelian concept of the “four humors” which they superficially resemble, they have no basis in scientific fact.

Feng Shui as a Belief System

For the numerous reasons mentioned, feng shui is not considered a science. As explained in the discussion of Form School feng shui, it is not the spirit of the ancestor that endows the living, but the ineffable qi that nourishes the ancestor’s bones. Thus nourished, the bones in turn “resonate” with the qi of the descendants. Without a spiritual aspect, it would appear then that feng shui is also not a religion. One scholar’s definition of qi as a psychophysiological power is an attempt to capture those aspects of the energy of qi that elude measurement. This would account for the purported intuitive powers of feng shui masters to locate qi in the environment, even when the topographical features of a particular locale do not conform well to the requirements of the text of the Book of Burial. This would also help to explain how the proper flow of qi benefits the living when there is no deceased to act as a “medium” between the physical environment and the human being. As a psychophysiological entity or event, *feng shui* may share its rate of success with a phenomenon in the medical community—the so-called placebo effect. Those whose ailments improve after being administered a placebo supposedly get better because they believe in the effect of the “medicine” they are receiving. If this effect can explain the influence of feng shui in modern society, then its practice is indeed similar to the practice of religion because the practitioner believes in the power of qi.

Stephen L. FIELD

Further Reading


Throughout China’s premodern history, xiao (filial piety) was its most significant social value. It enjoyed such favor because it strengthened both the family’s coherence and the state’s authority. In modern times, despite repeated attacks by anti-traditionalists, xiao has continued to play an important role in Chinese social life; however, the one-child policy threatens to diminish its long-term significance.

Changing Definitions of Xiao

The word xiao first appears in texts and inscriptions during the Western Zhou period (1045–771 BCE), when it usually designated sacrifices in honor of ancestors. Hence, its earliest meaning seems to have been “to make food offerings” to one’s ancestors, lineage, in-laws, and even friends. Yet it was also applied to the living, in which case it meant “to support or nourish,” or “to follow one’s elders’ wishes.” By the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), Confucians reinterpreted xiao by narrowing its focus to serving one’s parents. When his parents were alive, a good son should fulfill their material needs, cater to their whims, and obey their commands; when they died, for three years he should mourn them and continue their traditions. Mourning for three years, a Confucian innovation, meant enduring a number of austerities, such as quitting office, wearing rough hemp robes (rather than silk ones), living in an exposed lean-to, and avoiding meat, sex, alcohol, and music. In short, Confucians redefined xiao so that it would serve one’s immediate family rather than the lineage.

With the emergence of a unified empire in 221 BCE, some educated men, more of whom were becoming state officials, emphasized the political and metaphysical aspects of filial piety. Politically, they stressed what the historian Norman Kutcher has termed “the Confucian parallel conception of society” (1999). That is, if a son is loyal to his parents, he will more than likely also be obedient to the emperor. Analects 1.2 states this concept as, “Few are those who by character are filial and brotherly yet are still fond of opposing those above.” Due to the stabilizing effects of filial piety, nearly every imperial
dynasty esteemed and propagated the third-century BCE Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing 孝經), which clearly articulates xiao as loyalty to political authority. When steppe nomads conquered China, Xiaojing was the first text that they translated into their own language. At the same time, the Classic of Filial Piety and other early imperial Confucian texts stress the metaphysical properties of filial piety. Xiao is not only a type of behavior but is also a spiritual essence that literally connects people with the cosmos. As a result, Heaven responds favorably to those individuals who are loyal and punishes severely those who are not.

In early imperial times, filial piety reached a fever pitch: scholar-officials were not merely performing the mourning rites; many were exceeding them. Some sons mourned each parent for six years rather than just the customary three; others forever declined to consume meat and alcohol. Remarkable feats of filial action were disseminated widely through books called Accounts of Filial Children (Xiaozi zhuan 孝子傳). Illustrations of stories from these works soon decorated everyday objects, the walls of schools and government offices, and tomb interiors. By the early twentieth century, the most ubiquitous book in China was the Twenty-four Filial Exemplars (Ershisi xiao 二十四孝), which every child knew by heart. These narratives received such a welcome no doubt because they strengthened the patriarchal family system. They urged adult sons to live together and to submit unconditionally to their parents’ commands. Filial piety was of such great consequence in Chinese society that to compete with the Confucians, both Daoists and Buddhists found it necessary to craft and market their own version of it.

**Xiao’s Modern Fate**

During the early twentieth-century’s New Cultural Movement (also known as the May Fourth Movement),

This paper cutout depicts the legendary figure of Mu Lan, a woman who expressed her filial piety by disguising herself as a man to join the army and serve twelve years in place of her elderly father.

A father sits on a park bench, sharing lunch with his child. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
modernist reformers sharply attacked filial piety and the patriarchal family system it promoted. Many cultural forms that expressed filial piety, such as the three-year mourning rites, were abandoned. Despite the fact that it never lost its importance in Hong Kong or Taiwan, filial piety came under even more duress during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). With Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms of 1978–1997, filial piety has regained some of its former stature. To provide care for an aging and pensionless rural population, the state has once again promoted filial piety: children are required by law to take care of their parents. Hence, the state has redefined filial piety as supplying the material needs of elderly parents. But other factors have significantly reduced filial piety’s social importance: adult children usually no longer live with their parents, and their parents oftentimes do not control significant economic resources. Thus, although filial piety remains important as a moral value, its grip on social life has significantly weakened.

Keith N. KNAPP

Further Reading
Fireworks and Firecrackers

Huāpào 花炮

Fireworks have been used in China, the producer of 90 percent of the world’s fireworks, in various forms for at least two thousand years. In ancient times people would frighten away creatures (real or imaginary) by throwing bamboo on fires. Some historians say fireworks as we know them originated in 1723 with an edict by the new Yongzheng emperor demanding entertainment to celebrate the first year of his reign.

The general Chinese term for firecrackers and fireworks is huapao, which is a portmanteau of the words yanhua and paozhu. Yanhua (smoke and flowers) or yanhuo (smoke and fire or colorful fire when yan is pronounced in a different tone) refers to fireworks. Paozhu (cannon bamboo) or paozhang (cannon stick) refers to firecrackers, which once were called baozhu (exploding bamboo).

Origin

Wang Anshi (1021–1086), a great thinker and man of letters of the Song dynasty (960–1279), wrote in a poem that “baozhu sheng zhong yi sui chu; chunfeng song nuan ru tusu”:

Amidst the crackling of exploding bamboo a year is gone;
In the warmth of a spring breeze we drink the wine of tusu (Wang, 1999)

This couplet vividly describes how people of his time celebrated the Spring Festival or Chinese New Year by drinking tusu wine (made with medicinal herbs) and burning bamboo to create loud noises; both customs go far back in history. According to a legend, on every Chinese New Year’s Eve, a nian (a man-eating monster) would come out of the mountains to prey on humans. A god in the guise of a beggar scared the monster away with the crackling of burning bamboo. Humans then followed his example. Shen yi jing (Book of Gods and Spirits), a classic of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), shows how the custom could have grown from everyday practice. In ancient times, when camping deep in the mountains, people built bonfires to cook and to keep themselves warm. A strange human-shaped mountain goblin called shanxiao (von Glahn, 2004), however, often harassed them despite the fire, carrying a disease that could cause chills and fever. The campers then used bamboo as firewood. As it crackled while burning, it frightened the animal and kept it away from them.

History

Although burning bamboo to celebrate the Chinese New Year was still prevalent during the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), people had already begun to stuff saltpeter (potassium nitrate) into bamboo sticks to get more exciting effects as the sticks burned. The discovery of saltpeter was attributed to alchemists in the sixth or seventh century who used it along with sulfur and charcoal to produce dan (medicinal pills believed to make humans live forever). But by combining the right ratio of the three
components, they formed gunpowder. The inventor who chanced upon the correct combination was said to have been Sun Simiao, who lived sometime between 541 and 682. An alchemist as well as a pharmacist, he is regarded as the father of gunpowder in China.

When paper became more prevalent in the Song dynasty (960–1279), people rolled sheets of paper into small tubes in place of bamboo tubes, stuffed gunpowder into them, and fixed a fuse into each; the first modern-day baozhu (firecrackers) thus came into existence. People then strung and fused smaller baozhu together so they could be set off one by one in close sequence to create continuous explosions. People called this type of cluster bian (whip) or bianpao (whip cannon). By that time the military had already used rockets in battles, and the technology led to the invention of eritijiao (kicking twice) or liangxiang (sound twice), both referring to cannon crackers. A cannon cracker could be set on the ground or held gingerly in the hand; with the ignition of the fuse its lower section exploded and produced from its bottom a powerful jet that catapulted the top part into the sky, where it exploded again with a loud report that could be heard far and wide.

Yanhua (fireworks) did not become popular until the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), although some historians claim that it had been invented a few hundred years earlier. Some historians ascribe the birth of modern fireworks to the Yongzheng emperor (1678–1735). It was said that in the first year of his reign (1723), he ordered that novelty huapao be made for the coming Lantern Festival, which was characterized by the display of various kinds of lanterns to mark the end of the Chinese New Year season on the fifteenth day of the first lunar month. The burden fell to Li Tai, a huapao specialist. When he chanced to see colorful sparks shot out of iron being hammered in a blacksmith shop, Li Tai got the idea of mixing different sizes of iron particles with gunpowder to create the fireworks and propelling them into the sky with saltpeter.

Types

By the 1930s and 1940s a variety of fancy fireworks existed, such as those called “ground mouse,” “swan with eggs,” “drops of gold,” “turnip flower,” “big-leaf orchid,” “big-leaf chrysanthemum,” “double plum blossoms,” “three layers in a row,” and “double dragons playing with a pearl.”

Production

Fireworks consist of combustibles (powders of aluminum and iron), flash and sound compositions, and glue (usually natural resin and dextrin). The compositions are
rich in potassium chlorate, antimony sulfide, potassium perchlorate, and potassium benzoate. The production of fireworks involves a complex process of composition grinding, sifting, drying, purifying, mixing, granulating, and pressing.

Early in the mid-eighteenth century Liuyang County of Hunan Province had become a center of huapao (fireworks) production, producing 140,000 cartons a year. Today more than seven thousand factories employ about 1 million people. The factories are mostly in the provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi.

**Market**

Not only is China the birthplace of huapao, but also it has been the largest producer and exporter since the 1860s. In 2005 China sold 13 billion yuan ($1.8 billion) in fireworks, one-third of which was exported to more than one hundred countries. That amounts to 90 percent of world production and 80 percent of world trade in fireworks.

For safety reasons most Chinese cities banned fireworks in the 1990s. But with the rise of national pride amid economic success, the mounting cry to respect traditions lifted or partly lifted the ban in nearly all cities, thereby reopening a large domestic market. New products like the gigantic foot prints and smiling faces fired during the massive and magnificent display of fireworks at the opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games demonstrate the ingenuity and creativity of the Chinese firework producers. This impressive display surely helps to increase the share of Chinese fireworks on the world market even further. To promote international trade, Liuyang, a stronghold of China’s huapao industry, has held the Liuyang International Huapao Festival every other year since 1990.
Challenges and Possible Solutions

The Chinese huapao industry still faces a number of challenges, such as poor management, small-scale production, substandard technology, deficient training mechanisms, and little pollution control. As a result, fatal accidents occur frequently. From October to November 2007 eighty-six people died in twelve accidents. The fire that destroyed a huge storage hub in Foshan City, Guangdong Province, on 14 February 2008 proved devastating to the industry throughout the country.

China is trying to build better storage facilities and to produce smokeless, nontoxic, pollution-free fireworks that create the same excitement. It is also experimenting with noncombustible products that can mimic the effect of firecrackers but with reduced noise.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading

Thunder is louder than the little rain warrants.
雷声大，雨点小
Léi shēng dà, yǔ diǎn xiǎo
Fishing Industry

Yūyè 渔业

Due to rapid growth and expansion in the twentieth century, China’s fishing industry is the largest in the world. This growth, however, has caused widespread overfishing and endangered species, forcing the Chinese government to set up methods to control industry practices and protect the waters from pollution.

China is the world’s largest fish producer, accounting for approximately one-third of world production. Since 1989, the country’s fishing industry has grown dramatically, contributing $30 billion to the economy in 2002, about 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The rapid growth of China’s fish culture has not only added to the country’s food supply, it has also created employment and income. The industry is divided into four sectors: marine fishing, mariculture, freshwater fishing, and freshwater culture.

China’s Traditional Fishing Industry

Some form of aquaculture—the raising of aquatic animals and plants—has been practiced in China for over 3,000 years. The earliest known manual on fish farming was written around 475 BCE and is attributed to a wealthy landowner by the name of Fan Li. According to legend, Prince Wei of Qi asked Fan Li how he became so wealthy. Fan replied: “There are five ways to make a fortune, and the most important one is pisciculture.” He advised the emperor to make the country rich by raising fish, particularly carp because they grow quickly and do not eat their young.

Polyculture (the raising of multiple fish species) was introduced in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) when the consumption of common carp was forbidden because its name, li, had the same sound as the surname of the imperial family. Fish farmers then began to grow several species of fish together in ponds. Up to nine different fish species (primarily herbivores), each feeding on different resources, were spawned in the balanced ecosystems of artificial fishponds. This practice was less labor intensive, less polluting, and more efficient in the conversion of biological energy than monocultural systems that relied on carnivorous fish species.

Integrated fish farming was developed in the Pearl River delta in South China around 1400 CE. This method created a complex dike-pond ecosystem that utilized a variety of resources and reduced organic pollution. For example, livestock and poultry manure made good fertilizers for fish farming. Crops, such as mulberry, were grown on the dike banks. Silkworms were raised on the mulberry, and the silkworm pupae were used as fish feed. The worm feces and wastewater from silk processing could be used as pond fertilizers, and the pond silt could be used as fertilizer for the plants on the dikes or for fodder crops, which could then be used to feed livestock, poultry, and fish.

The practice of fish farming in rice paddies, first documented in the third century, likely arose when rice farmers noticed that monsoon floods would wash wild fish...
into the ponds that had been dug in the rice fields for water storage and irrigation. The realization that two crops could be cultivated at the same time on the same plot of land inspired farmers to learn how to grow fish in captivity. Later, farmers learned to cultivate those species of fish that would help control rice weeds and harmful insects as well as provide fertilizer for rice fields.

Modern Fishing Industry

After economic reforms began in 1978, China’s fishing industry expanded dramatically, becoming one of the fastest growing sectors among the country’s agricultural industries. A growing market economy combined with declining state monopolies and the lowering of trade barriers between Chinese regions created an environment in which the aquaculture industry could thrive. Technological advancements also paved the way for expanded production. An artificial breeding program for carp that was developed in the 1950s led to a surge in carp farming. Production of other species, such as seaweed, mollusks, crustaceans, and fish, grew rapidly after the 1980s. In 2003, total aquaculture production was 30.28 million metric tons compared with 1.23 million metric tons in 1979. Fish from capture fisheries and aquaculture increased from 20 percent of total animal products in 1985 to 32 percent in 2002.

Marine capture fisheries dominated production until the 1980s, when the depletion of many major marine fisheries forced the government to focus on developing aquaculture. In 1978, marine capture fisheries accounted for 73.9 percent of total aquatic production. By 1993, over 50 percent of total fish production came from aquaculture, making China the first major fish-producing country to have higher production from aquaculture than from wild capture fishing.

In 2004, marine fisheries produced 26.17 million metric tons of output. Marine capture fisheries contributed 14.47 million tons, including production from

Fishing boats in Shanghai. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
distant-water fisheries. In that same year, China’s marine fishing fleet consisted of nearly 280,000 motorized fishing vessels, a significant increase from the 50,000 motorized vessels in 1980. Those vessels operate within China’s national boundaries as well as on the high seas and within the boundaries of other countries that have agreements with China, such as Japan, Republic of Korea, and Vietnam.

Mariculture, or marine culture in intertidal zones, small bays, and shallow seas, accounted for 5.8 percent of total catches in 1970. But marine and brackish water aquaculture has grown over the last couple of decades as the culture systems have diversified to include floating rafts, pens, cages, indoor tanks with water recirculation, sea-bottom culture, and sea ranching. Before 1980, the main farmed species were kelp, laver (red algae with fronds), and mussels. A variety of marine fish species and mollusks have since been developed for farming and include seaweed, fish, crustaceans (especially prawns), and mollusks (particularly scallops). Output increased from 9.7 million metric tons in 1999 to 13.2 million metric tons in 2004. The increase in output was mainly in shellfish and seaweed. Mariculture has benefited recently from the practice of integrated culture, where some species may be bred with others, such as mollusks in prawn ponds or with cultivated seaweed. Integrated farming methods produced over 300,000 metric tons in 2004.

Carp continues to be the most important species of fish cultured in China, and the number of species increased from 12 in 1999 to 39 in 2004. Finfish account for 91 percent of total inland culture output, crustaceans 6.4 percent, and algae and other species (soft-shell turtle, frog, etc.) make up the remainder.

Since the 1950s, fish culture has spread from the traditional core areas of the Yangzi (Chang) and Pearl river deltas to virtually all provinces. Even lakes and reservoirs in remote regions and paddy fields in mountainous areas have been exploited. Nonetheless, pond culture is the most popular method of fish farming in China, accounting for 70 percent of total inland culture output in 2004. In formerly less-developed regions in the north, northeast, and northwest, the output of freshwater aquaculture has grown from 2.8 percent of the country’s total in 1979 to 15.42 percent in 2002.

Open-water fish farming in reservoirs, lakes, rivers, and channels has become more productive in recent years through the use of cages, net enclosures, and pens. The average unit output of inland aquaculture has increased about 10.72 times, from 297 kilograms per hectare in 1979 to 3,185 kilograms per hectare in 2003.

Rice paddy fish farming has grown from small-scale production to an important commercial activity. Paddy areas for fish farming expanded to 1.56 million hectares in 2003, with a total output of 1.024 million metric tons. Carp is the main species to be farmed, but Chinese river crab has become more popular because of its increased profitability.

Before 1960, fish farmers depended on fry (immature fish) from wild stock to seed their farms. Between 1958 and 1960, techniques were developed to artificially induce spawning for the four main species of carp, greatly increasing the availability of fry. Later, artificial propagation techniques, including induced breeding and hatching and larval breeding, were developed for additional varieties of fish. The expansion of fry production by artificial propagation was especially rapid after 1978. By the 1990s, most counties had at least one fingerling (fish up to a year in age) farm to supply local fish farmers.

After a period of rapid growth, the industry has encountered a serious decline in traditional high quality fishery resources. By 1990, average yields in capture fisheries had dropped to less than 50 percent of 1950s levels. Many traditional species have been overexploited, and harvests have increasingly shifted toward juvenile fish and low-value species. Industrial and domestic discharge has contaminated many lakes, rivers, and coastal areas. Red tides—massive concentrations of microscopic algae that flower and multiply rapidly—have caused serious losses in mariculture production along the South China coast.

The government first formulated a sustainable development strategy for its marine program in 1996. In 1999, the government set forth a goal of “zero growth” in coastal marine capture fishing, and it enacted a plan of “minus growth” in 2001. To achieve these goals, the government began reducing the number of fishing vessels in 2002 and moving fishermen away from marine capture fisheries. By 2004, the government had spent nearly $100 million, scrapped nearly 8,000 vessels, and relocated over 40,000 fishermen. In 2006, the government issued the Programme of Action on Conservation of Living Aquatic Resources of China. The plan calls for a halt to the deterioration of
aquatic environments, the decline of fishery resources, and the increase in the number of endangered species by the year 2010. Overcapacity is to be reduced, while efficiency and economic benefits are to be increased.

Robert Y. ENG

Further Reading


Taiwan has one of the largest fishing industries in the world. But because Taiwan no longer holds a seat in the United Nations, it is often left out of standard U.N. doctrines that monitor and regulate fishing. The dilemma of how to handle Taiwan’s unique situation while maintaining fishing-industry standards is an issue still to be addressed.

Taiwan is home to 23 million people and one of the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleets. In some of the world’s oceans, including the Pacific Ocean, Taiwan boasts more fishing vessels than the major fishing nations of Japan, Korea, Spain, and the United States. In particular, Taiwan has large numbers of fishing vessels that target tuna species by long-line and purse-seine (a large wall of netting that encircles a school of fish) methods.

Due to the increasing threat of overfishing throughout the world’s oceans, the internationally accepted management practice has been to create regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) to regulate the amount and method of fishing in defined areas of the world’s oceans. These are created by international conventions. A dilemma for the international community is how to include Taiwan within these legal frameworks in light of Taiwan’s non–United Nations (U.N.) recognized status. (After nearly two decades of conflict over which government—the Republic of China [ROC, Taiwan] or the People’s Republic of China [PRC]—should represent China in the U.N., the PRC replaced the ROC in a November 1971 vote by the U.N. Security Council.)

International Fisheries Agreements

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) (LOSC) provides the broad framework for the conduct of fishing within the maximum 200 nautical mile “Exclusive Economic Zone” of coastal States. It also creates a duty on all State parties to cooperate in the exploitation and management of shared living resources. It was envisaged by the drafters of LOSC that specific regional fisheries arrangements would be adopted based on the notion of State cooperation and the need to establish effective mechanisms to manage fishing activities on the high seas. Numerous regional fisheries agreements have since been made. These apply in defined areas and generally concern high value migratory species, especially tuna. These agreements are entered into on a voluntary basis by the flag States of the vessels involved in fishing for the species in the relevant areas. It is essential that all countries that have vessels fishing for these species sign these agreements. If they do not, the effectiveness of the agreements will be limited because they will fail to regulate all the fishing that takes place for the particular species. This is because countries are only bound by international agreements to which they have voluntarily signed. Fishing vessels from countries...
that do not sign such agreements generally have complete freedom of fishing on the high seas. An obvious problem arises due to the unique situation of Taiwan. It is not able to sign U.N. agreements, such as LOSC. Although less than thirty countries formally recognize Taiwan as an independent State, many more countries have shown remarkable pragmatism by devising a creative method to enable Taiwan to sign international fisheries agreements and to participate in the work of RFMOs. The solution has been to enable Taiwan’s involvement in RFMOs as a “fishing entity.” The use of this term is seen as not disturbing the “One China” concept.

The “Fishing Entity” of Taiwan

The “fishing entity” concept has been used in nonbinding U.N. fisheries instruments such as the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. These documents are directed towards States and “fishing entities.” Although the term is expressed in the plural, it is generally accepted that it applies only to Taiwan. This is an example of the delicate wording needed in international documents because even de facto recognition of Taiwan is a sensitive matter for international diplomacy.

The first time the term “fishing entities” was used in a binding international instrument was in 1995 in the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement. The Agreement states that, in addition to State parties, it applies “to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas” (Article 1.3). This provision has provided the pathway for Taiwan to be involved in regional fisheries arrangements. The U.N. General Assembly has endorsed the Agreement.

Taiwan has been included in a number of regional fisheries agreements, but there is no uniform method for its inclusion. As a general rule, Taiwan has achieved fuller participation in RFMOs that do not fall under the U.N. mandate.

Taiwan participates as “Chinese Taipei” in the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The Convention which constitutes the Commission enables “any fishing entity whose vessels fish for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area” to agree to be bound by the regime established by the Convention. Taiwan has a special status as a “Cooperating Fishing Entity” in the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. “Chinese Taipei” participates as an observer in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. “The Fishing Entity of Taiwan” is a member of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna through the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. Significantly, Taiwan has voting rights in the Extended Commission equal to those of other members.

The concept of Taiwan as an “entity,” or something similar, has potential in other fields. For example, Taiwan, like other member “economies,” became a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1991 as the “economy” of Chinese Taipei. Also, Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization in 2002 as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan.” But Taiwan has not yet been able to join the World Health Organization as a “health entity.”

Concessions

Even though the concept of “fishing entities” has increased Taiwan’s ability to engage in fisheries-related international activities with other countries, it has only come about due to Taiwan’s preparedness to make some significant concessions. These include using the name “Chinese Taipei,” accepting restrictions such as not being able to chair sessions or hold meetings in Taiwan, and having a limited or no role in decision making.

An Interesting Future

The international acceptance of Taiwan as a “fishing entity” is interesting in terms of the ongoing delicate nature of China-Taiwan relations and the manner in which other countries formally deal with Taiwan. The concept recognizes that Taiwan possesses full autonomy regarding the conduct of its fishing fleet and in its relations with other countries regarding fisheries matters. It also means that Taiwan’s legal obligations in most of the RFMOs in which it is a member are equivalent to those of State parties. However, the widespread use of the term “fishing entities” as a means to enable Taiwan’s participation in
international fisheries management does not mean that other countries have accepted that Taiwan is a state.

Warwick GULLETT

Further Reading


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Fish for sale at a market. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
One of the darkest times in Chinese history, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms was an era of political anarchy, national disunity, corruption, and social upheaval in China, beginning with the demise of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and ending with the founding of the Song dynasty (960–1279).

The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (五代十国 Wudai Shíguó)—or Ten Nations—was a tumultuous period of Chinese history named for the five successive short-lived dynasties (none lasted more than sixteen years) and the ten major kingdoms that existed during a period that commenced with the fall of the Tang dynasty in 907 CE and ended with the succession of the Song dynasty in 960 CE. Some scholars contend that there were eleven or twelve kingdoms; the Taiwanese historian Bo Yang calculated eleven (including Yan and Qi), but not Northern Han, perceiving it as a continuation of the Later Han. Traditionally, only ten are listed, hence the name “Ten Kingdoms.” Nonetheless, this was a period of social disunity, administrative corruption, political fragmentation, endemic warfare, and the collapse of the monetary system. The cumulative effect of this upheaval was the collapse of northern China’s irrigation system, and the regularity of the seasons that such a system ensured: Canals silted and dams fell into disrepair, floods devastated the countryside, and widespread famine was widespread. In northern China, dynasties succeeded each other in rapid succession, while in southern China polities existed concurrently with each controlling a specific geographical area.

Towards the end of the Tang Dynasty, the imperial government granted increased powers to the autonomous regional military governors who became further independent and were no longer subject to the authority of the central government. The Tang emperors, lacking soldiers for the imperial army and facing with military conscript desertions, had become “playthings” of the warlords. The inability to collect revenues and depleted treasury led to a monetary collapse that was exacerbated by a major decline in agricultural production. Attacks by the Turco-Mongolian Khitan and the lack of manpower for the continuous maintenance of dams and canals devastated the agro-economy. In the north, famine lead to the formation of roving bands of robbers who pillaged towns and ravaged public buildings and destroyed irrigation works vital to agricultural production that had been controlled by the central government, and massacred the wealthy and foreign merchants. Collectively, these bands had up to 600,000 men during this era of instability and turmoil.

At the end of the Tang dynasty, political power shifted quickly from the imperial government so that regional military governors (jiedushi) gained control, and by the tenth century, powerful jiedushi became de facto autonomous. In addition, a severe blow to the central government’s authority was dealt by the Huang Chao Rebellion (875–884), in which Huang Chao, a failed civil service examinee turned salt smuggler, led starving peasants and criminal gangs in guerilla warfare against the forces of the Tang.
The Five Dynasties

The Five Dynasties were the Later Liang dynasty (907–923 CE), Later Tang dynasty (923–936 CE), Later Jin dynasty (936–947 CE), Later Han dynasty (947–951 CE or 982, depending if Northern Han is considered part of the dynasty), and Later Zhou dynasty (951–960 CE). Nearly a dozen regional jiedushi are also known: Yan, Qi, Chengde Jiedushi (also known as Zhao), Yiwu Jiedushi, Dingnan Jiedushi, Wuping Jiedushi, Qingyuan Jiedushi, Yin, Ganzhou, Shazhou, and Liangzhou.

The polities in northern China included:

- Zhu Wen at Bianzhou (modern Kaifeng, Henan Province), precursor to Later Liang dynasty;
- Li Keyong and Li Cunxu at Taiyuan (Shanxi Province), precursor to Later Tang dynasty;
- Liu Rengong and Liu Shouguang at Youzhou (modern Beijing), precursor to Yan;
- Li Miaozen at Fengxiang (Shaanxi Province), precursor to Qi;
- Luo Shaowei at Weibo (modern Daming County, Hebei Province);
- Wang Rong at Zhenzhou (modern Zhengding County, Hebei Province);
- Wang Chuzhi at Dingzhou (modern Ding County, Hebei Province).

In the north, the powerful warlord Zhu Wen contrived to have Emperor Zhanzong assassinated in 904, placing the emperor’s thirteen-year-old son on the throne; three years later he induced the boy to abdicate in his favor, and Wen then proclaimed himself emperor (913–923), thus establishing the Later Liang dynasty. Rival warlords declared their own independence in northern China and the most successful established the Later Tang dynasty (907–923 CE) under four sovereigns: Li Cun Xu (923–926), Li Si Yuan (926–933),
Li Cong Xu (933–934), and Li Cong Ke (934–936). In 936, Shi Jingtang, a Shatuo Turk jiedushi from Taiyuan, was aided by the Manchurian Khitan Empire in what proved to be a successful rebellion against the dynasty.

The third dynasty was Jin (936–947 CE) under Shi Jing Tang (936–942) and Shi Chong Gui (942–947). In 943 the Khitans declared war on the Jin and three years later seized the capital of Kaifeng, marking the end of the Later Jin dynasty. The Later Han dynasty (947–950 CE) was led by Liu Zhi Yuan (947–948) and Liu Cheng You (948–950). The jiedushi Liu Zhiyuan entered the imperial capital in 947 and founded the Later Han, thereby establishing a third successive Shatuo Turkic dynasty. The fifth dynasty, the Later Zhou (951–960 CE), was led by three emperors: Guo Wei (951–954), Chai Rong (954–959), and Chai Zong Xun (959–960). The Later Zhou conquered much of the Southern Tang from 956–958, and in settlement the Tang ceded all lands north of the Yangzi River to the Zhou. Chai Rong sent armies against the Khitans in 959 in an attempt to regain territories lost during the Later Jin dynasty.

In southern China the polities included:

- Yang Xingmi at Yangzhou (Jiangsu Province), precursor to Wu;
- Qian Liu at Hangzhou (Zhejiang Province), precursor to Wuyue;
- Ma Yin at T anzhou (modern Changsha, Hunan Province), precursor to Chu;
- Wang Shenzhi at Fuzhou (Fujian Province), precursor to Min;
- Liu Yin at Guangzhou (Guangdong Province), precursor to Southern Han;
- Wang Jian at Chengdu (Sichuan Province), precursor to Former Shu.

The Ten Kingdoms

The Ten Kingdoms (or Nations) included the Wu Yue (904–978 CE), which had five emperors: Qian Liu (904–932), Qian Yuan Quan (932–941), Qian Zuo (941–947), Qian Zong (947), and Qian Chu (947–978). The Min Kingdom (909–945 CE) had at least five monarchs, as did the Jing Nan or Nan Ping Kingdom (906–963 CE).

The Chu Kingdom (897–951 CE), Wu Kingdom (904–937 CE), Southern (Nan) Tang Kingdom (937–975 CE), Southern (Nan) Han Kingdom (917–971 CE), Northern (Be) Han Kingdom (951–979 CE), Former (Qian) Shu Kingdom (907–925 CE), and Later (Hou) Shu Kingdom (934–965 CE) were the other regional states.

Implications of the Period

The nearly continuous warfare in chaotic northern China led to the displacement of peasant farmers and village craftsmen who became refugees and fled to southern China, where a stable society facilitated the development of technologies, science, culture, and the arts. Painters, calligraphers, and poets emerged during this period, notably Li Yu, the last emperor of the Late Tang, who was renowned as a great master of the ci (song lyric) poems in Chinese literary history. In 910 the king of Wuyue built Hanhaitang Dyke to facilitate agricultural production and enhanced his own wealth and position. Among the significant technological events were the manufacture of porcelain by the southern Chu (still famous for its Changsha Kiln) and the development of printing, which resulted in the publication of numerous Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist classics, including the first complete set of 130 volumes of Confucian writings.

Nonetheless, southern China also suffered from endemic warfare as the Wu Yue fought with other polities until they were supplanted by the Southern Tang. In the 940s Min and Chu had political administrative crises that gave the Southern Tang the opportunity to destroy the Min in 945 and Chu in 951. However, remnants of Min and Chu survived as Qingyuan Jiedushi and Wuping Jiedushi. The Southern Tang became the most powerful polity in southern China but was unable to repel the incursions by the Later Zhou dynasty. The Northern Song dynasty, established in 960, sought to reunify China and succeeded against the Jingnan and Wuping in 963, the Later Shu in 965, the Southern Han in 971, and Southern Tang by 975. By 978 the Northern Song had gained the territories of the Wu Yue and Qingyuan, thereby bringing all of southern China under the control of the central government.

Charles C. KOLB
Further Reading


China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire's authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Five Elements, The

Wǔxíng 五行

Often called the five material elements of the world and compared with Aristotle’s four elements, the Chinese wuxing, or “five movements” refer instead to the physical processes of water sinking, fire rising, wood bending, metal molding, and soil growing. The philosopher Zou Yan (350–270 BCE) is credited with being the first to combine the theory of yin and yang with that of wuxing to create a unified cosmology.

During the Warring States (475–221 BCE) period of ancient China, when feudal kingdoms were vying for supremacy and chaos reigned, the search for a correspondence between natural and social order was the overriding concern of the great thinkers of the day. This was the blossoming of the “hundred schools” when philosophical reasoning flourished. Ontological questions (those dealing with the nature of existence) were debated in the intellectual centers of the various states, and the answers to such questions became the origins of metaphysics and cosmology. As to the question of what constitutes the universe, the Chinese posited qi as the constituent matter or energy, and wuxing (the “five elements”) as its physical manifestation.

The origin of the concept of wuxing is unknown, but scholars speculate that the five xing or “movements” were originally the gods of the five visible planets, or “moving” stars, which share their names with the elements (Mars is the “Fire Star,” Mercury is the “Water Star,” etc.).

The wuxing categories sport the seemingly elemental designations — water, metal, fire, earth, and wood — which explains the term’s earliest English translation. But rather than being merely material elements of the world, these categories refer instead to physical processes. This is evident from the first textual explication of the concept (occurring in the “Great Plan” section of the Book of Documents), where the wuxing are described as water sinking, fire rising, wood bending, metal molding, and soil growing. Scholars now refer to wuxing as the “five processes” or “five phases.”

Transmutation of the Wuxing

The intellectual center where early theories of wuxing received their first hearing was an academy in the

The symbols for the five sacred Daoist mountains in China represent the five elements: water, fire, earth, wood, and metal, which correlate to the four cardinal directions (and center) of the square. Northern Peak is associated with the water element and the color black.
northeastern state of Qi called Jixia, founded towards the close of the fourth century BCE. An eclectic text called the *Guanzi* originated here, chapter 8 of which introduces the concept of the transmutation of the five processes. Several enumeration orders of the *wuxing* would be developed over time, but perhaps the most important sequence and the one outlined in the *Guanzi* was that of “mutual production.” It may be characterized as follows:

- Wood produces fire (by combustion);
- Fire produces earth (as ash builds the soil);
- Earth produces metal (by harboring the ores);
- Metal produces water (as condensate on bronze caldrons);
- Water produces wood (as it nourishes woody plants).

These phases of physical transmutation were then correlated with the cycle of the four seasons and the square of the four cardinal directions. The fire phase, the process of heating, matched south and summer, while the wood phase, the process of vegetal growth, matched east and spring. Water was matched with north and winter because ice and snow—the solid phase of water—accumulate there in that season. Soil was relegated to the center, since all of the other phases either originated in soil (the ores of metal and growing wood) or terminated there (the ash of fire and soaking water). That left the metal phase to be matched with autumn and west. With these correlations established, beginning in the center with soil and following the natural order of the seasons, the whole sequence was interpreted as the order in which the phases generate each other throughout the year.

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**Zou Yan, and the School of Yin and Yang**

The philosopher most closely identified with the theory of *wuxing* is Zou Yan (350–270 BCE), one of the first masters in attendance at the Jixia Academy. He is the purported leader of the School of Yin and Yang, and is credited with combining the theory of yin and yang with that of *wuxing* to create a unified cosmology. Unfortunately, none of his writings have survived and little is known about him aside from his state of origin—Qi, the location of Jixia. Zou Yan’s unique contribution to the history of Chinese cosmology was to correlate what he called the “five powers” with the cyclical patterns of human history so that the rise and fall of dynasties could be predicted. He based this idea on the second most important of the enumeration orders—the mutual conquest order, which may be characterized as follows:

- Earth conquers water (by damming it);
- Water conquers fire (by extinguishing it);
- Fire conquers metal (by melting it);
- Metal conquers wood (by cutting it);
- Wood conquers earth (with its tap root).

In his scheme, the current dynasty, the House of Zhou, was correlated with the phase of fire. So the succeeding dynasty would be governed by the phase of water, which extinguishes fire. As the master of *wuxing* theory, and therefore perceived to be the person most likely to know
which ruler accorded with what element, Zou Yan was the favorite of every hegemonic power seeking to seize the Mandate of Heaven from the declining Zhou dynasty. Under the patronage of some of the most powerful kings of the Warring States, Zou was able to refine his theories and disseminate them widely.

The Correlative Universe

Following upon the popularity of Zou Yan’s system, wuxing theories became very nearly universal. Every conceivable structural relation reducible to a factor of five was now correlated with the five phases. Red is the color of fire, yellow is the color of the soil of the Central China Plain, foliage is green, deep water is black, and the salts of metal are white. Fire rises, and feathered creatures fly up, so birds are correlated with fire. Water sinks, and shelled creatures dive down. Vegetation sheds its leaves and goes dormant in the winter, and scaly creatures shed their skin and hibernate, and so on. In similar fashion, the sense organs and internal organs of the human body, agricultural products, and land animals, for instance, are all correlated with the five phases. With these associations established, the production and conquest orders of the phases are then keys to properly affecting the natural process of particular organisms and organs. For example, when the five internal organs (spleen, lungs, heart, kidney, liver) are correlated with the five phases, wood governs the liver. When the five grains (rice, millet, barley, wheat, legumes) are correlated with the five phases, legumes belong to the element water. In the production order of the phases, water nourishes wood, so a diet rich in soybeans can be beneficial to the liver.

Stephen L. FIELD

Further Reading


Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence ▶
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

Hépíng Gòngchǔ Wǔ Xiàng Yuánzé
和平共处五项原则

Originating in talks between China and India regarding Tibet in 1953 and 1954, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. More than fifty years later the principles still apply to maintaining relations in Asia and around the world.

Scholars of Chinese foreign policy define “peaceful coexistence” as the slogan that guided Chinese foreign policy between 1953 and 1957, the years that followed a “communist internationalism” phase (1949–1952) and preceded a “militant anti-imperialism” phase (1958–1965), and which then climaxed with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), broadly coincident with the Maoist period in China’s foreign policy.

Even so, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are still upheld in modern China and have been embraced by countries around the world. The principles include (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.

Zhou-Nehru Discussions on Tibet, 1953–1954

Scholars date the Five Principles, also known in India as the “Panchsheel,” back to December 1953–April 1954 when complex negotiations took place in Beijing between

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China and India regarding China’s invasion of Tibet in 1950, an act that exacerbated age-old territorial issues between the two Asian giants. India had been one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and now Beijing sought India’s recognition of China’s suzerainty (dominion) over Tibet. The Five Principles were formally written into the preface of the Agreement between the PRC and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. Whether the formula was first proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai of China or by his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, remains obscure, but it is certain that both agreed. It is certain, however, that the Five Principles would influence opinion on the situation on Indochina that was developing April 1954.

**Zhou-Nehru Discussions on Indochina, June 1954**

As the Geneva Conference on Indochina commenced in April 1954, Zhou went to pains to portray China as a nonaggressive country. Nehru was no less concerned over peace in Indochina, and the coincidence of views between India and China over Vietnam led Zhou to visit India after the conference where, in a joint communiqué
issued 28 June 1954, Zhou and Nehru elaborated on and advocated adherence to the Five Principles. The two sides urged neutral status for South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. On this occasion they jointly supported noninterference. Zhou then visited Myanmar (Burma), where he and Prime Minister U Nu reiterated the Five Principles. India and China apparently were broadly reacting to the U.S. policy of containment leading to the creation in September 1954 of the anti-Communist United States/United Kingdom–backed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), an organization that included such pro-Western nations as Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.

At a rally held on 26 June 2004 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Five Principles, Premier Wen Jiabao of the PRC made a speech that paid tribute to Zhou and Nehru as the elder statesmen whose advocacy of the Five Principles of Coexistence made a contribution to diplomatic relations among nations of the world.

Geoffrey C. GUNN

Further Reading


The wind sweeping through the tower heralds a rising storm in the mountain.

山雨欲来风满楼

Shān yǔ yù lái fēng mǎn lóu
The Five-Anti Campaign 五反運動, launched in 1952, was a nation-wide movement aimed at eliminating bribery, theft of state property and economic information, tax evasion, and cheating on government contracts by private enterprise and capitalists. The campaign succeeded in consolidating the government’s control over the economy, which facilitated the country’s transition to socialism.

On 26 January 1952 the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched the nationwide Five-Anti Campaign to eliminate the corrupt practices of privately owned enterprises and capitalists. These corrupt practices were identified as the “Five Evils”: bribery, theft of state property, tax evasion, cheating on government contracts, and stealing of state economic information. These evils were considered detrimental to the national policy of rapid economic recovery and reconstruction. However, the Five-Anti Campaign was not a mere rectification movement in the economic sphere but rather carried deep ideological, political, and social implications.

After its founding in 1949 the PRC government had been confronted with the task of rehabilitating the national economy, which was severely damaged by the War of Resistance against Japan and the Chinese Civil War. Realizing that the majority of national assets and resources were in the hands of private capitalists, the government did not eliminate them for the Communist cause. Rather, the government permitted their existence and recognized their importance in engineering the rapid recovery of China. This policy, however, did not mean that the government would leave the private sector intact, as it had before 1949. According to the Chinese Communist ideology of “New Democracy,” the continued existence of private capitalism was a preliminary step in preparing the country for the ultimate transition to socialism. In the meantime the state would restructure the national economy by gradually placing all economic activities under state control. The Five-Anti Campaign was the first step toward accomplishing this goal.

Mass mobilization was the main tactic employed to eliminate the “Five Evils.” Party cadres, government officials, mass media, and ordinary citizens, especially the workers, were encouraged to criticize and expose the malpractices of privately owned enterprises and business leaders. Accused persons were tried in public and made repeated confessions, unleashing a brief reign of terror. By awakening the class consciousness of the workers, elevating their position vis-à-vis the capitalists, and demolishing the private capitalists, the government intended to consolidate the ideal of the people’s democratic dictatorship, from which the Chinese Communists had consistently drawn legitimacy for their leadership role before and after winning power.

Moreover, the Five-Anti Campaign was an intellectual and educational reform. Besides corrupt capitalists, the campaign targeted such traditional evil habits as drug use, gambling, and prostitution. With this campaign the government intended to reeducate and rectify the entire population so as to cultivate a utopian society.
The Five-Anti Campaign came with a price. Workers’ confrontations with their employers invited such retaliations as firings, withholding of wages and jobs, and wage reductions. Four months after the campaign began, unemployment and underemployment rose to 1.5 million, which was 1.5 times the pre-campaign figure.

Despite the economic and psychological setbacks, the Five-Anti Campaign, formally ended on 26 October 1952, was considered important. First, it eliminated the “Five Evils” and brought the privately owned enterprises under state guidance. This success encouraged the government to move beyond New Democracy and to embark on the transition to socialism, beginning with the Five-Year Plan in 1953. Second, the campaign reinforced the top leaders’ belief that mass mobilization and rectification were effective means to serve their interests. After 1952 a number of mass campaigns followed, among which the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was the most significant and disastrous.

LAW Yuk-fun

Further Reading
Five-Yuan System

Based on Sun Yat-sen’s (1866–1925) idealistic model of the new republic that was introduced to replace the ancient Chinese imperial system, the five-yuan (five branch) system of government was adopted under the Guomindang (GMD) in 1928 for China and remains the basic polity for today’s Taiwan.

As the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) in the late nineteenth century became increasingly impotent to handle both international and domestic crises China faced, some Chinese elite began to take radical actions against the Qing government and also search for an alternative polity to replace the Chinese traditional imperial system.

Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was the most prominent leader of this group of new elite. Born into a modest peasant family in Xiangshan of Guangdong Province, Sun obtained his Western-style secondary education in both Hawaii and Hong Kong from 1879 to 1892. In 1894, Sun founded in Hawaii the Revive China Society among overseas Chinese and in 1895 organized his first revolutionary uprising in Guangzhou. Thereafter Sun traveled to Landon, the United States, and Japan to spread his revolutionary ideas and mobilize more overseas Chinese to support his anti-Qing revolution.

In 1905, Sun founded in Tokyo the Revolutionary Alliance (which later developed to the Nationalist Party [Guomindang]) among overseas Chinese students and merchants and soon established more branches with their networks spreading over China, Europe, the Americas, Japan, and Southeast Asia. While continually mobilizing, organizing and coordinating secret society members, peasants, workers and army soldiers to launch anti-Qing uprisings in China, Sun also started to think about his “model republic” as the alternative polity to replace the Qing system.

Sun’s Five-Power Model Republic

In November 1905, Sun founded the People’s Journal monthly as the Revolutionary Alliance’s party organ. In his initial statement for the journal’s publication, Sun briefly outlined his famous Three Principles of the People—the principles of nationalism, the people’s rights, and the people’s livelihood—as an ideological pillar for his model republic. A year later, in a speech delivered to the Revolutionary Alliance’s overseas members who gathered to celebrate the anniversary of the People’s Journal in Tokyo (where the Alliance’s main headquarters was located), Sun first made public his ideas about the so-called five-power constitution (wuquan xianfa), which he considered another major pillar for his model republic.

In 1919 in Sun Wen xueshuo (The Doctrines of Sun Wen)—Sun Wen is Sun Yat-sen’s formal name while Yat-sen is his literary name—and then in a 1921 speech entitled “The Five-Power Constitution,” Sun further explained how this model would work. The five-power polity, in Sun’s view, was crucial to the realization of one of the Three Principles of the People—the principle of the people’s rights (minquan).
Originally inspired by British and American constitutional practices of the separation of power, as acknowledged by Sun himself in the 1906 speech, his model republican polity was designed to overhaul the serious flaws he saw in the Anglo-American political system. Strongly believing that a capable government was indispensable for the success of the Chinese republic, Sun realized that neither public elections nor the appointments made by a democratically-elected president could guarantee a government of capable officials; he saw in the West that elections could be manipulated and the president could appoint the people he wanted. Drawing from a long Chinese tradition of selecting officials through civil service examinations, Sun proposed to establish the Examination Yuan, the fourth independent government branch—the executive, legislative, and judicial were the other three—to handle modern civil service examinations to determine the qualifications of officials and carry out periodical evaluations of their performance, regardless of whether they were elected or appointed.

Also, having observed how the American Congress could use supervisory power to block actions of the president for pure political calculations, Sun turned to the Chinese traditional censorial system to look for a solution, proposing that the independent fifth government branch—the Supervisory Yuan—be established to supervise all government offices and officials.

The Five-Yuan System and the GMD Party-State

On 8 October 1928, the GMD Standing Committee selected Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) to be the chairman of the central government, and Tan Yankai (1880–1930), Hu Hanmin (1879–1936), Wang Chonghui (1881–1958), Dai Jitao (1891–1949), and Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) to be the presidents of, respectively, the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Supervisory Yuans.

Key GMD leaders, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), T. V. Soong (1894–1971), and H. H. Kung (1880–1967) also served as the president of the Executive Yuan in different times. Sun Ke (1891–1973) was the president of the Legislative Yuan from 1932 to 1948, while Ju Zheng (1876–1951) served as the president of the Judicial Yuan from 1932 to 1948, and Yu Youren (1879–1964) was the president of the Supervisory Yuan from 1930 until his death.

Although the five yuan were created as separate government branches, they were far from being independent institutions but were closely tied with different factions of the GMD party. In 1906 Sun outlined a three-phase republic-building process: the phases of military rule, of rule under imposed laws (rephrased in 1914 as political tutelage under a revolutionary party), and of constitutional rule. The phase of political tutelage began as soon as the Nationalists took over Beijing in June 1928, which also ended the Northern Expedition. On 3 October 1928, the GMD Standing Committee passed the Guiding Principles of the Political Tutelage and the revised Organic Law of the Republic China. The Guiding Principles specified that the GMD Central Executive Committee, through its Political Council (Zhengzhi huiyi), would represent the nonexistent People’s National Congress (Guomin dahui) to exercise the governmental power.

Started as Sun Yat-sen’s personal advisory body for providing political consultations, the GMD Political Council, with Chiang Kai-shek becoming its chairman in July 1928, was reorganized as the most important formal conduit through which the political decisions of the Nationalist Party could be transformed into concrete administrative policies of the Republic. The resolution passed by the GMD Standing Committee on 25 October 1928 further specified that the Political Council was the highest party organization designated with the mission of directing the political tutelage. It was given a wide range of powers to make important state policies and laws, and appoint top government officials.

The third GMD congress held in March 1929 ratified the Guiding Principles and reconfirmed the resolution of the Standing Committee:

...the people of the Republic of China who experienced the national revolution are really babies because they only had naive political knowledge and experiences, while the GMD is the mother that reproduced these babies. Being the mother, the GMD has obligations to nourish and educate the babies... (Rong & Sun 1985, 658)

The Organic Law of the Republic China, which could only be definitively explained and revised by the GMD Political Council, also guaranteed the GMD’s leadership over the central government. It stipulated that a State Affairs
Five-Yuan System

The Council (Guomin zhengfu weiyuanhui), with a chairman and twelve to sixteen councilors, was to be established to run the central government and its five separate yuan.

In the first actual operation, Chiang Kai-shek, Tan Yankai, Hu Hanmin, Dai Jitao, Wang Chonghui, and Yu Youren (who replaced Cai Yuanpei) all were members of either the GMD Central Executive or Central Supervisory Committees; they were also members of the Political Council. It was because of their party positions that they were chosen to be State Councilors and appointed heads of the central government and the five yuan. Although the member qualifications for the Political Council and their specific ties with the GMD party and the central government changed from time to time, the basic framework of the GMD party-state had been established by the late 1920s, which encompassed the apparatus of the central government, including the five yuan.

Yamin XU

Further Reading


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Food safety has become a major issue in recent years as the global marketplace has expanded and consumers around the world call for imported, affordable foods. China is a major player in the international food market, but recent cases of tainted foods appearing in domestic and foreign markets have dampened consumer confidence and damaged China’s export economy.

China is the largest exporter of food products in the world, with the United States a major market. According to World Trade Organization (WTO) statistics, China’s total food exports reached $53.3 billion in 2005 (although Chinese government statistics show only $27 billion for 2006), which is about 7 times the $7.5 billion it exported in 1980. Regulation of food safety has long plagued China because of weak monitoring capacity, strong local government protectionism of industries, and few consumer-protection watchdogs. The growing safety problems with food exports—ranging

Uninspected shipments arrive from the countryside daily in private vehicles like this into to be sold in city markets during the epidemic bird flu problematic time. Even though local news report an increase in monitoring, little change can be seen.

PHOTO BY ROBERT EATON.
from food bans by the European Union (EU) and Japan to the recent melamine-tainted dog food scandal in the United States—are bringing global attention to these deficiencies and creating a unique opportunity for international partnerships to address them.

**Consumer Concerns**

Chinese consumer demands plus an explosion of negative news media attention on food exports have greatly accelerated food safety reforms, new laws, and crackdowns within China. As global trade in food has grown, so has consumer demand for food safety. For example, the food safety expert Paul Young (Waters Corporation) highlighted recent surveys in Japan and the EU that reveal consumers are increasingly willing to pay higher prices to ensure the safety of their food. Food safety is not just a concern of consumers, however, it is also important to governments and businesses to ensure the integrity of the agricultural export markets. This is a particular concern for the United States, which has historically enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with food products, but is now losing that edge as many emerging countries around the world—such as China and Mexico—are expanding their food export markets.

**Food Safety Regulation Structures in EU and Japan**

According to Paul Young, a successful food safety regulation structure must include the active collaboration of the government, food safety technology leaders, and the food industry. An effective food safety system must be comprehensive, for relying solely on testing imports is reactive and potentially expensive if done in isolation. Conversely, simply depending on a third party or exporting country to test is risky and requires monitoring to ensure tests are done well. Ideally, food safety regulations should be internationally harmonized; that, however, has not yet happened. Among exporting countries it has long been considered that the EU has the most stringent legislation. But recent Japanese legislation has matched, or even surpassed, that of the EU. Both of these systems are successful, for a number of reasons.

**The European Union**

Strengths that distinguish the EU’s food regulatory system are: (1) the regulating body—the European Food Safety Authority—an independent, scientific point of reference for risk analysis ensuring that food safety regulations are based on science; (2) a comprehensive system for traceability of foods; (3) a rapid alert system for food and feed to disseminate information on risks within the European Community; and (4) a requirement that food imported from third countries are produced and tested with the same diligence as domestic produce.

**The Japanese System**

The strengths of the Japanese system are: (1) compliance to Japan’s food safety standards is ensured through a very high level (upwards of 10 percent) of laboratory testing for imports; (2) the onus is placed on importers to prove the safety of their products by having them tested before the products are allowed to enter Japan. One of the more demanding aspects of the Japanese food inspection regulations is the large list of substances that importers must test.

**Challenges**

China’s capacity to effectively protect food quality is hampered by a weak legal, political, and regulatory infrastructure that has not forced accountability among food producers and processors. Key weaknesses in China’s food-safety governance system include strong local government protectionism of industries; a lack of a product liability law; and weak monitoring capacity of food products because of the vast numbers of small-scale food producers and processors and competition among regulating agencies. China also lacks an independent court system, which could better protect consumers and company whistleblowers. Consumer education is also lagging in part because of few consumer watchdog organizations. Chinese urbanites are now demanding safer food, but answering their demands without addressing the rest of the population may create a dual system of food safety, potentially sparking social unrest. Thus Chinese regulators must design their food safety system around China’s unique political structure.
Chinese food exporters have gained market share mainly through low prices, but these gains could diminish if the quality of goods is constantly called into question. For example, the milk scandal of July 2008—in which almost 60,000 children were hospitalized in China—affected exports of a wide range of products to many countries and regions.

China faces several key challenges as it tries to ensure food safety for its exports and domestic markets. The first challenge is the structure of China’s food system, with 78 percent of food processors having fewer than ten employees and most farms being two acres or less. The numerous small farms combined with a cash-based and large and fragmented food production system make traceability difficult.

For centuries Chinese farmers have intensely cultivated their small plots, leaving much of China’s scarce arable land depleted. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, agricultural production has grown in China thanks to an extremely high use of fertilizers and pesticides on crops and drugs in animal husbandry. It is not surprising that Chinese agricultural products are tainted by drug and fertilizer residue. It has been estimated that 40 percent of all pesticides in China are counterfeit, further compounding the problem of overapplication with doubts surrounding authenticity and actual content.

The booming Chinese economy has also created food safety challenges. Rapid economic growth has enabled a massive expansion in highways and cell phone usage, which now connect the small farms with faraway markets, further confounding traceability of food products and additives.

China’s rapid growth has created a widening wealth gap, mainly along urban and rural lines. The Chinese government has tried to help stimulate the economy in rural areas, most notably by canceling the agricultural tax and lowering other fees to encourage small business and entrepreneurship in poorer rural areas. The Chinese government faces a difficult situation when the need to protect consumers requires shutting down dangerous food processors and farms that employ the rural poor.

**Civil Society**

China’s consumers lack a strong civil society, and manufacturers do not have strong independent associations to address their collective interests in ensuring food safety. The government has further reduced incentives of the manufacturers to self-regulate by restricting news media coverage of food safety stories that might cause panic or lack of faith in the government system.

Major class action cases around food safety in China have not been seen mainly because, in cases like the recent milk scandal, the government has rapidly taken action against those responsible. In this and other recent scandals, the government has bowed to the will of “netizens”—mostly fast, anonymous, Web-savvy bloggers—and forced responsible regulators to resign. In the milk case, the head of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), Li Changjiang (b. 1944), was forced to resign after netizens found classified government documents and posted them online showing that AQSIQ had turned a blind eye to the developing crisis. And yet when more than 200 victims’ families took the tainted-milk case to China’s highest court to seek long-term care, some were arrested. This case caused massive mistrust of the government’s food safety initiatives.

Although China faces many challenges to ensuring the safety of its food supply, the government has set up a coordinating committee under Wu Yi (b. 1938), vice premier and former minister of health, to examine strategies for improving food safety. In 2007 the government issued a five-year food and drug safety plan and a food safety white paper and carried out campaigns to close unsafe food processors. Chinese food safety regulators are reaching out to international partners to discuss issues of mutual interest; the Asian Development Bank, for example, played a key role in the analysis and development of China’s new food safety structure.

The needs of both the United States and China to strengthen their food inspection and regulatory systems underscore the ample opportunity for collaboration between the governments and private sector companies.

Paul Young noted that China’s prospects for improving its food safety regulation are not as dismal as they may appear today. Thailand had formidable food safety problems beginning in the 1990s culminating in 2002 with the EU mandating 100 percent testing on imported poultry and aquaculture products—the country’s two biggest exports. Thailand’s problems resembled those facing China now—a fragmented food producer system with many
Food Safety ▪ Shipin anquan ▪ 食品安全

small farms and companies, in which sources of food products were difficult to trace. The solution is widely regarded as a salutary lesson in dealing with such issues. The Thai government, the food producing industry, and technology leaders worked intensely with EU regulators and international companies to fix the country’s food production and regulatory systems. Young maintained that such a rapid and effective response would not have been possible without the collaboration of the Thai government with willing partners in the Thai producers’ organizations working in partnership with technology solution providers, such as U.S.-based Waters Corporation, to build effective testing programs and production strategies.

Linden J. ELLIS, Jennifer L. TURNER, and Rongkun LIU

Further Reading


China is increasing advertising and propaganda to encourage consumer confidence in the milk sector. PHOTO BY ROBERT EATON.
Foot-binding was a custom in which girls’ feet were bound with tight bandages so that they would grow to only about 8 centimeters long. Originally conferring femininity and social status to upper-class women, the practice spread to lower-class women seeking opportunities for upward mobility.

The Chinese custom of foot-binding, which may have originated in the court of a decadent, late-tenth-century emperor who had a fetish for small feet, spread through the country beginning at the end of the eleventh century and was common by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Girls between the ages of five and seven were subjected to the practice, in which their toes and heels were bound with tight bandages—usually by their mother or grandmother—so that their feet ideally would be only about 8 centimeters long. The practice made girls’ feet prone to infection, paralysis, and muscular atrophy.

Foot-binding, originally a mark of femininity and social status for upper-class women, spread to lower-class women, for whom the possession of feet resembling “golden lotuses” represented opportunities for upward mobility in the marriage and service markets.
The making of lotus shoes expressed the skills of female household labor. Despite the dangers posed by foot-binding, the practice did not keep women confined to the inner chambers. Wearing water-resistant outdoor lotus shoes, women worked in the fields, or went to shrines and temples. Foot-binding was simultaneously a symbol of feminine beauty, sexual and social hierarchy, and Confucian morality.

The Manchus, who conquered China in the seventeenth century, tried without success to abolish the practice. Later, one of the goals of the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) was to end foot-binding in the name of women’s equality.

By the early twentieth century Chinese reformers campaigned against foot-binding, condemning it as a source of national weakness and shame. To reformers foot-binding was seen as a symbol of China’s vulnerability to Western imperialism because the practice left a large part of the population able only to hobble. Natural feet thus became a sign of feminine beauty. By the 1920s—due to the anti-foot-binding efforts of Chinese natural-foot societies and Western women and Christian missionaries living in China, combined with criticism by May Fourth intellectuals (who favored adoption of Western science and philosophy to strengthen China), and with the practice of rewarding citizens who turned in women’s binding cloths and lotus shoes—laws were enacted that eventually ended the nine hundred-year-old custom.

Robert Y. ENG

Further Reading
The Forbidden City
Zìjīnchénɡ 紫禁城
Gùgōng 故宫

The Forbidden City, located in the center of Beijing, is the largest and most complete ancient palace in China, an unparalleled monument whose massive architecture and beauty encapsulate the Chinese notion of the unlimited power enjoyed by imperial rulers.

The Forbidden City in the heart of Beijing is an ancient architectural complex, commonly known as the “Old Palace” in China; it was the home of Chinese rulers and the seat of Chinese government for more than five hundred years.

Completed in 1420 during the Yongle reign of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), it continued to be used by a total of twenty-four emperors of the Ming and the Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. After the last emperor Pu Yi was evicted from the former Qing palace in 1924, a museum was established in the palatial compound to house the paintings and artifacts from the imperial collections, which at that time also included items later shipped to Taiwan. The Forbidden City, as the largest and most complete ancient palace in China, was added to the list of UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 1987.

The palatial complex is located in a quasi-rectangle of 72,000 square meters (961 m × 753 m), wrapped in a wide, stone-lined moat and massive brick-colored walls with soaring corner towers showing intricate roof designs. The principal structures within the compound inherited heavily from Ming constructions, built with timber frames on stone foundations and yellow glazed-tile roofs, clearly deployed with a north-south oriented axis in mind. The buildings are physically and functionally divided into two major sectors: administrative buildings for the outer (front) court in the south and residential halls for the inner (back) court in the north. The southern court can be easily accessed through the main entrance, called Wumen (Meridian Gate), an imposing U-shaped structure opening toward the south. Its central gate tower, rising 37 meters above the ground at one end of the axial line, is the tallest structure of the entire palatial complex. The area in front of this awe-generating passageway was a prominent venue for issuing edicts and conducting ceremonies.

Immediately adjacent to the north face of the Wumen Gate is an expansive, open square (26,000 square meters) with the bow-shaped Golden Water River running through it. This man-made river flows to the outside moat and is remotely linked to the source of spring water in the outskirts of Beijing. The square is framed in the north with the Taihe (Supreme Harmony) Gate and it functions as the vestibule leading toward a three-tiered, white stone terrace, the majestic site of three principle structures of the palatial complex: Taihe Hall, Zhonghe (Central Harmony) Hall, and the Baohe (Preserving Harmony) Hall. The nine-bayed Taihe Hall has a south-facing façade of 60.01 meters wide and is the largest of all buildings within the Forbidden City as well as the largest extant timber-framed building in China. This monumental structure was a throne room for Ming emperors, but was frequently used as a ceremonial center during the Qing. Both the Taihe and Baohe Halls are designed with double-eaved roofs and distinct embellishments symbolizing imperial power. They are linked to the smaller,
square Zhonghe Hall in the middle along the line of the stone-carved Imperial Way, which also was part of the central axial line of the ancient imperial city.

Through the central passageway of the Wumen Gate, the Imperial Way projects south and merges with a series of city gates including the Tian’an (Heavenly Peace) Gate at the modern Tiananmen Square. This axial line eventually directs toward an area where the Temple of Heaven and Twin Altars of soil and grain are located. It is evident that Chinese traditional planning principles were used for the ground plan and location of the palace so as to delineate the celestial king’s pivotal position in his sovereign space.

West of the outer court inside the Forbidden City is a building for the emperors to receive ministers and hold courts, called Wuying (Military Eminence) Hall. It also is the base of Forbidden City’s own printing house, which has produced important literary works including the mammoth *Siku Quanshu* (Complete Collection in Four Treasuries), a ten-year editorial enterprise resulting from the Qinglong emperor’s 1772 edict. This project brought together all varieties of important textual materials known in the imperial collection and libraries, and eventually led to the production of the largest single assembly of Chinese classical texts. This 36,000-volume work has since remained as a major source book for different fields of Chinese studies, and it is now made available in electronic versions based on one of the original copies previously kept in the Wenyuan (Literary Profundity) Pavilion, the imperial library located immediately north of a Wenhua (Literary Glory) Hall. The latter was a lecture hall for studying Chinese classical texts and is a mirror image of the Wuying Military Hall at the opposite side of the outer court, thus balancing the civil and martial components within the compound.

The inner court in the northern part of the palatial compound is an enclosed area with a crisscross of alleys within a perimeter of 1,500 meters. The major components are three residential complexes aligned along the central axial line, which pierces through the imperial garden and

Architectural details of the Forbidden City reflect highly specialized building techniques. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
the Shenwu (Divine Might) Gate in the northern sector of the Forbidden City and points outside toward the Di’an (Earthly Peace) Gate, and the Drum and Bell towers further north. The Qianqing (Heavenly Purity) Palace in the south of the inner court was the residence of the emperor during the Ming dynasty and the early Qing period; it later became the place for conducting state affairs, with furnishings replicating those used in the outer court. The Kunning (Earthly Tranquility) Palace in the north was the seated empress’s chamber during the Ming Dynasty, but was renovated to hold an altar for performing Manchu sacrificial rites during the Qing era. Between these two is the smaller Jiaotai (Union) Palace that functioned as a venue for the empress’s coronation and other festive occasions, and as the home of ritual paraphernalia and twenty-five Qing Imperial seals.
East and west of these three palaces are a series of self-contained courtyards and minor palaces belonging to the seated emperor’s concubines and children, in addition to the ancestral shrine in the east and the Yangxin (Mental Cultivation) Hall in the west. The latter became the emperor’s chamber starting from the Yongzheng’s reign (1722–1735). The Ningshou (Tranquil Longevity) Palace in the northeastern sector of the Forbidden City, built for Qianlong Emperor’s retirement (1795), is also remarkable. Its courtyard features an outer court and an inner court to emulate the principal setup of the Forbidden City, and it is furnished with complex recreational facilities and innovative landscaping designs. A colorful glazed-screen wall at its entrance, representing nine animated relief dragon figures, is one of the most conspicuous items of the Forbidden City. Inside the inner court of the entire palatial compound are religious settings in which to perform Buddhist, Daoist and Lamaistic, as well as Shamanistic, rituals. They attest to the liberalism in Qing religious practice.

Over the course of five centuries, some of the buildings within the Forbidden City were razed or plundered, while renovations and new addition also were been made. Nevertheless, distinct features and the original layout of the principal buildings remain discernible up to this day. The ground plans, designs, color schemes, building orientations, and names of these architectural structures clearly were made in accordance with principles prescribed in ancient texts of Grand Rituals and Yin-Yang correspondences essential for the dwellings of the emperors. These visual forms interpret traditional Chinese cosmological views regarding the terrestrial existence of celestial kings, known as “sons of heaven.” The architectural structures also bear witness to highly specialized crafts and technologies accomplished during the Ming-Qing era (1368–1912), ranging from stone carving, textile designs, ceramic productions, metalworking, and engineering for heating, water supply, and drainage systems—tangible evidence of synthesized cultural refinements and technological inventiveness originating from China and peripheral regions. They provide important clues for studying the concept of Mandate of Heaven in Chinese sovereign rule that had perpetuated for than five thousand years.

TzeHuey CHIOU-PENG

Further Reading


Foreign Investment

China is a major destination of international investment. Approximately 80 percent of the total realized foreign investment was direct investment, of which most came from Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea. Foreign direct investment in China concentrates in manufacturing, especially in garment, textile, electronic, electrical, and chemical industries. Most of the foreign manufacturing investments in China are export producers. Together they contributed about 57 percent of the value of China’s merchandise exports in 2007. In non-manufacturing activities foreign investment in China concentrates in real estate, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and business services.

China provides foreign firms three major modes of direct entry—the wholly foreign-owned enterprise, the equity joint venture, and the contractual joint venture. Wholly foreign-owned enterprises are investments solely controlled by foreign firms, whereas equity joint ventures and contractual joint ventures are Chinese–foreign collaborations with control rights defined by equity proportions and by contractual terms, respectively. The establishment and operation of these three major modes of investment are governed by specific Chinese laws. These laws include the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese–Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese–Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures. Together these three laws constitute the mainstay of China’s policy framework for foreign investment. Other major Chinese laws and regulations for foreign investment include the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, and the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries.

China’s policy framework for foreign investment has undergone necessary evolution and has become relatively liberalized in recent years. Prior to entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 but especially in the first decade of the economic opening beginning in 1979, China generally emphasized joint venture forms of investment and restricted foreign firms from using corporate takeovers to enter the Chinese market. Today foreign investors face few ownership and location restrictions and can employ more systemic investment strategies in China.
industries such as banking and wholesaling-retailing that could have an impact on immediate national economic stability. They were not allowed to establish ventures in places outside the special economic zones (SEZs) in south China and the open cities along the coast, except for those locations in which their Chinese venture partners were already situated. Today foreign firms can invest in China through acquisition and merger. They can invest in most industries in China without ownership and location restrictions. In 2007 approximately 77 percent of the realized amount of foreign direct investment (a 66 percent increase compared with 1989) was wholly foreign-owned investment, and about one-third of that amount (a 15 percent increase compared with 1989) agglomerated beyond Guangdong in Shanghai and Jiangsu Province.

Ownership and Location Choices

Foreign firms exploit the recent liberty of full ownership in China for exclusive control of their investments there. They can better relate their wholly owned subsidiaries in China to their corporate networks there and elsewhere in the world. Full ownership is generally viable for investments that cater to the home or third markets of foreign firms. They are applicable for investments that involve only the assets of foreign firms. Full ownership, however, is usually less viable for investments that focus on such China markets as automotive and real estate, which have restricted access to certain business channels. Foreign firms penetrating these markets in China may require participation of local partners possessing relevant access privileges. Under these circumstances foreign firms may face business goals and management practices that diverge from those of their local partners. They may have greater difficulties in aligning their joint ventures in China with the rest of their corporate activities.

On the other hand, since the early 1990s foreign firms can opt to locate in regions beyond the special economic zones and the open cities and extend their corporate networks and market reach in China. Numerous designated areas for foreign investment across China have come into existence to facilitate this development. These areas are of many types, including economic and technology development, free trade, and export processing zones of varied focus: economic and technology development zones concentrate on manufacturing investments, for example, and free trade zones on nonmanufacturing activities. These designated areas also vary in providing local incentives for competing foreign investors. Foreign firms can therefore negotiate with the authorities of their preferred zones to obtain optimal incentives. The major local incentives for which foreign investors can negotiate include a tax-holiday extension beyond the national standard of full exemption of enterprise income tax (25 percent for most enterprises
and 15 percent for advanced technology enterprises by 2012) for the first two years after an investment becomes profitable, and half exemption of the tax for the next three years. The incentives also include fee reductions, of which those for land use and public utility are most common. In general, the more important an investment is to a zone, the larger is the extent of local incentives to that investment.

The designated areas further vary in administration level and the quality of support they provide. Zones that are designated at a national level generally adhere more strictly to state-established policies, are better connected to central government authorities, and provide superior physical infrastructures for foreign firms. They are more suitable for foreign investments that demand formal institutional governance, high-level bureaucratic relations, or industry-standardized facilities. These national-level zones are therefore preferred by Japanese, U.S., and European firms for major undertakings, especially those that are technology- or knowledge-intensive or are oriented to China markets. As such these investments usually
assemble in major cities where national-level zones are concentrated. They are drawn to the greater Shanghai area and the greater Beijing-Tianjin area, where highly skilled workers and major markets congregate. Japanese investments flock especially to the greater Beijing-Tianjin area because of shorter distances and the existing locations of networked firms from home. Investments from the United States are nevertheless geographically more dispersed. U.S. firms are more active than their Japanese and European peers in exploring investment opportunities beyond the major coastal areas in China.

By comparison, zones that are designated at a provincial or local level are generally preferred by investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Unlike their advanced-economy counterparts, firms from these two places demand mainly good local relations and usable infrastructures because they undertake primarily small and medium investments in labor-intensive export production. Hong Kong and Taiwan investors therefore usually rely on their personal and kinship ties (guanxi) in China to navigate in these more relations-based settings. They utilize their social and cultural heritages to operate in these more informally governed environments. As a result, investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan concentrate in many former county areas (now cities) in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces where their ties are most strong. They concentrate especially in the Pearl River Delta, where communications with their Hong Kong offices are convenient and where major container ports are located. But as wages and other operating costs in the delta have continued to rise in recent years, Hong Kong firms have begun to relocate some of their investments to the inland areas in Guangdong and to the provinces in central and southwestern China. Taiwan firms have also begun to relocate some of their investments, especially to southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang provinces where they similarly have close personal and kinship ties. In 2007 the average monthly base wage of a manufacturing-plant worker in the Pearl River Delta reached approximately $200, which nearly doubled that of central or southwestern China. The major expenditures for benefits, which amount to at least 30 percent of the total payroll of an enterprise, cover mandated insurance (old age, medical, unemployment, work-related injury, and child bearing), housing, and employee meals.

Information on most major designated zones and on regional economic conditions in China is readily available today through the development corporations and management commissions of the zones and through the foreign investment and trade organs of municipal governments. Most of these organizational entities have an Internet presence, and some of them have representative offices overseas. Information on individual investment opportunities, on the other hand, is more readily available at fairs for foreign investors and in consulting services that cater to them. Data and advice are also increasingly available through the customers, suppliers, and other affiliated businesses of the investing firms that have local business knowledge in China. In recent years, foreign firms, especially those from Japan, North America, and western Europe, usually

A little girl sips her first can of Coca-Cola through a straw. The two big cola companies fight for the hearts of Chinese consumers now as heartily as they fought for the loyalty of American consumers. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
conduct detailed portfolio analyses when considering major investments in China. They assess the suitability of a zone before finally deciding to locate their business there. In general, the founding of a foreign-invested enterprise in China requires approval from relevant authorities on a project proposal, a feasibility study report, a contract (for joint ventures), articles of association, and a certificate for establishment. A foreign-invested enterprise, along with all local enterprises in China, further requires a license to operate a business.

**Personnel Management and Sales and Purchases Operations**

Foreign firms usually operate their investments in China with overseas personnel in key management positions there. These overseas personnel normally comprise the native nationals or native residents of their respective home countries or territories, but the expatriates in North American and European investments can include naturalized nationals, especially those of Chinese descent, from home or third countries or both. The use of foreign nationals of Chinese descent enables North American and European firms to better adapt their operations and cultivate their relations in China. The number of overseas personnel can range from several to more than a dozen in the first years of operation, but it usually declines when an investment is firmly established. The hiring of Chinese nationals to replace expatriate personnel in key management positions is common in established foreign-invested enterprises. Nevertheless, for major joint-venture investments where Chinese partner(s) actively exercise their equity rights, foreign firms may need to maintain a stable expatriate presence beyond the first years of operation. Today foreign investments in China can recruit Chinese workers through company web pages, local advertisements, and employment fairs. They can also recruit Chinese workers through local government employment service organizations, public employment agents, and private human resources firms. The white-collar workers in foreign investments in China have generally come from local urban areas and other cities, whereas the blue-collar workers usually have come from nearby rural places and neighboring provinces. Foreign firms in China can fire workers of their own accord, but they need to inform relevant local authorities of their actions and to compensate for the affected workers in accordance with China’s labor laws. The Labor Contract Law, which came into effect in 2008, requires all firms in China to have written contracts with their workers and to provide severance pay to dismissed workers.

The localization of key and other management personnel is a strategic measure used by foreign firms to better develop or penetrate the markets in China. Today foreign firms can establish extensive networks of licensed agents, sales outlets, and service centers in China. They can foster relations with Chinese firms whose privately owned distributors and marketers reach out to the national market. Foreign investments that focus on China markets are therefore generally autonomous in managing their China sales (i.e., host sales) activities, and their China marketing departments can be sizeable. The host sales relations of foreign investments in China can nevertheless be volatile. Foreign investments targeting final consumable markets in China have faced increasing price pressures in recent years, while those focusing on durable industrial-goods markets must look for new customers on a constant basis. Foreign investments may also encounter various transaction issues with local Chinese clients when simplified contractual terms, which are usually preferred by the latter, are used. These investments may suffer from accounts receivable problems because of the differing business practices of local customer firms. By contrast, foreign investments that focus on intermediate goods markets in China can have relatively stable host sales relations. The affiliations that foreign supplier firms have with networked foreign lead firms promote such stability. Foreign investments that focus on world markets similarly have stable export sales relations. These investments sell mainly to their home headquarters, Hong Kong offices, or other Asia-Pacific offices for global accounts management and transfer-pricing reasons. In particular, most Japanese investments sell almost exclusively to their home headquarters.

The investments of foreign intermediate-goods producers have made available many sophisticated materials, parts, and components that would otherwise not exist in China. They complement the growing number of Chinese enterprises providing a broad range of general supplies.
to local firms. Foreign firms can therefore procure most of their intermediate inputs and supplies in China. They generally have autonomy in identifying local suppliers and in purchasing from those suppliers who meet the quality-control standards of their home headquarters. The level of China or host purchases is high for investments in such industries as automotives, which have local regulations about the parts used in manufacturing, and for investments that focus on China markets using local quality-control standards. Foreign investments usually purchase from suppliers located in the same region for logistical efficiency. They sign annual or long-term contracts to ensure the supply of their major intermediate inputs from Chinese sources. The increasing competence of local Chinese suppliers further enhances the overall stability of host purchases relations, although quality and delivery reliability can still raise issues of occasional concern. The relative stability of host purchases relations allows foreign firms to transfer more systematically to their local suppliers certain technical and management know-how. It facilitates the research-and-development (R&D) relationships between foreign investments and their local suppliers as they seek to improve certain product and processes. The import-purchases relations of foreign investments, which entail primarily core intermediate inputs from home headquarters or sister units or from overseas networked firms, are stable. Such purchases are managed mainly by home headquarters. They can be integral parts of the global supply chains of the multinational corporations.

Local Authority Relations and China Market Development Strategies

The localization of many areas of operations, including strategic management and key purchases, generally enables foreign investments to establish harmonious relations with the local authorities with whom they interact in China. Such harmonious relations can help foreign firms to receive expedited services, including customs clearance and utility provision when needed. They can also help foreign investments to acquire some flexibility when complying with local workplace safety and other regulations. To maintain harmonious relations foreign firms usually participate in the activities held or sponsored by local authorities. These activities include business meetings with local officials, investment seminars by zone and
municipality authorities, and ceremonies of government organizations. Foreign investments can further develop their relationships with local authorities by partaking in community events, including local celebrations, social services programs, and fundraising gatherings. With increasing salary and anticorruption awareness of government officials, foreign investments in China generally allocate expenditures for developing and maintaining these relationships, the cost of which might be higher in local-level zones and rural areas.

The increasingly normal business environments in China have allowed foreign firms to employ more systemic investment strategies there. Foreign firms, especially large firms, have gradually established their wholly owned head offices primarily in Beijing or Shanghai to facilitate their relations with high-level government offices and to service their investments in China. A growing number of foreign firms also use their China head offices to centrally manage the marketing and sales activities of their investments or to plan and finance new investments, including R&D centers, in China. Most of the foreign-invested R&D centers in China perform applied activities, that is they improve upon the designs and specifications developed by home headquarters or overseas sister units for the markets in China. Nevertheless, some of these centers are the sole R&D facilities of divisions of multinational corporations that produce exclusively or almost exclusively in China. Foreign firms further gradually optimize their corporate configurations in China by converting joint ventures to wholly owned subsidiaries, consolidating existing operations, and by acquiring and merging with other foreign investments and Chinese enterprises. They adopt specific positions, corporate functions, and global value-chain practices in their investments in China wherever appropriate.

Foreign investment has played a pivotal role in the technological and economic transformations of China since 1979. Joint-venture investments, especially those established during the first two decades of the economic opening, have been a primary vehicle in the transfer of contemporary technologies and related know-how to partnering Chinese enterprises. These and other foreign investments have also been crucial in the diffusion of the latest product ideas, advanced management techniques, and international business practices to local Chinese managers and practitioners. The accumulation of such knowledge and the subsequent application of it by local entrepreneurs have partly helped the rise of new state and Chinese private firms, of which some have become multinational companies themselves in recent years. Together these Chinese firms augment the many choices that foreign firms can pursue in providing products for consumers and the many channels through which they can operate their enterprises in China.

Foreign investment heightens price competition in the markets and enhance consumption welfare of society in China and has further sustained the demand for various goods and services in China by employing tens of millions of local workers at attractive salaries. It has financed in part the economic development efforts of local and national governments in China through tax contribution and a consistent foreign trade surplus. The joint forces of foreign firms and the Chinese state have created a new economic landscape and contemporary social culture in China’s cities and coastal areas. The force of foreign investment in shaping society, including that of the inland areas of China, will continue in the future. Foreign investment will continue to play an indispensable role in China’s quest for world economic and political leadership in the “China century.”

Chi Kin LEUNG

Further Reading

Biography of Sir Robert Hart

SIR ROBERT HART, Bart. (1835- ), Anglo-Chinese statesman, was born at Milltown, Co. Armagh, on the 10th of February 1835 … From the first Mr. Hart gained the entire confidence of the members of the Chinese government, who were wise enough to recognize his loyal and able assistance. Of all their numerous sources of revenue, the money furnished by Mr. Hart was the only certain asset which could be offered as security for Chinese loans … Thrice only did he visit Europe between 1863 and 1902, the result of this long comparative isolation, and of his constant intercourse with the Peking officials, being that he learnt to look at events through Chinese spectacles; and his work, These from the Land of Sinim, shows how far this affected his outlook. The faith which he put in the Chinese made him turn a deaf ear to the warnings which he received of the threatening Boxer movement in 1900. To the last he believed that the attacking force would at least have spared his house, which contained official records of priceless value, but he was doomed to see his faith falsified. The building was burnt to the ground with all that it contained, including his private diary for forty years. When the stress came, and he retreated to the British legation, he took an active part in the defense, and spared neither risk nor toil in his exertions. In addition to the administration of the foreign customs service, the establishment of a postal service in the provinces devolved upon him, and after the signing of the protocol of 1901 he was called upon to organize a native customs service at the treaty ports.


China is the third largest trader in the world; its exports in 2007 were 80 times what they were in 1979. Computer and office equipment, apparel, textiles, and consumer goods are all mainstays of China’s foreign trade, which has led to rapid economic growth in China and increased consumption of Chinese goods worldwide.

China’s rapid ascent from the rank of twenty-seventh-largest world trader in 1979 to third largest in 2004 underscores the nation’s emerging economic and political power. In 2007 China exported $1.2 trillion (an eighty-fold increase compared with 1979) and imported $956 billion (a sixty-three-fold increase compared with 1979) worth of goods. It maintained its record of a consistent surplus in foreign merchandise trade that was set forth in 1994.

Foreign Trade Composition and Regime

In 2007 nearly 43 percent of China’s exports, which comprised primarily the top three export commodities (computer and office equipment, wearing apparel, and textile products), went to the three largest markets—the United States, Hong Kong, and Japan—whereas approximately 35 percent of China’s imports, which comprised primarily the most important import commodities (electronic parts and components consisting mainly of integrated circuits, micro-assemblies, and liquid crystal devices), came from the three largest sources—Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. The export of finished goods made of imported bonded materials and intermediate inputs—the processing trade associated mainly with the export production investment from the four Asian Tigers (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) and Japan—therefore constitutes the primary component of China’s foreign trade. In 2007 this type of trade accounted for approximately 45 percent of China’s total value of merchandise exports and imports. The other major exports in 2007 included steel products, whereas the other major imports included crude petroleum oil and mineral ore.

The Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China form the base of China’s policy framework for foreign trade, which has become relatively liberalized in recent years. During the economic opening period prior to China’s entry in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China exercised quota and licensing controls over its export and import activities. It largely had a state monopoly on its general foreign trade (import of goods for domestic sale and export of goods made of domestic materials). Foreign investments during that period were permitted to engage only in processing trade and in general import trade in which the investments themselves were the end users of the imports. Following its WTO commitments, China now uses tariffs and exchange rate adjustments to govern most of its foreign trade, and all enterprises and individuals in China are allowed to...
undertake export and import activities. Thus, now foreign firms can export to China through many channels, including trade agents at home, importers in China, and their trading or commercial investments in China. Foreign firms can also sell the products they make in China in the domestic market there.

In mid-2008 China had an average tariff rate of 9.8 percent on general imports. The average import tariff rate on agricultural products was higher at approximately 15 percent, and that on industrial goods was lower at about 9 percent. China further has a value-added tax up to a maximum of 17 percent on the increased value of most imports made at every stage of domestic sale. Certain general imports, such as equipment for manufacturing uses in innovative industries that have technology and know-how transfer potential, are nevertheless exempt from tariffs or value-added tax or both. With the exception of a limited number of goods such as iron and steel products, China also has zero tariffs on its exports. It further rebates the value-added tax that enterprises paid for their processing imports. However, as a means of moderating its foreign trade surplus, in recent years China has reduced the number of value-added tax rebates extended to merchants.

**Foreign Trade Surplus**

The import and export of food products, drugs, and a number of genetically modified goods are subject to China’s registration or certification requirements or both. The
import of certain mechanical, electrical, and electronic products is subject to the China Compulsory Certification requirement. Information on the latest regulations on China’s import and export trade can be found at the website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and that of China Customs.

Free Trade Agreements and International Economic Relations

Given its economic significance, China is at the center of the emerging Asian Free Trade Area, the trading bloc that parallels the European Economic Area and the North American Free Trade Agreement area. In 2008 China already had free trade agreements with several Asian economies, including Hong Kong, Macao, the Republic of Korea, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member nations, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. China has also recently entered into a free trade agreement with New Zealand and is seeking similar arrangements with Australia. In particular, the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement allows tariff-free flow of a wide range of local-origin goods between China and Hong Kong. It further allows firms in Hong Kong to invest in a number of services sectors that are beyond those committed to by China for its entry to the WTO. As a result, Hong Kong has reinforced its status as the most important gateway for both China’s foreign merchandise and China’s foreign services trade.

Employment and Income Growth

Foreign trade has been a major force in China’s employment and income growth since the economic opening. Such growth has not taken place at the expense of manufacturing jobs in North America and Western Europe, where firms benefit from the export of quality materials and parts, production equipment, and advanced technology products to China. Such growth also did not cause net job losses in the four Asian Tigers and Japan, where firms flourish on China’s processing or services trade or both. The growth of China’s foreign trade has further contributed to a substantial increase in consumption welfare in China, where the population enjoys a wide array of imported goods, and in the rest of the world, where people enjoy affordable Chinese exports. Nevertheless, China’s rapid ascent in the world trade arena has occasionally heightened economic and political tensions between China and its major trading partners, especially the United States and the European Union. Intellectual property protection and labor rights in China, along with the value of Chinese currency, are among the most frequently raised issues that China has faced. Notwithstanding these tensions, as the most populous nation and an active participant in the global economy, China is destined to be the largest world trader.

Chi Kin LEUNG

Further Reading


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In the distant past, the vast majority of China’s territory was forested, but much was lost due to over-use and neglect—especially during the past hundred years. Only now are efforts underway to correct decades of abuse, and only because environmental problems such as wind and water erosion, dust storms, and desertification grew so severe that action had to be taken.

Few natural resources are as important to a nation’s industrial production and environmental quality as forests and their products. Recent attention to China’s environmental problems has understandably focused on the negative effects of three decades of double-digit economic growth and the growing resource demands levied by 1.33 billion persons. Simply feeding such a population presents the government with a staggering responsibility, one with grave consequences to the nation’s land and water resources. Growing consumption of wood, especially roundwood (timber, as compared to processed or chipped wood products), has been driven by China’s ever-expanding role as the “world’s factory” and by the rise of a new middle class seeking better-quality wood housewares and furniture. In 2006 Chinese factories turned out a staggering 130 million pieces of furniture worth $60 billion. In short, few materials are as essential to China’s “economic miracle” as wood, and as a consequence China, a major player in the global market both as importer and exporter, is establishing a strong regional presence within the roundwood markets of Southeast Asia and Africa.

Despite significant increases in imports since 1978, demand for wood and other forest products has placed considerable pressure on China’s forest areas, estimated in 2003 to be fifth among all nations at 284.9 million hectares. About 60 to 65 percent of this area is estimated to be “natural” forest. Estimates of China’s forest coverage range from 15 to 18.2 percent of national territory. The figure represents marked improvement over 1949 and 1962, when the percentages of national territory covered by forest were estimated at 8.6 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively. The State Forestry Administration (SFA) reported that in 2006 China’s forest sector earned 900 billion yuan ($118 billion). The reported 2010 goal is 1.2 trillion yuan ($150 billion), and evidence suggests that this goal may be surpassed.

Since 1950 successful efforts to protect and restore forest environments throughout China have been occurring with little foreign recognition. The National Natural Forest Protection Project (NNFPP) initiated in 2000 will see 96.2 billion yuan ($12.6 billion) invested in a ten-year project with two major goals. The first is to “protect 61.1 million ha. [hectares] of natural forest in the upper and middle reaches of the Yangtze [Chang] and Yellow [Huang] Rivers by reducing 12.4 million m³ of commercial logging each year and by afforestation of 8.67 million ha. by 2010. The second major goal of this project is to effectively control and protect 33 million ha. of targeted state-owned forests by reducing annual commercial
logging on these lands by 7.52 million m³" (Cohen, Lee, and Vertinsky 2001, 7).

In China logging in traditional but slow-growth northern forests is declining in importance, and the management of old-growth forests (virtually all now protected to some extent) has improved dramatically. At the same time new commercial forest areas and tree plantations are being developed throughout southern China, an area with a longer growing season and greater water resources characteristic of commercial forest areas in other nations. New commercial varieties of trees have been introduced—not only for roundwood but also for low-cost paper pulp. China is second only to the United States in book publishing—and many U.S. publishers now have books printed in China because of lower labor and paper costs.

Beyond commercial forests, ecologically important forests that serve as shelterbelts and future buffers against encroaching deserts and degraded grassland have also received massive increases in both forested area and investment. Forests are made up of more than trees, and hundreds of forest biopreserves have been established throughout China, particularly in west-central and southwest China. The subtropical mixed evergreen/deciduous broadleaf forests and complex rain forests of these regions are home to a greater number of endangered flora and fauna. The growing importance of tourism in “natural areas” throughout China, particularly in the southwest, has been an important argument sustaining local support for the protection of forested areas. Given China’s huge rural population, local promotion of the economic benefits of preservation and sustainable forestry has been an important propaganda challenge to ecologists, forest ministry officials, and others seeking to protect forests from unsustainable practices and to gain local support for new programs and techniques.
National Planning, Local Action

Forest protection in China is in constant competition with economic interests because of demand not only for products but also for employment. Many of China’s major forest areas are located in remote areas with few alternative job opportunities. Gaining genuine local support for forest protection and reforestation in China depends on promoting strategies that offer the promise of some economic return for participation in these efforts.

Controlling point-source pollution (pollution discharged or emitted from an identifiable source) resulting from unscrupulous factory managers, municipal waste water plants, or power stations that lack the resources to properly treat waste water or airborne particulate matter, by no means the most complex factor in forest protection and reforestation, is still an important aspect. Solving such pollution problems often depends on garnering the support of political factions and enforcing regulations. In controlling point-source pollution the middle class also plays a role, especially in urban areas where citizens are increasingly demanding cleaner, healthier environments. In addition to the large numbers of government personnel, at least 2,500 nongovernmental organizations have been formed in response to environmental concerns. Most of these organizations are located in urban areas with more educated and wealthier activists who are quickly learning how to “work the system” and get results.

In contrast, the most severe land-extensive environmental problems (deforestation, desertification, arable land degradation, erosion) are largely found in rural areas—especially those throughout China’s dry northern and northwestern provinces and autonomous regions. The idea of excluding economic use of forests on the basis on environmental protection is a relatively recent concept in China, where high population density historically assured that all environments were viewed largely (some would say “only”) as economic resources to be exploited. Most locations in China simply don’t have enough surplus land or a sufficient workforce to set these areas aside as “uneconomic” national parks or biopreserves. As a consequence, one of the greatest challenges in forest restoration and protection is squaring the circle between local and regional economic and environmental issues. Locally reforestation is recognized as an excellent means to moderate wind and water erosion and to moderate local microclimates while providing additional sources of income through the sale of “thinned” lumber or mature stands of trees.

All too often discussions of China’s environmental problems, including those related to forestry, lack a “human face.” Although rural residents of many areas with degraded or disappearing forest areas are not always poor, many are. In contrast to the urban residents in east and southeast China, these residents face different, and sometimes more immediate, environmental and economic challenges. They face them with fewer resources, less political capital, and arguably fewer options. Farmers and herders in these dry areas are no less capable; they comprehend that unsustainable activities conducted in the short term will have costly long-term effects both locally and regionally. Rural families understand the ecological messages promoted by the government, but hard lives make for hard choices. On the high, dry Loess Plateau farmers coerced to plant trees to satisfy corvee requirements (unpaid labor extracted by local governments) for a local reforestation drive may surreptitiously cut down these same trees under the cover of darkness only a couple years or even months later when the farmers lack fuel to boil water or provide heat. (Not boiling water to kill parasites could result in illness or even death for farmers and their children.)

When the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) got much of the old-growth forest within the Xiaoxing’an Mountains in northern Heilongjiang Province declared a national forest preserve, people had much to celebrate. Unfortunately, the logging ban supported by Beijing conspired with an essentially bankrupt local government, which previously derived most of its revenues from taxes on forest-product industries, to create a human tragedy—it surfaced far from the foreign press and the representatives of international environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were party to the ban. Protection of some of China’s last old-growth forests is important, but this decision offered little solace or fiscal support to the sixty thousand laborers in Yichun who had no work, little savings, and fewer prospects. Scott Rozelle and colleagues in 2000 estimated that the nationwide logging ban that was part of the NNFPP program will cost the government $22 billion from 2000 to 2013 to reemploy or retrain 1.2
million workers shed by the shift in forest-management priorities.

China’s major forest issues can be classified as two types: commercial forestry activities and environmental protection related to forested areas.

**Commercial Forestry Activities**

Forest land in China is owned by the state but managed by county, township, or village collectives or increasingly by individual households signing twenty- to fifty-year contracts. In contrast to the land, the actual trees can be owned by the household or, if the trees are present on the land at the time of contract, are jointly owned in proportional terms by the farm household and the collective. The radically different ownership and incentive systems of the commune era (from approximately 1951 to 1976) and the reform era (from 1978 on) have left a great deal of uncertainty in the commercial forest sector that is slowly being worked out. Policies related to forestry and agro-forestry (cultivating both field crops and trees) vary dramatically by location. Crop land can be planted and harvested each year so that usufruct contracts (that ensure the legal right to use the land while the state owns it) and land transfer issues are less complicated than for forestry. Highest value trees take decades to mature, so those contract periods extend longer than for cropland, and the potential debt burden on farmers can be greater. Credit for the household can be hard to find in some areas and easily available in others. In some places seedlings are free, and fertilizer is subsidized. In Jiangsu Province a farmer willing to grow trees gets a generous stipend from the local government beyond free inputs—just so the county or township can meet its reforestation quota.

China is a major importer of forest products, particularly roundwood, plywood, and particleboard, but also exports equally significant volumes of wood-based finished products such as furniture, household products, wood and bamboo flooring, paper, and related materials. In 2006 imports of wood, wood products, paper, and paper products including paper pulp were valued at $18.4 billion, but exports were $16.8 billion; thus, imports outpaced exports by only 8.7 percent. Plywood, particleboard, and other construction-lumber imports are significant in China’s market where the domestic quality of such goods remains inferior to those of major exporters such as Canada and the United States. As more of China’s forests in the northeast are protected or limited by production quotas required by environmental regulations, many factories in Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces were closed, but wood is now purchased from nearby Russia, a nation lacking these strict regulations.

The fastest growth has occurred in labor-intensive forest products (natural rubber, pine resin, lacquer, walnuts), the harvesting of which China’s massive rural workforce affords comparative advantage. Perhaps the most important recent trend is China’s growing role as a major importer of lumber, often high-end hardwoods, from the forest-rich nations of Southeast Asia. Natural-wood exports to China from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have grown exponentially in the last quarter century and raised prices significantly for these products. Much of this high-quality wood is re-exported as increasingly high-end furniture. The growth in the wood-products trade mirrors increases trade in many products between China and near neighbors.

**Environmental Protection Related to Forested Areas**

Activities related to environmental and ecological protection of forested areas could be grouped into two macrocategories: protection of existing forested areas and reforestation of degraded areas, particularly those in ecologically sensitive environments. Progress has been made in both areas, not only in terms of increases in protected or replanted areas but also in terms of technical support provided from the nation’s network of forestry universities, agricultural universities, and ecological research institutes associated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. More than seven hundred experimental or approved national ecological demonstration zones are charged with developing appropriate cultivation techniques and the mass production of appropriate tree species. Legislation protecting existing natural forests has also been expanded, and prosecution of violators has increased. Geographically, efforts to protect existing forests has benefited the tropical and semitropical forests of southwest China, including Sichuan Province, the Tibet-Qinghai Plateau,
the high-elevation boreal forests of far northwest China’s Altai and Tian Mountains, and the boreal forests of the northeast (Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces).

In 2006 China had 2,395 nature reserves, accounting for 15 percent of the country’s total area. In 1997, only 7.64 percent of the country’s total area was protected. Of course, not all of these areas are forested, but aside from some coastal reserves, virtually all of these reserves have significant portions in forests. The rapid increase in protected areas represents the government commitment to environmental protection of forests and grasslands. Much remains to be done because the majority of protected areas are in the west. Of the 151.5 million hectares protected nationwide, 65 percent are located in Tibet, Qinghai Province, Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and Inner Mongolia.

Reforestation of degraded forest areas has received the lion’s share of both attention and investment. Reforestation is complex, and again, even after extensive work and investment, it can fail. Areas are sometimes reforested two or three times as natural disasters (particularly droughts) render efforts inconsequential.

From 2000 to 2006 38 million hectares of forests were planted or replanted. This represents 13.3 percent of China’s total area of forested land (of 285 million hectares). Most of these forests are planted by hand—often through corvee requirements. Of particular interest are the 4.5 million hectares planted by air. Aerial planting in China dates back to the early 1950s. Of the total area reforested, 69.3 percent is classified as protected forests.

In partial contrast to the efforts to protect China’s remaining natural forests, a significant portion of which is in southwest China, much of the nation’s reforestation effort is centered on a wide band across northern China. Halting the spread of western and northern deserts, creating windbreaks on the great plains of northeast China, or reforesting land foolishly brought under cultivation during the first three decades of “new” China in Inner

A Chinese village amidst forested mountains. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Mongolia or Gansu require more than the enforcement of regulations, the fining of violators, or the closing of illegal operations.

Positive Signs

China’s rapid economic growth resulted in environmental damage of many types. The nation’s forests did not escape this damage. Still, because of the paramount attention that forest protection and sustainable forestry have received in China, progress is being made in many areas, including the protection of natural forests, the reforestation of degraded or historic forest areas, and the development of a modern commercial forestry sector. The revenues from China’s unprecedented economic growth are now increasingly used to pay for efforts to mitigate the environmental destruction of the past. This good news seems to be an overlooked aspect of foreign assessments of China’s recent environmental history. China’s forest sector, although still facing challenges, has been the recipient of massive government investment and efforts by thousands of researchers, extension personnel, rural government agencies, and officials. Far more has been achieved than most could have imagined in the mid-1980s.

Gregory VEECK

Further Reading


48 Group Club
Sishǐ-bājiā Jítuán 四十八家集团

The 48 Group refers to a collection of individuals and companies that, beginning in the 1950s, were among the first British firms to do business in the newly formed People’s Republic of China. The “Club” of the name was added in 1991 after a merger with the Sino-British Trade Council.

The seed of the 48 Group Club was planted in 1953 by a group of British businesspeople who, along with then-premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), became known as the “Icebreakers” after a trip to China during which they discussed trade. Recognizing that it would be dangerous to isolate or try to ignore a great power such as China because of ideological differences between East and West, they defied the prevailing Western view of China during the Cold War by making business contacts in communist China.

In 1950 the United Kingdom was one of the first foreign states to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but relations quickly turned hostile because of the war in Korea. In 1951 the United Kingdom joined in a U.S.-led embargo on the sale to China of goods of strategic importance. In 1952 Lord Boyd-Orr (1880–1971), the first director of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, stated publicly that the Iron Curtain and the Bamboo Curtain would be less dangerous if the various sides engaged in trade with each other.

For their part, Chinese business and trade leaders, led by Zhou Enlai, were seeking better trade relations with the West. It was Zhou who coined the phrase “Equality and mutual benefit” as part of the Five Principles of cooperation with the outside world while on a diplomatic tour of India and Burma (Myanmar). The phrase would eventually become the mission statement for the 48 Group. At the time, however, geopolitical discussion was dominated by the Cold War, and top Western and Chinese leaders were withdrawing from each other. Zhou and Lord Boyd-Orr foresaw that such isolation would lead to weaker relations and instability.

The Icebreakers

In 1953 Lord Boyd-Orr formed the British Council for the Promotion of International Trade, and with this group took sixteen representatives of British companies to China to discuss trade. Zhou welcomed the meetings and encouraged more dialogue between representatives of both nations. For their initial efforts both abroad and at home, Zhou, Boyd-Orr, and the business leaders involved, including textiles tycoon Jack Perry, became known as the Icebreakers. The first meeting in 1953 was known as the Icebreaker Mission.

At home the Icebreakers lobbied and pressured the British government to lift trade restrictions with and the embargo on China that had been in place since the beginning of the Cold War. At first the government was unresponsive, but eventually it moved to reclassify certain items that had been categorized as goods of strategic importance, leading to more freedom for trade. These small victories came slowly, but they led to wider support...
among the British business community; in 1954 a delegation of forty-eight companies established a formal trading relationship between the two nations. Members of the delegation, led by Jack Perry, became the first Westerners to do business with the newly minted People’s Republic of China, setting the stage for a relationship based on trade and mutual respect.

**Bilateral Connections**

Throughout the 1960s the group facilitated meetings between single-industry representatives—such as mining equipment producers, construction companies, and port installers—and officials from the Chinese government, providing the group with unprecedented connections within the Communist Party politburo. One of the group’s biggest supporters, besides Zhou Enlai, was Bo Yibo, then chairman of China’s Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

When Mao Zedong initiated the Cultural Revolution in 1966, leaders within the party, including the infamous Gang of Four, were leery of foreign involvement in the PRC. But there were deep disagreements within the leadership about trade policies and openness to the West. Despite this turmoil, the 48 Group maintained contact with the Chinese leadership that was sympathetic to normalized relations. Because of this, the 48 Group in 1970 was the first organization to be invited back to China after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution dissipated.

The relationship between China and the West began to thaw following the diplomatic efforts made in the early 1970s, and because of its strategic relationships maintained over the traumatic years, the 48 Group came to the forefront of foreign business relations with China. Without official ties to the British government and with its mission to support British industry, the group was able to keep its agenda relevant and flexible to China’s changing needs. China had a plan to modernize, so it was important for the group to focus on China’s requirements by introducing specific strategies, technologies, and products timely and effectively. The group sponsored bilateral exchanges, forums, and other programs giving British and Chinese companies that attended these gatherings an edge in winning business contracts within the two nations, and ensuring customer satisfaction, trust, and quality. The small number of importers that were part of the group was just as active as the exporters were and gave China a chance to earn hard currency with which to buy further British goods. A virtuous circle was created, and for many years Britain led the trade with China among Western countries. At the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration in 1978, the 48 Group was recognized as the most potent force in bilateral trade and cooperation between China and the United Kingdom.

Due to Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, China became more open to foreign investment and influence, resulting in an explosion of interest from the outside world. Once again the 48 Group, despite the new competition and other significant challenges, had a major role in signing agreements with city and provincial governments in China, engaging with business groups, and bolstering cooperation through a variety of other initiatives. In 1985 and 1988 the group established offices in Beijing and Shanghai to maintain a permanent presence in China.

**The Group Becomes a Club**

In the late 1980s, encouraged by the British Department of Trade and Industry, the group began to explore a merger with the Sino-British Trade Council, which had been operating as an area advisory group to the Overseas Trade Board. In 1991 the two organizations merged to form the China-Britain Trade Group, now known as the China-Britain Business Council, which is now the leading U.K. organization dedicated to helping British companies that do business in China.

The 48 Group Club was formed at the merger, taking on the networking and social functions of the 48 Group, just as the new organization took on its trade functions. The club continues its efforts at strengthening Sino-British ties through its network of guanxi (connections) and by using its reputation as a long-standing and highly respected organization dedicated to trade with China. The club continues to grow in size and influence, and the involvement of young business people from both China and the United Kingdom ensures the continuation of the organization.

China’s president Hu Jintao in 2005 renewed the Ice-breaker mission for the twenty-first century, citing the
need to address the cultural differences between China and the rest of the world. He said that China has a massive trade surplus but a vast cultural deficit. The 48 Group Club’s mission is to decrease that deficit.

Further Reading


The Song dynasty scholar Zhu Xi streamlined Confucian education by compiling the Four Books: Mencius, Analects, Great Learning, and Centrality and Commonality. These texts influenced Chinese culture more than any other classics during the last six centuries of the dynastic period.

The great Song dynasty (960–1279) synthesizer of neo-Confucianism, Zhu Xi (1130–1200 CE), standardized educational methods by compiling what came to be known as the “Four Books.” Before Zhu Xi, Confucian education had concentrated on the Five Classics: the books of History, Poetry, Changes, Rites, and the Spring and Autumn Annals, supplemented by the Mencius, Analects, Xunzi, Chunqiu fanlu by Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE), and other texts such as the Classic on Filial Piety and Ceremonies and Rites (Yili). Zhu Xi streamlined the educational process with the Four Books: Mencius, Analects, Great Learning (Daxue), and Centrality and Commonality (Zhongyong, often misinterpreted as the Doctrine of the Mean). The latter two were extracted from Rites.

Zhu Xi wrote commentaries on these four books, reinterpreting them in the light of his syncretic approach, and used them as the foundation of his social, moral, and political philosophy. His innovation had a lasting influence on Confucian education and Chinese bureaucracy in that the Four Books were the basis of China’s civil service examinations from 1313 to 1905, when the examinations were abolished. Zhu Xi, by emphasizing the Four Books, removed many Daoist and Buddhist tendencies from neo-Confucianism. It is no exaggeration to state that the Four Books influenced Chinese culture more than any other classics during the last six hundred years of the dynastic period.

The Mencius describes the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Mencius and expands Confucius’s ideas, stressing the inner quality of the virtues and advocating humanitarian rulership. The Analects contains the teachings of Confucius and advocates moral self-cultivation and rulership based on virtue. The Great Learning explains the chain reaction that starts with the “investigation of things,” beginning a process of moral cultivation that regulates the family, brings order to the state, and ultimately creates peace on Earth. Centrality and Commonality is usually mistranslated as the Doctrine of the Mean, which incorrectly implies that the work is similar to the Greek philosopher Aristotle’s Golden Mean or the Buddha’s Middle Way. However, whereas Aristotle sought a balance between extremes, and the Buddha proposed a way to eliminate extremes, the Confucian concept of centrality is defined as the natural condition “before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy come forth.”

James D. SELLMANN

Further Reading


Fubing System

Fűbing 府兵

Fubing 府兵 was the primary military institution that evolved during the Western Wei dynasty (535–556 CE) and developed and declined from the 540s to the 740s. The dismantlement of the fubing system in the 740s effectively decentralized the military and provided opportunities for career militarists to challenge and undermine the authority of the central government.

Until the early eighth century men considered admission to the fubing to be an honor, and wealthy families were given priority in the recruitments that occurred every three years. The fubing system integrated soldiers into the agricultural population and made the military self-supporting and cost-effective. The militia men, twenty to sixty years old, had permanent status as farmer-soldiers. In times of peace they cultivated their land in the growing seasons, and in the winter months they went on rotational tours to the capitals and frontiers. In return for the extra land allocation and exemption from taxes and corvee (unpaid labor due to the state), they were not paid a salary and had to supply their own food, weapons, and horses.

The Tang dynasty had 634 garrison units, each with 800–1,200 farmer-soldiers. Two-thirds of these men had rotational duties in the capitals, Chang’an, Luoyang, and Taiyuan; the remainder had three-year postings at the frontiers. These units could also be turned into expeditionary forces. The fubing system began to decline in the late seventh century when the uneven burden of services and shortage of land for allocation turned away potential recruits. The move toward a professionalized army began in the 670s with ad hoc recruits and more troops placed directly under military governors. In 695 Empress Wu (reigned 690–705 CE) promoted the examination system in search of new blood from prominent families, who then found serving as officers in the fubing system less appealing than before. By 749 the administration of Emperor Xuanzong (reigned 712–756 CE) had completely dismantled the fubing system and replaced it with a professional army of career soldiers and officers. These reforms benefited
frontier military governors such as An Lushan, but they put the Tang government at risk of rebellion. In the 750s Tang China's professionalized army had the same number of soldiers as the fubing system, but the costs soared and burdened the central government, which now paid the salaries, food, and equipment of all the soldiers. The dismantlement of the fubing system effectively decentralized the military and provided opportunities for career militarists to challenge and undermine the authority of the central government, leading to rebellion and crisis.

Jennifer W. JAY

Further Reading

A mountain of knives and a sea of fire.
刀山火海
Dào shān huǒ hǎi
Fudan University

Fudan Dàxué 复旦大学

Shanghai’s Fudan University (Fudan Daxue), founded in 1905 as the Fudan Public School, is one of China’s most prestigious universities. As of 2007 the university comprised 17 schools with 70 departments and enrolled well over 40,000 fulltime degree candidates at the bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral levels, with an additional 15,000 students in schools of continuing and online education.

Fudan University (Fudan Daxue), established in Shanghai as Fudan Public School in 1905, is one of China’s most prestigious comprehensive universities. Fudan’s founder, Ma Xiangbo (1840–1939), an educator from a prominent Catholic family, alluded through the institution’s classical name, roughly translated as “constant heavenly light,” to hopes for a school directed by clarity of vision and inexhaustible self-reliance. These hopes are echoed in aims for Fudan’s contemporary development, summarized in the motto, “Rich in knowledge, tenacious in purpose, inquiring with earnestness, reflecting with self-practice.”

In 1917 Fudan Public School established undergraduate programs and was renamed Fudan University. At the onset of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Fudan was offering courses of study in the arts, sciences, law, and business, in addition to precollege education, and was temporarily relocated to the inland city of Chongqing, like many of China’s postsecondary institutions would be during World War II. The university was nationalized by the republican government in 1941 and moved back to Shanghai in 1946.

At the request of Chen Wangdao (1891–1977), Fudan’s first post-1949 president, Chairman Mao Zedong contributed the calligraphic rendering of “Fudan University” that is today featured on official university plaques and stationary. When China’s institutions of higher learning underwent major reorganization in 1952, Fudan lost its applied professional schools of law, business, and agriculture. At the same time, Fudan’s academic reputation was enhanced by the merger into its faculties of arts and sciences a number of departments and distinguished scholars from ten other universities. Following national reforms in 1978, Fudan restored its professional schools, including business and law.

Mirroring a decade of global reforms in higher education, Fudan has sought to strengthen its basic research and teaching capacities, as well as promote innovation in interdisciplinary and international education. Fudan was selected to participate in China’s 211 Project and Project 985, both of which were national initiatives to enhance the quality and international competitiveness of higher education institutions. In 2000 Shanghai Medical University merged with Fudan, adding for the first time a college of medical science to Fudan’s stable of professional schools.

As of 2007 Fudan consists of 17 schools with nearly 70 departments, 226 research centers and institutes, and 30 key laboratories. Fudan’s most prestigious academic specializations include philosophy, theoretical economics, Chinese language and literature, journalism, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, electronic science and technology,
basic medicine, and integrated traditional and Western medicine. The university has an enrollment of well over 40,000 fulltime degree candidates at the bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral levels, and an additional 15,000 students in schools of continuing and online education. Fudan has more than 2,300 fulltime faculty members and researchers, and significant global outreach with alumni from more than a hundred countries and regions. Fudan works collaboratively with a number of leading universities and is a member of Universitas 21, an international network of twenty leading research universities in twelve countries.

Heidi ROSS & Yuhao CEN

Further Reading


Fujian Province
Fújiàn Shěng　福建 省
35.81 million est. 2007 pop. 　120,000 square km

Fujian, a southern coastal province the size of the state of Pennsylvania, has a rich tradition of international trade and a large flow of migration to Southeast Asia. The province has experienced economic ups and downs, but since 1978 the development of light industry and an increase in investments from overseas Chinese has resulted in a period of huge growth.

Like Guangdong Province, Fujian Province in recent years has played a key role in the economic transformation of China. Its geography and location, its long relationships with other countries and territories, and its tradition of commerce have given it an advantage in China’s economic reform and development processes.

Fujian is a southern coastal province that is endowed with a subtropical climate. Its geography is a study in contrasts—a limited coastal area with ports of different sizes and a mountainous and hilly inland area where communication has always been difficult. Fujian’s limited cultivated land and the demographic pressures that this limitation presents have stimulated emigration, especially from its southern region, from where the Minnan and the Hakka people have fled to Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Although the Hakka and the Minnan are the dominant ethnicities and dialects of Fujian, more than ten dialects are currently spoken in the province because of its traditionally weak communications network.

Not unexpectedly, migration also has stimulated trade. As early as the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), vessels from as far as the Middle East visited Quanzhou, one of Fujian’s port cities, making the province an important center for international trade and hastening its economic development.

The first blow to this development came during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) with the “closure” of China and the prohibition of international trade. However, “the ban simply reduced to smugglers and pirates all sea-going merchants, of whom there were many” (Faure 1996, 7). The conquest of Taiwan by Koxinga, a Japanese-Chinese Ming loyalist from Fujian, during the mid-seventeenth century also had a negative impact on trade. During the nineteenth century Fujian greatly suffered from war and lost its importance in maritime trade.

The Communist victory in 1949 marginalized Fujian further. Because of its connections with and proximity to Taiwan, Fujian was considered by Beijing to be politically unreliable. The Communist leadership also feared a military attack from Taiwan, a fear justified by the bombing of the Fujian coast during the early years of Communist rule. Consequently, the province was denied major investment opportunities throughout the Maoist era, while it had to support a predatory army. These two factors were damageable to the Fujian economy because it was traditionally based on light industry and trade, while Maoist policies emphasized the development of rice cultivation.
and heavy industry. As a result, by 1978 Fujian had become one of the poorest provinces in China.

The 1978 economic reforms signaled the renewal of prosperity for Fujian. Once more it could capitalize on its connections with the outside world (including, since the end of the 1980s, Taiwan), and it received huge donations and investments from overseas Chinese. Beijing recognized Fujian’s potential to attract foreign direct investment and created the special economic zone of Xiamen, in the south of the province, in 1980.

These policies also gave more emphasis to light industries, which, along with Fujian’s attraction of foreign investment, allowed the province to become a major producer and exporter of sport shoes, garments, and so forth.

Finally, the reforms that occurred in the countryside at the national level also benefited Fujian, which made use of its comparative advantages: Its status as a major producer of tropical fruits and tea—notably oolong tea from Anxi County, which has become world famous—was re-emphasized. Fujian, despite its limited size and population, was China’s sixth-largest exporter and recipient of foreign direct investment in 2006. With a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of RMB 21,471 (US$2,683.88), Fujian ranked ninth among all provinces.

Louis AUGUSTIN-JEAN

Further Reading


Since 300 BCE betting on dice and other games of luck or fortune have been part of China’s historical record. Gambling is now illegal in on the mainland but permitted in Macao, where Chinese casino visitors drive the region’s economy.

In 2001 the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR) liberalized the Macao casino industry, issuing three gaming concessions to local and international operators and ending the forty-year-old casino monopoly by the Sociedade de Turismo e Diversoes de Macao (STDM). Under the monopoly market, STDM generated $2.32 billion gross revenue from eleven casinos in 2001, which accounted for approximately 60 percent of Macao’s gross domestic product. Since the liberalization, several new casinos have opened, including Venetian Macao, MGM Grand Macao, and Wynn Macao, all run by U.S. companies. STDM has also opened and renovated several casinos. Several other casino hotels and resorts are due to open in the near future.

Individual Visit Scheme

In the summer of 2003, China introduced the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) to encourage individual mainland Chinese citizens in designated cities to visit Hong Kong and Macao. (Prior to the IVS, people who wanted to travel to these destinations had to be part of a tour group.) As of 2008, 270 million mainland Chinese in forty-nine cities were qualified to travel to Macao as individual visitors. In 2007 Macao, which has a local population of just 500,000 residents, welcomed a record number of 14.9 million mainland Chinese visitors. According to observers, approximately 70 percent to 80 percent of Macao’s casino visitors come from mainland China although they account for about 55 percent of the total tourist arrivals.

Macao’s casino gaming revenue increased from $3.8 billion in 2003 to $10.5 billion in 2007. Although Macao is only one-fifth the size of Las Vegas in land area, it has about five times the number of gaming tables but only about 9 percent of the number of slot machines of the Las Vegas Strip. By 2006 Macao had surpassed the Las Vegas Strip as the top gaming revenue producer in the world, with $7.2 billion in gaming revenue. Analysts have predicted that Macao’s gaming revenue will reach $16 billion by 2012. Gaming taxes have contributed to more than 70 percent of the SAR government’s revenue.

The Chinese and Gambling

Chinese historical records on betting with dice and on Chinese chess matches date back to around 300 BCE. The demand for casino games is embedded in the Chinese culture, which has deep-rooted beliefs in luck and the pursuit of good luck. As one casino industry practitioner in Macao put it, “Basically, all Chinese have the gambling gene.”

These days baccarat is the most popular game. In some VIP rooms in Macao’s casinos, baccarat tables allow a bet of $250,000 per hand, whereas in Las Vegas a $150,000
maximum bet is considered extraordinary. In the United States and many other jurisdictions, the denominations of the chips are differentiated by color, but in Macao the higher the denomination, the larger the chips in physical size, which makes it possible for the mostly Chinese patrons to show off their wealth and ability to play.

Popular as casino gaming is among the Chinese, it is illegal in mainland China partly because of the conflict between the very nature of gambling and the ideology of communism, which encourages the sharing of resources and engagement in productive activities. Given the opportunity, however, the Chinese will gamble. Researchers have estimated that Chinese visitors spent $72 billion in foreign casinos in 2004.

Macao's Hotel Industry

Macao’s hotels have benefited less from the newly mobile and better-off mainland Chinese visitor than its casinos have. The annual average occupancy rate for 2007 was 77 percent (as compared with the more than 90 percent occupancy rate that hotels in Las Vegas enjoy), with an average daily rate of less than $90. The occupancy rate for five-star hotels, however, increased from 68 percent in 2006 to 75 percent in 2007 in spite of the opening of three large new hotels. Occupancy was highest at four-star hotels, at 84 percent. Given that the average length of stay among all visitors was only 1.1 days and that 52 percent of Macao's visitors are classified as same-day visitors, the occupancy rate is not surprising. Mainland Chinese visitors have a slightly longer length of stay (1.3 days), but they tend to stay in three- or four-star hotels and use at the gaming tables what they save on accommodations.

Macao’s gaming industry boom has also benefited Zhuhai, which is just across the border from Macao. Many of the 50 percent of mainland visitors to Macao who do not spend the night there choose to stay in Zhuhai, where accommodations are cheaper. Macao’s residents now earning higher income due to casino and related industry development are more likely to visit Zhuhai for shopping, dining, and entertainment.

An outdoor card game.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOULD COHEN.
Looking Ahead

Mainland Chinese visitors will continue to be important for Macao’s casinos and other tourism businesses, and gaming and tourism will continue to drive Macao’s overall economic development. But the Chinese central government’s policy toward Macao (e.g., expansion or contraction of the IVS) will determine the pace of its gaming and tourism development. Putting policy aside, proper tourism planning, infrastructure development, and human resources preparation will be of tremendous importance to Macao’s economic sustainability moving forward.

Cathy H. C. HSU

Further reading

The Gang of Four (siren bang 四人帮) is the name given to the four most influential supporters of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), namely Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, and Jiang Qing. Their arrest in 1976 represented the end of the Cultural Revolution, according to the Chinese Communist Party’s version of history.

The Gang of Four (siren bang 四人帮), the epithet given to the four most influential, and notorious, supporters of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), included three men, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen, and one woman, Jiang Qing. According to the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) version of history since the early 1980s, the arrest and overthrow of the Gang of Four on 6 October 1976 signaled the end of the Cultural Revolution.

The Gang

Zhang Chunqiao (1917–2005) was a noted radical ideologue. He was born in Shandong province in northeastern China. Zhang joined the CCP in 1940 and fought against the Japanese in 1942 and 1943. After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, he moved to Shanghai and became a radical writer and party propagandist. In January 1967—with the help of the other members of the Gang of Four—he seized control of the local party organization and established the Shanghai People’s Commune, which was modeled on the 1871 Paris Commune. Although the commune was short-lived, Zhang’s actions helped fan the flames of the Cultural Revolution.

In 1969 Zhang was elected to the CPC Politburo. In January 1971 he was appointed Shanghai party leader. And in 1975 he became vice premier and chief political commissar of the People’s Liberation Army. With his new position and power, he began to organize people’s militias, planning eventually to seize power on Mao’s death and to install himself as premier and Jiang Qing as party chairman.

Yao Wenyuan (1931–2005) was born near Shanghai. He became a radical journalist and a dedicated ultra-leftist who believed in Mao’s theory of perpetual revolution. Yao rapidly rose to prominence. In November 1965, he wrote an article that attacked the play The Dismissal of Hai Rui (Hai Rui baguan) as hostile to the Chinese Communist Party and to Mao. At the time Yao’s article was credited with launching the earliest stage of the Cultural Revolution. (The play was written Wu Han, a noted historian and then deputy mayor of Beijing and first published in January 1961. The play tells the story of the good and honest Hai Rui, a Ming official who was vilified for criticizing the emperor’s poor treatment of the people. Wu Han died in prison in 1969.)

Wang Hongwen (1935–1992) was born in Changchun, Liaoning Province, in northeastern China. He joined the CCP and the Chinese People’s Volunteers around 1950 and fought in the Korean War. In 1956 he moved to Shanghai and worked in a textile mill. He also became politically active in the left wing of the local CCP organization and
formed alliances with the future members of the gang. In 1967 Wang served as vice chair of the Revolutionary Committee of the Shanghai People’s Commune. In 1969 he was appointed to the CCP national Central Committee. In 1971 he became Shanghai municipality party leader. And in 1973 he was inducted into the CCP Politburo’s Standing Committee, and Mao made him vice chair of the CCP.

Jiang Qing (1914-1991) was the leader of the Gang of Four and its best-known member. She was born Li Shumeng in Zhucheng, Shandong Province. In the early 1930s she launched a career in acting and appeared in numerous plays and Chinese films. She took the stage name Lan Ping (Blue Apple). Also about that time she joined the CCP. She belonged to several groups that adapted the revolutionary Soviet model of art and literature. Her radical political activities often got her into trouble, and she was jailed several times in the 1930s. (Many of the facts of her life at this time have been expunged from official records.) In 1939 she married Mao, her fourth husband. From then until 1966, she remained in the background of Chinese political affairs.

Even before the Cultural Revolution started she had begun replacing traditional Chinese art with revolutionary art and reforming the Chinese theater, supervising the creation of the “revolutionary model dramas.” Mao appointed her deputy director of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. She used her influence to incite the Red Guards against government officials, senior party members, and old-school intellectuals. From 1969 to 1976, she also served as one of the most powerful members of the CCP Politburo.

The Plot

Sometime in 1975 or 1976, the Gang of Four launched a plot to seize control of China and the Communist Party...
following Mao’s death, with Jiang succeeding Mao as party leader. There was much unrest and plotting within the government at that time, and the term *gang of four* came to be associated with small cliques that isolated themselves from the government. It is said that Mao himself coined the term. It was first used publicly in a speech by Beijing CCP first secretary Wu De (1910–1995) on 24 October 1976 to an enormous crowd in Tiananmen Square. After Wu’s speech, the term was widely used in China.

Following the death of Mao in 1976, the Gang of Four staged its coup. It failed, and all four members were arrested. The CCP Central Committee dismissed all four from their posts, accusing them of being “bourgeois careerists, conspirators, and counterrevolutionary double-dealers.” A power struggle between radical and conservative factions within the party followed. Deng Xiaoping eventually came to power. The four were accused of treason and blamed for virtually all the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

### The Trial

The members of the Gang of Four were tried by a special court toward the end of 1980. They were accused of a range of crimes, especially of persecuting large numbers of people, including CCP and state leaders. Jiang Qing was most vocal in her own defense, arguing that she was simply carrying out Mao’s wishes. Despite this, all four were convicted. Actually, she was right in the sense that none of the four could have done what they did without Mao’s support, and it was he, not they, who led the Cultural Revolution. But the Chinese government went to considerable lengths to clear Mao of any criminal motivation or action, instead laying blame on the gang.

### The Outcome


*Colin MACKERRAS*

### Further Reading

Gansu Province

Gānsù Shěnɡ 甘肃省

26.17 million est. 2007 pop. 454,000 square km

Gansu is a northern province about the size of the state of California; it was an important stage on the Silk Roads. Agricultural products include tobacco, millet, wheat, and fruit; manufactured products include heavy machinery, petrochemicals, and nonferrous metals. The western end of the Great Wall is in Gansu.

Gansu (Kansu) Province is located in northern China at the upper reaches of the Huang (Yellow) River. On the west the province borders on Qinghai and Xinjiang provinces, on the north on Mongolia, on the east on Ningxia and Shaanxi provinces, and on the south on Sichuan Province. Gansu covers an area of 454,000 square kilometers and is divided into three topographical regions.

The western region composes part of the Gobi Desert and the so-called Gansu corridor, a passage more than 1,000 kilometers long but only 50 to 70 kilometers wide east to west between the Tibetan Plateau in the south and the Gobi Desert in the north. The Gansu corridor was an important part of the ancient Silk Roads, and agriculture in the oases there depend on the glacial streams from the Tibetan Plateau. The main crops are wheat, sugar beets,
and cotton. The central region, with its extremely eroded terrain, is part of the great Loess Plateau (an area of unstratified loamy deposit believed to be chiefly deposited by the wind) of northern China, parts of which are the poorest districts in China. The southern region is a mountainous earthquake zone rising between 2,000 and 4,000 meters above sea level.

About 90 percent of Gansu’s population are Han Chinese. The remaining 10 percent are distributed among a number of minority nationalities who are either Muslims or who belong to Tibetan religions. The capital of the province, Lanzhou (2007 population 3.29 million), is situated in the rich agricultural area of the Huang River valley in the central region.

Gansu has been under Chinese control and influence on and off since the third century BCE and always has played an important role in trade between central Asia and China. When China was strong, Gansu constituted
the western frontier of China, and the Great Wall ends there. During the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) Gansu became part of the empire along with Xinjiang and Qinghai provinces. The suppression of a Muslim rebellion in 1862–1878 almost devastated the area, and in 1928 Xinjiang and Qinghai became independent provinces. The borders of Gansu changed several times during the twentieth century, and in 1958 a large part was cut out to become Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.

In the fertile river valley of the central region agricultural products such as tobacco, melons, millet, wheat, and fruit dominate. Gansu’s highly polluted industrial center, which is concentrated in and around Lanzhou, manufactures heavy machinery, petrochemical products, and nonferrous metals.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading
Gardens

Yuánlín 园林

The Chinese garden is an expression of nature in a prescribed framework. Gardens are considered venues for spiritual and artistic endeavors, sites for celebrations, and works of art. The history of Chinese gardens is complex and divergent, and it is important to understand not only the design principles but also the spiritual basis of their construction.

Two main garden traditions in China have evolved over time: the vast imperial gardens, symbolic of the power and wealth of the empire, and the scholar, or literati, gardens, built as retreats from the stuffy world of officialdom. The earliest references to gardens in China are found in Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) records describing vast tracts of land reserved for hunting parks for kings and princes. Success in the hunt was a metaphor for a successful reign. Later, in the Chu ci (Songs of Chu), a fourth-century BCE text, a shaman singer attempts to entice the soul of a dying king back to life with a description of the beauties of a garden with winding streams, lotus lakes, and distant views of the mountains. In the Shanglin park of China’s first emperor Zheng (Shi Huang Di, 259–210 BCE), were countless animals, birds, and exotic plants gathered as tribute from vassal states, thus creating a living replica of his entire domain. Poets such as the famed Tao Yuanming (365–427) recorded in verse the pleasures of strolling through one’s garden. Both the Sui (581–618 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties saw the further development of imperial and individual gardens. Wang Wei (699–759 CE) created his Wangchuan villa in Lantian County, Shaanxi, a rustic retreat immortalized in poetry and paintings for centuries as the epitome of the scholar’s retreat.

The Song dynasty (960–1279) gave rise to the proliferation of urban literati gardens. At Kaifeng, Song Huizong (1082–1135) erected the Gen Yue mountain, an artificial construct approximately 77 meters tall that contained many famous garden rocks. Khubilai Khan (1214–1294) of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) built at Beijing an extravagant city complete with lakes and hunting parks. The subsequent Ming dynasty (1368–1644) revised and embellished the Forbidden City with many courtyards and gardens and developed the Park of the Sea Palaces, a vast complex of gardens and retreats for the imperial family. The most famous of the gardens of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was the imperial Yuan Ming Yuan, commissioned by the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799), within which precincts were countless watercourses, pavilions, libraries, farms, training fields for his soldiers, and European-style fountains and buildings.

Cosmology of the Chinese Garden

The unique character of the Chinese garden has its roots in Chinese philosophy, most notably in Daoism. A garden was seen as a mirror of the natural world. Everything in the universe was created from and a conduit for qi, vital energy, or life force. The universe was understood to be a combination of yin (female) and yang (male) elements in...
a state of constant fluidity. A balance of opposites in the construction of buildings, natural features, and plantings was a goal of the garden designer. Re-creating the natural world in a garden was thought to replicate the benefits of immersing oneself in nature, a similar belief to that of the benefits of landscape painting. Scholars whose official duties prevented them from visiting the mountains could enjoy the benefits of nature in their own gardens. The ancient practice of feng shui (literally, wind and water, often translated as geomancy) consisted of properly situating homes, buildings, graves, and gardens in a landscape to promote health, happiness, and prosperity.

Elements of the Chinese Garden

The two main elements of a Chinese garden are rocks and water, symbolizing the yang and yin. Traditional Chinese gardens are constructed in a series of walled outdoor courtyards joined by walkways or doorways. Use of garden rocks (yang) at strategic locations within a garden brings to mind the mountain ranges and peaks of nature. Incorporation of a watercourse, pool, lake, or cascade adds the water (yin) and all its changeable forms. Plants are included for literary and cultural references, for seasonal suitability, and for aesthetic reasons, such as the beauty of their shadows against the light garden walls, or the harmony of the sound of wind and rain in their foliage. Structures such as ting (pavilions with open sides), xie (gazebos), tang (formal halls), and covered walkways make accessible the featured sites in the gardens and the effects of the changing hours of the days and seasons.

Garden structures are named with references to classical literature, and the addition of calligraphy adds another layer of appreciation to the garden. Potted plants are often placed in courtyards at the peak of their blooming seasons, and pools and lakes house water lilies, lotus, and fish. Gardens also include rockeries constructed of aggregates of bizarrely shaped rocks made into miniature mountains or roofs for artificial caves, both symbolic of the entrance to the realms of immortals and useful as an escape from the heat of summer.

Yuan Ye (The Craft of Gardens, datable to 1631–1634), written during the late Ming dynasty by Ji Cheng (late sixteenth-early seventeenth century) is considered the classic text on garden design. Encompassing both practical and aesthetic advice, the manual advises the garden designer to be sensitive to the proper use of contrasts and juxtapositions of elements and to seek the essence lying behind the forms. Details concerning window lattice patterns, doors, wall openings, brickwork for paths, and suitable alignment of the garden with existing landscape features are included.

Chinese Gardens Today

Beihai Park in Beijing in the Forbidden City, which was first built in the tenth century as a hunting lodge, currently encompasses approximately 67 hectares (about 165 acres) of lakes and artificial islands. There an example of a prerevolutionary walled garden, Jing Qing Zhou (Limpid Mirror Studio), once housed the Qing dynasty princes. The West Lake in Yangzhou had its origins in the Sui and

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Tang dynasties. Suzhou’s gardens include the Shizi Lin (Stone Lion Grove), built around 1336 for the Buddhist monk Tian Ru, and the Wang Shi Yuan (Garden of the Master of the Fishing Nets), first constructed in 1440.

Suzhou also contains the Zhouzheng Yuan (Garden of the Unsuccessful Politician). The Zhouzheng Yuan dates to the Tang dynasty. It has been variously a Confucian scholar’s home, a garden, a Buddhist monastery, and a warlord’s headquarters. It has changed hands many times and once was sold to pay gambling debts. It is most renowned for its association with the Ming artist Wen Zhengming (1470–1559), who lived there for a time and recorded it in paintings. Wen Zhengming, a Wu School artist and one of the so-called four masters of the Ming, was an unsuccessful politician who, after many failed attempts at success in the imperial examination system, finally secured a minor post but quickly relinquished it to devote himself to artistic pursuits and teaching.

Chinese garden design has spread around the world. Many new Chinese gardens have been built in recent years in America, notably the Astor Garden Court at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City and the Chinese scholar’s garden at the Staten Island New York Botanical Garden.

Noelle O’CONNOR

Further reading
As one of the world’s longest and oldest civilizations—and the world’s most populous nation, for now—China contributed to the developing study of geography as early as the fifth century BCE. With varied terrains and climates, mighty rivers, rich natural resources, and diverse ethnic and religious groups, China continues to be a land worthy of geographical scrutiny.

China, one of the oldest continuous civilizations on Earth, consists of states and cultures dating back more than six millennia. The term China, which can be translated literally into English as “Middle Kingdom,” referred in ancient times to the Huang (Yellow) River valley. Ancient China introduced the world to a written language system that is still in use and as well to the “Four Great Inventions”: paper, printing, gunpowder, and the compass. As early as the fifth century BCE, the classic Yugong, Tribute of Yu, subdivided Chinese territory into regions, with a summary of mountains, rivers, lakes, swamps, and soils as well as major agricultural products and economic features for each region, and thus geography became one of the oldest traditional studies in China. Gradually the name China evolved to encompass the lands under the direct imperial rule of its dynasties.

As the result of the last Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), two political states now use the name China: the People’s Republic of China (PRC), commonly known as “mainland China” (the focus of this study), and the Republic of China (ROC), which comprises the island of Taiwan and its surrounding islands.

Physical Geography

China (PRC) is the world’s most populous country with more than 1.33 billion people—20.8 percent of the Earth’s population. Occupying most of East Asia, it is the world’s fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada, and the United States) with an area of about 9,600,000 square kilometers (or 3,705,405 square miles). According to official data posted on the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the Chinese territory measures some 5,500 kilometers from north to south, stretching from the center of the Heilongjiang River north of the town of Mohe (latitude 53°30′ N) to the Zengmu Reef at the southernmost tip of the Nansha Islands (latitude 4° N). From west to east, the nation extends about 5,200 km from the Pamirs (longitude 73°40′ E) to the confluence of Heilongjiang and Wusuli rivers (longitude 135°05′ E), with a time difference of over four hours. However, China has only one official time zone—Beijing time.

China’s land boundaries total 22,143 kilometers divided as such among the following countries: Afghanistan, 76; Bhutan, 470; Myanmar (Burma), 2,185; India, 3,380; Kazakhstan, 1,533; North Korea, 1,416; Kyrgyzstan, 858; Laos, 423; Mongolia, 4,673; Nepal, 1,236; Pakistan, 523; Russia (northeast), 3,605; Russia (northwest), 40; Tajikistan, 414; Vietnam, 1,281—and its two Special Regional Administrations (SARS) Hong Kong, 30; and Macao, 0.34.
Cultivation and Mineral Resources

Even though China is one of the largest lands in the world, it has only about 94.97 million ha of cultivated land, mainly in the Northeast Plain, the North China Plain, the Middle-Lower Yangzi Plain, the Pearl River Delta Plain, and the Sichuan Basin. Because China has a large population, the area of cultivated land per capita is small, less than 0.08 ha per capita, or only one third of the world’s average.

But mineral resources abound in China; the nation ranks third in the world in total reserves. As of 2000, about 153 different minerals had been confirmed in the Chinese reserves, including energy sources of coal, petroleum, natural gas, and oil shale. China’s coal reserves total 1,007.1 billion tons, mainly distributed in north China, Shanxi, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Varied Terrain

The territory of the PRC contains a large variety of landscapes. In the east, along the shores of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, lie extensive and densely populated alluvial plains, while grasslands occupy the edges of the Inner Mongolian plateau in the north. To the west, major mountain ranges (the Himalayas), and high plateaus stand out from the more arid landscapes of the Taklamakan and the Gobi Desert. In the South, the land is dominated by hill country and low mountain ranges. The Chinese coastline is about 14,500 kilometers along the East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, and South China Sea. China has more than 1,500 rivers, each draining 1,000 square kilometers or larger areas. More than 2,700 billion cubic meters of water flow along these rivers, 5.8 percent of the world’s total. Principle rivers from west to east include the Yangzi (Chang, central), the Huang (Yellow) River,
north-central), the Amur River (northeast), and Pearl River, Mekong River, and Brahmaputra River (south), with most Chinese rivers emptying into the Pacific Ocean. The largest Chinese river, the 6,300-kilometer Yangzi, is the third-longest river in the world, next only to the Nile in northeast Africa and the Amazon in South America, and has a catchment area of 1.809 million square kilometers. The Huang River is 5,464 kilometers with a catchment area of 752,000 square kilometers. But due to economic development for three decades, the Huang no longer flows to the ocean.

China’s geography is highly diverse, with hills, plains, and river deltas in the east, and deserts, high plateaus, and mountains in the west. With a broad area, China’s topography is very complex. Mountains and hilly land take up 65 percent of the total area. There are four main mountain ranges (Himalaya mountain range, Kunlun mountain range, Tanggula mountain range, and Qinling mountain range) that are more than 2,000 meters, and eight mountain peaks (Chomolungma, Godwin Austen, Lhotse, Makalu, Cho Oyu, Gasherbrum, Broad Peak, and Shishapangma) are higher than 8,000 meters above sea level.

China’s terrain descends in four steps from west to east: (1) The top of the four-step “staircase,” often called the “roof of the world,” is the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, with a height averaging more than 4,000 meters above sea level. (2) The second step, with an average elevation of between 1,000 and 2,000 meters, includes the Inner Mongolia, Loess, and Yunnan-Guizhou plateaus, and the Tarim, Junggar, and Sichuan basins. (3) The third step begins at the perimeters of the Greater Hinggan, Taihang, Wushan, and Xuefen mountain ranges and extends eastward to the coast, with an elevation of about 500 to 1,000 meters. (4) The fourth step of the staircase comprises the lands extending to the east and out into the ocean, in a continental shelf. The water here is less than 200 meters deep. The Bohai Sea, East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and South China Sea embrace the east and southeast coast.

Climate

China’s climate is equally varied, ranging from tropical in the south (Hainan) to subarctic in the northeast (Manchuria). China lies mainly in the northern temperate zone under the influence of monsoons from September and October to March and April. The monsoons blow from Siberia and the Mongolia Plateau into China and decrease in force as they move southward, causing dry and cold winters in parts of the country and a temperature difference of 40° C between the north and south. In the winter, the temperature in China is 5 to 18° C lower than that in other countries on the same latitude. In summer, monsoon winds blow into China from the ocean, bringing with them warm and wet currents and rains.

Great differences in climate are found from region to region owing to China’s extensive territory and complex topography. While the northern part of Heilongjiang Province in northeast China has no summer, Hainan Island has a long summer but not winter. The Huaihe River valley features four distinct seasons, and Yuan-Guizhou Plateau is spring-like all the year. Annual precipitation

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also varies greatly from region to region; it is as high as 1,500 millimeters along the southeastern coast and as low as 50 millimeters along the northwest, particularly the Tarim basin.

### Human Geography

Archaeological evidence suggests that the earliest humans in China date to about 2.24 million to 25,000 years ago. In Yunnan Province, "Yuanmou," lived in Yuanmou, Yunnan approximately 1.7 million years ago. "Peking Man," who lived in Zhoukoudian to the southwest of modern Beijing, has fossils dating from 300,000 to 550,000 years ago. Peking Man walked upright, made and used simple tools, and knew how to make fire. Humans in China passed from primitive society to slave society in the twentieth century BCE, with the founding of China’s first dynasty. The Xia Dynasty (2100–1766 BCE) and subsequent dynasties, the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE), saw further development of slave society. This age was followed by the Spring and Autumn (770–446 BCE) and Warring States (475–221 BCE) periods, marking the transition from the slave society to feudal society. China was one of the first countries to develop economic activity. As early as 5,000 to 6,000 years ago, people in the Huang River valley had already started farming and raising livestock. During the Shang dynasty, people learned how to smelt bronze and use iron tools. White pottery and glazed pottery were produced. Silk production was well developed, and the world’s first figured inlaid silk-weaving technique was being used.

### Geography Develops as a Study

During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States times, philosophy and other branches of scholarship were thriving, with the representatives of various schools vying with
each other in writing books to discuss politics and analyze society. Famous philosophers in this era included Laozi, Confucius, Mencius, and Sun Zi.

In the sixth century BCE the prominent Chinese philosopher Laozi (580–500 BCE) addressed the relationship between humans and nature, asserting that nature is non-human and therefore lacks a sense of will and can be treated objectively. He advised that man’s duty is merely to recognize and utilize nature with his famous saying, “use nature well and no contest.” This idea also represented the thinking of other ancient scholars, such as Mencius.

Most Chinese dynasties were based in the historical heartlands of China, known as China proper; the developing study of geography largely depended on their interest in preserving imperial history. Many dynasties also expanded into peripheral territories like Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Tibet. (China was united by the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE, possibly accounting for the root of the word China.)

In traditional China, Confucian scholars developed a systematically arranged geographical order that bolstered the imperial ideology—the concept of geography in Chinese history, or Yudi-zhixue, and chronological geography, or Yange Dili—which reached its zenith during the Qing dynasty. Yange Dili, reconstructed historical treatises sponsored by past dynasties, paying special attention to chronological descriptions of changing administrative systems, road networks, and water systems, and to the verification of the locations of key historical events and settlements. Because Yange Dili is based on the history of each Chinese dynasty, some scholars call Yange Dili the last stage of traditional Chinese historical geography.

Modern or scientific geography was not introduced in China from the West until the first two decades of the twentieth century, and it boomed in the 1930s. Scientific geography gave explanations of geographical phenomena rather than bare and tedious descriptions of facts. Among the chief founders of modern geography in China were Chang Xiang-wen (1869–1933), Zhu Kezhen (1890–1974), Ding Wenjiang (1887–1936), Weng Wenhai (1889–1971), Chang G-yun (1901–1985), and Hu Huanyong (1901–1998).

**Ethnicities**

Hundreds of ethnic groups have existed in China throughout its history. The largest ethnic group in China by far is the Han. The Han people make up 91.02 percent of the total population, leaving 8.98 percent for the other ethnicities. Over the last three millennia, many previously distinct ethnic groups in China were assimilated into a Han identity, which over time dramatically expanded the size of the Han population. However, these assimilations were usually incomplete and vestiges of indigenous language and culture often are still retained in different regions of China. According to an official report listed on Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC website, fifty-five minority ethnic groups still exist in China. They are (from large to small in terms of population): Zhuang, Manchu, Hui, Miao, Uygur, Yi, Tujia, Mongol, Tibetan, Bouyei, Dong, Yao, Korean, Bai, Hani, Li, Kazak, Dai, She, Lisu, Gelao, Lahu, Dongxiang, Va, Shui, Naxi, Qiang, Tu, Xibe, Mulam, Kirgiz, Daur, Jingpo, Salar, Blang, Maonan, Tajik, Pumi, Achang, Nu, Ewenki, Jing, Deang, Ozbek, Russian, Yugur, Bonan, Moinba, Oroqen, Drung, Tatar, Hezhen, Lhoba, Jino, and Gaoshan.

In traditional China, classical Chinese was the written standard used for thousands of years before the twentieth century and allowed for written communication between speakers of various languages and dialects in China. Vernacular Chinese, or baihua, is the written standard based on the Mandarin dialect first popularized in Ming Dynasty novels and was adopted with significant modifications during the Republic era of the twentieth century as the national vernacular. Today, most languages in China belong to the Sino-Tibetan language family, spoken by twenty-nine ethnicities. The most spoken dialects are Mandarin by over 70 percent of the population. The other major dialects are Wu (Shanghainese), Yue (Cantonese), Min, Xiang, Gan, and Hakka. Non-Sinitic languages spoken widely by ethnic minorities include Zhuang (Thai), Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur (Turkic), Hmong, and Korean.

**Religion**

China is a multireligious country, its people practicing Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Various religions exert different influences on different ethnic groups. For instance, Islam is followed by the Hui, Uygur, Kazak, Kirgiz, Tatar, Dongxiang, Salar, and Bonan nationalities, and Buddhism and Lamaism are followed by the Tibetan, Mongolian, Dai, and Yugur nationalities. Christianity is followed by the Miao, Yao, and Yi nationalities.
Modern Administrative Geography

Top-level political divisions of China have altered as administrations changed, beginning with the founding of Republican China in 1911 and throughout the People's Republic of China (1949–present). In 2008, PRC administrative geography embraces twenty-three provinces (note: the PRC considers Taiwan the twenty-third province), five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macao. Below these top levels are prefectures, subprefectures, departments, commanderies, districts, and counties. Recent divisions also include prefecture-level cities, county-level cities, towns, and townships.

In 2008, China's extensive national land and maritime boundaries are the source of international disputes with their neighbors. Land boundaries include those with India, Tajikistan, North Korea, and Russia (a section). Maritime boundaries are more complex, including Spratly (Nansha) Islands with Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei; Paracel (Xisha) Islands with Vietnam and Taiwan; and Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea with Japan and Taiwan. However, the Chinese government claims a total of 5,400 islands dotting China's vast territorial waters. According to the official website, the largest of these is Taiwan (area 36,000 square kilometers), followed by Hainan (area of 34,000 square kilometer). Diaoyu and Chiwei islands, located to the northeast of Taiwan Island, are China's easternmost islands. The many islands, islets, reefs, and shoals on the South China Sea, known collectively as the South China Sea Islands, are subdivided into the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha island groups.

The Chinese geography is unique—as the vast land with relatively little cultivated land to its feed 1.33 billion people, and as a rich culture with peoples of diverse ethnic backgrounds and religious.

GAO Boyang and Unryu SUGANUMA

Further Reading


Ginseng (Panax ginseng) is a small woodland plant indigenous to mountain forests in Asia, especially Manchuria, and is now cultivated primarily in Korea. Its root is valued for medicinal purposes, especially for its effects on the nervous system.

Ginseng (Panax ginseng; or renshen in Chinese), was discovered in Manchuria over 5,000 years ago and is indigenous to mountain forests from Nepal to Manchuria. It is a member of the Araliaceae family, and is one of a number of related plants valued primarily for their calming effects on the brain and the rest of the nervous system. Ginseng is said to restore physical

An engraving of the ginseng plant by Joseph-Francois Lafitau (1681–1746).
and mental vitality, defend the body from the effects of physical strain, and stimulate the endocrine glands.

Ginseng is the best-known medicinal product in China, where it is most prized for its perceived benefits to the urogenital system of aging men, whose sexual problems are a major concern in traditional Chinese medicine. After the swollen root of the plant has been carefully cleaned and dried, medicinal extracts can be made, primarily with alcohol, and to satisfy Western tastes for medicinal teas the root can be ground into powder. The suggestively anthropomorphic shape of this small woodland plant’s root has long been for some a powerful symbol of divine harmony on Earth.

The growing range of ginseng is rather limited, and its supply that grew mainly in the lush forests of Manchuria, and commercial cultivation of ginseng began in Korea to replace and expand root sources in areas where wild ginseng has disappeared. Interest in ginseng as a cure-all had also grown in the West by the nineteenth century, and the remotest parts of Manchuria were soon harvested from end to end by ginseng hunters. They advanced far into Siberia as Manchurian resources were depleted. By the late nineteenth century China was even importing wild ginseng from Canada and the United States (Panax quinquefolium), a trade that continues to some extent, although both countries are now net importers of ginseng, mostly from South Korea.

Paul D. BUell

Further Reading
The Golden Lotus is the first lengthy novel by a single author in Chinese literary history, and is noted for its highly sophisticated combination of plot and composition as well as its explicit sexual contents. The plot is set in Northern Song (960–1126) China and tells the story of the rise and fall of the merchant Ximen Qing.

The title of Clement Egerton’s 1953 English translation of the Chinese novel Jin Ping Mei, which was written by an anonymous author towards the end of the sixteenth century and first published in 1617 or 1618. The English title refers to the main female character, Pan Jinlian, whose personal name means Golden Lotus, whereas the Chinese title alludes to the three principal women in the novel; Pan Jinlian, Li Pinger, and Peng Chunmei. Jin ping mei literally means “the golden vase plum twig” — the twig in the vase being an allusion to sexual intercourse — and due to its sexually explicit contents the novel has been banned for long periods of time.

The story line tells how the licentious bourgeois merchant Ximen Qing rises to prominence and wealth and how his self-inflicted decline leads to his death from a lethal dose of aphrodisiac. Ximen’s undisguised partiality for his sixth wife Li Pinger slowly but surely disrupts the household, and his excessive sexual behavior eventually causes the deaths of those dear to him. The plot is set in Northern Song dynasty China (960–1126) in the latter half of Emperor Huizong’s reign (1100–1126) when worsening domestic crises eventually lead to the downfall of the dynasty and the Jurchen occupation of Northern China. The household of Ximen has many obvious parallels to the imperial house and the historical events; for example, the six wives of Ximen are thought to represent the six immoral ministers who were held responsible for the collapse of the Northern Song. It is also a widely held belief that the anonymous author deliberately used the plot as a concealed criticism of his own time, the declining years of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The novel is more likely a moral response to the sexual eccentricities it depicts in graphic detail than it is an endorsement of these.

The Jin Ping Mei stands out in Chinese literary history as the first lengthy novel by a single author and for the highly sophisticated combination of plot and composition. The novel consists of one hundred chapters of which chapters 53 and 57 are suspected to have been inserted by other authors. The Jin Ping Mei draws on a wide variety of literary sources and traditions but the author never loses focus on the story and the characters.

The composition of the novel may be broken down in several ways. It may be divided into ten parts of ten chapters each, which share the same repetitive patterns; thus when new elements and surprising developments are introduced into the story, it usually happens in the seventh chapter of each division, and a high point is reached in the ninth chapter. The novel has also been analyzed as being composed of four divisions: A prelude of twenty chapters introducing the cast, a main part in two divisions of thirty chapters each, and coda of thirty chapters.
chapters each describing the rise and fall Ximen Qing, and a postlude detailing the collapse of his household.

A complete translation into English entitled *The Plum in the Golden Vase* is being undertaken by David Tod Roy, with three of five planned volumes published as of 2006. Several movies have been based on the plot.

**Further Reading**


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**From Jin Ping Mei**

_In the following passage taken from David Tod Roy's translation of Jin Ping Mei, an estranged husband and wife reconcile after he observes her lighting incense and praying for him._

“Darling,” he said, “I had absolutely no idea that you’ve really been inspired by concern for me. I’ve been wrong about you all this time. I’ve been giving you the cold shoulder. By now, I’m afraid, it’s rather late to repent.”

“You must have lost your way in the snow,” said Yueh-niang. “I dare say these really aren’t the quarters you’re looking for, anyway. You’re barking up the wrong tree. I’m that ‘undutiful whore,’ remember. Since there’s nothing between us, where do you get that stuff about concern for you? What reason should you have to pay any further attention to me? If we were never to see each other again:

For a thousand years or all eternity, it would be all right with me.

Hsi-men Ch’ing took Yuen-niang by the hand and pulled her into the room where he proceeded to look her over by lamplight. She was wearing her usual attire: a scarlet jacket of Lu-chou silk that opened down the middle, and a skirt of a soft yellow material. On her head she wore a sable toque over her chignon and, in front of her coiffure, a tiara of gold representing “Kuan-yin in her full glory,” setting off to perfection:

Her silver salver face, modeled in plaster carved of jade; The clouds over Ch’u peaks, her cicada chignon and raven tresses, How could Hsi-men Ch’ing have been anything but captivated?

Goldfish, or jinyu 金鱼, are ornamental aquarium and pond fish originally cultured in China that later were spread to East Asia and the world. Due to accidental genetic mutation at first and artificial selection later, goldfish have developed from carp into 500 different types of goldfish today. Goldfish are now a world-wide industry. Activities written in the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Wild red carps, forerunners of goldfish, were first raised in a pond at a temple at the turn of the twelfth century.

A crowd views the goldfish at San Frank Park in Hangzhou. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Emperor Gaozong of the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279) started a fad, which spread first among his followers and then the common people, to raise red carps in their family ponds. Separated from other species and fed with specific food like water fleas, the fish began to mutate genetically. Subconscious selection helped the process. By the mid-sixteenth century, red carps, known as huoyu (fire fish), were bred in gang (bowls or jars) as popular pets. Conscious selection happened two hundred years later, resulting in different colors of their scales and shapes of their body parts. At the start of the twentieth century, there had been more than twenty varieties of goldfish. This number increased to more than seventy in the mid-1930s and to about 160 today.

Goldfish found their way to Japan in the early 1500s, to Portugal in the early 1600s, to England at the end of the 1600s, and to France in the middle of the 1700s. About a century later, they came to the United States and from there spread to the other parts of the American continents.

Having learned the art of breeding goldfish, culturists of other countries, Japan in particular, produced some four hundred varieties in addition to the Chinese varieties.

According to Goldfish Varieties and Genetics: A Handbook for Breeders (Smartt 2001), goldfish are classified into the varieties of Common Goldfish, Comet, Shubunkin, Wakin, Jikin, Fantail, Ryukin, Tosakin, Veiltail, Telescope, Celestial, Bubble-Eye, Pompon, Pearl Scale, Oranda, and the Ranchu-Lionhead Group. Common Goldfish, Comets, and Shubunkins are relatively simple fish that have typical single tail fins. Common Goldfish are known for their colors ranging from white, black to yellow, orange, and red; Shubunks are noted for their nacreous (mother-of-pearl-like) scales; and Comets are distinguished by their long and deeply forked tail fins. Jikins and Wakins have double tails, but with the body shaped like Comets. The others are known as “fancy fish.” Veiltails, as the name suggests, are known for their long flowing tails. Fantails are also recognized by
their medium sized double-split tail fins. Ryukins look like Fantails except for their characteristic hump in the shoulder region. Tosakins’ bodies are shaped like those of Ryukins, but their undivided tail fins are open and spread like the tail of a peacock. The Pearl Scale goldfish are also noted for the pearl-like appearance of their scales. Among the fancy fish type are also Pompons that have soft and fluffy growths above the nose and Telescopes that feature enlarged and bulging eyes. Celestials with their eyes upturned and Bubble-Eyes that have a sack under each eye are cousins of Telescopes. Orandas and goldfish of the Ranchu-Lionhead Group share the trait of a head growth known as hood. Ranchus and Lionheads differ from Orandas in the lack of their dorsal fins.

The Chinese, however, categorize goldfish into four major breeds, a system not commonly adopted in the West. They are 1) Caojin (grass goldfish), a group that includes the Common Goldfish, Comet, Jikin, Shubunkin, and Wakin varieties; 2) Wenjin (colorful goldfish), a type that covers the Fantail, Tosakin, Pearl Scale, Ryukin, and Veiltail breeds; 3) Longjin (dragon-eyed goldfish), comprising the Celestial, Bubble Eye, and Telescope varieties; and 4) Danjin (egg-shaped goldfish), including the Oranda and the Ranchu-Lionhead Group.

Chinese characters have an excessive number of homophones (words that sound alike but have different meanings), and for that reason the Chinese are fond of playing on words and symbols that reflect on the cultural significance of fish. Buddhist believers may see red carp, abnormal forms of the usual greenish-gray carp species, as sacred, and let their captives go as a show of mercifulness, but the average Chinese, taking a more secular approach, associate “fish” with “affluence” because the two words sound alike. Goldfish, pronounced as “jin yu” are homophonic to “gold” and “jade,” which are cultural symbols of girls and boys respectively. So the phrase “jin yu man tang” (a pond full of goldfish) is thus a pun for “a house full of children,” and having more children is the ultimate expectation of a Chinese patriarch. By calling the hood of a Lionhead goldfish shouxingqiu (ball of the god of longevity), the Chinese impart to the fish a good wish for a long, healthy life.

Today goldfish are mass produced in coastal cities of China and sold domestically and abroad. Goldfish hatcheries in Beijing alone occupy a total of 1,000 hectares (about 2471 acres). In 2001, China sold about 400 million goldfish at home, and today exports about $100 million worth of ornamental fish annually, mostly goldfish, to about 100 countries.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading

Throughout its history, China has been ruled according to one (or a combination) of three different principles of governance. The same basic precepts that have applied for thousands of years are still active today.

The concept of governance includes a wide range of subjects relating to how nations have exercised authority and enforced social and political order. In fact, humans have had governance long before there were nations in the modern sense. For traditional Chinese rulers over the centuries, the principles of the Mandate of Heaven reflected the moral order of the universe and charged authority at all levels with the welfare of subordinates. China has experienced only a limited range of governmental types in its long history, all of them centralized, and each one involving one or more of three main guiding principles of governance: lizhi 礼治 (rites and rituals), fazhi 法治 (laws), and renzhi 人治 (rulers).

**Tianming 天命: The Mandate of Heaven**

Over many centuries, traditional Chinese rulers sought to acquire a source of legitimacy in what was traditionally referred to as the “Mandate of Heaven,” or Tianming. Most probably, the concept first emerged to serve the political needs of Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) rulers who, by military conquest, ended the Shang dynasty in the eleventh century BCE. As usurpers, the Zhou needed a means to legitimize their seizure of power, which would immediately become justified if they could claim that their predecessors had failed to respect the Mandate of Tian 天命. Though Tian is commonly translated as Heaven or the heavens, both of these English words typically carry a misleading evocation of a Western-style Creator-God who resides in heavenly realms; hence the term is not subject to translation here in order to mark the difference. In general, Tian is most appropriately conceived as a name for the higher powers operating within a totality composed of heavens above and earth below.

By the time of Confucius (sixth century BCE), Tianming began to be applied to authorities at all levels, indicating an obligation to see to the welfare of their subordinates. Over time, Tian, though impersonal, came to be seen as potentially concerned for the welfare of human beings. The key test was prosperity, implying that rulers needed to ensure the material welfare of their people. If a ruler ceased to rule justly or wisely in these terms and began to rule only with his own self-interest at heart, then he could be seen as having lost the Mandate of Tian. In that case, an attempt at overthrowing the ruler might be justified. Rebellion was always a tricky proposition, however, because rebels could only justify the legitimacy of their revolt when and if the rebellion ended in their favor.

The Mandate of Tian thus came to represent the moral order of the universe. When the proper order was respected, the physical world ran smoothly and the human world prospered. When that order was not respected, anomalous and/or destructive events, such as earthquakes, floods, eclipses, or even epidemics, took place in the normal order.
of the universe. Solar eclipses were particularly difficult to forecast, but predicting them accurately was a way of assuring the populace that the central authority was indeed in touch with the powers represented by Tian, and thus worthy of their allegiance. Making accurate predictions became so important that emperors sought out the finest astronomers and mathematicians they could find, even if they were not always Chinese. When the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci (Li Madou, 利玛窦, 1552–1610) arrived in China late in the Ming dynasty 1368–1644), he was welcomed because he offered calculations that improved on those given by the mathematicians from India who had previously staffed this imperial service.

**Lizhi, Fazhi, and Renzhi**

A basic distinction in Chinese political thinking as to the nature of social-political order and the best means of achieving it is marked by the distinction between li 礼, conventionally translated as rites or rituals, and fa 法, conventionally translated as law or regulations.

Lizhi 礼治, traditionally associated with Confucianists 儒家, refers to political order based on reference to the li (or rites, that is, traditional customs and norms). This form of governance tends to be localized and situation-based.

In contrast, fazhi 法治, traditionally associated with Legalists 法家, refers to order attained primarily through reliance on publicly codified rules backed by the power of the state. In contrast to the Confucianists, who taught that social order would come from knowing one’s proper place in life, the Legalists promoted strong (often ruthless) centralized authority.

The relative merits of these two approaches—lizhi and fazhi—to social and political order have long been debated in the Chinese tradition. Basic differences in these positions still persist in debates about governance today.

First, advocates of lizhi tend to favor less formal means of maintaining order than advocates of fazhi. The former believe that informal methods foster more nuanced and situation-specific justice; the latter believe such methods give excessive discretionary authority to those in power and thus foster corruption and other abuses.

Second, fa (in the sense of laws) refers to formal rules of greater general applicability than li, which constitute the web of informal rules that were traditionally understood as attached to hereditary elites. Fazhi, therefore, is an externally imposed order that requires compliance more than participation, whereas lizhi emphasizes individual commitment and self-discipline as a way of maintaining social order.

Third, advocates of lizhi tend to be more optimistic about human nature and the possibility of achieving a harmonious social order in which each person is able to find a place and play an appropriate role. They tend to see civility, social order, and humanity as attainable goals. In contrast, many advocates of fazhi take a dimmer view of human nature. They see humans as so self-interested that, left to their own devices, the strong will exploit the weak. Impartial rules are necessary to limit the harm that one person can do to another. Thus, according to fazhi, law should serve to ensure minimal protection to all by systematically punishing transgressors.

Overall, there has been no stable dominance in China of either lizhi or fazhi, partly due to what (in modern perspective) can be seen as the inescapable importance of a third element: the attitudes and judgments of the ruler (renzhi 人治). Different supreme authorities exercised a decisive influence on the relative importance given to one or the other value at any particular historical moment.

When modern leaders seek stability above all, they may well evoke both morality (lizhi) and legality (fazhi, in its modern rule-of-law sense). During the 1990s, for example, President Jiang Zemin reiterated from time to time the principle that the People’s Republic of China should be governed with morality (yi de zhi guo 以德治国) in addition to laws (yi fa zhi guo 依法治国). Thus today’s Chinese authorities rely on both lizhi and fazhi depending on circumstances: They encourage good behavior (in relation to implementing current policies) by positive encouragement, but hold in reserve strong threats of punishment for anyone who proves recalcitrant.

While this assertion applies mainly to the strong centralized government, recently there have been moves towards a more popular basis for local government. Thus in many regions, village councils now have members elected by popular vote. Such procedures, however, do not imply a widespread adoption of Western-style principles of democracy. Over much of the last thousand years, while China was ruled by authoritarian emperors, villages chose their own local leaders, often by election. Hence, in China,
such practices have proved to be fully compatible with highly centralized power structures. In addition, locally elected officials typically have less clout than the village Party secretary, who is appointed by the Party, as are the officials of townships and counties, the next higher levels of administration. Since their support is needed for any local complaints to be taken seriously, the practical effects of these elections are tightly circumscribed.

**Chinese Political Thinking**

Chinese political thinking has always been hierarchical and organized around a strong central authority. Chinese leaders are normally seen as being able to determine what is in the best interests of society and its members. Indeed, much of their authority is based on their claim to superior ethical insight and political wisdom, that is, their knowledge of the best way to govern under current conditions.

In accordance with Confucian teaching that the harmonious family is the best metaphor for good governance, the image of the father traditionally dominates political rhetoric in China, though the specifics of the image vary according to the writer’s convictions. The Confucian (lizhi) father-ruler is kind, compassionate, and more a facilitator of order than an imposer of order. The Legalist father-ruler (fazhi) is a tough disciplinarian who well understands that—in Western idiom—“to spare the rod is to spoil the child.” Nevertheless, such a stern father, knowing what is best, takes care of his children.

As part of its holistic worldview, China has long assumed that the interests of the state and the individual can be brought into harmony. If one makes this assumption,
there seems no need to evoke rights to protect the individual against the state. The situation is very different from that in the modern West, where individual human rights are often evoked as the only way to protect individuals from the power of the state.

Given these differences in orientation within China itself, it seems safe to predict that disagreements about governance will continue. China has always had a strong central government, and there is no visible reason to believe that will change. But in the case of how that central government governs—whether by lizhi or fazhi or some combination of both—there is no final word on such debates. No system of governance is perfect because no one has yet achieved the ideal means for realizing and maintaining social order.

John G. BLAIR and Jerusha MCCORMACK

Further Reading


Governance System, Dual

Liǎngyuánhuà lǐngdǎo zhìdù
两元化领导制度

The People’s Republic of China, unlike other nations, is governed by a dual system. The government, as the visible face of this system, includes familiar branches called legislative, executive, and judicial. But behind this government the high leadership of the Chinese Communist Party determines policy at all levels, which the government merely implements and disseminates.

The dual governance system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has proven to be an effective way to cope with the extraordinary problems of managing a polity on China’s massive scale. Since the end of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, this system is unusual in the world today, perhaps even unique, because the center of power lies behind the government, not within it. For comparative purposes it is important to clarify how the present order came about and how it functions.

Westerners often assume that the Chinese government operates as the power governing the country. But in the PRC, the government is merely the outward and visible face of the governance system. Behind (and above) the government is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Party determines policy and oversees appointments to all levels of government and to Party supervisory committees, even in corporations and non-governmental organizations. In effect, the CCP comprises a “shadow” government that shares some superficial characteristics with the “shadow cabinet” in the U.K. In England the “shadow” ministers watch over (and criticize) their official counterparts as part of their role as a “loyal opposition.” But in the United Kingdom they have no power as such and can only appeal to the people at large when they have criticisms to make. In the PRC, the “shadow” officials are active at all levels of organization, and they, in fact, are in charge, dominating their government counterparts through the dual system of governance.

Soviet Origins

The Party-State dual governance system originated in Soviet Russia. Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) put forth the idea that the Communist Party’s task was to provide political leadership, rather than actually to govern. Under Josef Stalin (1879–1953), however, power became intensely centralized, to the point of overriding any possibility of a division of power between Party and government. The Soviet system, then, became a de facto unitary governing system under the Party. The chief mechanism for maintaining central control was that every major government and military office had a duplicate counterpart in the Party structure. The job of the Party representative was to double-check in advance on any action that might be undertaken by any government official. In case of disagreement between the two, the Party view prevailed, on the grounds that overall effectiveness required a coherent source of policy.
History in China

The Nationalist (GMD, Guomindang) Party (as constituted in 1919), led by Sun Yat-sen until his death in 1925, was the first to adopt the dual governing system of the Soviet Union. This represented a significant shift away from the unitary political control system that had been characteristic of Chinese political history for thousands of years. As a Leninist party structure, this one too was designed to protect against possible subversion.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, this dual system from the USSR became established national practice. After the third session of the Party’s eleventh congress in 1978, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders decided to reform the dual relationship so that the Party would be more discreet in exercising its control. This evolution was part of the reform process that tended to decentralize the governance system nationally.

Contemporary Party-State Relations

The relationship between the CCP and the State begins with the legislative branch of State power, the NPC (National People’s Congress) and extends through the executive and judicial branches of government. The relationship between the Party and the executive branch is mainly exhibited in the Party’s political, ideological, and organizational leadership, while the Party’s control over the judicial branch is shored up by policies that ensure against undue independence on the part of magistrates and judges.

The Legislative Branch

As the primary legislative branch, the NPC (with its local branches) has been set up under the direct leadership of the CCP. Members are designated for five-year terms and may be reappointed. Legislative proposals, including constitutional amendments and other proposals, either for new legislation or revisions of existing laws and regulations, are presented to the NPC and its committees at various levels by corresponding Party committees. In recent years the NPC has resisted rubberstamping legislation proposed to it, at least when controversial issues are involved. The most visible example involves the role of private property within the socialist State. Starting in 1993, draft laws were long debated in the NPC, leading to significant changes to the legislation that became the 2007 Property Law. Though the effectiveness of this law remains to be tested in practice, it does legitimize the registration of private property rights for the first time since the creation of the PRC in 1949.

Any change in the country’s political orientation, significant economic and social development policy guidelines, highly influential projects, and the like are decided first by the Party, and then sent to the NPC as proposals, which, through its legitimating procedures, become decisions of the State. According to the nominating criteria required in relevant Party regulations and laws, CCP committees recommend appropriate people to fill the important positions in all branches of the government and bring these nominations before the NPC. These nominations, made by the Party for the State, constitute a major organizational safeguard by which the Party exercises its direction of State affairs and maintains its political centrality.

The CCP’s leadership dominates the State’s executive and judicial branches. Party organizations established within the National Congress and its committees at various levels report regularly to Party committees, and maintain oversight over the People’s Congress.

The Executive Branch

The relationship between the CCP and the executive branch (i.e., the State Council and local administrative branches) is one of political, ideological, and organizational leadership. Politically the CCP defines principles, fixing the nation’s course and direction and making all important decisions. In such an arrangement the will of the Party becomes the will of the State by means of legislative procedures.

These political principles find their guiding ideologies within the Party as well. As one Chinese political scientist recently reaffirmed, as translated into English by Qin Chuan: “The Party applies Marxist worldview and methodology in order to guide all administrative staff. The Party’s propaganda organ uses ideological build-up, spiritual-civilization construction and propaganda education to educate cadres in how to oppose corruption and
interference from out-dated thinking patterns, so as to better serve the people” (Lu 2001, 261).

Organizational leadership follows naturally and inherently; it is accomplished by the CCP at all levels through Party organizations established within every department of the State. In practice, that means that a person or a committee responsible to the Party is active at every level of organization. Although these commonly operate out of public view, their influence is great. The CCP and local committees also recommend candidates for administrative leadership positions, who are to be elected by legislative branches. The Organization Department of the Party has particular responsibility for nominations and appointments.

**The Judicial Branch**

The relationship between the CCP and the judicial branch (i.e., The People’s Court and The People’s Procuratorate (Attorney General’s Office) is one of organization, that is, setting up guidelines, and support through community education and coordination with other departments within the State. The way this relationship is designed to work has been described recently by Lu Shigong, a Chinese political scientist, as one in which “the Party supports the judicial endeavor to strengthen Party leadership, educates citizens, protects the judicial from external interference in order to preserve its independence, guarantees this independence by coordinating its relationships with other departments, using Party members within the judicial branch itself” (Lu, 2001, 286–290). If the independence of the judicial body is enhanced by coordinating its activities with other departments of the State, the result may be greater governing coherence but at the price of judicial independence.

**Overview**

Westerners will recognize here the three branches of governance with which they are familiar: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. That familiarity should not, however, lead to easy assumptions that the Chinese dual system is not so different after all. In all of these domains—and at all levels from the local to the national—the Party is in control, deciding not only broad policies but also who will fill each role within the governing structure. Moreover, each position in the governmental hierarchy will have a shadowing “twin” in the Party structure. The National People’s Congress is the centerpiece of the legislative process, composed entirely of members approved by the Party. The same is true of all members of the government, the courts, the police, provincial and local committees, and so on.

The National People's Congress appears here on the left as the primary organ of the State, due to its role in officializing decisions that originated in the Party structure diagrammed below. The State Council, which serves to
implement decisions, normally takes its direction from the Central Committee, a primary organ of the Party. The Central Committee has about three hundred members, bringing together major figures in the Party, the State, and the military. The Central Committee in its turn is directed by a standing political committee known as the Politburo, currently with twenty-five members. The Politburo normally meets once a month, but its day-to-day business is handled by a standing committee of nine. These nine individuals are responsible above all others for formulating decisions and seeing to their application throughout the administrative system. This is the level of governance where alternative policies can be debated, though always outside of public view. Its decisions are said to be made by consensus rather than a voting process.

The arrows in this diagram point upwards to indicate how decisions generated within the Party apparatus end up as officialized by the National People’s Congress.
Through all these levels, the key factor is control over who will occupy positions in the Party hierarchy as well as in the State. Appointments remain under the control of the Party leadership. There are roughly 70 million members of the Communist Party, not quite 6 percent of the population. This group defines the political class in today’s China and functions as a leadership oligarchy.

The PRC dual system allows the vast governing apparatus to be responsive to an authoritative and centralized source of decision making. If the system sometimes seems unduly repressive to some Western observers, it also permits exceptional attention to long-term needs as opposed to short-term problems.

John G. BLAIR and Jerusha H. MCCORMACK

Further Reading

A governor may commit arson while the governed are not allowed to light a lamp.

只许州官放火，不许百姓点灯

Zhī xǔ zhōu guān fàng huǒ, bù xǔ bǎi xìng diǎn dēng
Originally built during the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE), the Grand Canal is a major waterway that unified northern and southern China, serving as a connection between major cities and as a vital means of maintaining trade relations within the empire. Today it is still used to transport goods such as bricks, gravel, sand, diesel, and coal.

The Grand Canal is an artificial waterway constructed in China during the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) and expanded during subsequent dynasties. The Chinese refer to this canal as the yunlianghe or “grain transport river,” or alternately as the jinghang dayunhe or “Beijing Hangzhou Grand Canal.” The canal was and is still used to transport both raw and finished goods between northern and southern China. The Grand Canal was crucial to the maintenance of the Chinese empire, enabling the Chinese to use the rich agricultural lands of southern China to help feed people in the north. It was also crucial to trade relations within the empire and to trade relations between the Chinese and the peoples of the steppes (vast, usually level and treeless tracts in southeastern Europe or Asia). In imperial times the canal was used principally to transport tribute grain (grain paid by other countries in deference to China’s position of power in Asia) to the capital, but it was also used to ship large quantities of tea, cotton, and other supplies.

China is blessed with an abundant river system, which gave China a comparative advantage over trading networks in Europe, central Asia, and Africa, which had to rely on camel caravans and more tempestuous oceanic routes. Over the centuries China also developed a sophisticated knowledge of canal building. As early as the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), states in China were building canals. The state of Wu in present-day Jiangsu Province built a canal to facilitate the transportation of soldiers to fight the state of Qi in Shandong. After the Qin unification in 221 BCE the Qin emperor ordered the building of canals to ease transport of goods and soldiers to the deep southern region of Guangzhou (Canton).

North and South Connected

After the decline and fall of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), during a four-hundred-year period of disunity, the northern and southern regions of China separated into a series of competing, overlapping dynasties. When the Chinese empire was reunited under the Sui dynasty the son of the first Sui emperor, Yangdi (reigned 604–618 CE), saw the need to promote national unity by connecting the north and south through the construction of a canal system. During this period canals were constructed to connect the southern city of Hangzhou to the nearby city of Suzhou (once the capital of the state of Wu) and on to the town of Yangzhou on the Yangzi (Chang) River. These cities would continue to prosper for centuries as major nodes in the Grand Canal transport network. From Yangzhou the canal headed northwest to the city of Luoyang in present-day Henan. The Huang (Yellow) River then connected the Grand Canal...
to the ancient capital of Xi’an. From Luoyang the canal was extended northeast all the way to the northern coastal city of Tianjin, where a river leads to Beijing. Thus, for the first time in China’s history the Huang and Yangzi rivers were connected, and a waterway extended from the Huang River valley to China’s northeastern border regions.

During the Tang dynasty (618–907 ce) the Yangzi River valley began to be settled in great numbers by Chinese from the north. This settlement process continued through the Song dynasty (960–1279). This region became the most economically and agriculturally productive in all of China and arguably in the world until the Industrial Revolution. The Grand Canal tapped and stimulated the growth of this region, carrying tribute rice and other goods to the northern capitals of Xi’an and Luoyang and eventually to Beijing. When the Song dynasty began, it chose Kaifeng as its capital, which was the site where the early Grand Canal fed into the Huang River. Advances in agriculture, canal building, and shipping during the Song dynasty greatly stimulated the production of grain in southern China, and the Grand Canal was vital to the rise of the Yangzi River valley as China’s most productive region. In 1127, when the Song dynasty shifted its capital to the south under heavy pressure from the northern Jurchen people, who established their own dynasty, the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234), the Song dynasty chose Hangzhou, the southern terminus of the Grand Canal, as its new capital.

During the early years of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) under Mongol leader Khubilai Khan, the Yuan state had the Grand Canal shortened significantly by as much as 700 kilometers. Workers did so by digging a canal through mountainous Shandong Province, thus creating a more direct route between Yangzhou and the new national capital of Beijing. The Grand Canal built under the Yuan dynasty was one of the features that enabled Beijing to remain the national capital under the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties.

**The Grand Canal in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.**
Tea and Textiles

During the Ming dynasty China underwent a major commercial revolution, once again spearheaded by the Yangzi River valley. Cotton emerged as a key commercial crop, and the Grand Canal became vital to the cotton industry. The Yangzi River valley became a leading producer of both raw and spun cotton, but the demand for raw cotton was so great that the Grand Canal was used to ship raw cotton from the north to the Yangzi River valley to be spun and woven into textiles. Meanwhile a commodities market in luxury goods such as silk and porcelain ware also flourished in China. Much of China’s silk and porcelain was also produced in the Yangzi River valley, and the best products were then shipped to Beijing. The Ming dynasty also traded heavily with the neighboring Mongols. The most significant items of trade were Chinese tea in exchange for Mongol horses. The Grand Canal was thus also used to transport tea grown in the southern coastal province of Fujian to the northern capital. The Qing dynasty continued to use the Grand Canal for similar purposes, although by the late nineteenth century the growth of a new railway system competed with the canal as a means for transporting grain and other supplies. Yet railways never completely supplanted the canal, and it is still used today to transport vast quantities of heavy goods between north and south China, including bricks, gravel, sand, diesel fuel, and coal.

Andrew FIELD

Further Reading


Grasslands, which constitute 41 percent of China’s territory, exist in desert, semi-arid, and moist forest ecological zones of the country. The Chinese government has taken action since the mid-1980s to preserve and protect this important environmental and economic resource.

Although China is perhaps best known in the West for its rice-growing eastern landscapes, China ranks second among the countries of the world (behind Australia) in terms of its total area in grassland. Grasslands extend over 41 percent of China’s territory. Together, these 393 million hectares of grasslands, located primarily across vast reaches of China’s north, northwest, and western regions with smaller areas in the highlands of the southwest, constitute China’s largest biogeographic region. These grasslands support a great diversity of flora and fauna, are homeland to a number of different peoples, especially the Tibetans and the Mongols, and provide the raw materials for a wide range of industries, from medicinal plants to dairy products. They are also the locus of some of China’s most threatened environments.

Physiographic Features

Although there are grasslands and meadows scattered throughout much of China (small areas of grassland are most numerous in southwestern China), the two largest areas of grassland are found in Inner Mongolia (the northern grassland) and on the Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau (the alpine grasslands). The grasslands follow the patterns of China’s climatic regions. In western, interior China, where the Himalaya and the Tibetan Plateau form a formidable barrier to the transport of moisture, semi-arid, arid, and desert-like conditions prevail, and the grasses grow short, tough, and sparse. Moisture increases from west to east until the moist summer monsoon patterns that come from the southeast overcome the arid winds of the west, and the grass gradually becomes taller and more lush. In the moist forests of northeastern China (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces), well-watered, green meadows fill the spaces between the tall trees. But most of China’s grassland area is found in more arid regions. (See table 1 for a list of grassland species and the types of climates in which they thrive.)

The northern grassland, located primarily in Inner Mongolia, constitutes 48 percent of China’s grassland area. It ranges from low desert and steppe vegetation in the arid west to relatively tall grasses in the more moist environments of the east, and comprises grasslands of the northeastern plateau, the Inner Mongolian Plateau. In the west, the dry, desert-grassland areas of Inner Mongolia’s Ordos Plateau and parts of Gansu Province, the Ningxia Autonomous Region, and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region are characterized by drought-resistant Stipa and Artemesia grass species as well as numerous annual plants. Most of the vegetation in these arid regions averages 23 to 30 centimeters in height. At its eastern extreme, in the northeast China plain forest-steppe region, the grass species include “sheep’s grass” (Aneurolepidium chinensis, Stipa baicalensis,
Grasslands

which averages 50 to 80 centimeters in height, and *Filifolium sibiricum*. Between these extremes, the temperate grasslands of the Inner Mongolian Plateau provide some of China’s richest grazing lands, dominated by *Aneurolepidium pseudoagropyrum, S. grandis, and S. krylovii*.

Animal species found in the northern grassland region include the Mongolian gazelle (*Gazella gutturosa*), Przewalski’s horse (*Equus caballus przewalskii*), foxes, wolves, as well as numerous bird species.

The alpine grasslands of China are found primarily on the Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau, which averages more than 4,000 meters elevation. Grasslands cover 68 percent of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (approximately 82 million hectares), and 60 percent of the entire Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau. Northwestern Tibet is characterized by dry, desert-like conditions, but as moisture increases from northwest to southeast, the grasslands become increasingly lush.

Grasses in the alpine grasslands average 15 to 20 centimeters in height and tend to cover 30 to 50 percent of the ground. Other vegetation in alpine grasslands includes low-lying plants such as cushion plants, plum, saxifrage, and dwarf juniper. On the southern Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau, the primary grassland species are *S. bungeana, Aristida triseta, Pennisetem flaccidem,* and *Oinus thoroldii*. At elevations above 4,400 meters, the grassland transitions to *S. purpurea, Artemisia wellbyi, A. younghusbandii,* and *A. stracheyi*. Above about 5,000 meters, the alpine meadows are dominated by *Kobresia pygmaea* and *Carex montis-everestii*. In the northern reaches of the plateau, the dominant grass species include *S. krylovii, S. brevisflora,* and *A. frigida*.

The alpine grasslands of Tibet are home to a wide range of animal and bird species. The most notable of these are large mammals such as wild yak (*Bos gruniens*), Tibetan antelope (*Pantholops hodgsoni*), Tibetan gazelles (*Procapra picticaudata*), Himalayan blue sheep (*Pseudois nayaur*), and Tibetan wild asses (*Equus hemionus*), as well as predators such as brown bears (*Ursus arctos*), wolves (*Canis lupus*), and snow leopards (*Panthera uncia*).

There are also alpine grasslands in Sichuan and in the Kunlun Shan, Altay Shan, Tian Shan and the Qilian Shan.

### Human Geography

These vast grassland areas have served as homelands for a number of different nomadic peoples over the long span of history for which there is archeological or historical evidence. The ancestors of the Chinese first encountered the peoples of the northern grasslands during the

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**Table 1** Grassland species

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grass Type</th>
<th>Moderate Temperate</th>
<th>Warm Temperate</th>
<th>Alpine</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Stipa baicalensis</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Stipa grandis</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa krylovii</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Stipa kirghisorum</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa capillata</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa bungeana</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa klemenzii</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Stipa orientalis</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa caucasica</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa stapfii</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa brevisflora</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa glareoasa</em></td>
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<td><em>Stipa subssessiflora</em></td>
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<td>var. basilhumosa</td>
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fourth century BCE. Over a long history of alternating wet and dry, cold and warm periods, a succession of different peoples—some inhabiting year-round permanent settlements, others living nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyles as they grazed their herds—thrived in these vast grasslands. Powerful confederations of nomadic tribes arose in the grasslands, such as the Xiongnu (sometimes referred to as the Huns), who became a regional power in the third century BCE, and the Mongols, who were united by Chinggus (also known as Genghis) Khan during the twelfth century. A Tibetan empire arose in the seventh century.

The grasslands were home not only to nomads but also to significant cities: Lhasa (Tibet), Xining (Qinghai), and Hohhot (Inner Mongolia), for example, are all major cities that have flourished for centuries in the grasslands. The eastern and southern reaches of the grasslands of Tibet and Inner Mongolia have also supported agricultural settlements. The Tibetans and Mongols have very distinct cultures, languages, and traditions. But they have shared some common history and culture since the sixteenth century, when Tibetan Buddhism became the primary religion of the Mongols.

Today the vast expanses of the Inner Mongolian and the Qinghai–Tibetan grasslands are sparsely inhabited, in comparison to eastern China, by peoples of Mongol and Tibetan heritage. But they are also home, especially since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, to increasing numbers of Han Chinese migrants from eastern China. For example (not accounting for boundary changes) the population of Inner Mongolia was about 6.1 million in 1953, and by 2006 was estimated at nearly 24 million. Most of the difference in population is a result of Chinese in-migration: there are now about 4 million Mongols and 19 million Han Chinese living in Inner Mongolia. Qinghai Province has seen a population increase from about 1.7 million in 1953 to about 5.5 million as of 2006, of which nearly 3 million are Han Chinese.
Economic Geography

The grasslands provide subsistence for a number of different nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. As is common with this type of subsistence system, herds of animals graze on the natural grasses and shrubs for a period of time until those resources are depleted, then the herds (and often the settlement, as well) move on to a fresh area of grass. The grazed grass is allowed to renew in order to serve as fodder again in the future. This type of system works well on the grasslands for a wide range of livestock such as horses, sheep, goats, and yak. These sophisticated subsistence systems have been endangered in recent years by changing land-tenure systems and economic and political pressures on the nomads to settle in one place.

Historically, the grasslands were important to China as a supplier of both a wide range of products (particularly livestock, livestock products, and medicinal plants) and knowledge. The grassland sheep supplied wool for Chinese carpets; horses raised on the grasslands carried the Chinese armies to their battles. Horsemanship in particular was an area of knowledge imported from the grasslands: Stirrups, saddles, and other technologies were often first developed or improved in the grasslands. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), a widespread system of trade with the peoples of the northern grasslands developed and became so important to China that the trade routes were protected by imperial decree.

Today the Chinese grasslands are the primary loci of a number of China’s livestock industries. The grasslands of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu account for 70 percent of China’s sheep, 100 percent of the camels, 44 percent of the horses, 39 percent of the donkeys, and 25 percent of the country’s cattle and goats. In the past the raw materials of the grasslands were often sent east for processing. In recent years there have been

Woman and child in folk dress, resting on China’s grasslands. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
increasing efforts to establish production facilities in or near the grasslands themselves in order to provide a better livelihood for the people who live there. Of these, the dairy and wool industries have been the most successful.

Environmental Issues and the Grasslands

The Chinese grasslands began receiving wider attention both in China and abroad during the late 1980s as China's scientific community came to a consensus: The grasslands were becoming increasingly degraded, and the degradation of the grasslands—as bare soil became exposed, dried, and blown by prevailing winds—became known as one of China's most significant environmental issues. This degradation, which many scientists believe leads to increases in desert area (desertification), is believed to be exacerbated by overgrazing of grasslands by herders. The rate of desertification in many of China's grassland areas may have doubled since the late 1970s, as economic development has led to greater economic uses of the grasslands. Chinese scientists estimate that about 10 percent of the grasslands were degraded in 1970, but that the amount of degradation has increased to about 30 percent in recent years, about 118 million hectares of degraded grasslands as of 2008.

In order to protect the environment of much of China (not just the grasslands themselves, but also the wide regions plagued by increasingly frequent dust storms across northern China), the Chinese government has worked to reclaim or restore the grasslands by relocating herders, by reorganizing agricultural and pastoral systems on the grasslands, and in some cases by replanting grasslands or reforesting nearby slopes to cut the wind. There are a number of major programs to carry out these changes, especially the Northern Shelterbelt Program, which is aimed at restoring grasslands and forest across a wide swath of northern China in order to reduce soil erosion.

Protected Areas

Under the laws of the People's Republic of China, all grasslands are owned by the state. A national grasslands law passed in 1985 specifically forbids any activities that would harm the grasslands and requires local authorities to close degraded areas until those areas recover. These general provisions have been strengthened through designation of grasslands as protected areas. For example, a number of grasslands in China have been designated as nature reserves. The first of these, designated by the national government in 1985, is located on the Xilin Gol grassland of Inner Mongolia. In 1987 the Xilin Gol grassland, one of China's largest contiguous grassland areas, was recognized by UNESCO as an International Biosphere Reserve. There are numerous nature reserves on the Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau, including the Changtang Nature Reserve, a vast protected area covering about 247,000 square kilometers that was established by the national government in 1992.

Grassland Tourism

Some of China's grasslands have become tourist destinations in recent years. In Inner Mongolia, tourist resorts where visitors can stay in yurts, eat Mongol foods, and attend Mongol cultural performances have become popular with both international and domestic tourists. And the recently opened railroad crossing the Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau from Golmud, Qinghai, to Lhasa, Tibet, has also provided new opportunities for tourists to experience the grasslands landscapes. In Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai, promotion of grassland tourism has resulted in the construction of new tourist-oriented settlements and in the marketing of local festivals and events. These take place primarily in the summer and often involve exhibitions of horsemanship, dancing, and contests of strength and endurance. In Inner Mongolia alone there are ten different summer festivals promoted for tourism, most of which are versions of Nadam, a traditional Mongol festival. Most of the Tibetan attractions are centered around traditional monastery events scheduled according to the Buddhist calendar.

Perspectives

The significance of the grasslands can be interpreted in many different ways. Are the grasslands an economic resource to be utilized to its fullest extent? A subsistence
resource? An environmental resource which provides biomass and carbon sequestration and protects against dust storms? A cherished homeland? Or the locus of a growing tourism industry? Although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, these five perspectives—all of which can be found within China in the twenty-first century—have different implications for the management and future of the grasslands. In recent years the Chinese government has focused on creating policy initiatives aimed at making use of the economic potential of the grasslands while preserving them in order to protect the environment.

Piper GAUBATZ

Further Reading


Rabbits do not eat the grass around their burrows.

兔子不吃窝边草
Tù zì bù chī wō biān cǎo
Great Britain–China Centre

Yīng-Zhōng Xiéhuì 英中协会

The Great Britain–China Centre promotes good relations between the two nations, focusing on legal, judicial, and labor reform.

The Great Britain–China Centre was founded on 16 July 1974 by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan under the auspices of the British Council and with the help of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The center was created to provide greater nongovernmental contact between Britain and China and to promote cultural exchanges for the development of good relations between the two nations. Although in its early years the center’s mission was primarily cultural education, in recent years the mission has shifted to legal, judicial, and labor reform.

China and the outside world had little contact during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), but the West remained curious about China. Programs such as the Royal Academy’s “The Genius of China” exhibition in 1974, although important and well intentioned, fell short of satisfying British public interest in China and Chinese culture. The Great Britain–China Centre and the Great Britain–China Educational Trust, a fund that supports students studying Chinese language and culture, were established to help satisfy this general interest in China.

During its first decade the center hosted arts conservation programs, briefings for business people, cultural exchanges and visits by news delegations, sinologists, librarians, geographers, agricultural, and medical delegations, and business groups both to and from China. During its early years the center faced challenges because of Chinese objection to visits by certain cultural groups, including the Manchester United football club and the violinist and composer Yehudi Menuhin.

By 1984 China had undergone significant change and, with agreement on the question of Hong Kong settled by the 1984 Joint Declaration (which called for the return of Hong Kong to China no later than 30 June 1997), contact and activities flourished between the two nations. The center became a reference point for people engaging with China. It developed a newsletter, lecture programs, and a “Directory of British Organizations with an Interest in China” and provided Chinese-language classes.

The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 changed the perspective of many people and put human rights at the forefront of relations with China. After the visit to China of a British human rights delegation in 1992, led by Lord Howe, the British foreign secretary during the Tiananmen Square incident, the center began to focus on legal reform. As the pace and variety of Sino-British links grew during the 1990s, the center continued to focus on legal and economic reform and to broaden its scope to include programs dealing with the environment, arts and humanities, public administration, and the media.

Since the 1990s the center’s mission has shifted slightly to the promotion of understanding between Britain and China in the areas of legal, judicial, and labor reform. The center operates exchange and research projects with Chinese partners and works with many organizations in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and China, including the Department for Constitutional Affairs, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Global Opportunities Fund, and many others.
the All-Party Parliamentary China Group, the European Union Delegation in Beijing, the British Council, and the Ford Foundation. Projects include research seminars on the use of the death penalty in China, collaboration with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on the establishment of labor arbitration courts to settle workers' disputes, and forums on legal reform and human rights. The center works with government ministries, universities, businesses, law firms, and research centers to conduct short-term and long-term exchanges, and it continues to develop contacts within both countries. The core of its efforts remains aimed at building the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.

The Editors

Further Reading


The Great Leap Forward was a campaign launched in 1958 by China’s leaders, particularly Mao Zedong, to use massive mobilization to advance in agricultural and industrial development. The campaign, which promoted people’s communes to remove economic incentives and encouraged the rural workforce to smelt iron in backyard furnaces, led directly to the Great Leap famine, the worst famine in human history.

The Great Leap Forward was the campaign launched by the Chinese Communist leadership in 1958 to catch up to and quickly leapfrog the economic growth of Great Britain and the United States. Having become disenchanted with the Soviet-style development strategy that prioritized heavy industry, China’s leaders, particularly Mao Zedong (1893–1976), believed that massive social mobilization would allow China to develop industry and agriculture simultaneously. Unfortunately, the campaign ended in utter failure and caused what is known today as the Great Leap famine.

Mao’s Successful Promotion of Large Collectives

Any explanation of the Great Leap must begin with the ideological preferences of Mao and his colleagues. Mao’s efforts to promote large collectives and communes were based on a belief in economies of scale—large (agricultural) units may lower production costs and increase efficiencies—and a desire to promote social equality. Even though Mao’s earlier pursuit of progressively larger rural institutions, ranging from mutual-aid groups to cooperatives and then to collectives, had caused many disruptions in agricultural production, the disruptions were dismissed as temporary. Mao forged on with his demands for larger collectives in the late 1950s.

The Chinese political system had no room for dissent at this time. Repeated political campaigns, particularly the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, had banished to hard labor and even imprisonment those (primarily intellectuals) who spoke up against the party. Those who raised questions a little later about Great Leap–policy practices, such as Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), were persecuted as Rightist opportunists. In such a political system, those who aspired to mobility on the political ladder of success watched for cues of Mao’s preferences and eagerly supported everything that Mao liked.

Once Mao endorsed the term “people’s commune” in early August 1958, local leaders and political activists raced to establish communes and competed to build ever larger ones. The number of communes proliferated. In just two months, most provinces claimed a successful transition to people’s communes. Rural China was organized into 26,500 gigantic communes, each averaging 4,756 households. (Yang 1996, 36.) The communes abolished private property and, in most cases, did away with all economic incentives, such as tying remuneration to the amount of work done. The commune mess...
hall epitomized the frenzy of the Great Leap. Commune members were encouraged to abandon their private kitchens, donate the pots and pans to backyard iron furnaces, and dine in communal mess halls so that women could join the labor force.

The Free-Supply System and Other Wasteful Practices

Amid the euphoria of Communist transition, China’s leaders ceased to manage the economy but instead encouraged practices that, in hindsight, were downright criminal. The state statistical system stopped functioning and was replaced by wild claims of bountiful harvests. Such claims in turn engendered wildly exaggerated output forecasts and prompted prominent regional leaders such as Ke Qingshi (1902–1965) and Tan Zhenlin (1902–1983) to exhort peasants to eat as much as they could. As a consequence, the free-supply system was widely adopted, and the mess hall became the site of communal feasts in many places. The free-supply system induced over-consumption and the waste of food, even while state grain procurement was increased sharply on the basis of highly inflated output forecasts. With worsening Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese leadership increased grain exports, again under the illusion of bountiful harvests, to accelerate China’s debt repayment to the Soviet Union.

Other practices, including the massive diversion of rural labor to backyard iron furnaces and water-conservation projects, led to gross neglect in harvesting the bumper crops of 1958 and contributed to the ensuing famine. By spring 1959, many communes, caught between higher
government procurement and free supply, had exhausted their grain reserves and witnessed a collapse of work morale. At this point, much still could have been done to avoid the worst of the famine. Unfortunately, during the Lushan Conference of 1959, in which he came down hard on Peng Dehuai, Mao unleashed a “second leap” and another push for communal mess halls. This further exacerbated the rural situation and undoubtedly contributed to the jump in China’s mortality rates from 12 per 1,000 in 1958 to 14.6 per 1,000 in 1959 and 25.4 per 1,000 in 1960, according to official Chinese statistics released in the post-Mao era. The statistics reveal that those provinces that had a higher mess-hall participation rate at the end of 1959 also tended to have a higher mortality rate in 1960, the year that China had a net population loss of 10 million people.

**Effects of the Great Leap Famine**

The Great Leap famine was thus clearly rooted in politics rather than nature. Unfortunately, the peasants who had put their faith in Mao’s regime were largely left to fend for themselves when they had exhausted their food supplies. The demographer Judith Banister estimated that the number of excess deaths, i.e., the number of deaths compared to what would have been the case had there been no famine, from 1958 to 1961 was between 15 and 30 million. In aggregate numbers, the Great Leap famine is the worst famine in human history. The incidence of the famine was emphatically rural, with the grain producers becoming the main victims of famine.
The intensity and magnitude of the Great Leap famine far exceeded the Great Depression in the United States and produced a lasting change in Chinese preferences and behavior. It shattered any nascent beliefs the rural people might have had about large rural organizations and led them to question government policies. It also prompted Mao and his colleagues to moderate rural policies and scale down the sizes of rural collective organizations. But the famine also induced fissures among the top leaders. As Mao turned his attention away from the economy, he launched the notorious Cultural Revolution in 1966.

While the basic collective institutions were maintained during Mao’s lifetime, the famine profoundly undermined popular support for such institutions and laid the foundation for China’s eventual decollectivization, or dismantlement of collective institutions in rural areas, following Mao’s death. Through the early 1980s, the provinces that had suffered more severely during the famine were less likely to adopt radical rural policies and institutions. Following Mao’s death in 1976 and the defeat of radical leaders, farmers again turned to household contracting (contracting land to the individual household), particularly in those areas that had suffered the most during the famine. By the turn of the 1980s, the national leadership, now led by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), had embraced rural decollectivization. The Great Leap famine was thus not just a monumental tragedy; it also laid the groundwork for institutional innovation. It is a great historical irony that the Great Leap Forward, launched to accelerate China’s march toward communism, actually served to hasten the arrival of market reforms by precipitating the greatest famine in human history. The tragedy is that China had to go through such a terrible detour.

Dali L. YANG

Further Reading
Great Wall
Chángchéng 长城

The Great Wall (changcheng or wanli changcheng) is a series of defensive walls built in northern China between the fifth century BCE and the nineteenth century. These walls played a role in defending China from incursions by northern steppe peoples, particularly the Mongols during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

Although the term Great Wall suggests a unitary structure, in reality there is no singular Great Wall but rather a series of border walls (bian qiang) built in different regions of northern China in different periods using different building techniques and materials. The most widely recognized areas of the Great Wall today are those walls and towers built north of Beijing in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century out of quarried stones, bricks, and mortar. Although many sources give an approximate length of the Great Wall, there is no effective way to determine the length of all of the border walls, nor have they all been discovered or surveyed in modern times.

Wall-Building in Ancient China

During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), in order to create a barrier against invading armies, states in northern China built border walls out of pounded earth or dry fieldstone (states not in northern China also built border walls). These walls were partially consolidated and expanded under the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), which continued to use the same building techniques. More walls were built along northern borders under the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), when incursions from northern steppe warriors known as “Xiongnu” were common. By the end of the Han dynasty border walls stretched from present-day Gansu to the Korean Peninsula, although these walls were by no means continuous. Subsequent dynasties continued to build walls sporadically, but the next large-scale wall-building effort by a unified Chinese empire was not until the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

Wall-Building in the Ming Dynasty

Although the first high-profile wall-building campaign took place in Liaodong in the 1440s, the most important wall-building projects in the last one hundred years of the dynasty were those designed to protect the Ming capital established by the Yongle emperor (reigned 1402–1423). Beijing is located on a flat plain surrounded to the northwest, north, and northeast by formidable chains of mountains. Yet, two major passes that run through the mountains to the northwest and northeast made the capital vulnerable to raids from the Mongols. One pass runs through the area of Great Wall known today as “Badaling.” The other runs along the Chao River, passing the Great Wall at Gubeikou near the present-day Great Wall tourist sites of Jinshanling and Simatai.
In the 1540s the Altan khan (1507–1582), a descendant of Chinggis (also spelled Genghis) Khan, gained control of the eastern Mongols and plagued the Chinese borderlands to the west. In 1550, after the Ming Jiajing emperor (reigned 1521–1566) declared a no-trade policy, the Altan khan led a major raid on the capital city, leading thousands of Mongol horsemen to the edge of the walled city. Thousands of Chinese living around Beijing were slaughtered and thousands of head of livestock brought back to Mongol territory.

The immediate result was a major wall-building campaign that lasted for the next three decades. The Ming dynasty decided to fortify existing walls and build new ones along the mountain ranges north of Beijing. Most of these walls used unquarried fieldstone but used lime-based mortar to hold the stones together. In 1554 Ming soldiers stationed along the wall in the area of Gubeikou succeeded in repulsing a major Mongol raid. The raiders moved eastward to the area known today as Jinshanling, where they were again repulsed by Ming soldiers. They continued to move eastward to the Great Wall area of Simatai but did not succeed in penetrating the Ming defenses.

In 1568 the Longqing emperor (reigned 1566–1572) invited two of China’s leading military strategists, the general Qi Jiguang and the scholar-official Tan Lun, to the capital to help design Beijing’s defense strategy. The two Ming officials promptly recommended that the Ming dynasty build three thousand brick towers along the border walls where soldiers could be stationed and could store key supplies such as grain, gunpowder, and weapons. That number was eventually scaled down to twelve hundred, and building commenced the next year. The towers were built out of kiln-fired bricks and mortar and were strategically placed at intervals along the ridgelines and on peaks.

An aerial view of the Great Wall shows its expansive reach and fortification points across the mountains. Photo by Tom Christensen.
In 1576, after an unsuccessful attempt to threaten the Ming officer in charge of the area into giving presents such as iron pots, silver, cloth, and grain, a small Mongol tribe launched another raid on Ming territory north of Beijing. The tribe crossed over to Ming territory and attacked a fort, killing eighteen soldiers. Soldiers who chased the tribe back into Mongol territory met their deaths in an ambush. Although the body count was low, this event prompted the Ming dynasty to begin building walls out of bricks and mortar. Eventually a few hot spots along the wall north of Beijing were fortified in this way. In most cases the Ming soldiers built the walls over existing structures.

Today the Ming Great Wall north of Beijing is one of China’s most important tourist sites and one of its most powerful symbols. Although the walls and towers sustained significant erosion owing to the elements and natural forces, as well as the dismantling of certain sections of the Great Wall by peasants in nearby villages who used them to build their houses (this practice was encouraged during the rule of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong), many of the walls and towers have been quite well preserved—a testament to the craftsmanship of their builders. In the 1980s the Chinese government began to reconstruct certain areas of the Great Wall north of Beijing to be designated as official tourist sites (this reconstruction actually began in the 1950s with Badaling). These areas include Badaling, Mutianyu, Jinshaling, and Simatai. In most cases an effort was made to restore the walls and towers to their original condition. In other cases, such as Simatai, many of the walls and towers were reinforced but left in the condition they were in to give people a more authentic picture of how the walls have fared over the past five hundred years or so.

Andrew FIELD

Further Reading
Great West Development Plan

China’s economy has been experiencing double-digit growth for over a dozen years. However, this miraculous increase hasn’t spread wealth equally throughout China. The comparatively sluggish economy in western parts of China could easily disrupt the nation’s rapid development as a whole, while environmental, ethnic minority issues, and allocations of natural and human resources only complicates matters.

China has been growing economically with great speed, but the benefit of this growth is not shared evenly within the country. Some eastern areas of China, such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, are doing well, whereas the western regions of the country such as Guizhou, Tibet, and Gansu are having trouble modernizing, and this gap is growing.

Rather than ignore these disparities, in 1999 China’s then-Communist Party chairman Jiang Zemin introduced the Great West Development Plan and stressed the importance of a balanced economic development between the west and east of China. In 2000 the Great West Development Plan was divided into several projects addressing natural conservation, human resource improvement, and industrial development.

The “Great West” refers to the provinces and cities of Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai and the autonomous regions of Tibet (Xizang, Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uygur, Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi Zhuang. This area covers 71.4 percent of China’s territory (6.85 million square kilometers) and holds 28.8 percent of China’s population (about 367 million people); it is a resource reserve with great market potential for the entire country’s economic growth. Therefore, the Great West Development Plan focuses on more than reducing the income gap between east and west.

Gross domestic product (GDP), the total market value of goods and services produced in an area in a given period, usually a year, is a useful indicator of that area’s development. The GDP of western China accounts for only about 16.8 percent of the national total. Moreover, the per capita GDP of the west is only two-thirds of the national average and less than 40 percent of the per capita GDP of eastern China.

Goals of the Plan

The Great West Development Plan is a difficult but necessary project. According to the plan, within the first ten years of the twenty-first century the infrastructure of the west will be largely enhanced and the ecological environment preserved (the “catch-up steps”), while advantageous industries should be promoted and people’s living standard should be improved (the “developing steps”). If the plan is carried out, by 2050 there will be a new west with a sustainable natural environment, prosperous economy, and stable society.

To quicken development in the west, the plan specifies a need for policies that will support the growth of
investments, taxes, education, and human and natural resources. Therefore, not only an environmentally friendly course of action based on scientific and technological advances, but also a lucrative market for investing through secure and smooth capital channels will be necessary for the plan’s success.

Key Points of the Plan
Infrastructure is the starting point of the plan. To prepare for economic development, efficient infrastructure, such as transportation networks including roads, railways, and airports, is needed. Also needed are a natural gas pipeline, a communication network, an electrical grid, broadcasting networks, and water projects.

Ecological conservation is a “catch-up procedure” for the sacrifices made for previous unplanned growth-oriented development on one hand and a future sustainable growth environment on the other. Large areas of land in the west, once fertile forests or grasslands, were of vital importance for the fragile ecology. These regions were altered for economic benefit, and now the gray, barren soils needs to be cultivated and coaxed back into green forest and grassland reserve, even though it means a short-term economic loss.

Industrial structure adjustment and adaptability will help the west create a niche in future development. The east has capital and technology, but the west has other advantages. Agriculture should be upgraded with support from science, technology, and information to benefit not only local farmers but also the whole country. Natural resources need to be utilized efficiently to promote the transition from a dependency on these resources to a broader economic base. In addition, tertiary industry that is resource efficient and labor intensive, such as tourism, should be encouraged.

Education creates talent, which is the engine for social progress. However, in China’s five minority autonomous regions of the west (Guangxi Zhuang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uygur, and Tibet (Xizang) education is not well developed.

Reform and open-door policies brought successes to the east of China, and such successes can be taken as a reference point for the west. The west needs to adopt preferential policies to stimulate economic activity. State-owned enterprises still need to be adapted to market-oriented economy mechanisms.

The foregoing points have been supported by policies of the central government. For example, in the period 2001–2010, enterprises in encouraged industries enjoy a 15 percent income tax waiver; new enterprises in transportation, electricity, water projects, and broadcasting enjoy two years of income tax waivers and three years of half income tax after being established; farmers’ income from planting trees and grass is tax free for ten years.

What the Plan Means
As a regional development plan, the Great West Development Plan is regarded as a national strategy because the plan may not only reduce the gap between the west and the east but also stimulate development in China as a whole. For the five minority autonomous regions stability will be one of the top priorities. Less-developed minority areas can be a weak link in the chain of stability, and the plan seeks to achieve overall prosperity by focusing on economic development and social progress in these remote areas, and by tapping into both the west’s vast resource reservoir and its large market, the potential of which is far from being fully explored. After a decade of double-digit economic growth, China has the capacity to fully implement the Great West Development Plan to everyone’s benefit.

ZHOU Guanqi

Further Reading
Barriers to Investment in Western China

Many companies continue to hesitate when it comes making large investments in western China. Infrastructure, business support systems, and government practices are all reasons why companies hold back.

Unskilled labor in western China is still very low paid (manufacturing wages are a dramatic 40–50 percent less than they are in the main coastal provinces), but this advantage for foreign companies is counterbalanced by difficulties in locating skilled labor and a decrease in productivity. Although facilities in western China do not require migrant labor and therefore have significantly lower turnover rates than their counterparts in the east, the pool of available high-quality mid-level managers and engineers is smaller, and companies may have to pay a premium to have senior-level managers move from the east.

While the central government is investing heavily in infrastructure projects in western China, the region still lags behind the east. To ship a “standard” truckload from the nearest major port to most major cities within the “Go West” regions costs between $500 and $1,000 and requires one to three days. River transport is only a third of the price of trucking, but it is slow and has limited capacity. Rail links also suffer from limited capacity due to a focus on passenger transport; they can only meet 30–40 percent of demand in the key Yangzi corridor. Air links are still developing and are relatively expensive. Power is generally less expensive than in the east, but reliability can be an issue.

When it comes to business support, foreign companies find that most local suppliers are not developed or sophisticated. Much more time and effort is required to find, qualify, and develop them to meet customer requirements. In addition, western China cannot easily accommodate foreign companies’ need for such sophisticated support services as accounting, consulting, architecture, design, and so forth.

Government policies and regulations are more inconsistent in western China. Intellectual property and environmental regulations exist, but are less stringently enforced than in coastal China.

Greater Xing’an Range

Dàxìng‘ān Lìng 大兴安岭

Greater Xing’an, a sparsely inhabited mountain range in northeastern China, is one of the country’s most important timber areas and home to a wide variety of natural resources, including many used in traditional Chinese medicine. Deforestation has become a problem in the mountain range.

The Greater Xing’an range (Da Xing’an ling) is a crescent-shaped mountain range extending 1,400 kilometers from south to north in the northwestern parts of Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces in northeastern China. The Greater Xing’an range is one of China’s most important timber areas. Other major natural resources include gold, marble, coal, charcoal, and peat. Deposits of silver, copper, iron, titanium, and other metals also have been detected. The area is also known for its many mineral springs as well as a vast variety of plants and herbs used in traditional Chinese medicine.

The Taoer River, running near the border between the two provinces, divides the range into a 100-kilometer-wide southern part and a 2,300-kilometer-wide northern part. The northern part of the range runs for about 670 kilometers, with smooth and rounded peaks rising 1,000 meters above sea level; a few, such as Mount Fengshui and Mount Dajiluqina, reach over 1,390 meters. The eastern slopes are steep; the western slopes merge into the Inner Mongolia Plateau, which is about 700 meters above sea level. It is an exceedingly cold area, with winters lasting more than eight months and an average temperature in January of –28° C. A record low for the area of –52.3° C was recorded in 1969, and permafrost is widespread. The brief but mild and relatively wet summers with an August average temperature of 15° C make a three-month growing season possible. The southern part generally consists of lower mountains and has a somewhat warmer and drier climate. Here grassland and mixed deciduous trees of aspen, oak, willow, and elm have taken the place of the dominant coniferous forests of the northern range.

Since the construction of several railways into the mountains in the 1930s, the region has been heavily deforested, which is increasingly threatening the ecological balance. Between 1960 and 1980 cultivation of farmland has pushed the tree line about 100 kilometers to the north. In 1987 a fire devastated over 1 million hectares of trees, reducing the forest cover of the mountains by an estimated 14.5 percent. This deforestation seriously affected the biodiversity (biological diversity in an environment as indicated by numbers of different species of plants and animals) and climate of the area and has had a critical impact on wildlife such as the already threatened population of brown bears.

The range is sparsely inhabited by ethnic groups, of which the Oroqen and Evenki (or Ewenke), who settled the area in the seventeenth century, are the most numerous. Both were originally nomadic people who bred reindeer, hunted, fished, and gathered wild herbs and fruits. Since the 1950s hunting and forestry have been their main sources of income, while some agricultural products for local consumption have been grown in the lower valleys. Since 1996 hunting prohibitions to protect wildlife have been enforced with increasing strictness by the Chinese...
One of “China’s Greatest Autumn Forests”

While many Western tourists have focused on well-known sites such as the Forbidden City, the Great Wall, and the Terracotta Army at Xi’an, those more familiar with China highlight other attractions, including ancient forests. This text comes from a website extolling the glories of an autumn day spent in the mountains.

Leaving Beijing or Shanghai for Northern Heilongjiang is like leaving Odessa or Moscow for Siberia. The Great Xing’an would be in Siberia, but for the Heilongjiang River, and sits at a higher elevation. The thousand-mile stretch is almost exclusively preserved virgin forest, China’s largest reserve of such, and a cornucopia of ecological diversity, although packed in ice much of the time. Visit late in the year at your own peril; with a good Oroqen guide you may live to see the northern lights.

The Oroqens are one of China’s most fascinating minorities, native to this region, and their lifestyle (until recently) reflects much of what is fascinating about this remote forest realm. They’ve been known by the Han for hundreds of years as both “the Hunting Clan”, and “the Deer-using Clan.” With such a short growing season and such a profusion of game, from the four footed in the hills to the finned in the rivers, the Oroqen had no reason to seek sustenance from the soil. The deer that they domesticated are actually reindeer, showing that these people and their lives are as Arctic as the Laplanders.

Not until the 1950s were the first families of Oroqen goaded out of their forest retreats and put in vaguely urban centers, but there are still some making a life in the forests, and worshiping their gods of fire and stone. If getting to the leafy heart of darkness is your kick, you can’t go far wrong with Xing’an, although you’ll go far by train—a twelve hour ride from Harbin to Jagdaqi, what passes for a major city in those parts.


Further Reading


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The Green Gang (Qing bang), the most famous and feared secret society in late Qing and Republican China, was centered in Shanghai and controlled most of the city’s criminal rackets. Under the leadership of Du Yuesheng, the Green Gang rose to national prominence in the 1930s.

The Green Gang was the most famous secret-society/underworld-gangster organization in twentieth-century China, controlling a vast array of rackets, primarily in Shanghai, including opium trafficking, prostitution, armed robbery, extortion, kidnapping, child slavery, gambling, and illegal arms sales.

Emerging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from an earlier criminal/fraternal organization known as the “Friends of the Way of Tranquility and Purity” (Anqing daoyou), the Green Gang itself claimed descent from the seventeenth-century “Three Patriarchs.” These men, Weng Yan, Qian Jian, and Pan Qing, were followers of the Luo sect of folk Buddhism popular among Grand Canal boatmen’s associations at the end of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and throughout the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The Friends of the Way flourished in Shanghai in the middle of the nineteenth century as thousands of displaced peoples from the Taiping Rebellion fled to the city, where they found work and protection among the salt smugglers. Gradually, although historical evidence remains sketchy, certain branches of the Friends of the Way split off and formed the Green Gang.

The Green Gang’s rapid expansion in the Shanghai underworld was fostered by the semicolonial structure of the urban environment. Shanghai at the time was divided into three cities—the Chinese city of Nanshi, the French Concession, and the International Settlement, each of which had jurisdiction over its territory. With its headquarters in one jurisdiction the Green Gang carried out its criminal enterprises in the other two with virtual carte blanche. To aid its criminal activities the Green Gang had many members highly placed in police departments throughout the city.

In the 1920s and 1930s famous Green Gang leaders such as Du Yuesheng (1888–1951), Huang Jinrong (1868–1953), Zhang Renkui (1859–1945), Gu Zhuxuan (1885–1956), and Zhang Xiaolin (1877–1940) brought the Green Gang into the realm of national politics and economic life. With a stranglehold on opium trafficking thanks to an agreement with the authorities in the French Concession, the Green Gang used its considerable profits to become an urban power broker and part of the fabric of everyday Shanghai life.

Throughout the Republican era (1912–1949) the organizationally strong but ideologically weak gang made alliances with whichever political force would best help maintain its interests. At various times the Green Gang forged alliances with warlords, the Nationalist Party (Guomindang), the Communist Party, and even the Japanese during World War II. Most famously, the Green Gang worked hand-in-hand with the Nationalist Party in the 12 April 1927 massacre of five thousand alleged...
pro-Communist workers known as the “White Terror” (*baise kongbu*).

Du Yuesheng, the primary “leader” of the 1930s Green Gang, which was actually only a loose coterie of overlapping organizations, rose to national prominence and became a figure of Shanghai folklore as he took control of major industries, brokered deals between national workers’ unions and the government, and maintained his iron grip over the vast underworld of Shanghai crime.

The Green Gang declined as an organization when the Communists captured Shanghai in 1949, and most members fled to Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Lane J. HARRIS

**Further Reading**


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**Tu Yueh-Sheng**, known as “Big-eared Tu,” the leader of Shanghai’s notorious Green Gang—a criminal cartel that dominated Chinese drug traffic and heroin exports. PHOTO COURTESY BRIAN CROZIER.
GU Yanwu

Gù Yánwǔ 顧炎武

As a founding father of the school of Evidential Inquiry, Gu Yanwu abandoned the approaches of the Song and Ming neo-Confucianists and replaced them with a strong emphasis on scholarly textual criticism favored by Han dynasty scholars. Gu opened the path to a renaissance of studying the ancient Chinese classics, as well as advancing practical studies to deal with specific problems that China faced.

Gu Yanwu was a great scholar during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties who exerted a profound influence over Qing scholarship. He is widely recognized as the founding master of the school of Evidential Inquiry (Kaoju xue 考據學) or Han Learning (Hanxue 漢學).

A native of Kunshan, Jiangsu Province, Gu was born into a wealthy family that had held government posts for many generations. At the age of fifteen, Gu joined Fushe, a literary association that was deeply involved in politics. While Ming China was falling into the hands of the Manchu armies, Gu joined an anti-Manchu resistance movement. The outcome of the Manchu invasion was especially tragic for Gu and his family: his hometown was sacked, his two brothers were killed, Manchu soldiers cut off the right arm of his biological mother, and his foster mother committed suicide by fasting. Gu thereafter became an ardent nationalist and Ming loyalist who, throughout his life, refused to serve the Manchus; he scorned those who served the new dynasty for material benefits. Many twentieth-century Chinese nationalists, when facing the crises of Western and Japanese invasions, were continually inspired by Gu’s most patriotic expression that “every ordinary Chinese has a responsibility” to defend the Chinese civilization.

Gu detested the once-flourishing neo-Confucian studies advanced by scholars like Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming (1472-1529) of the Song (960–1279) and Ming dynasties. Gu characterized the Song neo-Confucian scholars as being only interested in volubly and subjectively expressing their unrestrained opinions on abstract Confucian ethical principles. He further criticized the Ming neo-Confucian scholars for being obsessed with their own inwardly orientated meditative self-reflections on the vague and illusive goodness of human mind and human nature while taking no specific actions to do what the ancient sages said. Regarding these studies as having dealt with no practical problems faced by society and government, Gu satirized them as chan 禪 (a translation of the Sanskrit term dhyāna, meaning “sitting quietly to do meditation”) studies or empty studies.

Promoting a new type of learning, Gu insisted on returning to the study of the Confucian classics themselves and not the willful interpretations of the Song and Ming neo-Confucianists; he argued for an accurate restoration of the original texts of the classics and the correction of textual errors that occurred during the transcribing and printing processes in the past. Also, since these classics were written in ancient times, Gu claimed that philological researches and textual criticism were necessary to understand them. Gu believed that if anyone’s annotations
and interpretations of these ancient classics were more accurate, that should be those of the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) scholars, who lived closer to the time when the ancient classics were written. Gu thus urged scholars to thoroughly study the works of these Han scholars. Gu himself studied Han textual criticisms and methods and was later credited as the founder of the so-called school of Evidential Inquiry (Kaoju xue 考據學) or Han Learning (Hanxue 漢學), which flourished in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and had a powerful impact on Chinese linguistic (e.g., phonology) and culture studies.

Gu’s task was to clean up the loamy but distorted interpretations of the Song and Ming scholars and return to the simple teachings of the Confucian classics. Gu maintained that the value of the Confucian classics did not lie in their fancy words and sophisticated philosophical points, but in their usefulness in guiding people to behave properly and become filial, loyal, humane, and polite, as well as in guiding officials to govern justly, to make proper laws and regulations, to educate people, and to rectify people’s customs. Gu wrote many short essays, most of which were collected in his Rizhi lu (Records of Daily Knowledge), to clarify and correct past misinterpretations of the classical Confucian texts.

To show how a practical and useful knowledge, rather than the “useless and impractical” one produced by the Song and Ming scholars, could be pursued, Gu was the first in Chinese history to study systematically the phonology of the ancient Chinese language. With the re-establishment of the correct ancient pronunciations of Chinese characters and the understanding of how some pronunciations had changed over time, Gu believed that modern scholars could better understand how original texts of the Chinese classics should be read and interpreted, and thus restore the distortions done to these texts by scholars of the past.

After he failed civil service examinations in 1639, Gu abandoned for good all the lifeless studies-for-the-sake-of examinations, which focused mainly on memorizing Song neo-Confucianists’ annotations of the Confucian classics and on writing essays that followed fixed styles and format and had no intention of solving any actual political, economic, and social problems. Gu thereafter devoted his full energy to practical learning. Starting in 1657, Gu spent twenty some years traveling throughout northern China until he settled in Shaaxi for the remainder of his life. While traveling, he kept reading books, making new friends, collecting materials from places he visited, and writing constantly. In the early 1660s, Gu completed his practical learning masterpiece, the 100-chapter Tianxia junguo libing shu (The Book on Advantages and Problems Faced by Different Regions in the [Chinese] Empire). The book was an extensive collection of historical materials concerning regional customs, histories, geographies, military defense and supplies, agriculture, farmland conditions, river and irrigation systems, wasteland reclamations, grain transpiration, policies regarding taxations or salt production and trade, social unrests, and so forth. Meanwhile, Gu kept adding short essays and commentaries to his most important aforementioned scholarship collection, Rizhi lu, which remained unfinished at the end of his life. People can find in Rizhi lu’s 1,000-plus essays and commentaries Gu’s rich thoughts on statecraft—government operation and control, methods of selecting officials, taxation policies and management, rectification of ill social customs, and so on.

With all his efforts, Gu brought Confucian studies to a historical turning point where a more rational attitude was developed for handling the Confucian classics and where more practical issues concerning governance, national and regional agriculture, commerce, military defense, and society were to be tackled. Inspired by Gu, more Evidential Inquiry or Han Learning scholars hence emerged who not only reexamined and “objectively” annotated the main texts of the Chinese philosophical, historical, and literary classics, but also fostered a practical, rational, and even scientific approach to statecraft. Their efforts contributed to a renaissance of Chinese scholarly and cultural studies after centuries of dominance of Buddhist teachings and practices and helped to restore a confidence in the Chinese civilization at a sensitive historical moment when the alien Manchus still ruled China. Gu Yanwu’s important position in the Chinese intellectual history lies in the fact that, with his own brilliant groundbreaking scholarly accomplishments, he had laid down the most important foundation for all the new practical studies to blossom in the centuries that followed.

Yamin Xu

Further Reading
The Pursuit of Learning

While writing a letter to a friend, Gu Yanwu discusses and criticizes certain men’s pursuit of sagehood.

What then do I consider to be the way of the sage? I would say “extensively studying all learning” and “in your conduct having a sense of shame.” Everything from your own person up to the whole nation should be a matter of study. In everything from your personal position as a son, a subject, a brother, and a friend to all your comings and goings, your giving and taking, you should have things of which you would be ashamed. This sense of shame before others is a vital matter. It does not mean being ashamed of your clothing or the food you eat, but ashamed that there should be a single humble man or woman who does not enjoy the blessing that are his due. This is why Mencius said that “all things are complete in me” if I “examine myself and find sincerity.” Alas, if a scholar does not first define this sense of shame, he will have no basis as a person, and if he does not love antiquity and acquire broad knowledge, his learning will be vain and hollow. These baseless men with their hollow learning day after day pursue sagehood, and yet I perceive that with each day they only depart further from in.

GUAN Hanqing

Guān Hǎnqīng 关汉卿

1210/1220?–1300 Early dramatist

The Yuan dynasty dramatist Guan Hanqing wrote in the zaju format, a stylized form of theater usually in four acts. Scholars have likened his influence on Chinese theater to that of Shakespeare on Western theater.

Little is known about Guan Hanqing’s life. It has been said that he was born in Dadu (today’s Beijing), Qizhou of Hebei Province, or Jiezou of Shanxi Province. He was either a physician himself prior to becoming a dramatist or simply a member of a physician’s family.

One fact is certain: He was known as one of the four greatest dramatists of Yuanqu (melodious verse of Yuan), which is a generic name for Yuan Zaju (variety drama of Yuan), the national theatrical form of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Yuan Zaju, or simply zaju, followed a rigid format. It had four, or occasionally five, acts and four roles in the cast, namely, dan (female), mo (male), jing (strong man or clown), and za (all other roles). Its performance involved singing, talking, and acting, but only the leading role could sing. Guan Hanqing authored sixty-seven zaju, eighteen of which have survived, including Dou E yuan (The Injustice Done to Dou E), Jiu fengchen (Saving a Prostitute), Wang jiang ting (River-Watching Pavilion), Bai yue ting (Moon-Worshipping Pavilion), Lu Zhailang (A Man of the Lu Studio), Dan dao hui (Meeting the Enemies Alone), and Tiao feng yue (Teasing an Unfaithful Lover).

Dou E yuan, also known as Liuyue xue (Snow of June), is the most famous of Guan Hanqing’s works. It is a tragedy about a young woman named Dou E, who is betrothed to the son of her father’s debtor but soon widowed. A hooligan named Zhang Lü’er covets Dou E’s beauty. When she rejects him he stealthily poisons the food that Dou E intends to feed her mother-in-law, but Zhang’s father accidentally eats it and dies. Zhang Lü’er then accuses Dou E of murdering his father. Taking Zhang’s bribe, the magistrate sentences Dou E to death. Dou E bewails her injustice, “Heaven, how can you misidentify the good from the bad? / Earth, how come you indiscriminate right and wrong?” (Guan, 1959). Before the execution, she asks that her blood drop not onto the ground, that snow fall to cover her body in midsummer, and that a three-year drought hit the magistrate’s county—all as a divine revelation of her innocence. Then her spirit appears before her father, who has become a high-ranking official after a successful civil examination financed by borrowed money. Eventually the father avenges Dou E by punishing Zhang Lü’er and the magistrate.

Guan Hanqing’s zaju dramas are celebrated for their well-planned, intriguing, and emotion-filled plots. The language is elegantly versed and yet full of the vernacular of his time, which made them easily understood by his audience. His characters are vivid, talking in dialogue appropriate to their respective roles.

Scholars have likened Guan Hanqing’s influence on the theatrical world in China to that of Shakespeare on Western drama. Many of his zaju have been adapted into Beijing Operas as well as Kunqu, a form of opera designated as a World Cultural Heritage masterpiece by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 1958 the World Peace Council named Guan
Hanqing among the “famous men of world culture.” His dramas have been translated into many languages.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading


From Snow in June

In this brief excerpt from Guan Hanqing’s most famous work, Dou E yuan, (also known as The Injustice Done to Tou Ngo, or by its English title Snow in June), the character Tou Ngo responds to the mockery of the prophecies she has foretold.

You say nothing is to be expected of the Lord of Heaven,
That there is no pity for the human heart.
You cannot know the Emperor of Heaven will fulfill people’s wishes.
A drought will come to the country because you officials have no care to see justice done,
And anyone who has a mind to speak is forced to hold his tongue.


Guangdong Province
Guangdong Province is one of China’s most important economic and cultural areas. About the size of Syria, it is China’s most populous and wealthiest province with a gross domestic product (GDP) of 3.07 trillion yuan (US$422 billion). Its location on the southeastern coast of China gives it direct access to the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Macao and Southeast Asia.

The role of Guangdong Province in China is paradoxical. Guangdong has always been a somewhat different and marginal place. Yet this marginal position has been why the province has often played a central role in Chinese history. In recent years Guangdong’s connections with foreign countries and neighboring economies have generated huge economic growth for the province, which became a locomotive for China. Despite these achievements its development remains uneven because the province is culturally diverse and faces tough challenges.

Geographical and Cultural Diversity

The core of Guangdong is formed by the Pearl River Delta, with the capital city Guangzhou at the center. Foshan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Zhongshan, Dongguan, and Jiangmen are the other main cities. The delta, populated mostly by Cantonese people, was transformed during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries from an agricultural region—producing such commodities as sugarcane, silk, tropical fruits, and fish—into an industrial powerhouse. By comparison, northern and western Guangdong are hilly or mountainous and remain relatively poor. The Chaozhou area, near the Fujian border, is densely populated and fertile, and incorporates the two major urban centers of Chaozhou and Shantou. In addition to Cantonese and Chaozhou people, Guangdong also hosts a large minority of Hakka and a sizable population of fishermen with different traditions and languages and, at times, conflicting relationships with the Cantonese.

“The Mountains Are High and the Emperor is Far Away”

Because of its distance from Beijing, Guangdong was able to develop relatively independent and unorthodox policies and behaviors, a fact echoed by the Chinese proverbial expression “The mountains are high and the emperor is far away.” Since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Guangzhou has been a trading center frequented by Indian and, later, Arabic merchants. During the sixteenth century, the Portuguese settled in Macao, on Guangdong’s southern coast, followed two centuries later by the Americans, British, and other Europeans, who began trading in Guangzhou. Nevertheless, in the sixteenth century, economic growth, not international trade, led to the increased demand for grains and land reclamation. Moreover, at the end of the century, the ban on overseas trade had no effect on Guangdong.

By the eighteenth century, Guangdong’s economy benefited significantly from the confinement of China’s
foreign trade to Guangzhou, under the cohong, or licensed Guangzhou merchants guild system. Again, its distance from Beijing played a role in the imperial decision to restrict foreign trade to Guangzhou.

During the First Opium War (1839–1842), Guangdong was again at the heart of Chinese history. The decision of Lin Zexu (1785–1850), the imperial commissioner in Guangdong, to ban opium and seize stocks held by foreigners was motivated by moral, as well as economic, reasons, as the outflow of silver brought about an economic crisis in China. The Treaty of Nanking (1842), which ended the hostilities, greatly affected Guangdong and the rest of China with the cession of the island of Hong Kong to the British. Guangdong gradually lost its economic preeminence to Shanghai but remained a ground for new ideas and experiments. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864),
which originated in Guangxi, did not spare Guangdong. Most important, the province is the birthplace of the Chinese Revolution and of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1924), the “Father of the Revolution.” In 1938 the Japanese occupation of Guangzhou interrupted the economic progress initiated by the warlord Chen Jitang (1890–1954).

**From the Maoist Period to the Open Door Policy**

Guangdong’s difficulties continued during the Maoist era. With its proximity to Hong Kong and Macao, and its strong links with foreign countries because of an old wave of migration that accelerated during the nineteenth century, Guangdong was perceived by Beijing as unreliable. Most of its international trade was cut off for much of this period. National policies emphasizing the development of heavy industry were detrimental to Guangdong, which lacks natural and energy resources. Consequently, it concentrated on rice production while neglecting traditional commercial cultures.

With the reforms of the late 1970s, Guangdong revived its traditional role of experimenter and innovator. Rural reforms stimulated commercial agricultural production and rural industries. The Open Door policy, aimed at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), revived the traditional links between the province, especially in the Pearl River Delta, and Hong Kong, Macao, and overseas Chinese. Also significant was the creation in 1980 of special economic zones. The zones—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou—are in Guangdong. The only exception is Xiamen, in Fujian Province. In 1988 Hainan Island was detached from Guangdong to form another special economic zone. As land prices and wages in Hong Kong soared, thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises in Hong Kong moved across the border, thereby spurring the development of subcontractor industries in Shenzhen, Dongguan, Foshan, and other areas. The Pearl River Delta became the prime region of China for FDI.

The social consequences of this economic reorganization, however, were enormous. For the first time in thirty years, local populations were in contact with the lifestyles of their counterparts in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Many switched from an agricultural way of life to an industrial one. The high demand for unskilled workers stimulated migration from China’s less developed areas, such as Hunan and Jiangxi, which mixed populations with different cultures.
and dialects. The number of migrants in Guangdong has been difficult to assess. Official statistics indicated 13 million people in 2006, which may be a severe underestimation. As a result, Guangdong is China’s richest province, with the highest gross domestic product in the country—3.07 trillion yuan (US$422 billion), the sixth highest per capita gross domestic product 32,713 yuan, and the top exporter ($241 billion) of any province in the country in 2005.

**Future Challenges**

Despite these achievements Guangdong faces major challenges. Production factor costs (e.g., the labor force) have greatly increased over the last thirty years, making technological upgrading necessary despite undeniable progress in that field over the past ten years. The decentralization of the 1980s led to competition between local governments not only for access to technologies or FDI but also for infrastructure. Resources have been wasted in duplicated infrastructure projects, such as airports, and local cooperation remains difficult.

The relationship between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta needs to be better defined. Since 1997, the two economies have become more integrated while new projects like the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge continue. High-level political discussions are constantly held. Political channels of discussions between the Guangdong governments and that of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have been established to facilitate the relationship between these two entities. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether Hong Kong should remain a window into China while the delta keeps its industrial function, or if the delta should assume a more leading position. In relation to this point, the exact role of each of the two metropolises of Hong Kong and Guangzhou will have to be clarified.

After thirty years of double-digit economic growth in China, the last twenty of which have been the most accelerated, it is clear that Guangdong has become proportionally less important for China in comparison to other areas, such as the Yangzi Delta, which has attracted considerable foreign and state investment in recent years. But this evolution questions the future economic situation of the province within the context of national interests and globalization. To address this matter, local leaders are trying to stimulate local demand and investment in order to wean Guangdong off FDI and exports. While this
solution has been successfully implemented by newly industrialized economies, the long-term effects for Guangdong are unclear. Its aging population (about 10 million people are over 60 years old) may jeopardize this strategy and lower the province’s dynamism, not to mention the usual challenges associated with an aging population. A further challenge, and one that may trump the others, is how to curb the high level of pollution created by the explosive economic growth of the last twenty years.

Louis AUGUSTIN-JEAN

Further Reading


Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region

Guǎngxī Zhuàngzú Zìzhìqū
广西壮族自治区

47.68 million est. 2007 pop. 236,300 square km

Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region is one of China’s five Autonomous Regions: administrative divisions where certain ethnic groups—in this case the Zhuang—predominate. It is located on China’s southern coast and is famous both in China and around the world for its misty mountain scenery.

The Autonomous Region of Guangxi is located on the southern coast of China. Since 1958 the official name has been the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, named for the Zhuang nationality, the largest of China’s fifty-five minority ethnic groups; they constitute a third of the region’s population of nearly 48 million (2000 est.). The Zhuang speak a language (in two dialects) that belongs to the Zhuang-Dong/Dai branch of Sino-Tibetan, a relative of Thai.

Guangxi covers an area of 236,300 square kilometers (91,200 square miles, about the size of Romania) and borders on Vietnam and China’s Yunnan Province in the west, on Guizhou and Hunan provinces in the north, on Guangdong Province in the east, and on the Gulf of Tonkin in the south. The region is dominated by mountains with peaks over 2,000 meters above sea level in the far west and the far north. Guangxi Zhuang A.R. is traversed by sixty-nine rivers, most of which are tributaries to the Zhu (Pearl) River.

Guangxi has a subtropical monsoon climate, and the rainy season from April to September accounts for 80 percent of the annual precipitation of 1,250 to 1,750 millimeters. Temperatures in January average between 6° and 15° C, while the July average is between 23° and 28° C. The capital, Nanning (2007 estimated population of 6.83 million) is in the southern central part of Guangxi and is known as the “Green City” because of its array of parks and its subtropical climate. The eastern part of the region became part of the Qin empire (221–206 BCE) in 214 BCE, and after a brief period of independence, was conquered by the Han empire (206 BCE–220 CE) in 112–111 BCE. From the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) onward, the area has been part of various southern administrative divisions, sometimes divided into a Han Chinese region in the east and a Zhuang region in the west. Throughout the centuries, the region has been marked by rebellions against succeeding imperial governments and by tribal warfare between the Zhuang and other minority nationalities that were pushed south by the Chinese migration from the north. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) originated in Guangxi, and later in the nineteenth century the French colonial power in Indochina extended its activities to the region.

Guangxi is one of China’s most diversified areas with regard to population. Although the Han Chinese today constitute over 60 percent of the population, there are eleven minority nationalities, of which the Zhuang is the largest by far. Several of these minority groups number fewer than 100,000 people. The most important agricultural crops are rice, millet, and sugarcane, but the region grows a wide variety of crops, including tobacco, tea, fruit, soybeans, sweet potatoes, and peanuts. In the mountains in the northwest, forestry dominates, with pine, fir, oak, and camphor trees. Major industries include textiles, chemicals, machine building, and food and tobacco processing. The scenic areas around Guilin
and Yangshuo in the northeast, featuring dramatic karst (limestone) mountains and underground caves, provide a major source of income through tourism. The image of the improbably steep, misty mountains of Guangxi is famous around the world.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading


Guangzhou (Canton) has been an economic center for centuries. The city, with its liberal economic policies, has played a major role in China’s recent modernization efforts, attracting foreign capital and investment. Guangzhou is home of the Chinese Export Commodities Fair, better known as the “Canton Trade Fair.”

Guangzhou (Canton) is the largest city in southern China and the capital of Guangdong Province, which is the main point of entry to China from Hong Kong. Guangzhou is located on the southeastern coast in the Pearl River delta.

As the economic center of the delta, Guangzhou is one of the nation’s leading manufacturing and commercial areas. The city’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $92 billion in 2007, sixth among Chinese cities. Guangzhou has a long history of economic activity. As far back as the eleventh century, foreign traders settled in Guangzhou to trade spices and ivory for tea and silk. During the nineteenth century Guangzhou was further opened to the West when European nations imposed on China unequal trade treaties that gave traders from Europe access to Chinese markets. In addition to Guangzhou’s importance as a trading center, the city played a major role in the First Opium War (1839–1842), the Republican Revolution of 1911, and current political and economic reforms in China.

Guangzhou gained notoriety for another reason after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Residents of the city who had relatives living abroad were either punished or reeducated. Guangzhou residents were next attacked for their overseas family connections during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), this time by Red Guards. Residents who had relatives overseas were either harassed or persecuted for their contact with lifestyles deemed decadent. Guangzhou still has China’s largest population of people with relatives living abroad.

Guangzhou’s industry includes computers, petrochemicals, machinery, shipbuilding, sugar refining, textiles, household electrical appliances, light industrial products for daily use, rubber products, and garments. Local crops include rice, sugarcane, and fruit. Mineral resources include zinc, lead, limestone, coal, salt, copper, and iron.
Guangzhou, empowered by its liberal economic policies, has played a central role in the country’s recent modernization efforts, attracting foreign investment and capital. Western companies wanting to enter the Chinese market have established shops, factories, and hotels. But despite such investment, overseas Chinese investors account for most of the foreign capital.

Guangzhou is home of the Chinese Export Commodities Fair, which is more commonly known as the Canton Trade Fair. The fair, established in 1957, is held every April and October. The relevance of the fair has been in question, however, since China’s admittance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the nation’s continuing economic reforms. In the past the fair offered the only place where representatives of Chinese state-owned enterprises and foreign companies could negotiate deals. But with the opening of China’s massive economy, the fair faces increasing competition from other provincial and municipal governments intent on hosting large-scale business and trade conventions.

Keith A. LEITICH

Further Reading

The concept of guanxi in China is based on people having common experiences or connections—being a classmate or a co-worker, coming from the same area, having mutual friends—through which they can network. As a tool for contact and communication, guanxi holds great value in Chinese society. Because guanxi often involves an exchange of favors it can occasionally result in corruption.

The concept of guanxi, or “social relationships,” is important in everyday Chinese life. Both individual and group interests are asserted via such relationships. There is a particular image of society behind this concept. Many Chinese see society in the first instance as a hierarchically structured order covered by an interlaced network of relationships. While a person’s outward appearance and behavior may be important for many Europeans, who one knows and to which group or work unit one belongs are of consequence for many Chinese.

Not all interpersonal relations are based on guanxi. Relations between members of an immediate family or between spouses are based on other obligations (for example, obedience or respect). Guanxi relations arise when people have certain things in common, such as coming from the same area, mutual experiences or friends, or other social connections, and they are developed first of all with people with whom one is in direct contact.

Tong Relationships

Tong, or having something in common, is the most important basis for guanxi. The tongban (classmate), tongbao (person from the same region), tonghang (person in the same business), tongshi (colleague), tongxian (person from the same hometown or village), and tongxue (person who studied at the same school) all have special relations with one another (tong relationships). Relations can also be forged through gifts, personal favors, or mediation by third parties. They include mutual obligations and expectations. For every action, something is expected in return. Guanxi is less a private relationship than a role-playing game that, on the basis of previous or current situations, produces expectations. Those who do favors gain “face” and are recognized by others as people who have respect for those around them.

Friendship and tong relationships involve certain obligations, such as constant readiness to help and support not only the person directly involved in the relationship but also his or her family and friends. Refusing to give this help and support was and is seen as negative social behavior, as a complete lack of any kind of human feeling, or alternatively as proof that someone does not love those to whom he or she is naturally linked and therefore obliged to help. In these cases, refusing to help is seen as the highest form of inhumanity and a break with morality.
**Guanxi as Connection**

To make use of guanxi, both sides have to be able to give each other something (influence, protection, access to scarce goods and services, opportunities for promotion or profit). If no connection exists with an influential person, a link is “created” (la guanxi). To do this, a person from the same guanxi network is sought who can, via various channels, set up the connection. For example: A requires something from D. However, there is no guanxi between them. In A’s relationship network, there is B, who is connected with C. And C has guanxi with D. A therefore asks B to get in touch with C. B helps A and turns to C; C wants to help B and speaks with D. D wants to do C a favor and therefore helps A. Through this sort chain, new guanxi connections develop and with them new mutual obligations. In this way, guanxi fulfills the function of a social investment and can be seen as a relationship between people or institutions based on exchange and with a mutual understanding of the rights and obligations of both parties.

**Guanxi versus Corruption**

Although there are distinct similarities between guanxi and corruption, the two phenomena are not identical, because the social and ethical concepts behind them are (at least theoretically) different. Unlike corruption, guanxi is based on real or imagined things in common and is therefore a question of personal emotions. This means that one looks after the individual in question personally and is prepared to help him or her. These feelings can be maintained and extended through favors and gifts. Presents of this kind can be found in the traditions of many peoples, and it becomes corruption only within the framework of a rational state form.

**Guanxi as Network**

There are different degrees of intensity of guanxi depending on the degree of emotion involved. The bigger the emotional aspect, the closer the relationship. Guanxi relationships based on experiences in common plus emotional connections are therefore stronger than those that came about merely via mediation by a third party. The stronger a relationship, the more social, political, and economic use can be made of it, the more social capital it has.

Guanxi relationships have always played an important role in Chinese history. In premodern China, there was a life-long bond, including mutual political loyalty, between officials who had passed the same top-level exam. At the same time, they were politically loyal to the higher-rank officials who had examined them. This was an important basis for the emergence of “old-boy networks,” which today still exist in the form of loyalty to those who studied at the same university or to former political leaders. People from the same village or from the same province clubbed together in areas far from their local region to form regional groups, the members of which are obligated to assist one another. This practice continues today.

In the People’s Republic, a system of personal dependencies on superiors developed, because superiors were responsible for hiring, promotion, rewards, punishment, or evaluation of political attitude and therefore could determine the whole life and career of their subordinates. This was encouraged by the fact that the danwei (work unit) was responsible not only for one’s work life but also for political, economical, and social affairs. In this way, an authoritarian culture with relationships based on personal loyalty and “old-boy networks” was encouraged. Guanxi relationships are particularly important in this context because before the reforms there were many shortages of goods and services that the state in its monopolist position oversaw, and officials enjoyed privileges that allowed them to use guanxi to obtain everything that was not available legitimately or available only in limited quantities. Friendship and acquaintance with official cadres still help ease some material problems, and political careers and promotions depend on connections with leading functionaries.

Today guanxi still runs through the entire social framework: from employment (retaining or changing jobs) to finance and economics (granting business licenses, loans, tax rates) and everyday life (distribution of housing, access to good medical care), to name only a few examples. Just about everybody has to use guanxi to ensure trouble-free living and working. The reform era
has even led to a significant expansion of guanxi relationships. The strong orientation toward a market economy, combined with the simultaneous retention of the party’s monopoly on power, has led to more fostering and development of guanxi in the form of an explosion of present giving and hospitality, which has meant significantly higher expenditures for individuals and institutions.

**Guanxi as a Specifically Chinese Institution**

The main reason for guanxi is social uncertainty, particularly when other security structures such as the clan or the village community are no longer able to provide social protection. Those affected try to obtain personal protection through guanxi, particularly when in positions of political and legal uncertainty. In addition, studies have shown that the Chinese (because of their political and social experiences) are a lot more suspicious of other people and of their environment than, for example, Americans are. The conclusion from this is that suspicion and uncertainty make people seek security and trust not in the political sphere but in the private sphere and in guanxi relationships—an important factor in the creation of factions and “old boy networks.”

Guanxi is an important instrument for contact and communication between social groups and communities (villages, clubs, associations, professional groups) and also between individuals and the state or party, particularly since it eases reciprocal bargaining processes and can lead to decisions that otherwise would not be taken or would be only partially reached. Where there are no formal avenues for participation and the mechanisms for institutional pressure are weak, guanxi becomes a means to influence politics and political decisions and serves to link the state (party) with society. However, because individuals and groups use guanxi to seek influence, power, or advantages and in doing so disregard state, ethical, moral, social, or political standards, actively breaking with norms when it is advantageous to those involved, this behavior encourages and occasionally overlaps with corruption.

Guanxi is neither a “typically Confucian” nor a “typically socialist” concept. It should instead be interpreted as a principle on which society is organized that is explicable in both cultural and political terms and that functions in the People’s Republic of China as well as in Taiwan and among Chinese living abroad.

**Thomas HEBERBER**

**Further Reading**


Guanyin

Guānyīn 关音

Guanyin 觀音, or Guanshiyin 觀世音, is one of the most popular deities worshipped among Chinese Buddhists. During the process of domestication, this Indian male deity was transformed into a female divine savior, characterized by great mercy and compassion (daci dabei 大慈大悲); she is known for her ability to bestow miracles on her devotees.

Guanyin (or Guanshiyin) is the Chinese name for Avalokiteśvara, a male celestial bodhisattva (deity) in Indian Buddhism. Literally guan means “to perceive” or “to look on,” and [shi]yin refers to the “[world’s] sounds” of prayers. In China Guanyin is known as a goddess characterized by great mercy and compassion; she is efficacious in response to anyone who sincerely prays to her or calls out her name for help.

Two Mahayana Buddhist scriptures are particularly responsible for popularizing Guanyin worship in China. One is the twenty-fifth chapter of the Lotus Scripture (Saddharmapundarikâ-sûtra; Chinese: Miaofa lianhua jing), especially the version translated by Kumārajīva (344–413?) in 406 CE. Guanyin is said to be a compassionate deity who assumes various forms in the world to save people from suffering. This chapter, entitled “Universal Gate” (pumen), later became an independent text known as the Guanyin Scripture. The other scripture is the Longer Pure Land Scripture (Sukhâvatîvyûha-sûtra; Chinese: Wuliangshou jing), translated into Chinese around the third century CE. Guanyin here is the chief assistant to Amitâbha Buddha, the Buddha worshipped in Pure Land Buddhism. With the wide appeal of the Lotus Scripture and the popularity of Pure Land Buddhism, Guanyin worship has developed into one of the most prominent religious practices in Chinese Buddhism.

In the beginning Guanyin as shown in paintings or sculpture was either masculine or asexual. Gradually, however, this Indian male deity was transformed into a distinctively Chinese goddess. One theory among modern scholars to explain the sexual transformation of Guanyin is that Târâ, the white-robed goddess of mercy in Tibetan Tantric Buddhism, may have influenced the Chinese projection of a female Guanyin. The most recent theory, however, suggests that the feminization of Guanyin should be seen as a result of the sinicization of Indian Buddhism by incorporating various images and myths of goddesses in Chinese Daoism and folk religions. Whatever the case may be, representations of Guanyin clearly have become predominately feminine since the tenth century.

Apocryphal scriptures and miracle tales about Guanyin started to circulate during the fifth century and continue to be widely read by Buddhists today. As Guanyin’s popularity increased, she was also associated with many indigenous local legends. By far the best-known legend is that of Princess Miaoshan in Honan, which began to be told as the life story of Guanyin around the eleventh century. Miaoshan, a king’s third daughter, was a devout Buddhist who refused to marry. After her angry father killed her, she miraculously revived
and returned to Earth to cure her father’s illness by sacrificing her eyes and hands. She later manifested herself before her parents as a divine being with a thousand arms and a thousand eyes.

Guanyin is believed to embody the power to bring women sons, save fishermen from calamities at sea, cure the sick, and protect the faithful from harm on a daily basis. As a beloved goddess of great mercy, she has many images; aside from the White-robed Guanyin (baiyi Guanyin) and Son-granting Guanyin (Songzi Guanyin), there are the Water-moon Guanyin (Shuiyue Guanyin), Fish-basket Guanyin (Yülan Guanyin), and Guanyin of the South Sea (Nanhai Guanyin) residing on Mount Potalaka. To this day devotion to Guanyin is flourishing not only among east Asian Buddhists but also throughout the Buddhist world.

Ding-hwa HSIEH

Further Reading
Guilin

Situated in northeastern Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region on the southern coast of China, Guilin administers five city districts (the city proper is 565 square kilometers), ten counties, and two autonomous counties for a total area of 27,809 square kilometers. Guilin has a subtropical monsoon climate with an annual average precipitation of 1,949 millimeters. Its annual average temperature is 18.9° C; the hottest month, August, has an average temperature of 23° C, and the coldest month, January, 15.6° C.

Guilin was founded around 111 B.C.E and obtained its current name in 1372 C.E. The word guilin (forest of Sweet Osmanthus) is a reference to the Sweet Osmanthus shrubs that crowd the city’s landscape. Traversed by the Li River, Guilin has a typical karst (an irregular limestone region with sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns) topography. Qixingyan (Seven Star Cave), located on the eastern bank of the Li River, is eminent among the karst caves of Guilin. Consisting of three layers of caves on the upper, middle, and lower levels with an underground river, Qixingyan culminates into a labyrinth of stalactites, stalagmites, and stone pillars illuminated by colorful lights. Ludiyan (Reed Flute Cave) is an underground karst cave that descends to 240 meters. White natural stalactites of different shapes form a myriad of “scenes.” Some resemble lions, pine trees, or mushrooms, and others suggest a dreamy crystal palace or mountain of clouds.

Guilin’s scenery has inspired generations of literati, giving the city the reputation that Guilin Shanshui jia tianxia (Guilin waters and mountains rank first class around the world). Commercial tourism in China was nonexistent until the 1980s. According to the National Tourism Administration, the earliest recorded numbers of visitors for domestic tourism were 240 million arrivals, with a total revenue of 8 billion yuan in 1985. The earliest recorded numbers of visitors for international tourism were 1.8 million arrivals with receipts of USD$0.26 billion.
in 1978. International hotels have grown from 431 in 1978 to 4,418 in 1996, and international tourists increased from 1.8 million in 1978 to 51.1 million in 1996. Domestic visitors increased from 2.4 million arrivals in 1985 to 640 million in 1996, and the revenue they generate increased from 8 billion yuan in 1985 to 164 billion yuan in 1996.

Scenic sites around Guilin extend from the Lingqu Canal in Xing’an in the north to the town of Yangshuo in the south. Most representative of Guilin scenery are the Li River, Qixingyan and Ludiyan caves, and Duxiufeng, Fuboshan, and Diecaishan hills. The Li River reflects the picturesque hills with bamboo fronds and passes a procession of peaks and waterfalls. Fishermen on bamboo rafts fish with trained cormorants.

Xiangbishan (Elephant Trunk Hill) is so named because of its resemblance to an elephant dipping its trunk in the water to drink from the western bank of the Li River. Duxiufeng (Solitary Beauty Hill) features a stairway of 306 stone steps leading to the top. Cliffs on the hill are engraved with poems of artistic and historical value written by literati throughout the dynasties. Diecaishan (Folded Brocade Hill) is lush with vegetation and honeycombed by caves decorated with calligraphy and Buddhist statuary. Fuboshan (Wave Subduing Hill), not far to the east of Duxiufeng, is also punctuated with caves.

These sites represent only a sample of the Guilin panorama. Standing out among scenic natural beauties are shanqing (verdant mountains), shuixiu (limpid waters), dongqi (peculiar caves), and shimei (beautiful rocks).

**Further Reading**


A fisherman on the Li River in Guilin. A traditional mode of fishing in China involves the use of cormorants to catch fish. Fishermen on bamboo rafts use strong lights suspended over the water to attract the fish. The cormorants, which are tethered with rings round the base of their necks, catch the fish and then disgorge them for the fishermen (When their work is done the rings are removed so they can eat). The boats are flat, narrow rafts consisting of five or six large, round bamboo trunks tied together and upturned at the stern. The fisherman stands on the raft, using a pole to propel the boat. His cormorants perch on his outstretched arms, diving on his command. One good cormorant can feed an entire family. PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL.

Guizhou Province
Guizhōu Shěng 贵州省
37.62 million est. 2007 pop. 176,100 square km

Guizhou is a province about the size of Uruguay in the southwestern part of the country. It is surrounded by the provinces of Sichuan (to the north), Hunan (to the east), and Yunnan (to the west), as well as Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (to the south). Guizhou is a relatively undeveloped and poor province.

A traditional saying sums up conditions in Guizhou, a relatively undeveloped province in southwestern China: “Not three days of weather the same, not three mu [about half an acre] of flat land, not three fen [about half a U.S. cent] in the pocket.”

Here some 38 million people are crowded into 176,100 square kilometers (68,000 square miles, about the size of Uruguay), of which only 4,900 square kilometers (1,982 square miles) are under cultivation. Much land is habitable only at low densities or not at all. About 75 percent of the land is hills and mountains, mostly limestone. About 3 percent is bare rock. So limited is agricultural land that each acre must support twenty farm people. Each acre, even on slopes, must be cropped, on average, 1.8 times a year. Population pressure results in 40 percent of the total land being seriously eroded.

About 63 percent of Guizhou’s workers are employed in the primary sector, mainly in coal mining and agriculture. Coal mining is important with an annual production of about 100 million tons. The main crops are summer rice, maize, winter wheat, and rapeseed (canola). Other crops include potatoes, a major subsistence crop at high elevations, and apples. Overall, the primary sector accounts for only 22 percent of production.

Secondary industries produce 43 percent of the wealth from just under 10 percent of the workers. These are concentrated mainly around the provincial capital, Guiyang, a city of a little over a million people (the associated administrative region has a population of 3.2 million). Industrial plants are also located in smaller towns, such as the large steel works at Anshun in the west, built at the height of the Cold War.

Provincial gross domestic product per person is amongst the lowest in China. Poverty is widespread, compounded by relatively high levels of dependency and, for China, high birthrates. Some 27 percent of the population is not ethnic Han and thus not subject to the one-child policy. In addition, most Han in the province are rural and are thus allowed two children. Life expectancy at birth averages five years less than the seventy-three years that is the norm for China as a whole (2008 estimate).

Although Guizhou was considered part of the Chinese empire by the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the ethnic Han population, even in the sixteenth century, probably did not exceed a few hundred thousand. The provincial administration began in the seventeenth century under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) although the native Miao peoples were not brought fully under government control until 1870, under the Qing (1644–1912).

While the province is rich in coal and limestone resources, it will take very large investments to exploit them fully. Although annual rainfall ranges from 800 to 1,500 millimeters (31 to 59 inches), surface water is scarce. Limestone landscapes and China’s largest waterfall,
Huangguoshu, attract tourists mainly from within China, but infrastructure in the province is weak. Levels of literacy are low, with 12 percent of men and 28 percent of women being unable to read or write simple Chinese.

The central government tends to obtain better returns from development expenditure in the coastal provinces, so growth in Guizhou is likely to remain relatively slow in the near future, especially as the province’s transportation infrastructure lags behind that of the rest of the country.

Ronald David HILL

Further Reading
Gunpowder and Rocketry
Huǒyào hé huǒjiàn 火药和火箭

Gunpowder is one of history’s most important discoveries. Scholars believe gunpowder originated in China by the late Song dynasty (960–1279). While the early history of rocketry is not certain, the earliest known clear reference to a rocket dates to 1264.

Gunpowder and rocketry have related, although unclear histories. Scholars believe that both had originated in China by the late Song dynasty (960–1279). Gunpowder was the first propellant and explosive and one of history’s most important discoveries. It has three ingredients: potassium nitrate (also called “salt peter”), sulfur, and charcoal. Gunpowder, also called “black powder,” propelled the first gun projectiles and rockets. Rockets used a low-nitrate, slower-burning gunpowder and were self-propelled after the powder ignited.

Discovered, Not Invented
Most likely gunpowder and the rocket came about as surprise discoveries rather than as inventions. Chinese Daoist philosophers for centuries experimented with chemicals to seek a way to longevity. One Daoist book, Zhen yuan miao Dao yao lue (Classified Essentials of the Mysterious Tao) from about 850 CE warned not to mix certain ingredients, including salt peter and sulfur, because the mixture had been known to flame up, singe beards, and burn a house. These are examples of several known Daoist alchemical explosions, and evidently the Chinese at the time apparently did not understand the nature of combustion. They still believed, as late as the seventeenth century, for example, that the combustion of gunpowder was caused by the interaction of the yin (female element) and the yang (male element).

The earliest recognizable gunpowder formulas appeared in Wu jing zong yao (Essentials of Military Classics), edited in 1044 by Zeng Guangliang. The first real gun appeared about 1260. Scholars have many theories about how the rocket appeared. One theory is that the discovery occurred accidentally when a Chinese soldier modified an ordinary slow-burning “fire arrow” that suddenly flew on its own before it was shot from the bow.

Chinese chronicles contain numerous accounts of gunpowder weapons beginning during the late Song dynasty, although it is often unclear whether the accounts refer to rockets. The most famous examples of such weapons are the flying fire arrows—or, more likely, flying fire spears—used in 1232 by the Chinese against the Mongols in the siege of Kaifeng. Some scholars contend that the weapons were no more than thrown flying fire spears containing or emitting incendiary compositions or perhaps handheld lances that merely shot fire into the air; other scholars contend that the weapons were true self-propelled rockets.

The term huo chien (fire arrow) at first meant simply an incendiary arrow but later came to mean a rocket. The earliest depictions of Chinese rockets, in the Wu bei zhi (Treatise on Armament Technology, c. 1628) of Mao
Yuanyi show many variations of arrows with rocket tubes attached and therefore were real rocket arrows. These examples may be strongest evidence that Chinese rockets did evolve from ordinary incendiary arrows.

The clearest early Chinese reference to a rocket involves fireworks. According to Qi dong ye yu (Rustic Talks in Eastern Qi, c. 1290) by Zhou Mi, a fireworks display was held in 1264 in the courtyard of the royal palace. One firework, called a “ground rat,” shot up the steps of the throne of the empress mother and frightened her. Thus, it was self-propelled, that is, a rocket.

However the rocket came to be, it had spread to Arabia by the late 1200s and apparently from there into Europe, probably first to northern Italy, via maritime trade routes. The first guns appeared in Europe by the fourteenth century. The spread of gunpowder and rocketry throughout the rest of Asia is less well documented. The earliest known rockets in Korea appeared in 1377, possibly introduced directly from China.

Southeast Asia and India

One possible way by which to trace the spread of rocketry in Asia is by tracing the origins of allegedly centuries-old rocket festivals in Southeast Asia. Northeast Thailand holds the annual Boun Bang Fai (also spelled Bunbang-fei) festival during which large, decorated gunpowder rockets with bamboo guide sticks are fired by different villages to please the rain gods and to ensure a bountiful rice harvest. Neighboring Laos celebrates the identical animistic (relating to a doctrine that the vital principle of organic development is immaterial spirit) and Buddhist festival. A similar practice is found in the remote...
Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous District in Yunnan Prefecture of China, adjacent to northeast Thailand and Laos. Myanmar (Burma) stages the Pa-O Rocket Festival of the Pa-O minority group in the Shan states.

There is a definite link between the festivals in Thailand, Laos, Yunnan in China, and Myanmar, whose practitioners of the festivals are all of the same Tai or Dai cultural stock. However, we do not know the actual histories of the festivals, but one theory is that basic gunpowder and rocket technology began in China in the eastern, more advanced area of the country, probably in the Song dynasty capital of Hangzhou. From this area, knowledge of gunpowder and rocketry probably first spread via Chinese maritime trade missions to India in the early fifteenth century.

In India, gunpowder, fireworks, and especially the rocket, became well developed. War rockets were used in India for centuries. From India, the technology may have then spread to neighboring Burma (now Myanmar) and from there to Siam (now Thailand), Laos, and back to China, to the more rural agricultural area of Yunnan.

Frank H. WINTER

Further Reading


GUO Moruo ▶
Guo Moruo was a literary figure and cultural leader who is well known as an authority on Chinese ancient history and for his service to the cause of Communist power. Both his acclaimed written works and his public involvement in government and cultural activities led to his reputation as a cultural leader during his time.

Guo Moruo was born in the town of Shawan in Sichuan Province to a merchant-landlord family and named “Kaizhen” by his parents. His family had business in oil of various kinds, money exchanging, and the opium trade, and was affluent enough to have a family school, where Guo began his formal education in the Confucian classics at age five. He was inspired by the study of world history and eager to leave his small town. While still a high school student in Chengdu, Guo married Zhang Qionghua (1890–1980), an illiterate bride betrothed to him by his parents. Not happy with this arranged marriage, Guo left home soon and enrolled briefly at the Military Medical School in Tianjin, but left without earning a degree. In 1914 he went to Japan and attended the Sixth Higher School, which prepared him to attend Kyushu Imperial University, where he would graduate with a bachelor’s degree in medical science in 1923.

While at the Sixth Higher School, Guo met Satō Tomiko (1895–1994), whom he called “Anna” and who would make a lasting impact on Guo’s personal life as well as his career. Their life together as a common-law couple inspired Guo to write romantic poetry. From the time they appeared in Shishi Xinbao (Current Affairs Newspaper) in Shanghai, Guo’s poems became immensely popular among Chinese youth and earned him a distinctive position in the new literature of the anti-imperialist May Fourth era. In publishing these poems Guo first used the name “Moruo,” after the two rivers flowing by his hometown. Through his literary activities Guo met several like-minded people, including Yu Dafu, Cheng Fangwu, and Tian Han; together they organized the Creation Society in 1922, published Creation Weekly (Chuangzao zhoukan), and regularly contributed to the literary supplement of New Daily of China (Zhonghua xinbao) in Shanghai. While wavering between a literary and a medical career, Guo turned to autobiographical fiction as he recorded the difficulties of earning a living as a writer in Shanghai to support his growing family, now with four children, and the racial discrimination he confronted as a Chinese in Japan.

Guo’s career took a political turn around 1924 under the inspiration of the Marxist writing of Kawakami Hajime. Returning to Shanghai, Guo found himself in the whirlpool of the May Thirtieth Movement, which began when Shanghai police opened fire on anti-imperialist strikers, and gave public speeches at mass rallies. He soon made connections with the Communists and joined the Northern Expedition to head the Department of Propaganda. He had to flee from China to Japan when the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) turned against the Communists.

Research Acclaimed

Between 1928 and 1937 Guo lived in Japan and turned his energy to historical studies, especially the study of...
oracle bone and bronze inscriptions and the ancient history of China. He participated in the 1928 debate on the structure of Chinese society and applied Marxist theory to his arguments. His book, *Researches on Ancient Chinese Society* (*Zhongguo Gudai Shehui Yanjiu*), was published in Shanghai in 1930 and became an instant success. Both of his works on ancient history and oracle bone inscriptions were acclaimed in China and Japan in the 1930s and established him as an authority on ancient Chinese history.

In 1937, soon after the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan, Guo eluded the gendarme surveillance in Japan and returned to China, leaving Anna and their five children behind. He wrote articles for resistance war propaganda and presided over the *Salvation Daily* (*Jiawang Ribao*) in Shanghai in 1937. In the remaining years of the war he lived in Chongqing, China’s war capital, and headed the Cultural Activity Committee of the government. After the second United Front of the Guomindang and the Communists deteriorated, Guo sided firmly with the Communists and wrote historical plays to criticize the government’s policy. One of his major accomplishments was *Qu Yuan*, a historical drama masking his criticism of the ruling Guomindang, staged to acclaim in Chongqing in 1942. On the three hundred-year anniversary of the fall of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in 1944, Guo published (in the *New China Daily*) *In Commemoration of the 300th Anniversary of the Jiashen Year (1644)* (*Jiashen sanbianian ji*), another masked criticism of the Guomindang through a historical analysis of the internal conflict that caused downfall of the Ming dynasty. His works during the war infuriated the ruling Guomindang but were acclaimed by the Chinese Communist Party. In 1939 Guo married Yu Liqun (1916–1979) in a ceremony presided over by the Communist leader Zhou Enlai. The couple had five children in the next decade and half.

### Cultural Representative

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 Guo took several important positions in the government as a leader in cultural circles. He became one of the thirteen vice directors, along with Song Qingling, Lin Boqu, and Li Jishen, of the Standing Committee of the First National People’s Congress and one of the sixteen vice chairs of the Political Consultant Council in 1954. In the same year Guo was one of the leading intellectuals designated by the government to organize the Chinese Academy of Science and later was appointed president of the academy, the highest research institution in China. Abroad Guo was arguably the cultural representative for the new China. Throughout the 1950s he led several Chinese delegations to the World Conference to Defend Peace, held in Moscow and Stockholm. In 1955, in absence of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Guo led a ten-person Chinese science delegation for a month-long visit to Japan. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) Guo continued his official functions as cultural leader and was placed under protection by order of Zhou Enlai, but lost one son to the abuse of the Red Guards and another to suicide. Guo survived the Cultural Revolution and died at age eighty-seven in 1977.

Guo left a legacy of romantic poetry that represented a youthful yearning for freedom during the May Fourth era, a deep engagement and paradoxical relationship with Japan and Japanese culture, and a record of using his literary talent and scholarly knowledge in the service of Communist power.

**LU Yan**

### Further Reading


Guohua (National-Style Painting)

The term guohua or “national-style painting,” first gained prominence in the early twentieth century as part of a broader discussion about how to define “Chineseness.” Although originally used to distinguish Chinese painting from Western art (xihua), the term guohua is now used primarily to distinguish between traditional art and modern art.

The term guohua, or “national-style painting,” refers very broadly to artworks that employ the materials (ink, mineral pigment, paper, silk) and stylistic models established as far back as the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1279) dynasties. Sometimes referred to as Zhongguo hua (“Chinese painting”), such works are frequently contrasted with xihua, or “Western-style painting,” though in most instances such sharp dichotomies are somewhat artificial.

After the fall of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the founding of Republican China the country entered a period of rapid social transformation that was accompanied by unprecedented exposure to foreign ideas on virtually every front—political, industrial, economic, and cultural. Partly as a reaction to these circumstances and in the process of defining the new nation, questions of national identity arose. During these years guoyu (“national language”) first came to be defined and the Beijing Opera started to be known as guojju (“national theater”); also at this time, the guoxue (“national study”) movement, which focused on Chinese history and classical literature, was initiated by the scholar Liang Qichao (1873–1929). The concept of guohua, emerging from this milieu, was thus part of a larger consideration of Chineseness.

While many early proponents of guohua were concerned with transmitting traditional Chinese artistic values, they were also interested in experimenting with some of the more modern (Western) visual techniques.
and ideas to which they were now being exposed. The issue, in other words, was not simply one of preserving tradition but of finding ways to “imbue new pictorial configurations with historical authenticity” (Wong 2006, xxiv). Particularly influential in this enterprise was a group of artists from Guangdong Province who promoted a “new national-style painting” (xin guohua), by which they meant artworks that combined Chinese themes and Western techniques. Known as the Lingnan (“south of the ranges”) school, this group’s founders had studied in Japan, where they were much influenced by nihonga, or “Japanese-style painting,” a Meiji movement that similarly championed a fusion of East and West.

Following the creation of the People’s Republic in 1949, traditional Chinese-style painting increasingly shared the stage with proletarian prints as the sanctioned art of the state. As culture became ever more politicized, guohua artists were faced with the new challenge of how to apply to painting Communist leader Mao Zedong’s famous dictum that the past should serve the present. One solution was the creation of a hybrid art that fused revolutionary values and history with traditional painting styles. Sunrise in Yan’an after Snow by Qian Songyan (1899–1985), for example, shows a towering pagoda, emblematic of the past, off in the distance, while a modern highway bridge with trucks and buses spans the misty gorge at the heart of the composition. “The whole is illuminated by the rosy glow of dawn, or perhaps to those who wished to read it so, of Communism” (Andrews and Shen 1998, 234).

The situation for painters (and other visual artists) in China has changed dramatically since the late 1980s, especially for certain postmodern practitioners who have been avidly embraced by the international art market. Traditional Chinese-style painting, guohua, continues to be produced and continues to be popular, especially domestically, but the issues of identity that informed its early history now seem to be located elsewhere. In the face of globalization, the question of guohua versus xihua no longer seems to be the pressing issue that it was a century ago.

Charles LACHMAN

Further Reading

An image of a bamboo has already been formed in mind before it is committed to the painting canvas.

胸有成竹

Xiōng yǒu chéng zhú
Hai Rui

Hải Rủi 海瑞

1514–1587 Ming dynasty official

Hai Rui 海瑞 (1514–1587) was a scholar and bureaucrat who served in the late Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). He was known for his stern ethical positions and his unswerving rectitude, remaining an icon of political incorruptibility for the rest of Chinese history.

Hai Rui was a civil official of the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644), famous for his uncompromising moral stance and his Spartan lifestyle. In an era when civil servants commonly enriched themselves through their official positions, Hai was hailed as a paragon of the idealistic Confucian values of incorruptible service to the people and the state. According to his official biography, he was so frugal that his purchase of some pork for his mother’s birthday was treated as sensational news. A minor figure in Ming history, Hai Rui remained a model of public-minded virtue for the rest of Chinese history.

Hai Rui never passed the highest level of the civil service examinations, and it was rare for a scholar to rise in the bureaucracy without doing so. His promotions were based largely on his moral reputation. After serving as a schoolteacher, he was appointed to a magistrate’s position in Shun’an County in Zhejiang Province, an important crossroads for commercial activity. As such, the region was prone to exploitation of the local populace by local officials and by high-ranking travelers who expected luxurious treatment. Hai earned a reputation for challenging and shaming prominent figures who sought special treatment in his jurisdiction.

Hai was soon promoted to a minor post in the Ministry of Revenue at the capital. In 1565, Hai got into trouble for writing a scathing admonition to the emperor, attacking his personal morals, accusing him of misrule, and urging him to reform his ways. For Hai’s lese-majeste (crime committed against a sovereign power) he was imprisoned and only narrowly escaped execution. After his release Hai Rui continued to be appointed to prominent positions in the bureaucracy, although he was given mostly sinecure positions that limited the reach of his stern moralism.

In 1569, after begging the emperor to give him a more substantial position, Hai was assigned to the post of governor of the Southern Metropolitan District, the prosperous region around Suzhou and Nanjing. Again he quickly lived up to his reputation, imposing a stern regimen of austerity and moral rectitude on his new jurisdiction. Official business was conducted with great frugality, and the manufacture of luxury goods was forbidden. In his zealous efforts to fight the exploitation of commoners, Hai launched campaigns against exploitive practices by wealthy landlords, many of whom had ties to the most prominent political families in the empire.

The memory of Hai Rui resurfaced in the late 1950s when Wu Han (1909–1969), a prominent historian and deputy mayor of Beijing, wrote the play The Dismissal of Hai Rui, which was performed in 1961 in Beijing. Hai Rui was portrayed as a moral official willing to speak truth to
Hai Rui Scolds the Emperor

In his 1959 essay “Hai Rui Scolds the Emperor” the historian Wu Han quoted the 1566 petition that Hai Rui wrote to the Jiajing emperor which harshly criticized the emperor’s governance and proposed drastic reform:

How would you compare yourself with Emperor Wen Di of the Han dynasty? You did a fairly good job in your early years, but what has happened to you now? For nearly twenty years you have not appeared in the imperial court, and you have appointed many fools to the government. By refusing to see your own sons, you are mean to your own blood; by suspecting court officials, you are mean to your subordinates; and by living in the Western Park refusing to come home, you are mean to your wife. Now the country is filled with corrupt officials and weak generals; peasants begin to revolt everywhere. Although such things happened when you were enthroned, they were not as serious as they are today. Now Yan Gao has resigned [as Grand Minister], but there is still no sign of social reform. In my judgment you are much inferior to Emperor Wen Di…

The dynasty’s officials know that the people have been dissatisfied with you for some time. By engaging in occultism and searching for immortality, you have confused yourself. Your shortcomings are numerous: rudeness, short-temperedness, self-righteousness, and deafness to honest criticism. But worst of all is your search for immortality… You should realize the impossibility of achieving immortality and repent past mistakes. You should attend the imperial court regularly and discuss national affairs with your court officials. This is the only way to redeem yourself. By doing so you may still be able to make yourself useful to the country during your remaining years.

The most urgent problems today are the absurdity of imperial policies and the lack of clarity of official responsibilities. If you do not tackle these problems now, nothing will be accomplished.


Further Reading


Peter B. DITMANSON

a power hierarchy that was out of touch with the common people, a clear and harsh allegorical indictment of the upper echelons of the Communist Party. Official criticism of Wu and his play began in 1965, and his scholarly circle was purged and imprisoned the next year in the opening salvo of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).
Haier

Hǎi’ěr 海尔

Major home appliance company

As the leading home appliance company in China, Haier has become a common household brand name. The incredible business turnaround and advanced management strategies of the Haier company are often used as case studies and examples in major business magazines and business schools. Haier continues to grow stronger in today’s increasingly competitive world market.

Haier is China’s major home appliance company, located in Qingdao, Shandong Province. The company has more than 240 subsidiary companies, not including design centers, manufacturing bases, and trading companies in more than thirty countries. More than fifty thousand Haier employees work in the areas of science and technology, the home appliance industry, foreign trade, and finance. In 2006 the global revenue of Haier was about $15 billion, and the brand name “Haier” was estimated to be worth more than $11 billion.

In 1985 Haier was a desperate refrigerator factory with a huge debt and more than eight hundred employees waiting for their pay. Now Haier is one of the top four home appliance manufacturers in the world, and the brand name “Haier” is a household word and referred to as a miracle example by Fortune, Finance Times, and the Wall Street Journal.

This business miracle was not accidental. When industry focus was on quantity instead of quality twenty years ago, Haier CEO Zhang Ruimin smashed seventy-six defective refrigerators with a hammer in front of the factory’s workers to show a new focus and an iron-strong determination: Quality was going to be the key for the factory. Zhang’s hammer drove home his point: In 1993 Haier was awarded the “Chinese Famous Brand” accolade, and in 2006 Haier had a 25.5 percent market share of home appliances in China.

But in this rapidly changing world quality is not enough to guarantee the sustainable success of an enterprise, and innovation has become another key factor. Haier is not only solid but also flexible. In addition to being dominant in the home appliance market, Haier has entered into cutting-edge technology. In 1998 Haier developed on average one new product and applied for two patents every day. In the same year 236 research results developed into products. Haier owns more than seventeen hundred patents, which ranks it number one among Chinese enterprises.

Zhang Ruimin knows not only how to smash refrigerators with a hammer but also how to manage his complex corporation. Advanced management strategies are used in every procedure. New ideas are also introduced. Indeed, Haier’s management is a good case study in textbooks at Harvard and Oxford Business Schools.

Haier was born in China but has developed internationally. Globalization has presented Haier with more opportunities. Because of its strict quality control Haier has received market access to Europe and the United States (Haier passed international certification in forty-eight
countries, including the UL certificate in the United States, the CE certificate in the European Union, the ISO 90001 certificate for quality, which is issued by the International Organization for Standardization, and the ISO 14001 certificate for environmental protection. Haier’s products have been exported to more than eighty countries in Europe, Japan, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the United States. In addition, Haier has forty-nine overseas franchisers and an international logistics center in the Middle East and Germany. The “Three One-Third Principle” shows Haier’s globalization: One-third of its products are produced and sold at home; one-third of its products are produced at home and sold overseas; and one-third of its products are produced and sold overseas.

Where will Haier go in the next twenty years? Its officers and employees hope that, to invoke the company’s slogan, it goes “Haier and higher.”

ZHOU Guanqi

Further Reading


Haier, a household name in China, is one of the top home appliance manufacturers in the world. The girl in this photo retrieves an ice cream bar from a Haier-brand freezer. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
Hainan Province
Hǎinán Shěng 海南省
8.45 million est. 2007 pop. 34,000 square km

The island province of Hainan is slightly smaller than Taiwan and located off of China’s south coast in the South China Sea. It is the only part of China that grows tropical crops. As a Special Economic Zone, Hainan attracted foreign investments and experienced brisk economic growth during the 1990s, although recently that growth has slowed.

Hainan, an island province in the South China Sea off the coast of China’s Guangdong Province, covers an area of 34,000 square kilometers. Before 1988, when the island was granted provincial status, it was part of Guangdong Province. The island has dense forests and a mountainous inland with the highest peak, Mount Wuzhi, rising to 1,867 meters above sea level. The coastal regions consist of plains, low hills, and volcanic terraces. The island has a tropical climate, with average temperatures of 22° to 26° C all year, but in extreme cases in the northern part of the island, temperatures may drop to 0° C. Annual precipitation varies; the west receives an average of 1,000 millimeters, whereas the southeast averages 1,500 to 2,600 millimeters and is frequently struck by typhoons.

About 12 percent of Hainan’s population belongs to the indigenous Li nationality. Another important minority nationality is the Miao. The province’s capital, Haikou (2006 population 830,192), is situated on the north shore. Several autonomous counties and townships are concentrated mainly in the middle of the island and on the south coast.

Since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the island has technically been part of the Chinese empire, but for long periods the Li evaded government control. During the Song dynasty (960–1279), when emigration from the mainland began, the island became part of Guangdong Province, a status that continued for centuries except for brief periods—during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and from 1912–1921 when Hainan enjoyed independent provincial status. In imperial China, undesirable officials were commonly exiled to the island. Hainan was occupied by the Japanese from 1939 to 1945 during the War of Resistance against Japan, and since 1950 the island has been part of the People’s Republic of China.

Hainan is the only part of China that grows tropical crops. Forestry accounts for almost half of the agricultural output. The island also has a big rubber production and coconut farming, and other important tropical crops include cashew nuts, cacao, coffee, pepper, pineapples, bananas, carambolas, longans, litchis, and jackfruits. As one of China’s Special Economic Zones, Hainan attracted foreign investments and underwent rapid economic growth during the 1990s. The economy is mainly based on tourism, which is located on the south coast in the area around Sanya, and light industry, which is concentrated in the area around Haikou, and includes processed rubber and food, electronic articles, and textiles. The flow of outside investment to Hainan subsided drastically toward the end of the 1990s, however, and many unfinished construction sites have been abandoned.

Bent NIELSEN
The Chinese New Year’s parade in Haikou, Hainan Island, in the South China Sea off the coast of Guangdong Province. Masked old men lead a dragon who dances to scare away last year’s ghosts. The lunar new year falls at the end of January or in February, but Hainan’s sub-tropical climate makes it feel like a summer holiday. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

Further Reading


The Hakka are an ethnolinguistic minority group. About 40 million live in China, mostly in the south, but it is thought that even larger Hakka populations exist outside China than within the country, in Malaysia, Australia, Canada, and the United States. They are known for their ethnic solidarity; the government considers them a part of the Han majority.

The Hakka are a Chinese ethnolinguistic minority group. The word Hakka means “guest people” or “newcomers” in Yue (Cantonese) and reflects their migration from central to southern China from about the ninth century into the early twentieth century. They tended to settle in distinct Hakka communities. About 40 million Hakka live in China. Most live in southern China, with Guangdong Province having the greatest concentration, particularly in northern Meizhou Prefecture. Sizeable populations also live in Fujian Province, Jiangxi Province, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Hainan Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. More Hakka may live outside of China than inside it, with large overseas communities in Malaysia, the United States, Canada, and Australia. The Hakka language is classified with Yue and Min as a southern Chinese language.

As an ethnolinguistic minority and late arrivals in southern China, the Hakka often had tense and sometimes violent relations with the Yue- and Min-speaking Han. The Han considered the Hakka to be inferior and a tribal people. Research indicates that their origins are Han Chinese, and the government classifies them as Han. Hakka men and women were known as skilled and hardworking farmers who grew sweet potatoes, rice, and vegetables on harsh land ignored by non-Hakka farmers. They also often served in the military and outside China worked in construction and on plantations. In cities Hakka have been notably successful in academia, politics, and the professions. Well-known Hakka include China’s late leader Deng Xiaoping; Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s former president; Lee Kwan Yew, Singapore’s president; and Ne Win, president of Myanmar (Burma).

Both inside and outside China the Hakka are known for their ethnic solidarity, which may be a product of centuries of discrimination by the Han. Hakka interests are advanced by the Tsung Tsin (Cong-zheng) Association and the United Hakka Association.

Further Reading
Hakka Languages

Kèjiāhuà 客家话

The Hakka dialect group is very widely dispersed in the southern part of China due to different migration waves of different periods. As a result of historical sound changes and contact with other dialect groups, the unique criterion for distinguishing Hakka from other non-Hakka dialects is still unsettled.

The Hakka languages, or dialects, are one of the seven major language groups in China. (The other groups are Mandarin, Wu, Yue, Gan, Min, and Xiang). Hakka is also known as Aihua, Majiehua, Xinyinminhua, and Tuguangdonghua. In China Hakka is spoken in Guangdong, Fujian, Xiangxi, Hunan, and Sichuan provinces, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and in Taiwan. Outside of China Hakka speakers are found in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. Estimates place the number of speakers worldwide at about 80 million.

Historical Hakka

Hakka comes from the Cantonese roots hak (guest) and ka (family/people). According to the historical records, five major migration waves of Hakka-speaking people, from the central plains of China to the south, have occurred. The first began during the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420 CE). The Hakka-speaking people moved because of various non-Chinese invasions, civil wars, and clashes with local peoples. The term Hakka first appeared in Chinese historical documents during the Song dynasty (960–1279). During the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and early Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Hakka-speaking people migrated to northeastern Guangdong province. There they clashed with indigenous peoples over farmland. The local peoples referred to these new immigrants as Hakka. Squabbling between the Hakka and the indigenous population continued well into the twentieth century and contributed to the Hakka’s famed strong sense of ethnic and linguistic identity. The Hakka’s devotion to their mother tongue is illustrated by the well-known family precept, “One would rather sell one’s ancestors’ land than to forget one’s ancestors’ speech.”

Characteristics of Hakka Dialects

Because of the different destinations of the various waves of Hakka migration, several distinct Hakka dialects have developed. The standard is considered the Meixian dialect, spoken in northeastern Guangdong Province.

Hakka differs in a number of ways from Standard Chinese. Hakka, like Chinese, uses tone, the musical pitch of the voice, as a way to convey meaning in speech. Since the rise of Middle Chinese (about the seventh century CE), tones in Chinese have been classified into four categories: ping (even tone), shang (rising tone), qu (going tone), and ru (entering tone). Each tone may have undergone some
Hakka Languages

further split into two subcategories, yin and yang. But each tone category has evolved into different types of pitches, or tonal values, as reflected in modern Hakka dialects. Meixian Hakka has six tones: yin ping (high level), yang ping (low level), shang (low falling), qu (high falling), yin ru (short low level), and yang ru (short high level). Meixian Hakka has seventeen consonants: p, p', m, f, v, t, t', n, l, ts, ts', s, ng(n), k, k', h, o (zero initial); six (main) vowels: i, í, u, e, a, o; and three pairs of consonant endings: –m/–p, –n/–t, –ng/–k. The sounds represented by m and ng can also occur alone as distinct syllables.

The Hakka dialects are further set apart from other major Chinese dialects by their unique sounds, vocabulary, and use of word order. For instance, in the sound system of Hakka dialects, the sounds in Chinese represented by b, d, g, v, and z at the beginning of words are pronounced, respectively, p, t, k, f, and s. Also, most of the sounds in Middle Chinese represented by h are pronounced as f in Hakka.

Because the Hakka dialects share some common sound features and vocabulary items with Gan, Yue, and Min, some linguists have argued that the Hakka dialects should be grouped with Gan to form a Gan-Hakka language group. Others have assigned the Hakka dialects to a different group. And others have suggested that the Hakka dialects should be considered subdialects of the Gan-Yue dialect group. The current view is to treat Hakka as a separate language group.

Margaret Mian YAN

Further Reading

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The Han comprise the majority of the people among the fifty-six state-recognized nationalities (fifty-five minority groups and the Han) of mainland China and Taiwan. The largest nationality in the world, the Han are what people around the world generally think of as “the Chinese.”

The Han are the most numerous of the world’s nationalities, numbering about 1.27 billion in 2006, with sizable populations in Indonesia, Singapore, the United States, and numerous other locales. They are renowned for their highly distinctive and powerful languages and cultures, and for their long and eventful history. The main concentrations of Han Chinese are in the eastern half of China, as well as Taiwan. Under the People’s Republic of China, the state decides who belongs to which nationality. This decision is made based on Joseph Stalin’s rigid definition of what factors determine nationality. One group that on occasion has requested separate identity is the Hakkas, but the state considers them part of the Han nationality.

Population

In the mid-seventeenth century, China’s population was about 200 million, the overwhelming majority being Han. The 1953 census showed the Han population at 547 million, which was 93.9 percent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) total. Census figures for 1990 and 2000 put the Han population at 1.04 billion and 1.16 billion, or 91.99 and 91.59 percent of the PRC total. Since the late 1970s, Han families in the PRC have been subject to a very strict policy rarely allowing more than one child per couple, without which the 2000 Han population would have been somewhat higher than it was. About 97 percent of Taiwan’s 2008 population of 23 million was Han.

At the end of the nineteenth century, there were an estimated 4 million overseas Chinese. In 2006 this figure had grown to about 40 million Chinese living outside China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, and about 31 million living elsewhere in Asia. The country with the largest Han population outside China was Indonesia, with about 7.5 million Chinese. The country with the highest Han proportion was Singapore, where in an estimated 2005 total population of 4.27 million, 2.68 million (62.8 percent) were Han. In 2007 Hong Kong and Macao had combined total populations of about 7.5 million people, overwhelmingly Han Chinese in both places. Outside Asia the country with the largest Chinese population is the United States (about 3.38 million in 2005).

Language

Chinese belongs to the Sino-Tibetan family of languages. The Chinese written language dates at least to the fourteenth century BCE and consists of monosyllabic characters, or ideographs. The characters were standardized in the third century BCE and remain essentially unchanged even though the PRC adopted a simplified writing system in the 1950s. Literate Chinese have always been able to
understand each other through writing, which has acted as a unifying force throughout history.

Each character in the Chinese written language represents both a sound and a concept, but meaning is conveyed through characters either singly or in combinations. Chinese is not monosyllabic. Objects, actions, or ideas are more likely to be represented through groups of two or three rather than a single character.

Spoken Chinese is sharply regional and divided into several sublanguages and numerous dialects. All of these are tonal and express grammatical relationships through word order, not word endings. The official language is Modern Standard Chinese, or Mandarin, which is based on the pronunciation found in Beijing. The north and southwest of the Han regions of China (the eastern half of those territories ruled as part of the People’s Republic of China, plus Taiwan) are dominated by the Mandarin dialects, most of them intelligible to a speaker of Modern Standard Chinese. Sublanguages of the southeast include Yue (Cantonese), Wu (spoken in Shanghai), Hunanese, Jiangxi, North and South Fujian, and Hakka. In the south even dialects are often mutually unintelligible. Fujian is known for strong dialect differences from one valley to the next.

Approximately two-thirds of Han Chinese speak one of the Mandarin dialects as their mother tongue. In the twentieth century successive regimes have attempted to have Modern Standard Chinese spoken, or at least understood, by all Chinese through education, radio, and television. Of the southern sublanguages, Wu has the greatest number of speakers, followed by Cantonese.

Culture and Economy

Under Emperor Han Wudi (reigned 140–87 BCE), Confucianism dominated the Chinese state, including its ritual, and formed the ideological basis of duty and service for the scholar-official class that ruled the country. Confucianism placed great emphasis on morality within hierarchical human relationships, on creating and maintaining harmony within society, and on the family as the central social unit.

The Chinese people gather together in Tiananmen Square, to see the daily flag-raising ceremony. This is a popular tourist destination for visitors to the capital of the PRC.
Confucianism accorded greater social respect to men than to women and to sons than to daughters. Until the twentieth century, marriages were arranged by parents through the aid of matchmakers, and women were very subordinate. Although the revolutions of the twentieth century greatly raised women’s status, allowing them to enter the work force, gender equality is nowhere on the horizon among the Han, especially in the countryside.

Confucian ideology was one reason why Han governance was generally far more secular than that found in other great civilizations. In the twentieth century, Confucianism came under strong attack from modernist nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. Modernist nationalists denounced Confucianism as hierarchical, patriarchal, and oppressive, even though Confucianists argued that they were the real nationalists because they upheld Chinese values and traditions. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) orchestrated attacks on Confucian and religious values everywhere in China, but there has since been a major revival of Confucian influence in the PRC, and it remains strong in Han communities outside China.

Secularity of governance does not mean the Han are irreligious. To this day folk religions, which attempt to harmonize relations between humankind and the cosmic order, remain highly influential. Buddhism and Daoism still have Han followers, and their places of worship are common. But religions that emphasize belief in a single God have never attained more than minor influence among the Han. Muslims are never classified as Han, but as Hui.

Below the scholar-official, Confucianism prized the peasant. Han society is based on agriculture. The staple in the south is rice and in the north wheat-based products, supplemented by a wide variety of vegetables, dominate the Han diet. The meat most associated with the Han is pork. The Han do not care for dairy products, a taste even extensive Western influence has failed to change. To this day local markets are important for the economy.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), China was the world’s most technologically developed society. Although Confucianism looked down on the merchant, China underwent a commercial revolution during that time, which produced a degree of prosperity that Marco Polo marveled at in the thirteenth century. But China later fell far behind technologically and failed to undertake an industrial revolution until the second half of the twentieth century. Under Mao the Han entrepreneurial spirit was suppressed. But since the late 1970s, it has revived, with heavy industry being replaced by more consumer-oriented enterprises and self-reliance by foreign trade.

The commonalities of the Han should not disguise important regional differences. These apply not only to language but also to many aspects of culture and society, including cuisine, festivals, clothing, marriage customs, village architecture, music, and theater. Cuisine provides one example. The Han of the southwest (Hunan, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces) favor spicy dishes. In the southeast Cantonese food is noted for its quick cooking and stir frying at high temperatures and for rich, sweet dishes.

**Unity in the Twenty-First Century**

The strength of their culture and the size of their population have made the Han at times inwardly focused, at times outwardly focused. Although there are periods of division in China’s long history, and although localist elements remain influential to this day, the Chinese have shown a highly enduring sense of national unity. China’s joining the World Trade Organization late in 2001 should reduce isolationist tendencies but will not undermine the essential features of Chinese culture or eliminate nationalism.

**Colin Mackerras**

**Further Reading**


Han Dynasty

One of the most dynamic periods of Chinese history, the Han dynasty was a time of political consolidation, military and economic expansion, invention, and empire building. The dynasty began with the fall of the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) after a widespread insurgency by peasants, soldiers, and nobles led by military commander Xiang Yu. The Han dynasty ruled by the prominent Liu clan was established in 206 BCE and created an empire based on militarism and economic power that endured to 220 CE. The Han was preceded by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) and was succeeded by the Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE). The Han dynasty arose following a brief civil war in which the Han defeated a Qin army in the Wei Valley and established a capital at Chang’an (western Shaanxi Province). It retained much of the Qin administrative structure but also established vassal principalities or kingdoms in some regions. Confucian ideals of governance, in disfavor during the Qin regime, were ultimately reinstated, and Confucian scholars attained prominent status in the civil service. During the more than four hundred years of Han hegemony, China prospered in agriculture, science and technology, commerce, military expansion, and empire building. Following a brief disruption in the dynastic succession, the capital was relocated east to Luoyang (Henan Province). By the first century CE, the Han population grew to about 55 million. The gap between a peasant proletariat and landowning dynasty class widened, and the wealthy became more independent and relied less on the central government. Overexpansion coupled with domestic intrigues and foreign pressures led to a political fragmentation and the rise of the Three Kingdoms after 220 CE.

The dynastic history is divided into two periods: the Former Han dynasty (Qianhan 前漢) or Western Han dynasty (Xi Han 西漢), conventionally 206 BCE–24 CE, seated at Chang’an; and the Later (or Latter) Han dynasty (Hou Han 後漢) or Eastern Han dynasty (Dong Han 東漢) 25–220 CE.
Former or Western Han: 206 BCE–23 CE

Widespread insurgency by peasants, soldiers, and nobles led by a military commander named Xiang Yu against the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) resulted in that monarch’s death and the formation of the Han dynasty in 206 BCE. Xiang Yu divided the country into nineteen feudal kingdoms. But he lacked political acumen and Liu Bang (who posthumously became Emperor Gao Zu) gained control and became sovereign from 202–195 BCE. Some scholars date the Han dynasty to the fall of the Qin in 206 or to the ascendancy of Gao Zu in 202. He consolidated Han power and reorganized the country into ten feudal states. Three administrative branches of ex-Qin governance were retained: chief counselor (chengxiang), grand marshal (taiwei), and inspector-in-chief (yushi dafu). The chief counselor ruled nine chief ministers and oversaw thirteen governmental departments.

Emperor Gao Zu was succeeded by his son Hui Di, although Gao Zu’s widow (a member of the rival Lu clan) retained great political power; Hui Di reigned from 194–188 BCE and was replaced by infant rulers under her control (Shao Di Gong, 188–184 BCE, and Shao Di Hong, 184–180 BCE). When she died in 180 BCE, administrators restored the Liu clan and named Wen Di as monarch. He brought an era of economic prosperity in government and social reform, but was opposed by princes of the imperial family. Barbarians from the north (Xiongnu) conducted cavalry raids into Han territory but were repulsed by Han armies, and a peaceful, albeit transitory, alliance was eventually negotiated. Wen was succeeded by his son, known as Jing Di (156–141 BCE), who faced a serious uprising known as the Revolt of the Seven Kingdoms in the year 154 BCE, which was led by princes of the imperial family who had gained wealth and power in southern Han territory. Because of the threat of the accumulation of power by these feudal princes, Emperor Wen and his successor deprived them of the right to appoint their own ministers and forced the princes to divide their lands among their sons, thereby diluting their resources for potential future uprisings.

Emperor Jing Di’s son, Wu Di, took office in 140 BCE and remained in power until 87 BCE. Central powers were reinforced, skilled officials recruited, and the Qin calendar and emblems abandoned. He also enhanced and greatly expanded road and riverine communications systems for political and economic control. This was an era of great military expansion into Korea and Central Asia, attacks on the Xiongnu, initial economic prosperity, tax reduction, and China’s lip-service adoption of Confucianism, displacing Daoism. A Grand School (taixue, a kind of university) was created, and essays called Five Classics (separate books on changes, documents, odes, rites, and annals) became the official moral and political ideology of the state. The colonization of the northwest frontier south of the Gobi Desert during his reign involved the transfer of an estimated two million colonists from the east. But this fifty-year period of foreign adventures, war and territorial expansion, and domestic expenditures—notably for extravagant diplomacy and a magnificent court—left the empire in a state of unrest and the treasury greatly diminished.

At the age of eight, Wu Di’s son became sovereign (87–74 BCE); during his reign as Zhao Di, the government was administered ably by Minister Ho Kuang. A grandson of...
Emperor Wu Di, Liu He (Prince of Changyi) was to succeed to the throne, but he did not follow appropriate protocols in mourning his predecessor and was stripped of the office by Ho Kuang. Therefore, he was replaced by Wu Di’s great-grandson, who became Xuan Di (73–48 BCE). His reign was one of great prosperity in agriculture and foreign relations; notably, the Xiongnu accepted Han sovereignty. By the first century BCE, the capital, Chang’an, reached its greatest extent. Rectangular in shape and laid out on a north-south axis, it housed palaces, administrative buildings, arsenals, two large markets, and elite residences, and was protected by a 25-kilometer wall around the perimeter. Next to Rome, it was the largest city in the world at its time.

Emperor Yuan Di (48–33 BCE), son of the previous sovereign, diminished government expenses, expanded welfare for the peasants, and promoted Confucians and eunuchs to high offices. But he erred in granting great power to his Wang-clan maternal relatives and enhanced the authority of the eunuch secretaries, thereby diluting central authority and setting a precedent that would result in the demise of the dynasty. Yuan Di’s son, known as Cheng Di (32–7 BCE) was a weak ruler who further gave additional control to the Wang clan. Three other short-term sovereigns (Ai Di, 7–1 BCE; Ping Di, 1 BCE–5 CE; and Emperor Ruzi Ying, 6–8 CE) were ineffective rulers.

**Xin Dynasty: 9–23 CE**

The dynastic succession was interrupted by Wang Mang, who established the Xin dynasty (9–23 CE). His radical reforms during this interregnum were ineffective. The nephew of the widow of the sovereign Yuan Di, he was eventually overthrown by a peasant secret society called “Red Eyebrows” (so-called because they painted their eyebrows red) and killed in 22 CE by an army of nobles under the leadership of Geng Shi Di (23–25 CE).

**Eastern or Later Han: 25–220 CE**

Guang Wu Di of the Later or Eastern Han, an educated Confucian scholar who served as emperor from 25 CE to 57 CE, won the support of other aristocratic clans who dominated Han society and established great estates worked by tenant farmers and slaves. Based on the accumulation of wealth and supported by a bureaucracy drawn for these supporters, he moved the capital eastward to Luoyang (in present-day Henan Province) in the year 25 CE. The city was organized along a north-south axis, encompassed about four square miles, and would become one of the largest cities of the ancient world, with a population exceeding...
one-half million. It functioned as an administrative and commercial center and international marketplace. Two palace complexes each covered 125 acres. There were separate wards or districts for foreigners (usually merchants or envoys from other lands). Central Asian envoys came in 94 CE, west Asian jugglers in the year 122 CE, and Japanese diplomats in 57 CE and 107 CE; economic links with Rome are documented in 166 CE. The central government became weaker and relied more on private armies for the protection of the state. Guang Wu Di’s son, known as Ming Di (58–75 CE) initiated the conquest of Turkestan, but upon his death, Zhang Di (76–88 CE) succeeded to the throne and favored an isolationist policy for the homeland. By this time, the dynasty was in disarray and a succession of minor rulers became sovereigns (He Di, 89–105 CE; Shang Di, in the year 106 CE; An Di, 106–125 CE; Shao Di, the Marquess of Beixiang, in 125 CE; and Shun Di, 125–144 CE). By the year 100 CE, Buddhism, which likely had reached China in 60 CE and is documented in the form of rock carvings at the site of Kungwangshan in Jiangsu Province, began to make inroads into Han Chinese culture. An Qing (also known as Anshigao), a Buddhist missionary from Parthia, was active in the Luoyang area in 148 CE. As political corruption led to internal struggles for power and divided the peasantry, the succeeding sovereigns (Chong Di, 144–145 CE; Zhi Di, 145–146 CE; Huan Di, 146–168 CE; and Ling Di, 168–189 CE) were weak emperors. A revolt, led by the “Yellow Turbans,” began in 184 CE and served to unite the divided peasant factions. But the defeat of these revolutionaries further weakened the dynasty and did not result in Han China returning to a united state. Dong Zhou, a military dictator, arranged for the succession of eight-year old Xian Di (189–220 CE). A series of warlords succeeded Dong Zhou following his assassination in 192 CE. Ts’ao Ts’ao gained control and was opposed by other militarists who controlled the western and southern regions of the disintegrating empire. Upon his death in 220 CE, the three regions emerged as independent polities called the Three Kingdoms, and the Han dynasty came to an ignominious end.

Han Sociopolitical Organization

The Han bureaucracy was both centralized and local, with the former including cabinet officials (called Three Lords and Nine Ministers), led by a chancellor who was also one of the lords. During the Western Han period, there were local administrative levels, approximately 1,180 sub-prefectures, and counties; governors of the latter had great autonomy and were delegated legal, economic, and military authority by the central government, including powers of taxation and conscripting corvée labor. Slaves were
both private and state-owned. Officials were appointed to office on the basis of skills rather than clan affiliation. A professional civil service developed, and record-keeping enhanced the ability of the emperor to tax his subjects and expand the empire.

The Han empire expanded to encompass most of present-day Mongolia and continued westward to Lake Baikal (in present-day southern Siberia), eastward to northern Korea and Japan, and southeast to Gansu and Vietnam. Han political and cultural influence extended westward through the Tarim Basin (the modern Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) and portions of central Asia, notably most of the former Soviet central Asian states to the Caspian Sea (including portions of present-day Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), as well as northern Afghanistan and eastern Persia (Iran). The conquest of Dayuan (the Ferghana Valley and adjacent regions in Central Asia) in 101 BCE gave the Han the opportunity to seize long-legged “celestial” horses (tianma); unlike the Han’s short-legged Mongolian ponies, they greatly enhanced the Han cavalry speed and mobility. There was a notable military campaign in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) in 73 CE to maintain the trading monopoly. The so-called Silk Roads (a series of east-west and north-south commercial routes used for millennia) facilitated caravan trade between China and the West, notably for the export of Chinese silk, gold, bronze artifacts, and porcelain. In return, the Chinese received woolen fabrics, glass, pottery, spices, grapes, wine, sesame, pomegranates, alfalfa, and a variety of other Western foods. A tribute system developed in which non-Chinese polities remained autonomous in exchange for a symbolic acceptance of the Han as overlords.

Sima Qian (145–87 or 80 BCE), a Chinese historian, wrote Records of the Great Historian (also called Historians’ Records or Shiji), which was facilitated by the invention of paper; this was the initial attempt to document Chinese history in book form. This 116-chapter work set a standard for government-sponsored histories that continued into the twentieth century. The compilation of encyclopedias and other books, such as Book of the Mountains and Seas (a geography and natural history), expanded education and the rise of literate gentry. The arts, including calligraphy (with texts on wooden and bamboo slips or on silk), poetry, literature, philosophy, music, painting, and mural art flourished, as did medicine and alchemy and imperial cults oriented to magic and sorcery.

Han Economic Organization

Since 119 BCE, the state sought to monopolize the production of iron and salt, and less so copper working and silk weaving, which remained in both private and federal hands. Iron tools, especially the swing plow drawn by yoked oxen, allowed agricultural productivity and expansion, which necessitated the construction of irrigation systems (dams, dikes, and canals). Crop rotation was practiced from 85 BCE onwards. Chinese inventions during this era included paper, porcelain, the compass, water clocks, sundials, astronomical instruments, the seismometer, water wheel, the hydraulic trip-hammer, piston bellows, and...
the forging of steel. Terracotta figures; textiles; gold, silver and bronze working (including gilt bronzes); lapidary in semiprecious stone; jade carving; wood working; and lacquer wares are among the crafts that flourished. Ceramic spirit models (minqiqi) in the form of soldiers, attendants, entertainers, and other human depictions expanded to include house models, towers, granaries, wells, stoves, farm scenes, and other implements and accoutrements. Scholars interpret these as marking a change from mystical beliefs regarding the afterlife to a presumption that the activities of everyday life would continue after death. Pure rag paper is known from the second century BCE and was mass produced by the early first century CE; hemp paper was developed in 109 CE.

By 100 BCE, monumental stone sculptures were erected in public areas and placed on tombs, and by the first century CE, clusters of stone monuments and figures lined avenues or “spirit roads” leading to imperial tombs (replacing the terracotta armies of earlier dynasties). Tombs for the imperial family and official and nobility contained elaborate burial goods that document the lives of rich landowners and traders in contrast to peasant poverty and slavery.

The Han created the first centralized state and conducted major military expansion into Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea and Central Asia, as well as advances into Southeast Asia. The period was characterized by technical progress and economic expansion that enhanced merchants and gentry. Culturally this was the zenith of classical studies and an intellectual renaissance with courtly literature, scholastic philosophy, and the performing and graphic arts including music, theater, painting, and textiles.

Charles C. KOLB

Further Reading


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Han Rhapsodists

The *fu* 賦 (rhapsody or prose-poem) developed during the Han era as the dominant literary genre, and it continued to be composed by many later major writers. *Fu* initially meant a presentation, usually at court, of narrative compositions. Such compositions later included more personal literary expressions that served as vehicles of Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist ideas.

Although the *fu* (rhapsody) is principally associated with the Han era (206 BCE–220 CE), when it developed as the dominant literary genre, it was occasionally composed, often in sophisticated and new ways, by many later major writers, including Li Bai 李白 (701–762 CE), Bai Juyi 白居易 (772–846 CE), Ouyang Xiu 欧阳修 (1007–1072), and Su Su 蘇軾 (1037–1101). Although it rarely attained literary significance after the thirteenth century, it was still occasionally used as a vehicle to commemorate court, official, and private ritual occasions.

Originators

The earliest range of meaning of *fu* suggests how it became the name for a literary genre: first it was the word used for *tax* or *levy* (as both verb and noun); then, *pay* tax or provide *levy*; next, more generally, *provide*, *present*, *submit*, and specifically *create* or *present* a poem or song at a royal banquet; and later to designate one of the three rhetorical figures, or modes, of expression in the odes of the *Classic of Poetry* (Shijing 詩經): *xing* 興 (evocative image), *bi* 比 (simile), and *fu* 賦 (straightforward description/narration). During the early Han, the term *fu* thus came to mean a presentation, usually at court, of descriptive and narrative compositions. Such compositions later included more personal literary expressions.

The *fu* seems to have originated from three sources: (1) chapter 26 of the *Xunzi 荀子* (Sayings of Master Xun) of Xun Qing 荀卿 (c. 335–c. 238 BCE), which contains five riddles together with answers, parts of which are in rhymed four-syllable lines called *fu*; (2) formal and expressive features of the *Lisao 遊騷* (Encountering Sorrow) of Qu Yuan 屈原 (c. 340–c. 278 BCE) and the *Chuci 楚辭* (Elegies of Chu), traditionally attributed mostly to Qu and his literary disciple Song Yu 宋玉 (c. 290–c. 223 BCE) but likely in some cases to be as late as the early Han and thus contemporary with the rise of the *fu*; and (3) literary materials called *fu* presented in various official, court, and ritual contexts, characterized by elaborate diction, florid exposition, and ornate description. These elements appear in early works such as the *Zuo zhuan 左傳* (Zuo’s commentary to the *Chunqiu 春秋* [Spring and Autumn Annals]), of uncertain date but likely no later than the third century BCE, and in the *Zhuang zhi 戰國策* (Intrigues of the Warring States), which contains texts that date from 454 to 209 BCE. The core of such addresses and presentations likewise consists of four-syllable rhymed lines.

But 174 BCE is the earliest date for any Han *fu*: the *Funiao fu 鳥鳥賦* (Rhapsody on the Owl) by Jia Yi 賈誼 (200–168 BCE). Jia’s is a transitional composition that
contains elements from both the Chuci (Elegies of Chu), the so-called sao 誠 style—with its flexible form and most syllables ending with the exclamatory syllable xi—and new elements that characterize the Han fu. Although it contains four-syllable lines with one or more end rhymes per stanza, the exclamatory interjection syllable xi (Han pronunciation, ghei) often occurs between two four-syllable quasi-lines to make nine beat lines, or occasionally as six syllables + xi + four syllables to make eleven syllable lines, or to set off topics at the beginnings of individual lines. Some lines, either four or six syllables, as in the mature Han fu, lack a xi entirely. In tone and theme, it also shows more affiliation with the Chuci than the majority of early Han fu. Instead of presenting lengthy objective description and public-oriented rhetoric, it explores a personal state of mind and emotional outlook. When an owl, harbinger of ill fortune, flies into Jia's studio (like Edgar Allan Poe's raven), it sets him to pondering the uncertainty and impermanence of life. Jia is saved from hopeless pessimism by recourse to the transcendent philosophy of the Zhuangzi, whose texts he reworked to affirm the equality of fortune and misfortune, life and death.

**Early Composers**

By the time of Emperor Wu (141–87 BCE), the fu reached maturity, largely through the efforts of Sima Xiangru 司馬相如 (c. 145–c. 86 BCE), whose compositions set the standard for form and content. They were elaborate and exhaustive descriptions of real or imagined places and things conveyed by an encyclopedic vocabulary, often couched in rhetoric designed to persuade and admonish. Although Sima is known to have written at least twenty-nine fu, of those surviving, only four are considered genuine. The first two are Zi Xu fu 子虚赋 (Master Fictitious Rhapsody) and Shanglin fu 上林賦 (Rhapsody on the Shanglin Park). They originally were two halves of one fu, the Zi Xu fu, but were later divided and given separate titles. They recount in the voices of Master Fictitious and two other imaginary figures the glories of Emperor Wu’s great hunting park. The third is the Ai Qin ershi fu 哀秦二世賦 (Lament for the Second Qin Emperor Rhapsody), which warns of the dangers of misrule. And the fourth is the Daren fu 大人賦 (Great Man Rhapsody), which recounts the virtues of the true sovereign in terms of the perfect sage, or great man, of Confucian and Daoist lore.

Several other Former Han fu writers are considered among the best of the entire Han era. Mei Cheng’s 松乘 (d. 140 BCE) best known rhapsodies are the Qifa 七發 (Seven Stimuli), composed to admonish the world-weary and ill Han crown prince that he should recover health and spirit so he could again engage with the world, with all its sensual, aesthetic, and intellectual delights, described in great and loving detail. Mei also composed the Liang Wang Tuyuan fu 梁王苑頴賦 (Rhapsody on the Dodder Park of the King of Liang), which describes the scenic beauty and recreational pleasures found in the Liang princely domain hunting park. Wang Bao 王寔, who served at the court of Emperor Xuan (reigned 73–49 BCE), is best known for his Dongxiao fu 洞簫賦 (Rhapsody on the Panpipes), which relates the source of the instrument—beginning in gorgeous forests where bamboos from which it is made lushly grow, through noble craftsmen who make it with great skill and ingenuity, to musicians who play it across a wide spectrum of rhythms and modes and conjure up visions rich in moral effect and full of intellectual and aesthetic value, and concluding by likening the sound of panpipes to the sounds of nature, especially the movement of water and the breath of wind, with their cosmic implications for moral transformation.

Yang Xiong 楊雄 (53 BCE–18 CE), active at the court of Emperor Cheng (reigned 32–7 BCE), among other duties, accompanied the emperor and his entourage to sacrificial ceremonies and imperial hunts, which resulted in two ceremonial fu: Gaquan fu 甘泉賦 (Rhapsody on Sweet Springs Palace) and Hedong fu 河東賦 (East of the River Rhapsody), and two hunting fu: Yule fu 羽獵賦 (Rhapsody on the Feathered Arrows Hunt) and Changyang fu 長楊賦 (Rhapsody on the Wide Stretch of Weeping Willows Palace). Although full of praise for the grandeur of the events and the emperor’s demonstrated virtue, all four contain subtle warnings against extravagance and thus function also as a teachable moment.

**Classical Composers**

An even greater number of excellent fu writers appeared during the Later Han, of which four deserve especial attention. The historian Ban Gu 班固 (32–92 CE) as a literary writer is best known for his Liangdu fu 兩都賦 (Two Capitals Rhapsody), which describes the two Han capitals,
Chang’an 長安, the western, which served as capital for the Former Han, and Luoyang 洛陽, the eastern, which served as the capital for the Later Han. Both parts provide detailed accounts of historical events, with loving depictions of the natural and manufactured sights of the two cities as well as their larger geographical settings, accounts of the doings at court, and the virtue of successive emperors. It concludes with confirmation of the eternal political and cultural significance of the two capitals. Ban’s earlier Youtong fu 邁通賦 (Rhapsody on Communicating with the Hidden), in the archaic sào style, is quite different. It explores the realm of hidden gods, sagely spirits, divine maidens, and other members of the spirit world, through which Ban, then perhaps twenty-two years of age, roams in imagination, consciously copying the quest theme of the Lisao (Encountering Sorrow) in which Qu Yuan undertakes a journey in search of a virtuous sovereign to serve. Ban by contrast seeks advice from the spirit world on how he should conduct a successful life, now that his father has just died and he wishes to continue his family’s good name. Another long quest fu is by Zhang Heng 張衡 (78–139 CE), the Si xuan fu 思玄賦 (Rhapsody on Contemplating the Arcane), also in sào style and with Qu Yuan clearly in mind. Inspired by the sad conclusion that the good man rarely finds the world a congenial place, Zhang imaginatively wanders through the mysterious spirit world in search of the Heavenly Way, seeking advice on how to cope with the hostility and suspicion he meets in official life. Although his quest ends in frustration, he resolves to retire and lead a quiet life in the country, cultivating himself and studying the teachings of the ancient sages. Zhang wrote a short sequel, Guitian fu 歸田賦 (Rhapsody on Returning to the Fields), not in sào style but in standard fu six and four syllable lines, which rejoices in his release from the snares and delusions of official life and in his newfound simple joys of country living.

**Late Composers**

Closing the Han era is Wang Can 王粲 (177–217 CE), an original writer who excelled in all forms of literature, including the new short lyric poem, the shī 詩, as well as the fu. Wang’s fu tend to be short, full of direct and intimate description and intense feeling. It is likely that this late Han development of the fu, as seen in the works of Wang Can and his contemporaries, into much shorter and more lyrical compositions is due to influence from the shī, which was then rapidly becoming the new dominant literary form. Wang’s Denglou fu 登樓賦 (Rhapsody on Climbing the Tower) was composed sometime after 193 CE while he was living in Jiangling 江陵 (present-day Jingzhou 荊州, Hubei), where he escaped to avoid the chaos caused by the imminent collapse of the Han. In it Wang describes and praises the marvelous scenery viewed from atop a wall tower, probably on the Maicheng 麥城 city wall not far from Jiangling. But it is not his home, and, although he strains his eyes toward the northwest, his view is blocked by mountains, reminding him of the vast distance involved. Overwhelmed with sadness and worry, he realizes that only the recovery of political and military stability, which he fears is unlikely to come soon, will allow his return home.

To round out this account of the Han fu, it is necessary mention the following age of disunity, the Three Kingdoms era, and the fu of Cao Zhi 曹植 (192–232 CE), third son of Cao Cao 曹操 (155–220), military strongman and usurper of Han rule and younger brother of Cao Pi 曹丕 (187–226), Emperor Wen, first emperor of the Wei dynasty. Cao Zhi’s most famous fu, widely appreciated throughout the tradition, is his Luoshen fu 洛神賦 (Rhapsody on the Luo River Goddess). No evidence exists to indicate why Cao composed this work, but speculation over the centuries has proposed several theories. The Luo River goddess represents Empress Zhen 甄, his brother’s wife, whom he supposedly loved. Because the goddess was beyond human reach, so too was this forbidden earthly love for him, so he wrote the Luoshen fu to express allegorically his love and longing. Another theory claims that this rhapsody should be understood as an expression of Cao Zhi’s frustration at not being given high office at the Wei court by his brother but instead often kept at a distance in politically insignificant “cushy” jobs. The goddess allegorically represents his brother, whose attentions and affections are denied him. Yet another theory says the rhapsody was inspired by legends of the Luo River goddess, supposedly the daughter of the ancient sage ruler Fu Xi 伏羲, who drowned in the Luo and was subsequently worshiped as its protector deity. Cao Zhi draws on this legend when on a journey he halts above the Luo, looks down, and supposedly has a vision of the goddess in all her beauty and glory. There is no way of knowing if the resulting composition was the articulation...
of a vision in the psychological or spiritual sense, a playful but erudite literary invention, a voluptuous description and expression of passionate love for some unidentified woman, or perhaps, simply, a clever verbal concoction designed to enrich lore surrounding the local goddess. Nevertheless, with Cao Zhi the fu was becoming more infused with complexity, expressive subtlety, and layers of meaning, characteristics of many fu composed during the centuries that followed by such masters as Ji Kang 晉康 (223–262 CE), Pan Yue 潘岳 (247–300 CE), Lu Ji 陸機 (261–303 CE), Tao Qian 陶潛 (365–427 CE), and Yu Xin 畲信 (513–581 CE), whose works in this genre have always been regarded as among the great masterpieces of Chinese literary art.

Richard John LYNN

Further Reading


Poet, essayist and Confucian thinker, Han Yu is considered to be one of the foremost writers of the Tang dynasty, whose carefully wrought prose greatly influenced the literature of China and whose ideas helped establish neo-Confucianism.

Han Yu, born in Heyang, Henan Province, and orphaned at the age of six, was one of the greatest prose writers of the Tang period (618–907 CE). His philosophical works inculcated Confucianism tenets and his prose style brought about the Old Prose Movement.

Han Yu was raised by his older brother, an accomplished singer, and an uncle, a well-known prose writer. These early influences charted the course of his own life, as he set about from a very early age to study for the imperial examinations to gain a government position as a scholar-official. He sat for these examinations on three separate occasions, but failed each time. It was only on his fourth attempt that Han Yu passed and by 802 was successful in acquiring a post at court. However, he was overly outspoken and critical of the way government officials behaved and the royal refusal to rescind certain taxes during times of famine. Han Yu’s criticisms of the government were expressed in his works, particularly *Study of the Five* and *Study of the Way*, in which he advocated an adherence to the guiding principles of Confucianism. Before long he was sent into exile by the emperor Dezong.

In time, Han Yu was rehabilitated and given various minor posts in far-off cities, away from the royal court. He might well have lived out his life in such remote places had he not taken up a cause significant to his beliefs. During the Tang period, the influence of Buddhism and Daoism was expanding rapidly in China. Han Yu, as a committed Confucian, detested these new and foreign influences. When Han Yu learned that the new emperor, Xianzong, would take part in a procession honoring a Buddhist relic, he famously sent off an open letter to the emperor titled *Memorial of the Bone of the Buddha*, reminding the emperor of the nobility of the Confucian way and openly deriding anyone who chose to follow foreign, non-rational ideologies that did nothing to further Confucian morality in the kingdom. According to Han Yu, Buddhism and Daoism represented a great threat to Chinese society because both belief systems were concerned solely with the other-worldly, meaning that people did not concern themselves with the here-and-now and with bettering society, as advocated by Confucianism. In addition, Han Yu saw the emperor as the central authority for the betterment of society. Thus, if the emperor gave himself over to worrying about the hereafter, he would neglect his Confucian duty to rule over a peaceful and just kingdom.

Han Yu’s critical letter enraged the emperor, who ordered Han Yu’s immediate execution. But friends of Han Yu, and those who followed Confucianism, convinced the emperor to order exile instead, which the emperor promptly decreed. When another emperor, Muzong, ascended the throne, Han Yu sent another
letter, this time of apology, and he was allowed to return to Ch’ang-an, where he was given various posts until his death. Han Yu is best remembered for his clarity of style. He stripped off the frivolous ornamentations that had encumbered literary prose; his writing was concise and uncluttered. This methodology was derived from his devotion to Confucianism and the canon of Confucian writing, which advocated a life of frugality and honesty without vanity.

In his writings, Han Yu sought to elaborate the workings of an ideal Confucian society, in which the ruler, his officials and his people would have clearly defined duties and obligations. However, in his own lifetime, he was considered a minor thinker. It was only during the Song Dynasty that he was rediscovered and his work was elevated as a worthy example of Confucian thought. Thereafter his influence upon Chinese thought grew unabated.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


Han Yu was a poet and a Confucian thinker. His carefully wrought essay style earned him a reputation as one of greatest prose writers of the Tang period. This image was included in a book of portraits of famous poets called Wan hsiao tang-Chu chuang—Hua chuan, which was published in 1921.
Hangzhou

Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province, is a city near the East China Sea coast with a rich history; its Zhejiang University is considered one of the best in China. Hangzhou’s green tea (Longjing tea) is renowned for its high quality. Tourists and surfers know the city as the location of the world’s largest tidal bore, the so-called Qiantang Dragon.

Hangzhou has long been regarded as one of the most beautiful cities in China; there is a popular Chinese saying that “above the earth, there is the heaven, on the earth, there are Suzhou and Hangzhou” 上有天堂，下有苏杭. It is located on the Fuchun River near Hangzhou Bay on China’s east coast, north of the Qiantang River, and is situated at the southern end of the Grand Canal, the world’s longest artificial river.

The city of Hangzhou was founded about 2,200 years ago during the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) and is listed as one of the seven ancient capitals of China. When the capital of the Song dynasty, Kaifeng, was captured by the Jin (an ethnic-minority dynasty ruled by the Jurchens) in 1126, the Song court fled south to set up the capital in Hangzhou, which they named Linan. The Song capital remained there until the Mongol invasion conquered China in 1276 and set up its capital in contemporary Beijing.

Hangzhou is a city famous for its natural beauty: The Qiantang River to the south and West Lake (Xihu) to the west surround the city environment with the

The multistoried Liuhe Pagoda in Hangzhou, reconstructed in 1165 after the original was destroyed in warfare in 1121, during the Song Dynasty. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
tranquil scenery of water and hills. The traveler Marco Polo (1254–1324) described Hangzhou as one of the most splendid cities in the world when he passed through during the thirteenth century. The West Lake covers an area of six square kilometers and is surrounded by scenic hills, temples, and pagodas. Across the lake are two beautiful dikes with willow trees and bridges: Su Ti (Su Dike) was built by Su Zhi, and Bai Ti (Bai Dike) was built by Bai Juyi. Both men were famous Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) poets.

On the Qiantang River, the world’s largest tidal bore, or wall of water, can race across Hangzhou Bay when conditions are right. When the tide is coming in, the bay’s tunnel shape can create a spectacular wavelike bore from 1.5 meters to 4.5 meters high (although it has been measured as high as nine meters) that sweeps past Hangzhou. This unique natural occurrence, referred to as the Qiantang Dragon, has become very popular with seasonal tourists, especially during autumn, when the tides tend to be strongest. The river tides in the Qiantang River have taken place twice a day since time immemorial. Because
of the moon’s gravitational pull, the biggest tides take place in the first four days of a month in the lunar calendar, and then again from the sixteenth day to the nineteenth day.

Hangzhou Bay also is now spanned by the world’s longest over-ocean bridge, the Hangzhou Bay Bridge. After five years of construction, the 36 kilometer bridge opened in 2008, linking the cities of Shanghai and Ningbo and cutting travel time between the two from four hours to two.

Economically, Hangzhou is famous for the production of tea and the silk and textile industries. Hangzhou is best known for growing some of the finest green tea in China—Longjing tea, which means “Dragon Well” tea. The most famous, Xi Hu Long Jing, is from the West Lake region.

Hangzhou also is the center of the silk industry. The biggest company, Dujingsheng Silk Company, has a museum in Hangzhou that explains the silk-making process, from silk worms on the leaves of mulberry trees to the manufacture of silk cloth. There are also exhibits on the art of silk weaving that include a vivid portrait of Chairman Mao Zedong in silk.

Hangzhou has two famous national universities (Chinese Academy of Art and Zhejiang University), ten public universities, and two private universities. (A national university is funded at the national level; public universities are funded by the provincial and municipal levels.) Zhejiang University, founded in 1897, is one of China’s most prestigious comprehensive universities. The British academic and sinologist Joseph Needham visited Zhejiang University in 1944, calling it the “Cambridge of the East.” From 1952 to 1998, however, Zhejiang University was split up into a number of single-discipline

Gateway at West Lake Island in Hangzhou. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
institutes based on the government policy that read-
justed China’s tertiary education system in 1952. In 1998,
the new Zhejiang University was established, combining
four major universities: Zhejiang University, Hangzhou
University, Zhejiang Agricultural University, and Zheji-
ang Medical University. Since then, Zhejiang University
has become a comprehensive university with twenty-five
colleges and schools.

According to a 2008 national ranking by the China
Academy of Management, Zhejiang University is third
after Tsinghua University and Peking University; a 2007
ranking by the École National Supérieure des Mines de
Paris placed Zhejiang University first in China and num-
ber thirty-four worldwide. The notable alumni and faculty
of Zhejiang University include many officials of the Chi-
nese Communist Party, government ministers, university
presidents, and Nobel Prize winners. Notable faculty have
included Chang Chi-Yun (1900–1985), the Minister of Ed-
cucation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and founder
of the Chinese Cultural University in Taiwan; and Noble
Prize laureate (Physics, 1957) Tsung-Dao Lee (b. 1926).

Teh-Kuang CHANG

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Pagoda at the scenic West Lake area of Hang-
zhou. Marco Polo described Hangzhou as one
of the most splendid cities in the world when he
passed through during the thirteenth century.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Hanlin Academy (Hanlin Yuan)

Hànlínyuàn 翰林院

Founded as a personalized consulting group for the Tang emperors, Hanlin yuan (翰林院 Hanlin Academy)—a common variant for Hanlin xueshi yuan (Institute of Academicians)—later evolved into a prestigious cultural and secretarial apparatus staffed with the best educated and most ambitious elites involved in imperial politics at the highest levels of both the inner and outer courts.

The Chinese character han in hanlin (“a grove of han”) literally means “feathers” and, by extension, “Chinese writing brush” and then “professional writer.” Since the beginning of the Tang (618–907 CE), a group of so-called talents awaiting orders (daizhao) was summoned to serve the emperor’s offhand needs. The group included writers (cixue or wenci), classical scholars, alchemists, diviners, shamanists, astrologers, physicians, fortunetellers, Buddhist and Daoist priests, calligraphers, painters, and chess masters. Over time some writers were singled out to become academicians in attendance (Hanlin gongfeng) and later, by 738, Hanlin academicians (Hanlin xueshi). The Hanlin Academy (Hanlin xueshi yuan) was duly established under Emperor Xuanzong (reigned 712–755) to organize these academicians.

The office of the Tang Hanlin Academy was near the

Hangzhou

Bai Juyi (772–846). This famous poet of the Hanlin Academy was known for his bleak style. Poets, along with alchemists, diviners, shamanists, astrologers, physicians, fortunetellers, were on hand at the academy to serve the Emperor’s needs.
Evolution of the Hanlin Academy

During most of the Song dynasty (960–1279), Hanlin academicians stayed in the imperial inner quarters, as they were still largely regarded as the “private men of the Son of Heaven” (tianzi siren). However, unlike their Tang predecessors, Song academicians, beginning with the Yuanfeng period (1078–1085), were formally ranked and thus were formal officials. Continually recruiting academicians from the scholars who had earned the jinshi degree in civil service examinations, the Song Hanlin Academy became a more complex institute. Following the Tang career model, nearly half of the Song Hanlin academicians became counselors-in-chief.

The Hanlin Academy moved out from the inner imperial quarters in the early 1440s under the Ming (1368–1644). Its relationship with the imperial house became more distant and formal, as the Ming emperors ruled more directly through other apparatuses, such as the highly personalized Grand Secretariat (Neige). As a formal bureaucratic institute, the Ming Hanlin Academy further expanded to include more than a dozen ranked posts, all with designated duties that included drafting edicts, helping emperors to study and write, educating princes, editing books, and compiling dynastic histories. This bureaucratic tendency continually developed under the Qing (1644–1912). In its full organizational capacity, the Qing Hanlin Academy retained 119 people, about half of whom were office clerks.

Most of the Ming and Qing Hanlin scholars came from the top three tiers (jia) of the jinshi degree holders. The first tier automatically became Hanlin senior (xiuzhuan) and junior (bianxiu) compilers, and the second and third tiers, if qualified after an additional examination, were accepted as Hanlin trainees (shujishi) for future appointments. As expected, powerful officials, such as the Ming grand secretaries (Neige daxueshi), the privileged Qing “serving personnel” (xingzou) of the imperial Southern Study (Nanshufang), or the Qing grand councilors (junji dachen), were always chosen from Hanlin academicians.

Yamin XU

Li Bai (701–762) was one of the most famous Daoist poets of the Hanlin Academy. He is said to have died while drunkenly seeking to touch the moon’s reflection in a lake.
Ancient Air
A poem by Li Bai, one of the most famous Daoist poets of the Hanlin Academy.

Climb high gaze four seas
Heaven earth how vast
Frost blanket crowd thing autumn
Wind blow big desert cold
Magnificent east flow water
10,000 thing all billow
White sun cover elapse brilliance
Float cloud without certain end
Wutong nest swallow sparrow
Thorn jujube perch yuan luan
Moreover again return go come
Sword sing travel road difficult
I climb up high and look on the four seas,
Heaven and earth spreading out so far.
Frost blankets all the stuff of autumn,
The wind blows with the great desert’s cold.
The eastward-flowing water is immense,
All the ten thousand things billow.
The white sun’s passing brightness fades,
Floating clouds seem to have no end.
Swallows and sparrows nest in the wutong tree,
Yuan and luan birds perch among jujube thorns.
Now it’s time to head on back again,
I flick my sword and sing Taking the Hard Road.


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Harbin

Harbin is the capital city of Heilongjiang Province in northeastern China. The cosmopolitan city, known as Little Moscow, was once a haven for refugees from Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and is now famous worldwide for its winter Ice and Snow Festival.

Harbin is the capital of Heilongjiang Province in northeastern China. Its administrative region covers eight districts and eleven counties with a total area of 53,000 square kilometers. Harbin is the political, economic, cultural, educational, and transportation center of the province and (as of 2007) is the eighth largest city in China.

Harbin's winter is as long as five months and overnight low temperatures can fall to 40° C. Although summer is hot and short, the cool evening breezes from the Songhua River make Harbin one of the most popular retreats in July and August.

Originally a quiet fishing village on the south bank of the Songhua, Harbin derives its name from Alejin, the Manchu word for "honor" and "fame." During the twentieth century this village with a population of only 2,300 grew into a metropolis of nearly 4 million people by 2001, before more than doubling in population over the next six years. The city's rapid expansion during the twentieth century was precipitated by construction of the China Eastern Railway through Manchuria by the Russians at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the city became a haven for refugees from Russia, many of them Jews. In fact, during the first half of the twentieth century Jews in Harbin numbered more than twenty thousand—one of the largest Jewish communities in China. By the 1930s, Harbin's Jews had begun to scatter across eastern Asia because of economic crises and persecution by the Soviet army. After World War II many Harbin Jews moved away, mostly to Israel, the United States, Europe, or Australia.

During the period of the Japanese-dominated state of Manchukou (1932–1945), Harbin was the site of a notorious Japanese biological warfare laboratory. Soviet troops occupied the city in 1945, and a year later Chinese Communist forces took it over. From 1946 to 1949 Harbin was
used as military base by the Chinese Communist Party. The city played an important role in the Chinese Communist victory in northeastern China.

Since 1949, the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Harbin has grown into an integrated city with industry as the principal part of its economy. Hosting large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises, Harbin had been an important industrial base of China from the 1950s to the 1980s. Hydroelectricity equipment, airplane engines, and linen textiles were the main products. Since the 1978 economic reform Harbin has diversified its economy by developing light industry and service industry.

One of the most beautiful cities in China, Harbin is known as “Little Moscow” and “Paris in the East” because of its European-style architecture and its people’s daring way of dressing, the result of colonialism and cooperation with nearby Russia. Harbin, one of the few cities in China that never had a city wall, is famed for its cosmopolitan and open attitude toward things that are new and foreign. The local language is considerably influenced by the Manchu and Russian languages.

Di BAI

Further Reading
Health Care System

Quánkē yīxué 全科医学

Political, social, and economic changes since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China have created a continued challenge to provide medical care for 1.33 billion people in both urban and rural populations. As reforms made in response to the 2003 SARS epidemic have begun to show their efficacy, the government recognizes the need to rein in costs and address public concerns over quality of health care.

Modern China’s health care system has undergone substantial change in conjunction with the country’s political, economic, and demographic change. The rapid economic growth since the 1980s and changes in living conditions, nutrition, and health have resulted in decreased infant mortality (estimated at 21.16 deaths per 1,000 births in 2008) and increased life expectancy (estimated at 73.18 years in 2008).

China faces huge health problems, however, including a lack of access to affordable health care, often-inadequate medical insurance coverage, and an inequality in health services between urban and rural areas. As it has in the past when health concerns have caused great discontent among its populace, China’s government has proposed reforms to provide safe, effective, convenient, and affordable health care to both urban and rural populations.

Development of Health Care in People’s Republic of China

When the Communists established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the country’s health and health systems had been weakened both by the civil war and by China’s war with Japan. In the period from 1949 to 1965, the government took steps to improve the nation’s health, emphasizing preventive measures. A three-tiered health care delivery system was implemented. At the lowest level, rural, village, or urban street clinics provided basic prevention and cure. Township or community health centers provided care for patients who needed additional treatment. Specialized services, unavailable at either of the two lower levels, were provided through a network of government-funded hospitals. The government established basic insurance systems for urban workers. The Government Insurance Scheme, or GIS, covered active and retired government employees, disabled veterans, and university staff and students. The Labor Insurance Scheme, or LIS, was funded by state-owned enterprises for their employees. The commune-based Cooperative Medical System, with village and town clinics, was developed in rural areas. New medical schools were established. Famine during the Great Leap Forward (the period in the late 1950s when farm workers were mobilized to work in factories and crops failed to be harvested) was a disaster in which up to 30 million people starved to death. But improved sanitation, water quality, and nutrition contributed to overall improved health during the period before the Cultural Revolution. For example,
schistosomiasis, a parasitic disease from infected water, was virtually eradicated.

Many of these health-care-system improvements were lost during the social upheaval of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Medical schools were closed for five years, and their students and faculties were sent to the countryside. Treatment, specifically psychiatric treatment, favored political re-education over drug therapy. In rural areas, where up to 80 percent of the population lived, basic health care was provided by the “barefoot doctors.” These peasant youth received three- to six-month training courses that included traditional Chinese medicines and procedures (such as acupuncture) in addition to Western medical practices. The barefoot doctors continued farming work in the fields while providing first aid, immunizations, and health education. In 1986, there were an estimated 1 million barefoot doctors. Chen Zhou, appointed China’s Minister of Health in 2007, began his medical career as a barefoot doctor.

Rapid economic growth, decentralization of political and economic power, and a shift to a market economy characterized the thirteen years immediately following the end of the Cultural Revolution. Decentralization of government financial responsibility to provinces resulted in an inequity of health care between rich and poor areas. The percentage of health care services that the government subsidized declined, and financing of health care was increasingly privatized. A government-mandated price cap on some drugs led to increased use of expensive drugs and diagnostic technology (such as MRIs and CAT scans) to increase revenues for privatized large hospitals. The increasing costs had to be borne by consumers on a pay-as-you-go-approach that often forced people to forego treatment. Changes to the rural Cooperative Medical System resulted in fee-for-service treatment by often undertrained village doctors. Gaps appeared in medical insurance coverage. Industrialization resulted in the creation of many urban migrant workers who lacked health coverage, and the increasing numbers of people employed in the private sector were not covered by GIS or LIS plans. A positive step during this period was the undertaking of new public health initiatives that decreased the incidence of infectious diseases and infant mortality.

The period from 1990 to 2002 saw government efforts to rein in health care costs. Resistance by large hospitals and drug companies, plus the inability of poor provinces to implement centralized changes, largely resulted in the failure of these reform efforts. The number of private health care providers increased. GIS and LIS, which covered formal public sector employees, collapsed as insurance became a burden for businesses. A new program for urban uninsured, merging GIS and LIS into the Basic Health Insurance Scheme (BHIS), was implemented. This new plan is employment based: both employers and employees make contributions to a common fund. This period saw an increase in the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, hepatitis B, and schistosomiasis.

The SARS epidemic of 2002 and 2003 brought the world’s attention to the inequities and infrastructure...
weakness in China’s health care system. Reforms inspired by this crisis included partial resumption of central management of public health and reallocation of funds. A new rural Cooperative Medical System, operated by county governments and funded by beneficiaries, counties, and the central government, was formed. As of September 2007, around 80 percent of the whole rural population of China had signed up (about 685 million people). One consumer weakness in the Cooperative Medical System is that benefits are provided on a sliding scale: The program pays a lower percentage of fees for treatment in urban areas, with patient responsible for the balance, but patients must often go to urban areas for specialized treatment. The numbers of people with health insurance seems to have increased significantly in 2007. A total of 220.51 million people participated in the urban Basic Health Insurance Scheme; a significant portion of the increase is due to the inclusion of migrant workers coming from the rural areas. The Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention was organized; the renewed reduction in infectious diseases since its inception shows its efficacy. Health care response to the Sichuan earthquake of 2008 was another indication of a strengthened system.

Strategies for Reform

Even after reforms that responded to the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak of 2003, many challenges remain, including soaring medical costs, a lack of access to affordable medical services, antagonism between health-care providers and patients, and low medical insurance coverage. New reforms of the health care system, proposed in late 2008 and passed by the State Council in January 2009, attempt to address these problems. The goal is to provide universal medical services that are safe, effective, convenient, and affordable to both urban and rural populations. The plan promises to spend RMB¥850 billion by 2011 (approximately US $124.4 billion) to provide a universal primary medical service to the country’s 1.33 billion people. There are five key strategies in the plan.

The first key proposal is to increase the amount of urban and rural population covered by the urban Basic Health Insurance Scheme or the new rural Cooperative Medical System to at least 90 percent by 2011. Each person covered by the systems would receive an annual subsidy of 120 yuan (approximately US $17.50) beginning in 2010. Currently, farmers and their families and unemployed urban workers must pay for health care. Responding to a concern that the goal should be 100 percent insurance coverage, Li Ling, a professor at the National School of Development at Beijing University who developed the draft of the new plan, said that even developed countries can’t achieve 100 percent coverage.

The second key proposal is to build a basic medicine system that includes a catalogue of necessary drugs produced and distributed under government control and supervision starting from this year. All medicine included would be covered by medical insurance, and a special administration for the system with strengthened government control over drug production and distribution would be established. Medications represent more than half of health care costs for consumers, and the high cost is often a point of contention between health-care givers and patients. Opposition to this proposal comes from pharmaceutical companies, who say going back to a planned and controlled economy would result in lower productivity and that lowering drug prices may reduce drug quality.

The plan proposes to implement reforms to improve services in public hospitals. Increased government subsidies would partially offset reduced revenues from drug sales. A pilot program running from 2009 to 2011 would reform public hospitals in terms of their administration, operation, and supervision in order to improve the quality of their services. The government will select public hospitals in several cities to participate in the pilot program. Li Ling said that reform of public hospitals lies at the heart of the new plan.

A fourth strategy is to improve services of grassroots medical institutions, especially hospitals at provincial levels, township clinics or those in remote villages, and community health centers in less developed cities.

The final key proposal addresses inequality in delivery of health services. According to the United Nations, in 2005, 25 percent of public-health resources were devoted to rural residents, even though they made up roughly 60 percent of the population. China would gradually provide equal public health services in both rural and urban areas in the country.

Reforms are designed to address public concerns about the cost and quality of health care. The government describes the reforms as “putting people first,” but plan proponents expect additional benefits to China’s overall economy. Out-of-pocket health expenditures by individuals are one factor in the increased poverty rate in China (16.2 percent...
in 2006). With lowered costs for health care, people would have more money to spend on consumer goods. It is hoped that increased domestic consumption would result in less reliance on exports for economic growth. As was seen with the SARS epidemic, improved public health in China has implications for global health care.

The Editors

Further Reading


Traditionally, Chinese food was healthy, mainly because millennia of famine led people to learn by trial and error how to eat to survive. But the Chinese diet has changed with modernization, as more fats and sugars have become available. Traditional nutritional medicine worked well to remedy certain deficiencies, despite being based on concepts very different from those accepted today.

Food has always been integral not only to the health but also to the culture of the Chinese people. China’s traditional diet was adapted to scarcity. Before the mid-twentieth century, China suffered famine in some part of the country almost every year, and a major famine every two to four years. Malnutrition and starvation were the commonest causes of death. Enormous developments in food production took place but were counterbalanced by rising populations and by environmental decline from deforestation, cultivation of marginal lands, and similar processes that led to erosion and drought–flood cycles. The people adjusted by eating a diet that maximized the amount of nutrients produced per acre.

Most nutrients came from the humble, often despised everyday grains and greens. Grain staples provided the most calories and nutrients. Where possible wheat and millet, more nutritious grains, dominated. Rice is less nutritious but yields far more crop per acre, thus it became the choice in places where it could grow well. Soybeans, another prevalent

A little girl takes a bite from a sandwich. Nutrition and food safety in China have become an international issue since it was discovered that melamine was added to Chinese milk and infant formula to artificially increase its protein levels. The chemical caused the poisoning of many Chinese children and contaminated many foods exported from China. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
crop, yield high amounts of protein. Common vegetables such as Chinese cabbages, beans, and spinach are particularly rich in vitamins and minerals. The few animal protein sources—usually pork, chicken, and fish—were particularly economical to raise or catch and a rich source of protein and vitamins. Chinese women traditionally breastfed for a long time, sometimes three years, though usually half of that. Virtually all people lose the ability to digest lactose (milk sugar) after early childhood. This, along with the lack of pastureland and ancient conflicts with herding peoples, explains the lack of dairy products in the Chinese diet. In the West fermented dairy products are common. The lactose turns to lactic acid and is thus safely consumed.

Medical works from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) show that the Chinese learned how certain foods corrected problems we now recognize as vitamin and mineral deficiencies. Watercress cured scurvy. Fresh foods and whole grains and beans cured beriberi. Red meats, especially iron-rich wild meats and liver, cured anemia. Goji (Lyccium chinense) leaves and berries produced strength, vigor, and general health. We now know they are extremely rich in key vitamins and minerals and are, in fact, a vitamin-mineral supplement. They were, and are, used especially for women recovering from childbirth. Many spices have both mineral value and antiseptic action and were used to preserve food and improve its nutritional value. Diarrhea was effectively treated with broth in which fresh foods were cooked, an early oral rehydration therapy.

In the low-meat diets of ordinary people, lack of vitamin B12 was a special problem. B12 occurs only in animal and fungal foods. The solution was soy sauce and other soy and grain products fermented by yeasts and fungi. Early Chinese, though ignorant of vitamin B12, found that such products complemented other foods and helped survival. Also important was bean curd (tofu). It provides not only protein but also vital calcium because it is usually coagulated with calcium salts.

Anyone with the means to survive could at least have a healthful diet. Studies by Cornell University in the 1980s and 1990s showed that Chinese living in traditional rural conditions had low levels of cholesterol (average of 127 vs. above 200 in the contemporary United States); were lean and in good shape; and had low rates of heart disease, certain cancers, and circulatory and degenerative ailments. Some areas, however, showed high rates of cancer, possibly because of extremely low cholesterol levels.

The situation has changed in recent years. Meat, fat, and sugar have become more available. People prefer them to bean curd, vegetables, and unprocessed grain. The result has been a rapid increase in obesity, heart disease, and diabetes. Problems for the future also include specific deficiencies. Folic acid deficiency is an emergent danger because of the decline in vegetable and whole grains consumption. Folic acid deficiency is a major cause of birth defects around the world and may be increasing in China.

Traditional beliefs about food and health centered on ideas of yin (cool, dark, soft) and yang (warm, bright, assertive). Foods were categorized in various ways within this system. Early on the ancient Greek system of humoral medicine reached China. It was known in the sixth and seventh centuries as still a rather exotic system. It fused with the yin–yang system and other Chinese nutritional knowledge. Foods were categorized as heating, cooling, wetting, or drying. Only heating and cooling remained important. In general, “heating foods” were high calorie and thus, literally, heating—calories are a measure of heat energy. “Heating foods” were generally prepared over high heat and frequently oily, spicy, or strong flavored. Examples are fatty meats, strong alcohol, fried and baked foods, and spicy foods. Some foods were regarded as “heating” only because they were of “hot” colors, red and orange. “Cooling foods” were low calorie, sour or astringent, cool colored, and bland: greens and other vegetable foods. Rice, noodles, and similar staples and moderate-calorie foods were balanced, at the midpoint between heating and cooling.

This system generally worked well because conditions such as scurvy and indigestion were considered hot and effectively treated with fresh vegetables. Anemia, tuberculosis, and general debility were cold and effectively treated with a diet of red meats, spices, and high-nutrient foods in general. Some “cooling foods” are also cleansing, helping the body to get rid of toxins or simply making one feel better by improving digestion and metabolism. The system did not always work, but it worked often enough to keep it valuable and functional up to the present.

Another system was the consumption of “strengthening (bu) foods,” considered to build body, blood, and vigor. These are easily digestible, mineral-rich protein foods, ranging from game meats and mushrooms to pine seeds and edible birds’ nests (from the swift, Collocalia esculenta). These do indeed have nutritional value.
Unfortunately for biodiversity, a less valuable belief arose that any strong, sexually potent, or strange-looking animal had special magical powers and could transfer them to the eater. Dozens of species of wildlife are now disappearing because of this belief, which, unlike so much of Chinese traditional nutrition, has been disproved by modern biomedicine. A less formal but widespread concept that does not stand up well is the folk idea that red liquids build blood, brain-shaped foods (like walnuts) build brain cells, and similar associations.

To this may be added the thousands of medicinal herbs and products recognized in traditional Chinese medicine. Many of these fail modern tests, but others are useful and have become worldwide remedies. The boundary between food and medicine has never existed in China. Foods are eaten for health, and herbal medicines are incorporated into gourmet dishes.

Chinese medicinal food has spread to the Western world through books, Chinese clinics, and medicinal-food restaurants. In China itself restaurants serving yaoshan—“medical dining,” traditional medicinal dishes—have been growing in number and elaborateness since their beginning around 1980 in Sichuan. They serve updated recipes based on the medical-nutrition classics.

**E. N. ANDERSON**

**Further Reading**


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Various animals are considered healthy, but for different reasons. Here the head and legs of an alligator are for sale in a restaurant in Guangzhou.
The Tiandihui (Heaven and Earth Society) was one of several voluntary associations that came into being during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), but its origins and raison d’être have been a subject of ongoing debate among scholars. Some regard it as a mutual aid organization formed by China’s lower classes; others see it as a political order founded by Ming loyalists to overthrow the Qing.

Heaven and Earth Society, also known as Tiandihui (TDH), was one of several voluntary associations or brotherhoods, characterized by ceremonial initiation rituals in the form of blood oaths, which appeared during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). These associations, or hui, were organized for a variety of purposes. Understanding their true nature and tracking them through time and space have challenged those who have come into contact with them. Often, in the absence of real information, they have become a tabula rasa onto which different groups have imprinted differing understandings of their origins and purpose. Today, the TDH’s origin is still a subject of dispute by scholars, who regard it as either a mutual aid or Ming Loyalist organization.

The mutual aid view, made possible by the recent opening of Qing dynasty archives in both Beijing and Taiwan, suggests that the TDH emerged around 1762, in Fujian Province, in response to the demographic and economic crises of the late eighteenth century. Founded by an itinerant monk, it subsequently took shape as a multi-surname fraternity, transmitted throughout southern China by an emigrant society for the purpose of creating, through rituals of sworn brotherhood, pseudo-kinship groups to provide sojourners, cut off from the social safety net of their families, with a means of mutual interaction. Once formed, these societies figured in the survival strategies of China’s lowest classes in ways that combined protection and predation. While the rank and file, on learning secrets in the form of passwords and coded behavior, obtained immediate brotherhood, their leaders quickly learned to profit from the selling of membership and to mobilize their units for everything from robbery to feuding to occasional rebellion.

This view of the society as a product of China’s eighteenth-century demography stands in marked contrast to that of the Ming Loyalist scholars, who saw it as a product of China’s seventeenth-century politics, the goal of which was to overthrow the alien Qing dynasty in the hope of restoring the defeated Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The story embedded in the society’s creation myth recounts how once-loyal monks of the Shaolin monastery, after rendering aid to the throne, were betrayed by the Qing and subsequently sought revenge against them through the founding of the society, which they dedicated to the dynasty’s overthrow; Ming Loyalist scholars thus tend to view the society as having been created by Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) or other loyalists of the seventeenth century for the purpose of overthrowing the Qing. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, society materials, in the form of manuals, registers, and insignia, unearthed in China and Southeast Asia,
gave rise to disputes among them about the meaning of the legend and the historical counterparts of its fictional characters.

To complicate matters even more, Westerners, especially colonial officials of the nineteenth century, imbued with a consciousness of fraternal orders and clandestine organizations, regarded the TDH as a Chinese secret society—the term *Triads* eventually came into use to refer to such secret groups, and is often used throughout Asia today as a synonym for the TDH in general—and preoccupied themselves with discussions of whether it shared a common origin with the Freemasons and other European mystery cults.

Qing officials, immediately perceiving the TDH as a threat to society, condemned it in 1792 as a rebellious order and engaged in repeated witch hunts against alleged members, thereby giving rise to self-fulfilling prophecies, as members, squeezed by persecution, had little choice but to rise up, which they did repeatedly, especially in conjunction with the Taiping Rebellion and the 1911 revolution.

Members also responded to government persecution by going undercover and changing the organization’s name so that, depending on locality, the TDH could be also known as the Three Dot Society, the Three Unities Society, and the Hong League. Despite Communist efforts to suppress it during the 1950s and 1960s, today, known as Triads, the society is experiencing resurgence in the realm of worldwide Mafia and organized crime, with tentacles broadly extended throughout the global economy.

**Dian MURRAY**

**Further Reading**


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**Approach heaven with a single stride.**

一步登天

Yì bù dēng tiān

Hebei Province ▶
Hebei is a northern province that surrounds the national capital, Beijing, and features the eastern extension of the Great Wall. It is about the size of the state of Nebraska. The province’s agriculture supplies Beijing with wheat, corn, vegetables, and fruit. In 1976 an earthquake devastated the eastern city of Tangshan.

Hebei (Ho-pei, Hopeh) Province in northern China covers an area of 190,000 square kilometers. It borders in the west on Shanxi Province, in the north on Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Liaoning Province, in the east on the Bohai Gulf—an arm of the Yellow Sea—and Shandong Province, and in the south on Henan Province. The province (not to be confused with Hubei Province in central China) surrounds the self-governed municipalities of Beijing and Beijing’s seaport, Tianjin. To the west the Taihang mountain range, with peaks up to 2,870 meters above sea level, forms a physical barrier between Hebei and Shanxi, and in the north the Yanshan range, rising to 1,500 meters, constitutes the traditional frontier between China and the nomads in the north. It is here that the eastern extension of the Great Wall is located. Southern Hebei, covering about 78,000 square kilometers, is part of the North China plain, most of which is lowlands less than 50 meters above sea level.

The province has a temperate, continental, monsoon climate. Winters are cold and dry, and in January temperatures may drop to –21° C in the north (a low of –42.9° C has been recorded). The climate is less cold in the south. The rainy season stretches from June through August, and temperatures in July average 18° to 27° C, but most regions have recorded temperatures above 40° C. The capital, Shijiazhuang (estimated 2007 population 9.55 million) is situated in the southern lowlands, which are also where the majority of Hebei’s people live.

Hebei is divided into 10 regions, 142 counties, and 2 autonomous counties between Beijing and Tianjin that are inhabited by the Hui Muslims, which is the largest minority group in the province. Manchu and Mongolian people also live in the northeast, but the Han Chinese make up 98 percent of the population. Traces of agriculture date back to 4000 BCE, but the marshy lowlands of southern Hebei were first drained and settled during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), and for centuries this densely populated area was one of the most productive in the empire. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) the area declined as the Yangzi (Chang) River valley was developed. Hebei was incorporated into a number of foreign dynasties, including the Liao (916–1125) and the Jurchen Jin (1125–1234). Beijing became the capital of the Yuan empire (1279–1368), and with brief interruptions Beijing has remained the capital of China.

The economy of Hebei Province has for centuries been dependent on Beijing, and the intensive agriculture in the lowlands has supplied the capital with wheat, corn, vegetables, and fruit. Light industry is distributed over the province, with major textile centers in Shijiazhuang (the provincial capital, with an estimated 2007 population of 9.55 million) and Handan (estimated 2007 population 8.96 million).

In 1976 a major earthquake (7.8 on the Richter scale)
devastated the city of Tangshan in eastern Hebei. The earthquake is considered to be the most devastating of the twentieth century. Estimates vary widely, but it is thought that as many as 750,000 people lost their lives. After a ten-year project the city was entirely rebuilt.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading


Heilongjiang Province, in the far northeast corner of the country, is named after its longest river, the Black Dragon River (known elsewhere as the Amur), and is nicknamed “the Great Northern Granary.” It borders on Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region to the west, Jilin Province to the south, and Russia to the north and east. It holds the record for the coldest recorded temperature in China (–52° C).

Lying in the northernmost part of northeast China, Heilongjiang Province has a total area of 469,000 square kilometers (about 181,000 square miles; approximately twice the size of Romania), of which 60 percent is mountains, 10 percent rivers, and 30 percent farmland. It has a common boundary with Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Jilin Province, and borders Russia to the north and east. Within its population are some 2 million people of minority nationalities, including Manchus, Koreans, Huis, Mongolians, Daurs, Hezhens, Oroqens, and Evenkis.

Heilongjiang has a cold-temperate continental climate with a mean annual temperature of –2° to 3° C (35° to 28° F), an ice-bound period of five to six months, and a frost-free period of 120 days. The city of Mohe, where it is possible to see the Northern Lights, has the record for the lowest temperature recorded in China: –52° C (–62° F). It has warm, rainy summers with an annual rainfall of 400 to 650 millimeters (about 15 to 26 inches) and long hours of sunshine, which is favorable for crop growth.

Named after its longest river, the Black Dragon River, known outside of China as the Amur, Heilongjiang has five large river systems made up of the Heilong, Songhua, Wusuli, Nenjiang, and Suifen rivers. Rivers and lakes provide good quality water resources for agriculture, industry, and human consumption. Heilongjiang has vast expanses of flatland and wide areas of fertile back soil and is one of China’s major commodity grain growers. It is nicknamed “the Great Northern Granary,” denoting its abundant production of soybeans, maize, millet, sorghum, sugar beets, flax, and sunflower seeds. Ginseng is cultivated in this area as well.

Heilongjiang’s land area also includes the country’s largest known oil reserve, the Daqing oil field, which was the site of huge protests in 2002 after the central government pressured the owner of the oil fields to cut back on some of the social benefits offered to its current and previous employees. The province also is rich in coal, gold, copper, aluminum, lead, zinc, silver, molybdenum, bismuth, and cobalt. Heilongjiang has a forest area of close to 210,000 square kilometers (about 81,000 square miles), or 49 percent of the province’s total area, and leads the country in timber reserves. The mountains and forests abound in alpine weasels, sables, otters, deer, and musk deer.

Heilongjiang has the most developed inland shipping among the northern provinces. Rail is the principal means of transport in Heilongjiang, with Harbin as
the general hub. Harbin, the provincial capital (with an estimated population of 9.87 million in 2007), is on the south bank of the Songhua River. It is the economic, cultural (Harbin is famous worldwide for its annual Winter Ice Festival), and communications center of the province and is the eighth largest in China. The city used to be called “Little Moscow” as a result of colonialism, cooperation with, and immigration from nearby Russia. Harbin looks a bit like a last outpost of imperial Russia.

**Di BAI**

**Further Reading**


Henan Province
Hénán shěng 河南省
93.6 million est. 2007 pop. 167,000 square km

Henan Province, in the north-central part of the country, is China’s most densely populated province. It is known as the cradle of Chinese civilization, with evidence pointing to its inhabitation during China’s Neolithic period (12,000–2,000 BCE). Several ancient imperial capital cities are located in the province, which is about the size of the state of Wisconsin but with approximately seventeen times the population.

Henan Province, in north-central China, covers an area of 167,000 square kilometers (64,000 square miles, slightly smaller than the state of Wisconsin). It is bordered by Hebei Province to the north, Shandong Province to the northeast, Shanxi Province to the northwest, Anhui Province to the southeast, Hubei Province to the south, and Shaanxi Province to the west. Henan has a population of more than 93 million and is China’s most densely populated province. The capital and largest city in the province is Zhenzhou, which was inhabited as far back as the Neolithic period, (12,000–2,000 BCE in China). Recent excavations have unearthed artifacts dating back to the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE).

Henan is known as the cradle of Chinese civilization. Archeologists have found evidence that Henan was inhabited as far back as the Neolithic period, (12,000–2,000 BCE in China). Recent excavations have unearthed artifacts dating back to the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE).

Several cities in Henan have been prominent in Chinese history. Anyang, in the north, was the first capital of the Shang dynasty. Luoyang, in the west, served as imperial capital of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE). And Kaifeng, in the northeast, was the imperial capital during the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE) and the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126 CE). The province is a major producer of wheat, tobacco, and cotton. Textile, electricity, and high-tech industries help drive the local economy. Zhenzhou, at the crossroad of several major railroad lines that transverse China, is one of the key points of China’s national transportation system. Within the city
are several important economic and high-tech development zones and a major export processing area.

Henan Province’s economy is not as open as other provinces and has had problems attracting foreign investment. Structural weaknesses, underdeveloped transportation links and a weak private sector contribute to Henan Province’s underdevelopment. The economy is dominated by agriculture, mining and manufacturing interests. Further complicating development is the concentration of the manufacturing sector in six industries: petrochemicals, food processing, nonferrous metals, automobiles, textiles and machinery. Even though Henan Province is a major railway transit hub, the province lacks the infrastructure to sustain economic growth.

Keith A. LEITICH

Further Reading


Located in Yunnan Province in southwestern China, the sparsely populated Hengduan ranges are China’s longest and widest mountain system. Main sources of income are cattle, sheep, and forestry. The ranges also are a major tea producer. Most of the inhabitants belong to minority nationalities such as the Lisu, Yi, Bai, and Tibetans (Zang).

The Hengduan ranges in northwest Yunnan Province, extending into neighboring Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region and Sichuan Province, are China’s longest and widest mountain system. Several large rivers flowing from north to south—the Nu, Lancang, Yalon, and Jinsha—traverse the area. The river valleys are 1,500–2,000 meters above sea level, whereas peaks in the southern part reach 4,124 meters (Tiancang); Guangmao in the eastern part reaches 4,023 meters. The peaks stand close together, and the area is almost without plateaus and broad valleys.

The ranges have a relatively high annual precipitation of up to 2,500 millimeters on the western slopes of the mountains, whereas the eastern slopes receive markedly less rain—about 900 millimeters. The region is sparsely populated; most inhabitants belong to minority nationalities such as the Lisu, Yi, Bai, and Tibetans (Zang), and the majority of the region is divided into autonomous districts. The main city of the area is windswept Xiguan, situated at the southern end of Lake Erhai. Main sources of income are forestry, cattle, and sheep. Since tea plants were introduced in the nineteenth century, the region has become a major tea producer. The region is also one of China’s important nonferrous metal industrial bases.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading
High-Technology Sector

Since the late 1990s and especially since the start of the new millennium, China has surged forward in terms of economic development. It has also made significant advances in the high-technology sector, especially in the fast-growing Internet and mobile phone fields.

The Internet moved into the public domain in China in 1997 and exploded after 1999, when China’s Internet users reached a critical mass. At that point, many Internet companies were created, the largest of which were financed by venture capital (VC) from the United States. A new group of entrepreneurs emerged in Zhongguancun (ZGC), a district in Beijing that has come to be known as China’s Silicon Valley. These new entrepreneurs were returned from abroad with extensive contacts or experience overseas.

Though the Internet is a service industry requiring little manufacturing for export, the commercial strategies of Chinese entrepreneurs have been strikingly similar to those of the successful PC manufacturing companies, learning from the foreign companies while building on their own technical expertise and focusing on the domestic market. Neither the uncertainty of state regulation nor the initial hesitation of foreign investment has disturbed their focus. They have been heartened by the growth of China’s Internet market, which since the late 1990s has become the world’s second largest. In 2008, the number of China’s Internet users exceeds the United States to be the largest in the world. However, unlike in other high-tech sectors where foreign brands are the most prominent, China’s Internet landscape is dominated by local firms.

The Development of China’s Technology Market

According to China’s Ministry of Information Industry, during the 1990s, China’s information and communications technologies (ICT) market experienced growth rates that varied between 20 and 40 percent annually. By 2000, China’s ICT market was one of the most significant in the world. The booming Internet and mobile-phone industries, in particular, fueled this spectacular growth. The personal computer had been seen as a necessary tool for offices in the 1980s and early 1990s; the advent of the Internet brought the PC into the home as a source of mainstream media and home entertainment, vastly enlarging its appeal and consumer base. Rising incomes among urban households and ever-declining PC prices also contributed to the market’s growth.

The watershed year for China’s Internet industry was 1997. Before then, the country’s Internet development was mostly limited to infrastructure building among research institutes, universities, and state organizations. Only after 1997 did the Internet become widely available to the public. China’s first Internet café opened in Beijing in November 1996.

The first Internet user survey in China, which was
conducted in October 1997, showed there were 620,000 Internet users nationwide and less than 300,000 computers able to connect to the Internet, minuscule in a country of (then) 1.24 billion people. In comparison, in the same year, the United States had 54.6 million Internet users, and Japan had 8 million.

Since 1997, however, the number of Internet users has soared. Since 1999, there has also been a sharp rise in the number of Internet service providers. After 2001, China felt the chilling effects of the dot-com bubble bursting and the NASDAQ crash, and the number of domains stagnated for about two years. In late 2002, however, domain-name registration started to take off again. According to CNNIC, China official site for Internet statistics, China had 200 million Internet users by the end of 2007; by January 2009, with China’s population at 1.33 billion, the number of Internet users had risen to 298 million, ranking China first in both counts.

Beijing has remained the home of China’s main Internet service providers, accounting for about 19.1 percent of Internet domain registrations in China at the end of 2006. In contrast, Shanghai, with the highest GDP per capita in China, had 9.2 percent of the country’s domains, and Guangdong province (China’s most developed province) had 15.6 percent. Beijing’s predominance has largely to do with its concentration of educational and research institutions and its status as the national capital. Most national and international organizations and media are also located there. Access to information, regulators, and policy makers has also boosted Beijing’s central position in the Internet age.

Another important force in the development of China’s technology industry has been the rapid surge in mobile phone use. In the 1980s, mobile phones were a status symbol for newly rich businessmen or important officials who carried the expensive and bulky gadgets around. But the technology progressed, yielding ever more portable devices and lower prices. As prices declined and the network infrastructure improved, the number of subscribers skyrocketed. The lack of coverage of land phone lines and the expense of installation in China also made mobiles a logical option. By 2002, China had become the world’s largest mobile phone market. The rise of the mobile phone, in turn, has led to increased demand for a variety of telecommunication technologies and services—equipment, software, integrated-circuit designs for phones, as well as text messaging services, all of which have become converging points for the ICT sector.

As with Internet provision, Beijing is the center of China’s telecommunication industry and services. Unlike Internet services, which are dominated by non-state firms, the telecommunication sector is heavily regulated by the state and dominated by giant state-owned carriers. To be a part of the telecommunication industry, one has to win approval or favor from (or at least have good access to) the decision makers in Beijing, which makes the city a favorable location for this industry too. Ironically, while Beijing’s industrial power has long been diluted and surpassed by the booming southeast coast, the...
telecommunication age seems to be restoring its predominance as an industrial-communications center in the “new economy.”

The New Entrepreneurs

To understand the new high-tech environment in China, it is instructive to look at the entrepreneurs who were active in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Consider the story of three of the better-known of these entrepreneurs: Wang Zhidong 王志东 and Zhang Caoyang (张朝阳, Charles Zhang in English), and Robin Li 李宏彦, each is the founders of a key Internet company located in ZGC, and each represents a different characteristics of the sector development.

WANG ZHIDONG

Wang Zhidong was a legendary figure in ZGC and a long-time spiritual leader of China’s Internet industry. In the 1990s Wang was a software genius. Starting in his junior year at Peking University in the 1980s, Wang held part-time jobs at different ZGC companies, doing sales, software, and other work on the then-thriving “Electronic Street.” After he graduated from Peking University in computer science, he started to work on Windows-compatible Chinese-language word-processing software. His first original program, Chinese Star 中文之星, could cleverly convert Windows into a Chinese environment while maintaining its functions. Prior to Microsoft’s creation of a Chinese version of Windows, Wang’s program was the gold standard for Chinese word processing; most computers in China probably had it installed. But despite Chinese Star’s popularity, Wang did not become China’s Bill Gates: the company he founded to sell Chinese Star made little money due to the program’s high piracy rate.

In 1993, Wang left the company and founded another one, Stone Rich Site 四通利方, where he developed his more sophisticated Richwin software, and integrated Chinese into the emerging Internet environment. In 1995, Wang received a $7 million venture investment from a venture capitalist in California and he later merged his company with a Taiwan Internet portal, changed the name to Sina.com, and raised a more substantial sum of capital. Sina was approved to list its stock on the NASDAQ in 2000 and it is now China’s largest Internet portal.

Wang’s experience exemplifies the importance of ZGC as the cradle of China’s high-tech industry. Not only was there technological continuity in his move from his Chinese-language Windows platform to a Chinese Internet platform, but his fame from Chinese Star and Richwin—popularized through his work in ZGC companies—was the key in attracting the attention of foreign venture capital.

ZHANG CAOYANG

Zhang Caoyang, a graduate of China’s prestigious Tsinghua University, followed up his experience with graduate work at MIT, earning a PhD in physics. He was lured by the Internet boom in the United States in the mid-1990s and joined an Internet start-up created by a friend from Harvard. That job took him back to China in 1995, where he supplied the start-up with Chinese information online. Having no roots in China’s own high-tech industry, Zhang nevertheless understood its potential, and he decided to start his own Internet company. Unlike Wang, he did not even try to obtain state sponsorship but directed his capital search toward VC firms in the United States from the start. He received limited capital support at first from his friends and professors and was later able to win substantial VC investment.

Although Zhang’s Internet site, Sohu.com, initially was not as well known in China as Wang’s Sina.com, Zhang was much more accessible to people in the United States. He was listed as one of the fifty “digital heroes” of the world by Time magazine in 1998, and the fact that Zhang made the list increased his name recognition and the fame of his company enormously. He became an instant celebrity both in China and in Chinese student communities overseas. Sohu.com and Sina.com are the two most well-known Chinese Internet portals.

The story of Sohu.com thus had implications entirely different from that of Sina.com. Zhang’s success was due in large part to U.S. expertise and U.S. capital. It was a powerful enticement for many Chinese youth who were either studying or working in technology-related fields in the United States: They started to see that there could
be riches and fame in their future if they brought their technological and business expertise and U.S. connections back to China.

One of the people inspired by Zhang’s example is Robin Li (Hongyan 李宏彦). Li graduated from Peking University, much later than Wang, in 1991. As did Zhang, he headed to the United States for graduate education in the computer sciences. Before he finished his PhD through State University of New York, Buffalo, he landed a string of internship or jobs at a number of Japanese and American corporations in the United States. Li made a breakthrough in Internet search-engine technology during his work, and he was recruited into Infoseek—the once leading Internet company—to be responsible for its search engine development. In the white-hot Internet bubble of the late 1990s, Li decided to start his own company and was able to raise US$1.2 million venture investment (Barboza 2006). He went back to Beijing in 1999, rented a space in a hotel next to his alma mater and named his company Baidu.com. The name came from a famous phrase in a classic Song dynasty poem, describing the desperate search for a beauty in the crowd, only to find her under a light when you suddenly turn around. Baidu struggled in China for a few years due to the immature Internet industry, but was able to climb steadily to the most favored search site after 2003. It achieved international fame in August 2005 when it issued an initial public offering on NASDAQ. Known as “Chinese Google,” the share price of Baidu more than quadrupled on the first day, setting a record for first-day performance among foreign firms ever listed on the U.S. stock market, and among all firms in the previous five years.

These three examples show how dynamic China’s Internet development has been at the turn of the century. All three persons show strong linkages with U.S. in capital and business models, but specialize in different areas.

Visitors at the Shanghai Industrial Exhibit. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
The new entrepreneurs emulated the Western business model and Western professionalism, which were rather alien to the first generation of Chinese entrepreneurs. In fact, they are so familiar with U.S. entrepreneurs that they are often accused of simply being copycats who transplanted U.S. models to Chinese soil, only to find out later that Chinese soil is quite different.

Online retail companies had to sell to a public that seldom use credit cards, and there was no giant Western-style, reliable delivery system in place; information providers had to work around the state monopoly on information and censorship; and software makers had to live with the high rate of piracy, to name just a few obstacles. Given all these difficulties, it is no wonder that foreign Internet giants were not interested in China before 2002. Only the local firms had the perseverance, skills, and connections to survive during the cold spell.

Yet being local also brings other benefits. The Internet is highly consumer driven, so local knowledge, access, and expertise offer tremendous advantage. Take the example of Internet search engines. Google is the undisputed global leader, with over half of the global market share, but it only ranks third in the Chinese market, after Baidu.com (the leading Chinese search engine) and a more localized Chinese Yahoo. Many in the West blame the result on Chinese government censorship, which reduces Google’s speed in China. But a large number of Chinese do use Google, so the speed must have been tolerable. Other factors might be more influential. The marketing director of Baidu suggests that Baidu’s knowledge of the...
habits and preference of Chinese users, the resources it dedicates to Chinese language searches, and its efforts to build Chinese online communities are among its main advantages over Google. Baidu is not alone; in China’s Internet industry, local firms are the market leaders in virtually all fields, and by high margins. This cannot be an accident. Nor can it be attributed solely to the manipulation of the Chinese government, as similar patterns of local firm dominance on the Internet are also found in Japan and South Korea.

Those local firms who survived the early 2000s eventually experienced another boost from 2003 to 2005, when the share prices of China’s dot-coms surged again on the NASDAQ due to profits in text messaging services and online games, both of which seem to enjoy a level of popularity in China unmatched in the United States. Other large international dot-coms such as eBay, Amazon, and Monster rushed to purchase local dot-coms as a way to enter the Chinese market, but by then Chinese firms were already well established China, which made competing with them more difficult and costly for the multinationals.

**Broader Growth in High-Tech Sectors**

The development of the Internet led to broader growth in the high-tech sectors. For example, the subsequent development of e-business and e-government led to a sharp increase in demand for enterprise-level management software, where piracy is much less likely than consumer-oriented software. Combining their computer hardware trading experience and software expertise, many ZGC firms created thriving businesses providing organizations with systems integration, network solutions, and applied software. Unlike the software industry in India, which is primarily oriented toward outsourcing in the United States and European markets, China’s software industry is domestically oriented, so it is the domestic demand that defines the industry.

Take the example of China’s largest private software company, UFIDA 用友. In 2005 it claimed to have the largest market share of enterprise software in China. It first got started because differences in the accounting systems of China and the Western world made imported accounting software hard to use in China. Enterprise management software of foreign origin also suffered a very high failure rate in its application in Chinese enterprises—over 80 or 90 percent—and imported software was far too expensive for all but the largest Chinese enterprises. UFIDA focused its attention on small and medium-sized firms. It and its “twin,” Kingdee Software 金蝶 in Shenzhen, dominate China’s small-firm market for enterprise management software.

Even though the Internet bubble burst in the spring of 2000 in NASDAQ, the returning flow of Chinese students to Beijing after that year actually intensified the industry. The Chinese central government and local governments became increasingly active in recruiting overseas talents through organized publicity tours in the United States, and by giving tours in high-tech regions in China, and in others areas. Some local governments, such as the administrative committee of Beijing’s ZGC Science Park, also set up permanent offices in Silicon Valley, California, and a few other locations in order to recruit high-tech professionals for entrepreneurial ventures in Beijing. Limited grants and various programs of capital assistance for enterprises gradually became available, attracting returnees to high-tech zones across China. All these efforts, adding fuel to China’s sustained economic growth since 1980, finally created a growing flow of returnees in 2002. Although salaries in mainland China for highly-skilled professionals are still low in comparison to their U.S. counterparts, the much lower cost of living in China affords these professionals a comfortable, luxurious lifestyle that they could not afford in developed countries.

According to the Yearbook of the Ministry of Education, the number of mainland Chinese returnees has increased significantly since 2002. Overall, about a quarter of students who went abroad beginning in 1978 have returned to China at mid 2000s. Major science parks in large Chinese metropolitan areas such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen have attracted the lion’s share of returnee entrepreneurs in the high-tech sectors. The vast majority of these enterprises are very small and undercapitalized at the moment. Together, however, they constitute an indispensable force in the internationalization of the ZGC business environment and in the creation of an industrial ecosystem that allows larger and more technologically sophisticated companies to emerge or survive. The returnee
firms are particularly active in the highly sophisticated technological or capital sector such as Internet, semiconductor design, software outsourcing, cell phone development, and venture capital fund.

**Learning the Power of Capital**

The Internet boom opened Chinese businessmen’s eyes to the concept of venture capital and stock market options and prompted many to consider the various capital tools available to overcome their inherited disadvantage in the state-owned financial sector. Looking at the NASDAQ model, many small and medium-size non-state companies hoped to gain the opportunity to use the stock market option without having to go through the cumbersome procedures that came with overt state involvement. A proposal was made in 2000 to establish China’s own NASDAQ to focus on smaller and high-tech companies. The so-called Chinese NASDAQ, which was established in 2004 in Shenzhen, focuses on small and medium-size companies, but without a high-tech focus. Raising capital on the stock market is still not a viable option for most small Chinese firms. The door is opening wider, however, and more and more private companies are taking advantage of the stock markets in China, Hong Kong, and the United States. According to the statistics of the ZGC administrative committee, by 2006, 85 ZGC firms were listed on stock markets, mostly in Hong Kong and China, though thirty-six were listed abroad.

In order to trade publicly, ZGC firms had to adopt a more formal, Western business model, which led, after 2000, to a flurry of restructuring schemes in Chinese firms and to quite an array of mergers and acquisitions. Managers with foreign business backgrounds—the so-called astronauts—were hired and fired at a rapid pace to accomplish that restructuring.

**The Chinese Market, the Internet, and Beyond**

From 1983 to the first decade of the twenty-first century, China’s ICT industry shifted decisively away from the insular socialist model toward a market-driven model open to international involvement. As the size and diversity of China’s market grew, more opportunities arose for both domestic and foreign enterprises. State regulation, market demands, technical capacity, and infrastructure are changing fast in China. Such changes require much keener understanding of the situation and a high dose of tolerance for uncertainty, which means that domestic firms have ended up doing better than large multinationals.

China’s ICT market is now one of the largest in the world. The Internet and wireless communication booms have diversified the ZGC’s industrial structure and provided platforms for an array of software firms, other service companies, and hardware firms. Nonstate high-tech enterprises have been legitimized and become the mainstay of China’s ICT industry. A new generation of entrepreneurs with a strong global orientation has emerged. Multinational corporations are increasing their investments and local involvement. The state, after years of standing off to the side, has designated ZGC as a center of innovation.

The returnee enterprises, in particular, are a rising force in many of China’s high-tech areas. They are significant because of their transnational experiences, their connections to overseas business, and their local links to universities and domestic enterprises. They occupy a uniquely favorable position in the innovation system in China. Like foreign multinational corporations, they maintain ongoing technological, capital, and market connections with the global technology centers, but unlike large foreign companies, they are well integrated into the research and business communities in China. Their access to overseas resources and markets gives them distinct advantages over homegrown firms in accumulating technology and raising capital, though they must make considerable cultural and business adjustments, and not all of them will fulfill their ambitions. While the number of returnee-founded enterprises has grown rapidly since 2000, as a whole they are still small and vulnerable. The capability of the Chinese market to absorb advanced products is limited, and the returnee enterprises constantly face capital shortages due to China’s undeveloped capital market for private businesses.

The Chinese government has been encouraging the returnees by granting them limited political and financial support. But the perceived favorable treatment for returnees may also backfire if they generate resentment
and jealousy among homegrown entrepreneurs. For the returnees to truly perform their services, China must have an infrastructure conducive to fostering productive links with the local business culture, such as information transparency and highly developed professional services. In the end, public policies that increase the flow of information, provide a fair and transparent legal structure, and strengthen the capital market and business services are critical for all enterprises in China. But they may be more important for returnee-founded enterprises, as these enterprises are more sensitive to the commercial infrastructure of the region.

Since 2003, the Chinese government has put increasing emphasis on indigenous innovation. Attracting overseas returnees is one way to promote it. China is also pursuing technological standards that would be alternatives to the established ones of the West. Establishing a technology standard is the ultimate prize, one that will encourage future technology innovation. Those companies responsible for establishing the mainstream global standards enjoy significant commercial rewards from the market. China’s effort for defining its own technical standards is controversial both internationally and nationally, since some observers see it as a proof of China’s pursuit of ethno-nationalism policies.

Overall, China’s institutional structure still need further reform for entrepreneurial ventures to succeed in a significant ways. China still lacks a stable financial infrastructure that supports innovation, so most start-ups have gone overseas in their search for capital. More important, as the Chinese market grows increasingly sophisticated, far more coordination and collaboration is necessary among firms in such diverse areas as design, consulting, research and development, software, services, and manufacturing. In other words, a few vertically integrated companies are no longer sufficient for the ICT industry; close networking between many different types of companies is necessary. It will be worth watching to see how the industry—and ZGC—will develop in the years to come.

Yu ZHOU

Further Reading


Historical geography is the study of how cultural features of various societies emerged and evolved; it necessarily involves the analysis and compilation of historical treatises that documented the evolution of a society—its administration, infrastructure, and the events that shaped its history. Until the twentieth century Chinese historical geography was slow to develop as a formal field, but it has roots in a discipline well explored in Chinese scholarship: the “geography of administrative change,” or “dynastic geography.”

The two Chinese characters that translate the English word geography (di and li) literally mean “land” and “inherent order.” The word “dili” appeared in Chinese literature no later than the fifth century BCE. “Lishi dili” in the Chinese language describes historical geography. In traditional China, history was an essential branch of official scholarship and historical geography was considered the essential basis for all social knowledge. In fact, China’s first modern historical geographers were students of history, not of geography. As they tried to develop the field of historical geography into an independent, professional, and rigorous discipline, history students began to recognize its profoundly geographical nature. As a result, they began to develop a “geographical mind” to improve the caliber of their research. Historical geography has come to play an important role in the study of the long history of China. Chinese historical geography has two important influences—the critical inheritance of traditional scholarship and the influence of Western ideas.

Yange Dili

Confucian scholars invented the concept of chronological geography, which reached its zenith during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Chronological geography was the reconstruction of historical treatises compiled by past dynasties; the development of such a systematically arranged geographical order over the years bolstered the imperial ideology. Special attention was paid to chronological descriptions of changing administrative systems, road networks, and water systems, and to the verification of the locations of key historical events and settlements. Because chronological geography (or yange dili, the “geography of administrative change”), is based on the history of each Chinese dynasty, some scholars refer to it as the “dynastic geography” stage of Chinese historical geography.

The ideas of Confucian geography were derived from two major historical literatures: the intentional geographical writings and the unintentional geographical writings. The former contains dozens of official dili zhi, treatises on geography, in the standard dynastic histories. The latter contains the interpretation of ideas of geography from philosophical or religious writings. Of three main philosophical schools in Chinese history (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism), Confucianism is the most
devoted to geographical concepts, but geographical ideas also appear throughout the philosophical and religious writings of Buddhism and Daoism. For example, the idea of geography in feng shui, a theory of auspicious or harmonious spatial relationships, has been used to analyze topographical features and configurations in the placement and arrangement of houses or tombs. Despite its references to history, ethics, and other forms of social inquiry, Confucian geography could not avoid becoming a branch of “official learning” that rationalized and supported a highly stratified society.

The size of the area actually governed by the central government of China has changed many times throughout China’s history. As early as the fifth century BCE, the Chinese began to administer their territories by using geographical concepts. Yugong (The Tribute of Yu), a chapter of the sanctioned Confucian text Shangshu (The Book of Documents), is considered the oldest scientific treatise on geography in China. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) another influential geographical work, Hanshu Dili Zhi (The Treatise of Geographical Studies in Hanshu), a chapter of Hanshu (The History of the Earlier Han Dynasty) by Ban Gu (32–92 CE), appeared. This treatise represents the first officially sponsored monograph on geography and provides the first Chinese usage of the term “geography” (dili). Hanshu Dili Zhi illustrates the fundamental approach to Chinese geographical research for more than a thousand years. The Chinese often referred to this approach as the yange dili model—the word yange meaning “evolution” or “change”—its major focus embracing the ever-changing size of the national territory and the regional administrative divisions in China. Even though the Chinese yange dili is a specialized science, it has never been treated as a single field of study. Until 1900 there were only a few scholars who specialized in yange dili; the majority of Chinese scholars came from other fields, such as history, economics, and literature. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) the study of geography itself was in its heyday, and yange dili, traditional “dynastic geography,” was in its last stage.

Chinese scholars considered the formal discipline of geography to be one of the fundamental branches of knowledge. Dynastic geography was recognized as one of the xiaoxue, or prevailing studies. A number of scholars, including Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), Gu Zuyu (1631–1692), Yan Ruoju (1636–1704), Liu Xianting (1648–1695), Quan Zuwang (1705–1784), Zhao Yiqing (1710–1764), Dai Zhen (1724–1777), Li Zhaoluo (1769–1841), and Yang Shoujing (1839–1915), expressed a keen interest in geography. Their intellectual pursuits popularized the study of geography and fostered a new spirit in scholars participating in geographical research. The ultimate aim of geographical research was to ascertain the true history of geographical practices in past dynasties in order to provide a frame of reference for the contemporary management of geographical issues. But the Qing scholars assumed that the true history of geographical practices was to be found only in original documents, in faithful copies of the original dynastic records. In other words, “truth” for Qing scholars was definitely a textual truth. In their search for textual truth, they collated and checked texts, correcting any mistakes in the geographical records while adding to the basic texts more information collected from other sources.

Geography in China has commonly been considered an applied science developed to solve objective problems. Geographers have typically devoted themselves to explorations of objective geographical issues, paying relatively little attention to either self-examination or self-criticism. A fresh intellectual spirit transformed Confucian inquiry from a search for moral perfection to a more systematic search for empirical knowledge. A common field of inquiry and a shared discourse emerged among later Ming and early Qing scholars who insisted on the centrality of xiaoxue (minor learning) that is philology (in this context, textual criticism). Such philological concerns provided the necessary precondition during the Qing period for the formation of a new school.

Gu Yanwu and Dai Zhen led the new school of Ka-xianxue, evidential research, (also called Han learning), and the major focus of their works was to establish authentic editions of important ancient books. Scholars in the new school undertook the arduous task of collating the various geographical works and maps that had been handed down through the ages, with a view to correcting the accumulated errors on the basis of original official documents. Their works focused mainly on five areas: annotation, confirmation, collation, correction, and verification. The Qing scholars did not systematically summarize their rules for textual criticism, as their techniques were transmitted from generation to generation through exemplary works. Sanguo Zhizhu (An Annotated History
of the Three Kingdoms) by Pei Songzhi (372–451) and Zizhitong Jianzhu (An Annotated Comprehensive Mirror of Aid for Government) by Hu Sanxing (1230–1302) were regarded as models for textual criticism. Both Pei and Hu made a careful exegesis of the historical terms given in the original texts, supplementing this in their annotation with philological, historical, and geographical information. These academic works had a huge impact during the Kaoju movement for the Qing scholars who began to correct mistakes in their primary sources by comparing them with contemporary works. The Qing scholars tried (1) to find missing, misspelled, misused, and misplaced characters in the text; (2) to correct the historical facts given in the text, especially when the text contained anachronistic mistakes in the recording of official titles, the names of institutions, or the names of places; (3) to correct individual sentences in their primary sources, using the ancient rules of grammar and rhetoric; (4) to supplement their original texts by additional related sources so as to give a fuller, more accurate account. These scholars never doubted the value of the original texts; what concerned them was how to enhance the value so as to preserve the texts for future generations.

Consequently, the study of historical geography became an integral part of Kaoju, with geographical records and descriptions occupying a considerable proportion of the pages in the dynastic histories and Confucian Classics. As the Qing scholars reasoned, only a solid understanding of the geographical facts could provide a firm foundation for understanding historical events. The study of geography shaped within the Kaoju movement culminated in the golden era of yange dili in China. The term yange can be found in many titles of Qing geographical works such as Lidai Dili Yange Biao (Evolutionary Tables of the Geography of the Successive Dynasties) by Cheng Fangji and Lidai Dili Yange Tu (Evolutionary Maps of the Geography of the Successive Dynasties) by Yang Shoujing.

### Western Influence

Despite the effort of most Qing scholars using the Kaoju geographical method to examine the base of Chinese history, the understanding by the Chinese scholars was still based upon the Confucian world, which had been created by the sages in antiquity and maintained by imperial authority. There was no alternative analytical framework with which to think about world order or world structure. Before 1840, Chinese knowledge about the existence and distribution of countries and people outside China was sufficient to allow Confucian scholars to realize that China did not physically occupy the center of the world. The foreign invaders who both contributed to and followed the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912 brought a new wave of knowledge from outside and the traditional imperial ideology, including yange dili, came under attack. The dynastic geography was no longer considered a meaningful format to provide a compelling portrait of China and its land. The Chinese scholars finally realized that the Middle Kingdom was a poor and weak country, not the powerful, central "Heavenly Kingdom they had considered it in the past.

In the 1920s and 1930s the historian Gu Jiegang (1893–1980) took a "revolutionary" approach to Chinese historical geography. Gu’s historiography tended to undermine traditional concepts and values in Chinese history. He considered the geographical integration of the whole of Chinese civilization. Creating the term gudibian, critique of ancient geography, Gu Jiegang’s skeptical approach considered the creation of the Confucian geographical texts in their social contexts. To Gu, mistakes in the texts were not simply wrong characters, wrong names, or wrong years; they were the inevitable results of the very manner in which the texts had been composed and of the sociopolitical implications of the texts. His book, Gushibian (Critiques of Antiquity) rejects and reinterprets most of the traditional conceptions associated with Chinese classical history, casting doubt on the historicity of the sage-king Yu. Yu was described in Confucian texts as a great flood-queller, a selfless king who established the first dynasty of China, the Xia dynasty, and the creator of the geopolitical structure that dominated the Confucian geographical mind for thousands of years. Because the sage-king Yu was such an important figure in the Confucian construction of the Golden Age, it was unheard of for Chinese scholars to criticize him. According to the criticism of Yugong by Gu Jiegang, China as a political unit did not really exist before unification under the Qin and Han dynasties in the later third century BCE. Had there been a Xia dynasty established by sage-king Yu, as described in Confucian texts, its domain could not have constituted a tiny area nestled in the bend of the Huang
Gu pointed out that if the size of “China” had been small and subject to variation in high antiquity, the world outlook of its people would have been correspondingly diminished and subject to change.

Another contribution by Gu Jiegang was the organization of the Yugong Society and the creation of Yugong Banyuekan (Journal of Yu Gong) in 1934, bringing historical geography to the particular attention of China’s best scholars. Even though Gu had never traveled outside of China, nor had he made contact as a young man with Western teachers, he was heavily influenced by people who studied overseas. For instance, Gu was influenced by Hu Shi (1891–1962), who was educated at Columbia University with John Dewey. Hu advocated Dewey’s pragmatism, the essence of the scientific method. Gu’s ideological sources came from the lens of Hu Shi’s work. Three of his students, Tan Qixiang (1911–1992), Hou Renzhi (b. 1911), and Shi Nianhai (1912–2001), who later contributed a great deal to historical geography in China, were brought into his academic circle when Gu Jiegang established Yugong Society. The members of the Yugong Society were mostly teachers, editors, researchers, and students from Yanjing, Peking, and Furen Universities. Unquestionably, the most important contribution of the society was the publication of the semi-monthly magazine Yugong Banyuekan (Journal of Yu Gong), the first journal of historical geography in China. Until 1937, when the fate of Yugong Banyuekan was sealed by the Japanese invasion, the journal published a total of eighty-two issues containing a total of 710 articles. The subject of historical geography included topics such as dynastic geography, regional studies, and foreign relations with China. The Yugong Society intended to promote the following research projects involving historical geography in Yugong Banyuekan:

1. To rewrite a series of books on the evolution of Chinese geopolitics,
2. To make accurate and useful historical maps,
3. To correct all the documents and dynastic geographies,
4. To compile an accurate and inclusive dictionary of historical place names,
5. To collect materials on human geography,
6. To invite scientist to answer questions on the role of physical geography in history.

In the 1930s through the 1960s, China underwent a series of great social and intellectual transformations giving rise to most of China’s modern social sciences. Among Gu Jiegang’s three students, Tan Qixiang, Hou Renzhi, and Shi Nianhai, Tan and Hou contributed and promoted historical geography in China. Tan Qixiang published a number of historical geography books including his well-

“Ten-Thousand-Mile Map of Maritime Defenses,” drawn during the Qing Dynasty, circa 1705. This map, which is one of eleven maps mounted in an accordion-folded album fifty-one feet in length, shows military defenses along the Chinese coast from Hainan Island to the Shandong Peninsula. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
known eight-volume Zhongguo Lishi Ditu Ji (Historical Atlas of China).

In 1946, Hou Renzhi went to England and enrolled in the graduate program at the Department of Geography, Liverpool University; there he studied with H. C. Darby, a well-known historical geographer in the West. Hou is the only Chinese scholar who went to the West and received a foreign doctoral degree in historical geography during the Republican period (1912–1949). Hou was most intrigued by Darby’s ideas about the distinction between history and geography and about the proper use of the cross-sections method to approach questions of “geographical evolution.” During his graduate study, Hou Renzhi was also strongly influenced by the famous American historical geographers Andrew H. Clark and R. H. Brown.

Hou Renzhi contributed to the development of historical geography in China in the following ways: First, he broke through the framework of the traditional dynastic geography to apply modern geographical theory and terms to the study of past geography. Hou completed the transition from dynastic geography to historical geography. Second, Hou brought the landscape into the study of historical geography. Third, Hou encouraged research on changes in the physical environment, arguing that such research is vital if geographers are to develop a plausible theory about the dynamic role of man in the changing ecology of the earth.

In 1949, with his doctoral degree from England, Hou returned to China where he wrote a number of books including Zhongguo Gudai Dilixue Jianshi (A Brief History of Geography in Ancient China) and educated many students, including his successor at Beijing University, Tang Xiaofeng (a PhD with a specialty Syracuse University), the current director of the school’s Center for Historical Geography. Influenced by the well-known American historical geographer D. W. Meinig’s writings and teachings...
at Syracuse, Tang published his major book *From Dynastic Geography to Historical Geography* in China, where still only a few historical geographers could write and publish in the English language.

During Hou’s tenure at Beijing University, he recommended that the Chinese government change higher education policy. In the 1950s a number of universities began to list courses on lishi dili (historical geography) to replace the old courses on traditional yange dili (dynastic geography). Hou’s studies questioned the utility of all human constructs when considering Chinese ancient geographical structure. He necessarily promoted the devaluation of the Confucian classics and dynastic histories, arguing that insofar as the Confucian documents were preoccupied with given political questions, they could not help to answer the kinds of questions posed by modern geographers.

Historical geography in China has been a major field in China’s thousand-year history. After 1840, Western influence began to modify the development of historical geography. Today, historical geography has become one of the major studies in China’s higher education system. Currently, Tang Xiaofeng is one of the main figures who is a successor from Hou Renzhi in China.

Unryu SUGANUMA

**Further Reading**


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**The trees want to remain quiet, but the wind will not stop.**

**Shù yù jìng’ér fēng bù zhǐ**

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Although the overall incidence of HIV/AIDS is low in China, it has reached epidemic proportions in several high-risk groups, including drug users and sex workers; migrant workers are especially vulnerable. The Chinese government has developed several programs that address prevention, treatment, and family services for HIV-affected populations. Discrimination against people living with HIV hampers effective identification and testing.

China’s first AIDS cases were discovered in 1989, but it took the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002 and 2003 to spur the government into launching aggressive measures against AIDS. The effectiveness of government and other organizational responses is hampered by the stigma and discrimination against those with HIV by the population at large, by the reluctance of public security authorities to support education and specialized treatment for those engaged in illegal activities (e.g., illicit drug use and commercial sex), and by the logistics of providing standard, consistent, and equal care in such a large, diverse country.

AIDS Situation in China

In 2007, studies showed that HIV was spreading both in numbers and geographically in China, but the percentage rate of new infection was decreasing from previous years. The incidence of HIV in China at the end of 2007 was very low overall at 0.05 percent, which translates to about 700,000 people. The estimated number of active AIDS cases was 85,000. Estimates have been much higher than the number of cases actually identified; nearly 80 percent of those living with HIV in China do not know they are HIV-positive. By comparison, only about 25 percent of Americans with HIV are unaware of their infection. HIV has been reported in all thirty-one Chinese provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, but it is most prevalent in Guangdong, Henan, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces and in Guangxi and Xinjiang ARs. Henan was the site of a 1990s HIV outbreak among rural residents who became infected by unhygienic practices and contaminated equipment at commercial plasma-donation centers. Most other affected areas are in rural border provinces or along heroin-trafficking routes where HIV transmission is fueled by injection-drug use. HIV infection is highest in the twenty-nine- to thirty-nine-year age group; AIDS cases are concentrated in the twenty- to forty-nine-year age group. Routes of transmission include needles and/or drug use, heterosexual sex, and homosexual sex among men. Transmission by the sharing of infected needles among illicit drug users was the main mode of transmission until 2007, when sexual transmission became the more prevalent mode. Certain at-risk groups have a high incidence of infection, and HIV is spreading to the general population through sexual transmission. Migrants are considered especially vulnerable.
High-Risk, Vulnerable Groups

High-risk behavior by certain subpopulations is driving the epidemic, and the government has undertaken education and prevention programs that target these groups.

Injecting Drug Users

The use of contaminated needles when injecting illicit drugs is the second most common HIV transmission route in China. In 2007, approximately 8.3 percent of drug users had HIV. High-risk behavior includes needle sharing. Some support their habit by turning to commercial sex work, thus increasing transmission to the non-drug-using population.

Understanding that reducing drug use is linked to control of HIV/AIDS, the Chinese government authorized the rapid establishment of methadone-maintenance therapy sites, both fixed and mobile, along with needle exchange programs throughout the country.

Sex Workers

The commercial sex trade is increasing in China, especially in eastern areas. Some surveys suggest that one in ten sexually active men has bought sex from a prostitute. The real number may be higher. Knowledge of HIV and transmission routes is low among sex workers, and even if sex workers know about HIV/AIDS, it can be difficult for them to insist that clients use condoms. Official attitudes toward commercial sex workers make it difficult to target them in government-run education and health programs. The incidence of other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) is also increasing in China; people, especially women, with untreated STDs are much more likely to catch HIV from infected partners than are people without STDs.

HIV-prevention efforts directed toward this high-risk group focus on the nighttime entertainment industry that is burgeoning in China. Condoms are distributed in hotel lobbies and guest rooms as well as popular karaoke clubs and other entertainment venues where transactional sex occurs.

Migrants

Chinese migrant workers, who are often young and single, flock from rural to urban areas to find work. The challenges of adjusting to urban life while being separated from their families and social networks increase the possibilities for high-risk behaviors among sexually active migrant workers.
Male migrants might turn to prostitutes and have relations involving multiple sexual partners, while female migrants might engage in commercial sex. Many of the estimated 150 million migrant workers lack prevention knowledge and have limited access to community support, health services, condom supplies, and information about HIV, and so are especially vulnerable. Figures from the Hunan Province Center for Disease Control show that the mobile population, mainly migrant workers, accounted for 77.1 percent of HIV/AIDS patients in the province in 2008.

A 2008 joint program of China’s Ministry of Health, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the International Labor Organization is designed to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among the mobile population in China. The three-year program, covering key industries in areas with a high concentration of migrant workers, will focus on prevention education, promote the use of voluntary testing, and will monitor discrimination in the workplace. Numerous other programs targeting migrants have been implemented across the country since 2004.

FORMER BLOOD PLASMA DONORS

At the end of 2007, over 19 percent of those with HIV/AIDS had been infected through blood and plasma collection. Donor blood, untested for HIV, was pooled and injected back into donors to prevent anemia. Because they were paid for their blood, many of these people donated multiple times. These individuals have been identified through aggressive testing campaigns, while treatment and prevention programs have effectively stopped HIV from spreading beyond this group. Blood-pooling practices have been outlawed, and China’s blood supply, now nearly 100 percent from volunteer donors, is regularly tested for HIV.

HOMOSEXUAL SEX AMONG MEN

HIV has been identified in some urban areas among male homosexuals, but this population is stigmatized and is difficult to survey. There are strong taboos against homosexual behavior in China, where men are expected to marry and produce male heirs. Estimates of the population of men who have sex with men range from 5 million to 10 million, and the number may well increase as social mores continue to change. Chinese health officials estimate that nationwide about 1 percent of male homosexuals are HIV positive, though some surveys have found higher rates of infection. The government has increased budgets and established an advisory group that includes activists and behavioral specialists to formulate policies designed to reach this marginalized population.

Government Activities

A framework known as the “Three Ones” has helped to streamline and strengthen the national response to HIV/AIDS: one national plan (China’s Action Plan for Reducing and Preventing the Spread of HIV/AIDS 2006–2010); one national authority coordinating the response (State Council AIDS Working Committee); and one monitoring and evaluation system (AIDS Monitoring and Evaluation Protocol of June 2007). The Regulation on AIDS Prevention and Treatment was issued by the State Council in early 2006. Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Wu Yi showed their support of people living with HIV and children affected by AIDS through personal visits to “AIDS Villages” and AIDS wards in Beijing hospitals. Children orphaned by AIDS, along with doctors and teachers, were their guests at a gala concert in 2006.

In addition to targeted prevention programs, the Chinese government has developed programs and policies to care for those who have contracted HIV/AIDS. First implemented for former plasma blood donors who contracted HIV/AIDS, the China CARES program (China Comprehensive AIDS Reseponse) has been instrumental in halting the epidemic in that group. Now operating in 127 rural counties and available to other HIV/AIDS patients, the program offers free antiretroviral treatment to HIV patients, provides family planning and free condoms, coordinates getting free education for children, subsidizes affected children, and operates orphanages for children whose parents are dead or incapacitated because of AIDS.

The “Four Frees and One Care” policy, operating as of 2007 in 1,190 counties in all provinces and autonomous regions, commits the government to providing many of the same services to rural residents and low-income urban residents: free antiretroviral drugs to those with HIV; free voluntary counseling and testing; free treatment to prevent the spread of HIV from pregnant women to newborns; free schooling for children orphaned by
AIDS; and care and economic assistance to households affected by HIV.

**International Cooperation**

The United Nations—through its Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, which helps coordinate the international response against AIDS in China, and its China Country Team, which provides support for reducing vulnerability and risk behavior and improving treatment, care, and support for people living with HIV/AIDS and their families—is a major source of international support. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria is the largest monetary donor for China’s efforts to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic; the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development and the United Nations system also contributed.

China has provided assistance to other countries in their fight against HIV/AIDS. The Chinese government provides training in HIV/AIDS prevention for African countries, where the incidence of HIV/AIDS is the highest in the world. In return, China profits from African expertise in AIDS awareness programs.

**Challenges**

In their 2008 joint report on the status of AIDS in China, the State Council and UN China Theme Group on HIV/AIDS identified several challenges facing the HIV/AIDS response in China, with recommendations to increase the effectiveness of China’s HIV/AIDS programs.

Awareness campaigns to address widespread discrimination in communities and work places, including health care facilities, need to be undertaken. The involvement of people affected by AIDS in the design and implementation of informational and educational messages remains weak and should be strengthened for more effective outcomes. Antinarcotics policies and practices, such as surveillance and arrest of those seeking clean needles or methadone treatment, often conflict with HIV prevention efforts; more coordination with security authorities is needed. Current information, education, and communication activities need to be broadened, especially those for youth not in school, for minorities, and for remote and rural areas with migrating populations. Government-funded treatment programs are facing growing incidence of drug-resistant strains of HIV, requiring the provision of expensive, imported “second line” drugs and enhanced training for medical workers.

China has made great progress in its HIV/AIDS programs, moving from an emergency response to a standard treatment approach. But much remains to be done, especially in China’s rural areas, where the epidemic is most widespread and where poor residents have little access to health care. Thus, the work of controlling the epidemic will largely fall to county-level jurisdictions. As the Joint Assessment report notes, with more than three thousand counties in China, the task of ensuring an effective and relatively standard response will be an enormous one.

**Drew THOMPSON**

**Further Reading**


Hmong ▶
The Hmong, whose own name for themselves is not officially recognized in China, are a mainly agricultural people living mostly in the southern provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan, as well as Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; there is also a considerable diaspora population in Southeast Asia and abroad. Hmong customs show traces of the earliest customs ever recorded in China, leading some scholars to believe that they were in China before the Han Chinese.

The Hmong account for about a third, some 3 million people, of the Miao people, one of the fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minority peoples in China. They live as farmers in villages in a unified swathe of territory reaching down from north to south in the provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan, as well as the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region toward the Vietnamese border. In Chinese history they are referred to only as Miao, together with the members of two other main language groups related to them by distant ties of language and custom, but whose languages they cannot understand. Since 1850, Hmong shifting cultivators (people who farm a plot of land temporarily and then move on to cultivate another) have migrated across Chinese borders into the mountainous regions of neighboring Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Burma. Many Hmong from Laos were further resettled as refugees overseas following the Vietnam wars to third countries such as the United States, France, Canada, and Australia. There are some 1 million Hmong in Asian countries outside China and approximately 320,000 in diaspora.

**History**

Throughout history the Hmong, under the rubric of Miao, were generally described as shifting cultivators of the mountainsides. They planted upland crops, such as millet, buckwheat, and maize, moving their villages great distances once the fertility of the soil was exhausted. There are various legends and theories about their ultimate origins, but it is most probable that they originated in the Huang (Yellow) River valley basin. They were recorded in Chinese annals as early rebels against the establishment of the Chinese state, having been banished from the central plains around 2500 BCE. Rebellions of the Miao against the Han Chinese are recorded since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). The expansion of the Han Chinese people into southern China since the Song dynasty (960–1279) led to increasing pressure on scarce resources, such as water and land, and fierce conflicts with local minority people who inhabited these regions.

The encounter with in-migrating Han Chinese troops, farmers, miners, and merchants, and the colonization by the Chinese of the southwest in the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties led to important divisions within minority people like the Hmong. Some became more settled and law abiding, adopting Chinese customs and manners, while others remained in the remote
mountains beyond the reach of the Chinese state. The Chinese referred to them for this reason as the Sheng (raw, or wild) and Shu (cooked, or tame) Miao. Hmong customs show traces of the earliest customs ever recorded in China, such as the courting game of catch played at the New Year still retained by Hmong outside China. For this reason some researchers have seen them as aboriginal Chinese who may have inhabited China before the Han Chinese. There have certainly been strong Chinese influences on the Hmong in history. A high proportion of their language is shared with Chinese, and they adopted Chinese surnames for their clans.

**Economy and Socialist Impact**

Hmong traditional economy was in most areas based on the shifting cultivation of upland crops, along with the animal husbandry of poultry and swine, hunting, some fishing, and gathering of wild products in the forest. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, opium was cultivated in remote mountainous areas in exchange for silver with itinerant traders. However, in some areas Hmong were able to farm small patches of irrigated rice-land on terraces or in valley basins, where settled villages were established.

With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, opium cultivation was banned and shifting cultivation was outlawed. Remote upland villages were resettled in lowlands. Hmong villages joined cooperative socialist organizations and agriculture was collectivized. Communist Party organization penetrated the villages and organized much of social and economic life. Traditional religion, such as ancestor worship and shamanism, was illegal but still continued in secret and at night. During radical left periods, such as the Great Leap Forward beginning in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), it was prohibited to sing minority songs, speak minority languages, and wear ethnic costumes. As members of an official ethnic minority, the Hmong received some special privileges in the form of a measure of autonomous local government in many areas (although this autonomy is limited) and special lower pass marks for college and university entrance (although the numbers of Hmong achieving this status have been minimal). However, special funds were allocated for minority regions, which benefited some Hmong areas.

Under the household responsibility system, which followed the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, some measure of autonomy has been returned to the Hmong household, which was traditionally the main basis of the social system. Families now work together again as an economic unit in cultivating the areas of land allotted to them by village organizations according to the number of household members. They cooperate with other members of the local lineage and affinal relatives (those related by marriage) in ritual, social, and economic affairs. The Hmong generally live in brick houses in rural villages much like those of the Han Chinese. The greatest concentration of Hmong is in Wenshan Autonomous Prefecture on the Vietnam border; Bijie in northwest Guizhou is another area of dense Hmong settlement.

**Culture and Kinship**

In the past the Hmong were divided into a number of tribal cultural divisions. These still survive outside China in the form of strong divisions between Green and White Hmong in Laos and Thailand. They still wear different costumes, and they live in houses of a different design and speak consistently different dialects. Even outside China these divisions have become less significant as members of different cultural divisions intermarry and live in the same villages. In Wenshan there is some memory of these divisions, reflected in still different dialects and traditional costumes (now worn only at festivals), but Communist Party policy firmly discouraged such signs of local cultural variation and in most places they have almost disappeared.

Hmong culture, from China to Thailand, remains remarkably homogeneous. This may have resulted from their traditional life as shifting cultivators, which distributed uniform cultural traits widely over great geographical distances. There is a range of Hmong dialects, but they are all recognizably part of the same Hmong language, and the rituals of death and shamanism, which now, to some extent, have been revived in China since the more relaxed economic reform policies since the 1980s, are similar within China and beyond its borders.

Hmong culture is rich and complex and full of oral
legends and dramaturgical performances at marriage, death, and illness where traditional shamans are still consulted. For example, there are the elaborations of the wedding ceremony and the beauty of the women’s intricate batik and embroidery; festivities of the Hmong New Year; the long, mournful chants of the Master of Death as he guides the soul of the deceased back to the village of its ancestors at the dawn of historical time; and the shaking of the shaman as he or she enters the Otherworld in trance to rescue the lost soul of a sick person.

The Hmong share with the Chinese and other ethnic minority people in southern China a system of geomancy (divination by means of forms of the landscape) to determine the location of houses and graves in which human residences are aligned with the natural contours of mountains and rivers.

At the heart of Hmong culture is the kinship system and the division of all Hmong into some twenty patrilineal exogamic (out-marrying) surname groups or clans. These surnames, such as Lee, Wang, or Yang, reach across the cultural divisions. Intermarriage is still forbidden among them, even in China where members of the same surnames (generally huge in number) are legally allowed to marry. The lineage is divided into ritual sublineages clustered around a common known ancestor and known as ib tus dab qhuas (of one group of spirits). It is still the case that a visiting Hmong of the same surname will be treated as a classificatory brother by those of the same surname, wherever he comes from (even the United States). Marriage with other groups, however, still remains very rare, even in villages where Han Chinese and Hmong have lived together for several generations.

In traditional society Hmong women occupied a low position, although one higher than that of most Chinese women, and there was considerable freedom in premarital courtship. In post-1949 China, while premarital liaisons are generally forbidden, the position of Hmong women
has much improved. A Hmong woman at marriage is still expected to leave the household of her natal family and move to that of her husband. The wedding process is elaborately celebrated and can be protracted, including ceremonial presentations and wedding songs sung by go-betweens who represent both parties to the marriage. The bridegroom is expected to present to his bride’s family an expensive bridewealth, which was traditionally paid in silver and is said to compensate the bride’s parents for their trouble in raising her. A young man is often dependent on his parents for this requirement, which today generally takes the form of furniture and clothes, besides the pork and whisky expended on the wedding feast. Strict monogamy is expected of a wife; a man traditionally could take two or more wives, although this rarely occurred and is now illegal. The one-child, one-family policy has affected the Hmong, as it has all people in China. However, in some areas, because they are impoverished or ethnic minority people, there are exemptions, and a couple may be allowed three or even four children in some cases, without any fines or imprisonment.

Foreign missionaries have worked among the Hmong for over a century, arriving in Guizhou in 1875 and working in Yunnan and northern Vietnam shortly after that. Many Hmong converted to Protestantism at the turn of the twentieth century in an extraordinary mass movement and some of them continued their faith throughout the years of socialist revolution. A smaller number have become Catholics. Recently new converts to Christianity have been made along the Vietnam border, which has led to persecution and imprisonment and the flight of some Hmong across borders into neighboring countries.

**Homecoming**

Since the 1980s, under newly liberal policies and the impact of the tourist industry, there has been an enormous revival of interest in and sympathy for traditional ethnic minority culture in China, and the Hmong have proved no exception to this. Many local Hmong scholars have recorded their own customs and transcribed parts of their traditional oral culture. Some overseas Hmong, particularly from the United States, have begun to revisit their old homes in Laos, their more remote places of family origin in Vietnam, and even the homes their ancestors left many generations ago in southern China. New connections between transnational Hmong communities have been formed, helped by the use of videos, mobile phones, and the Internet, and some global trading relations have been established between Hmong in China and Hmong in the West, particularly for the marketing of traditional Hmong costumes now required overseas. These new contacts have been spearheaded by Hmong and other Miao minority cadres now working in universities or local provincial research institutes or at minority colleges or in governmental organs such as the Ethnic Minority Affairs Commission, which is in charge of minority affairs in China. Whether these new connections will lead to a new kind of emergent global Hmong community, or whether they represent a vain attempt to reconstitute a community already divided and scattered across the world by migration and war, it is too early to say.

**Nicholas TAPP**

**Further Reading**


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Homosexuality during China’s long history can be traced through literature, accounts of life both inside and outside the imperial courts, and in attitudes about male prostitution. In recent years, more egalitarian relations have developed, but few people make homosexuality their core identity.

Historically, homosexual relations between men in China often involved a person of lower status seeking the favors of someone more powerful, whereas women who lived in communities without men sometimes formed monogamous relationships formalized by ceremony. In modern China efforts are being made to approach homosexuality in both genders without stereotyping or using the labels gay and lesbian.

Traditional Male Homosexuality

In China the oldest known reports of male homosexuality appear in the earliest poetry anthology of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). In this period heterosexual marriages were frequently negotiated for other than romantic reasons, and men were free to search for satisfying sex and romantic love elsewhere, including in homosexual relationships. Homosexuality was typically structured in terms of class, with courtiers seeking the love of powerful men because of the concomitant benefits of such alliances, as in the instance of Lord Long Yang, who made elaborate efforts to prove his devotion to the king of Wei. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the emperor’s favorites attained enormous prominence at court, and in one instance the dying emperor Ai (reigned 6 BCE–1 CE) even gave the throne to his favorite, Don Xian. Don Xian’s enemies, however, forced him to commit suicide and usurped the throne.

The first-known sources on homosexuality outside court life date from the North and South dynasties (220–589 CE). In Shishui xinyu (A New Account of Tales of the World) by Liu Qing (403–444 CE), male beauty is a major focus of attention. The Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) provides fewer records of homosexuality at court than did earlier periods, although homosexuality was more often mentioned in literature and particularly in poetry. The first derogatory term connected with homosexuality, jijian, usually translated as sodomy, surfaced during this period in the story of the male prostitute Xue Aocoa.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), homosexuality apparently continued to be more common outside court circles, and evidence for it increased. Whereas in earlier times patronage consisted of emperors and other high-placed persons bestowing presents and honors on their favorites, in the Song period this patronage took the form of straightforward prostitution in the major cities. Prostitutes were typically seen as passive and receptive. Whereas in earlier times some relationships had been ones of love, the patron/prostitute relationship was purely sexual.

In the early twelfth century male prostitution was legally prohibited, but the law seems not to have been often enforced. The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was a time of greater tolerance, with a flowering of literature depicting
homosexuality that reflected patronage relationships before prostitution. During this period clashes over homosexual activity with foreigners occurred. In Manila, for instance, the Spanish arrested and condemned Chinese immigrants who protested that homosexuality was an accepted custom in their culture.

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), literature on homosexuality remained rich, and prostitution was common. In 1860 a Western visitor to Tianjin reported that there were thirty-five brothels and an estimated eight hundred boys engaged in prostitution. Sources of information about male prostitutes largely described actors who were elite prostitutes. There were sodomy laws at this time, and under Manchurian influence intolerance toward homosexuality began to emerge, though the practice continued to flourish.

### Traditional Female Homosexuality

There is relatively well-documented information about women’s communities in imperial China, especially in southern Guangdong. In such communities women could resist social demands that they marry, and particular economic opportunities enabled these women to live largely independently of men. This appears to have been the case in the silk industry. Women in these communities held marriage ceremonies and lived like couples. In Chinese-dominated states, including Singapore, such communities have persisted.

As early as the Han dynasty, there is literary evidence of female homosexuality, including a love relationship between two slave women, as well as an empress's servant who dressed in male attire, suggesting a lesbian relationship. The famous Qing dynasty novel *The Dream of the Red Chamber* also contains depictions of lesbian affairs.

### Contemporary Male and Female Homosexuality in China

Homosexuality in China today continues to be associated with male as well as female transgender practices, but such viewpoints have begun to be questioned. Nowadays the words *gay* and *lesbian* are often used in place of the traditional terms, especially among highly educated people, who tend to distance themselves from the transgender implications of indigenous concepts.

In China as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan, a movement has developed to accommodate this conflict between traditional and contemporary ideas of homosexuality. The common denominator used for gay men, lesbian women, transgender and transsexual people, and even supportive heterosexuals is *tongzhi*, which is the Chinese Communist term for *comrade*. The introduction of the term *tongzhi* is a product of the wish to avoid the explicit sexual overtones of other terms for gay men and lesbian women and at the same time to create a network that overcomes the limitations of identity-oriented categories like *gay* and *lesbian*.

Wim LUNSING

### Further Reading


Hong Kong

Xiānggǎng  香港

6.9 million est. 2008 pop.

Hong Kong has one of the most important import-export and finance economies in the Pacific region. It became a British colony in 1842 but was returned to the People’s Republic of China in 1997. It is now known as the “Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” in recognition of its economic importance, which the PRC has committed to respecting until 2047.

Hong Kong was part of China’s Guangdong Province until it became a British colony in 1842. In 1997 Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and is now known as the “Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” During its colonial era Hong Kong became one of the most important import-export and finance economies in the Pacific region. Today it remains a vibrant, modern Chinese city with a diverse range of cultural influences and a thriving capitalist economy.

History

Located on the south coast of China near the mouth of the Pearl River, the area that is now known as “Hong Kong” comprises Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories. Until the 1840s this area was part of Xinan County in Guangdong Province of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The region was populated mostly by Han Chinese and Hakka (a Chinese minority people), and the local economy was dominated by pearl fishing, salt making, incense tree cultivation, and piracy and smuggling.

The British, seeking a new location from which to maintain their lucrative opium trade with China, occupied Hong Kong Island in 1841. They were granted formal control of the island by China in 1842 through the Treaty of Nanjing, which ended the First Opium War (1839–1942), and the island became a colony on 26 June 1843. The Second Opium War (1856–1860, also known as the Arrow War) resulted in Britain’s acquisition of Kowloon Peninsula, located across the bay from Hong Kong Island, and in 1898 Britain acquired a ninety-nine-year lease on the New Territories. Britain maintained control of Hong Kong until 1997, except from 1941 to 1945, when the Japanese controlled the territory. The impending end of the lease on the New Territories led to a 1984 agreement between the British and Chinese governments for Hong Kong’s return to China as an autonomous region.

Political System

Under the British the governor, who was appointed, had executive power and was assisted by the Legislative Council, of which a small percentage was elected. This system, which was made somewhat more democratic under the
leadership of Governor Chris Patten in the 1990s, has remained essentially intact in the post-1997 era. In March 1990 the PRC’s National People’s Congress approved a “Basic Law,” based largely on English law, which constitutes the basis for Hong Kong’s current legal system. Under this system Hong Kong has an appointed chief executive who serves for five years, an appointed cabinet, and a legislature that is selected by both direct and indirect elections.

As a condition for the 1997 handover, China agreed to maintain a “one country, two systems” approach to governing Hong Kong for fifty years. Under this system Hong Kong is to have a high degree of political and economic autonomy from China. Its foreign and military affairs, however, have been taken over by the PRC government. In addition, Hong Kong’s chief executive is appointed by the PRC.

Geography
Hong Kong has a tropical monsoon climate. It has an area of 1,097 square kilometers with 733 kilometers of coastline and a large deep-water harbor. The territory consists of a peninsula and more than two hundred small islands and is mostly mountainous with a small percentage of arable land. The hilly terrain provides relatively little living space, and so both Hong Kong Island and Kowloon have been enlarged through land reclamation. Architecturally, Hong Kong is composed almost entirely of large office and apartment blocks. Hong Kong is connected to the rest of China by waterways, such as the Pearl River, as well as railroads and roads.

Demographics
The density of Hong Kong is 6,352 people per square kilometer, making Hong Kong one of the world’s most densely populated areas. Ninety-five percent of the population is ethnically Chinese, with Filipinos, Indonesians, British, and Indians constituting the largest other ethnic groups.

Economy
Prior to its colonization by the British, Hong Kong had long been the site of both legal and illegal trade with neighboring Asian nations, Arabs, and some Westerners. Under the British the colony replaced Guangzhou (Canton) as the principal locus of Anglo-Chinese trade in southern China, much of which, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was based on opium. This trade was controlled by a few large trading houses, known as hong. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949 Hong Kong experienced a huge influx of refugee industrialists, mostly from the Chinese industrial city of Shanghai. These industrialists, using refugee labor that continued to flow into Hong Kong through the second half of the twentieth century, turned Hong Kong into a center of manufacturing and finance. Hong Kong has limited natural resources, however, and must import most of its food and raw materials. As China increasingly opened up for trade in the 1980s and 1990s, Hong Kong’s economy again became more oriented toward China.
Culture

Hong Kong’s culture has been influenced by its mostly Chinese population as well as its British colonial past. Its official languages are Cantonese and English. Its population has always been mostly Chinese, and this fact is reflected in the cuisine, popular culture, and many aspects of the landscape. The British elite who dominated colonial Hong Kong were mostly merchants, civil servants, and missionaries. As the post-1949 Shanghai industrialists established themselves financially; however, Hong Kong’s elite culture became increasingly Chinese.

Hong Kong’s colonial past led it to develop differently from the rest of China, especially during the period after 1949. Unlike the rest of China, Hong Kong has a thriving, free market, capitalist economy, and the very identity of Hong Kong is rooted in that successful economy. Although the PRC has committed itself to protect Hong Kong’s economic and political autonomy until 2047 (fifty years after the handover), what exactly will be the impact of Hong Kong’s reintegration into China remains to be seen. Will Hong Kong remain distinct from China, or will it become just another Chinese city?

J. Megan GREENE

Further Reading


With the return of the former British colony of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the city became a “Special Administrative Region” of the People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong SAR is now an independent and, for the most part, self-governing entity of China. While it does not have control over defense and foreign affairs, Hong Kong maintains an image as China’s international city; it joined the World Trade Organization in 1995, six years ahead of the PRC.

Hong Kong, with Macao, is one of two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Established in 1997 with the return of the former British colony to Chinese sovereignty, the Hong Kong SAR, as a virtual administrative district of China, is a legal entity underwritten by the Basic Law, or mini-constitution. The Hong Kong Basic Law, established between the former administering power, Britain, and China, was in turn drafted in accordance with the joint declaration entered into by London and Beijing in 1984 and adopted by the Seventh National People’s Congress (NPC) of the PRC in 1994.

Establishment of SARs was first provided for in Article 31 of the Constitution of the PRC promulgated in 1982. Still, one should acknowledge that in 1972 the PRC ambassador to the United Nations, Huang Hua, formally placed on record at the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization China’s policy on the return of Hong Kong and Macao as legacies of “unequal treaties.” Hong Kong and Macao were duly removed from the list of territories pending decolonization.

The “one country, two systems” formula imposed on Hong Kong would, two years later, also become binding on Macao, then under Portuguese administration, and remains the formula that Beijing seeks to apply to Taiwan.

The Sino-British Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law stipulate that Hong Kong will be governed with a high degree of autonomy until 2047, or fifty years after the transfer.

Although maintaining a high degree of autonomy (Article 2), the Hong Kong SAR is short of being an independent jurisdiction, especially as Beijing retains control over foreign affairs and defense. Under the SAR formula, Chinese-style socialism is not to be introduced into Hong Kong; rather, its prevailing capitalist system and way of life are guaranteed for fifty years (Article 5).

Notwithstanding Beijing’s control over foreign affairs and defense, Hong Kong maintains an international legal personality. For example, since 1992 Hong Kong has been a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and on 1 January 1995 Hong Kong gained membership in the World Trade Organization ahead of China. Today, with Beijing’s concurrence, Hong Kong is party to hundreds of conventions, organizations, and agreements under the “Hong Kong, China” name.

The chief executive—head of government—in the Hong Kong SAR is indirectly elected by a college of five hundred to eight hundred members closely sanctioned by Beijing. Tung Chee Hwa, the first chief executive,
assumed office on 1 July 1997. His successor, Donald Tsang, took office on 16 June 2005.

Laws are enacted with the approval of the chief executive and the majority consent of members of the sixty-seat Legislative Council (Legco), currently (under the third post-handover term) with half directly elected and half indirectly selected by “functional constituencies.” As of 2008 thirty “functional constituency” lawmakers are elected by sixteen thousand voters in twenty-eight business and professional sectors. For many people in Hong Kong such an arrangement appears to be a colonial legacy reflecting vested business interests and inimical to full democratization. The Basic Law does, however, provide for the eventual election of all seats under universal suffrage. Elections were held in 1998, 2000, and 2004, with candidates representing a range of political views from openly pro-Beijing to democratic and reformist. Deemed especially controversial was the proposal by the government to enact an anti-subversion law based on an interpretation of Basic Law Article 23. Public outrage over the proposal, viewed as a threat to civil liberties and even foreign business, has brought a shift in public attitudes in favor of greater democratization. Protests against the proposal were led by the so-called pan-democrat camp, with the chief executive playing the role of broker between Hong Kong public opinion and civil society actions and the NPC. Importantly, the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power to interpret the Basic Law (Article 159).

On 29 December 2007 the Standing Committee ruled out the possibility of universal suffrage for the election of both the chief executive and all legislators in 2012 as per the registered wishes of a majority of Hong Kong residents. Although the NPC did concede the direct election of the chief executive by 2017, many questions remain as to the modalities of such an election,
especially because Beijing insists on preapproval of all candidates. Although the NPC held out the prospect of a future directly elected Legco and the chief executive backed 2020 as a goal, the NPC also insisted on freezing the 50–50 split between directly elected and “functional constituency” seats in the Legco, thus disallowing even incremental democratization in the 2012 elections. Although a timetable for democratization has been established, frustration remains among those disappointed at the slow pace of change and loopholes that would allow even the decision on 2017 to be changed at any time.

Much uncertainty hounded the early years of the Hong Kong SAR, created by sagging real estate values, the outbreak of the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) virus, the worldwide economic downturn, and unacceptable pollution levels; nevertheless, few would doubt that Hong Kong retains its vitality and image as Asia’s international city, notwithstanding the challenges posed by massive economic and social change within China itself.

Geoffrey GUNN

Further Reading
Hong merchants were licensed by the Qing dynasty government to trade with foreign merchants at Guangzhou (Canton), the only Chinese port open to foreign trade from 1759 to 1842. Many became prominent and wealthy.

Since the early days of Sino-Western trade in Guangzhou (Canton), Chinese merchants who were licensed by the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to trade with foreign merchants were known as “hong merchants.” The term came from the name of the trading guild, Cohong, established in 1720, to which they all belonged. Because their number was restricted to about a dozen or fewer at any one time, and as the trade volume grew to substantial size by around 1775, many hong merchants became some of the most prominent and wealthy merchants in China.

During the early nineteenth century the most powerful hong merchant was Houqua (d. 1843). The full extent of his wealth is not known because besides running extensive business enterprises in China, Houqua formed joint ventures and partnerships with Russell & Company, a U.S. firm that did business in China. He consigned specific shipments of goods to Russell & Company for sale overseas without the knowledge of the Chinese state. He also invested directly in the United States, including in stocks in the transcontinental railroad. From what can be gleaned from various accounts, Houqua appears to have been worth several million U.S. dollars and thus may well have been the richest man in the world at that time.

Not all hong merchants were as successful. Indeed, many, for a variety of reasons—highly speculative ventures, poor management, unduly heavy pressure from government officials, conspicuous consumption, simple bad luck, among others—had to declare bankruptcy. These failures became so prevalent in some years that by 1775 the Cohong decided to establish a kind of self-insurance fund, called the “Consoo Fund,” to cover the debts left behind by its bankrupt members. The fund was officially recognized in 1780. Each member paid 10 percent of his previous year’s profit to the fund annually. In 1789, in order to ensure that no debts would be owed to foreign merchants, the Qing authorities imposed a 3 percent levy on foreign imports that went to augment the fund.

Although the main functions of the hong merchants were the buying and selling of goods for the foreign merchants who congregated at Guangzhou, the only Chinese port opened to foreign trade from 1759 to 1842, they were also assigned to secure the port, to collect all the port charges and papers for each arriving or departing foreign vessel, and to guarantee the good behavior of individual foreign merchants. With respect to the goods they sold to foreigners, hong merchants also stood behind quality and authenticity thereof, and if goods were returned, then the hong merchants were obligated to replace them without charge. They also gave advice to supercargoes (officers on merchant ships who were in charge of the voyage’s commercial concerns) and to private traders. Indeed, many lifelong friendships were struck between Western and hong merchants, and their advice often extended from the professional to the social and personal. These friendly relationships, however, did not result in greater mutual
understanding of each other’s culture. Because Chinese officials refused to have direct dealings with European and U.S. merchants, hong merchants had to serve as intermediaries.

Thus, in addition to handling business matters, they took care of foreign merchants’ personal needs, such as petitioning grievances, finding living quarters and household servants, and getting official permits to leave their living compounds for occasional outings in the countryside. These official functions, together with the considerable customs fees that they collected for the Imperial Household Bureau—because all taxes levied from foreign trade went directly into the emperor’s private purse—gave them access to senior officials and opportunities to receive official commendations. Several second- or third-generation hong merchants were scholars who had passed the state examinations and were therefore treated as social equals by the local officials. As a group, they occupied a rather unique place among the Chinese merchant class. But the hong merchants’ exclusive trading privileges with foreigners and their position as intermediaries between foreign merchants and Chinese officials came to an end in 1842 with Great Britain’s victory over China in the First Opium War (1939–1942). The hong merchants and their Cohong guild were disbanded, and they came to be regarded as relics of a period when the Chinese world and the Western world came together without much mutual understanding. The Chinese government did not recognize foreign trading as a private citizen’s right. According to normative Confucian values, trading with foreigners was an element of diplomacy and therefore ought to be highly controlled and limited in scope. Nevertheless, it was not a matter of sufficient importance to involve the state directly, and hence, any communication between Chinese officials and foreign merchants was channeled through hong merchants. On the other hand, both the Chinese and the foreign merchants worked successfully together because they shared a similar set of values about private enterprise and profit motives. After 1842 many of the hong merchants, joined by newcomers, continued to engage in foreign trade in the form of compradors (Chinese agents in the employ of foreign firms). The Chinese worldview itself remained fractured, and another generation or two would pass before the Chinese state gave proper recognition to international trade and the critical role played by the hong merchants.

Wellington K. K. CHAN

Further Reading


HONG Shen
Hong Shèn 洪深
1894–1955 Dramatist

A founder of the Chinese spoken drama (huaju 话剧), Hong Shen established the role of the Chinese director and a complete system for performing this new drama. His most important dramatic work is the play Yama Zhao (Zhao yanwang 赵阎王), which was influenced by Eugene O’Neill’s The Emperor Jones.

Hong Shen, together with Tian Han 田汉 and Ouyang Yuqian 欧阳于倩, was one of the founders of Chinese spoken drama (huaju 话剧), which greatly affected the nature of theatrical performances in China.

Born into a well-to-do gentry family in Jiangsu Province, Hong attended modern-style schools in Shanghai and the prestigious Qinghua University in Beijing. He developed an interest in drama through acting in school plays. His formal dramatic education began in 1919 at Harvard University, where he attended Professor George Baker’s play-production workshop and became the first Chinese to study Western drama. In his spare time he also performed with drama companies in Boston and New York. His U.S. training laid the foundation for his career in drama.

When Hong Shen returned to China in 1922, modern Chinese drama was still in its infancy, with only student-organized amateur theaters to replace the declining “civilized drama” (wenming 文明戏) of the previous decade. At the invitation of the Ouyang Yuqian, who had returned from Japan, Hong joined the Shanghai Drama Society and began his reform of the amateur theater. He required all performances to be based on a written script and instructed his actors to follow his detailed procedure for rehearsal. He also wanted to get rid of the old practice of female impersonation. His production of Hu Shi’s 胡适 play The Greatest Event in Life (Zhongshen dashi 终身大事) in 1923 marked the first time men and women acted on the same stage in China. His adaptation and production of Oscar Wilde’s Lady Windermere’s Fan the next year established a complete system for dramatic performance and introduced the role of the director in Chinese drama. His many writings on the theories and practices of drama and film laid a theoretical foundation for these performing arts. He also changed the name of “new drama” to “spoken drama” to emphasize the importance of dialogue in a play. This focus improved the literary quality of plays in China.

Hong Shen’s most important dramatic work is the play Yama Zhao (Zhao Yanwang 赵阎王, 1922), in which he exposes the brutalizing effect of the wars among the warlords on the common people. Modeled on U.S. playwright Eugene O’Neill’s The Emperor Jones, the play employs expressionist techniques to explore the protagonist’s psychology. It also expresses Hong’s belief that evil is not inherent in the human nature but rather is a result of social forces. The central character’s transformation from an honest peasant into a murderer, or King of Hell (Yama), is due to his dehumanizing environment. He is both a victim and a victimizer.

In the 1930s, he joined the League of Left Wing Writers, and his Shanghai Drama Society adopted the slogan of “proletarian drama.” His representative works during this period were the three plays in his “village trilogy” (nongcun sanbuqu 农村三部曲), which describe the dire conditions in the countryside and the social causes of rural poverty. These plays reflected his belief that playwrights should do
something beneficial for society, but in doing so he fell into the trap of using drama to preach political doctrines.

During the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War) Hong promoted "drama for national defense." He wrote many patriotic plays and was active in organizing traveling troupes to spread the message of resistance against Japan. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (1949), his many official duties prevented him from doing dramatic work, except the play *This Is the American Way of Life* (*Zhe jiushi Meiguo de shenghuo fangshi* 这就是“美国的生活方式”), which he wrote to show his support for the Korean War. As a founder of Chinese spoken drama, Hong Shen followed the development of this drama from the pluralistic 1920s, when romanticism, expressionism, and Ibsenian realism coexisted, to the politicized theater after the 1930s.

Shiao-ling YU

Further Reading


Hong Shen, the famous dramatist, around 1930. Hong established a complete system for dramatic performance and introduced the role of the director to the Chinese stage.
Hongcun and Xidi, two villages in Anhui Province, are living museums offering natives and tourist alike a glimpse into the region’s past.

Hongcun and Xidi, two ancient villages in southern Anhui Province (east central China), were selected for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Cultural Heritage List in 2000. (World Cultural Heritage sites are considered to have outstanding historical, educational, and cultural value and belong to the people of the world. UNESCO lists 679 throughout the world, 26 in China.) Hongcun and Xidi and the relics found in them are preserved as national historical treasures, and as a way to interpret China’s feudal rural past.

Founded in 1131 by the prominent Wang family, Hongcun thrived during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. Shaped like an ox, Hongcun’s design emphasizes its waterways.

Approximately 140 historical stone buildings, courtyards, and alleys form a living museum in present-day Hongcun. Lexu Hall, the Wang family ancestral temple, is near a
Hongcun and Xidi

Tourism in Hongcun Village

Tourism has become a major source of revenue for many towns in China, making historic buildings, traditional festivals, and local legends of new commercial value. This text comes from a tourist information website:

Stunning delicate woodcarvings were engraved on the beams above the front lounge of the Chenzhi Hall, the house of Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) salt dealer Wang Dinggui in Hongcun Village. One depicts dozens of playful children celebrating the Lantern Festival by setting off firecrackers, beating drums and gongs or blowing trumpets. Another portrays dozens officials playing stringed musical instruments, painting or doing calligraphy at four tables. Barbers and tea servants are shown working behind them. The memorial archway—built in 1578 and dedicated to Hu Wenguang, a Xidi native who became a high official of the Ming Dynasty—is a masterpiece of stone carving. The best brick carving ever in Xiyuan, or west garden, at the house of another prominent Ming-dynasty official from Xidi. The pine, bamboo, plum blossom and rocks look real. The 13 stone pillars on the north end of the pond are said to be the guardians of the village.


Further Reading


Elizabeth D. Schaffer
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)

Xiānggǎng-Shànghǎi Huìfēng Yínháng
香港上海汇丰银行

The Hongkong (spelled as one word) and Shanghai Banking Corporation has been a leading foreign bank in China since 1865. HSBC was a quasi-official bank during the later Qing dynasty and lent money to the Qing government for political indemnities, national railways, and military campaigns by using China’s customs revenues as collateral. HSBC is rebuilding its network following China’s banking reform in recent decades.

The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) was established in Hong Kong in 1865 by a group of shipping companies, led by Thomas Sutherland of the Peninsular & Oriental Steamship Company and Francis Chomley of Dent & Company. The new bank (which spells Hongkong as one word) sought to combine banking with the tremendous business opportunities in trade and shipping between Hong Kong and Shanghai.

HSBC established its Shanghai branch on 3 April 1865, with the Chinese characters of the words Huìfēng Yínháng, meaning “abundant remittances.” David MacLean, the first branch manager, had a close friendship with Robert Hart, inspector-general of Imperial Maritime Customs of China. Subsequently, Imperial Maritime Customs deposited all its revenues with the HSBC, and the bank established branches where Imperial Maritime Customs had local offices.

HSBC became a quasi-official bank in modern China, primarily because of the fact that the decaying Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government had no official bank before the end of the nineteenth century. The Qing government frequently borrowed money from the bank for political indemnities, national railways, and even for military campaigns by using customs revenues as earnest money or as collateral. As the most important and influential foreign bank, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation issued its bank notes in various denominations in China. Acting as a proxy for the Chinese government in banking and finance, the bank utilized access to London’s financial markets to sell bond certificates. Its foreign exchange transactions often accounted for 60 to 70 percent of total daily transactions in Shanghai financial markets. For more than a half century China’s financial markets set their daily foreign exchange rates based on Shanghai, and the Shanghai interest rates were set by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.

During the Pacific War (1941–1945) HSBC was forced by the Japanese military to suspend business. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, only the Shanghai branch remained, and its role was limited to inward remittance and export bills until economic reform in 1978.

HSBC began building its new network in China in the 1980s, establishing branches in major cities and quickly becoming the largest foreign bank in China.
1991 HSBC Holdings was established to act as a parent company to HSBC Group, and in 2000 HSBC moved its China headquarters from Hong Kong to Shanghai. Currently the headquarters is located in its own HSBC Tower in Pudong. From 2001 to 2004 HSBC acted as a strategic partner to obtain a 19.9 percent stake of the Bank of Communications and about an 8 percent stake in the Bank of Shanghai. In February 2007 HSBC applied for its license from the Chinese Banking Regulatory Committee to become a registered foreign bank in China.

**Further Reading**


Hongze Lake

Hongze Hú 洪泽湖

Hongze Lake is China’s fourth-largest freshwater lake. Located in the Huai River valley, Jiangsu Province, it is an important stopover site and winter habitat for many species of migratory birds. Hongze is also renowned for its aquaculture products.

Hongze (vast marsh) Lake, China’s fourth-largest freshwater lake, is located in the Huai River valley in the western part of Jiangsu Province in eastern China. The lake covers an area of 2,069 square kilometers; the deepest spot in the lake is 5.5 meters, and the surface elevation is 12.25 meters above sea level. Of several rivers flowing into the lake from the west the largest is the Huai, which continues south to join the Yangzi (Chang) River.

The lake assumed its present size in 1194 when the Huang (Yellow) River changed course and no longer provided an outlet for the Huai River, which flowed into Hongze Lake instead. With no other natural outlet the Huai River frequently flooded the lake and the surrounding area, and canals were dug linking Hongze Lake to the Grand Canal, which runs north-south on the plains 20 kilometers to the east. A canal also connects the lake to the East China Sea 160 kilometers to the east. Dams, sluice locks, and embankments have been constructed to control floods and permit the rivers to replenish the water table of the lake. The largest dam, the Sanhe Dam (three rivers), is located where the Huai flows into Hongze Lake. Along the eastern shore is a 67-kilometer-long stone embankment. The fields of the coastal plains of Jiangsu Province are irrigated with water from Hongze Lake, and the lake is used for hydropower generation.

Because of its location in a transition zone between a warm temperate and a subtropical climate, the lake is rich in aquatic plants and animals and is one of China’s principal lakes for freshwater fish farming. Aquaculture products farmed for domestic use and export include whitebait, perch, eel, Chinese mitten crab, and shrimps as well as water chestnuts and lotus. Hongze Lake is an important stopover site and winter habitat for 143 species
of migratory birds, nine of which, such as the red-crested crane, the gray crane, and the great bustard, are protected by an international convention signed by China. In 2006 the Chinese State Counsel approved the Hongze Lake Wetland National Nature Reserve in Sihong, which covers 16.7 square kilometers of the northwestern shore. The Hongze Lake area is also home to some oil activity, which is a danger to the environment. In 2003 the Huai River flooded the lake, and more than 250 oil wells were waterlogged. A new threat to the environment was added during a drought in 2000–2001 when the water table of Hongze Lake dropped drastically. The western part of the lake became unnavigable as the water table dropped by 2 centimeters a day for a prolonged period of time.

Today Hongze Lake has become a tourist attraction because of its scenery and seafood; the latter attracts many visitors to the annual Golden Autumn Crab Gourmet Festival.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading

Fish cannot survive in absolutely clear water.
水至清则无鱼
Shuǐ zhì qīng zé wú yú
The objective of the Johns Hopkins–Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies (known as the Hopkins–Nanjing Center) is to foster mutual understanding and appreciation between China and the West, and to train students with an interest in becoming leaders in Sino-Western relations. It is the only joint-university program of its type in China.

The Johns Hopkins University–Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies (known as the Hopkins–Nanjing Center) was established in 1986 by then–Johns Hopkins University president Steven Muller and then–Nanjing University president Kuang Yaming. Its mission is to train future leaders involved in Sino-Western relations and to improve mutual understanding and relations between China and the West by bringing people together for a period of intense exposure to each other’s history, culture, contemporary thought, and society.

The Hopkins–Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies is housed on the campus of Nanjing University in Nanjing, China. The program is operated jointly by Nanjing University and the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C.

President Muller first envisioned the center back in 1977. SAIS already had a track record of success with its international program and with its graduate school in Bologna, Italy. Muller wanted to replicate that success in Asia, and realized that China was “the country of the future” (Rienzi 2007). He foresaw the need to establish a positive relationship between the U.S. and China.

It would be a few years before Muller’s vision became a reality, but in 1981, when a delegation of Chinese university presidents visited the campus of Johns Hopkins, Muller met Kuang Yaming, and the Hopkins–Nanjing Center was born.

The Center officially opened in 1986 with twelve international students and forty Chinese students enrolling that first year. Since then it has grown to become the largest institution dedicated solely to training future leaders of Sino-American relations, with a total enrollment of 140 students in 2008.

Each year, around seventy postgraduate Chinese students go to the Center to study in English about the United States, economics, and international affairs. They are taught at the Center by faculty hired from American universities by the Johns Hopkins University. At the same time, around seventy students from outside China, most of whom are American, study in Chinese from the Chinese faculty of Nanjing University. They learn about contemporary Chinese politics, economic development, social changes, and the underlying cultural issues affecting contemporary China. Students can work toward either a one-year certificate in Chinese and American studies or a two-year Master of Arts in International Studies.

The two groups of students live together at the Center’s dormitory. Usually, Chinese and non-Chinese students are paired as roommates so they can learn from each other and explore differences in culture and language. In addition, all students have access to a bilingual, open-stack library with about 65,000 volumes. The Center also
hosts seminars, lectures, and extracurricular activities aimed at offering opportunities to learn more about each other’s society and culture.

The Center currently boasts over 1,700 graduates now working in such fields as business, journalism, government positions, and academia. It is the only accredited academic program in both China and the United States that offers a master’s degree.

The Editors

Further Reading


Hou Debang, a chemical engineer committed to the industrial development of China, established a reputation by creating a way to eliminate calcium chloride as a waste product. This technique, called the Hou process, along with his work with the Ministry of Chemical Industries and China’s Society for Chemical Industries, has left a lasting impression on the chemical engineering business in China.

Hou Debang was born in 1890 to a farmer’s family in Changsha, a village outside Fuzhou (the capital of Fujian Province, on China’s east coast). From 1903 to 1906 he studied at the Anglo-Chinese College, a school sponsored by the American Methodist Episcopal Mission. Expelled for his participation in the Anti-American Boycott of 1905, he attended Chen Baochen’s Quanmin xuetang (Fujian Academy) before enrolling at the Fujian-Anhui Railroad School in Shanghai. After graduation in 1910 he spent three months as an engineer apprentice before being admitted to the Qinghua preparatory academy for studies in the United States. From 1913 to 1916 he attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology on a scholarship, majoring in chemical engineering. After graduation he attended Pratt Institute in Brooklyn for a certificate in chemical tanning. He graduated from New York’s Columbia University with a dissertation on iron tannage in 1921.

Before Hou had obtained his doctorate, he already had begun a lifelong association with Fan Rui’s Pacific Alkali Co. (Yongli Chemical Industries, founded 1917). Although W. D. Mount, a retired engineer, had sold Fan a set of plant plans, unraveling the Solvay process (a process for making soda from common salt) proved daunting. Returning to China in 1922, Hou was appointed chief engineer and spent the next three years preparing the plant for commissioning. Regular production began in 1926, with Hou and Li Zhuchen rotating as plant manager. In 1931 Hou took leave from the company to share his expertise with the world by publishing a practical treatise on the manufacture of soda. In 1934 Hou Debang was dispatched by Fan Xudong to New York to undertake another major project: design and purchase equipment for an ammonia sulfate plant in Nanjing. With the help of the Nitrogen Engineering Corporation and the Wah Chang Trading Corp., Hou completed the tasks, and the new plant began production three years later.

World War II, however, interrupted Hou’s work. He was evacuated to Sichuan Province in 1938 and found a new challenge in adapting the Solvay process to local conditions. He left for Europe and the United States in 1939 to develop a new approach and to procure equipment for Yongli’s new plant in Sichuan. The result was the Hou process, which eliminated calcium chloride as a waste product and created a by-product, ammonium chloride, used as a fertilizer. His reputation established, Tata Industries in India retained him as chief consulting engineer for its soda ash plant from 1947 to 1949.

Hou, however, remained committed to China’s industrial development. After Fan Xudong’s death, he became general manager of Yongli and steered it through the turbulent civil war years. In 1950, together with Li Duchen, he proposed
to place Yongli Chemical Industries and Jiuda Salt Industries under joint state-private management, thus launching the socialist campaign to transform capitalist enterprises in heavy industries. He was reappointed general manager of the new enterprise in 1952 and served until his departure for the Ministry of Chemical Industries in 1958. Continuing work on his Hou process, he also served as the executive director of China’s Society for Chemical Industries until his death in Beijing.

**KWAN Man Bun**

**Further Reading**


The household responsibility system is an essential component of the agricultural reform initiated by China in the late 1970s. Under the system, land or certain tasks are contracted to individual households for a period of time. After fulfilling the procurement quota obligations to the state, farmers are free to keep their surplus for their use or sell it on the market.

Having transformed China’s countryside into a system of agricultural cooperatives by 1957 (the process called collectivization), the Chinese leadership moved on in 1958 to more ambitious programs of the Great Leap Forward. Existing collectives were soon organized into people’s communes, much larger units with an average of about 20,000 to 30,000 members. Communes as a basic organization of the Chinese countryside remained until late 1970s when reform impulses began to pop up in various places. The household responsibility system (jiating chengbao zeren zhi) was one of the agricultural reforms that emerged at the time. Although forbidden by the central government until the autumn of 1980, the household responsibility system was introduced experimentally in rural China, most famously in Anhui Province.

The household responsibility system had two major forms. The first involved contracting output to the household (baochan daohu); the second involved contracting everything to the household, or contracting tasks to the household (baogan daohu). Under both forms the collective retained the ownership of the land. Under the form of contracting output to the household, land was divided equally and then leased to individual peasant households on a per capita basis for the return of a certain kind or amount of yield as specified by the contract to the state. Peasant households had the autonomy to decide what and how much to produce. Any surplus beyond the fixed quota would be kept by peasant households either for their own consumption or for sale in the newly liberalized rural markets.

Under the form of contracting everything to the household certain plots of land were assigned to individual households in return for fixed payments to the collective as procurement quotas, taxes, welfare funds, and collective investments. The household would keep anything else for its own use or for sale.

The terms of household contracts varied in different areas. Initially some areas used annually renewed contracts that reallocated land to allow for changes in a household’s size or situation. In other areas the duration of the contract was not clearly stipulated but was assumed to be long term. In the latter, land allocations were to remain unchanged regardless of household situations such as births or deaths. Over time the system gradually evolved into explicit long-term leases of land under collective ownership. The government even began to grant land-use certificates through county offices that would be good for fifteen to twenty years. Eventually the government extended leases to fifty years on land that could be inherited and sublet.

The essential feature of various forms of the responsibility system was the establishment of a direct and
effective link between work and rewards. The system did not change the nature of collective ownership of land and property, but it did change the way the land and property were used and the way agricultural production was managed. The work-point system that had been in place since collectivization was gradually replaced by various forms of the responsibility system.

Early forms of the household responsibility system were introduced in response to excesses of the crash collectivization movement in the mid-1950s. But this endeavor was quickly reversed with Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong’s intervention. Accused as “rightist opportunism,” these nascent experiments were soon submerged in the waves of “agrarian radicalism” during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Their revival came in the late 1970s in response to initiatives taken by the farmers and local governments.

Experiments with various responsibility systems in the late 1970s started in Anhui Province when Wan Li was appointed provincial party secretary. In November 1977 the provincial government began to liberalize the rural economy with the passage of a policy known as the “Six Articles,” which called on officials at various levels to respect local units’ autonomy. In 1978, when a severe drought hit Anhui, with the endorsement of the provincial government Shannan District in Feixi County began the practice of “lending” pieces of land that were not used by the collectives to peasant households.

With the benign neglect and implicit support of some reform-oriented regional and local leaders such as Wan Li, other localities in Anhui began experimenting with various forms of the responsibility system. These experiments included contracting output to groups (bochan daozu), contracting tasks to groups (boagan daozu), contracting output to the household, and contracting tasks to the household. These forms of the responsibility system calculated rewards based on yields and distributed bonuses for output over quotas (lianchan jichou and chaobao jiangli). For example, in 1978 Xinjie Commune in Tianchang County adopted a limited version of household contracting by fixing output responsibility.

Farmers cart their produce to sell at market. Because farmers are now allowed to sell their surplus crops after government quotas are fulfilled, incentive is a factor in China’s reformed agricultural system. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
for certain crops such as cotton to individuals (in reality, households). In the spring of 1978 Mahu Commune in Fengyang County and Weiyang Production Team in Lai’an County began linking production and reward via contracting output to groups or contacting everything to groups (da baogan daozu). At about the same time in Xiaogang, Fengyang County, eighteen peasant households secretly began practicing the household responsibility system. Given the political uncertainty at the time, they signed a pledge in the spring of 1978 to take care of the dependents of team cadres in case they were arrested for allowing such a practice.

**Contracting Spreads**

Although Fengyang County later reversed its decision to permit the household responsibility system when other areas demanded the same right, its initial endorsement emboldened residents in other localities, and household contracting began to spread even though this practice was often concealed from higher authorities. By the time of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, over one thousand production teams had already adopted the household responsibility system.

Although the Third Plenum reaffirmed the Dazhai model, a brigade widely heralded during the Cultural Revolution for its spirit of hard struggle and self-reliance, it also encouraged experimentation with various forms of the responsibility system that linked work with pay under unified accounting and distribution by the collective. More important, while the Third Plenum still forbade the adoption of the household responsibility system, the fact that it tolerated the development of different forms of the responsibility system was a sign of relaxation. In such an atmosphere responsibility systems in the form of contracting output to small groups and even contracting output to households were soon adopted in various places, especially in remote and poor areas. Although not all of the practices were sanctioned, none was really punished or banned. Therefore, well before the central government permitted the practice of group and, later, household responsibility in agriculture, various localities had already adopted them secretly.

But the household responsibility system continued to face strong opposition, and in most provinces the responsibility system was still limited to contracting to small groups, not households. Even Xiaogang was among the first to adopt the household responsibility system, it was forced by county authorities to switch to small-group responsibility in 1979 because of complaints from neighboring brigades and communes.

While the general atmosphere during this period was favorable to various experiments of agricultural reforms, it was not until 25–28 September 1979 at the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee did
the official policy regarding the household responsibility system began to relax. Although contracting output to households was still prohibited, it was allowed with the exception of certain sideline productions with special needs and isolated households living in remote poor areas.

Even this limited opening to allow households in poor remote areas to contract land in certain sideline productions became a window of opportunity for those looking for change. By late 1979 contracting output to households quickly spread. According to the economist D. L. Yang (1996), 25 percent of rural households were already engaged in output contracting in the spring of 1980. By July–August of the same year the number increased to 30 percent. In Anhui production teams practicing household contracting grew from less than 1 percent in 1978 to 16 percent in 1979 and 90 percent in 1980. The rapid expansion of the household responsibility system was due largely to the permissive attitude and even support from reform-minded regional and local leaders such as Wan Li in Anhui and Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan. Wan Li openly defended the practice of the household responsibility system as simply one form of responsibility system and it was socialist because the land still belonged to the collective.

Despite the much-improved political atmosphere, rural reform, and especially the household responsibility system, still faced strong opposition. Even in Anhui, the most radical of China’s provinces, the household responsibility system was still not widely accepted. Although Feixi County had adopted the system from the beginning, most of Anhui had adopted the alternative system of contracting to small groups. In Fengyang County, which became famous for pioneering the system of contracting to small groups, the party leader gave his support only to contracting output to small groups but opposed the adoption of the household responsibility system. As noted earlier, the county authorities who had originally allowed Xiaogang to adopt the household responsibility system reversed their decision when Xiaogang’s example came into conflict with the policy of contracting to small groups in nearby areas. Although the leadership at the prefecture level in Chuxian supported the more radical household responsibility system, resistance from local cadres, especially at the county level, persisted.

From Permitted to Popular

During the next two years the first tentative endorsement of the household responsibility system was gradually extended, and the corresponding increases in grain production helped alter attitudes toward the system. The subsequent policy changes evolved from permitting the household responsibility system to recognizing and then popularizing it. This change was due largely to Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping’s endorsement and Wang Li’s open support after he became vice premier in charge of agricultural affairs and head of the State Agricultural Commission.

Even in 1980 at a meeting of provincial party secretaries most provinces still opposed the household responsibility system. However, a major breakthrough occurred at a meeting of provincial party secretaries on 14–22 September. With strong support from Wan Li, the meeting issued a resolution on “Certain Problems with Respect to Further Strengthening and Improving Responsibility System for Agricultural Production,” known as “Document No. 75.” Despite continued opposition from some provinces at the meeting, this document endorsed the experiment of various forms of responsibility system, including the continued practice of the household responsibility system even in some prosperous areas that had already adopted it.

At the time of this meeting an estimated 20 to 30 percent of all production teams had already adopted the household responsibility system despite continued opposition. In the aftermath of the release of the document most provinces and autonomous regions responded promptly and positively, and subsequently various forms of the responsibility system developed quickly. Apart from contracting output to small groups and contracting output to households, many places began dividing labor according to specialization and linking rewards to yields (zhuanye chengbao, lianchan jichou). At the same time restrictions on rural markets and fairs were further eased, and measures were also taken to encourage crop diversification, specialization, and production for expanding internal and external markets. Most important, by July 1981 many basic accounting units in rural China had adopted some form of the household responsibility system even though the document stipulated that “average areas should not adopt” this system.
A variety of responsibility systems was used in different regions. More-developed regions along the coast preferred some form of specialized contracting. The poorest and least-commercialized areas in the interior would find the household responsibility system most appropriate. Regions in the middle would tend to adopt a hybrid system of the two. By this time most people still viewed contracting output to individual households as an effective way to raise rural income levels because it could alter the incentive structures in the “backward” areas where the collective economy was weak and ineffective. But suspicion and even opposition to its adoption in more prosperous regions persisted.

By the time of the National Rural Work Conference on 5–21 October 1981 about half of the production teams had already adopted the household responsibility system and divided up team property. The household responsibility system gained legitimacy at the conference when it was formally recognized as a form of socialist collective economy. This policy shift was reaffirmed by the CCP Secretariat the next month.

The Chinese political system has an inherent tendency to swing between extremes. Although there was still some resistance to adoption of the household responsibility system, resistance soon collapsed after the system was endorsed and pushed from above. Like the socialist high tide during the collectivization movement, party apparatus at various levels again lapsed into rigidity after an initial flirtation with experimental innovations and local flexibility.

With the promulgation of Document No. 1 of 1982, rural reform became unstoppable. Despite the government intention for a period to slow down the new system and reflect, stabilize, and improve on it, the momentum toward household contracting was so strong that the household responsibility system was accelerated. Within a year production teams that had already adopted some form of the household responsibility system increased from about 50 percent of the total in 1981 to about 80 percent in 1982.

The effect of the adoption of the household responsibility system was remarkable. By the time of the Rural Work Conference in November 1982, there were dramatic increases in the production of grain, cotton, and oil crops. Consequently the household responsibility system was reaffirmed in January 1983 by Document No. 1. This reaffirmation led to further acceleration in the pace of decollectivization. Rural households engaged in the household responsibility system jumped to 98 percent of the total in 1983 and 99 percent in 1984.

**Litmus Test**

After the central authorities accepted the household responsibility system, implementation of the system soon became the litmus test in many areas of a cadre’s support for reform despite government calls for selective adoption of the system where the collective had failed. Most cadres, skilled at sniffing shifts in the political wind, quickly jumped on the bandwagon of reform. Those that did not were subjected to political pressure by 1982. Although adoption of the household responsibility system was to be originally voluntary and based on peasants’ “democratic decisions” in regions where it was suitable, primarily in the poorer and remote rural areas where collectivized farming had failed, the system soon became mandatory throughout China.

Implementation of the household responsibility system was further facilitated by the dismantling of the commune system in 1984. In accordance with a state constitution adopted in December 1982, the political and administrative authority of the people’s communes was transferred to township (xiang) governments. The central government required that separation of the government administration from economic management be competed throughout China by the end of 1984. The separation of the government administration from economic management, along with the establishment of xiang governments, was a major institutional reform in rural areas in the early 1980s, and these changes made the individual peasant household the main unit of production and management.

Thus, the initial changes in the form of production since 1978 in rural China soon turned into a new high tide of decollectivization. In this sweeping process of change the old commune system was replaced by the new household responsibility system based on individual family farming. By 1984 most villages divided their land and collective properties; even villages that never divided their land and collective properties were pressured to adopt various forms of the responsibility system and make necessary adjustments.
Adoption of the household responsibility system—together with rising procurement prices, increased supplies, use of farm inputs such as chemical fertilizer, and revival of rural markets—produced spectacular growth in agricultural output and in peasant standards of living. With growth in the agricultural sector exceeding that of the industrial sector, the urban-rural income gap declined for the first time. Consequently peasant demand for consumer goods mushroomed, providing strong market support for increased production in the light industrial sector.

**Peasants Lose Confidence**

But the limitation of the household responsibility system soon began to manifest itself. Lack of explicit ownership rights of land and the initial short-term lease undermined peasant confidence in the durability of the contracts and prompted peasants to engage in short-term economic behavior. Critics were also concerned that the household responsibility system seriously depleted public assets such as draft animals, farming tools, and machinery. A more serious consequence of decollectivization is that many of the collectives’ functions began to lapse. This lapse could be seen in the deteriorating conditions of flood control, irrigation projects, and the provision of basic public goods. More important, as stimulus effects from institutional change began to taper off after 1984, growth of agriculture became sluggish.

In response the government introduced long-term leases of collective land to peasant households. These long-term leases were expected to provide a means of re-establishing all the incentives of family farming without turning all the land over to direct private ownership.

The rapid growth in productivity resulting from all these institutional changes has ushered in a period of great transformation in rural China. The surplus labor created by increased productivity, together with the easing of travel and residence restrictions, has led to massive
rural migration. Many have abandoned tilling the land and found employment in village and township enterprises. More have become migrant workers, seeking jobs and even permanent residence in cities and, in the process, fueling rapid urbanization in China.

Qunjian TIAN

Further Reading

China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
“Butterfly” Hu was the most famous Chinese actress of the silent and early sound era. Like many contemporaries, she performed under a stage name, which followed her throughout a career that spanned four decades. Once an official representative of China’s film industry under the Nationalist Party, she founded her own production company before retiring in 1967.

Known during the 1930s as China’s “Film Queen,” “Butterfly” Hu’s personal name was Ruihua and her father a high-ranking customs inspector for the Beijing-Fengtian Railway. Moving with her family from Shanghai to numerous cities in northern China allowed Hu to acquire fluency in several Chinese dialects. Although a film actress from 1925 onward, these linguistic abilities proved extremely valuable in aiding Hu to successfully make the transition from silent films to “talkies.” She starred in the Shanghai film industry’s first partial-sound production (the film was recorded with a complete soundtrack, but this was played back on a separate disk which accompanied the feature), The Singing Girl Red Peony (1931), which also made her a figure in the burgeoning world of mass-produced popular music.

Hu Die entered the Zhonghua Film Academy in 1924. A year later, she appeared in her first film, Victory (1925), and steadily built a career as an actress for studios such as Youlian and Tianyi. During this early period Hu distinguished herself in both “modern” roles (wife, movie star) and those depicting mytho-historical female icons (Meng Jiangnū, Madame White Snake, Zhu Yingtai, all of which are exemplary though “doomed” lovers in classical Chinese oral tradition and fiction). In 1928 she parlayed this success into a high-paying contract with the

Hu Die (1907–1989). “Butterfly,” as she was known to her adoring fans, reached won great acclaim for playing a pair of estranged twins.
Mingxing (Star) Film Company, whose veteran directors Zhang Shichuan and Zheng Zhengqiu abetted her rise by casting her as the female lead in the long-running serial *Burning of the Red Lotus Temple* (1928–1931), along with numerous other high-profile Mingxing productions.

As cinema became an increasingly widespread urban phenomenon during the 1930s, Hu Die’s commercial successes brought her undeniable fame. Her performance as a pair of estranged twins in *Twin Sisters* (1934) was received as a marvel of both artistic and technological prowess in Chinese cinema at the time, and still considered an example of Hu at the peak of her acting powers. She appeared in the films of highly-regarded scriptwriters and directors, including relatively popular “leftist” social features such as *Wild Torrents, Salt Tide, and Cosmetics Market*, all released in 1933. This year also marked Hu’s ascension to the title of “Film Queen” (yìng hòu), chosen by readers of the popular tabloid *Mingxing Daily* poll. The Oscars-like event constituted a victory of sorts over Hu’s chief rival, former Mingxing Film Company actress and Lianhua (United) Film Company silent film star Ruan Lingyu. In 1935 Hu attended the Moscow and Berlin international film festivals as a representative of the Chinese film industry, and had her impressions of the trip published in numerous newspapers, magazines, and journals. That same year, subjected to increasing media scrutiny as a result of her failing marriage, Hu’s rival Ruan committed suicide.

Hu’s own career was not without controversy. The press published critical pieces concerning her ambiguous marital status, and questioned her devotion to her country. During the early 1940s she was pressured by the powerful Chinese secret service “spymaster,” Dai Li, to become his mistress. Their relationship did not end until Dai’s death in 1946.

War between China and Japan dramatically transformed Hu Die’s life and career in many ways. In 1937 she fled to Hong Kong and continued making movies until 1941, when Japanese invasion of the colony forced her to relocate to the hinterland “Free China” capital of Chongqing. Hu continued to act until the 1960s, appearing in several features while briefly running her own studio; her filmography includes over ninety titles. Ultimately retiring to Canada, Hu Die’s autobiography was published by numerous Chinese-language presses during the late 1980s, a testament to her popularity as the emblem of several remarkable eras in film history.

Matthew JOHNSON

Further Reading


Hu Jintao is the current President of the People’s Republic of China. During his two terms in office he has faced several crises, with varying degrees of success. His handling of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake was initially praised for his break from previous government secrecy but later criticized outside China after widespread media censorship of the event became apparent. He has been very active in promoting development at home and improving foreign relations, notably with Taiwan.

Born in Shanghai in December 1942, with ancestral roots in Anhui Province, Hu Jintao graduated in 1965 from China’s Qinghua University, Department of Irrigation Engineering. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in April 1964 and became a political/ideological counselor for students while in college. After graduation, Hu worked as an engineer at the Liujiaxia Irrigation Works in Gansu Province, northwestern China.

Chosen by Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) to be a leader of the so-called fourth generation of leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hu was ranked as the fifth and the youngest standing member of the seven-member Political Bureau of the CCP during Jiang Zemin’s era (1989–2002) and succeeded Jiang in 2002. He had been head of the Chinese Communist Youth League (January 1983–July 1985), party secretary of Guizhou Province (July 1985–November 1988), and the party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (December 1988–January 1991). Currently Hu serves as president of the PRC, as well as general secretary of CCP’s Central Committee, and chairman of the CCP’s Military Affairs Committee.

Since his succession to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has taken an active role in developing China’s foreign relations. The first developments were the introduction of the concepts “harmonious society” and “peaceful rise,” the latter of which was proposed in 2003 by Chairman of the China Reform Forum Zheng Bijian. Peaceful rise, later termed the peaceful development path by Hu, was touted as a path of economic development that could raise “China’s population out of a state of underdevelopment” (Glaser & Medeiros 2007, 295) while working cooperatively with other countries to promote national security and world peace. The concept of peaceful development also included Cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and the mainland. In 2006, Hu stated that China’s foreign policy would include a peaceful approach to the Taiwan issue. As a result of this goal, which was developed via consultations with the United States, tensions between the Mainland and Taiwan lessened, and economic and agricultural cooperation improved. This was helped by the election of the more conciliatory Guomindang (Kuomintang, [KMT]) under Ma Ying-Jiao in the Taiwanese Presidential elections in 2008.

These socioeconomic developments were evidence of Hu’s philosophy of a “harmonious society” that places people at the center of policy decisions and debates. At the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP in October
2007, Hu asserted that China’s primary goal was to become “a well-off society that would ensure balanced economic growth, improvement of people’s well being and social justice” (Jianhai Bi 2008, 17). This goal included dispersing China’s wealth by retooling income distribution policies and balancing growth between rural and urban areas. Hu’s focus on government for the people exemplified his ideology, which was based expressly on Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents,” a guiding belief system that centered on learning, politics, and integrity. This ideology was not without its critics, however, who claimed that Hu’s rhetoric about the administration working for the people’s best interests allowed him to impose his own agenda. Such claims were not uncommon or far-fetched given the corruption scandals of Communist leaders since the 1980s.

Throughout Hu’s term as president there was an increase in anti-corruption campaigns, but top officials remained beyond investigation, which became problematic during times of national crises when information was not

Hu Jintao inspecting the honor guard in Nairobi, Kenya. China is actively trying to expand its relationships with sub-Saharan African governments.
communicated and governmental activity was not transparent. During the SARS outbreak in 2003, official announcements were slow to materialize and numerous cases went unreported by hospitals and health officials. This crisis provided Hu and his administration with the opportunity to make policy changes, particularly with regard to accountability of governmental officials and to media ownership. Significant changes, however, were slow to materialize. Instead, the opportunity was used primarily to legitimize the CCP and bolster Hu’s position therein.

Unlike during the SARS crisis of 2003, Hu’s administration was praised by the international community for its rescue and relief efforts and for its initially allowed open reporting of the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008, which left nearly 80,000 dead or missing. This praise was short lived, however, as reports began to surface of thousands of schools collapsing because of poor construction. State-controlled media censored reports about the school collapses amidst protests from parents and teachers, some of whom were detained. In early 2009, reports speculated that the earthquake might have been induced by the 320 million tons of water held back by the four-year-old Zipingpu Reservoir, a government sponsored project that was meant to provide power and water for drinking and irrigation to the Sichuan region.

China under Hu experienced continuing strong economic growth. In 2007, the beginning of Hu’s second five-year term, the trade surplus with the US and the EU exceeded $260 billion and foreign reserves moved to a record $2 trillion at the end of 2008. Hu expanded foreign interests, paying visits to the United States, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe to propagate his ideas of China’s peaceful rise and harmonious society. Economic progress was one of the top priorities of Hu’s administration, the focus of which was on developing global industry and advancing Chinese brands.

During his second tenure as President of China, the 29th Olympic Games was held in Beijing, China, during the summer of 2008, bringing unprecedented attention to the People’s Republic. Hu is due to be replaced as President and Party Secretary in 2012.

Wenshan JIA and Cassie LYNCH

Further Reading


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HU Shi
Hú Shì 胡适
1891–1962  New Culture Movement leader

Hu Shi was a leader of the early twentieth century New Culture Movement. Hu was known for his writings on language reform and literature revolution. Labeled as the leader who sought construction, not destruction, Hu Shi was criticized by conservatives and Communists alike for his efforts and views during the Movement.

Hu Shi, an educator and a major leader in the New Culture Movement, was born as Hu Hongxing in Shanghai in 1891. Hu Shi lost his father, a government official, when he was only three. Growing up in a family of declining fortune, Hu Shi witnessed the struggle of his mother, widowed at the age of twenty-two, in dealing with the irresponsible and insolent step-sons of her husband’s deceased former wife, quarrelsome daughters-in-law, and creditors who came to collect debt every New Year’s Eve. His mother’s self-restraint and resilience influenced Hu Shi to make pragmatic choices in both his personal life and public career.

Hu Shi’s education began in the Chinese tradition at age three, first under the tutelage of his father in Shanghai, then at a traditional school in his native county of Jixi in Anhui Province. In 1904 Hu Shi returned to Shanghai for education at so-called “modern” schools. He had his first exposure to vernacular writing at the China Public Institute, where he was an editor of a student periodical, Commitment Ten-Day Weekly (Jingye Xunbao), and tried his hand at writing fiction in the vernacular. He also had his first taste of student protest there when students demanded participation in drafting school regulations but were refused by the authorities and expelled from the school. After a brief period of teaching at a middle school, Hu Shi passed the national examination for the Boxer Indemnity Fellowship. In taking the examination, Hu took the name of “Shi” (to adapt), which carried a distinctive flavor of social Darwinism at the time. In 1910 he went to Cornell University on the fellowship and, at the advice of his brother, enrolled in the College of Agriculture. His interest in the humanities soon led him to transfer to philosophy. He was attracted to U.S.-style democracy when he observed the pre-election process in 1913, participated in public rallies, and gave many public lectures on Chinese affairs—at the cost of nearly failing his course. In 1914 he graduated with a bachelor’s degree and went to Columbia University to study philosophy with educator John Dewey, the leading advocate of pragmatism, an influential school in American thought of the twentieth century.

Hu began to participate in China’s New Culture Movement, a movement among intellectuals advocating a new Chinese culture based on Western-style (rather than Confucian) thought and ideals, while still a student in the United States. Between 1915 and 1916 he and a few other friends at Cornell and Harvard engaged in a debate on the use of the vernacular, as opposed to classical, in literature. “A Preliminary Discussion on Reform in Literature,” an article published in New Youth Magazine in 1917, was Hu Shi’s national debut in
the vernacular language movement, to be followed by more writings on language reform and literature revolution. In the same year Hu Shi returned to China, married Jiang Dongxiu, an illiterate girl betrothed to him through his mother’s arrangement when both were in their teens, and began teaching philosophy at the prestigious Beijing University. Hu’s approach to the history of Chinese philosophy was ridiculed by conservatives but instantly popular among students. He also joined the New Youth editorial board in 1918 and contributed regularly to the weekly.

Isms vs. Problems

In contrast to the political radical Chen Duxiu and cultural radical Qian Xuantong, Hu took moderate, pragmatic approaches to both politics and culture, arguing for the need of gradualism to attain revolutionary ends. His most well-known solutions were “less talk on isms, more discussion on problems” in his 1919 rejoinder to Li Dazhao, the co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party, and “bold hypothesis, careful investigation” for scholarly research. Thus, Hu emerged among the leaders of the New Culture Movement as the one who sought construction, not destruction. He became a vocal advocate for the vernacular and wrote A History of Vernacular Literature for its historical justification; he researched the authorship of A Dream of Red Chamber and issues relating to several other important fictions and ancient works, such as The Water Margin and Journey to the West. Hu’s efforts raised the status of these vernacular fictions and made them canonized works in Chinese literature. His research method also influenced generations of scholars after him. Some of them, such as Gu Jiegang, Luo Ergang, Fu Sinian, and Yu Pingbo, became leaders in the study of Chinese history and literary history.

Hu Shi’s liberalism made him an uncomfortable ally of the National Government under the Guomindang but an even harsher critic of the Chinese Communists in the late 1920s. He opposed hasty confrontation with Japan when its aggressive expansion in China escalated after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. However, he turned away from what others viewed as appeasement after the War of Resistance against China (also known as the Second Sino-Japanese War) broke out in 1937 and supported resistance by offering himself to government service. In 1938 he accepted the mission to the United States and Europe as a semiofficial emissary seeking Western support of China’s war effort. Between 1939 and 1942 he was China’s ambassador to the United States. He stayed in the United States for the remaining years of the war and researched Annotation on the Book of Rivers by Li Daoyuan (d. 527) and the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) scholarship of the book. Hu returned to China in 1946 and was appointed chancellor of National Beijing University. In 1949, when the ruling Nationalist government collapsed on the mainland, Hu Shi went to the United States and was curator of the Gest Library at Princeton University between 1950 and 1952.
Caught in the Crossfire

Throughout his life Hu Shi was criticized by both the conservatives and the Communists alike for his radical influence in the New Culture Movement or for his pragmatism and gradualism. On the mainland Hu Shi was the target of a Communist ideological campaign in 1954 in which he was criticized for promoting John Dewey’s pragmatism movement. In the same year Hu accepted the presidency of Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan. His appointment immediately provoked the publication of books in Taiwan that attacked him for causing the social and cultural disorientations in China that opened the way to the Communist revolution. Still presiding over Academia Sinica, Hu died in 1962. In the 1980s and 1990s, scholarly interest in Hu Shi revived on the mainland as volumes of monographs were published and his importance in history recognized.

LU Yan

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**HU Yaobang**

Hú Yàobāng 胡耀邦

1915–1989 Chinese Communist Party leader

Hu Yaobang, Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, was a liberal reformer. He was responsible for promoting and implementing Deng Xiaoping’s political idea of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as well as for adopting capitalist elements to facilitate economic reform and the opening up China to the world. Hu was also responsible for reforming the party by establishing clear lines of authority and recruiting young members.

Born in Liuyang, Hunan Province, into a peasant family, Hu Yaobang joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Youth League in 1929 at the age of fourteen while still attending school. In 1933 Hu became a CCP member and was transferred to the CCP’s soviet (an elected governmental council in a Communist country) in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. As secretary-general of the central committee of the Youth League, Hu was responsible for organizing young people. His success captured the attention of CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, who personally recommended Hu to head the political section of the party-founded Anti-Japanese University. During the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) Hu served as political commissioner in the Red Army in central and north China, working under Deng Xiaoping, who became the paramount leader after Mao’s death.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Hu followed Deng to the southwest, heading the North Sichuan People’s Administrative Office. In mid-1952 Hu and Deng were transferred to Beijing. Hu was assigned to serve in the New Democratic Youth League, which later was renamed the “Chinese Communist Youth League,” first as secretary and then in 1957 as first secretary of the league’s central committee. In September 1956 Hu was elected to the CCP Central Committee. At age forty-one he was the youngest member. Hu served in Beijing until 1963, not only continuing his youth work at home but also leading a number of delegations to promote youth work among Communist and socialist countries.

In late 1964 Hu went to Hunan Province, where he stayed until June 1965. As the first secretary of the Chinese Communist Shaanxi Committee and concurrently second secretary of the CCP Northwest Bureau, Hu had as his chief task restoring the rural order that was severely dislocated by Mao’s Great Leap Forward (1958–1960).

In June 1965 Hu returned to Beijing for medical treatment. On 13 August 1966, Hu was relieved of all official posts simply because his ties with Deng made him the target of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Hu was being accused of possessing “bourgeois” tendencies. During the Cultural Revolution Hu was sent to reeducation camps and subjected to frequent persecutions from Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.

Mao’s death in September 1976 ended the Cultural Revolution. Deng was reinstated as vice premier and brought Hu back in 1977 as the head of the Central
Organization of the CCP. After Deng's leading role was confirmed in late 1978, Deng rapidly filled in the key positions with his aides. In 1980 Hu was made secretary-general of the CCP, a post that Deng previously held in 1954 but left vacant in 1957. The next year Hu concurrently took over the chairmanship of the CCP, a post abolished in 1982.

As secretary-general, Hu closely adhered to Deng's policy of "seeking truth from facts" and promoting "socialism with Chinese characteristics," both meaning more pragmatism and less dogmatism. Hu's first task was to rehabilitate the party members who had been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution to restore national confidence and consolidate the position of the Second Generation (the name given to refer to the core leadership of Deng and Chen Yun, assisted by Hu and Zhao Ziyang, from 1978 to 1989).

**Economic Reform**

Hu's next important task was overseeing economic reform and opening up China to facilitate rapid economic development. Like Deng, Hu believed that economic reform should be gradual and begin in the rural areas. This belief came partly from his peasant background and partly from his early service in rural areas. Not least were the lessons he had learned from Mao's radical Great Leap Forward movement, which had done great damage to the national economy. Hu took part in devising measures to develop agriculture, establish special economic zones to attract foreign investment, and introduce capitalist and consumption elements into China's economy, all of which were perceived as being preconditions for China's modernization.

Hu's other important contribution was the establishment of a three-ladder system within the CCP Central Committee Politburo in 1985. This system resolved the succession problem that Mao had created. Because Mao died without naming a successor, his death had created a power vacuum that invited a power struggle, ensuring political instability and a crisis of confidence. Moreover, the three-ladder system helped rejuvenate the party because recruitment of young members could lower the average age of politburo members from the late fifties and early sixties to the mid-forties. One of the young members recruited into the third ladder was Li Peng, who was later responsible for handling the protest that resulted from Hu's death in 1989.

Hu's other efforts included unprecedented attention to ethnic minorities, which did much to enhance national cohesion. In 1980 Hu visited Tibet and promised reform to relieve Tibetan poverty, lessening the three-decade-long Tibet-state tensions. Similar reforms were carried out for other minorities along Chinese borders.

Hu's moderate and progressive stance, especially in economic areas, together with his popularity among youths, irritated some senior party members and conservatives, all of whom felt that Hu's apparently right-wing tendency had undermined Communist ideology. On 16 January 1987, Hu was forced to resign his secretary-general post while keeping his membership in the politburo and the standing committee of the politburo. Hu was deemed to be incapable of controlling the democracy-seeking student demonstrations that broke out in Hefei, Anhui Province, in April 1986 and were supported by similar demonstrations in fourteen other cities. The conservatives held Hu accountable, reasoning that his initial inaction was responsible for the spread of the student antigovernment actions. Thereafter, Hu stepped down from the front line.

**Tiananmen Incident**

After Hu died in Beijing of a heart attack, the next day students gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn the loss. Their mourning soon became a protest, renewing demands for political liberalization and immediate democracy. To curb the discontent, a state funeral for Hu was held on April 22. However, the funeral failed to end the protest. As students continued to come to the square, similar protests were held in other places, culminating in the Tiananmen Incident that stunned the world. On 4 June, at the order of President Yang Shangkun, who had Deng and Premier Li Peng on his side, the People's Liberation Army marched in to clear and restore order in Tiananmen Square. The violence and resulting deaths focused the world's attention on Beijing.

After the incident the reform measures that Hu had
taken an active role in were slowed, some even halted, and Hu’s name was never mentioned publicly by the government and the media. This silence was broken on 18 November 2005, when the CCP held an official commemoration to celebrate the ninetieth anniversary of Hu's birth. This commemoration generated speculation that the Fourth Generation, led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, had plans to rehabilitate Hu.

LAW Yuk-fun

Further Reading


How can you put out a fire set on a cart-load of firewood with only a cup of water?

杯水车薪

Bēi shuǐ chē xīn
Huai River
Huái Hé 淮河

The Huai River is one of China’s largest rivers. It has served as a vital source of irrigation, an important route for river transportation, and at times a political boundary between northern and southern regimes. Prone to flooding, it has posed perennial problems for river management, including major drainage projects in the twentieth century.

The Huai is a river in central China, 1,100 kilometers in length and draining a basin of 190,000 square kilometers. It originates at Mount Tongbo in southern Henan Province and flows eastward through northern Anhui Province into Lake Hongze; from there it divides into two channels, one flowing directly into the Yellow Sea, and another flowing south into the Yangzi (Chang) River. The Huai, along with the Yangzi, Huang (Yellow), and Ji rivers, is one of the four principal rivers of China (si ā diú).

Historically the lower course of the Huai River has changed significantly in response to the shifting course of other rivers and drainage projects. Originally it flowed directly into the sea; in the twelfth century the Huang River shifted its course southward and entered the sea through the Huai River channel, making the Huai River its tributary. The high silt content of the Huang River raised its bed above the level of the Huai, and the resulting drainage problems led to the expansion of Lake Hongze at their confluence. From this point onward the Huai River became a constant source of floods, and its control became one of the most important and frequently discussed issues in Chinese river management. After the Huang River shifted its course northward once more in the early 1850s the lower course of the Huai was subject to almost a century of intensive engineering and flood control. Since 1950 the government of the People’s Republic of China has tried to solve the flooding problem by a complex system of reservoirs, dams, and drainage channels.

The Huai River, aside from its importance for agricultural irrigation, has always played a crucial role in Chinese history as a transportation route. Beginning with the state of Wu in 486 BCE, successive governments have used the Huai as a major artery in larger efforts to connect rivers and forge broad river transportation networks, and water from the Huai was critical for the functioning of the Grand Canal linking Beijing with Hangzhou in the Yuan (1279–1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. Together with the Qinling Range, the Huai has formed the geographic, economic, and cultural boundary between dryer, grain-growing northern China and wetter, rice-growing southern China. In periods of political disunity, such as the North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE), Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE), and the division between the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) and Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234), the Huai also formed a political boundary between the two regions. During the Yuan dynasty Han Chinese living south of the Huai and formerly subject to the Southern Song were termed Nanren and formed a class of subjects distinct from northern Chinese Hanren.

Matthew MOSCA
Huai River Management

Responsibility for the management of the Huai River has passed through many hands and organizations. In the early twentieth century the Nationalist Government attempted to reestablish control over Huai River management by forming the Huai River Conservancy Commission.

By the nineteenth century the Qing government, facing internal and external challenges, was unable to muster the resources to address deteriorating conditions in the Huai valley. In mid-century, the Qing government abruptly withdrew administrative responsibility over the Huai River management as it turned its interest to developing the littoral. The consequence was the complete collapse of Huai River control. Endemic cycles of flood and famine resulted in extreme social and economic dislocation in the Huai valley by the early twentieth century.

Following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the “warlord” period of the teens and twenties, the Nationalist Government attempted to reestablish central control over the Huai River management as part of its national reconstruction program. One of the first institutions created by the Nationalist Government was the Huai River Conservancy Commission. Faced with severe hydraulic problems, the goals of the Huai River Conservancy Commission were two-fold: to stem flooding and to advance industrial development. The first goal was largely political—to preempt potential political opposition arising from economic dislocation in the valley. The second goal was to promote modern hydraulic practices such as hydroelectric generation and modern transport to serve the industrial goal of the Nationalist Government.


Further Reading


The Huang (Yellow) River, known as “China’s sorrow” for its disastrous flooding throughout history, is China’s second longest, after the Yangzi (Chang) River. Named for the yellow silt in its waters, the lower reaches of the river are considered the cradle of Chinese civilization, with archaeological sites dating back 7,000 years. The Huang is an important source of hydroelectric power and water for irrigation.
The Huang (Yellow) River originates in the Qinling Autonomous Region (AR); then through Inner Mongolia AR before turning south, forming the border of Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces. From there, the Huang turns east through Henan and Shandong provinces before emptying into the Bohai Gulf.

The lower basin of the Huang River is considered the birthplace of Chinese civilization because archaeologists have discovered sites there dating as far back as 5000 BCE; the emergence of the Yangshao culture (5000–3000 BCE) and the Longshan culture (3000–2200 BCE) on the North China Plain along the Huang River has also been chronicled.

On numerous occasions throughout China’s long history, the Huang River has overflowed its banks, causing extensive damage to nearby farmland and surrounding communities. Dikes have been constructed to prevent the flooding but are rebuilt continually. The river has also changed course many times, causing untold destruction. Because the river runs through very flat land, the water follows the natural law of least resistance and changes course frequently. During the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), the Huang changed its course from northern to southern Shandong Province, flooding 7,769 square kilometers (3,000 square miles) of farmland. Between 1853 and 1855, the river again began flowing through northern Shandong Province, destroying large areas of farmland. And in 1938 General Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) ordered his troops to destroy the dikes along the river in Henan Province to flood a valley to stop the advance of Japanese troops. Although the advance was stopped and many of the enemy killed more than 1 million Chinese civilians drowned.

In 1955 the government began a fifty-year construction
program designed to control flooding and to harness the river for hydroelectric power and irrigation. One of the most important components of the plan is the San-Men Gorge Dam in western Henan Province. Begun in 1955 and completed in 1974, the dam helps to control flooding and to store water for a hydroelectric station. Another important dam is the Liu-Chia Gorge Dam, along the middle basin of the river. At this site the river is harnessed to produce hydroelectric power. The Liu-Chia hydroelectric power station was the largest and most productive in China until the Three Gorges Dam (on the Yangzi River) becomes operational in 2009. Although the Huang still overflows its bank almost every spring, flooding is under control and there have been no major floods on the river since the mid-1970s.

Keith A. LEITICH

Further Reading

Man struggles upwards; water flows downwards.
水往低处流，人往高处走
Shuí wǎng dìchù liú, rén wǎng gāochù zǒu
Located in southern Anhui Province, Huang Shan is one of the most spectacular mountain ranges in China. For thousands of years, Huang Shan has inspired literati, artists, pilgrims, and travelers. With seventy-seven peaks over one thousand meters, Huang Shan features qisong (“astonishing pines”), guaishi (“peculiar rocks”), yunhai (“sea of clouds”), and wenquan (“hot springs”).

Huang Shan (literally meaning “Yellow Mountain”) is one of the most spectacular mountain ranges in China, offering landscape views as stunning as those depicted in traditional Chinese paintings. Located in southern Anhui Province in east central China, Huang Shan contains seventy-seven peaks over one thousand meters, twenty-four streams, two lakes, and three waterfalls. The range covers a core area of 154 square kilometers with a buffer zone of 142 square kilometers.

Though not listed among the famous Wuyue, or “Five Great Mountains” (Mount Tai in the east of the country, Mount Heng in the north, Mount Hua in the west, Mount Song in the center, and Mount Heng in the south), the stature of Huang Shan’s beauty is not to be denied. The renowned geographer and traveler Xu Xiake (1587–1641) once praised the magnificence of Huang Shan: “Not a mountain in the world is like Huang Shan of Anhui. There would be no mountains to climb after ascending Huang Shan.”

Huang (Yellow) Shan is one of the most spectacular mountain ranges in China, offering true landscape views just as stunning as those depicted in traditional Chinese paintings. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Shan. Sightseeing stops here.” A popular saying has thus followed: Wuyue guilai bu kan shan, Huang Shan guilai bu kan yue (“Upon returning from Wuyue, one does not want to visit any mountains; upon returning from Huang Shan, one does not even wish to see Wuyue”).

Huang Shan features qisong (“astonishing pines”), guaishi (“peculiar rocks”), yunhai (“sea of clouds”), and wenquan (“hot springs”). Pine trees are scattered amid steep slopes and precipitous cliffs, many of which are millennia old. Yingkesong (“Guest-Greeting Pine”), stretching its branches predominantly on one side of its trunk, is unique of all pine trees found in Huang Shan. The tree, an 800-year-old specimen of the species Pinus Hwangahenensis growing out of granite, is China’s most famous tree. The 10-meter high tree has been guarded around the clock against manmade and natural disasters by a series of bodyguards since 1983.

The mountains are rife with peculiar granite rocks of many shapes, some named after plants or animals, some after legends. Lianhua Feng (“Lotus Flower Peak”) is the highest among the three major peaks; the others are Tiandu Feng (“Celestial Capital Peak”) and Guangming Ding (“Bright Summit Peak”). More than 1,800 meters high, these peaks are often above the clouds.

The mountains are known for their unusual natural features. The phenomenon known as “sea of clouds,” where waves of clouds and fog surge among the hills and peaks, may appear during all four seasons in Huang Shan. At sunrise or sunset the splendid sea sometimes refracts sunlight, forming a colorful aureole known as baoguang.

The western slope of Huang Shan, much steeper than the eastern side of the mountain.

PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL.
Humans have also left their mark. Over two hundred engravings have been preserved in the rock faces, together with ancient paths, bridges, and pavilions of historical cultural value. Under the administration of Huang Shan City, the villages of Xidi and Hongcun are renowned for their Anhui/Huizhou architecture dating from the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, featuring white walls, green roofs, horse-shaped gables, ornamental bricks, and both wood and stone carvings.

Due to its natural beauty, cultural heritage, and significance as a treasure house of rare and endangered species, Huang Shan was listed as a World Historical Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1990.

Yu Luo RIOUX

Further Reading


Huang Zongxi was an important philosopher and author who worked to uphold Confucian principles of government after the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644. Huang roundly criticized tyrannical monarchies in favor of democratic principles long before Rousseau and Locke in the West.

Huang Zongxi was an important Confucian philosopher, political theorist, author, and historian living between the Ming and Qing dynasties. A versatile talent, Huang is widely acclaimed not only as the first serious scholar of Chinese intellectual history, but also as the first Chinese enlightened thinker.

Like his father who, being a member of the famous Donglin Academy (Eastern Grove Academy 東林書院), closely watched and boldly criticized the Ming court politics, Huang Zongxi joined a similar association of men of letters called Fushe (The Restoration Society 復社) and developed a keen interest in politics as Ming political crises deepened. After the Ming collapsed in 1644 under a nationwide rebellion and the Manchu invasion, Huang spent the next few years participating in a military movement aimed at restoring the Ming dynasty. When such efforts proved to be futile, Huang turned away from the actual politics and devoted the rest of his life to scholarly research and writing.

Huang's writings covered many different areas from literary creation to studies of Confucian classics, history, geography, mathematics, astronomy, calendar, and music. His most influential works are Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待詰錄 (A Plan for the Prince, 1663) and Mingru xuean 明儒學案 (Records of Ming Scholars, 1676). Mingyi daifang lu comprises twenty short essays on the prince, ministership, law, eunuchs, subofficials runners, methods of selecting talents and officials, schools, the land and tax system, finance, the military, and so forth. Haunted by the Ming’s fall, like many of his Confucian intellectual contemporaries, Huang converted his energy into defending the Way of Governance (zhi 治) as an historical mission. In this effort, while drawing broad lessons from the Ming’s fall, Huang pushed the Mencian-type of criticism of tyrannical princes one step further. At a time when France was under Louis XIV and European royal absolutism was a dominant ideology and practice, Huang sharply attacked the autocratic monarch who treated the whole country (tianxia 天下) as his private property, the ministers as his private servants, and the law his as own family rules. Huang proposed, in today’s words, a “gentry democracy” guided by Confucian moral principles and a doctrine of “government for the people.” Huang’s work was completed twenty-seven years earlier than John Locke’s Two Treatises on Civil Government and a century earlier than Rousseau’s The Social Contract.

Mingru xuean is a remarkable scholarly accomplishment in which Huang systematically introduced and commented on more than two hundred individual
Ming thinkers and scholars of seventeen different groups. This work also recorded Huang’s own philosophical ideas. Huang followed the great Ming Confucianist Wang Yangming (1472–1529) and rejected the dichotomous view of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Huang argued that li (principles) is the li of qi (material force/actual beings) and xing (innate human nature) is the xing of xin (human mind), so li and xing cannot exist independently but are contained in qi and xin respectively. The significance of Huang’s argument is that there were no other places to search for the innate human goodness except in one’s own mind and heart, which should be the focus of Confucian moral cultivation. The combination of Huang’s place in time, the quality of his historical scholarship, and his sharp criticism of monarchical tyranny with the introduction of democratic conviction make him an important predecessor to Enlightenment thinking in China.

Yamin XU

Further Reading
Huangdi Neijing, one of the earliest and most important classics of Chinese medicine, consists primarily of two texts: the Suwen (Plain Questions) and Lingshu (Spiritual Pivot). These texts articulated the basic theoretical construct of Chinese medicine and laid the foundation for the primary diagnostic and therapeutic methods of the tradition.

One of the earliest and most important classical texts of Chinese medicine, *Huangdi Neijing* (Inner Canon of the Yellow Lord) has been attributed to Huangdi (Yellow Lord) and some of his ministers. Huangdi was the first of five legendary pre-dynastic Chinese rulers and cultural heroes who was believed to have ruled the North China Plain in the third millennium BCE. Since the eleventh century the majority of Chinese critical philologists (scholars of literature and of disciplines relevant to literature or to language as used in literature) have begun to treat the *Huangdi Neijing* as the work of a single author composed during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), but studies of the medical manuscripts excavated in 1973 from Mawangdui tomb No. 3, a Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) tomb situated at the northeastern part of the city of Changsha, Hunan Province, demonstrated that the *Huangdi Neijing* was a collection of interrelated short essays composed at different times from different medical lineages but were brought together sometime in the first century BCE.

*Huangdi Neijing* was listed in the bibliographical treatise *History of the Former Han Dynasty* as a single work of eighteenjuan (fascicles—the divisions of a book published in parts), but it survived in four extant partially overlapping recensions (revisions) of varying lengths: Suwen (Plain Questions), Lingshu (Spiritual Pivot), Taisu (Great Simplicity), and Mingtang (Bright Hall). Since the tenth century Suwen and Lingshu, the most complete and influential of these recensions, have been collectively known as the *Huangdi Neijing* or simply Neijing. Both texts consist of eighty-one chapters and were written in the form of dialogues between the Yellow Lord and his ministers, among whom Qi Bo appears most often. As a whole, these texts provided the basic rubric (rule) for classical Chinese medicine. Contrary to shamanistic or demonic medicine that had dominated earlier medical practices, Neijing takes a strongly naturalistic approach to diseases and healing. It regards the human body as a microcosm that functions on the same principles operating in the macrocosm: qi (Ch’i), yin, yang, and the five phases. Applying these basic cosmological concepts to understanding the human organism, it articulates the basic theoretical construct of Chinese medicine in terms of yin and yang, the zang-fu organ systems, and the circulation of qi within the meridians. Health or illness is seen as dependent on the state of balance between the individual’s yin and yang powers within and between the body and the environment without. Neijing discusses various aspects of human anatomy, physiology, and pathological processes, the effects of nutrition, living habits, emotions, and environmental factors such as winds on a person’s health, the signs and symptoms of illnesses, as well as diagnostic and therapeutic measures. Whereas Suwen treats
Humans, Sky, and Earth

In this excerpt from the Huangdi Neijing, the Yellow Emperor asks Bogao about the relationship between the human body and the earth and sky.

Bogao replied, “The sky is round, the earth rectangular; the heads of human beings are round and their feet are rectangular to correspond. In the sky there are the sun and moon; human beings have two eyes. On earth there are nine provinces; human beings have nine orifices. In the sky there are wind and rain; human beings have their joy and anger. In the sky there are thunder and lightning; human beings have their sounds and speech. In the sky there are the four seasons; human beings have their four extremities. In the sky there are the Five Sounds; human beings have their five yin visceral systems. In the sky there are Six Pitches; human beings have their six yang visceral systems. In the sky there are winter and summer; human beings have their chills and fevers. In the sky there are the ten-day ‘weeks’; human beings have ten fingers on their hands. In the sky there are twelve double-hours; human beings have ten toes on their feet, and the stalk and the hanging ones complete the correspondence. Women lack these two members, so they are able to carry the human form [of the fetus]. In the sky there are yin and yang; human beings are husband and wife.


These topics in general, Lingshu is more focused on how to apply acupuncture to the circulation tracts (meridians).

Huangdi Neijing is not only an influential text of classical Chinese medicine but also a critical source for understanding early Chinese philosophy and cosmology. Its views on the relationship between the interior and exterior of the body—and between the human organism on the one hand and the environment and the cosmos at large on the other both—drew upon and provided the ultimate expression for the correlative thinking that underlay the mainstream of the broader Chinese philosophical discourse during the last three centuries before the common era.

Qiong Zhang

Further Reading


Huanglongsi is a nature reserve on the edge of the Tibetan plateau in northwestern Sichuan Province. It is the home of Yellow Dragon Temple, a Daoist monastery, as well as numerous hot springs and dramatic glaciated peaks. It is also one of the last holdouts of the critically endangered giant panda.

Huanglongsi (Yellow Dragon Temple) is a nature reserve area in northwestern Sichuan Province on the edge of the Tibetan Plateau, 150 kilometers from the bustling provincial capital of Chengdu (estimated 2007 population 11.2 million). Huanglongsi, along with the adjacent ravine to the north, Jiuzhaigou, was recently designated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site for its natural scenery and endangered wildlife (Huanglongsi in 2000, Jiuzhaigou in 1997). The limestone geology of the area, combined with hot spring algae growth, has produced a great range of colored waters in both areas: turquoise, green, yellow, and milky white.

Much of the area was heavily logged in the 1980s; today the area, which has been banned to logging since 1998, is one of the last holdouts of the giant panda (Ailuropoda melanoleuca). The reserve also features the smaller (and also endangered) red panda (Ailurus fulgens, also called the lesser panda), golden snub-nosed monkeys (Pygathrix roxellanae roxellanae), water deer (Hydropotes inermis), and 55 other species of mammals, as well as 155 species of birds and five species each of reptiles and amphibians. There are also vast areas of rhododendron, wild roses, clematis, and wild ginger.

The Yellow Dragon Temple, for which the reserve is named, is a Daoist monastery. Because it is located so high (3,430 meters) in the Minshan range, the temple was previously known as the “Snow Mountain Temple” (Yueshansi). (Yueshan, the “Snow Mountain” itself, features China’s easternmost glacier.) The temple is situated at a pass into a forested valley surrounded by glaciated peaks (up to 5,000 meters) and dotted with more than three thousand natural hot pools of various-colored water, from which the Tibetan name of the temple, Gser mthso lha khang (Yellow Pool Temple), is derived. The existing structure, dating from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), originally was the rear of a complex of three halls.

Further Reading


Huanglongsi, a nature preserve, is the home of the giant panda and the site of Yellow Dragon Temple, a Daoist Monastery. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.


As a leading telecommunication company in China, Huawei has been growing step by step and maintains its stable position in a globally competitive field and environment. The company credits its ability to thrive and compete to a corporate culture that coincides with the nation’s, which includes many traditional Chinese values, such as helpfulness, diligence, and pragmatism.

Huawei Technology Co., Ltd., (Huawei) was founded in 1988 by Ren Zhengfei in Guangdong Province in the south of China. The company is a supplier for telecommunication network solutions and products, which covers mobile networks (such as GPRS/GSM and CDMA2000), core networks (such as Mobile Softswitch), alternate networks (such as LAN Switch), and other telecommunication business. At the beginning of 2007, Huawei was a business partner of more than thirty-one of the global top 50 international telecommunication companies, including Telefonica, FT/Orange France, China Mobile, British Telecom, China Telecom, and China Unicom. In addition, Huawei’s products and solutions are widely used in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Holland, Japan, and the United States.

Departing from the business plan of some other Chinese enterprises, Huawei emphasizes Research and Development (R&D). Every year no less than 10 percent of Huawei’s annual sales income is put back into R&D, with a team of two thousand people (48 percent of Huawei’s total staff) charged with maintaining its cutting-edge technology. Huawei operates R&D centers in Stockholm, the Silicon Valley, Dallas, Moscow, and sites in China, such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing. Through this focus Huawei has succeeded in applying for more than 12,500 patents, as of the beginning of 2006. It is considered one of the most intellectually active companies in China.

In telecommunications, standardization means competitiveness to some extent. Huawei sensed and acted on this point long ago. Huawei joined some seventy international standardization organizations and became a leader in some, including the International Telecommunication Union, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and the Object Management Architecture. Huawei’s input and effort in positively following industry standardization have helped make the company one of the world leaders in the area of telecommunication (Huawei takes 7 percent of 3GPP basic patents, ranking No. 5 in the world).

Huawei is truly a global player. The international market is the main source for Huawei’s sales. About 70 percent of Huawei’s sales volume came from foreign markets in 2007. The company’s solutions and products have been applied in more than a hundred countries, serving more than 1 billion users. Huawei has eight regional headquarters, more than a hundred branches,
and twenty-eight local training centers around the world.

Huawei’s corporate culture is considered a good model among Chinese companies. As part of its business strategy, the company applies the Huawei Basic Law, which specifies nearly every possible aspect of the company, including corporate values, goals, and social obligations. In the opinion of Huawei’s management and employees, the company’s culture coincides with the national culture, which includes many traditional Chinese values, such as helpfulness, diligence, and pragmatism. Teamwork, which is regarded as the soul of the company, is also heavily emphasized at Huawei. At Huawei success is the team’s success; failure is the team’s failure.

The private sector is growing steadily in China, and large enterprises play an important role. The top corporations not only contribute to the national economy but also serve as examples and leaders in many areas, such as social behavior and responsibility. Huawei is considered one of these top corporations. As an international brand, Huawei continues to grow, which not only benefits Huawei itself but also China in general and, increasingly, the global economy.

ZHOU Guanqi

Further Reading
Huayan Buddhism

The Huayan school of Chinese Buddhism is part of the Mahayana tradition that examines the metaphysical condition of things. As such, it seeks to explain phenomena as an interpenetration of the universal with the particular, wherein the macrocosm is found contained within the microcosm.

The larger purpose of Fazang’s treatise is to systematize the diverse range of Buddhist teachings and doctrines that existed in China at the beginning of the Tang period (618–907). This act of classification and standardization was far more complete than the one presented by the Tiantai school in that Fazang addressed the various modes of Buddhist thought that had come into China after the death of Zhiyi. Tiantai is the first true Chinese school of Buddhism, which developed with little influence from India, and which emphasized both meditation and engagement with the world. Zhiyi (538–597) is considered to be the founder of the Tiantai school. These various modes Fazang arranged into five classifications, or the Five Teachings: the Hinayana, which sought to explain phenomenal reality; the Mahayana, which examined the nature of phenomena as well as the Middle Way (which, in turn, describes the universal principle that all reality shares—namely, emptiness); late Mahayana, which elucidated the relationship of the particular to the universal; the Abrupt Teaching with its explication of silence; and lastly the Huayan, or what Fazang called the “Perfect Teaching,” which defined emptiness as the interpenetration of all existence.

Interpenetration

The primary teaching of Huayan is its paradigm of interpenetration; that is, the absolute (or the principle) and the thing (or being) are completely united, so things cannot exist apart from the absolute. The absolute and the particular inform one another, in that each is contained within the other. This means that when a thing is placed within its context and associates with other things, it and they have similarities as well as differences. As a result, each thing perpetually interacts with all other things in a contradictory and harmonious relationship so that when the thing is affirmed, that which is not the thing is negated, and if the thing is negated, that which is not the thing is affirmed. The relationship is an eternal giving and taking;
the filling of a gap, which at the same time creates a gap; the principle and being forever filling each other and emptying into each other. In this way Fazang defines form and emptiness: form is emptiness and emptiness form; the interrelationship of the two is an opposition and at the same time a cooperation, a fulfillment, which leads to endless variations that may be called creation.

Reality, then, is a unity, but also a multiplicity of interacting unities. And reality is complete but also lacking; it needs nothing but also needs everything. Such contradictory reasoning explains the cycle of formulation and dissolution of things: form and content are always unstable and shifting. Such negative assertions, or paradoxical language, calls into question the being of phenomena so that the truth of a thing is recognized—that it may take on a form, yet it is empty of a self; and if there is no self, then there cannot be an origination or an existence. The idea of permanence, therefore, is false, since permanence demands that one thing be static and another fluid. For Fazang, stasis is illusion, since there is only perpetual flux; and this acknowledgement means that truth is both ad hoc and ultimate. Such simultaneous harmony and contradiction is the state of all phenomena. Only the enlightened mind can discern this interrelationship of things.

Reasons for Paradoxical Language

The purpose of such paradoxical language is to demonstrate the disparity between the unenlightened mind and the enlightened one. In other words, conventional truth (based as it is in discerning the difference between subject and object) cannot reach ultimate truth, which exists outside this paradigm, since this difference is housed entirely in the interaction of the self with language. Ultimate truth, which Fazang calls “true emptiness,” or “suchness,” may be revealed only to the enlightened mind in sudden bursts of realization; it cannot be known by any conventional, systematic means. The self is entirely bereft of all referents that provide it with sense and meaning; it has become empty. When this state of being, devoid of meaning, comes about (enlightenment), only then is there the possibility that ultimate truth may be known. And Fazang describes ultimate truth as that realization that is empty of all tangible form and is unconditioned in that it is neither subjective nor objective. Ultimate truth is nothing (or emptiness).

Another reason for such paradoxical language is that it seeks to mirror the experience of the self that seeks to
grasp ultimate truth. The self can only know tangible, conditioned forms while ultimate truth is intangible and unconditioned. The self can only know tangible, conditioned forms while ultimate truth is intangible and unconditioned, which brings about a fall into paradox each time the self seeks to comprehend that which it cannot comprehend; for the self to know that which lies outside it, it must rely on objectification—through language, for example. But ultimate truth does not obey the division between the subject and the object, between the inner and the outer. Ultimate truth is both subject and object at once; it is both inner and outer at once. And language cannot express this relationship properly or truthfully.

The only way possible, therefore, is to assert a statement and its immediate denial simultaneously. Ultimate truth is a dilemma that cannot be resolved because even when it becomes revealed to the enlightened mind, the expression of that revelation must be reduced to examples—that is, to objectification or to conceptualization that render the revelation far less than the truth, for they are nothing more than descriptions of the steps toward enlightenment rather than an accurate record of enlightenment. The bond between the thing and the idea is false.

Since ultimate truth is the perpetual interaction of the principle and the phenomena, a relationship in which neither one is lessened nor destroyed, the paradox of the one and the not-one can never be resolved, for reality is always empty. If it were resolvable, then the opportunity for ultimate truth to reveal itself in sudden intuitive bursts would not exist.

The Huayan school was the last flowering of Buddhist thought in China. In the years 841 to 845, there was a massive suppression of the new faith. However, the influence of the Huayan school was far ranging, for it became the founding doctrine of all the subsequent East Asian Buddhist schools, such as Zen Buddhism.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading
Hubei Province is located in central China; it is approximately the size of Syria. It was the center of the Chu kingdom during the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE); today the steel yards and iron works of the capital, Wuhan, are among the largest in China. The huge Three Gorges Dam (the world’s largest engineering project) is being built in Hubei and is scheduled for completion in 2009.

Hubei (Hu-pei, Hupeh), a central province that covers 187,400 square kilometers (about the size of Syria), borders on Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces in the west, on Henan Province in the north, on Anhui Province in the east, and on Hunan and Jiangxi provinces in the south. Hubei is traversed by the Yangzi (Chang) River from west to east, with the greater area of the province located north of the river. More than three-fourths of the province is hilly and mountainous, with peaks in the west rising more than 3,000 meters above sea level, whereas the east consists mainly of low-lying plains.

The climate is subtropical, with monsoon rain during spring and summer. Summers are hot and humid; winters generally are mild. The annual average precipitation varies between 700 and 1,700 millimeters, which is the highest average in the southeast. Most of Hubei’s population lives in rural areas along the rivers and in the lake district in the east, where the capital, Wuhan (estimated 2007 population 8.29 million), also is located.

The city of Wuhan originally was three cities separated by the Han and Yangzi rivers, but these cities were joined by bridges in the 1950s. During the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE) the Hubei area was the center of the Chu kingdom, and copper mines were operating near present Daye County, not far from Wuhan. With the unification of China in 221 BCE by the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), Hubei became part of the Chinese empire, but not until the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) did emigration from the north accelerate, and the province became a wealthy rice-producing area. During the nineteenth century the province suffered greatly under the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the largest rebellion in China’s history, during which an estimated 20 million people lost their lives. Cities along the Yangzi River were opened for trade with the Europeans, and tea became a major commodity. In the next century, the rebellion that ended the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) originated in Hubei. During the Japanese occupation of eastern China (1937–1945), parts of Hubei were controlled by Japanese troops, and industrial works were bombed.

Large areas of the province are well suited for agriculture; the major crops are rice, wheat, corn, sweet potatoes, cotton, and rapeseed. Products indigenous to Hubei include tangerines, tremella, lacquer, camphor trees, and medical herbs and tea. The iron works and steel yards of Wuhan are among the largest in China, and its industry
manufactures engines, farm machines, railroad cars, and transport machinery.

In 1994 the Chinese government began work on the Three Gorges Dam, a gigantic dam on the Yangzi just west of Sandouping, located about 35 kilometers west of the river port of Yichang. It is the world’s largest engineering project, and China’s largest since the building of the Great Wall. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2009 and is expected to meet nearly 10 percent of China’s energy needs. An estimated 1.3 million people in western Hubei and the neighboring province of Sichuan, however, have been displaced by the dam, which has inundated 17 cities, 109 towns, and more than 1,500 villages.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading


The Hui are among the most populous, as well as the most widely distributed, of China’s fifty-five minority groups. Mostly concentrated in the northwest Chinese autonomous regions of Ningxia Hui (which is named for them) and Xinjiang Uygur, and the provinces of Gansu and Shaanxi, the Hui are mainly Sunni Muslims. Often persecuted during China’s Cultural Revolution, there has been a revival of Hui ethnic consciousness since the 1980s.

Hui is a state-recognized nationality of China characterized by its combination of Muslim religion and Chinese culture. Alternative names include Huihui and Dongan. The Hui are among the most populous of China’s minorities. With 9,816,805 people (2000 census), the Hui are the fourth most populous of China’s fifty-six ethnic groups after the Han majority and the Zhuang and Manchu minorities, and the most populous among those ten ethnic groups classified as Muslim. The Hui are also the most widely distributed of China’s minorities. Although the main concentrations are in

An imam walks inside the main Hui mosque in the Xinjiang capital Ürümqi. PHOTO BY COLIN MACKERRAS.
the northwest, such as in the Ningxia Hui and Xinjiang Uygur autonomous regions, and in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces, communities also exist in Yunnan and elsewhere, and even in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese communities. Most are Chinese-speaking, retaining Arabic only to read the Quran.

Islam and Society

Muslims have lived in China since the seventh century, notably in the southeast. But it was not until the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century that many came, gradually settling and adopting Chinese culture, speaking Chinese, and marrying Chinese women. To this day most Hui maintain a belief in a single god, abstain from pork, practice circumcision, and attend mosques in Hui communities. Intermarriage is becoming more common but remains infrequent. Hui dedication to Islam is much stronger in the northwest than it is elsewhere. In the southeast some people of Muslim descent regard themselves as Hui while following customs and beliefs hardly different from their Han neighbors.

The Hui Muslim tradition is Sunni, but sectarian divisions have been common historically. Relations with the Han Chinese have often been contentious. There has long been a portion of the Hui community that has valued its links with the Islamic peoples west of China more than it has those with their Chinese neighbors. Links with world Islam are still significant, with such Islamic countries as Saudi Arabia funding Islam in China. Although disputes occasionally arise over matters like Hui disgust for pork as opposed to their Han neighbors’ favoring it, these only rarely develop to the point of disrupting society.

Historical Reaction to the Chinese State

The Hui have shown much opposition to the Chinese state for various reasons, including that it is infidel. Despite much violence, there is doubt over whether Hui history is any more conflict ridden than Chinese history as a whole.

The nineteenth century saw a high point in Hui rebellions against Chinese regimes, all fiercely suppressed. Two were particularly devastating. One broke out in western Yunnan in 1855. Its leader, Du Wenxiu, later set up a sultanate based in Dali. Government troops retook Dali at the end of 1872 and executed Du. The other rebellion engulfed Shaanxi and Gansu provinces from 1862 to 1873, with Ma Hualong (executed 1871) among its main leaders. Government accounts depict these Muslim rebels as militant bandits who preached the apocalypse.

Since China became a republic in 1912, the Hui have generally been loyal to the Chinese state and fought for it against foreign enemies and even against non-Hui Muslim rebels. The Hui warlords from the Ma family, notably the brothers Ma Hongbin (1884–1960) and Ma Hongkui (1892–1970), ruled the northwestern provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia from the 1910s to 1949, mostly supporting Chiang Kai-shek and helping in the war against the Japanese.

Hui in the People’s Republic of China

The government of the People’s Republic of China formally established the Chinese Islamic Association in 1953. The government tolerates and patronizes Islam as long as it does not threaten the state. In October 1958 it set up the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region as a province-level administrative unit with unusually great concentrations of Hui people. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Muslims were persecuted and mosques were desecrated. The Hui suffered serious religious and ethnic persecution and many hid their identity. Repression resulted in the most serious incident in the ethnic areas during the Cultural Revolution: the Shadian Incident of 1975. After local Hui in the Yunnan village Shadian were refused permission to reopen a mosque, they formed a militia group. Government troops moved in and razed the village. A week’s fierce fighting left more than 1,600 Hui dead. In 1979 the government apologized and had seven new mosques built in Shadian and surrounding areas.

Since the early 1980s, Hui ethnic consciousness has revived strongly. The Hui have remained loyal to China, showing little support for and much opposition to Muslim secession from China.
The Hui are traditionally noted for their commercial skills. The Asian studies scholar Dru C. Gladney (1998, 116) wrote: “Hui are known in every small town in China for certain ethnic specializations: butchering beef and lamb, tanning leather, cobbling shoes, running small restaurants, processing wool, and carving stones and jewelry.” An interesting recent change is the rise of consumerism among urban Hui. This has come along with modernization, which urban Hui greatly favor, believing it in line with the Quran.

Culture

A tradition of Hui Chinese-language Islamic scholarship developed in China, including in mysticism (Sufism). In addition, the Hui have contributed to such Chinese arts such as the Beijing Opera. The Hui do well socially and educationally, with literacy rates among the highest of the minorities. Many urban Hui, including women, enter the professions. As the scholar Brent Haas wrote when discussing Jonathan Lipman’s 1997 study of Muslims in China, Hui history is one “of becoming and then being Chinese while remaining Muslim” (Haas 2006). Currently few physical or nonreligious cultural characteristics distinguish the Hui from the Han.

Colin MACKERRAS

Further Reading


Huineng

Huinéng 慧能

638–713 CE  Chan Buddhist patriarch

Huineng was the Sixth Patriarch of the Chinese Chan Buddhist school. His teaching of “sudden enlightenment” (duňwu 頓悟) became the essential aspect of the Southern Chan (nan-čan 南禪) tradition. Subsequent Chan sects all traced their lineage back to Huineng, and they came to be known as the “Five Houses and Seven Schools” (wújia qízōng 五家七宗).

Huineng (638–713 CE) was the sixth patriarch of Chan Buddhism. The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (Liuzu tanjing), an important Chan text written between the eighth and ninth centuries, is said to have contained the patriarch’s autobiographical account and sermons he preached at Dafan Temple in Shaozhou, Guangdong Province, shortly before his death. Huineng’s emphasis on “sudden enlightenment” (duňwu) and advocacy of the “no-thought” (wúnian) practice became the hallmark of the Southern School (nan-zong) of Chan Buddhism, as opposed to the Northern School (beizong) led by Shenxiu (606–706), who allegedly taught “gradual enlightenment” (jiănwu).

According to the Platform Sutra discovered at Dunhuang in Gansu Province, Huineng was born into the Lu family in south China. His father died when Huineng was still a child. Poor and illiterate, Huineng sold firewood to support his mother and himself. One day he happened to hear someone reciting the Diamond Sutra (one of the discourses of the Buddha that constitutes the basic text of Buddhist scripture), and he was awakened. Huineng then decided to seek further instruction of Buddhism; he traveled all the way to the East Mountain in Hubei and became a disciple of the fifth Chan patriarch, Hongren (601–674).

Huineng trenched the pestle in the monastery’s threshing room for eight months. One day Hongren announced that anyone who could write a verse to demonstrate his superior understanding of Chan would be given the patriarch robe and the dharma (the basic principles of cosmic or individual existence). Shenxiu, Hongren’s most learned disciple, wrote the following verse as a demonstration of his qualification:

The body is the Bodhi tree,
The mind is like a clear mirror.
At all times we must strive to polish it,
And must not let the dust collect. (Platform Sutra, sec. 6; Yampolsky, 1967, 130)

In response, Huineng wrote the following verse on the wall:

Bodhi originally has no tree,
The clear mirror also has no stand.
Buddha nature is always clear and pure;
Where is there room for dust? (Platform Sutra, sec. 8; Yampolsky, 1967, 132)

It is said that upon reading the preceding verse, Hongren immediately made Huineng his legitimate successor.

In his sermons recorded in the Platform Sutra, Huineng reiterated the essential teachings of Chan: the doctrine of inherent Buddha nature, the ineffable experience of self-
realization, and the nonconceptual state of enlightenment. However, he placed an unprecedented emphasis on the nonduality of meditation (Sanskrit: samâdhi; Chinese: ding) and wisdom (Sanskrit: prajñâ; Chinese: hui):

Never should one say that meditation and wisdom are different; they are essentially a unity not two. Meditation is the “essence” (ti) of wisdom, and wisdom is the “function” (yong) of meditation. (Platform Sutra, sec. 13; Yampolsky, 1967, 135)

In short, meditation should be considered a simultaneous expression of enlightenment, not a preliminary to enlightenment. From his assertion of the nonduality of meditation and wisdom, Huineng went on to propose a new concept of meditation: the doctrine of no-thought. “No-thought is not to think even when involved in thought … If in all things successive thoughts do not cling, then you are unbound” (Platform Sutra, sec. 17; Yampolsky, 1967, 138). Through the Platform Sutra enlightenment in Chan thus came to mean a direct insight into one’s self-nature, a sudden realization of one’s inherent Buddha-hood, and a spontaneous manifestation of one’s unbiased and detached mind in everyday life.

According to Chan history, Shenxiu’s Northern School declined after the eighth century, whereas Huineng’s Southern School continued to expand. Subsequent Chan sects all traced their lineage of “mind-to-mind transmission” (yixin chuanxin) back to Huineng, and they came to be known as the “Five Houses and Seven Schools” (wujia qizong). Among them Linji and Caodong were the most prominent ones, and both continue to flourish in Japan and Korea today.

Ding-hwa HSIEH

Further Reading


Scholars, politicians, and activists—inside and outside of China—have long debated the theories behind and the application of human rights in the world’s most populous country, and Western media thrives on stories denouncing China’s human rights record. This debate probably causes more misunderstanding between China and the West than any other. The history of human rights in China divides into three parts: the rallying cries of human rights activists, the political and academic arguments of the government and foreign scholars, and Beijing’s suppression of human rights. The activists do not concern themselves with the intellectual or historical origins of human rights or with their Western relationship to China. They are engaged in the application, not in the historical legitimacy of the rights. The cultural theorists argue whether China is exceptional and thus not part of the universal code of human rights, or whether China has a historical background that fostered human rights ideas. Beijing’s actions have created a vast response of critics both inside and outside China.

The acceptance of human rights for China was not universal. Radicals and reformers like Liang Qichao (1873–1927) adopted a Darwinian and Spenserian view that denied the existence of human rights because all rights were considered to be created by the powerful. From this point of view, only the strongest survived. It was necessary for the state to become strong in order to protect the people, even if the people’s rights were denied. What is significant in the criticism of human rights doctrine is that the argument is not based on Chinese values but on Western criticism of human rights theory. The debate within China about human rights was a pragmatic one: would they strengthen or weaken China, not whether they were foreign or domestic.

The founding of the Republic of China in 1911, the collapse of the Qing dynasty, and the subsequent abdication of its emperor in 1912 ushered in a period of domestic and international chaos: warlords, Japanese intervention, the rise of nationalist reformers, and Communist revolutionaries. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Nationalist Party...
(Guomindang), disparaged the concept of human rights. All rights and power came from the political party or the state. People’s rights were valid as long as they supported the state. Citizens who opposed the state lost their rights. These ideas were shared by the leaders of both the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, and the current Communist leadership.

Conversely, many early Nationalists and Communists supported the rights of the individual. Gao Yihan (1885–1968), a Guomindang leader, advocated for political and civil rights: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly, and rule by law. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), initially argued for civil and political rights in the tradition of the American and French revolutions. Li Dazhao (1888–1927), another founder of the CCP, stressed the socialist rights of economic and labor rights over the civil and political rights of the individual. But he did not renounce the traditional nineteenth-century definition of individual rights. His stress on people’s rights (min ben) was related more to the ideas of socialism than to the Confucian stress on the people’s livelihood.

From 1915 to 1923 (a period generally named the May Fourth Movement for demonstrations in Tiananmen Square held on 4 May 1919), many journals debated the nature and the pros and cons of human rights. The most vigorous debates were published in New Youth, New Tide, and Human Rights. Freedom of thought and of publication dominated the concerns of these editors. Human rights were necessary not only to protect the individual from the state but, even more important, also to provide for the dignity of the individual. Without rights people would lose their human dignity and collapse into a state of slavery. It was the duty of both the citizen and the state to provide for the common good of all people.

The trend toward social utility was reinforced by the visits of John Dewey (1859–1952) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) to China and the writings of English idealists such as T. H. Green (1836–1882) and David George Ritchie (1853–1903), social liberals such as L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929), and socialists such as Harold Laski (1893–1970). The popularization of terms such as freedom, democracy, and human rights made them part of the rhetorical framework of the 1920s. They were not always defined in academic terms because they were familiar and considered norms that were applicable to China’s crisis.

The May Fourth Movement was not monolithic in its analysis of why human rights did not exist in China. The New Tide group felt that the tradition of Confucianism had caused the Chinese to repress their feelings and their sense of dignity. The New Youth writers Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Gao Yihan blamed the government and the warlords for violating what they claimed were their rights of freedom of thought, assembly, and representation in government.

During the Nanjing Decade (1927–1937) and the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War) many of these debates became moot. The commitment to national salvation against the Japanese and the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists created a military campaign mentality. The debate transformed to questions of dictatorship versus democracy. Nonetheless, liberals and scholars such as Hu Shi (1891–1962), Luo Longji (d. 1965), Zhang Junmai (1886–1969), and Zhang Pengqun (1892–1957), also known as P. C. Chang, and organizations such as the Xinyue Group, the China League for Civil Rights, and the China Democratic League vigorously argued for the adoption of human rights, though from very different, and often contradictory, perspectives. Hu Shi argued for both civil and economic rights. For him human rights were universal and were to be established in the legal and constitutional system of the Republic of China, a stance that caused a backlash in the Guomindang, which attacked him for his views and passed laws that were even more authoritarian.

Luo’s views were directly related to Harold Laski’s argument that human rights were historical and contextual. Rights and laws reflected the needs of the social and economic system. They should be used functionally to create a safer and more wholesome society. At times the individual’s freedom may need to be curtailed. Zhang Junmai attempted to synthesize the humanism of neo-Confucianism with the philosophical perspective of human rights. He believed that China’s traditional ethics, which were based on conscious and promoted human dignity, were not only the best approach to legitimizing human rights and democracy but also, in fact, China may have been the real source for the West’s views of human rights.

P. C. Chang was China’s chief representative to the Commission on Human Rights, which created the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He is given credit for
Article 1, which refused to claim that rights were based on natural law or divine inspiration. Faintly echoing Zhang Zhunmai, Chang stressed the innateness of dignity and conscience.

**Human Rights with Chinese Characteristics**

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 resulted in a total rejection of the legitimacy of human rights arguments. Human rights were a product of the bourgeoisie and were thus used to maintain the rule of the capitalist and imperialist class. With a few, but startling, exceptions in 1957 and 1978, any mention of human rights was taboo and resulted in imprisonment.

But just before and after the suppression of pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square (4 June 1989), the Communist authorities began to engage in the human rights debate to justify their authority and their rule. In 1991 a government “white paper” on human rights declared: “Since the very day of its founding, the Communist Party of China has been holding high the banner of democracy and human rights.” This stunning declaration was followed up with academic conferences on human rights and the creation of several institutes especially devoted to human rights, such as the China Society for Study on Human Rights. From 1995 to 1998, the Confucius Foundation in Beijing sponsored a series of international forums with the purpose of discussing Confucius and human rights. In the late 1990s, Beijing signed the two covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights.

The study of human rights in China is initiated and managed by the CCP and the government. It has not included meetings with Chinese citizens or with local non-governmental organizations active in human rights. The official position is that China has developed a socialist system of human rights with Chinese characteristics. Stages of economic and industrial development determine the scope and quality of human rights. Liu Huaqiu, head of the Chinese delegation at the Vienna World Conference on Human rights in 1993, defined the Chinese view succinctly:

> The concept of human rights is a product of historical development. It is closely associated with specific social, political, and economic conditions and the specific history, culture and values of a particular country. Different historical development stages have different human rights requirements. Countries at different development stages or with different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also have different understanding and practice of human rights. (cited in Svensson 2002)

From this point of view, the most basic rights are those of subsistence and shelter. These economic rights are considered superior to, and of greater priority than, political and civil rights.

There is more to the definition than a mere enunciation of domestic policy. China argues that America and the West use the invasive argument that human rights are universal to force China to peacefully evolve into a colony of Western economic and political control. Beijing does not argue that Chinese cultural (e.g., Confucianism) values prevent it from accepting Westernization. Rather, it is China’s anti-imperialist stand and its desire to create its own national identity in the twenty-first century that makes it refuse to accept standards that serve the interests of Washington, D.C.

**Beijing’s Repression of Human Rights**

The Chinese government has maintained that its sovereignty excludes foreign powers from interfering in its affairs. It has adamantly refused to allow independent agencies to investigate openly and report on its alleged human rights abuses. According to its critics, China has engaged in massive abuse of human rights. With regard to political and civil rights, it has tortured and executed prisoners of conscience, repressed religious organizations, prohibited democratic organizations and meetings, arrested and detained people without trial, and engaged in widespread abuse and repression of women, the unemployed, minorities, and the poor. The Chinese leadership has been accused of long-term genocidal practices against the Tibetan people. Contrary to the Beijing’s claim that it
favors economic and social rights, it has been accused of destroying the environment, censoring the educational system, exploiting workers, and engaging in organized official corruption.

The Tiananmen Square riots resulted in a massive amount of attention to human rights conditions in China. The call for human rights became widespread, though underground, in China, and was openly publicized by Chinese groups abroad. Wang Dan, Wuer Kaixi, and other leaders of the student movement found exile in America and Europe, where they organized resistance groups and published journals such as *China Spring*. American human rights organizations joined forces: Amnesty International and Asia Watch were joined by the online sources Tibet On Line Resource Gathering and Asia Observer. The U.S. government’s pressure on China to adhere to human rights standards was most visible in the arguments surrounding the congressional review of China’s most-favored-nation status and the arguments over entry to the World Trade Organization. The most sensational and informative moment for the Chinese citizenry came on 30 June 1998 when President Bill Clinton spoke on the “Shanghai Radio 990” call-in show. Broadcasting to China’s largest city, the president declared, “whatever differences of opinion we have about what human rights policy ought to be . . . we still have a lot in common. . . . I believe that the forces of history will bring about more convergence in our societies going forward.”

Beijing’s response to these overtures was generally negative. A diatribe entitled *The China That Can Say No* best expressed the voluminous official reactions to the human rights movement. It countered the arguments by exposing America’s human rights abuses and the hypocrisy of the leadership. In the United Nations Commission Xi’an students protesting. The rallying cries of activists echoed throughout China’s turbulent twentieth century.
What are Asian Values?

In the early 1990s, “Asian values” became a hot topic in the international human rights debate. Several countries, with Singapore among the most prominent, accused the West of imposing its human rights standards on Asia without regard for Asia’s specific culture and history. The proponents of Asian values argued that their countries had a different understanding of human rights due to their specific culture and history. While they did not completely reject universal human rights, their cultural relativism nevertheless represented a major challenge to an international consensus on human rights. References to culture and to national conditions (guoqing) have become more prominent in Chinese human rights discourse since the 1990s, but the Chinese government itself has placed much less emphasis on cultural arguments than have nations like Singapore. As a socialist country, China is more wont to argue that different economic systems and levels of economic development influence the understanding and realization of human rights. China’s official position is to identify itself with the Third World as a whole, rather than with Asia alone. Despite the relatively small importance of cultural arguments in official discourse, several Chinese intellectuals and dissidents have written explicit critiques of Asian values. Liu Junning (b. 1961) is one of those who strongly refutes the view that Asian people would have different views from Westerners on human rights and democracy. He believes that the Asian values advocated by Asian political leaders only serve to defend their hold on power and suppress people’s genuine demands for human rights and democracy. Writing in 1998, Liu blamed the leaders particular concept of Asian values for both the recent Asian economic crisis and the attacks on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in May of that year.


on Human Rights, Beijing’s diplomats claimed their right of sovereignty and denounced what they depicted as fallaciousness of the attacks on their integrity. Human rights activities in China were considered to be antigovernment in nature and result in harsh punishment. China also considered the United States’s campaigns and support of human rights to be an extension of America’s imperialistic attitudes.

Twenty-First-Century Developments

Individual rights, judicial reform, and environmental justice continue to be subjects for academic discourse and also popular journalism in China. There are Chinese as well as Westerners blogging and discussing human rights online. Chinese people remain sensitive to unfair criticism by Western powers whose own record is not pristine.

This sensitivity was marked during the Tibetan riots and the Olympic torch relay controversy in spring 2008. Instead of being swayed by Western protesters, many Chinese argued that Westerners were hypocritical, ignorant of history, and culturally chauvinistic in their readiness to impose their values and perspectives. This situation typifies much of the human rights debate, as neither side seemed able to understand and acknowledge the underlying convictions of the other.

Western clumsiness often reminds the Chinese of past intrusions and the long imposition of Western controls on Chinese society and economy, and suggests to many Chinese that Western nations simply want an excuse to keep China from taking its rightful place in the world. Discussion of relations with China changed in tone, however, after the global economic crisis began in late 2008. Both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UK foreign secretary David Miliband have expressed a desire to develop a new spirit of cooperation with China, with a focus on the
global economy and but also mentioning climate change cooperation and human rights as priorities.

A human rights manifesto Lingba Xian-zhang, known as Charter 08, was published on 10 December 2008, the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and signed by some three hundred Chinese intellectuals, scholars, and activists. Its call for free speech and free elections has support inside and outside China, but whether such an approach will lead to substantial change is uncertain. Awareness of individual and human rights issues is growing, in any case. While U.S. and international organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Human Rights in China continue to monitor activities in China, the Chinese government has established its own NGOs, the China Foundation for Human Rights Development and the China Society for Human Rights Studies. It has begun a new dialogue with the Dalai Lama, and showed more openness in the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. There are also independent civil society organizations involved in this area, and the Internet creates new opportunities for individuals to express their views and to communicate directly with one another about human rights. The resurgent interest in Confucian values is also providing a way for China to define human rights on its own terms, but considerable challenges remain in bridging the real and perceived differences about what human rights are and should be in the twenty-first century.

Richard C. KAGAN

Further Reading


Humor

The use of humor is as common in China as it is elsewhere in the world. From the ancient philosophers to contemporary television, from political satire to regional insults, humor has always been a part of Chinese culture.

Playful writing and amusing anecdotes survive from China’s earliest times, and they continued to be produced throughout the imperial era (221 BCE–1912 CE). As in other cultures, humor has served a variety of purposes in Chinese history, including entertainment, cultural criticism, personal denigration, and bolstering group solidarity against outsiders. It is important to study humor, therefore, for a fuller appreciation of the complexity, tensions, and joys of Chinese life over the ages.

Zhuangzi on Confucius

The most famous and influential humorist of ancient China was the philosopher Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu, 369–286 BCE), whose eponymous writings are considered one of the two primary texts of Daoism (the other being the mystical Daodejing). Zhuangzi used playful parables, parody, and clever wordplay to mock other philosophers’ beliefs in the power of human reason. According to Zhuangzi, people’s understanding of the world is always restricted by their own limited perspective, just as a frog in a well cannot see more than a small patch of the sky or a sleeping man has no way of knowing that he is not the butterfly he dreams himself to be. Zhuangzi’s stories have delighted Chinese readers for generations and served as models of humorous writing.

A chief target of Zhuangzi’s wit was an earlier prominent philosopher, Confucius (551–479 BCE). In contrast to Daoists like Zhuangzi, who believed in living in intuitive harmony with the natural order, Confucius promoted a strict code of ethics and social hierarchy. Confucius is often depicted as a rather stern teacher, but there is evidence in the conversations with his disciples recorded in the Analects that he, too, had a sense of humor. One of the most amusing images from ancient China was actually produced to illustrate the Confucian ethical principle that one should be respectful to one’s parents: A stone carving in the funeral shrine of the Confucian scholar Wu Liang, constructed during the second century CE, relates the well-known story of a seventy-year-old filial son persuading his even more elderly parents that they are still young by acting like an infant.

Confucianism and Humor

Since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Confucianism has tended to dismiss humor, seeing it as incompatible with sincere devotion to ethical principles. The female historian and writer Ban Zhao (c. 45–116 CE) stated that a good woman should shun jokes and laughter and solemnly devote herself to serving her husband and his parents. Some Confucian scholars criticized as frivolous all humorous popular novels and plays, which were often banned by governments that tended to adopt the most rigid Confucian perspective.
on humor as subversive of the social order. Even whimsical poetry did not escape the attacks of sterner Confucian critics in the late imperial era (1368–1912), who saw it as a waste of time that instead should be spent studying history and promoting morality.

The question of the value of humor was never definitively settled within the Confucian tradition, however, and Confucian thought continuously coexisted and interacted with other schools of thought (such as Daoism) that did appreciate humor. Buddhism came to China during the Han dynasty, and the Chan school of Buddhism made use of the “shock effect” of humorous and absurd images to bring about knowledge, much as Zhuangzi used humor to question rationality. The use of amusing yet incongruous images for their shock value was borrowed by poets in the Song dynasty (960–1279) and later periods.

**Humor in Periods of Unrest**

Advances in printing and publishing beginning circa 1100 in the Song period (960–1279) contributed to the wider dissemination of humorous literature in China. Two periods of political unrest and technological change in later Chinese history produced a flood of writing that spanned the spectrum from escapist entertainment to harsh satire: the early seventeenth century, when the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was in decline; and the Republican period between the fall of the Qing dynasty (1912) and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (1949). In the earlier period, occasional bawdy and erotic novels, such as *Jinpingmei* (*Golden Lotus*), and comic short stories, such as those collected by Feng Menglong (1574–1646), were immensely popular. During the 1920s and 1930s, China’s greatest satirist, Lu Xun (1881–1936), criticized Chinese society and politics in essays and short stories published in some of the hundreds of newspapers and literary journals that appeared in those years; he also promoted woodblock printing and satirical cartoons that the illiterate masses could understand. Also during this period, the writer Lin Yutang (1895–1976) introduced the English word “humor” into the Chinese language and argued that China needed more of it.

During the era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), and particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), sincere revolutionary fervor was held up by the Communist Party as the only proper attitude toward life. Humor did not entirely die out, but it was politically dangerous.

**Humor Themes**

The themes of Chinese humor often resemble those in other parts of the world: Published joke books abound with stereotypical characters such as the henpecked husband and the lusty widow. Confucian and Buddhist institutions and thought are also popular objects of humor, especially in plays and operas that existed prior to the twentieth century. Residents of one part of China often make fun of those of another, but this sort of regional humor and jokes about foreigners are not as prominent in China as humor involving ethnicity and nationality is in Europe and North America. Instead, the nature of the Chinese language, which has a relatively small
number of different sounds, encourages puns and wordplay. These are particularly common in the performance humor called *xiangsheng*, which resembles vaudeville dialogue.

**Humor Today**

The decades of the 1980s and 1990s, during which ideological orthodoxy disintegrated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the use of the Internet mushroomed, may have been the beginning of another great age of humor in Chinese history. A growing appetite for humor in the PRC led publishers to comb traditional literature and excerpt the funny bits in best-selling anthologies. Lin Yutang’s writings from the 1920s and 1930s are enjoying new popularity, and the television sitcom has become a well-established form in the PRC. Chinese bloggers experiment with the full array of humor, visual and textual, on the Web, keeping the government’s Internet censors busy removing anything deemed subversive. Much of the online humor, political or otherwise, has made its way onto sites outside of China managed by overseas Chinese. In this way Chinese humor is increasingly global.

**Kristin STAPLETON**

**Further Reading**


Hunan Province

Húnán Shěng 湖南省

63.55 million est. 2007 pop. 210,000 square km

The southern inland province of Hunan, about twice the size of Iceland, is well-known for its natural beauty, agricultural products (it is China’s largest producer of rice), cuisine, history, tourist attractions, and native citizens, notably Mao Zedong. It is a province rich in natural resources, although these are under considerable strain.

Hunan Province is located in south central China in the middle reaches of the Yangzi (Chang) River. The province has an area of 210,000 square kilometers (approximately twice the size of Iceland, although with over 200 times the population), with 136 counties and 13 cities. The provincial capital is Changsha (estimated 2007 population 6.53 million), a city recognized in Chinese history for more than 3,000 years; today it is a major river port on the Xiang River and commercial center. More than fifty minorities, including Miao, Tujia, Yao, and Hui, live in Hunan, but the majority of the population is Han Chinese.

The name “Hunan” comes from the fact that most of the province is located south of Dongting Lake, the second largest freshwater lake in China (after Poyang Lake): hu means “lake” and nan translates as “south.” The longest river within Hunan Province is the Xiang River; because of this “Xiang” is often used as an abbreviation for Hunan.

With Dongting Lake to the north, the remainder of the province is surrounded by mountains and hills: the Wuling Mountains to the northeast, the Xuefeng Mountains to the west, the Nanling Mountains to the south, and the Luoxiao Mountains to the east.

The economy of Hunan is primarily agricultural; it is sometimes called “a land of fish and rice” because many of its products (such as rice, tea, corn, sweet potatoes, barley, potatoes, buckwheat, rapeseed, fruits, and tobacco leaf) are considered the best in the country. Hunan is the largest producer in China of rice, the second largest producer of tea, and the third largest producer of oranges. The Dongting Lake area has been important for its supply of freshwater fish; it is also a major center for the production of ramie, one of the world’s oldest fiber crops. However, the Dongting Lake, one of the most famous lakes in Chinese history, has been polluted by a number of companies near the lake. Since 2001, the lake’s water has ranked the fifth degree level, meaning that almost no wildlife is able to survive. (A first degree level means no pollution while a fifth degree level means severe pollution in which wildlife is unable to live.)

Hunan cuisine is justifiably admired around the world. Like Szechuan cuisine from neighboring Sichuan Province to the west, Hunan cuisine is very spicy, making considerable use of chile peppers. Because Hunan is quite distant from the sea, with access to freshwater fish but not much seafood, Hunan cooks tend to use a lot of rice, meat, bean curd, mushrooms, bamboo shoots, and forest products. Elaborate preparation is also a hallmark of Hunan cookery.
Tourist Destination

Hunan Province has become a popular tourist destination as a result of its natural beauty. In addition, about 900 historic sites exist in Hunan Province, some of them dating back 8,000 years.

In 1988, the Chinese government established its first national forest in western Hunan—Zhangjiajie National Forest Park. Making up part of the Wulingyuan Scenic and Historic Interest Area, the forest park is well-known for its quartz-sandstone rock formations, sculpted through erosion and set among a forest of dense green with frequent inundations by clouds. The entire park is covered with more than 3,000 sandstone pillars (many more than 200 meters high), as well as caves, pools, waterfalls, streams, and other natural wonders. It was recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1992 as a World Natural Heritage Site.

In southern Hunan, Mount Heng of the South is one of the five sacred mountains of Daoism, but it is also a sacred mountain to Buddhists; its summer resorts are also popular with people seeking mental and psychological treatment. To the north, Dongting Lake is frequently mist-covered in the early morning and very picturesque, despite its pollution. Located on the shores of Dongting Lake, Yueyang City is home to one of China’s most famous towers, the Yueyang Pavilion. Originally built during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the unique architecture of
this three-story building has attracted not only tourists, but poets and romantic scholars for a thousand years. To the east is Mawangdui, an archeological site containing the tombs of an aristocratic family dating from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Excavated in the early 1970s, thousands of relics have been unearthed, many preserved in near-perfect condition, including a mummified two-thousand-year-old female body.

Hunan is also the birthplace of a number of well known figures in Chinese history, including the poet Qu Yuan (340–278 BCE); the supposed inventor of paper, Cai Lun (50–121 CE); the painter Qi Baishi (1864–1957); and several twentieth-century revolutionaries and politicians of the People’s Republic of China, most notably Mao Zedong (1893–1976), but also Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), Ren Bishi (1904–1950), He Long (1896–1969) and Zhu Rongji (b. 1928). Today, Shaoshan, where Mao was born, is a historic site for the Chinese Communist Party.

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Unryu Suganuma

Notoriety travels farther away.

臭名远扬
Chou ming yuan yang
The “Hundred Days Reform” was an effort, over the summer of 1898, by the young emperor Guang Xu and many young Confucian scholar officials to introduce much-needed reforms to Qing dynasty China following the country’s defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War. It was put down by the dowager empress Xici.

Defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) greatly affected the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government of China and many young Chinese Confucian scholars. Some of these scholar-officials, particularly Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), called for dramatic changes in the structure of government, the examination system for entrance into government service, and the relationship of the government to the Chinese people, although they clothed these changes in traditional Confucian principles.

The young emperor, Guang Xu (1871–1908), was caught up in the fervor for reform and committed himself to carrying out a comprehensive reform program for approximately one hundred days, hence the phrase “Hundred Days Reform.” From mid-June to mid-September 1898, the emperor issued some forty reform decrees. The decrees called for educational reform by replacing the centuries-old “eight-legged” essays—a rigid, codified set of exams that for centuries had been the standard for entry into the civil service—with an exam that better

Kang Youwei, a prominent scholar and reformer of the late Qing dynasty, called for dramatic changes in the structure of government, the examination system for entrance into government service, and the relationship of the government to the Chinese people.
reflected current affairs, establishing an Imperial university, and initiating classes in foreign affairs and languages, economics, medicine, and the sciences. The decrees also sought changes in government and streamlining administration. Finally, the decrees called for government support for building railways, developing the economy, and improving the capital city, as well as providing government protection of missionaries, simplifying legal codes, and preparing an annual budget. These measures were designed primarily to reform the government, but also had the aim of impressing foreign powers in order to slow down the pace of foreign encroachments on Chinese sovereignty.

Predictably, there was backlash. The empress dowager, Cixi (1835–1908), allied with conservative elements in the Imperial City and across the nation and prepared a counterstrike. Rumors of a coup had floated around Beijing for days, and as the emperor moved slowly, the empress dowager and her allies moved quickly. On 21 September 1898, she seized control of the emperor, announced that he was incapacitated, took over all reform documents, and seized control of the government. Many of the reformers were arrested and executed, but Kang and Liang managed to escape. The reforms were undone, and one outcome was the so-called Boxer Rebellion, which accelerated foreign encroachments on China.

Whether the Hundred Days Reform was too comprehensive or too radical remains secondary to their short-term failure, but the seeds they planted were felt in the form of more gradual reforms as well as rebellions that would shape China’s history into the twentieth century.

Charles DOBBS

Further Reading
The Hundred Flowers Campaign was an intense, but short-lived, period that encouraged open criticism and discussion of the Communist regime in the otherwise tightly controlled intellectual climate of 1950s China. It resulted in another campaign aimed to purge those considered to be at the “right” of the party.

In May 1956 Mao Zedong (1893–1976), leader of the People’s Republic of China, announced that the government would relax its strict control over thought and expression. The policy later became known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign, or Hundred Flowers Movement. The new freedoms promised under the campaign, however, lasted only a little more than a year.

As part of the campaign, Mao invited intellectuals to voice their criticism of party and government policies and leaders. The intellectuals, especially educators, had lost faith in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after it introduced a Soviet-style education system to China in the early 1950s. Under this system liberal arts education was discarded in favor of science and technology education. Mao thought to win over the alienated intellectuals by giving them a degree of intellectual freedom. For example, intellectuals who worked in schools, colleges, and universities were given more access to foreign publications.

The campaign was slow to catch on. Leaders within the party resisted the possibility of criticism. The intellectuals were reluctant to criticize the government for fear of reprisals. It was only in the spring of 1957, after Mao made a desperate plea to get the campaign moving with the slogan “Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend,” that members of political parties, writers, journalists, teachers, and professionals began to openly criticize Communist rule, government policy, and party members. (The phrase “a hundred schools of thought” reverberates throughout China’s history in reference to the myriad philosophies, from Confucianism to Daoism to Legalism and more, that proliferated during the Warring States period 475–221 BCE.) In some extreme cases, wall posters appeared in public attacking the entire Communist system. Some people even publicly questioned the legitimacy of CCP rule. Mao and other party leaders were not prepared for the volume and intensity of the criticism.

By early July, just five weeks after the inauguration of the campaign, the party launched the dramatic new Anti-Rightist Campaign that shifted the target of criticism from the Communists to the intellectuals. Critics of the regime were themselves severely criticized by party members. An estimated 500,000–750,000 intellectuals were denounced or blacklisted. Some were arrested, and many were sent to the countryside to “rectify their thinking through labor.” In 1979, three years after the death of Mao, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), the new leader of the CCP, finally restored a “decent name” to (i.e., rehabilitated) these vilified intellectuals, but the damage had
Mao Zedong introduces the “Hundred Flowers”

These notes from Mao’s speech to the Politburo on 25 April 1956 are the first published reference attributed to Mao on the policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom.”

In their speeches [many comrades] displayed a lack of vigor. The relationship of the low-level [cadres] to the upper-level [cadres] is like that of a mouse when it sees a cat, as though its soul has been eaten away. There was so much [on their minds], they didn’t dare speak out. This same problem of a lack of democracy also exist in the various provinces. However, there were some model workers who did speak out quite spiritedly. Our Financial and Economic [Work] Conference and the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee had some side effects. Because of several stipulations, people did not venture to speak their minds. At the Economic and Financial [Work] Conference, certain comrades did not give appropriate speeches, and there were some who didn’t dare speak up at all…

We must delegate certain powers to the lower levels. Our [system of] discipline has come mostly from the Soviet Union. If the discipline is too strict, we will be fettering people. It is not possible to smash bureaucratism this way. The dictatorship of the proletariat requires an appropriate system. The Political Bureau and the State Council have not yet decided on either the problem of the division of power between the central government and the local areas, or how to the one-person management system of the Soviet Union came about. The various provinces should share power, they should not be afraid of being called people who clamor for independence. As the Center has not yet arrived at a decision, we are free to speak up. Every locality can draw up on its own regulations, bylaws, and methods as provided for by the Constitution. We must enable the various localities to be creative, spirited, and full of vigor. Beginning next year, we should convene a large conference annually…

In art and literature, to “let a hundred flowers bloom,” and in academic studies, to “let a hundred schools of thought contend” (as a hundred schools contended during the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period) should be taken as a guideline. This was the view of the people two thousand years ago.


Already been done. Mao’s distrust of the intelligentsia had a long-standing effect on China’s efforts at modernization efforts.

Stephanie CHUNG

Further Reading


During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) many diverse philosophical systems thrived in China; the expression a hundred schools of thought is used to refer to their sheer number and diversity. The most prevalent schools included Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism, the School of Names, the Yin–Yang School, and Daoism.

The expression a hundred schools of thought was created to convey the idea that during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) there were a large number of diverse philosophical systems, or schools of thought, in China. Records of the Grand Historian (c. 99–98 BCE) by Sima Qian (145–86? BCE) lists the following six: Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism, the School of Names, the Yin–Yang School, and Daoism. Written at about the same time as the Records of the Grand Historian, the Zhuangzi, Chapter 33, provides a Daoist, satirical description of these schools. In the Standard History of the Former Han by Ban Gu (32–92 CE), the “Journal of Literature” written by Liu Xin (d. 23 CE) adds four more groups—namely, Agriculturalists, Diplomats, Eclectic School, and Storytellers. Even a list of ten schools is incomplete because it does not include the Militarists, made famous by Sunzi’s Art of War, or the Pacifists, represented by Song Rongzi. And a school could have subdivisions—for example, there were subschools of Confucianism, Mohism, and Daoism. Some of the schools were not strictly philosophical—namely, the Agriculturalists, the Diplomats, and many of the texts classified under the Eclectic School. Numbering the schools at a hundred might be an overestimation, but the expression evokes a period of Chinese history in which philosophical thinking was arguably at its most formative.

Social Changes

When the Zhou overthrew the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) they gave fiefs to family members and a few local chiefs who assisted them. After the Zhou capital was moved eastward in 770 BCE, the dynastic power began to shift away from the Zhou house, and the feudal lords became more powerful as heads of independent states. During the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) there were as many as 170 mostly small states. By the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) there were only seven powerful states left on the battlefields. Toward the end of the Spring and Autumn period the feudal lords began to call themselves “kings.” When they competed for power, they created a context that allowed social mobility for commoners.

Iron came to China during the Spring and Autumn period, its use spreading during the Warring States period. Iron tools as well as irrigation, drainage, fertilizers, and new crops revolutionized agriculture. As the kings expanded their territories, they opened new agricultural lands. The surplus food helped grow the population, and the enlarged population provided more soldiers for the warring kingdoms. The use of iron and other developments in metallurgy improved military technology. Improvements in carriages and chariots and the rise of a cavalry changed military strategy and tactics. Surplus
produce and expanding tastes opened and maintained new trade routes by land and sea, allowing for more contact among cultures and the spread of ideas. The political, social, economic, and cultural changes that accelerated during the Warring States period provided a context for new philosophies to develop. The practice of universal education, even for commoners, that Confucius (551–479 BCE) had begun in the late Spring and Autumn period became popular during the Warring States period because of the growing need for highly trained knights, scholars, officials, and skilled craftspeople. As that need increased, there were more opportunities for commoners to gain wealth and even status.

Overall, the various philosophers agreed on a few general points. They all agreed that the state needed educated rulers and officials to operate effectively. This need inspired the philosophers to seek the Way (dao), a practical means to achieve desired results. Unlike the Greek philosophers who sought an abstract truth, the Warring States philosophers sought the best path to success. The philosophical tendency inspired a social movement away from privileged aristocratic birthrights to systems of worthy rulers and versatile ministers who were capable of administering the state, ensuring safety and a good harvest. Most of the Warring States philosophers proposed that all people—especially the ruler and ministers—had to adhere to their socially acquired roles. Everyone had to do his or her part for society to function properly. Most of the philosophers looked back to a past golden age to set a standard for complete and comprehensive harmony among people and with nature. Aside from these few general commonalities, for the most part the various philosophers disagreed about the means for achieving harmony and educating the ruler, ministers, and commoners.

**Confucius and Disciples**

Confucius believed that the Zhou imperial family and the feudal lords had lost the way of the former kings—especially the beneficent way of the Zhou founders: King Wen, King Wu, and the duke of Zhou. For Confucius the dao referred to the way of the former kings, the way of virtue. Confucius built his teachings on the popular idea of a past golden age of perfect social harmony. To reform society, he intended to revive the virtues and values of the past. Reform begins, he argued, in the ruling families and trickles down through aristocrats to commoners. Methodologically, Confucius’s teachings began by instilling filial piety in children. If children could not learn to love and respect their parents, then they would not become loyal ministers. Ontologically, Confucius held that all people are similar at birth—namely, they have the ability to be kind to others. Through improper training, they lose their natural propensity toward kindness. Therefore, childhood training in filial devotion was necessary to develop and maintain the natural propensity toward benevolence. These teachings promoted a type of graded love, in which a person loves close relatives more dearly than distant ones and fellow villagers more than strangers.

Another way to ward off social decay, according to Confucius, was moral education. Ritual action (li) was the proper way to promote human kindness (ren); all people and especially government officials had to demonstrate trustworthiness (xin); people had to follow the correct standards of rightness (yi); they had to practice moral wisdom (zhi). These tenets of moral education were commonly called the “five virtues”; there were many more. Through moral education people learned their role in society and behaved accordingly with virtue. The outcome would be a well-rounded individual and, ultimately, peace in the empire.

The disciples of Confucius emphasized different aspects of his teachings. The third-generation disciple Mengzi, also known as “Mencius” (371–289 BCE), advocated that all people are naturally good at birth. Mengzi interpreted the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, the divine sanction to rule, to include the right of peasants to rebel. As a champion of the Confucian way, Mengzi debated the followers of the individualist Yang Zhu, the Agriculturalists, the Militarists, and the Mohists. His interpretation of Confucius was revitalized in Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) neo-Confucianism.

Xunzi (c. 300–230 BCE) offered a pragmatic interpretation of Confucius. He proposed that people are born deviant and that education and ritual action are the means to control them. Xunzi argued that ancient records were in error and that a wise ruler should follow the way of the later, more recent kings, not the former kings. His teachings influenced the development of Confucianism in the Han dynasty.

Mozi, or Master Mo (flourished 479–438 BCE), probably began his studies as a Confucian. Trained in military
strategy and tactics, he defended the underdog. He attracted many disciples, possibly three hundred in his lifetime, and many subsequent followers. Like Confucius, Mozi believed that the way of the former kings and moral education were the correct means to rectify social decay, but he attacked the details of Confucius’s project. For Mozi social decay was caused by advocating family values and graded love, two concepts praised by Confucius. To correct the social decay, Mozi argued that the way of the former kings led to equal love for each and every person (jianai): If all people love each other in the same manner that they love their parents, then all strife will come to an end, and there will be peace in the empire. To promote the general welfare, Mozi advocated frugality in state functions. He opposed the excesses of aristocratic funerals and musical performances, which the common people imitated. Mozi attacked offensive warfare as the clearest indication of how graded love brings misery to the masses. He argued against fatalism. He supported promotion based on merit. With the meritorious in office, he advocated for deferring to the superior’s opinion.

**Legalists**

The Legalists were influenced by the agrarian and military roots of ancient society. They acknowledged that society needed reform so that it could establish peace based on law and order. They argued that Confucianism and Mohism, which promoted morality over the law, were the problem because morality justified protecting special interests, not the law. As the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE) incorporated various ethnic groups and expanded economically, the need for legal governance grew. The end of the Spring and Autumn period saw written laws such as Zi Chan’s penal code (c. 536 BCE) and Deng Xi’s bamboo code (c. 496 BCE) cast in iron. Guan Zhong (d. 645 BCE), prime minister to the state of Qi, emphasized the need for a well-ordered state administration. Gongsun Yang, or Lord Shang (d. 338 BCE), stressed the importance of written, objective law applied equally to commoners and nobility. The prime minister of the state of Han, Shen Buhai (d. 337 BCE), taught the importance of statecraft, political techniques, and methods. Shen Dao (350–275 BCE), from the state of Zhao, stressed the importance of strategic position and the contextual circumstances that go into creating and maintaining political power. Shen Dao’s Legalism influenced Han Fei (d. 233 BCE), who with Li Si (c. 280–208 BCE) studied under the Confucian Xunzi. Both Han Fei and Li Si went to the state of Qin to assist Lü Buwei, prime minister to the child king who would become the first Qin emperor. Han Fei’s teachings synthesized earlier Legalist thought—especially the concepts of law, power, and statecraft. Han Fei attacked the Confucians and Mohists for claiming to represent the moral way of the early sage rulers while explicitly differing about the details of that way. He criticized their morality and favored the objective law and legal system.

**School of Names**

The School of Names, or Logicians (sometimes called “Sophists”), originated among the officials who allocated rewards and punishments to the lower officials and common people. They assessed people’s job titles and performance. Assessing job titles and performance transformed linking name and reality into a philosophical concern.
Because debate at court was the means by which philosophers gained fame and a livelihood, argumentation and rhetoric were emphasized by all the schools, but the Logicians took rational inquiry into the nature of language to the paradoxical realm. Hui Shi (c. 380–305 BCE) served as prime minister to King Hui of Liang (reigned 373–320 BCE). Hui Shi with his friend Zhuangzi argued that all things form a grand unity. Hui Shi sought to know that unity through reason and language; Zhuangzi, through direct experience. Gongsun Long (c. 310–250 BCE) was born in Zhao. Favored for a time by Prince Pingyuan (d. c. 251 BCE) in Zhao, Gongsun Long acquired fame by arguing that a white horse is not a horse. He might have meant that people ought not to confuse primary qualities (horse) with secondary qualities (color), or he might have been making a part/whole, individual/category distinction.

Yin–Yang School

In grappling with the forces of nature, people demarcate bipolar, interconnected yet opposing phenomena such as high/low, heavy/light, dry/damp, hot/cold, bright/dark. This kind of correlative thinking underlies most Chinese philosophy. In early Zhou literature the term yin referred to the shadow and the term yang to the sunlight. By the Warring States period yin and yang were used as philosophical concepts in the written works Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi to refer to the interconnected yet opposing forces of the universe. Yang is associated with heaven, light, movement, the male gender, and life-giving forces. Yin is associated with earth, darkness, tranquility, the female, decay, and death. These two forces are interconnected and contain each other such that when yin is exhausted, then yang arises and vice versa. Yin and yang are not a duality. They constitute a nondual energy force very similar to the positive and negative charges in the electro-magnetic spectrum. Yin and yang are used to explain why and how things change. They are coupled with the Five Phases (wuxing) — namely, wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.

Little is known about the founder of the Yin–Yang School, the scholar Zou Yan (305–240 BCE) from the state of Qi. He attempted to rectify the inferior virtue of rulers by instructing them in the processes of change through yin, yang, and the Five Phases. He linked his naturalistic philosophy to the Confucian virtues to develop a political theory, based on the study of natural phenomena, that culminates in the ruler’s cultivation of virtue.

Daoism

If the Confucians established the cultural tradition, then the Daoists formed the counterculture movement. Whereas most philosophers sought fame for themselves, the Daoists wanted to be anonymous. Daoist philosophy originated in ancient shaman—that is, priestly, magical—practices in which the shaman wanders in the spirit realm and merges with the forces of nature. In the Zhou dynasty these shamanic practices were modified into breathing and meditative techniques.

The Laozi and the Zhuangzi are the two extant texts from the Warring States period that form Daoism’s core. Laozi, also known as “Lao Dan” or “Master Lao,” was the founder of the Mohist school, a popular alternative to Confucian teachings.

Mozi, the founder of the Mohist school, a popular alternative to Confucian teachings.
born in the state of Chu in the sixth century BCE and is the alleged author of eighty-one poems that bear his name. The text of *Laozi* was written by court officials who sought to advise their ruler and other officials on the proper way to govern by means of self-cultivation that connects humans to the forces of nature. Along with the dao, sky, and earth, the king is one of the four great things in existence. People take earth as their model; earth follows sky; sky follows dao; and dao follows self-so (spontaneity). The ruler is encouraged to behave like the dao by taking no purposive action; as a result nothing will be left undone. Laozi’s contribution to ancient philosophy was his ability to abstract the dao into the most general and ultimate category.

Zhuang Zhou (370–301 BCE) was a minor official in the state of Song. According to his biography in the *Records of the Grand Historian*, he rejected an invitation by King Wei of Chu (reigned 339–329 BCE) to serve as prime minister. He is the alleged author of the first seven, or inner, chapters of his namesake book, the *Zhuangzi*. Those chapters focus on the theme of self-cultivation by embracing the flow of natural transformation, which ultimately leads to entering the silent oneness of the sky, a mystical union. Living in harmony with the forces of nature and the dao and then dying in harmony with nature lead to the ultimate mystical experience of forming one body with the universe. Zhuangzi emphasized the importance of the human role in living in harmony with the flux of life. He recognized that people are preoccupied with others’ opinions, so they work hard, live in distress, and die young. He proposed that people engage in meditative practices that purify their hearts and reduce stress and conflict, bringing them into harmony with the dao of nature. The text is written in fable and anecdote, making it difficult to interpret.

**Agriculturists**

During the Warring States period most public and private wealth derived from grain and silk. Though the Agriculturists’ works no longer exist, given that Mengzi debated the followers of Xu Xing (c. late fourth century BCE), the Agriculturists were a force to be reckoned with. They advocated a well-rounded agrarian philosophy, dealing with the best means for planting, weeding, and harvesting; promoting cottage industry and price controls; and organizing people in small agrarian work forces. Two of their lasting contributions to the economics of agriculture are the ever-ready granary system and the principle of acting (buying/selling) at the right time.

**Diplomats**

The Diplomats, or Strategists, were concerned with political alliances during the Warring States period. The name of the school refers to vertical versus horizontal alliances. For the Diplomats the way of the former kings was political and military strategy. Zhang Yi (flourished third century BCE) supported a vertical, south-to-north alliance between the states of Qin, Han, and Wei to attack Qi in the east and Chu in the south. Su Qin (flourished third century BCE) supported an alliance in the east to control Qin in the west. The Diplomats were criticized by the Confucians for proposing violent means instead of virtue and ritual to mediate conflict.

**Eclectic School**

The first three texts—the *Shizi*, the *Lüshi chunqiu*, and the *Huainanzi*—listed under the “Eclectic School” label in the “Journal of Literature” are philosophical works that employ a syncretic, unified eclectic philosophy, drawing from the other schools. The subsequent texts under that label are a miscellany. Therefore, confusion led some scholars to discredit the first three texts as a mere hodgepodge of literature. Yet the *Shizi* (c. 300 BCE), surviving in fragmentary form, displays a unified philosophy built on synthesizing other philosophies. The syncretic, unified philosophy of the *Lüshi chunqiu* (238 BCE) and the *Huainanzi* (130 BCE) is more obvious. The former organizes the philosophical systems under the seasonal calendar such that Yang Zhu’s individualism, Daoist nonaction, and Mohist love are practiced in the spring; Confucian education, ritual, and music are studied in the summer; military and legal affairs are reserved for the autumn; and Mohist frugal funerals as well as Legalist administrative matters and executions are suited for the winter. This eclectic trend influenced Han dynasty literature and philosophy.
Storytellers

Because rhetoric is sometimes more persuasive than logical argument, some scholars became adept storytellers. Confucians criticized their rhetoric for leading rulers astray from the way of the former kings. All of the philosophers employed stories as examples to make their point.

The Militarists are not listed among the other schools in the Han histories. But the military thinkers were given the honorary title of “master” (zi), which is bestowed on the philosophers. Sunzi (Sun Wu) lived during the end of the Spring and Autumn period. He was born in Qi but led the Wu troops. He is famous for his work on strategy, the Art of War, which is studied at military academies today. In 1972 another text called the Art of War, this one by Sun Bin, was excavated at Yinqueshan in Shandong Province. Sun Bin (flourished 350 BCE), a descendant of Sun Wu, emphasized military tactics. Both texts recognized the importance of developing moral virtues in the troops to bolster their loyalty, and both emphasized the importance of engaging only in just wars.

Further Reading


After the Warring States Period

The Warring States period was a turbulent yet important developmental stage for Chinese culture. Aspects of the various schools were absorbed into Han dynasty Confucianism, making it comprehensive and viable. Although Confucians disdained Legalism, the imperial Confucian state sponsored by the Han and subsequent dynasties could not have prospered without a legal system in addition to the system of ritual for controlling the masses and for diplomacy with other countries. Given the eclectic character of the subsequent development of Confucianism and Daoism, the Eclectic school left a lasting impression on Chinese philosophy.

James D. SELLMANN
Hungry Ghost Festival
Zhōngyuánjíé 中元节

Celebrants believe that during the annual Hungry Ghost Festival the gates of hell are thrown open, and ghosts are once again free to roam and may prey on the living. People hold feasts to fete both deities and ghosts.

Supplicants come to a temple in southern China to burn joss (incense) sticks to please their ancestors. They also bring food and drink to feed the hungry spirits.

Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
roots in Chinese forms of social life, Daoist folk religion, and Buddhism. People believe that during the time of the festival the gates of hell (purgatory or the underworld) are thrown open, and ghosts—“good brothers”—are once again free to roam the realm of the living.

The Hungry Ghost Festival is an inauspicious time when hungry ghosts may prey on the living, driven by resentment and anger. Couples do not have weddings during this time, and people circulate ghost stories of mishaps and bad luck to keep the living alert. Particularly vulnerable are children, and parents are careful to prevent them from swimming in the open sea or camping in forests, for example.

To appease the ghosts, people make offerings outside of homes at nearby road junctions, country lanes, and open spaces. People also take care not to invite the ghosts into the homes. Clan and trade associations and neighborhood groups have more elaborate celebrations that last for a few days. They build temporary sheds in open spaces to house deities. The deities, made of papier-mâché, are burnt at the end of the festival. The chief deity—called “Phor Tor Kong” in the Hokkien language—is the keeper of purgatory who keeps watch over the wandering ghosts. People hold feasts to fete both deities and ghosts. An assortment of foods is laid out, including rice, noodles, meat dishes, sweet cakes, fruits, wine, and other drinks as well as joss sticks, paper money, and paper clothes. In addition, entertainment, such as traditional Chinese opera, singing bands, and open-air film showings, is provided. In addition to fulfilling ritual obligations, the Hungry Ghost Festival sometimes is used to raise funds and awareness to support concerns about the well-being of diasporic (scattered) Chinese communities, particularly concerning Chinese ethnicity, education, and culture.

YEHOH Seng-Guan

Further Reading


Hutong are the narrow lanes and alleys (as well as the neighborhoods formed by them) in cities of north China. Hutong have become iconic symbols of Beijing, once an imperial capital and today an international city undergoing unprecedented change. In recent years, the conservation of the tangible and intangible aspects of hutong neighborhoods has met only limited success.

Beginning in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) when the imperial capital was Dadu, much of what is today called Beijing was laid out like a chessboard grid with neighborhoods defined by the presence of shared water wells or hutong, as they were known in the Mongol language. By extension, the associated narrow lanes and alleys as well as the neighborhoods formed by them, each with its own characteristics, came also to be called hutong. Running east to west and crossing those running north to south, the lanes and alleys were said to be “like ox hair” in that their number was beyond calculation.

Over a span of fourteen years early in the fifteenth century, Zhu Di, the third emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), moved the capital from Nanjing in the Yangzi (Chang) River basin back north to the site of Dadu but with a new name: Beijing. The construction of the magnificent complex known in English as the “Forbidden City” created a cosmic anchor around which the city grew.
was rebuilt, growing in an orderly and structured fashion comprising walled complexes and passages of various extents. Princes, high-ranking officials, and some wealthy merchants lived in expansive residences, many of which had access to water bodies, to the east and west of the imperial palaces. In this core area the connecting hutong were comparatively broad, with imposing gateways leading through high gray walls into expansive courtyard dwellings called siheyuan. First to the north and then later to the south of the Forbidden City, commoners—shopkeepers, artisans, and laborers—built simpler and smaller courtyard dwellings, fashioning in the process densely packed hutong neighborhoods along newly laid-out narrower, irregular, and sometimes winding lanes.

In the areas around the Imperial Palace the main hutong ran principally from east to west since the main residential buildings aligned along them typically were oriented so that their main rooms and gates faced south.

Linking these larger hutong, narrower alleys ran from north to south to provide shortcuts and access to residences as they were built. Over time, whatever traditional orderliness there once was, lanes and alleys came eventually to proliferate, even in a somewhat disorderly way, so that some hutong became mazelike in layout. Where once hutong were rigidly parallel in structure, meeting each other at right angles, smaller ones away from the imperial precincts often were irregular in width and length, becoming simply extended passageways. The Jiudaowan (Nine Turnings) hutong in the Dongcheng district, which actually has nineteen turns along its length, is even today an irregular, somewhat labyrinth-like, route of singular interest. Within the Qianmen area in the south of the city, the well-known Qianshi hutong is only 80 centimeters wide in one spot, insufficient for two persons to pass. Some extant hutong are nothing more than narrow alleys that lead fairly quickly to dead ends.

Throughout the twentieth century, but especially after 1949, as crowding occurred in old courtyard residences, hutong neighborhoods themselves increased in their overall residential density. Where once behind the walls of a capacious courtyard house lived a single family, now eight to ten families occupied the space, leading usually to the building of structures in once-open courtyards. Activities that once might have been confined within the dwelling increasingly spilled out into the lanes, where neighbors spent free time sitting on small stools in the alleys to read, chat, and watch children. The evolution of social communities, with markets and service facilities nearby, under these circumstances is striking. In spite of overcrowding, poor hygiene, leaky roofs, and lack of privacy, many in China today view hutong neighborhoods as quiet spaces with an idyllic atmosphere. In urban China there is much nostalgia for the quiet and community of traditional hutong life in the wake of the intrusion of automobiles and trucks into narrow lanes and the wholesale destruction of old neighborhoods.

In recent decades substantial portions of old Beijing have vanished in demolition that has, according to many observers, actually accelerated even as authorities claim that they have slowed the pace of destruction by enacting regulations to protect twenty-five hutong zones in the city. News reports and blogs regularly express outrage at wholesale demolition in areas said to be protected from destruction. Poignant tales of longtime, often elderly
families and neighbors uprooted from familiar surroundings with inadequate compensation are commonly repeated, especially as the city remade itself for the 2008 Summer Olympics. In 2006 a survey by the Beijing Institute of Civil Engineering and Architecture confirmed that only about 30 percent of hutong built prior to 1949 still existed, with most destruction having taken place in the 1990s and early 2000s. One sprawling neighborhood that has been undergoing gentrification is the Shichahai area, with its archipelago-like lakes, tree-lined esplanades, and bridges strewn along the western part of the Imperial City. Here hutong tours whisk foreign and domestic tourists in three-wheeled pedicabs along narrow lanes lined with old buildings in hopes of giving them a sense of the character of life in the old city. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.

Ronald G. KNAPP

Further Reading

I Ching (Classic of Changes)

Yijing 易经

I Ching (Classic of Changes, also known as Yijing) 易經, the first of the Chinese Confucian classics, has profoundly shaped East Asian thought and culture and has also become influential among many intellectuals in the West. As a book about divination and the source of wisdom, it is both a repository of moral and political insight and a guide for individual self-fulfillment.

The I Ching (Classic of Changes, also known as the Yijing), one of the most widely consulted books in the Chinese tradition, had an incalculable influence throughout history and acquired a significant following even outside China in East Asia. Nowadays, besides those consulting it in its original language—often aided by translations into modern Chinese, Japanese, or Korean—thousands access it through translations into Western languages. Originally it was a manual of divination, and its oldest layers are traditionally attributed to King Wen and the duke of Zhou (eleventh century BCE). But modern scholarship regards its base texts as the product of anonymous and gradual compilation that reached its final form during the ninth century BCE. The Changes subsequently developed into a book of wisdom as it acquired a group of commentaries, the so-called Ten Wings (shiyi), traditionally attributed to the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) but now reckoned of uncertain authorship dating mostly from the mid-third to the early second century BCE.

At the core of the Changes are sixty-four hexagrams (gua) and related texts: The hexagrams, formed by combinations of two trigrams (also gua), consist of six lines (yao) in vertical sequence, read from the bottom up. Lines are either solid (yang) or broken (yin), and their combination into sixty-four hexagrams is determined by numerical manipulation of divining sticks or the casting of coins. Each hexagram is assigned a name (guaming) indicative of the image (xiang) or abstract meaning of the hexagram statement (guaci) or “Judgment” (tuan), and each of the six lines has a line statement (yaoci) that contributes to the general topic of the Judgment and states a specific variation of it, often followed by an injunction to take or refrain from action, and often a final determination of “misfortune” or “good fortune.” The hexagrams, Judgments, and line statements are the oldest parts of the Changes and constitute the first chronological layer of a three-layered text.

Radical Reinterpretation

The original meaning of the Judgments and line statements, however, which were concerned with the mechanics of divination and its amoral consequences, was radically reinterpreted, either through ignorance or intent, by the exegesis (an explanation or critical interpretation of a text) of the “Ten Wings” to fit with Confucian morality; this reinterpretation shaped all subsequent

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interpretation—up to modern times. The second layer includes another two parts: “Commentary on the Judgments” (Tuanzhuan), which expands upon the Judgments, and “Commentary on the Images” (Xiangzhuan), which addresses both the “Great Images” (Daxiang) or abstract meaning of the Judgments and the “Little Images” (Xiaoxiang) of line statements. The Tuanzhuan and Xiangzhuan are each divided into two sections, together forming the first four of the “Ten Wings.” The fifth of the “Ten Wings,” “Commentary on the Words of the Text” (Wenyan), containing elements of the second and third layers, consists of two fragments of a lost commentary on the hexagrams as a whole. Only those parts concerned with the first two hexagrams, “Pure Yang” (Qian) and “Pure Yin” (Kun), survived, and these deal with the philosophical and ethical implications of the Judgments.

Diagrams from the I-Ching, (the Book of Changes). On the left is a Luo Shu diagram, on the right is a He Thu diagram. They represented a simple magic square and a cruciform array of the numbers from 1 to 10. Even or Yin numbers are represented in black and odd or Yang ones in white. The Luo Shu is a magic square in which the figures, added up along any diagonal, line or column, make 15, from which can be created a swastika symbol. The He Thu is arranged so that if the central 5 and 10 are ignored, both odd and even number sets add up to 20, a series of numbers which had symbolic attributions, for instance; the four seasons, five elements, etc.
based on Confucian thought. The sixth and seventh Wings are formed by the two parts of the “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” (Xi chi zhuon) or “Great Commentary” (Da zhuon). The first part is a group of essays on the general nature of the Changes; the second is a collection of remarks about the Judgments and line statements of individual hexagrams. The eighth of the “Ten Wings,” “Explaining the Trigrams” (Shuogua), addresses the meaning of the eight trigrams (bagua) in terms of yin-yang dualism and the theory of the five phases (wuxing), this indicative of early Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) thought. The ninth Wing, “Providing the Sequence of the Hexagrams” (Xugua), addresses each of the hexagrams and justifies their order in terms of etymology and pseudo-rational argument—often farfetched. The tenth Wing, “Hexagrams in Irregular Order” (Zagua), consists of brief remarks that define the meaning of individual hexagrams, often in terms of contrasting pairs.

Hexagram divination—originally a method of consulting and influencing gods, spirits, and ancestors (the “powerful dead”)—with the Changes became a method of penetrating moments of the cosmic order to discern how the Dao as macrocosm is configured at such moments and to determine what one’s own microcosmic status in it should be. One thus averts wrong decisions, avoids failure, and escapes misfortune and instead makes right decisions, achieves success, and garners good fortune. The hexagrams represent sixty-four archetypal situations possible for the individual. The casting of sticks or coins determines six lines, either solid (yang) or broken (yin); lines can be either “old,” about to change from yang to yin or yin to yang, which warrants separate consideration when the hexagram is interpreted, or “new” and not about to change, thus disregarded when individual lines of a hexagram are interpreted.
Consulting Hexagrams

When a hexagram consists entirely of “new” lines, only the Judgment, “Commentary on the Judgments,” and “Commentary on the Images” are consulted. But if one or more “old” lines occur, the line statements and the “Commentary on the Images” for such lines are also consulted. Furthermore, the Judgment, “Commentary on the Judgments,” and “Commentary on the Images” of the “new” hexagram resulting from the change of “old” lines to “new” are also consulted. For example, if in casting Hexagram 36, Mingyi (Suppression of the Light) (yang, yin, yang, yin, yin, yin), the third yang line is “old” and about to turn into a “new” yin line, this results in Hexagram 24, Fu (Return) (yang, yin, yin, yin, yin, yin). In general, Mingyi represents an unstable situation, a weak position for the individual in it, and advises patience and restraint; Fu by contrast represents a stable situation, a strong position for the individual in it, and advises assertive action. However, consulting the Changes is a much more enriching experience than this. Those interested in the Swiss psychiatrist C. G. Jung’s reading of the Changes and its influence on him, especially on his theory of synchronicity, should read Jung’s foreword to Richard Wilhelm’s The I Ching or Book of Changes. Richard John Lynn’s The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi is recommended as an accurate translation based on the most important of the traditional Chinese philosophical commentaries.

Richard John LYNN

Further Reading


India-China Relations

Zhōng-Yin wàijiāo guānxì 中印外交关系

Existing in close proximity for thousands of years, the ancient civilizations of China and India had surprisingly little political interaction for most of that time. The twentieth century saw tensions between the two increase over disputed borders and geopolitical competition for power, influence, resources, and markets. How the relationship will develop and play out is an important question in the twenty-first century.

As ancient civilizations, China and India coexisted in peace and harmony for millennia. But as post-colonial modern nation-states, with the exception of a very short period of bonhomie in the early 1950s, relations between the two Asian giants have been marked by conflict, containment, mutual suspicion, distrust, and rivalry. Just as the Indian subcontinental plate has a tendency to constantly rub and push against the Eurasian tectonic plate, causing friction and volatility in the entire Himalayan mountain range, India’s bilateral relationship with China also remains volatile and riddled with friction and tension.

Past Perfect: Ancient Civilizations

China and India are two of the world’s oldest civilizations, each with the quality of resilience that has enabled it to survive and prosper through the ages and against the odds. During the past three thousand years, every one of the Asian countries—some situated on the continental landmass, others being islands off the Asia mainland—has at some stage been directly influenced by one or both of these two great civilizations.

Both have long, rich strategic traditions: Both Kautilya’s Arthashastra—a treatise on war, diplomacy, statecraft, and empire—and Sunzi’s (Sun Tzu’s) Sunzi bingfa (The Art of War) were written over two thousand years ago in India and China, respectively. The traditional Chinese concept of international relations was based on concentric circles from the imperial capital outward through variously dependent states to the barbarians. It bears remarkable resemblance to the Indian concept of mandala, or circles, as outlined in Arthashastra, which postulated that a king’s neighbor is his natural enemy, while the king beyond his neighbor is his natural ally. The Chinese dynasties followed a similar policy of encircling and attacking nearby neighbors and maintaining friendly relations with more distant kingdoms (yuàn jiāo jìng gōng). Much like imperial China, tribute, homage, subservience—but not annexation—were the rightful fruits of victory in ancient India.

Political contacts between ancient China and India were few and far between. In the cultural sphere, it was mostly a one-way street—from India to China. Hindu and Buddhist religious and cultural influence spread to China through Central Asia, and Chinese scholars were sent to Indian universities at Nalanda and Taxilla. Though Chinese and Indian civilizations reacted to one another during the first few centuries of the Christian era,
the process of religious-cultural interaction ceased after about the tenth century CE (coinciding with the Islamic invasions of India). Since then, the two countries lived as if they were oblivious to each other's existence for over a thousand years, until about the advent of the nineteenth century, when both came under the influence of European powers.

Before the age of European colonization, China accounted for about 33 percent of the world’s manufactured goods and India for about 25 percent. China under the Song (960–1279) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties was the world’s superpower. Under the Guptas (c. 320–c. 550 CE) and Mughals (1526–1857), India’s economic, military, and cultural prowess also was an object of envy. Then in a complete reversal of fortune, the mighty Asian civilizations declined, decayed, and disintegrated and were eventually conquered by European powers.

**Present Imperfect: From Civilizations to Nation-States**

The gradual westward expansion over the centuries under Mongol and Qing dynasties extended China’s influence over Tibet and parts of Central Asia (now Xinjiang province). In contrast, India’s boundaries shrank following the
1947 partition that broke up the subcontinent’s strategic unity that went back two thousand years to the first Maurya empire (c. 324–c. 200 BCE). Then came the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950; as a result the two nations came into close physical contact for the first time and clashed. India’s partition in 1947 and the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 have allowed China to extend its reach and influence into a region where it had, in terms of history and civilization, previously exercised no influence at all.

China-India relations have been tense ever since a border dispute led to a full-scale war in 1962 and armed skirmishes in 1967 and 1987. Several rounds of talks held over more than a quarter of a century (since 1981) have failed to resolve the disputed claims. Agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility on the disputed border were signed in 1993 and 1996. An agreement on the guiding principles for settlement was concluded in 2005. However, China’s increasing assertiveness, as evidenced in increased incursions in Arunachal Pradesh by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 2005, has led to a rapid meltdown in the Sino-Indian border talks, despite public protestations of amity. Apparently, the Chinese believe that a border settlement, without major Indian territorial concessions, could potentially augment India’s relative power position, and thus impact negatively on China’s rise. While Chinese insist on the return of Tawang (the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama) on religious grounds, Indians seek the return of the sacred Mount Kailash-Mansarovar in Tibet, since it is a sacred religious place associated with the Hindu religion. The consequence is that the 2,520-mile frontier between India and China, one of the longest interstate borders in the world, remains the only one of China’s land borders not defined, let alone demarcated, on maps or delineated on the ground. The prospects of a negotiated settlement in the near future seem as remote as ever for several reasons. An unsettled border provides China the strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions and nervous about its capabilities, while exposing India’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses and ensuring New Delhi’s “good behavior” on issues of vital concern to China. Furthermore, unless and until Beijing succeeds in totally pacifying and sinicizing Tibet (as Inner Mongolia has been), China does not want to give up the “bargaining chip” that an unsettled boundary vis-à-vis India provides it with. An unsettled boundary also suits Chinese interests for the present because China’s claims in the western sector are complicated by the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, Pakistan’s interests in the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, and Beijing’s interest in keeping India under strategic pressure on two fronts.

Even if the territorial dispute was resolved, China and India would still retain a competitive relationship. Other factors, apart from the territorial dispute, contribute to the fractious and uneasy relationship. These include the nature of China’s ties with India’s smaller South Asian neighbors (including its arming of them); the legacy of Cold War alignments (Beijing-Islamabad-Washington versus the Moscow-New Delhi axis); continuing unrest in Tibet and Kashmir; Chinese encroachments into what India sees as its sphere of influence; Beijing’s plans for a naval presence in the Indian Ocean; resource competition; power asymmetry and a rivalry for the leadership of the developing world and multilateral forums; and, more recently, the nuclear and naval rivalries.

Since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), independent India has entertained hopes of a joint Sino-Indian leadership of Asia as a counter to Western influence, but the Chinese have shown no enthusiasm for sharing leadership of Asia with anyone, least of all India. After all, the main objective of China’s Asia policy is to prevent the rise of a peer competitor to challenge its status as the Asia-Pacific’s sole “Middle Kingdom.” As an old Chinese saying goes, “one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers.” Checkmated in East Asia by three great powers—Russia, Japan, and the United States—Beijing has long seen South and Southeast Asia as its spheres of influence and India as the main obstacle to achieving its strategic objective of regional supremacy in mainland Asia. Chinese policymakers’ preference for a balance-of-power approach in interstate relations has led them to provide military and political support to those countries that can serve as counterweights to Beijing’s perceived enemies and rivals. Recognizing that strategic-rival India has the size, might, numbers, and, above all, the intention to match China, Beijing has long followed hexiao, gongda policy in South Asia: “uniting with the small (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) to counter the big (India).”

For its part, India has always perceived the Sino-Pakistani nexus, in particular, as hostile and threatening in nature. As the pivotal power in South Asia, India
perceives itself much as China has traditionally perceived itself in relation to East Asia. That the “strategic space” in which India traditionally operated has become increasingly constricted due to Chinese penetration became further evident from Beijing’s forays into Myanmar (Burma) and the Bay of Bengal in the 1990s.

Historically and culturally India never played second fiddle to China. Therein lies the root cause of volatile and strained relationship: Seeing China as the reference point of India’s economic, security, and diplomatic policies, India’s strategic analysts have long emphasized the need to keep up with China militarily. Initially, India’s nuclear capability was aimed solely at deterring China, not Pakistan. It is the adversarial nature of the Sino-Indian relationship that has driven India’s and, in turn, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs. The 1998 Indian nuclear tests were preceded by the Indian defense minister George Fernandes’ statements that called China a “bigger potential threat” than Pakistan and described how his country was being “encircled” by Chinese military activities in Tibet and alliances with Pakistan and Myanmar. From New Delhi’s perspective, much of Beijing’s penetration deep into the South Asian region in the second half of the twentieth century has been primarily at India’s expense. At the heart of Sino-Indian antagonism is the Indian belief that China is seeking to deny India its proper stakes in the game of international politics. That China does not want India to emerge as an equal is evident from its opposition to India’s membership in the P-5 (UN Security Council), N-5 (Nuclear Club), ASEM (Asia-Europe Summit), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and EAS (East Asia Summit).

Both China (after a century) and India (after a millennium) of decline are keen to assume the great power roles they believe they have been their right in view of their histories and civilizations. Both have similar robust attributes of a strong power: massive manpower resources; a scientific, technological, and industrial base; and formidable armed forces. Both are nuclear and space powers with growing ambitions. When Chinese and Indian elites speak of restoring their country’s rightful place in the world, they give expression to a concept of preeminence in Asia and the wider world. This concept reflects their perception that as the foundation of regional cultural patterns, their rightful place is at the apex of world hierarchy.

The similarities between the two Asian giants’ outlooks, aspirations, policies, and interests are indeed striking, despite their differing political systems. Both want a new international status that is commensurate with their size, strength, and potential. Both identify the present pattern of international relations with a world order designed to perpetuate the world domination of Western powers. Both see Asia’s rise on the world stage as bringing about the end of Western dominance. Though uncomfortable with the U.S. dominance in world affairs, both are courting Washington to help balance their relationships with each other until they are strong enough to do so on their own. Both oppose the status quo: China in terms of territory, power, and influence; India in terms of status, power, and influence. Both yearn for a truly multipolar world that will provide them the space for growth and freedom of action that befits great powers. Both have practiced “tilted nonalignment” (during the Cold War China tilted toward the U.S. (1971–89) and India toward the USSR (1971–1991) while preaching independent, non-aligned foreign policies. Both vie for influence in Central, South, and Southeast Asia and for leadership positions in global and regional organizations. Each puts forward proposals for multilateral cooperation that deliberately exclude the other.

Both see themselves as great Asian powers whose time has finally come. Both have attempted to establish a sort of Monroe Doctrine in their neighborhoods without much success. Both claim that their attitude toward their neighbors is essentially benevolent, while making it clear that those neighbors must not make policies or take actions, or allow other nations to take measures in their countries, that each deems to be against its own interest and security. If they do so, China and India are willing to apply pressure in one fashion or another to bring about desired changes. Both are unable to reassert their traditional suzerainty (dominion) over their smaller neighbors, as any attempt to do so encounters resistance from regional and extra-regional powers. Both remain suspicious of each other’s long-term agenda and intentions. Each perceives the other as pursuing hegemony and entertaining imperial ambitions. Neither power is comfortable with the rise of the other. Both are locked in a classic security dilemma: One country sees its own actions as self-defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to
the other. Both suffer from a siege mentality borne out of an acute consciousness of the divisive tendencies that make their countries’ present political unity so fragile. After all, much of Chinese and Indian history is made up of long periods of internal disunity and turmoil, when centrifugal forces brought down even the most powerful empires. Each has its weak point—regional conflicts, poverty, and religious divisions for India; the contradiction between a capitalist economy and Communist politics for China. Both are plagued with domestic linguistic, ethno-religious, and politico-economic troubles that could be their undoing if not managed properly.

China and India also share remarkable similarities in economic outlooks and policies. Both are focusing on increasing comprehensive national strength on a solid economic-technological base. Both are major competitors for foreign investment, capital, trade, resources, and markets. Burgeoning economic ties between the world’s two fastest-growing economies have become the most salient aspect of their bilateral relationship. Both have begun to behave like normal neighbors—allowing trade and investment and promoting people-to-people contact. Bilateral trade flows are rising rapidly (from a paltry $350 million in 1993 to $30 billion in 2007) and could cross $60 billion in 2009 and double again by 2015 (The Times of India, 2008). Several joint ventures in power generation, consumer goods, steel, chemicals, minerals, mining, transport, IT, and telecommunication are in the pipeline. Each is seeking to reintegrate its neighborhood with its national economy.
But in the economic sphere Chinese and Indian economies are still more competitive than complementary. Both look to the West and Japan for advanced technology, machinery, capital, and investment. Many Indians see China as predatory in trade and look with worry at China’s robust growth rates, fearing getting left behind. The Chinese economy is about 2.5 times greater than India’s, and China receives three times more foreign investment than India ($74.7 billion for China versus $23 billion for India in 2008) (Hiscock, 2008). China’s dramatic economic progress evokes envy, admiration, and a desire for emulation among Indians, who lament that whether China practices Communism (under Mao) or capitalism (post-Mao), it always does it better than India. Obviously, India has a lot of catching up to do in the economic sphere. Besides, the bulk of Indian exports to China consists of iron ore and other raw materials, while India imports mostly manufactured goods from China—a classic example of a dependency model. While China’s economic boom offers profit and opportunity, Beijing’s strategic ambitions and efforts to lock up a significant share of Central Asian, African, Latin American, Burmese, and Russian energy resources and minerals for China’s exclusive use generate suspicion, envy, and fear. India’s poor transportation infrastructure and frequent power shortages remain the Achilles’ heel of India’s fast-growing economy, hindering its ability to compete with China. In theory, the partnership of China’s awesome manufacturing power with India’s enviable information technology and services sector could make “Chindia” the factory and back office of the world. But the reality is that China wants to beat India in the services sector, too. As a March 2004 Beijing Review commentary put it, in the IT software sector, “[a] fierce face-off with an old competitor—India—has [just] begun.”

Despite ever-increasing trade volumes, there is as yet no strategic congruence between China and India. On almost all counts, the two Asian heavyweights clash or compete, and they are vulnerable to any deterioration in relations. Their burden of history, long memories, deep-rooted prejudice, tensions over unresolved territorial disputes, and global competition for natural resources and markets add to mutual distrust and tensions. Furthermore, Beijing worries that the logic and pull of geopolitics is pushing India, much like Japan, to a strategic alliance with the United States so as to contain China.

Future Tense

China and India’s strategic cultures require both to regain the power and status their leaders consider appropriate to their country’s size, population, geographical position, and historical heritage. There have been numerous occasions in history when China and India were simultaneously weak; there have been occasional moments of simultaneous cultural blossoming. But for more than half a millennium, Asia has not seen the two giants economically and militarily powerful at the same time. That time is now approaching fast, and it is likely to result in significant new geopolitical realignments. The emergence of China and India as economic giants undoubtedly will throw a huge new weight onto the world’s geopolitical balance. As India grows outwardly, the two giants are beginning to rub shoulders (or ruffle feathers) in different parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. New economic prosperity and military strength is reawakening nationalist pride in India, which could bring about a clash with Chinese nationalism. The existence of two economically powerful nations will create new tensions as they both strive to stamp their authority on the region.

In the power competition game, while China has surged ahead by acquiring economic and military capabilities underpinned by a clear policy to achieve broader strategic objectives, India has a lot of catching up to do. The existing asymmetry in international status and power serves Beijing’s interests very well; any attempt by India to challenge or undermine China’s power and influence or to achieve strategic parity is strongly resisted through a combination of military, economic, and diplomatic means.

More importantly, resource scarcity in the twenty-first century has now added a maritime dimension to the traditional Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry. As India and China’s energy dependence on the Middle East and Africa increases, both are actively seeking to forge closer defense and security ties with resource-supplier nations, and to develop appropriate naval capabilities to control the sea lanes through which the bulk of their commerce flows. Nearly 90 percent of Chinese arms sales go to countries located in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing is investing heavily in developing the Gwadar deep-sea port in Pakistan, and naval bases in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. For its part, India has countered by
promoting defense cooperation with Oman and Israel in the west of India while upgrading military ties with the Maldives, Madagascar, Seychelles, and the United States in the Indian Ocean, and with Myanmar, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and the United States in the east. Maritime competition is set to intensify as Indian and Chinese navies show off their flags in the Pacific and Indian oceans with greater frequency. Their maritime rivalry is likely to spill into the open in a couple of decades’ time when one Indian aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and one Chinese aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean, ostensibly to safeguard their respective sea lanes of communication. Perhaps sooner rather than later, China’s military alliances and forward deployment of its naval assets in the Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, and Myanmarese ports would prompt India to respond in kind by seeking access to ports in Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay), Taiwan (Kao-hsiung), and Japan (Okinawa), which would allow for the forward deployment of Indian naval assets to protect India’s East Asian shipping and Pacific Ocean trade routes, as well as access to energy resources from the Russian Sakhalin province.

For the foreseeable future, India-China ties will remain fragile and as vulnerable as ever to sudden deterioration as a result of misperceptions, accidents, and eruption of unresolved issues. Simmering tensions over territory, overlapping spheres of influence, resource scarcity, and rival alliance relationships ensure that relations between the two rising Asian giants will be characterized more by competition and rivalry than cooperation for a long time to come. In the short to medium term, neither New Delhi nor Beijing will do anything that destabilizes their bilateral relationship or arouses the suspicions of their smaller Asian neighbors. Their efforts will be aimed at consolidating their power and position while striving to resolve more pressing domestic problems. But instability in Tibet, coupled with China’s military links with Pakistan and Myanmar, will pose a continuing complication in Sino-Indian relations. At the same time, both will continue to monitor closely each other’s activities to expand influence and gain advantage in the wider Asian region and will attempt to fill any perceived power vacuum or block the other from doing so. India, like China, would prefer to avoid entangling alliances so as to maximize its options and freedom of action. Nonetheless, a pro-U.S./pro-Japan tilt in India’s national security policy—a reaction to the power-projection capabilities of China—will be a defining characteristic of an increasingly globalized India. But both sides would seek to keep the competition as muted as possible for as long as possible.

In the long term, neither Indian nor Chinese defense planners can rule out the possibility of a renewed confrontation over Tibet, Kashmir, Myanmar, or in the Indian Ocean. A Sino-Indian rivalry in southern Asia and the northern Indian Ocean (especially the Malacca Straits) may well be a dominant feature of future Asian geopolitics of the twenty-first century, which could force their neighbors to choose sides. The nature of the rivalry will be determined by how domestic political and economic developments in these two countries affect their power, their outlooks, and their foreign and security policies.

While they are competitors for power and influence in Asia, China and India also share interests in maintaining regional stability (for example, combating the growing Islamic fundamentalist sector), exploiting economic opportunities, maintaining access to energy sources and markets, and enhancing regional cooperation. Cooperation could allow them to balance U.S. influence and increase their negotiating positions with the sole superpower. On economic, environmental, and cultural issues, they may have far more reason to cooperate than to collide. Intensifying tourism, trade, and commerce should eventually raise the stakes for China in its relationship with India. It is possible that economically prosperous and militarily confident China and India will come to terms with each other eventually as their mutual containment policies start yielding diminishing returns, but this is unlikely to happen for a few decades.

J. Mohan MALIK

Further Reading
India-China Relations: The Way Forward

Excerpts from an article by Indian Ambassador to China, Nirupama Rao, that appeared in the January 2009 issue of the Beijing Review.

During the visit of the then Indian Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988, at which I was a delegate and witness to history in the making, our young leader’s celebrated “long handshake” with China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, generated great excitement and anticipation as the two countries emerged out of their brief estrangement and looked boldly to the 21st century . . . The visit remains a defining point in India-China relations . . .

Today, there is an overarching consensus across India’s political spectrum that an efficiently transacted, stable, durable and well-balanced relationship with China is vital to India. It is heartening to see similar sentiments expressed by the top leaders in China, who have defined ties with India as a strategic policy of their country. Our leaders today are meeting with increasing frequency, as befits the two great nations. Our two governments have decided to characterize our engagement in the changed geopolitical and geo-economic scenario as a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. This means that we should not only take a strategic and long-term view of our bilateral ties in their multiple dimensions, but should constantly bear in mind our converging worldview of global, international and regional issues and events and thus give full play to our role as the two largest developing nations.

Thus our relations hold great promise, and beckon to us to rise to the challenges before us in a rapidly evolving world situation. As long as we keep the long-term and strategic nature of our partnership in mind, we will be able to calmly approach seemingly difficult and intractable issues in the interest of the long-term objectives of peace and friendship, which, as Premier Wen Jiabao has famously observed, have been the mainstream of India-China civilization ties for 99.99 percent of the time. While the scope for competition and cooperation exists side by side, the choice, of whether to make competition or cooperation the dominant theme of India-China discourse, is ours . . .


The indigenous peoples of Taiwan are the island’s original Austronesian inhabitants. They are a diverse collection of ethnic groups who have preserved and transformed their cultures over 400 years of invasion and rule by Chinese and Japanese rulers. Today they are important symbols of a multicultural Taiwan whose distinct political identities are institutionalized in law and state policies.

Taiwan’s 480,000 indigenous people—the island’s non-Chinese original inhabitants—make up 2 percent of Taiwan’s population. Archaeological evidence indicates that their ancestors migrated from the Asian mainland at least six thousand years ago and became the source of migrations south into insular Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Later migration northward from the Philippines brought some groups back to southern Taiwan. The twenty-two indigenous cultures and languages in Taiwan—fourteen of which still exist—are a major resource for research into Austronesian origins. Their languages include the oldest languages of the Austronesian family.

Original Inhabitants

The indigenous peoples of Taiwan were the island’s only inhabitants until 1625, when the Dutch founded a colony, and Chinese migration began. Almost all the plains aborigines (Pingpu 葡族) had been sinicized and had intermarried into Chinese settler society by the early twentieth century. Although a Pingpu ethnic revival is under way today, the real descendants of these people are the Hokkien-speaking Taiwanese, most of whom have Pingpu as well as Chinese ancestors. The fourteen state-recognized groups who inhabit the eastern coast and mountains survived because of their location’s geography and in part because other people feared them as headhunters and “savages.” Indigenous people were known as “Mountain People” (Shandiren 土地人, Shanbao 山胞) until the Return Our Name movement resulted in official adoption of the phrase Taiwan Aboriginal Peoples (Yuánzhuminzu 原住民族) in 1994. Since then the term indigenous has generally replaced the term aboriginal as the preferred translation of the Chinese term.

Relationships between the mountain aborigines and settler society were determined by trade and a Chinese defensive line along the mountain fringe until the 1860s, when export demand for camphor and tea led settlers to expand into the mountains, especially in northern Taiwan. Resistance by indigenous people and reprisals by settlers characterized a generation of sporadic warfare in the north. Such warfare ended only after 1895 with imposition of a strong defense line by Taiwan’s new Japanese rulers, who separated mountain indigenous areas from the rest of Taiwan and prohibited Chinese settlement and any non-Japanese cultural influence. This strategy of colonial control ultimately helped preserve indigenous territory and culture. The Tayal tribe most strongly resisted the imposition of harsh Japanese police administration.
A military campaign of five years (1910–1914) cost thousands of lives before the Tayal were conquered. In 1930 a final uprising, the Wushe Incident, occurred in central Taiwan. The Japanese rulers relocated villages from the deep mountains, introduced a cash economy and rice agriculture, and educated a generation of indigenous elite while eradicating much of the traditional indigenous social structure. Today indigenous culture is deeply marked by Japanese language and custom.

Importance of Churches

The Republic of China (Taiwan, 1949–) under the Chinese Nationalists continued most Japanese policies after 1945 but opened up the mountains to Christian evangelism and Chinese settlement. Policies of agricultural development, suppression of indigenous languages, enforcement of Mandarin Chinese education, and politicized sinicization in the 1950s were intended to assimilate the indigenous people. Attempts to oppose these policies by some members of the indigenous elite were quickly crushed, notably in 1954 with the execution of several leaders of the Formosan National Salvation Alliance. Most local leaders joined the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang 國民黨 [GMD], Kuomintang) in order to win elections in the thirty Mountain Townships 山地鄉, which were low-level units of self-government that serve as conduits for patronage. Much of the indigenous reserve land, which had been held in trust by the state since days of Japanese rule for indigenous users, fell into Chinese hands. Indigenous society became plagued by alcoholism, poverty, suicide, and family breakdown. Indigenous people became sources of cheap labor in construction, factories, mines, and fishing. Today these problems continue in spite of significant improvements in the situation of indigenous people.

Churches became the basis of indigenous ethnic revival and cultural persistence. Through Catholic and Presbyterian evangelism about 70 percent of indigenous people had become Christian by 1960. Today in Taiwan Christianity is often considered to be a mark of indigenous identity. Use of indigenous language in worship, leadership by indigenous clergy, and inclusion of traditional forms of social cooperation in church organization affirmed and perpetuated indigenous identity, especially among Presbyterians. Churches were the only autonomous indigenous people’s organizations that were beyond state control.

A charismatic movement revitalized the indigenous Presbyterian churches from the mid-1970s on, and human rights concepts combined with biblical images of the Promised Land and the Chosen People, bringing elements of indigenous nationalism to everyday religious practice. Politically, most indigenous politicians continued to be loyal members of the Guomindang. However, widespread opposition to authoritarian GMD rule began to increase in the early 1980s. A few educated young people began to challenge GMD control of the indigenous people. In 1984, with support from the Presbyterian church, they founded the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines 原住民權益促進會 (ATA). Indigenous churches were already conducting a campaign to gain land rights from the state and, with the ATA, began to be openly critical of state policies.
In 1987 several highly publicized local demonstrations were staged over land issues, with Presbyterian clergy played leading roles. The next year these demonstrations coalesced into the Return Our Land movement 還我土地運動 and an indigenous mass demonstration in the capital, Taipei, on 25 August 1988.

**Indigenous Rights Movements**

The Return Our Land movement gained the return of only about 13,000 hectares of land. However, it raised the profile of indigenous issues in Taiwan. Indigenous politicians sought to win elections by fighting for long-denied rights. Self-government 自治 and native language 母語 became popular social causes in the 1990s. The following resolutions were enshrined in constitutional revisions adopted in July 1997:

> The State affirms cultural pluralism and shall actively preserve and foster the development of indigenous languages and cultures.

> The State shall, in accordance with the will of the ethnic groups, safeguard the status and political participation of the aborigines. The State shall also guarantee and provide assistance and encouragement for indigenous education, culture, medical care, economic activity, land and social welfare. Measures for this shall be established by law. (Additional Articles 1997, Article 10)

In 1996 the cabinet-level Council of Indigenous Affairs was established, although it has no administrative authority. Nevertheless, the large roles in funding and policy consultation it has been given have contributed to an indigenous renaissance and to the development of many local and national nongovernmental initiatives. By 2000 indigenous peoples had become the symbol of the new multicultural Taiwan, present at every major public event and in overseas cultural exchanges. The then new president Chen Shuibian in 2000 appointed a leader of the indigenous rights movement, a Presbyterian minister, to head the Council of Indigenous Affairs 原住民族委員會 and made classes in native languages part of the school curriculum. Ambitious proposals to create indigenous autonomous areas were made but, because of GMD control of the legislature and aboriginal townships, were never executed. The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law 原住民基本法, passed in 2007, mandates this indigenous control of resources and culture. If the new GMD regime (2008) implements this law, the indigenous peoples of Taiwan could become a political model for the world in their transition from the ethnic margins to the political center.

Michael STAIPTON

**Further Reading**


Indochina-China Relations

Yindùzhīnà hé Zhōngguó de wàijìào guānxì
印 度 支 那 和 中 国 的 外 交 关 系

China’s relations with the three countries of Indochina—Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—have been marked by periods of collaboration interrupted by periods of tension and conflict. The relationship between China and Vietnam stands out as both the longest and the most multifaceted.

For more than a thousand years before Vietnam gained independence in the tenth century CE, it was a part of the Chinese empire. The independent Vietnam, however, remained under Chinese cultural and political influence in a tributary relationship (a prevalent feature of China’s dealings with foreign countries until the late nineteenth century, in which rituals of submission and offerings of money or goods were made to China with the assumption that those living within China’s ever-changing borders, as well as outside them, were in some sense Chinese subjects). But relations between China and Vietnam were not always harmonious, and in times of internal strife in Vietnam Chinese emperors interfered militarily in order to gain direct control, as the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) emperor did from 1407 to 1428, or in order to assist a threatened or deposed monarch, as in the case of the last emperor of the Vietnamese Late Le dynasty (1428–1788) in 1788. On both occasions the Vietnamese eventually defeated the Chinese. Another period of militarized conflicts occurred in the late thirteenth century when the Mongols ruled China and tried to expand political control into Vietnam. Eventually Vietnam won a decisive battle in 1288.

Vietnam also served as a safe haven for people fleeing political upheavals in China. One wave of immigrants came in the thirteenth century after the fall of the Song dynasty (960–1279). Another wave came in connection with the demise of the Ming dynasty during the seventeenth century when the Manchus ousted this dynasty.

The Chinese empire and the Khmer empire also had extensive contacts, as shown by the dispatch of Chinese diplomatic missions and also by trade relations. In fact, one of the most detailed accounts of life in the Khmer empire is the study of the customs of the Khmers by the Chinese diplomat Zhou Daguan.

During the period of French colonial rule over Indochina—gradually established during the second half of the nineteenth century—Chinese migration increased, and authorities in China became increasingly active in attempts to influence French policies toward the Chinese migrants. During the War with France (French, or First, Indochina War, 1946–1954) the support provided by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after its victory in the civil war in China in 1949 was of crucial importance to the armed struggle of the Vietminh in the war against the French. Eventually the war ended in 1954 with the decisive victory of the Vietminh at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and with the Geneva Conference held shortly thereafter. China’s role at that conference was important, and the outcome agreed upon was a compromise, with Vietnam being divided into two parts and with the armed resistance in Laos regrouping into two provinces of the
country. Because Cambodia had already been granted independence in 1953 it was not part of the agreement reached in Geneva.

Relations between 1954 and 1975

Relations between China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) were close in these years. China provided the DRV with extensive economic and military assistance and sent thousands of advisors to assist in various fields. China also provided the DRV with considerable assistance during the Vietnam War against the Republic of Vietnam and the United States in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. However, conflicts developed because of different perceptions of the Soviet Union and divergent views on relations and negotiations with the United States. After the Paris agreement in 1973 Vietnam claimed that China had advised it to diminish the level of the fighting in the south for a few years; the advice was perceived to be aimed at keeping Vietnam divided. China rejected this claim.

China's relations with Cambodia were also good but not as good as with the DRV. After the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 China became one of the main sources of support for Sihanouk in his alliance with the Communist forces in Cambodia in the conflict against the Khmer Republic and its main ally, the United States.

In Laos China's support logically followed its stand toward the DRV, and thus China's support also extended to the Pathet Lao in the conflict against the government backed by the United States.

Relations between 1975 and 1991

In 1975 China's allies emerged victorious in both Cambodia and Vietnam, and in Laos China's ally assumed full control of power. Experts expected the new governments to continue their close collaboration with China. However, relations between China and Vietnam began to deteriorate over China's uneasiness about Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union and China's increasing support for Cambodia in the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. The Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia in late December 1978 caused further tension. There were also territorial disputes along the land border, in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in the South China Sea. The clashes that occurred along the border had more significance as an indication of deteriorating relations and of divergence on other issues than as conflicts in their own right. Finally, there was the issue of how the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were treated by Vietnamese authorities. The mass migration of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam to China in the spring of 1978 led to the open and public deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries. Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 eventually led to China's attack on Vietnam in February and March 1979.

The deterioration of relations between China and Vietnam also affected relations between China and Laos. Laos, as an ally of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, sided with Vietnam in the conflict with China, and consequently relations between Laos and China deteriorated in the late 1970s and into the 1980s.

Relations between Cambodia and China displayed a diametrically different development as compared to Sino-Vietnamese relations, that is, progressing from a good relationship to an alliance, with China emerging as the main supporter of the Cambodian government in its deepening conflict with Vietnam. China sought to mediate between Cambodia and Vietnam from 1975 to 1977. Initially, Chinese reporting on the conflict in early 1978 was fairly neutral, but China's pro-Cambodian stand gradually became more apparent. The Chinese decision to support Cambodia was taken after a visit by Le Duan, secretary-general of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), to China in November 1977, but it was not implemented until 1978. As China's relations with Vietnam deteriorated in 1978 Chinese support to Cambodia increased. The Vietnamese military intervention that overthrew the Cambodian government was a major blow to China because a friendly government had been toppled, and China had not been in a position to prevent it.

China opted for a dual response to the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. The first was a military response, which after the Chinese attack in February and March
1979 was characterized by continued military pressure and increased pressure in connection with Vietnamese military offensives in Cambodia. The other response was support for the Cambodian groups combating Vietnam and full diplomatic support for the policy of criticizing and isolating Vietnam—spearheaded by the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN).

The normalization process began with low-level contacts in the mid-1980s and expanded to high-level meetings from early 1989. In early September 1990 a secret Vietnamese high-level visit to China took place. Despite this meeting, political normalization did not gain momentum until mid-1991. Increased diplomatic interaction paved the way for a high-level summit from 5 to 10 November 1991, during which bilateral relations were officially fully normalized.

The relations between China and Laos were also normalized in the late 1980s in a process that was less complicated than the one between China and Vietnam, given that the deterioration in relations with Laos had
Relations in the 1990s and 2000s

The relationship between China and Vietnam has been characterized by two contradictory trends: one is positive, with expanding contacts and cooperation in many fields; the other is negative with continued differences relating primarily to territorial disputes. The positive trend has been prevalent since full normalization has at times been slowed by the fluctuating levels of tension relating to the territorial disputes, in particular those in the South China Sea area.

The expanding political, cultural, economic, and military contacts between the two countries illustrate the positive trend in improving and expanding bilateral relations. On a regular basis official delegations of one country visit the other country to discuss ways of expanding cooperation in various fields. A strong political willingness exists to strengthen the overall relationship between the two countries. The two countries have signed a number of bilateral agreements. Economic relations have expanded, and bilateral trade has grown considerably. China is also providing loans and assistance to upgrade Chinese-built factories in northern Vietnam. In the political field the relationship between the two ruling parties, that is, the Chinese Communist Party and the CPV, has been expanded through a regular exchange of visits at various levels within the two parties. The contacts between the armed forces of the two countries have also expanded through regular visits.

Tension in bilateral relations has primarily been caused by sharp differences relating to territorial disputes—that is, overlapping claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, to water and continental shelf areas in the South China Sea and in the Gulf of Tonkin, and to areas along the land border—that occurred on several occasions in the 1990s. However, efforts to resolve territorial disputes led to the signing of the Land Border Treaty on 30 December 1999 and to the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin on 25 December 2000. In the 2000s tension relating to the disputes in the South China Sea has been reduced.

China’s relationship with Cambodia has been growing steadily since the early 1990s. China participated in the United Nations’ peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1993. The shift away from support of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) to support of the elected government in Cambodia and the traditionally good relations between King Norodom Sihanouk and Chinese leaders facilitated the political collaboration in the 1990s, and the trend has continued into the 2000s. Economic links also have been established and expanded. To maintain good relations with China is of considerable importance to Cambodia, given its complex and at times sour relations with Thailand and Vietnam, respectively.

Relations between China and Laos have expanded during the 1990s and 2000s. In October 1991 the two countries signed a treaty relating to their land boundary. The relationship has been characterized by both expanding economic ties and by closer political collaboration at both party and government levels. Its relationship with China has provided Laos with the opportunity to diversify its foreign policy and its dependence on Thailand economically and on Vietnam politically.

The Future

The history of relations between China and Indochina has been dominated by the relationship between China and Vietnam; periods of collaboration have been interrupted by periods of conflict and war. This pattern characterized the second half of the twentieth century. Currently a period of cooperation prevails after the improvement of relations during the 1990s and the expansion of relations in the 2000s. Relations between China and Laos have mainly been linked by the patterns of relations between China and Vietnam, in particular since 1975. The impact of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship on China’s relations with Cambodia has also been evident since 1975, in particular up to the resolution of the Cambodian conflict in 1991.

The future of the relationship between China and Vietnam will be determined by how the two sides handle disputes. Expanding bilateral cooperation and economic interaction contributes to building a more stable
bilateral relationship, and progress in managing territorial disputes has contributed to the prospect of long-term stability in the bilateral relationship. However, the disputes in the South China Sea remain a serious challenge. China’s activities along the Mekong River also could lead to disputes with Vietnam and also with Cambodia. Otherwise, relations between China and Cambodia can be expected to strengthen. The same can be said about relations between China and Laos.

Ramses AMER

Further readings


One cannot refuse to eat just because there is a chance of being choked.

因噎废食

Yin yē fèi shí
China is rapidly becoming an industrialized country. Since 1980 its gross domestic product has grown at an average rate of 10 percent annually, the highest in the world. China now ranks among world leaders in the output of steel, cement, coal, chemical fertilizers, and electronics.

China’s first attempts at modern industrialization occurred during the nineteenth century when the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) military leaders, who urged China to borrow technology from the West, initiated the Self-Strengthening Movement. The slogan voiced by one of the proponents of the movement, Feng Guifen (Feng Kuei-fen) (1809–1874), was “Learn the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control the barbarians” (Mason 1997, 410). In light of the strong military influence, from 1861 until 1872 the emphasis was on manufacturing weapons. Later (1872–1894) the emphasis shifted from weapons to a broader range of products and from close central government control to control by regional authorities. The most conspicuous enterprises during that period were the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company and the Kaiping coal mines.

In time, because of bureaucratic inefficiencies, internal embezzlement, and corruption, most of the enterprises became economically unsuccessful. Scholars have argued that traditional society and traditional system of values contributed to the slow and uneven pace of industrialization from the end of the nineteenth century until 1916.

Wrapped up in political turmoil, civil war (1927–1950), the Japanese invasion and the subsequent War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945), China was able to resume industrialization process only in 1953 with its first Five-Year Plan (1953–1957). During that plan the government prioritized rapid industrial development at the expense of agriculture. The privileged sectors included the iron and steel industries, electric power, coal, heavy engineering, construction materials, and chemicals. China’s Five-Year Plan followed the example of the Soviet model of industrialization with the goal of building a large-scale heavy industry production base. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong, like Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, used agriculture as a resource for the development of industries. The Soviet Union helped China build plants with Soviet technical and financial assistance. In fact, prior to 1956, when the first truck was built by Changchun’s First Auto Works (FAW) in collaboration with the Soviet Union, China had almost no automotive manufacturing.

The next major campaign to industrialize was undertaken by the Chinese Communists between 1958 and early 1960 during the Great Leap Forward. The goal was to mobilize the population to solve China’s industrial and agricultural problems. Because of China’s vast labor resources, the labor-intensive method of industrialization rather than reliance on heavy machinery was chosen. Because the Great Leap Forward emphasized small-scale manufacturing, its most absurd manifestation was an imposition of small backyard steel furnaces in every village rather than construction of large steel plants. The Great Leap Forward was inherently deficient because of the
prevalence of ideology over expertise, errors in implementa-
tion, and economic inefficiency of the commune-based
small-scale production. As a result China’s agricultural
sector was seriously damaged, and about 20 million peo-
ple died of starvation between 1958 and 1962.

China’s modern industrialization is usually associ-
ated with the economic boom that began in 1978 with
Chinese Communist Party General Chairman Deng Xi-
aoping’s reforms. The Four Modernizations program was
announced in 1978 to facilitate progress and reform in the
fields of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and
national defense. China also introduced an open-door
policy and invited foreign direct investment (FDI).

**Focus on Agriculture**

The first period of the reforms (1978–1984) focused
on agriculture. One of the features of the agricultural
transformation was the household responsibility system,
which gave families permission to launch family coopera-
tives. The immediate focus on agricultural reform was
pragmatic: to provide food for 1 billion-plus people. The
success of the household responsibility system in the ag-
ricultural sector made two substantive contributions to
reform in the manufacturing sector. First, the agricul-
tural reform prompted farmers to be more productive.
Surplus farmers migrated to the manufacturing sector
and satisfied the labor demand. In 1980, 68.7 percent of
employment was in the agricultural sector, declining to
46.9 percent in 2000. Second, farmers’ increased income
boosted demand in manufactured products and allowed
them to indulge in consumerism.

The second period (1984–1992) was characterized by
the dismantlement of the Soviet-style centralized eco-

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continued market-oriented reforms and intensive industrialization.

Since the early 1990s China has allowed foreign investors to manufacture and sell a wide range of goods in the domestic market and has authorized the establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises in some industries. China is now one of the world’s leading recipients of FDI. It received $60 billion in 2005. The inflow of FDI into China over the period of twenty-five years surpassed $623.8 billion in 2005. The first serious investments into the realization of the Four Modernizations were made by the Chinese in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and by ethnic Chinese from Singapore, Southeastern Asia, and the West. Following the Chinese, the West started to invest in China. Western investors are attracted by the huge Chinese market, cheap labor, flexible environmental regulations, closeness to raw materials, and low construction costs. The establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) created a valuable instrument of investment allocation. The zones represent favorable investment climate regimes that provide various incentives to foreign investors, including tax exemptions and developed infrastructure. SEZs rely on centrally conceived legislation and are administered by local authorities. SEZ is an umbrella term that emerged from the original four SEZs located in Guangdong Province (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou) and Fujian Province (Xiamen). Currently forty-nine national-status zones are divided into several categories: national economic and technological development zones (ETDZ), national free trade zones (FTZ), national high-tech industrial development zones (HIDZ), national Taiwanese investment zones (TIZ), national border and economic cooperation zones (BECZ), national export processing zones (EPZ), and national tourist and holiday resorts (THR).

**Coal Deposits**

Because of the investment regimes created in special economic zones, the eastern and southeastern coastal areas of China account for about 60 percent of the national manufacturing output. However, many industries are situated in the interior of China, especially coal mining. China’s most important mineral resources are hydrocarbons, of which coal is the most abundant. Most coal deposits are located in the northern part of the country.

In March 1992 Deng Xiaoping announced that China should not be constrained by ideological and political arguments about which label the reforms should carry—socialism or capitalism—implying that the economic transition is not about the label but rather about the process. The famous saying, “It does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice,” is attributed to Deng Xiaoping and alludes to the new mixed system of economic organization that combined market and socialist elements. Another slogan of economic reforms in China, “To get rich is glorious,” encouraged entrepreneurship. The economic reforms are slow and gradual when compared with the Russian quick transformation of the 1990s that combined both pro-market economic reforms and pro-democracy political reforms.

Since 1980 the average annual rate of growth of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has been 10 percent, the
highest in the world. This period of accelerated growth in an industrializing country such as China is referred to as “catching up.” China’s industrial transformation was largely inspired by the experiences of the East Asian latecomer countries. Today China has the world’s fourth-largest economy in terms of GDP after the United States, Japan, and Germany.

Because of a trade surplus (China exports more than it imports), in 2006 China’s holdings of foreign-currency reserves, the yields of fast-growing exports, reached $1 trillion. Exports reached $762.3 billion in 2005. Major exports are electronics, machinery, apparel, furniture, and optical, photographic, and medical equipment. The main partners are the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, European Union, South Korea, and Singapore.

China’s industrial revolution over the past twenty-five years has allowed it to emerge as a leading industrial economy. At present China is referred to as the “world manufacturing base.” The manufacturing sector accounted for 52 percent of China’s GDP in 2003. As early as 1999 China ranked among world leaders in the output of steel, cement, coal, chemical fertilizers, and television sets.

Most heavy industries and products considered to be of national strategic interest remain state owned, but an increasing number of lighter and consumer-oriented manufacturing firms are private or are private-state joint ventures. At the beginning of the reforms China’s industrial policy focused more on marketization of the socialist economic system than on privatization of state-owned enterprises. The policy is changing now as more and more sectors are opening up to private investment.

Steel Industry

Among industries the metallurgical and machine-building industries have received high priority and account for about two-fifths of the total gross value of industrial output. China is a major player in the global steel market with regard to consumption and production. China’s steel consumption constituted 32 percent of the world’s total in 2005, and annual crude steel production surpassed the combined output of Japan, United States, Korea, and Russia. Chemical and petrochemical industries also receive state attention. The growth of the chemical industry has placed China among the world’s leading producers of nitrogenous fertilizers.

The pace of industrialization quickened and diversified in the 1990s. China developed automobile, aircraft, and aerospace manufacturing. In addition, China expanded rapidly into the production of electronics, semiconductors, software, and precision equipment, often in cooperation with foreign firms. The consumer electronics sector has been especially successful.

Industrial plants like this one in Beijing find a ready pool of skilled workers and a market for the goods they produce. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
The automotive sector is one of the pillar industries in China. At present China occupies third place after the United States and Japan among the fifteen largest motor vehicle-producing countries. According to the recent Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), the goal for the auto industry was the production of 1 million cars a year. In 2002, the automobile industry in China was reported to consist of thousands of vehicle manufacturers and auto parts makers, employing nearly 2 million workers. A prominent trait of the Chinese automotive sector since the industrial transformation in the 1980s is heavy reliance on borrowed technology. Until the end of the 1990s nearly all cars manufactured in China were produced by joint ventures. As the end of the twenty-first century approaches, every large world automaker has a presence in China. With China having the potential to become the world’s largest car market—China’s January 2009 auto sales surpassed those of the United States for the first time—no major car manufacturer can afford not to be operating in China. The presence of foreign automakers is usually an indicator of a developed network of local suppliers—component parts manufacturers. Foreign automakers form joint ventures with Chinese state-owned companies to produce cars for the domestic market and for export. The industry is dynamically developing: China’s auto exports hit a record of 340,000 units in 2006, more than double the figure for 2005; in 2007 the number of vehicles and chassis reached 612,700.

One of the keys of China’s industrial revolution is state support of science and technology (S&T) and applied research. Between 1994 and 1998 nationwide research and development (R&D) funding as a percentage of GDP was 0.6–0.7 percent. This indicator increased sharply to 0.83 percent in 1999 and 1.01 percent in 2000. Whereas most developed countries’ R&D percentages range between 2 and 2.5, China stands out as a heavy spender among developing countries. Mexico’s R&D spending, for example, ranged from 0.31 percent in 1994 to 0.4 percent in 1999,
and India’s ranged from 0.81 percent to 0.86 percent in the same period. China’s government reported investing more than 57.6 billion RMB ($6.9 billion) in S&T in 2000, an increase of 4.8 percent over the previous year. The general directive of the S&T system is to enhance research implementation—the system encourages research institutes to launch commercial spin-offs based on successful applied research in their laboratories, especially in the high-tech sector.

**Abundant Labor Force**

One of China’s major resources is its abundant labor force. China’s population base of 1.33 billion people will continue to provide a labor supply at a relatively low wage rate for a long time. Consequently, the wage rate will go up, as it historically has in all mature industrialized economies.

Transportation is a key to an industrialization effort. Railway construction began in China at the end of the nineteenth century. Because railways can carry a large volume of goods over long distances, they are of special importance in China’s transportation system. Coal has long been the principal railway cargo. The increase in the production of petroleum and natural gas has made it necessary to build pipelines. Since the 1980s and especially since 1990 the emphasis had been on construction of highways. Thousands of miles of multilane express highways have been built in and around large cities to accommodate a vigorously increasing traffic. The road mileage has roughly doubled since the early 1980s. However, the increase in the motor vehicle fleet has grown more rapidly than road construction, especially in Beijing and Shanghai.

Since ancient times water transport has played a major role in moving goods. The Yangzi (Chang) River, the most important artery in China’s waterway network, accounts for almost half of the country’s waterway mileage. China has more than 125,000 kilometers of navigable inland waterways, the most extensive system of any country in the world.

In light of the impressive industrialization growth, China faces a number of challenges that can impede further development. One of the challenges is the resource and energy gap. China is generously endowed with raw materials, but, taking into account the accelerated development rate, these resources soon may be exhausted. At present China has reserves of 153 minerals, which positions China in third place in total global reserves. The country has abundant coal, oil, and natural gas deposits. However, the development of present resources does not keep up with the speed and growth of demand. Experts estimate that among the forty-five major minerals in China, only twenty-four will be able to meet demand in 2010, and only six will be able to meet demand in 2020. China will depend on the supply of gas and oil from abroad.

Another challenge is the deterioration of China’s environment as a side effect of intensive industrialization. In the absence of appropriate environmental protection policies, China’s human capital will be harmed. China faces a water shortage, which will have a dramatic impact on both industry and health care. Pollution, increasing desertification, and a growing population have put China’s annual per capita water availability at 2,200 tons, representing 25 percent of the world average. The volume of global air pollution will also increase as the billion-plus people in China begin to drive automobiles in massive numbers. If China’s number of motor vehicles per capita were comparable with the world average, its fleet would total 160 million, with 10 million new and replacement vehicles purchased each year.

**GDP Discrepancies**

Another development challenge facing China is the discrepancy in the contributions of the industries and services sectors to the GDP. Industry in China has surpassed the agriculture and services sectors in economic growth. Value-added shares of GDP in 2003 constituted 52 percent for industry, 33 percent for services, and only 15 percent for agriculture. No doubt China has emerged as a leading industrial economy. However, some argue that the fact that China’s growth in the manufacturing sector has failed to be matched by the growth in its services sector is an indication of underdevelopment. Industrial structure evolves from primary industry to the secondary and finally to the services sector. In many countries the manufacturing sector’s share within a country’s overall economy goes up at an early stage of economic development but declines when the country’s economic level approaches that of advanced countries. For example, the
Manufacturing sector's share of GDP in advanced countries, including Japan and the United States, has fallen to about 20 percent in recent years. This decline shows that deindustrialization is occurring in most advanced countries in the world.

In 2002 Xu Kuangdi, president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), declared that China would need about twenty years to become an industrialized country and another thirty or forty years to become a modernized country. China is now on the path to those two goals. Many analysts are calling for sustainable industrialization of China, which involves balanced economic and social development, better regional integration, and more attention to the environment.

Irina AERVITZ

Further Reading


Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, or Nei Monggol, is one of five such regions in China with a large percentage of ethnic minorities, and the first to be established (in 1947), predating the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It is slightly smaller than South Africa in area and is dominated by vast grasslands.

Bordering on the Mongolian People’s Republic and Russia to the north, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, or Nei Monggol, is China’s northern frontier. It was the first Autonomous Region (a region with a large percentage of ethnic minorities) to be established, in 1947, predating the People’s Republic of China by two years. It is an oblong strip of land, extending from northeast to southwest, with an area of 1.2 million square kilometers (463,423 square miles). Internally, it borders on Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces. It is home to the Mongolian, Han, Hui, Manchu, Daur, and Ewenki peoples.

Inner Mongolia, with a temperate continental monsoon climate, has cold, long winters with frequent blizzards and warm, short summers. With its vast stretches of grasslands, it is a major stockbreeding center known for its Sanhe horses, Sanhe oxen, and fine wool sheep. Daxinganling Forest, in Inner Mongolia’s northeast sector, makes up one-sixth of China’s total forest reserve. Apart from wheat, naked oats, millet, sorghum, maize, and rice, a wide range of cash crops is grown, including soybeans, linseed, rapeseed (canola), castor oil plants, and sugar beets. Inner Mongolia holds first place in the country in rare earth metals and niobium and natural soda reserves and second place in coal reserves.

Huhehaote (Hohhot), the capital of Inner Mongolia, is an ancient city located north of the Great Wall. Baotou, another major city in the region, is one of China’s major iron- and steel-producing centers.

Many changes are afoot in the largely pastoral region as traditional ways of life such as herding are encroached
upon by the rapid modernization of China in recent years.

Further Reading


The Chinese have a long history of freely borrowing ideas from other countries, which, in the past, has caused no problems. But in today’s global marketplace, ideas, or intellectual property, have become a commodity. Borrowing intellectual property has become infringement, a violation of ownership rights. China is one of the world’s worst offenders of intellectual property infringement.

Visitors to China can easily buy pirated CDs and DVDs on the streets of most major cities. Representatives from U.S. companies find imitations of their products in the factories and markets they visit in China. Editors of journals and books in the United States and Europe too often turn down written work from Chinese authors because of obvious plagiarism. These are examples of blatant infringement of intellectual property rights, a persistent problem in China.

Creative Content

Intellectual property broadly refers to creative content, including music, art, writing, and innovation, such as the research and development creations of business and corporate work. In general terms, intellectual property rights (IPR) are the exclusive rights of individuals or businesses to control the production and reproduction of their creative, intellectual property. This is often seen in the form of copyrights, patents, and trademarks, and frequently discussed in terms of music, films, printed texts (such as books and periodicals); software, and proprietary business developments. IPR infringement has become an increasingly visible issue as global markets for foreign products widen. As demand for access to a greater range of intellectual property grows, illicit reproduction of this creative content has become more commonplace. In economic, trade, and diplomatic circles, IPR protection has become a top agenda item for foreign countries and businesses entering China, one of the fastest growing consumer markets.

As a member of the World Trade Association (WTO), China is required to have in place an IPR protection and enforcement system that includes consistent enforcement, criminal and civil procedures to deal with IPR infringers, and equal protection, access, and treatment for holders of copyrights, trademarks, and patents, whether the copyright holders are foreign or Chinese. But protection of intellectual property rights has been somewhat lax in China.

Violations

In 2005 the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) reported that more than 86 percent of the business software in use in China, 92 percent of entertainment software, 85 percent of all music, 93 percent of all movies, and 52 percent of all books were pirated. In surveying the U.S. copyright-based industries (software, publishing, music, and film) that it represents, the IIPA discovered
that China was responsible for an estimated $2.6 billion in lost trade revenue in 2005.

Several high-profile companies have taken action against IPR infringement. One is Starbucks Corporation, which was successful in 2005 in getting two coffee shops to give up the name Xingbake, a Chinese phonetic approximation of Starbucks, with xing also meaning “star,” and to stop using a near duplicate of the famous green Starbucks logo.

Despite Starbucks success IPR infringement remains rampant in China, with everything from the most popular and noticeable brands to the most minute parts and components of everyday products being copied. The rapid rise of the Internet and the burgeoning numbers of Internet users has made piracy even easier and less costly for the infringer—though it should be added that this problem is not unique to China. U.S. interests would like to see China bring more cases of infringement of foreign-owned copyrights, patents, and trademarks to court. The IIPA noted that in 2005, of all the cases of IPR infringement prosecuted in China’s courts, only approximately 2 percent involved protecting foreign-owned intellectual property.

Enforcement

The United States uses three main methods to target IPR infringement: bilateral negotiations, the option (and sometimes threat) of a WTO dispute case, and a provision of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 called Special 301.

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

The United States and China have two major mechanisms for addressing bilateral trade issues in general, and these mechanisms have been moderately useful for discussing issues related to IPR. The first is the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), established in 1983, and the second is the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), launched in 2005. The JCCT meets twice annually, once in Beijing and once in Washington, for discussions of market access, subsidies, IPR, and other trade issues. The SED has become a forum for high-level talks between officials, including cabinet-level officials from the United States and their equivalents among the Chinese leadership.

The JCCT

The United States uses JCCT talks to pressure Chinese leaders on the local level to crack down on IPR infringement in their jurisdictions. The JCCT has allowed China and the United States to discuss disagreements, solve trade-flow issues, and address pending regulations before they are implemented, thereby averting future problems. For example, officials from Washington and Beijing were able to reach an agreement on a proposed software law in China that would have limited foreign companies’ ability to get legitimate software into Chinese government offices. If the law had been enacted, not only would it have hurt foreign companies’ ability to do business in China but also would have undermined efforts to curb IPR infringement. Without easy access to legitimate software, government offices would most likely have turned to pirated software.
The SED
The SED talks have been used mainly as a catalyst to invigorate areas of bilateral negotiations by raising them to the senior levels of government. Because the SED involves senior-level officials, it can be used to increase the focus on getting results from other forums, such as the JCCT, and to make political commitments to support such things as IPR enforcement. In 2006 the SED talks allowed the United States and China to lay out commitments on IPR (for example, a province-by-province review of China’s IPR enforcement) that would be further discussed through the JCCT.

WTO Involvement
The United States has sought improvements in China’s IPR system primarily through bilateral dialogue instead of taking action through the WTO because bilateral dialogue generally produces faster results than a drawn-out WTO case does. Additionally, to date there has never been a WTO case against China on IPR, which means that bringing such a case involves navigating an uncharted area of WTO dispute settlement. Nevertheless, the U.S. industries most affected by IPR infringement have been outspoken in Washington about pushing for better IPR protection in China, and there has been a lot of talk about pursuing a WTO case against China on IPR.

In April 2005 the United States, Japan, and Switzerland did use Article 63.3 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property to request that China spell out the specific details of its IPR system. The biggest challenge in a WTO case is proving that China’s system is ineffective. As is the case with most countries, China is obligated to protect only trademarks, copyrights, and patents registered in China. It is not required to enforce the intellectual property laws of any other country or to protect patents, trademarks, or copyrights that are registered in other countries but not in China. To prove that China is failing to meet WTO-mandated IPR commitments, companies need to try to prosecute cases in
China’s courts. This means that they have to have registered their trademarks, patents, or copyrights in China. They then must file a suit there and see the suit through to some conclusion.

Because registering a copyright and then proving infringement is a tedious and oftentimes frustrating process, negotiators and trade officials feel that mounting and proving a WTO case could be difficult to do quickly, though U.S. officials have been amassing data and information so they will be prepared should they choose to pursue such a case. A WTO-dispute case would be difficult because the United States would have to show that U.S. companies went through the Chinese court system and that the system failed them in order to prove that China’s system does not provide the level of protection agreed to under the WTO. In the meantime, industry groups, including the IIPA, have asked their members to register their copyrights and to attempt to bring IPR cases to China’s courts so that the deficiencies of China’s systems will be evident when proof is needed.

**SPECIAL 301**

The United States also uses Special 301, an annual review process provided for in the Trade Act of 1974, to identify countries that are especially egregious violators of IPR rules and standards. China has long been listed on the Priority Watch List, a designation that dictates extra attention and bilateral dialogue aimed at improving IPR enforcement. U.S. officials use the Priority Watch List designations to increase the amount of resources devoted to targeting IPR protection in a country. Additionally, if a country is on the Priority Watch List, it is subject to special investigation. The United States also uses the Special 301 designations as a trigger for increasing its negotiations with countries that have failed to meet their IPR commitments. In 2008 China was listed on the Priority Watch List, along with Russia, Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Pakistan, Thailand, and Venezuela.

**China’s Point of View**

China’s history, specifically its efforts to establish its independence from foreign influence, has in part been attributed to its notoriety as a place for IPR infringement. As China tried to move beyond foreign allegiances and strengthen its standing, copying intellectual material, mainly books, that would aid in such growth was seen as morally defensible. Without any overall negative sense being attributed to copyright infringement, there was little impetus to curb such infringement.

Further, China established efforts to solidify its individual standing in the world by limiting the amount of foreign content allowed inside the country (such as a quota on foreign films) and boosting its own intellectual production. And since China has started to take a larger place in the global market and its own intellectual property has become attractive, especially in cinema, Chinese producers have started to see their own products subject to illegal infringement. IPR advocates see this development as key to reversing the trend of illicit reproduction of creative content in China.

Many government and trade-group officials in the United States believe that IPR infringement can be further curtailed by increasing enforcement, shutting down major piracy operations, and getting pirated products off the streets. A more effective enforcement system is critical to China’s economic development and trade relations with the United States, a fact that the Chinese leadership is sure to be aware of.

Scott ELDRIDGE II

**Further Reading**


The screening of content over the Internet by the government is common and far-reaching, overseen by thousands of private and public monitors who filter content sent through websites, blogs, forums, and e-mail. A majority of Chinese Internet users have said in surveys that they prefer that the Internet be controlled in some way.

The Chinese government’s control over the Internet, including Internet content, is well documented and hardly a surprise to anyone. All media in the country is tightly controlled, which, to most people in the West, amounts to unacceptable censorship. The actual scope of Internet content filtering is difficult to determine because the monitors continually shift their attention to certain sites and topics they deem undesirable.

Monitoring the Monitors

Reports of China’s Internet filtering comes from the activities of bloggers, academics, nongovernmental organizations, and watchdog groups both within and outside the country that monitor China’s filtering system and compare and discusses its characteristics on e-mail lists, blogs, and other public forums. One such watchdog is the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), a joint project that monitors and reports on Internet filtering and surveillance practices by governments. Partners in the project are the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at the Harvard Law School; the Oxford Internet Institute at the University of Oxford; and the Advanced Network Research Group at the University of Cambridge.

In a 2005 report, the ONI described China as operating “the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world.” China’s filtering program employs a combination of technical, legal, and social measures applied at a variety of access points and overseen by thousands of private and public monitors who filter content sent through a range of communication methods, such as websites, blogs, forums, and e-mail. Together, these measures create a matrix of soft and hard controls and induce a widespread climate of self-censorship.

Technical Mechanisms

Technical filtering mechanisms can be found at all levels of the Internet, from the basic architecture to PCs located in hotels and Internet cafés. Although Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet cafés, search engines, and other network services can and do operate their own filtering systems, all network traffic is subject to a uniform system of filtering at three major international gateways in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou known collectively as the Great China Firewall. Filtering is centralized and largely consistent across each of the international gateways.
This gateway level of filtering is an unavoidable last line of defense. ONI research has uncovered three forms of filtering at these international gateways: DNS tampering, keyword filtering, and IP blocking.

DNS tampering works by interfering with the system that cross-references domain names with the numerical address associated with them. Users are directed to an invalid IP as if the site they requested did not exist. By contrast, IP blocking targets the numerical address. This type of blocking can cause major collateral filtering of unrelated content because different domain names can share the same IP address host.

Keyword filtering targets the URL path—and, increasingy, the webpages—searching for banned terms. When one is found, the routers send what are known as RST packets, which terminate the connection between sending and receiving computers, effectively preventing that computer from making requests to the same server for an indefinite period. Because the system works both ways (for requests exiting and entering China), it can be tested by searching for banned keywords like “Falun Gong” or “Tibet” on search engines hosted in China. In each case users requesting banned information receive an error message on their web browser, making it appear as if the information is not available or that there is something wrong with their Internet connection. Users trying to access banned content do not receive a block page informing them that the content is officially filtered, as is the case in some other countries that censor the Internet.

During the Tibetan protests in 2008, another new, sophisticated form of blocking appeared: the use of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. There have been persistent and increasing charges that DDOS attacks against servers in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere have their origins in mainland China. Such attacks were prominent during and following the demonstrations in Tibet, with the servers of many Tibetan and Chinese human rights organizations systematically targeted. It is difficult to pinpoint the source of these more aggressive methods of denying access to information, which effectively target and disable the sources of information themselves rather than passively blocking requests for information, as the filtering systems do.

Technical means of filtering are complemented by an extensive set of social and legal or regulatory measures. Legal or regulatory measures tend to be vague and broad; they offer a wide scope for application and enforcement as well as uncertainty among users. Most have the effect of holding end users and services—such as café operators, ISPs, blog-hosting services, and media—responsible for
censoring the content they post and host. Since enforce-
ment can be arbitrary, users and operators of services tend
to err on the side of caution, preferring to prevent or re-
move offending material rather than risk censure.

Social measures are even more general and thus harder
to define, but they include operating norms, principles,
and rules that are propagated through media and official
channels and are combined with extensive techniques of
surveillance, which together affect behavior in both for-
mal and informal ways. These include self-discipline pacts
signed by Chinese Internet service companies pledging
to uphold public values and self-censorship by Internet
users. The first thing many users see when logging on are
two cute cartoon police officer characters, Jingjing and
Chacha, that pop up and warn users not to visit banned
sites or post harmful information.

Content
Content targeted for blocking is wide ranging and covers
social, cultural, security, and political topics considered a
threat to Communist Party control and social or political
stability. Among the topics most frequently blocked are
Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the
Dalai Lama, the Tiananmen Square incident, and opposi-
tion political parties.

ONI investigations revealed that China’s filtering
tends to focus disproportionately on content in local Chi-
inese languages. Users searching for the equivalent Eng-
lish language terms, for example, will often get a higher
proportion of results than they would for the same terms
searched for in Chinese.

During the 2003 SARS epidemic, the government
tried to restrict news about the outbreaks in the early days
of the crisis while officials and experts tried to work out
a course of action. But groups inside and outside China
used the Internet, along with mobile phones and satellite
broadcasts, to ensure that information about the disease
was widely distributed.

In January 2009 the Internet Affairs Bureau under the
State Council Information Office launched a campaign
against online gaming sites that may be too violent or too
political. Websites and services that help people evade
government censorship are also regularly filtered.

Although the filtering system appears consistent and
relatively stable from day to day, the Chinese government
has also demonstrated a propensity to use what ONI calls
just-in-time blocking in response to special situations as
they emerge. For example, during the demonstrations
in Tibet in 2008, the government implemented blocks
against Youtube.com and other video-streaming services
that were circulating images of protests. The blocks were
later lifted.

Government Response

Official acknowledgement of censorship of Internet content
has been inconsistent. Officials deny or do not discuss de-
tails of content-filtering practices. On rare occasions when
public officials raise the subject, they compare it to similar
practices in the West and justify it as way to protect public
safety, core social values, and stability. When Google.cn
was established and agreed to abide by government rules,
there was an international outcry over censorship. But
searches on Google.cn on controversial topics brought up
many sites that were critical of the government. But the full
scope of China’s censorship regime is never spelled out in
official circles or public government documents.

Generally speaking, Chinese Internet users accept
government intervention much more readily than users
in Western countries would do. In surveys conducted in
2003, 2005, and 2007, more than 80 percent of respon-
dents in China said that the Internet should be controlled
and that the government should be the controlling agent,
a role that the government intends to maintain.

Ronald J. DEIBERT

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China’s burgeoning Internet industry is helping fuel the nation’s economy. Online gaming and social networking are the most popular uses of the Internet. Business-to-business selling and online shopping are growing rapidly. In just a few short years, and with limited penetration, the Internet has grown to become one of China’s major industries.

The Internet is one of China’s largest industries. The China Internet Economy Research Center (CNERC) divides the Internet industry into many sectors and subsectors. These include Internet enterprises, such as search engines and service portals; Internet business activities, such as advertising, recruiting, and business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce; online economic activities such as banking, investing, travel booking, and shopping; online social networking, which includes text messaging, chat rooms, and the online community; and online recreation, such as gaming, watching videos, and downloading music.

History
The history of the development of China’s Internet industry can be divided into four phases: beginning, upswing, depression, and recovery.

First Phase, Beginning (1993-1995)
In 1993 the concept of an Internet economy was first introduced to China, initiating the construction of basic network facilities. In 1994 China officially connected to the Internet, and four main networks were established: ChinaNet, run by a state-owned telecommunication company, is the largest Internet service provider in China providing public Internet access. China Science and Technology Network, managed by the Chinese Academy of Science, is a network for the scientific and technology communities. China Education and Research Network (CERN) is mainly for academic use by students and researchers. And China Golden Bridge Network links government departments.

Second Phase, Upswing (1996-1999)
In May 1996 Yahoo, founded by Yang Zhiyuan (also known as Jerry Yang), was listed in NASDAQ for the first time. A rush to open websites took over China, among which the portal site Sohu became the most influential. In 1998, World Electronic Commerce Year, the Chinese Commodity Market officially joined the Internet. In that same year, the Chinese Ministry of Information Industry (MII) was established to regulate the entire information industry, from the manufacturing of electronic and IT products to developing national communication networks. Internet connections were installed under the

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directive of the MII to cover forty-three cities that constitute the Chinapac network for data transmission. The MII also connected one thousand universities under CERN to use the Internet.

In 1999 B2B e-commerce began, and the portal site Sina was launched, which ended the leading role of Sohu in China. Also at this time, different kinds of professional vertical websites were launched, and the competition among domestic websites became more intense. During these years the information industry became China’s first large-scale industry. China’s IT sector was growing at 25 percent per year.


China, like the rest of the world, suffered through the dot-com collapse at this time. A great number of websites closed before showing any profit.

FOURTH PHASE, RECOVERY (2003–PRESENT)

Since 2003, the Chinese Internet industry has recovered and has been growing stronger. Although the Internet industry started comparatively late in China, it developed rapidly. Since 2005, its market scale has grown by 40 percent or higher every year.

Recent Developments

Overall, the Internet industry continued to grow through 2008, although at a slower rate than in previous years. All sectors continued to develop, and online gaming and mobile value-added services became two of the main drivers in the evolution of the Internet industry.

In 2007 the market share of online gaming exceeded that of mobile value-added services for the first time, with 57 million users generating some 12.8 billion yuan ($1.8 billion) in sales. But after ten years of rapid development, online gaming entered a new phase in 2008. Social problems and legal issues caused by gaming have put this sector of the industry under close government scrutiny. At the same time, reorganization among providers, the licensing of third-generation (3G) technology, and the regulation of junk messaging have boosted mobile value-added services. In the coming years, this sector is expected to see more reshuffling as the government works to strengthen management practices and expand the market.

The top four earning enterprises of the Chinese Internet industry in 2008 were Tencent, China’s largest Internet services portal; Shanda, an online gaming company; Alibaba, a B2B marketplace portal; and Netease, a Web portal and gaming site.

According to CNERC, B2B e-commerce in China developed rapidly in 2008, despite the global economic crisis. Under the effect of the financial crisis, more small and medium-sized enterprises turned toward the domestic market, and online retailing started to become attractive to buyers.

Internet advertising spending grew from nothing in 1996 to 39.6 million yuan ($5.8 million) in 1998 and to 82 million yuan ($12 million) in 1999. It reached 5 billion yuan ($731 million) in 2006. The 2008 Beijing Olympics provided a superb opportunity for large-scale Internet marketing, and Internet advertising increased by 70 percent from the previous year. The long-term effects of the financial crisis that began in 2008 are yet to be seen, but Internet ad sales were expected to hit 12.2 billion yuan ($1.79 billion) by 2009, according to a 2006 Deutsche Bank report. The media service group ZenithOptimedia predicted in a 2007 report that online ad spending in China will surpass magazine ad spending by 2010.

Online Shopping

According to Taobao.com, China’s largest online auction site, online shopping accounted for just 0.64 percent of retail sales in China in 2008 but will likely make up 5 percent to 8 percent by 2012. The total amount spent online increased 125 percent in 2008, according to a survey by Shanghai-based research agency iResearch Inc. Online shopping in China was expanding sharply in early 2009 and expected to continue growing, bucking the worldwide trend in private saving over spending. The iResearch agency predicts Chinese e-shoppers could be spending 569 billion yuan ($83.1 billion) a year by 2012.
E-shopping is attractive to Chinese consumers because of the low prices of goods available online, the countless choices that appeal to younger fashion-conscious buyers, and the purchasing power of the yuan.

Foreign-made goods are in particular high demand with online shoppers, with products from Europe and East Asia leading the way. In 2008 purchases from the United States ranked fourth on Taobao.com by volume but first in amount spent per transaction. Transactions at Taobao.com’s global shopping channel have been rising at a three-digit rate each year since the channel launched in 2006.

Profiting from Taobao.com’s success, Alipay, an e-commerce payment-transfer provider, introduced a new service in 2007 that enabled overseas retailers to sell products directly to mainland consumers. Eighteen months after launching, Alipay had 250 partner retailers based in Hong Kong, East Asia, Japan, Europe, and the United States. Its membership had reached 120 million by the end of 2008. The service is sure to grow because Chinese online shoppers are trusting and prefer third-party payment transfers to paying by credit card online.

The most popular purchases through Alipay are cosmetics, brand name clothing, nutrition products, and electronic equipment and gadgets. Alipay’s biggest user group is made up of young, relatively affluent women. Often a number of these shrewd shoppers band together to place group orders, which results in reduced shipping costs.

The Internet shopping market potential is huge. In June 2008 China became the largest Internet country in the world when it surpassed the United States with 253 million users online. (By comparison the United States had 223 million active Internet users in June 2008.) By January 2009 there were 298 million Internet users in China, according to China Internet Network Information Center, a government-approved group that provides data on technical aspects of the Internet as well as demographic information.

**Limitations**

In spite of the rapid development of the Internet industry and Internet use, a number of factors persist to limit development of the industry and the proliferation of Internet technology.

Most Internet users in China live in urban areas. People in the countryside are isolated by the lack of communication. Estimates are that half have never even used a telephone. Farmers do not know the market prices for their crops and are swindled by business people who profit from their ignorance. In emergencies farmers have to walk, often long distances, to get help because they have no technology with which to connect to the outer world. Lack of access to communication restricts employment and education. The main cause of unequal access is cost. Most people in the poorer rural regions cannot afford Internet services or equipment.

Although there has been a notable expansion in the quantity of services and equipment, quality has remained
second-rate in many cases. China’s Internet infrastructure lags behind most other developed countries’ facilities; the bandwidth is narrow; the pace of accessing is slow; and the running standards of networks are poor. Development of the Internet industry has been unbalanced. Different sectors and different enterprises have developed at different rates. In addition, investment in Internet infrastructure construction and improvement has been low.

The level of innovation in information technology in China falls far behind that of other developed countries. The core technologies that make up of China’s basic information architecture—such as network facilities, computer chips, system software, and security products—are usually provided by foreign enterprises. Some major technology projects still depend heavily on the participation of foreign companies.

Although advancing, until recently B2B e-commerce had been unknown and underused. A suitable platform for effective B2B e-commerce is still being tested. Logistical problems, inefficient payment systems, and a lack of available credit have been bottlenecks in the expansion of e-commerce in particular and the Internet industry as a whole. But the government is now actively promoting a workable e-commerce platform, and awareness of this way of doing business is growing among Chinese business people.

Despite the limitations and problems, researchers at CNERC and others believe that the Internet industry will be grow steadily in the future, if not as dramatically as in the past. With easier access, higher quality products and services, supportive government policies, and the commitment of 300 million Chinese Internet users, it is reasonable to expect a bright future for the Internet industry.

DU Junfei

Further Readings


Internet Use

Hùiliánwǎng shìyòng 互联网使用

China has surpassed the United States as the country with the largest number of Internet users in the world, although use of the Internet differs in the two countries. While the majority of U.S. users shop online, for instance, only about a fraction of Chinese do. Nevertheless, e-shopping in China surged dramatically in early 2009.

Internet use in China began with the sending of an e-mail from Beijing to Germany on 20 September 1987. Chinese and German scientists had jointly created an e-mail node. The subject line of the first e-mail was “Across the Great Wall we can reach every corner in the world.”

The Internet in China was used mainly by academics until early 1996 when Internet service provider (ISP) ChinaNet began to provide public Internet access. After that, Internet development and usage expanded quickly.

Subject for Study

Founded in June 1997, and administratively operated by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), which also takes responsibility of China’s top-level domain name registry under “.CN” country code, started to release Internet survey reports as early as October 1997. The reports are recognized as official data approved by the Chinese government. They cover Internet usage, such as location and time spent on the Internet, and users’ online activities, as well as demographic information.

A research project at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, the China Internet Project (CNIP), has released Internet survey reports every two years since 2001. It covers the broad effects of the Internet and has become a key source for analyzing technical aspects of the Internet, comparative demographics, and research on Internet use. Its research focuses on urban China. Data on Internet usage in rural China is still sparse and anecdotal, though it is thought that a large number of mobile telephone users access the Internet via their phones. Other studies on Internet use in China can be found from CCID Consulting, International Data Group, and iResearch, among others.

Internet Development

Until 1999 there were only four gateways connecting China to the world. ChinaNet, run by a state-owned telecommunication company, is the largest ISP in China providing public Internet access. China Science and Technology Network (CSTNET), managed by the Chinese Academy of Science, is a network for the scientific and technology communities. China Education and Research Network (CERNET) is mainly for academic use by students and researchers. And China Golden Bridge Network (CHINAGBN), which no longer operates independently,
links government departments. Since 1999, a host of major portal websites has come online, including Sina.com, Sohu.com, and Netease.com. Other commercial websites, such as Baidu.com, a Chinese search engine, Taobao.com, a Chinese eBay-style C2C website, and Dangdang.com, a Chinese online bookstore, are becoming popular in China. Unlike in most other industries, only a few foreign Internet companies have been able to gain the kind of market share they hoped for when entering China. Homegrown Chinese companies dominate the field.

In 2005 fewer than 70 percent of Internet users were accessing information through search engines, about 60 percent were using e-mail, and only 20 percent were shopping. Since then, however there has been a well-recognized shift. More users are logging onto search engines and buying things online; e-mail and online marketing are becoming familiar; and bulletin board systems, social networking sites, blogs, and other web sources for use in both education and entertainment are becoming more important.

In 1997 the number of Internet users was 620,000; the number of computer hosts, 300,000; and the number of websites, 1,500. Since 2000, the volume of Chinese content on the Internet has exploded. By December 2007 the number of Chinese websites had reached an estimated 1.5 million; many overseas Chinese, especially college students and professors, contribute to the content of these sites. Chinese became the second Internet language after English. There are about 431 million English-language Internet users worldwide; the number of all Internet users worldwide is about 1.5 billion.

China became the largest Internet country in the world in 2008 when it surpassed the United States with 253 million users online. By January 2009 there were 298 million Internet users in China, about a 23 percent penetration (the average percentage of the population that regularly accesses the Internet), according to CNNIC. By comparison the United States had 223 million active Internet users in June 2008, about a 73 percent penetration. In developed countries the average penetration is 70 percent; overall penetration in the world is 21.1 percent. Most Internet users in China live in urban areas, where the Internet penetration rate is about 56 percent.

**Users and Uses**

Internet users in China are mainly concentrated in urban areas. They tend to be young, male, fairly well educated, and working in professional jobs. One study showed that 30.3 percent of Internet users are eighteen to twenty-four years old and that 18.7 percent are twenty-five to thirty years old, a total of 49 percent of users. This is a common profile for technology adopters in general. But, compared to the United States, where 73 percent of women and 73 percent of men use the Internet, development in China is still in an early stage.

In urban areas the Internet plays a major role in many people’s lives. Users read news; gather information about health care; download music and movies; play games; communicate with classmates, colleagues, or friends; and express opinions on current events, news, public affairs, and government policy.

Reading news online is popular among urban users. The Internet has become a convenient and inexpensive way to learn of domestic and international events. Chinese users are particularly eager to comment or enter into discussions online after reading the news. Yet traditional media—TV, newspapers, and radio—are still more trusted than online news is. In the 2007 CNIP report, 70 percent of respondents in China (compared to 52 percent in the United States, according to the survey conducted...
by USC Digital Center) said that a small portion or none of the information online is reliable.

Urban Internet users spend more time on entertainment, such as downloading music and movies or playing games, than on any other online activities. The 2007 CNIP survey found that in urban China, 37 percent of Internet users go online at least once a week to download or watch videos, the highest percentage of any country surveyed.

E-mail is used mainly among classmates or colleagues but is less popular than QQ, an instant message computer program, which is mostly used among friends. And text messaging has become very popular. Most people use pinyin, the English alphabet to write Chinese pronunciations, when texting. But the fastest way is to use the wubizixing input method, which uses Chinese characters. Some people use a text editor known as MULE (an abbreviation of multilingual enhancement) that can process many languages, including traditional and simplified Chinese.

Compared to the United States, where 71 percent of Internet users shop online, China has a low rate of e-shoppers. According to CNNIC, about 20 percent to 25 percent of Chinese Internet users buy things online, although the number of e-shoppers has rapidly increased, and is expected to rise even higher. While many online shoppers pay for goods with bank cards (mostly debit cards), others use systems similar to PayPal, such as Zhifubao. On the most popular online shopping website, Taobao.com, part of the business site Alibaba.com, Zhifubao is widely used. Some online bookstores and other retailers that sell small consumer items continue to use the traditional cash on delivery (COD) payment method. Orders are placed online but nothing is paid until the goods are delivered into the customer’s hands, whether at their home or workplace.

Chinese Domain Names

Chinese characters in URLs will soon be part of the international standard for the Internet. When a Chinese domain name (中国 domain name) is formally put into use, this domain name is upgraded into the Chinese Domain Name global root domain name registration database. The system requires that “中国” be a top-level domain name representing China on the global Internet. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
An internet forum in which Chinese students discuss taking the GRE (Graduate Record Examination) and TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language). Together, students taking these two tests are called GT’ers.

Karen CHRISTENSEN and GUO Liang

Further Reading


During the pre-reform years of China’s planned economy, the Iron Rice Bowl was a range of social services guaranteed to workers. Services included lifetime employment, housing, health care, and pension plans.

Before China moved from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, the Iron Rice Bowl (tie fan wan) was an array of social services enjoyed by workers that could exceed in value even the workers’ nominal wage. These services included lifetime employment, housing, health care, pension plans, child care, education for workers’ children, ration coupons for commodities, and even subsidized food. The access to services was directly related to a worker’s employment in a work unit (danwei) or to a worker’s place of residence as indicated by his or her residence certificate (hukou).

The Iron Rice Bowl embodied the commitment of the Chinese Communist Party to China’s modernization and in particular to the belief that industrial workers employed in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) represent the vanguard of society. The privileges enjoyed by these workers were also granted, to various degrees, to civil servants, teachers, and army personnel. This regime became theoretically universal after Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong sponsored the development of People’s Communes, rural farm collectives that were administered by a central authority (a Communist cadre) where everything was shared and even distributed. Class enemies were excluded, however, and for residents of impoverished regions access to social services was merely theoretical. In addition, the advantages that should accrue from the Iron Rice Bowl did not amount to much during the famine of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), Mao’s plan to turn China from a primarily agrarian economy dominated by peasant farmers into a modern, industrialized communist society, or the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

Yet, because workers made decisions in their councils on the benefits they should enjoy—often regardless of the economic performance of their employer—the Iron Rice Bowl represented an ideal to which everyone aspired. The policies undertaken by Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping after 1978 undermined these benefits in the name of economic growth. After the household responsibility system replaced the People’s Communes during the 1980s, peasants gradually lost many of their entitlements and suffered a deterioration of living and employment conditions after the 1990s as doctors, teachers, and other providers of social services charged increasingly expensive fees for their services. Because a worker’s free access to social services was limited to services from his or her place of residence, migrant workers who moved to cities looking for work were often deprived of services if they could not afford them.

Many rural residents who were too old or too frail to work the land and whose children were gone were not entitled to pension benefits because they could theoretically draw revenue from what they produced. Many urban
workers employed in the private sector did not receive any of the benefits enjoyed by SOE employees or civil servants. Even the privileged category of SOE workers suffered a deterioration of its situation as many firms were constrained by their managers to close and therefore left their former employees without a living. The aging of the Chinese population aggravated the situation: Chinese demographers expect that in the next decade the ratio of employed people to unemployed people will decline and place a major burden on those who hold jobs. Former premier Zhu Rongji (in office 1998–2003) pushed for a reform of SOEs, and his successor, Wen Jiabao, has replaced the Iron Rice Bowl with a more universal system of social security.

André LaLIBERTÉ

Further Reading
Islam

Yìsilánjiào 伊斯兰教

Although “Seek learning even onto China,” the oft-cited hadith—a narrative record of the sayings or customs of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions—has been over-interpreted in commentaries and by pure speculation, it does suggest the farthest limits of Muslim expansion. From the Tang years (618–907 CE) to the present—considering the basic demand of Islam that its followers ought to live under Muslim regimes—difficult problems have arisen for Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim lands.

In the twenty-first century Chinese Islam (or Islam in China, as some would have it) has over 25 million adherents divided almost evenly between the Hui (the ethnically sinified Muslims of mainland China) and the Turks (mainly Uygurs but also tiny Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other minorities) in the Chinese northwest and Tibet. This population constitutes the core of Muslim presence in eastern Asia. The other countries of eastern Asia—Japan and Korea—have been home to Muslim minorities only in recent decades, and most of them are not native or converted Muslims but rather members of foreign Muslim communities of diplomats and traders who have settled or, more often, have been posted provisionally there. For those who count Taiwan as a separate entity, one may also take notice of the small (a few tens of thousands) but thriving Muslim community that derives from mainland China and emigrated to the island in 1949, together with the withdrawing forces and populations accompanying Chiang Kai-shek and his retinue into exile.

Today, due to unrest of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, aided by their exiled kin in the West or in the adjoining former Soviet Muslim republics of central Asia, Islam in those far-flung regions of the world has taken center stage in China, not only when viewed for its own sake and the challenge it poses to the jealously unified Chinese state but also when viewed in the context of the Muslim fundamentalist wave that has been rocking much of Asia. Indeed, the familiarity in China of the terms jihad (a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty) and Hezbollah (Party of God)—and occasional acts of terror that have been resorted to in northwest China of late—conjure Muslim unrest in Asia and elsewhere that cannot be glossed over: the Middle Eastern violence; the militant Islamist Osama bin Laden's activities in southern and central Asia; the Abu Sayyaf “exploits” in the Philippines; or the rampages of some Muslim radical groups in the Malay world of Southeast Asia.

In view of the basic demand of Islam that its followers ought to live under Muslim regimes, difficult problems are posed by the very idea of any Muslim minority living in non-Muslim lands, which is certainly the case with China (unlike the Muslims of southern, southeastern, and central Asia who constitute majorities in their respective countries). This applies not only to majority-minority and host culture–guest culture relationships but also to some basic requirements, short of which a Muslim
minority may rebel against the ruling government and even try to secede from it. This issue, which has recurred in the history of many Muslim minorities throughout the world, not least of which were the bloody secessionist rebellions in nineteenth-century China, acquires more acuity in China these days due to the extraordinary convergence of several major factors:

- Chinese society and culture, which have a long tradition of assimilating foreign cultures, had to contend in this case with a self-confident guest culture, with a vast hinterland of Islam outside the confines of China, which hardly lends itself to acculturation.
- Chinese Communism, which has been until recently strictly antireligious, has been opening up of late, thus creating a more accommodating environment for religious, if not yet political, pluralism.
- The growing interest of the Islamic core in the minorities of the periphery, partly due to the current revival of Islam, has raised the feasibility of Islamic renewal in the remote fringes of the Islamic world.

Mosque, Shanghai, 1980. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
The proximity to Chinese territory of the newly independent former Soviet Muslim republics, some of whose kin (e.g., Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) live in China, has made the latter permeable to ethnic-nationalist influences from the outside.

The Coming of Islam to East Asia

The formative years of Islam in China—or east Asia, for that matter—occurred during the era between the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and the Yuan-Mongol rulers (1279–1368), when Muslim merchants and artisans and later administrators and mercenaries made their way there. It is generally held that while the numbers of Muslims in China were small and initially confined to the coastal cities of the southeast, notably Quanzhou during the Tang and the Song dynasty (960–1279), by the fall of the Song dynasty there were probably four or even six mosques in China. This indicates that the population, although small and almost exclusively foreign, had sufficient continuity and common wealth to sustain a mosque, burial grounds, and other features of an ongoing Muslim settlement. It must, however, remain conjectural as to whether this population would have assimilated or emigrated over the centuries to rejoin the Muslim landmass had it not been for the dramatic growth of China’s immigrant Muslim population under the Yuan-Mongol rule.

Unlike the first wave of immigrant Muslims via ocean-faring routes, known as the “Maritime Silk Road,” the second wave under the Yuan followed the ancient land-bound Silk Roads, now reconnecting China to the west by the continuity of Mongol rule. Then an unprecedented period of exchange unfolded between the Chinese and Islamic cultural worlds, which for the first and only time in history were part of the same political entity. Voluntary and enforced migrations from the Islamic lands into China meant that by the restoration of indigenous Chinese rule under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), sizable Muslim communities were established right across the country. It is thus mainly from the latter immigrants that most Hui Muslims now descend, although many of them claim more ancient roots. This was also the period when mass conversions of the Uyghurs to Islam took place.

Expansion of Islam

Under the conditions of tolerance—some would say indifference—of the great khans (medieval sovereigns of China and rulers over the Turkish, Tatar, and Mongol tribes), the Muslim community made great strides, and the evidence of such great Muslim travelers as Ibn Battuta shows that there were also flourishing mercantile colonies in the coastal cities along the China Sea. Muslims became prominent in occupations such as engineering, medicine, technology, transportation and overseas trade, agriculture, and handicraft work. Under the Yuan there was also a significant change in religious life; mosques and schools were built; and a network of Muslim hostels was established for traveling Muslim merchants. In the end of the Mongol rule Muslims may have totaled some
4 million souls, more than any other minority in China. They took their place in all aspects of Chinese life: political, economic, administrative, and military; yet, they were still confined to their own communities, somewhat isolated, partly by their customs and dietary laws, from the vast Chinese population surrounding them.

The high profile of the Muslims during the Yuan dynasty inevitably provoked a backlash. Many Muslim officials and commanders behaved arrogantly and oppressively, lording it over the native Chinese majority, which had itself cultivated the much more ancient Confucian ethos and traditions that were at variance with some Muslim attitudes. Hence, the situation changed under the indigenous Ming, for whom the Golden Age of the Yuan was now over. At the beginning Muslims could still practice their social and religious freedoms, but later the regime forced many Chinese to settle in the border zones where the Muslims had established their communities. Through intermarriage and prohibitions to the practice of their religious laws, many of them assimilated materially and adopted Chinese dress, speech, and other customs, a process that turned them from Muslims in China to Chinese Muslims.

Ming times also saw the appearance of a series of Muslim charismatic leaders who founded new, generally Sufi (Muslim mystic) movements within the Muslim communities after returning from periods spent in Muslim lands to the west. There is evidence of Sufi presence in China since Yuan or even Song times, which provided a fertile ground for the Naqshbandi missionaries who arrived in fifteenth-century China. The arrival of the Naqshbandi and Qadari Islamic mystics gave new forms of expression to Chinese Muslims who had been muzzled by the oppressive atmosphere of the regime. These expressions were crystallized into the quintessentially Chinese-Muslim invention of the *menhuan*, groups that clustered around charismatic mystics, whose leadership often became hereditary. These *menhuan* often subdivided into bitterly rivaling clusters, the most famous and widespread of who are the Khufya and Jahriyya branches of the Naqshbandiya, themselves subdivided into dozens of groups that lend to Chinese Islam its extreme sectarian variety. Other non-Sufi denominations include the whole range from fundamentalist puritans to reform-minded progressives.

**Into the Modern Era and Beyond**

The last Chinese dynasty, the Qing (1644–1912), perhaps because it was itself Manchu and therefore wary of other “alien” cultures, inaugurated an era of violence in the relationship between the Middle Kingdom and its minorities.
The general chaos and devolution of power in the nineteenth century triggered large-scale Muslim rebellions throughout the northwest and the southwest of the country, where three separate attempts were made at secession by Du Wenxiu in Yunnan, Ma Hualong in Gansu, and Yakub Bek in Kashgar. At least two of those rebellions (Yunnan and Gansu) were related to the dynamics of Sufi sectarianism, associated with the eighteenth-century scholar and revivalist Ma Mingxin. His group was known as the “Xinjiao” (the New Teaching), apparently one of the many appellations of the Jahri brand of Sufism, and it turned to armed unrest no less to battle its other Sufi rivals than to counter the ruling dynasty. However, all those attempts were sunk in blood, leaving millions of Muslims and Chinese dead and vast swaths of country devastated.

Under the Republic of China (1912–1949) and then under Communist rule (since 1949), the Muslims have
been recognized as a “national minority,” but under the People’s Republic of China they are kept atomized under their various ethnic groupings (Uyghur, Kazakh, Hui, etc.) to facilitate the ancient divide et impera (Latin: divide and conquer) device of control. Generally speaking, because of the regime’s necessity to maintain relations with Muslim countries on the international arena, it strove to avoid any brutal mass oppression of the Muslims domestically. However, during the excesses of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Muslims were greatly mistreated and abused, waqf lands (endowed land in Islamic tradition) were confiscated, mosques destroyed, and Muslims forced to undergo Marxist indoctrination. On several occasions attacks were launched by Chinese troops against Muslim villages. However, since Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping came into power in 1979 and initiated the opening and reform of China to the outside world, the government has relented on pursuing the policies that once suppressed Muslims across the country.

In the post-Deng era (since the mid-1990s), the Chinese leadership, which has been struggling to maintain its balancing act between openness and economic development on the one hand and stringent control on the reins of power on the other hand, has also had to face the challenge of Uygur separatism over the past decade. Deng’s policy of relaxation had been calculated to make any social unrest unwarranted. However, following Deng’s own saying in another context that “when the window is open it also allows mosquitoes in,” his moderate policy also opened the door to widespread violence in practically all the counties of Xinjiang, the northwest, and the far west of China. Admittedly, some of the violence was directly triggered by printed insults against the Muslims, but it escalated and got out of hand with the military intervention of the People’s Liberation Army, as in Xining in the autumn of 1993. In some areas, as in Kashgar, bombing was perpetrated (October 1993), and the ominous war cries of jihad, associated with a local Hezbollah, were voiced.

Prospects
The rampages of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan and the unrest in east Turkestan are watched by other Asian countries not only for their own threatening sake but also for their radiating influence onto their territories. The active support of radical Muslim groups and countries has turned the Chinese parts of East Asia, just like neighboring central Asia, into one of the centers of Islamic radical violence today. Most of the Hui-Muslim minority is spread over practically all of mainland China and therefore lacks a specific territory it can claim as its own and use as a base—hence its avoidance of clamoring for secession—while Qinghai and Xinjiang provinces, which are closer to the Muslim world and have been drawing support from some of it, have advanced secession demands, and violence has been resorted to in pursuance of this goal. Thus, due to both the lax policy of the Chinese government, which permits links and visits between its Muslims and the outside world, and the pressing interests of the radical elements in the Islamic world, one can expect more outbursts of this sort. Such outbursts may culminate in outright demands for secession from China. In view of the unified concept of government in China, which has never acknowledged the existence of “federated republics” in its midst (unlike the Soviet Union) nor tolerated secession (consider Tibet as an example), it is hard to conceive a China that would sit idly by while its borders are permeated by rebellion and chaos.

Raphael ISRAELI

Further Reading
Closely associated with China for more than 7,000 years, jade has been personified with moral attributes and used for religious, ceremonial, and decorative purposes throughout history.

Jade (yu), a hard, luminous stone available in various colors (including white, yellow, green, gray, mauve, and brown), has been an artistic medium in China from at least the fifth millennium BCE. The term “jade” is generally given to two types of stones: nephrite, a crystalline calcium magnesium silicate from northeastern China (Jiangsu Province) and Central Asia’s Khotan and Yarkand regions; and jadeite, a green, glassy sodium aluminum silicate mineral of the pyroxene family from Myanmar (Burma). It is nephrite, however, that early Chinese artists used to create ritual objects, personal items, and ornaments.

Valued originally for its innate beauty, jade came to be conceptualized as having moral virtues and magical properties; mythology claimed it was the congealed semen of a celestial dragon. The Han dynasty scholar Xu Shen

Workroom in the jade factory at the Yangzhou Commune. Jade sculptures and ornaments were made in factories like this one and exported or sold to tourists. Propaganda posters line the walls of this particular factory. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
(c. 58–147 CE) characterized jade as having five virtues: wisdom, as typified by its purity and penetrating sound when struck; courage, in that while it can be broken, it cannot be bent; integrity, as signified by its translucence; charity, epitomized by its bright warm luster; and equity, represented by its sharp angles that injure none.

Special techniques for carving jade were necessary because of jade’s exceptional density. Unlike most other stones, which can be chiseled, jade must be carved through an arduous abrasion process utilizing drills and quartz sand. This labor-intensive process makes jade artifacts very costly. From earliest times, jade was the ultimate symbol of wealth and power, and thus, the finest workmanship and artistry were lavished on the precious stone.

The earliest artistic use of jade occurred in the Hongshan culture of the middle Huang (Yellow) River basin, Liaoning Province, from the fifth to fourth millennia BCE. Examples of jade carvings in this period include coiled dragons, owls, turtles, and cloudlike plaques. Jade carvings are so predominant among Hongshan artifacts that some scholars have referred to this period as the Jade Age.

Ritual use of jade in burials continued in China throughout the Han dynasty (206 BCE–24 CE). Jade objects were positioned on, around, and under the bodies of the deceased in their tombs. Thus jade was regarded as having more than social status; it had ritual and protective properties as well. The most extraordinary examples were found near Lingshan, in Hebei Province: In the tomb of Prince Liu Sheng and his wife Princess Dou Wan, the two royal figures were covered from head to foot in outfits made entirely of jade plaques drilled at the four corners and fastened with gold wire. It is believed that these functioned as shrouds, protecting the body from decomposition and from attack by evil forces.

Jade implements were important in conducting affairs of state during the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Zhou (1045–256 BCE) dynasties, in that various pieces came to signify specific courtly ranks. Because jade was identified with the imperial court and with great virtue, it became likened to the Confucian ideal of the perfect gentleman (junzi).

Beginning in the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), jade was used increasingly for secular items and personal adornment. By the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the secular use of jade was widespread. Jewelry, fine vessels, and utensils, as well as objets d’art that had no particular religious connotation, were crafted from jade. Decorative and functional items such as bowls, cups, dishes, jugs, vases, containers, hair ornaments, beads, and bracelets received lavish, delicate ornamentation.

After centuries, the art and tradition of working with jade spread westward from China through Central Asia into India and Turkey. There are fine examples of carved jade from the Mughal Empire (1526–1857), known as Hindustan jades. Many of these are embellished with intricate designs that incorporate precious gems held in place with gold filigree.
Jade Working in Ancient China

In his work Science and Civilisation in China, scholar Joseph Needham discusses the appeal and importance of working with jade and other semi-precious stones.

The Chinese had begun fashioning objects of jade at least by about –5000 [BCE]. By the end of the Neolithic period, jade had clearly established its primacy among the semi-precious stones suitable for “carving” and it would continue to grow in importance in the succeeding centuries...

Because of the rarity of jade deposits in the Chinese heartland, jade played no significant direct role in the history of Chinese mining. It was important, indirectly, however, in two ways: (1) its combination of prestige and rarity led Chinese to search widely for other stones that most resembled jade, and (2) the Chinese love of “carved” jade, which is not carved at all since jade, either nephrite or jadeite, is too hard to be cut even by steel tools alone, led the Chinese to search for the most effective abrasives that could be used for shaping it.

Neolithic stone carvers used many other minerals and stones along with jade to make ornaments. A very early example comes from the Ho-mu-tu culture south of Hang-chou Bay where fluorite was used along with jade to make ornaments. At another site, near Nanking, jade and agate were used together.


After thousands of years, jade remains so closely identified with Chinese culture that the medals presented during Beijing’s 2008 Summer Olympics were inlaid with a ring of jade.

Katherine Anne HARPER

Further Reading


Japan-China Relations

Riběn hé Zhōngguó de wàijiāo guānānxì
日本和中国的外交关系

Relations between China and Japan extend back to ancient times, with frequent cultural borrowings travelling in both directions across the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. Scholars divide writings about Japan from pre-Ming years (pre-1368) up to the present into eight phases, within which are four periods described as “high tides,” often brought on by war, when the volume of literature swelled.

Ancient China is better understood today than ever before, thanks to archaeological finds of the past fifty years. Ancient maritime China, however, is less well understood, although studies underway are yielding insights into the early relations centered around the geographic triangle of northeastern China, Korea, and Japan. Recent writings discuss patterns of trade and migration, the distribution of artifacts and their meaning, the spread of peoples, goods, and ideas, funerary practices across the region, and early state formation.

A long written record precedes and complements the archaeological finds. The earliest Chinese account of Japan appears in the classic Shanhai jing (Classic of Mountains and Waters). A work of lively imagination, Shanhai jing refers to Japan metaphorically as “Fusang” (intertwining mulberry tree, like two lovers embracing each other). China’s unifier, Shi Huangdi of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), was so captivated by the magical “Eastern Seas” that he dispatched Xu Fu (255 BCE–?) in 219 BCE and again in 210 to search for elixirs of immortality, sending with him a reported three thousand virgin boys and girls and sailors and craftsmen in the thousands. In Japan to this day shrines and monuments to Xu Fu abound. A native of the state of Qi in modern Shandong Province, Xu Fu was born not far from Penglai, itself shrouded in legend. Chinese and Japanese scholars pursue studies of Xu Fu and this maritime region with vigor.

A less mythological and more objective early Chinese account of Japan is the data on Woren (Japanese) in the Chinese dynastic history, San’guo zhi (Treatises of the Three Kingdoms [289 CE]), by Chen Shou (223–297 CE). From this account forward most zhengshi (Chinese official histories) include an entry on Japan. (See table 1.) Beginning with the Jiu Tang shu (Old Tang History) of 945 CE, Chinese refer to Japan by its own preferred name of “Riben” (in Japanese, Nihon or Nippon) which translated as “Land of the Rising Sun,” that is, land to the east where the sun rises. For the next one thousand years all Chinese standard histories used Riben as the primary term for Japan. This practice shows a Chinese knowledge of and formal respect for Japan that was significant. However, many entries on Japan before the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) include materials that are sinocentric and contain data that are unscientific and thus must be used with care.

These official histories and other Chinese writings reflect the ups and downs of China-Japan relations to the present. The eight phases of writing and interactions include four “high tides” (gaochao). The four high tides are the Ming dynasty, the late Qing dynasty (1895–1912), the
period of the War of Resistance against Japan (1931–1945), and from 1979 to the present. (See table 2.)

Phase 1, the long period before 1368 and the Ming dynasty, covered writings of more than a thousand years. In this period of loose if steady Chinese awareness of Japan, Japan for its part underwent episodes of transformative borrowings from China after 600 CE, well known to students of Japanese history.

Phase 2 was the Ming dynasty itself. The Ming faced enormous pressures from the outside world, summarized in the phrase “bei Lu nan Wo” or “Lu [nomad enemies] to the north, and Wo [Japanese pirates] to the south.” During much of the Ming dynasty Japanese pirates or Wokou (in Japanese, wakō) devastated coastal east Asia from Korea down China’s long eastern shore on into Southeast Asia. This piracy created a rift within China, pitting hawks—those wanting to ban ocean travel—against doves, those favoring state protection for China’s lucrative maritime trade. China’s Wokou problem spurred an unprecedented need for knowledge about Japan among Chinese. This need resulted in the first “high tide” of Chinese writings on Japan. Ming studies of Japan are distinguished from previous writings by several features: their range of authorship (by officials but also by nonofficials); by the nature of their writings, not just brief notes in official histories but also comprehensive monographic works; and by the variety of specialized new topics—among them Japanese terminology of Chinese origin, Japanese systems of governance, famous people, household utensils, Japanese “gods and ghosts” (guishen), and information from Japanese primary sources collected in Japan itself. Among the most important writers and works of this first high tide are: Xue Jun (flourished 1523–1530); Riben kaolue (Brief Reference Materials on Japan); Zheng Shun’gong (sixteenth century); Riben yijian (An Account of Japan), based partly on six months in 1556 collecting data in Japan itself; and Zheng Ruozeng (1503–1570), Chouhai tubian (Atlas for Coastal Defense) (1562), a groundbreaking work in eight parts including chapters relating to Japanese pirate raids and Chinese defense against them.

Phase 3 occurred during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) up to Japan’s Meiji Restoration of 1868. Here Chinese writings virtually vanished as a result of Japanese

### Table 1 Japan in Chinese Standard Histories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Work</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year of Formal Adoption</th>
<th>Entry Name</th>
<th>Term for Japan</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>San’guo zhi</td>
<td>Chen Shou</td>
<td>289 C.E.</td>
<td>Dong Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Woren</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hou Han shu</td>
<td>Fan Ye</td>
<td>445 C.E.</td>
<td>Dong Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Wo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Song Shu</td>
<td>Shen Yue</td>
<td>488 C.E.</td>
<td>Yi Man liezhuang</td>
<td>Woguo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nan Ji shu</td>
<td>Xiao Zixian</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>Dongnan Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Woguo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Liang shu</td>
<td>Yao Silian, et al.</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>Dong Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Wo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sui shu</td>
<td>Wei Zhi, et al.</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>Dong Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Woguo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jin shu</td>
<td>Fang Xuanling, et al.</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>Si Yi liezhuang</td>
<td>Woren</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan shi</td>
<td>Li Yanshou</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>Yi Mo zhuang</td>
<td>Woguo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bei shi</td>
<td>Li Yanshou</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>Si Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Wo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiu Tang shu</td>
<td>Liu Xu</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>Dong Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Woguo, Riben</td>
<td>both terms used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xin Tang shu</td>
<td>Ouyang Xiu, et al.</td>
<td>1061</td>
<td>Dong Yi zhuang</td>
<td>Riben</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Song shi</td>
<td>Tuo Tuo, et al.</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>Waiguo zhuang</td>
<td>Riben</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ming shi</td>
<td>Zhang Tingyu, et al.</td>
<td>1739</td>
<td>Waiguo liezhuang</td>
<td>Riben</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Xin Yuan shi</td>
<td>Ke Shaomin</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Waiguo zhuang</td>
<td>Riben</td>
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<td>Qing shi gao</td>
<td>Zhao Erxuan, et al.</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Bangjiao zhi</td>
<td>Riben</td>
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</table>

government policies. Well before 1644 the Tokugawa shogunate or bakufu (1600/1603–1868) for internal security reasons had sealed Japan’s borders and forbidden its people from leaving Japan on penalty of death. By this unilateral action Japanese authorities solved China’s “wakō problem.” As for non-Japanese coming to Japan, the Tokugawa created a system of regulated foreign contact at the one port of Nagasaki, with access limited to the Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans. China’s new Manchu conquerors after 1644, free of Japanese pirates, were able to pacify China’s coast and in 1683 bring Taiwan under direct Chinese administration. Taiwan emerged as an object of Chinese curiosity and of rich firsthand reports, motivated by trade and security interests. Because writers lacked similar access to Japan, Chinese writings on Japan floundered. Writings on Nagasaki by Chinese focused narrowly on trade issues, while the more comprehensive study by Weng Guangping, *Wuqi jing bu* (Supplement to the *Azuma kagami* [History of Japan]) (1814), remained unpublished and little known. In short, Qing writings are undistinguished when compared with writings of the Ming dynasty or with Chinese writings after 1877.

The last 140 years, from the Meiji period in Japan (1868–1912) to the present, have been a period of accelerated writings that reflects interactions both constructive and destructive. Phase 4, 1868–1894, a period of just twenty-six years, ushered in Phase 5, 1895–1912, a high tide of seventeen years. From the latter part of Phase 4, in 1877 when China established its first modern diplomatic mission in Japan, Chinese recorded impressions of a rapidly modernizing Japan in the form of diaries, collected poems, and high-quality reference materials. Chinese diplomat Huang Zunxian launched this era with his collected poems, *Riben zashi shi* (Poems on Japan Topics) (1879), themselves a springboard to his magnificent *Ribenguo zhi* (Treatises on Japan) (1890/1895). Other notable works were Wang Tao’s *Fusang youji* (A Record of Travels in Japan) (1879), the breakthrough mini-encyclopedia of diplomat Chen Jialin, *Dong cha wenjian lu* (Records of Things Heard and Seen in Japan) (1887), and the ambitious compilation by China travel mission reporter Fu Yunlong, *Youli Riben tujing* (Japan, with Maps and Tables) (1889). Behind many of these reports hovered the injunction of Qing dynasty statesman Li Hongzhang “to investigate other people’s

### Table 2

**Chinese Writings on Japan: Eight Phases with Four High Tides**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Subphase</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Dynasty or Political Period</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pre-1368</td>
<td>Pre-Ming dynasty</td>
<td>chiefly in dynastic histories</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1368–1644</td>
<td>Ming dynasty</td>
<td>high tide 1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1644–1868</td>
<td>Qing dynasty, 1644–1912; Edo or Tokugawa Japan, 1600/1603–1868</td>
<td>Japan “closed”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1868–1894</td>
<td>Early Meiji Japan, 1868–1912</td>
<td>Japan opened</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1895–1912</td>
<td>Post Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895</td>
<td>high tide 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1912–1949</td>
<td>Republic of China, 1912–1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 (1)</td>
<td>1912–1930</td>
<td>Yuan Shikai and warlord era</td>
<td>translations from Japanese</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>1931–1945</td>
<td>War of Resistance against Japan</td>
<td>high tide 3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>1945–1949</td>
<td>Chinese Civil War</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1949–1978</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7 (1)</td>
<td>1949–1966</td>
<td>Early revolutionary period</td>
<td>political analyses</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7 (2)</td>
<td>1966–1976</td>
<td>Cultural Revolution</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7 (2) (1)</td>
<td>1966–1972</td>
<td>Cultural Revolution, phase 1</td>
<td>a halt in writings</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 (2) (2)</td>
<td>1972–1976</td>
<td>Diplomatic relations restored</td>
<td>language “fever”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1979–present</td>
<td>Unprecedented efforts and initiatives</td>
<td>high tide 4</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Source: Adapted from Wu Anlong and Xiong Dayun (1989); Li Yu (2001, 4–25); and Wang Baoping (2001–2003, 1–5).*
activities in hopes of both connecting with and containing them, so as to minimize future troubles” (quoted in Wang Baoping 2001–2003, 2). These authors, unlike earlier writers of the Qing period, based their knowledge on firsthand data, observation, and experience.

In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and China’s humiliating military defeat, Chinese study missions “rushed to Japan like clouds chased by the winds” (Wang Baoping 2001–2003, 4). Phase 5, 1895–1912, included China’s second great wave or high tide of Chinese writings about Japan. For the previous fifteen hundred years Japan had essentially borrowed from China. Now, in a great reversal, China borrowed deliberately and profusely from Japan. Kang Youwei, the noted reformer, declared in 1897 in an audience with China’s Guangxu emperor, “The Japanese did in thirty years what took the west three hundred years. China with its great size and large population should be able to do it in three” (quoted in Wang Xiaoqiu 1992, 2000, 321). Thanks to Meiji Japan as a model and helpmate, what followed from 1898 to 1912 was revolutionary for China, with intellectual and institutional transformations under the label of xinzheng, or modernization, that brought China into the twentieth century.

Phase 6, the nearly forty years from 1912 to 1949, had three subphases. Subphase 1, 1912–1930, included growing Chinese disillusionment with Japan after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 but especially after Japan’s Twenty-One Demands of 1915. Unlike in Phase 5, Chinese writings of this period were dominated by translations rather than original reporting, with 665 titles published between 1912 and 1931, averaging thirty-two titles per year. Subphase 2, 1931–1945, featured accelerating Japanese aggression against China, highlighted by Japan’s occupation of northeast China (Manchuria) in 1931 and its steady thrust into north China. These actions culminated in Japan’s “total war” with China after 1937, including the infamous “Rape of Nanking” of December 1937 and other atrocities. Chinese, driven to understand this recent helpmate-turned-relentless enemy, produced a third high tide of writings on Japan that featured journals (nearly thirty titles in the 1930s and 1940s alone) and multivolume collectanea (collected writings, congshu). Fresh inquiries addressed the complex issues of “Japanism” (Riben zhuyi), Shinto and Japanese imperialism, and militarism and fascism in Japan. One-time Japanophile and Chinese military strategist Zhang Baili (1882–1938)—the
Japanese Military Academy (Shikan Gakkô) top graduate in the class of 1904—wrote a probing article, "The Japanese: One Foreigner's Analysis" (Ribenren: Yige waiguo ren de yanjiu) (1938), that was guarded toward Japan. Like Zhang Baili, his superior, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—trained also at Shikan Gakkô and a sometime Japanophile—was not allowed the option of a mutually beneficial relationship because of Japan's brutal aggression. Both Zhang and Chiang—and a host of others, including Guo Moruo (1892–1978), who, like Zhang Baili, was married to a Japanese woman—are symbolic of the failure of military aggression as a policy in contrast to the cooperation of the second high tide period of 1895–1912. The third subphase, 1945–1948, included a number of writings on postwar Japan, but China's civil war prevented any systematic advance of Japanese studies in China.

The period after 1949, under the People's Republic of China, constituted Phases 7 and 8. Phase 7, 1949–1978, passed through two subphases. In the period from 1949 to 1966 some writers from subphases 6 (2) and 6 (3) published new works and remained active, but more typically the studies of this period were government driven and focused on politics, particularly Japan's cozy relationship with the United States. A few Chinese university-based Japan Studies Centers came into being, and research activities began to pick up just when the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) erupted and brought most academic endeavors to a standstill.

Subphase 7 (2), 1966–1978, included two further subperiods: 7 (2) (1) (1966–1972) and 7 (2) (2) (1972–1978). During the height of the Cultural Revolution Japanese studies and writings basically came to a halt. Then, in 1972 Japan and China restored diplomatic relations, and the People's Republic of China resumed its membership in the United Nations, replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the legitimate representative of China. Immediately the study of the Japanese language took off in a kind of "craze" (rechao), with dozens of Chinese universities establishing Japanese language departments or centers, more than one hundred institutions of higher learning offering Japanese as a second language, and major Chinese cities broadcasting Japanese-language study programs and correspondence courses. All this, along with the reopening of former Japan Studies Centers, laid the foundation for the next high tide of Chinese writings on Japan.

Phase 8, the current high tide, follows the 1978 call by the Chinese Communist Party and central government for "emancipation of the mind" (jiefang sixiang) and "opening and reform" (gaige kaifang). The field of Japanese studies has grown spectacularly. Serial publications on Japan have soared, numbering nearly sixty titles just since 1979. These serials have played a vital role in nurturing the more mature scholarship of the present.

Most distinctive today are the numerous academic exchanges and joint projects between Chinese and Japanese academicians, often independent of Chinese government direction. Scholars from Japan travel to China by invitation, and Chinese scholars travel to Japan to study (and increasingly remain to teach), give guest lectures, participate in academic conferences, and conduct research and investigations. These exchanges, in the words of Li Yu, are "most direct, most effective, and most conducive of deeper understandings" (Li Yu 2001, 22). In depth, scope, and sophistication, current researches and exchange are unparalleled in Chinese history.

Although marked by these many positive exchanges, relations today are far from untroubled. On the positive side, besides the academic exchanges one can point to the large and mutually beneficial trade relationship that has led China to surpass the United States as Japan's number one trading partner, while Japan remains China's number three trading partner after the European Union and the United States.

However, at the popular level Chinese seethe at certain Japanese actions and attitudes. These actions include repeated visits by prominent politicians such as Jun’ichiro Koizumi, prime minister from 2001 to 2006, to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines “war dead,” including perpetrators of wartime atrocities in China; repeated authorization by the Japanese Ministry of Education of textbooks that label Japan’s invasion of China as an "advance" rather than “aggression” or expansion or militarism; trade disputes that come and go; territorial issues such as conflicting claims to the Diaoyutai or Senkaku Islands; persistent signs of Japanese sympathy for the independence of Taiwan, a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945; positive responses by Japan to pressures from the United States to enhance its armed forces under U.S.-Japan military agreements and in support of the George W. Bush administration’s “sole superpower” designs; and Japanese activists agitating for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics of 2008 on human rights and other grounds.

The seventieth anniversary of the Rape of Nanking was 13 December 2007, and China remembered. For a
Further Reading


Douglas R. REYNOLDS

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Jardine Matheson Group

Yíhé Jítuán 怡和集团

Jardine Matheson Group is an Asia-based conglomerate and the oldest of the original Hong Kong trading firms. The firm played an instrumental role in the opium trade in China, which resulted in the Opium Wars and the establishment of the British colony of Hong Kong.

Building on earlier trading networks, Scottish entrepreneurs William Jardine (1784–1843) and James Matheson (1796–1878) founded Jardine Matheson near Guangzhou (Canton) in 1832. After the British Parliament’s revocation of the East India Company’s commercial privileges in 1833, Jardine Matheson sent its first delivery of Chinese tea to England in 1834. The firm quickly established a leading position in trading, shipping, banking, insurance—and opium trading.

Opium proved to be Jardine Matheson’s most profitable commodity. British imports of Chinese tea had created a major trade imbalance between England and China, but smuggling of south Asian opium—a narcotic illegal in China—reversed the balance of trade in Britain’s favor. In 1831, before the official creation of the firm, William Jardine wrote that “our principle reliance is on opium” (Robins 2006, 142). The Chinese emperor’s response to the spread of opium proved to be a turning point in China’s relations with the European powers.

To halt the growing incidence of opium addiction, the Chinese emperor empowered imperial commissioner Lin Tse-hsü (Lin Zexu, 1785–1850) to put an end to the trade. On 18 March 1839, Lin issued a decree requiring British traders to relinquish their opium stockpiles under pain of death. In turn, the British superintendent of trade, Captain Charles Eliot (1801–1875), ordered the merchants to turn over their opium stockpiles to him; Eliot then handed over the opium to Lin, who destroyed it over the traders’ furious objections. In response Jardine Matheson and other British merchants called for armed intervention to protect their commercial interests. The resulting First Opium War ended in a stunning Chinese defeat.

With the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 China opened five “treaty ports” to trade and ceded Hong Kong Island to Great Britain. Jardine Matheson was the first British company to buy land in the new colony and sited its headquarters there in 1844. The firm quickly established a leading position in trading, shipping, banking, insurance—and opium trading.

In the twentieth century the firm weathered a series of financial setbacks brought on by World War II, the Communist revolution in 1949, and increased competition from Chinese businesses. In 1984 Jardine Matheson reincorporated in Bermuda in advance of Hong Kong’s handover to China on 1 July 1997. The Keswick family, descended from William Jardine, continues to exercise a controlling influence over the firm. Jardine Matheson today retains a leading position in Asia with holdings in insurance, motors, supermarkets, and hotels.

Matthew E. CHEN
Jardine Matheson and the Hong Kong Trading Industry

Jardine Matheson & Company is well-known British firm that established its presence in Asia over 150 years ago. This extract comes from a description of the Hong Kong trading industry as an adaptive ‘ecosystem’ based on trade, equity, and debt relationships that reduced business risk, an approach that is likely to receive increased scrutiny as businesses and governments seek new, sustainable models for global enterprise.

To each of its subsidiaries and to the firms for which it acted as principal and agent, Jardine Matheson provided a cluster of capabilities that included trading, banking, maritime insurance, and shipping—the same services historically known in the China trade as “agency services.” Underlying these was a network of relationships built and sustained by frequent communications and the development of logistical and organizational routines to facilitate trade. Jardine Matheson not only handled direct imports and exports to and from Hong Kong but also handled third country trade, where the firm acted as a middleman. Jardine purchased raw materials and sold finished projects throughout the world, served as the eyes and ears of major clients, provided them with global market information and analysis through its associates and subsidiaries, and helped smooth out the rockers road their clients faced in dealing with foreign languages, foreign currencies, and foreign governments.


Further Reading
Jian Zhen, a Buddhist monk who did much to bring Buddhism to Japan, is credited with founding the Ritsu school, which concerns itself with the proper observation of monastic rules.

Jian Zhen began his studies at the Dayun temple in Yangzhou, and at the age of twenty he went to Chang'an to further his education. By the time he returned to Yangzhou, at age twenty-six, he was well versed in Buddhist scriptures, in architecture, in literature, and also in medicine. Soon after his return he was elected the abbot of Daming monastery in recognition of his great learning and his piety; he won over large numbers of converts to Buddhism and also had many of the important scriptures copied in order to make them more widely available. His reputation as a sage spread quickly, and he began to attract students from all over China as well as Japan.

In 742, a delegation of Japanese monks who had been studying in China came to Yanzhou to request Jian Zhen to travel to their homeland to teach the Buddhist way. Jian Zhen readily agreed, and the very next year he collected monks and craftsmen for the mission and set forth to propagate Buddhism in Japan. But his attempt to cross the East China Sea failed, as did four further attempts to cross over to Japan. Then, in 748, he tried again for the fifth time. But his ship was blown off course and he landed in Hainan Province, from where he made his way back to Yangzhou on foot and by boat. The journey was difficult, and along the way he contracted an eye infection; by the time he got back to his monastery he was blind.

In 753, Jian Zhen learned that a Japanese deputation in China would soon be returning home; he succeeded in securing a place on their ship. Thus, on his sixth attempt, Jian Zhen finally arrived in Japan, where he was eagerly received by the Emperor Shōmu and Empress Köken, whom he instructed and then ordained as Buddhists. It was at the ancient temple of Todai-ji, in Nara, that Jian Zhen took up residence. During the ten years that followed, Jian Zhen preached the Buddhist way to the nobles of the land, who came from near and far to hear him and to be ordained by his hand. Jian Zhen’s learning in Buddhist scriptures and his ability to expound simply what was contained within them made his style of preaching immediately accessible. This brought him much renown and the number of his disciples increased. The school of Buddhism that Jian Zhen followed and preached was the Ritsu rite, which focused on the discipline of monasticism. Jian Zhen thoroughly expounded the *vinaya* texts, which focused on the discipline required of monks; he centered his exposition specifically on the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya*, in which the process of monastic vows and duties is detailed, and discipline is emphasized over doctrine.

Although his chief aim was preaching Buddhism, Jian Zhen had also brought with him many monks and craftsmen who imparted Chinese knowledge of medicine, printing,
architecture, and sculpture to the Japanese. Thus, missionary work went hand-in-hand with cultural exchange, since many of the monks that traveled with Jian Zhen were gifted artisans, writers, and physicians. Along with Buddhist doctrine, Jian Zhen brought to Japan the Chinese knowledge of architecture, dwarfed potted trees, calligraphy, printing, medicine, and literature. He also established several temples and monasteries in order to educate Japanese novices.

At the age of seventy-one, Jian Zhen retired to a house and property given to him as a gift by the emperor, where...
he established a school as well as a small temple he named Toshodai-ji, which still stands on the western section of Nara, Japan. Jian Zhen died at this temple, and at first the monks tried to mummify his body and to show it sitting in a meditative pose. But the process failed, and his remains had to be cremated. Where the mummy had sat, the monastic community placed a statue showing Jian Zhen in meditation; it is said that this statue may have been finished just a few years before his death. This statue may still be seen in Toshodai-ji temple.

Jian Zhen was responsible for invigorating Japanese cultural and religious life by introducing into both ideas, practices and technologies that would align the island nation with the very best that Tang China had to offer.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader of China in the 1990s and continued to pursue economic reforms and improved relations with the West into the twenty-first century. He served as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party from 1989 to 2002 and as Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 2004.

Jiang Zemin was born into an intellectual family in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province. He graduated from Shanghai Jiaotong University with a degree in electrical engineering in 1947. While at school, he participated in underground student activities led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He joined the CCP in 1946 and worked in various economic- and industrial-related Communist government positions; he studied at Moscow’s Stalin Automobile Works in 1955. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), his part in the industrialization of China saved him from persecution by the Red Guard.

As an advocate for economic reform, however, he prospered after the 1978 rise of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), becoming mayor of Shanghai in 1985 and Shanghai’s CCP first secretary in 1987. Massive protests took place across China in 1989, culminating in the Tiananmen Square incident in June; perhaps because of his ability to
peacefully defuse Shanghai’s own pro-democracy demonstrations, Jiang was chosen by Deng Xiaoping as CCP general secretary in June 1989, and he became chairman of the Central Military Commission in November 1989. He became China’s president in March 1993, thus holding the three most senior positions in the military, party, and state branches of power in China.

After 1989, Jiang strengthened his authority in China more than most observers thought he would. He continued to follow reform policies and worked to strengthen the CCP’s power and to eliminate the widespread corruption within it. He presided over the transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese control in 1997, played an active diplomatic role by traveling abroad many times, and worked hard for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. During Jiang’s tenure, Beijing was chosen to host the 2008 Summer Olympics; he was present at the 8 August opening ceremony. One of his most controversial decisions was to suppress the quasi-religious movement Falun Gong (1999). In a highly important ideological proposal, made in a major speech he gave in July 2001, Jiang asserted that private entrepreneurs and other members of classes previously regarded as exploitative should be welcomed into the CCP, as long as they made a contribution to China and to socialism.

Colin MACKERRAS

Further Reading


Jiangsu—a populous, developed province on the eastern seaboard about the size of Iceland—has enjoyed recent double-digit rates of economic growth. The success of rural industrialization driven by local governments and foreign investment, however, has further widened the gap between a prosperous Sunan (southern Jiangsu) and an impoverished Subei (northern Jiangsu). Accounting for only 1.1 percent of China’s territory, Jiangsu 江苏 is the fifth-most populous and the fifth-most densely populated province. Located on the eastern seaboard of China, it is the most low-lying province in the nation. It borders Shandong Province to the north, Anhui Province to the west, Zhejiang Province to the south, and the municipality of Shanghai to the southeast. Jiangsu straddles the lower course of the Yangzi (Chang) River and has relatively...
mild temperatures and abundant precipitation. In terms of both regional cultures and environments, Jiangsu is often considered a transitional zone between north and south China. Nanjing is Jiangsu’s capital and largest city, with an estimated 2007 population of 7.41 million.

Rapid economic growth and persistent uneven development distinguish Jiangsu from other provinces. Since the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), it has been one of the most prosperous provinces in China. Its early economic development was due in large part to an efficient water-transportation system consisting of numerous rivers and the Grand Canal, as well as to sophisticated technologies in agriculture, industry, and trade. The post–Mao Zedong (1893–1976) economic reforms in China have further accelerated the growth of Jiangsu, whose gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew at an average rate of 13 percent from 1990 to 1999 and 12 percent from 2000 to 2006, both exceeding the national rates. In 2007 Jiangsu’s GDP per capita was 33,689 yuan ($4,430 USD), 80 percent higher than the national level and fifth among all Chinese provinces.
Jiangsu’s recent economic growth is in no small part due to foreign investment and rural industrialization. “Open” cities and zones, such as Suzhou, Wuxi, and Kunshan, were designated to attract foreign investment. Equally important, rural industrial enterprises—often referred to as township-village enterprises (TVEs)—that have benefited from the leadership or management by local governments, have fueled economic growth. The prominence of TVEs in Sunan (southern Jiangsu), which borders Shanghai and Zhejiang and is part of the agriculturally and industrially prosperous Yangzi Delta, has popularized a “Sunan model” of development emulated in other parts of China. In Kunshan, for example, where tens of thousands of investors, mostly from Taiwan, live and work, numerous development zones and industrial parks have been developed, industrial enterprises are scattered among rice paddies and wheat fields, and a major center of information technology is emerging.

But as well known as Jiangsu’s rapid growth is its persistent disparity. The gap between the prosperous and resource-rich Sunan and the impoverished Subei (northern Jiangsu) is as large as that between China’s richest and poorest provinces, and it has widened further since the economic reforms. Though a transitional Su-zhong (middle Jiangsu) falls between the two extremes, Jiangsu remains a classic example of the simultaneous processes of rapid growth and spatial polarization that accompany China’s miraculous economic success.

C. Cindy FAN

Further Reading


Venerable Nanjing

Nanjing, the capital and hub of Jiangsu Province, is a city with a rich cultural history, a famous university, and a recent tragic past. Today, the city is very popular with tourists, as this blog about the city’s sites and attractions attests.

So you’ve made your way to venerable Nanjing, and you’re standing by the paifang at Sun Yat-sen’s Mausoleum. Mount Zijin, rising up behind it, seems more brown than purple. You try to muster the appropriate sentiment for this tribute to one of modern China’s greatest heroes, but it’s not easy…

Now imagine if you’d been there on June 1st, 1929, the day Dr. Sun was interred at the mausoleum. Stern Kuomintang generals stand gravely by, trembling with tears. The sense of loss to China, and her children’s depthless respect for the dead hero, are palpable.

Quite a bit more emotionally engaging than scenario A, to say the least.

So when you make it to Nanjing, by all means stop at the mausoleum. Do attempt a grasp at the history emanating from Confucius Temple… But to become one with Nanjing, however temporarily, commit to a meal at one of its famed restaurants.

Nanjing cuisine is known as Jin Su, or Jin Ling. It has lingered, understandably, in the shadow of Shanghai cuisine’s endless munificence… Salted duck, Eight-Delicacies Soup, Longchi carp, these classics and others await at the following restaurants, outstanding for their histories as well as their fare.

Jiangxi Province

Jiāngxī Shěng 江西省

43.68 million est. 2007 pop. 166,600 square km

The home of China’s largest freshwater lake and a portion of the world’s longest manmade waterway (the Grand Canal), Jiangxi is a landlocked, subtropical province in China’s southeast about the size of the state of Wisconsin. Rice is very important to the economy, with two or even three harvests a year in some locales.

The landlocked, southeastern Chinese province of Jiangxi (Chiang-hsi, Kiangsi) covers an area of 166,600 square kilometers (slightly smaller than the state of Wisconsin) and borders on the provinces of Hunan in the west, Hubei and Anhui in the north, Zhejiang and Fujian in the east, and Guangdong in the south. Hilly and mountainous areas account for three-fourths of the area, which is traversed by rivers that flow into Lake Poyang, China’s largest freshwater lake, situated in a 20,000-square-kilometer lowland area in the north of the province. While the mountains in Jiangxi rise from 1,000 to 2,000 meters, the low area in the north rarely exceeds 50 meters above sea level. The climate is subtropical, with plenty of rain, averaging 1,500 millimeters annually. This makes the province perfect for agriculture. A total of 99 percent of the population are Han Chinese. The capital, Nanchang (est. 2008 pop. 2.3 million), is situated in the northern lowlands.

Jiangxi remained sparsely populated until the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), when it was connected to the ancient capital of Xi’an by the Grand Canal, the world’s longest manmade waterway. (In March of 2008, China applied to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for World Heritage Site status for the canal.) During the Song dynasty (960–1279), Jiangxi became a center of political and cultural eminence and the resort of famous scholars, such as Zhu Xi (1130–1200). With the fall of the Song, the intellectual milieu declined, and in the following centuries
the mountainous border regions became strongholds for antigovernment rebels. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Jiangxi experienced peace and unprecedented wealth. This, however, was terminated with the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). In the early 1930s, Jiangxi became the battleground between the Communists and Nationalists, and from 1938 to 1945, the province was occupied by Japan.

Since 1949 economic development has grown steadily. Rice is by far the most important crop; most areas have two harvests a year and some have three. Other major agricultural products are rapeseed, peanuts, and cotton; Jiangxi is also one of the most important tea producers in China, with a tea-planting history going back to the eighth century. Jiangxi also produces a large amount of pork and exports its timber and bamboo to the rest of China. Industry is concentrated in the larger cities, and products include diesel engines, trucks, tractors, and aircraft. In the northeast, the famous imperial kilns of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) still produce high-quality Jingdezhen porcelain.

Further Reading
Jilin Province

Jilin Province in northeast China is both an important industry base and a rich source of the country’s commodity grains. Ethnic Koreans make up a relatively large part of its population. Jilin is about the size of the state of North Dakota with roughly forty-three times the population.

Jilin Province is located in the northeastern region of China. Bordering Russia on the east and North Korea on the southeast, Jilin also shares borders with Liaoning Province on the south, Heilongjiang Province on the north, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on the west. It has an area of about 187,000 square kilometers. About forty minority groups live in Jilin Province, including Koreans, Mans, Huis, and Mongolians.

The eastern part of the province is close to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, where the atmosphere is moist, often with much rain. The climate of its western part, which is far from the sea and approaches the arid Mongolian Plateau, is dry. As a whole, Jilin has a temperate continental monsoon climate with a clear-cut change of seasons. The yearly average temperature of most of the province is 3–5°C. With hot and rainy days occurring in the same season, the climate is good for farming. The frost period begins in the last ten days of September and lasts until the end of April or early May.

Jilin is rich in natural resources. Major minerals are coal, iron, copper, zinc, and gold. Coal is mined in the southeast. The major hydroelectric power installation, the Fengman station on the Sungari River southeast of Jilin, provides much of the energy needs for the northeast region. Jilin also has abundant forest resources. One of the major forests in China, Changbai Mountain Area, produces top-grade pine trees and is the source of precious traditional Chinese herbs such as ginseng and pilose antler. Changbai Mountain Area’s mushrooms and fungi are regarded as of best in the country.

Jilin is one of the important commodity grain bases in China. It abounds with soybean, corn, sorghum, millet, rice, small red bean, wheat, tuber, sunflower seeds, beets, and tobacco. About 2.96 million hectares of prairie in the province’s northwest make Jilin Province an ideal place for animal husbandry; it has abundant pasture land for sheep and is a major production base of commercial cattle.

Jilin Province has a solid industrial infrastructure, with more than fourteen thousand industrial enterprises and six dominant industries: engineering, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, food, metallurgical, and forestry. With Changchun-based First Automobile Works, one of China’s most important automobile manufacturers, Jilin leads the country in its production of automobiles, railway cars, and tractors.

Changchun, the provincial capital with an estimated 2007 population of 7.46 million, is the economic, cultural, and education center of the province. It became the capital of Japanese-controlled Manchukuo in the 1930s. Today’s Changchun is a beautiful city shaded by trees. The Changchun Film Studio is the first film production factory built after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It is regarded as the cradle of modern Chinese cinema.

Di BAI
Further Reading


As early as the sixth century CE, the city of Jingdezhen produced ceramics. It went on to specialize in making ceramics for the imperial courts.

The city of Jingdezhen, sometimes referred to as Fowliang, has long been known for its production of high-quality ceramics—specifically, porcelain. Jingdezhen is located in the northeastern part of Jiangxi Province, which is in southeast China, just south of the Yangzi (Chang) River.

During the period between 1004 and 1007 porcelain production in the area began to focus on serving the imperial court. The name Jingdezhen derives from a reference to this period as the Jingde reign period of Emperor Zhenzong of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126). Before 1004, the city was called Chang-nan, which means “south of the Chang River,” on the banks of which Jingdezhen lies. The suffix “zhen” of “Jingden-zhen” refers to the administrative status of “market town” (zhen), a status conferred during the Jingde reign. The growth and development of Jingdezhen porcelain in large part mirrors the development of Chinese porcelain since the early tenth century.

Pottery production in Jingdezhen can be traced to the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), when the city was known as Xinping. In 583 CE the court of the Chen royal family who ruled during the last part of the North and South dynasties (220–589 CE) received pottery from the region, and during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) on several occasions, Jingdezhen kilns supplied the emperor with objects. Then Jingdezhen’s relationship with the court underwent some starts and stops but began in earnest again during the mid-thirteenth century. Official imperial intervention and direct control by the court originated during the Yuan dynasty (1271–1279); specifically, in 1278 with the establishment of a porcelain bureau (ci jiu), porcelain was sent to the imperial court only at the specific order of the court officials in the capital. A director dispatched from the court to Jingdezhen oversaw the making and firing of porcelain and took responsibility for the affairs of the porcelain bureau. In 1295 the bureau expanded, and its director gained higher rank. In 1324 the bureau was incorporated with the local tax bureau, and by 1328 the provincial governor of Jiangxi Province acted as the inspector of porcelain production. Between 1352 and 1354 the kilns ceased production with the pending fall of the Yuan dynasty. Jingdezhen’s status as a porcelain producer that functioned mainly for the imperial court began in earnest during the early years of the Song dynasty. At the start of the Ming dynasty in 1368, an imperial porcelain factory was built on Pearl Hill (Zhushan), located in the southern part of the city. Thereafter, the quantity of porcelain production increased dramatically; the Ming and Qing dynasties, spanning the fourteenth century through the early twentieth century, were the most active periods of production and diversification of Jingdezhen porcelain objects, as measured by court patronage and numbers of export wares.

During the Ming and Qing dynasties porcelain produced in Jingdezhen imitated and sometimes surpassed the brilliance of various styles from other kiln sites: Styles included celadon wares of the northern and southern
kilns, which had reached their peak in the Song dynasty; the underglaze blue-and-white wares that attracted consumers worldwide; the blue-white wares (*yingqing*) with a shadowy blue tint popular during the Yuan dynasty; polychrome and monochrome glazes; and overglaze enamel. The availability of outstanding raw materials such as kaolin (a fine clay) and china stone (*petuntse*)—with superior durability, delicateness, high translucency, low porosity, and high firing temperatures (more than 1280° C)— contributed to the renown of Jingdezhen’s prolific history of porcelain production over the last one thousand years.

Today roughly half of Jingdezhen’s population actively participates in the porcelain industry. Over the last fifty years, since the late 1950s, the central government of the People’s Republic of China and the Jiangxi provincial government have invested in establishing ceramic research institutes, local museums, and ceramic vocational schools. While the modern status of Jingdezhen porcelain wares pales in comparison to the renown of its imperial past, Jingdezhen’s ceramic training institutes, research institutes, and porcelain industry continue to make it a destination for collectors, potters, and commercial buyers worldwide.

Ellen HUANG

**Further Reading**


Jiuzhaigou

Jiǔzhàigōu 九寨沟

Jiuzhaigou nature reserve, located in the mountains of Sichuan Province, is one of the world’s most scenic areas. The reserve has more than one hundred rivers, lakes, and waterfalls covering 650 square kilometers.

The mountains, waterfalls, and rivers of the Jiuzhaigou nature reserve make it one of the most scenic areas in the world as well as a major tourist attraction. Jiuzhaigou is located in the Min Shan, a mountain range in the northern part of Sichuan Province in southwestern China, about 400 kilometers north of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province.

The name “Jiuzhaigou” has an interesting origin. The words jiu, zhai, and gou mean “nine,” “tribe,” and “gully,” respectively. Because nine Tibetan tribes live in the Min valley, people began to call the area “Jiuzhaigou.” Located about 2,000–4,700 meters above sea level, the Jiuzhaigou reserve has more than one hundred rivers, waterfalls, and lakes covering 650 square kilometers. About 42 percent of Jiuzhaigou is forested. A number of endangered animals, including the giant panda (Alluropoda melanoleuca) and the golden snub-nosed monkey (Pygathrix roxellanae), live in Jiuzhaigou.

Jiuzhaigou has been called “the fairy-tale world” of China because of its natural beauty. The Chinese media has often used it as a film location. Because the number of visitors to Jiuzhaigou from all over the world has increased, in 2001 the government began limiting visitors to twelve thousand a day. About 60,000 hectares of the reserve were designated as a natural protective area in 1978 and were listed as a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Natural World Heritage Site in 1992; 24,000 hectares became a UNESCO World Biosphere Reserve in 1997.

The Editors

Further Reading


Discussion of “journalism reform” emerged with fervor in the mid-1980s, revolving around journalists’ desire for more autonomy and reinforced by reformist politicians’ calls for greater informational transparency. In the 21st century, important changes in journalism hinged on the possibilities of new technologies, along with continued efforts to strengthen journalistic professionalism.

The news media played a key role in the initiation of China’s post-Mao political and economic reforms, acting as harbingers of change, promoting policy experiments, and documenting results. The press—with the Chinese Communist Party (CCCP) flagship paper People’s Daily taking a lead—eagerly took up the officially sanctioned shift from “class struggle” to “economic construction” from 1979 on as license to delve into social problems, proposing solutions, and inviting readers to join the discussion through expanded forums for letters and opinions. Similarly, the pragmatic admonition to “seek truth from facts” provided reporters and editors with a rationale for pursuing more rigorous practices in gathering and verifying information.

These were liberating changes from the conventions of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), now repudiated as a period when fabrication, imitation, prattle and bombast ruled the news. As pent-up grievances left over from the Cultural Revolution made their way into both public accounts and “internal” (neibu) reports for political authorities, the news media and journalists gained new respect as a kind of court of last resort that sometimes produced remedies.

Discussion of reforming journalism itself did not emerge with much fervor until the mid-1980s. Once the idea took hold, however, “journalism reform” became a common refrain in occupational and official circles, worthy of attention in conferences, forums, articles and speeches as essential for moving from outmoded propaganda models to modern concepts of news. The discussions incorporated journalists’ calls for professional autonomy, scholars’ revisions of goals of journalism in a socialist society, and public officials’ declarations of the need for greater transparency and accountability in the news media. Academics and legislators began to explore prospects for a national press law that would insulate the media from politics and expand journalistic independence.

These debates took place in a context of rapid recovery and growth of the news media that saw restoration of hundreds of newspapers, magazines and journals that had been suspended during the Cultural Revolution, and establishment of thousands of new outlets. Radio and TV underwent tremendous growth as well, as did advertising, long banned and now reintroduced as a primary means of financing. College and university journalism programs proliferated, with curricula drawing on foreign methods of both teaching and practicing journalism. At the same time, the institutional structure and prescribed mission of China’s news media underwent little change, and in practice media remained beholden to state and Party authorities even amidst mounting pressures for greater...
responsiveness to citizens and consumers. Such tensions between loyalty to official dictates and accountability to the news audience reached their height during the 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations, which many journalists joined, and which earned sympathetic coverage until the crackdown.

A new phase of journalism reform unfolded with the renewed emphasis on economic development initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, in which the eighty-eight year old CCP leader made a surprise visit to some of the Special Economic Zones he had established in the early 1980s. In line with the development of the market economy, media organizations were expected to become self-supporting. State subsidies in the form of both direct support and government subscriptions were withdrawn, and new media startups were premised on commercial models—even as technically, all media outlets still required sponsorship from Party or government organizations. Through the 1990s, domestic media conglomerations was encouraged, with major print and broadcast organizations in China’s provinces and cities combining into larger enterprise groups (jituan); and although foreign investment found its way into supporting aspects of media industries, such as technology and distribution, outright foreign ownership remained prohibited.

In the twenty-first century, new technologies began to transform Chinese journalism in ways familiar throughout the world, producing an expansion of both institutional and popular communication in cyberspace, encouraging visual and multi-media methods of presentation, and providing diverse alternative channels for news and information that, despite state efforts to reign in and filter the Internet, could not be thoroughly controlled. Chinese news organizations have embraced technological innovations to enrich their content and expand their reach, while journalists have welcomed the new opportunities for individual expression through blogging.

Yet many stresses and strains remained among competing interests in the journalism mix, including the state and Party’s continued insistence on leading and molding communications, increasing emphasis on professionalism among journalists themselves, growing public access to a multiplicity of channels of information, the heightened importance of economic return, and China’s increasing integration into the global marketplace.

Judy POLUMBAUM

Further reading:
**Journey to the West**

Xīyóu jì 西游记

Xīyou jì (Journey to the West), a Chinese novel believed to be written by Wu Cheng’en in the sixteenth century, portrays the adventures of a priest, a monkey, and their pilgrim band as they journey to get Buddhist scriptures. The tale, long shared through various media in China, is rich in allegory and instruction from Daoist, Buddhist, and Confucian thought.

The novel Xīyou jì (Journey to the West) is a favorite source adapted in storytelling, opera, theater, puppetry, comics, television, and video games both in China and abroad. It can be interpreted as a fairy tale, a humorous piece of literature, a religious allegory, or an adventure tale.

The beginning of the hundred-chapter novel introduces Sun Wukong (Monkey), born from a stone and nourished by the five elements. He leads a band of monkeys on the Mountains of Flowers and Fruits until he goes in search of a spiritual teacher, finding the Daoist master Subodhi. Given the spiritual name “Aware of Vacuity,” he soon learns the Dao and seventy-two transformations but is forced to return home after showing off his magic skills.

Monkey soon declares himself the “Great Sage Equal to Heaven,” creating havoc by consuming the peaches of immortality, stealing Laozi’s golden elixir pills, and destroying much in Heaven. The Jade Emperor, a rich source of satire in the novel, can’t control Monkey, so Lord Buddha must intercede. Monkey proudly accepts and loses a challenge from the Buddha and thus is imprisoned in a stone mountain.

Chapters 8–12 introduce the priest Xuanzang and tell the tale of his parents’ troubles. Next, at the Buddha’s

In this Suzhou Opera performance commemorating the 30th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, the Monkey creates havoc in Heaven.

*Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.*
request, the bodhisattva Guanyin (a being that refrains from entering nirvana in order to save others, and who is worshipped as a deity in Mahayana Buddhism), selects the priest to bring precious Buddhist scriptures from India. Xuanzang, now called Tripitaka or Sanzang, sets out with the emperor’s blessing. His character on the journey is often that of a fussy, whining man, yet one with a kind heart who will need some help on his quest. Chapters 13–22 describe the protectors and fellow pilgrims whom he meets:

- Sun Wukong (Monkey) is a vibrant, good-hearted creature whom readers have already met in the book’s early chapters. His weapon is the “will-following golden-banded staff,” which can grow to an enormous size or shrink to fit behind his ear. He also obtains a pair of lotus-root cloud-walking shoes, a phoenix-winged purple and gold helmet, and a suit of golden chain mail. The bodhisattva Guanyin gives him three life-saving magic hairs to help him on his travels, as well as a headband, which, when activated by a chant from the sacred scripture Tripitaka, will cause Monkey pain and allow Guanyin to control Monkey’s volatile nature.

- Zhu Bajie (Pigsy) is an immortal who was called “Field Marshall Tianpeng” until he drank too much, flirted with the moon princess, and came to Earth by mistake as a pig-like creature. He is a powerful fighter who uses the nine-tooth iron rake, can do thirty-six transformations, and has a large appetite for sensual pleasures.

- Sha Wujing (Sandy), once the curtain-raising general, was banished to Earth for accidentally breaking a crystal goblet. He knows eighteen transformations, fights well in water (his weapon is the monk’s spade), and is the most polite and obedient of the disciples.

**Dragons and Demons**

These characters are helped by the Third Prince of the Dragon King, who turns into a white horse so Tripitaka can ride him to escape punishment. A succession of struggles follows, lasting almost to the novel’s end, which take place in a wilderness with flaming mountains, impossibly wide rivers, and a long list of monsters: Green Lion Demon, White Elephant Demon, Dream Demon, and Nine-Headed Bird Demon among many. Often these creatures hope to eat Tripitaka’s flesh to gain immortality. After eighty such episodes, with help at times from Guanyin and Laozi, members of the weary band at last reach Vulture Peak, receiving wordless scriptures that they exchange for others with written words. To make the number of tests an auspicious eighty-one (corresponding to the number of chapters in Laozi’s *Daodejing*, they undergo one last test and then receive their rewards: Tripitaka and Monkey become Buddhas, Pigsy is named an altar cleanser, Sandy becomes an arhat (spiritual practitioner), and the white horse becomes a heavenly dragon.

**Early Versions**

Various earlier versions of the story, both oral and written, were inspired by the real-life experiences of the priest
Journey to the West

Xuanzang (602–664), a monk at Jingtu Temple in Chang’an during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) who endured great troubles as he traveled to India to get Buddhist scriptures. He spent seventeen years on his journey and returned with many precious volumes. Praised by Emperor Taizong, he then spent the rest of his life translating the scriptures into Chinese. As his story changed and grew after his death, the other pilgrims were added along with a cast of otherworldly creatures and a long list of struggles.

Importance of the Work

The story, shaped by oral storytellers as well as writers, took its final form as a hundred-chapter novel in the sixteenth century. Although scholars debate the issue, most agree that Wu Chen-en, a writer known for his poetry, humor, and love of the marvelous, was the author of the novel.

As a work both told and read, Journey to the West has long been one of the most popular stories in China, enjoyed for its humor and its use of verse in dialogues, for description, and for commentary. It appeals to all ages because it both entertains and instructs, poking fun at the Chinese court and at religious traditions, while also offering an allegory of the spiritual quest.

The novel includes Daoist, Buddhist, and Confucian thought. Alchemy and the art of transformation appear repeatedly, along with teachings of the Dao. Buddhist characters and scriptures play an important role, with the Buddhist Heart sutra (a precept summarizing Vedic teaching) often chanted by the priest Tripitaka to cultivate truth, being included in some editions. The accumulation of merit is a recurring Buddhist theme, with many good deeds done on the journey: restoring kingdoms, freeing the enslaved, helping orphans, and more. The Buddhist need for compassion is stressed, with the necessity for self-cultivation reinforced. Confucian thought is reflected in an emphasis on correct conduct, learning, and order in society.

Various editions of the story have appeared in English over the years, including a popular version translated by Arthur Waley and abridged by Alison Waley, and two complete translations, one by Anthony C. Yu and the other by W. J. F. Jenner. Whether read in these or other editions or seen on television, on film, or in the opera, the story has been beloved by generations.

Cathy SPAGNOLI

Further Reading

Drawn by China’s rich culture and, for most of its long history, by its religious tolerance, many traders, missionaries, and scholars from abroad settled permanently in this vast country. China’s environment was particularly attractive to Jews, and those wishing to emigrate formed sizable communities in many Chinese cities.

For most of its many centuries China was a reasonably tolerant country. That factor, combined with its rich culture, made it an attractive place to which many traders, missionaries, and scholars were eager to emigrate. Sizable communities of Jews formed throughout China’s history, particularly in the cities of Kaifeng, Shanghai, Harbin, and Tianjin.

Kaifeng

Kaifeng’s thriving economy attracted many Jewish traders and merchants who most likely came from central Asia along the Silk Roads. Although the exact date of the Jews’ arrival in Kaifeng is not known, most scholars believe that they arrived during the Song dynasty (960–1279). Unlike Jews who settled in other Chinese cities to flee persecution, the Jews who moved to Kaifeng did so by choice and enjoyed a relatively positive relationship with Chinese authorities. The Jews greatly respected the Chinese rulers and their laws, and the Chinese officials, in turn, were tolerant of Jewish religious practices and beliefs.

For centuries the Kaifeng Jews maintained a remarkable balance between assimilating into Chinese society and preserving their Jewish identity. They adopted Chinese names as well as the Chinese language, dress, and way of life, but they adhered strictly to their traditional religious practices and customs. In 1163 the Kaifeng Jews were the first Jewish community in China to erect a synagogue, which remained for almost seven hundred years as a place of worship for Jewish believers in China. They observed most or all of the holidays, Sabbath services, and rites of passage and preserved the Torah scrolls and Hebrew prayer books.

During the second half of the fourteenth century the Kaifeng Jewish population reached its peak—a golden age, so to speak—in which a majority of the Jews prospered in trade, intellectual pursuits, and civil service. Some served as court officials or military officers and others as scholars and physicians.

At the start of the nineteenth century the Kaifeng Jewish community had been in steady decline. When the Kaifeng line of rabbis passed away with no successors between 1800 and 1810, the knowledge of Hebrew in the community passed away with them. As a result of both natural and human-made disasters, most of the Kaifeng Jews had fallen into extreme poverty by 1860, leaving them unable to maintain their synagogue.

Today a small Jewish community still exists in Kaifeng and has become a major tourist attraction for Jewish visitors because the homes and streets in the Jewish section of the city have been preserved. Treated as a minority ethnic group, Kaifeng Jews receive a monthly allowance from the government and are not required to abide by the one-child policy. Recent visitors to Kaifeng have reported that...
the few surviving Jewish descendants in the city still have a strong Jewish identity and seek to preserve the Kaifeng Jewish legacy.

**Shanghai**

As an open city on the east coast of China, Shanghai had no immigration restrictions or visa requirements and thus became a haven for refugees from all sorts of persecution.

Three major groups of Jews came to Shanghai: the Sephardic Jews who arrived in the early nineteenth century, the Russian Jews who settled in the early years of the twentieth century, and finally the refugees from Hitler’s Europe in 1938 and 1939. Shanghai was also a transit station for twenty thousand to thirty thousand refugees who were looking to emigrate to the United States or Palestine in the years before World War II.

The majority of the Jews who arrived in Shanghai in the late 1930s were middle-class, white-collar workers,
skilled artisans, professionals, and businessmen. At the time of their arrival Shanghai was undergoing an economic crisis that prevented most of them from finding livelihoods. As a result, many were forced to relocate to other countries. The ones who did stay settled mostly in the Japanese-occupied district of Hongkou and kept to themselves, rarely interacting with other foreigners or even the Chinese. During this time Shanghai was under Japanese rule. But rather than echo the racial policies of their Nazi allies, the Japanese occupiers to some extent perceived the Jewish refugees as professionals and businessmen. Although treatment of the Jewish population ranged from indifference to militaristic abuse, the authorities welcomed refugees into China and did not implement any organized policy of extermination. By 1967, however, records indicate that only fifteen Jews remained in Shanghai, and a Hong Kong newspaper reported the death of the last Jewish refugee in Shanghai in 1982.

Little physical evidence remains of Shanghai’s former Jewish community. The Sephardic Jews built two beautiful synagogues in Shanghai. For a number of years Jewish study and research flourished in the Ohel Rachel (1920) and the Beth Aharon (1927). Unfortunately, the former was demolished in 1952 and the latter in 1985. In recent years former Shanghai Jewish refugees have returned in hopes of finding remnants of Jewish life that they could photograph, but most of the Jewish buildings have either been demolished or put to use for other purposes.

Harbin

From the beginning of World War I to 1932, the Russo-Manchurian Treaty of 1897 allowed Russians to build the Chinese Eastern Railway. Harbin grew to become the administrative center of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Along with the Russians, many Jews came into Manchuria during this time. In the first half of the twentieth century Jews in the city numbered over twenty thousand, which made it one of the largest Jewish communities in China.

The Jews in Harbin created many cultural and social establishments for themselves, building synagogues and hospitals as well as forming clubs and newspapers. Harbin was hospitable to a Jewish community that contributed to the rich and diverse culture of the city and introduced the people of Harbin to European culture, values, and lifestyles. The Harbin Jews also greatly influenced the economics of the city, especially in industry, commerce, and real estate. Jewish businesses contributed significantly to the development of Harbin’s economy and international reputation.

The largest and best-preserved Jewish cemetery in Asia lies in downtown Harbin, although it has been closed for new burials since 1958. There were more than 3,100 graves in this cemetery, which has great historical significance as a publicly visible representation of the Jewish cultural styles of the first half of the twentieth century. About six hundred graves with tombstones (and some two hundred more marked with tablets) have been moved to a new cemetery site in Huang Shan, about 50 kilometers north of Harbin. In addition, Harbin was the home of the largest Jewish synagogue in northeast China, the New Jewish Synagogue, from 1921 to 1956. The Jewish community in Harbin survived for nearly a century, from roughly 1899 to 1985. However, by the 1930s Harbin Jews had begun to scatter across eastern Asia due to economic crises and persecution by the Soviet army. After World War II many Harbin Jews moved away, mostly to Israel, the United States, Europe, or Australia. Some moved to Shanghai.

Tianjin

Jews began to settle in Tianjin as early as the 1860s. They came mainly in three waves. The first wave came with the European merchants who poured into Tianjin when it opened as a commercial port in 1860. The second wave occurred between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century and consisted of Jews fleeing czarist Russia. The third wave, by far the largest, occurred during the years leading up to World War II as Jews fled Nazi rule. By 1935 the Jewish population of Tianjin reached its peak at 3,500.

The Jews of Tianjin maintained their own living patterns, apparently able to co-exist peacefully with the native population. They found a home among open, tolerant people and were able to live successfully as merchants, employees, and professionals. A synagogue built in 1940 still stands but is now used for other purposes.

Other cities with identifiable Jewish communities include Xi’An, Beijing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Yangzhou,
Ninxia, Guangzhou (Canton), Quanzhou, and Nanjing. Under Communist Party leader Mao Zedong these communities were allowed to exist but certainly not to participate in the political life of the country. Today, however, the economic resurgence of China puts its Jewish communities in a new light as possible assets in the global economy, especially the worldwide tourism industry.

Wan-Li HO

Further Reading
The junk has been the classic Chinese ship design since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), and is still in use today. With a flexible, usually flat-bottomed design that allows it to navigate both rivers and the open sea, the junk has been put to many uses over the years, from warfare to commerce.

The junk is the basic traditional Chinese ship design, flexible enough to be used for river and oceangoing vessels of various sizes. The junk’s predecessor apparently was a bamboo raft with flat ends and many internal compartments separated by bulkheads. That design was adapted into a variety of easily maneuvered vessels. The junk originated during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and by the ninth century was plying international waters in Southern and Southeastern Asia.

Multiple internal bulkheads created a series of watertight compartments that gave the junk further stability and seaworthiness. Older junks lacked a keel and instead relied on thick wales (planks) that ran along the sides of the vessel to provide rigidity. River junks normally had only one mast, although space was provided for oars in
The Superior Chinese Junk

China scholar Joseph Needham explains why the Chinese junk was superior to vessels found outside of China.

This is clearly a much firmer method of construction than that found in the ships of other civilizations. Fewer bulkheads were required than frames or ribs to give the same degree of strength and rigidity. It was obviously also possible for these bulkheads to be made watertight, and so to give compartments which would preserve most of the buoyancy of a vessel if a leak should occur, or damage below the waterline. In other ways also the bulkhead structure had various advantages, one example being the provision of the essential vertical support necessary for the appearance later of the hinged rudder. But we shall deal with such matters in due course.


the forward section, with cabins and other kinds of superstructures always placed aft of the mast. These junks could reach 46 meters in length, although most were 11–30 meters long and were used for all kinds of transportation. In areas where rapids or narrow channels caused difficulties in navigation, articulated ships (ones with a hinge or pivot connection to allow greater maneuverability) were built, although the basic junk design was retained.

Articulated ships could also be adapted for use in warfare: Incendiary devices were placed in the forward portion of a vessel that was then brought up to an enemy position, uncoupled, and left to explode. Oceangoing junks had a design similar to that of river junks but could reach 52 meters or more in length. The design of both types of junk provides for the greatest width of the ship to be at the rear, in imitation of aquatic birds. Many ships were built without the use of metal, the artisans instead preferring to use wooden pins. The flat-bottomed design also allowed comparatively large ships to dock in shallow waters or to navigate relatively small rivers or canals. Propulsion could be by sails or oars or a combination of both. Evidence of the first true rudder, connected to the ship by a post and balanced on an axis, is found on tomb models of Chinese ships from the first century CE. Today junks are still commonly used.

Paul FORAGE

Further Reading


Jurchen Jin Dynasty
Nūzhēn Jin Cháo 女真金朝

The Jurchen Jin dynasty was founded in Manchuria by the chieftain Aguda in 1125. During its 109-year reign the Jurchen people combined tribal vigor with Chinese-style government, struggling all the while to preserve their ethnic identities. Although the dynasty was defeated by the Mongols in 1234, the Jurchen people were able to prosper and survive for several more centuries.

Two groups of Jurchen, a sedentary, Tungus-speaking people living in Manchuria and southeastern Siberia, existed in the eleventh century. One was a little-assimilated group of “raw” tribespeople living more or less the traditional life. The other was the “cooked” Jurchen, who had interacted closely with the Kitan, who, as the rulers of the Liao dynasty (906–1125), were the dominant political group at that time in north China, and with the many Chinese ruled by the Kitan.

The chieftain Aguda (1068–1123) of the Wanyan clan, the founder of the Jurchen state, was primarily a ruler of the “raw” Jurchen people, but he had learned how to use cavalry effectively in warfare from the Kitan. (Horsemanship and war on horseback were then not part of Jurchen native tradition but soon became an important part of Jurchen culture and the real basis of their military power.) Aguda had also learned how to form a state in the central Asian manner by joining heterogeneous elements, including Kitan tribesmen dissatisfied with their own government, to a Jurchen core.

After a series of raids conducted all along the Liao’s western frontiers, Aguda began attacks that captured the Liao subordinate capitals one by one, sometimes with the help of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), the native Chinese dynasty occupying the rest of China. Aguda died before completing his conquest of the Liao, but his successor, Wuqimai, or Taizong (1075–1135), not only completed the task but also began a massive invasion of the Song, his former ally. The invasion had attempted to make gains in the north as the Liao had collapsed at the expense of the Jurchen Jin.

New Dynasty

In the decades of war that followed, the Song dynasty was nearly destroyed; it was then reorganized as the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) under a collateral branch of the old imperial line based in the city of Hangzhou in central China. Not just the old Liao domains, which had been confined to the northeast, but the entire north came under Jurchen Jin control. China was divided between two equally powerful regimes, with a third regime, that of the Xi Xia state, occupying the northwest.

Even as the wars with the Song continued, internecine struggle (conflict within a group) divided the Jurchen Jin elite. The courts of Wuqimai and his successors had adopted Chinese forms of government in order to organize its new conquests. Many traditional elements of Jin society failed to understand why this was necessary; they felt
that their vested interests were in danger and that they faced absorption by Chinese culture. This conflict was still unresolved at the time of the Mongol invasions, and it was one of the reasons why the Mongols were able to conquer the Jin with relative ease—in part with some of the very same tribal allies that the Jurchen people had used in their own rise.

The Jurchen emperor at the time of the dynasty’s first Mongol crisis was Zhangzong (1168–1208), a sinicizer. He had begun a new war with the Southern Song in 1207 in which Jurchen cavalry had proven far less effective than in the past, indicating a weakening of a native Jurchen tribal base that was having more and more difficulty maintaining its traditional life, not to speak of the cavalry forces sanctioned by Aguda as part of this traditional life. The reign of Zhangzong also witnessed growing Jurchen Jin problems with its other tribal groups, principally with the Kitan of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. In 1207 most of the peoples involved revolted, handing what is now Inner Mongolia over to the Mongols, who used it as a base for raiding and expansion.

The Jurchen Jin, who had once actively intervened in the steppe and had manipulated events there in its own interests, build fortifications in response to the Mongol threat. These proved to be no barrier whatever to the Mongols, who began a general assault on the Jurchens in 1211. During the next twenty-three years they conquered Jurchen Jin territory piecemeal. They took the principal capital of Zhongdu in 1215 and consolidated their rule in much of the north with a great deal of local help, including from Chinese warlords, the Kitan, and even Jurchen allies. Forced to retreat to its domains along the Huang (Yellow)
River, the Jurchen court held out for another nineteen years thanks to Mongol preoccupation elsewhere, principally with a campaign in the west (1218–1223) and the conquest of Xi Xia, and then with an interregnum (the time during which a throne is vacant between two successive reigns or regimes).

**Mongol Assault**

When the Mongol khan (sovereign) Ogodei (1185–1241) gathered his resources and refocused Mongol attention on China, the Jurchen Jin dynasty came to a close. Mongols assaulted the capital, then at Kaifeng, from several directions. The Jurchen Jin court fled south to Caizhou, where it attempted to organize further resistance. Kaifeng fell in 1233 and Caizhou in February 1234. The last Jurchen Jin emperor committed suicide.

Unlike the Tangut of Xi Xia, who were virtually exterminated resisting the Mongols, the Jurchen survived and prospered when their dynasty ended. The Jurchen had their own native scripts, based loosely on Chinese, and these survived into the sixteenth century. Later the same cultural groups that had given rise to the Jurchen produced the Manchu, who had their own “raw” and “cooked” components and who also tried to combine tribal vigor with a Chinese style of government. They had even less success than the Jurchen in maintaining their ethnic identity during their reign of China, and the once-large Tungus population of Manchuria is all but extinct today.

Paul D. BUCELL

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KANG Youwei

Kang Yŏuwéi 康有为

1858–1927 Scholar and political reformer

Kang Youwei 康有为, as one of the engineers of the Hundred-Day Reform of 1898, championed for a strong constitutional monarchy in place of Qing imperial rule to facilitate the modernization of China. A coup by conservative elements toppled him from power. Kang fled to Japan and continued to promote constitutional monarchy for China.

Born in Foshan, Guangdong Province, to a scholar-official family, Kang Youwei was raised to be a devoted Confucian and a nationalist. Viewing the unceasing foreign penetration into China, Kang was determined to help the country preserve Chinese cultural heritage. After failing the civil service examination in 1888, Kang turned his attention to education. In his native province he organized an academy that focused on restudying Confucianism and learning Western knowledge in order to find self-strengthening measures to save the country. One of his students was Liang Qichao, who later worked with Kang to lead the Hundred-Day Reform in 1898.

China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) hardened Kang’s determination to urge more comprehensive reform, which a few officials and reformers, such as Feng Guifen in the 1860s, had proposed decades earlier. In the summer of 1895 Kang led one thousand students to Beijing to protest the peace terms imposed by Japan. Kang remained in the capital, where he founded study associations and newspapers and sent memos to senior officials, hoping to awaken the nation to the need to save the country through reform.

Kang’s patriotic zeal finally received attention from Emperor Guangxu, who recruited Kang in June 1898 to reform the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government. Unlike the previous Self-Strengthening Movement, Kang’s reform program was much more comprehensive. While self-strengthening measures such as promoting economic development and military modernization and learning Western ideas and techniques would continue, Kang renewed Feng’s earlier demands of revising the civil service examination and educational systems. In addition, Kang proposed replacing imperial rule with a constitutional monarchy, modeled on Japan’s Meiji period (1868–1912). Kang urged that Emperor Guangxu should have the determination of Russia’s Peter the Great, who modernized and strengthened Russia as a great power in the early eighteenth century.

Long frustrated by the lack of real power and eager to restore China’s past glory, Emperor Guangxu accepted Kang’s ideas, entrusting him to implement the reforms. Kang, assisted by Liang, helped launch the Hundred-Day Reform. It began on 11 June 1898, but ended on 21 September 1898, as a result of the coup staged by the conservatives led by Empress Cixi, who feared that Kang’s measures would topple the foundation of Qing rule. Kang’s only success was the abolition of the Eight-Legged Essay in the civil service examination, which Feng had failed to achieve during the Self-Strengthening Movement.

After the coup Kang and Liang fled to Japan. There Kang published newspapers and established the Protect the Emperor Society, continuing his vision of a constitutional monarchy. Kang also traveled abroad to seek moral
and monetary support from overseas Chinese and foreign governments.

After the 1911 revolution, which resulted in republicanism, Kang returned to China and continued to push for a constitutional monarchy, reasoning that it was a necessary precondition for ultimate attainment of real democracy. From then until his death Kang made several abortive attempts to restore the dethroned Pu-yi, the last Qing monarch. His repeated failures owed much to his ignorance of the strong antimonarchist sentiments across the nation.

Kang died in Qingdao, Shandong Province.

LAW Yuk-fun

Further Reading


Confucianism and Human Rights

*Kang Youwei, widely recognized in his time as a leading modern exponent of Confucianism, believed that China, and Confucianism itself, had to be liberated from a family system intrinsically repressive of the individual. Hard though it is to conceive of Confucianism stripped of its family system, this is what Kang had to say:

We desire that men’s natures shall all become perfect, that men’s characters shall all become equal, that men’s bodies shall all be nurtured. [That state in which] men’s characters are all developed, men’s bodies are all hale, men’s dispositions are all pacific and tolerant, and customs and morals are all beautiful, is what is called Complete Peace and Equality. But there is no means by which to bring this about this way without abolishing the family… To have the family and yet to wish to reach Complete Peace and Equality is to be afloat on a blocked up stream, in a sealed-off harbor, and yet to wish to reach the open waterway. To wish to attain Complete Peace and Equality and yet keep the family is like carrying earth to dredge a stream or adding wood to put out a fire, the more done, the more hindrance. Thus, if we wish to attain the beauty of complete equality, independence and the perfection of [human] nature, it can [be done] only by abolishing the state, only by abolishing the family.


Photograph of Kang Youwei, circa 1905.
During Emperor Kangxi’s sixty-year reign the borders of the Qing dynasty’s empire were strengthened, Manchu rule in China was solidified, and China’s economy, culture, and population prospered.

The sixty-year reign of Emperor Kangxi, from 1662 to 1722, was one of the longest and most successful in China’s imperial history. In addition to solidifying Manchu rule in China and countering Russian and Mongol threats along the empire’s borders, Kangxi proved himself to be a cultured and able administrator who skillfully bridged the divide between his nomadic Manchu heritage and the agrarian civilization of his Han Chinese subjects.

In the winter of 1661 Emperor Shunzhi, the first emperor of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), contracted smallpox. On his deathbed he named his third son, Xuan Ye, as his heir, possibly because the youth had survived a battle with the disease that shortly was to claim his father, and people believed that this survival was a sign that the child would have a long life. Twelve days after his father’s death, Xuan Ye was proclaimed emperor and took the reign name “Kangxi.” Because the young emperor was only seven years old, a council of four regents was appointed to rule while the child was in his minority. After an abortive first attempt to assert his authority, Kangxi managed at age fifteen, with the help of his mother’s uncle and a group of loyal Manchu officers, to take control of the empire, thus beginning a reign that would last for the next six decades and make him one of the most respected rulers in all of Chinese history.

One of the greatest problems facing the young emperor was the need to unify the empire under Manchu rule. To this end Kangxi ordered that a military campaign be conducted against the three Chinese generals who had directed the conquest of south and southwest China in the 1650s. These generals—Shang Kexi, Geng Jimao, and Wu Sangui—had earlier been named princes and had their sons married to the daughters of Manchu nobles as recognition of their loyalty to the Qing cause. By the early 1670s, however, Kangxi wanted to remove these generals, who were referred to as the “Three Feudatories” because of the high degree of independence they wielded over southern China. The campaign against these former allies was bitter and bloody, but after eight years of fighting Kangxi subdued the last of the Chinese resistance in the south. The emperor then turned his attention to conquering the island of Taiwan, where a large army under the command of the Zheng family had established itself in 1659. A fleet of three hundred ships, under the command of Admiral Shi Lang, whose father and brothers had been killed in the 1650s by the rebel leader Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), was assembled to capture the island. In the summer of 1683 Admiral Shi’s fleet dealt the rebels a fatal blow off the coast of Taiwan, and the last remnants of Chinese resistance surrendered.

Kangxi also worked to protect his empire’s northern and western borders against foreign threats. By the late seventeenth century the Russians had conquered most of
Siberia and were exerting pressure along the Amur River in northern Manchuria. Kangxi attempted to remove this threat by laying siege to the Russian military presence at Fort Albazin in the mid-1680s. In 1689, with the assistance of Jesuit missionaries who served as translators, representatives of the Qing and Russian empires met at the town of Nerchinsk and signed a peace treaty—the first diplomatic treaty between China and a European nation. In the years that followed Russian embassies traveled to the Qing court at Beijing, and the two nations enjoyed cordial commercial and diplomatic relations.

**Northern Border Stabilized**

Kangxi had been anxious to solve his problems with Russia in order to focus his attention on the greater threat posed by the Eleuth king Galdan in western Mongolia. In 1699 Galdan’s armies invaded the territory of the Khalkhas, a nomadic people who lived in eastern Mongolia. The Khalkhas sought refuge in Inner Mongolia, and in 1691 their princes pledged alliance to Kangxi and accepted Qing suzerainty (dominion). Five years later Galdan’s armies again invaded Khalkha territory, and this time Kangxi himself headed an expedition to end this threat along his northern frontier. In 1697 Galdan’s forces were defeated, and the Eleuth king was forced to commit suicide. The northern border of the Qing empire was now stabilized, and all of the peoples of Outer Mongolia were under Manchu control. In 1720 Qing armies also established control over Tibet.

Domestically Kangxi was a conscientious ruler, and under his administration the empire prospered. He ensured that public works, such as maintenance of the dikes along the Huang He (Yellow River) and the navigability of the Grand Canal, were completed. He personally conducted six tours of the empire during his reign, during which he inspected conservancy projects and the work of his officials. While in Beijing he continued to keep a close watch on the work of the empire’s bureaucracy by reading secret reports compiled by teams of censors who were routinely sent to inspect the work of the officialdom. Having mastered classical Chinese, Kangxi was a great patron of Chinese culture and scholarship, and during his rule he sponsored court painters, imperial porcelain factories, academies of learning, and the compilation of works of philosophy and literature. In an effort to retain the traditions of his nomadic heritage, Kangxi also enjoyed periodic hunting trips with members of the Manchu aristocracy.

Kangxi exhibited great intellectual curiosity, and this was demonstrated by his use of Jesuit missionaries as advisers. Not only were the missionaries used as translators during the negotiations with the Russians at Nerchinsk, but also they were used as cartographers and charged with running the Imperial Board of Astronomy because of their mathematical knowledge and ability to correct the Chinese calendar.
Power Struggle

Kangxi had twenty sons and eight daughters who lived to adult age, but only one of these—the prince Yinreng—was born to the first empress. The young prince was named heir-apparent at a young age and was left to serve as acting ruler when his father was absent from the capital during the military campaign against Galdan and the inspection tours of the south. Yinren, however, proved to have a cruel personality, and after years of reading secret reports documenting the prince’s abusive behavior, Kangxi finally revoked Yinren’s status as heir-apparent in 1708 and ordered him arrested. When Kangxi died in December 1722 he had failed to fulfill an important responsibility by not publicly naming an heir, and, in the power struggle that followed his death, his fourth son took the throne under the reign name “Yongzheng.”

Despite his failure to name an heir, Kangxi is recognized, along with the emperor Qianlong (reigned 1736–1799), as one of the two greatest emperors of the Qing dynasty. The empire’s borders were strengthened by his military campaigns, and China’s economy, culture, and population prospered because of the new stability.

Robert John PERRINS

Further Reading

Kao-hsiung, Taiwan’s second-largest city, was founded during the Ming dynasty. The city has Asia’s biggest oil refinery and is of strategic importance because of its naval base.

Kao-hsiung (in Pinyin, Gaoxiong) is Taiwan’s second-largest city. It is situated on the southwestern coast of the island. The city was founded during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) but was under Dutch occupation from 1624 to 1660. In 1863 Kao-hsiung became a treaty port for trade with the European colonial powers. During the Japanese occupation (1895–1945) of Taiwan, Kao-hsiung was transformed into a major industrial center, and the port sustained heavy damage during World War II. The port was rebuilt, and in the 1970s and 1980s it became Taiwan’s most important seaport, covering an area of 154 square kilometers.

Kao-hsiung has shipyards, steel mills, and other heavy industry, as well as petrochemical plants and Asia’s biggest oil refinery. The city is among the most heavily polluted in Taiwan. The port also has a large fleet of fishing boats, and agricultural products are exported from Kao-hsiung by ship. Kao-hsiung is of strategic importance because of its large naval base. The city enjoys equal status with Taipei and is administered directly by an executive committee (yuan) instead of the Taiwan provincial government. Kao-hsiung has a university and several institutions of higher education and an international airport. The eighth International World Games will be held in Kao-hsiung in 2009 from 16 to 26 July.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading
Khulubai Khan

Hūbiliè dàhàn 忽必烈大汗
1215–1294  Founder of the Mongol empire

Born into a ruling Mongol family, Khulubai Khan began his career as a minor prince who had been granted land in present-day Inner Mongolia, and therefore always had a direct interest in north China. Years of opposition from his brothers and a seemingly constant struggle for power finally led Khulubai to establish a Mongol empire in China, ending the Song dynasty in 1279.

Khulubai Khan, founder of the Mongolian successor khanate (the state or jurisdiction of a khan [sovereign]) in China, was the second of four sons of Tolui-noyán (c. 1190–c. 1231), who was the youngest son of Mongol conqueror Chinggis Khan (also known as Genghis Khan, reigned 1206–1227). Born on the steppe (vast, usually level and treeless tracts in southeastern Europe or Asia), the last ruler of Mongol China so born, Khulubai began his career as a minor prince with an appanage (a grant of territory) in what is now Inner Mongolia, which gave him a direct interest in Mongol-occupied north China. In 1251, with the ascension of his brother Möngke as khan of the still-unified Mongolian empire (with the house of Tolui as its rulers), Khulubai acquired considerably more importance. He became his brother’s viceroy in China, then a principal commander as Möngke set about conquering the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279).

During this period Khulubai carefully recruited talent from various quarters, not exclusively Chinese, to build his own coterie of advisors. These allies drew the jealousy of his brother, who removed Khulubai as viceroy and came near to eliminating him. Later, after the sudden death of Möngke while campaigning in 1259, these same advisors helped Khulubai claim succession and build a separatist regime in China.

During the early years Khulubai’s principal opponent was his brother Ariq-boke (d. 1266), whom Khulubai ultimately defeated, but an even more serious opponent emerged in Qaidu (1236–1301), a grandson of Ögödei (reigned 1229–1241), second khan of the unified empire. The struggle with Qaidu, although never threatening Khulubai’s position in China, did prevent him from gaining acceptance as the successor to Möngke and confined Khulubai’s power to China and such areas of Mongolia and Turkistan that he could dominate from a Chinese base.

Forced to make do with what he had, Khulubai built an empire in China, initially in the north, long conquered by the Mongols, then in the south, too, where Khulubai’s armies ended the independent regime of the Song dynasty by 1279. Even before his final victory, Khulubai’s regime had adopted the Chinese dynastic designation “Yuan,” meaning “origin,” drawn from the Book of Changes.

Khulubai’s China, described by the European traveler Marco Polo, was a mix of Mongolian, Chinese, and other cultural influences as Khulubai and his ministers set out to provide a regime that had a little something for everyone,
but the most for the Mongols. At its center was a government that was generally Chinese in nomenclature but behind which the reality was very Mongolian. There was no single capital, but the court moved from place to place in a regular seasonal cycle based on Daidu, today’s Beijing, and Shangdu (Xanadu), Khubilai’s summer playground in Inner Mongolia. At court representatives of so many cultures jostled for influence, speaking not only Chinese and Mongolian but also Persian, various Turkic dialects, and even Old French. Few societies were ever as diverse. Even the food served was drawn from all over Asia, although the preferred banquet dish was a much-modified Mongolian soup.

Paul D. BUeLL

Further Reading


Kong Xiangxi, as brother-in-law of both Republic of China founder Sun Yat-sen and Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, assumed a number of important official posts. Manipulating the posts as the Minister of Finance and Director of the Bank of China, Kong pocketed the nation's financial resources. This corrupt practice, together with the mismanagement of the economy, resulted in Kong's fall from power.

Born in Taigu, Shanxi Province, into a poor family, Kong Xiangxi attended a U.S.-run missionary school, where he was converted to Christianity. In 1901, with church sponsorship, Kong went to the United States and studied first at Oberlin College and then at Yale University. During his stay Kong met Sun Yat-sen, who later founded the Republic of China (ROC). In 1907 Kong returned home and founded the Ming Yin School and started a business. In 1913 Kong was invited by Sun to stage the Second Revolution, thereby beginning Kong's political career. The revolution failed, and Kong followed Sun to Japan. There Kong met and married Soong Ai-ling in 1914. The next year Sun married Soong Mei-ling, the youngest sister of the Soongs, which consolidated the Kong–Chiang relationship.

In 1915 Kong returned to China and helped Sun's Guomindang (GMD, Chinese Nationalist Party) to compete against the warlords for national power. Because of Kong's Western education and exposure, Kong's role was primarily as liaison officer and diplomat, in which capacity he led a delegation to Moscow to explore Soviet assistance to strengthen the GMD.

After Sun's death in 1925 Kong worked closely with the new GMD leader, Chiang Kai-shek, to compete for national power against the warlords. In addition to acting as liaison, Kong managed finances and sought donations. Two episodes in 1927 secured Kong's access to China's political stage. First, the successful Northern Expedition to unite China ensured Chiang the national leadership. Second, at Kong Xiangxi's arrangement, Chiang married Soong Mei-ling, the youngest sister of the Soongs, which consolidated the Kong–Chiang relationship.

In 1928 the expedition ended, and Chiang was recognized as the only Chinese leader. Kong was entrusted with a number of key positions in the government, making him the wealthiest and most powerful financier in China. Kong was named minister of industry and commerce and director of the China Currency Bank, in which capacities he restructured Chinese financial institutions. In 1933, Kong assumed both of these posts, resigning the ministerial post in 1944 and the Bank of China post a year later on V-J Day (Victory in Japan of World War II). During his tenures Kong was responsible for coordinating national and foreign economic resources at Chiang's proposal and fiscal and monetary policymaking, which contributed much to support Chiang's anti-Chinese Communist and anti-Japanese efforts throughout the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s.
Concurrently Kong held several important political posts and participated in diplomatic affairs, including being president of the GMD government’s Executive Yuan. As V-J Day approached, Kong was forced to retreat from the front stage of politics because of internal and external pressures, the latter coming primarily from the United States, Chiang’s important ally. First, Kong’s wartime economic measures had resulted in hyperinflation. Second, evidence indicated that Kong had manipulated his official positions in accepting bribes and pocketing national resources. In 1944 Kong resigned his ministerial post and his Bank of China post the next year.

When the Chinese Civil War broke out in 1947 Kong went to the United States, although he intended to return to Chiang’s camp. Kong lived in seclusion until October 1962, when Chiang invited him to Taiwan. Kong was again made a member of the GMD Central Committee. In February 1966 Kong returned to the United States for medical treatment and lived in Long Island, New York, until his death.

LAW Yuk-Fun

Further Reading

Never harbor the intent to victimize others; but never let guard down against being victimized.

害人之心不可有，
防人之心不可无

Hài rén zhī xīn bù kě yǒu, fán rén zhī xīn bù kě wú
China and Korea have shared their cultures, languages, and history for millennia. Although China was long the dominant power in East Asia, the disruption of Chinese power in the nineteenth century by European colonial activities, as well as the growth of Japanese power, encouraged greater Korean independence. But that was cut short by Japan's annexation of Korea, and the subsequent partition of the Korean peninsula after 1945.

The Korean Peninsula extends from China's northeastern coast toward Japan. To Korea's east is the Sea of Japan (on Korean maps, Dong Hae or East Sea), and to Korea's west is the Yellow Sea (also known as the East China Sea). The land border between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is defined by two rivers that flow from a dormant volcano known to Koreans as “Paektusan” (White Head Mountain) and to Chinese as “Baitoushan.” The border between China and Korea is marked by the Tumen River (Tumen-gang in Korean), which flows east from the volcano, and the Yalu River (Amnok-gang in Korean), which flows south from the volcano before changing course to the southwest and the Yellow Sea.

Early records, including the Kwanggaet'o stele (a stone slab or pillar used for commemorative purposes) in China, indicate that areas north of the Yalu River were under control of Koreans during the time of the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE) in the fourth century CE.

Ethnology
The Korean people are physically more like northern Chinese and Mongolians, and their language is related to the Altaic languages of that region. Chinese cultural influences and technology, such as the use of bronze and iron, were introduced into Korea during the first millennium BCE. By the third and second century BCE the northern Chinese state of Yen controlled southern Manchuria and the northern part of the Korean peninsula.

The Han Chinese established a colonial capital at Lo-lang, the location of modern P'yongyang, in the late second century BCE. This capital was maintained until 313 BCE. Of note, the Han character that is used to express the name of the river that flows through the city of Seoul and that is used in the Korean name of the country is a different Chinese character from the one used to describe Han Chinese.

Language
Early Koreans had no system of writing, so Chinese characters were used to express ideas. However, these characters did not express the Korean vocabulary well. The use of Chinese pictographs, with the addition of phonetic characters, was called idu. The Korean phonetic alphabet,
Hangul, was not created until the fifteenth century and is attributed to King Sejong the Great (1397–1450), who ruled from 1418 to 1450.

**Historical Relationships**

During the last century BCE and most of the first millennium CE the Korean Peninsula was divided among three kingdoms. During this time, the peninsula was ruled by the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE), which extended from the northern portion of the Korean Peninsula into present China, the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE) in the southeastern part of the peninsula, and the Paekche kingdom (18 BCE–663 CE) in the southwest. Under pressure from China’s Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) the Koguryok-dominion was defeated in the seventh century CE. The Shilla kingdom joined with Paekche kingdom to create Unified Shilla (668–935 CE) in opposition to the Chinese conquest of northern Korea, but this northern region gained control of most of the Korean Peninsula (except the regions south of the Tumen and Yalu Rivers) by 935 CE. This unified area became known as “Koryo,” which is the root of the word Korea.

The Koryo kingdom (918–1392) had to accept the tributary state system by force when the Chinese Liao dynasty (contemporary of the Song dynasty 960–1279, but controlled only the border) invaded at the end of the tenth century CE. In the twelfth century, with the founding of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), Koryo became a tributary state to the Southern Song.

In the thirteenth century CE Mongols invaded Manchuria, and Manchurians fled into Korea. Koreans resisted the intrusion, and Korea came to be known as a “hermit kingdom.” Nevertheless, Emperor Ch’ien-Lung (1736–1795) again extended Chinese suzerainty (dominion) over vast regions, including Korea, during his reign.

Over the next few centuries, as European explorers began their intrusion into east Asia, Chinese relations with European countries and even many east Asian countries were handled through the Ministry of Rituals; this arrangement was suitable for countries such as Korea,
which had some cultural and linguistic commonalities with China.

In 1875 the Chinese foreign ministry (Tsungli Yamen) encouraged Korea to open itself to relations with the Japanese, thus sacrificing its own suzerainty over Korea. Insurrections in Korea in the early 1880s prompted China to attempt to reassert its influence in Korea, even as Japanese influence was growing there.

In the twentieth century, after the Japanese surrender in World War II, many Koreans who had fled their homeland remained in Manchuria and joined the People's Self-Defense Army in support of the Communists. During the Korean War the People's Republic of China viewed U.S. involvement in the Korean War as a resurgence of Western imperialism; many of General Douglas MacArthur's statements and actions contributed to this view.

The division of the Korean peninsula after World War II, which resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north, has benefited China. Northeast China benefited from economic relations with South Korea, and South Korea became one of China's major trading partners in Asia. Although China has gained little from its trade with North Korea, China has provided nearly one-fourth of all international trade with that country, and has been a major provider of food and fuel to it.

In 2001, the year when China was admitted to the World Trade Organization, South Korea replaced the United States as China's greatest source of foreign direct investment (FDI). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korea's post–Cold War international relations have been based less on reliance on the United States and more on diversification in its relations; China is a player in this diversification.

North Korea benefited from the political competition between the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, playing one against the other in acquiring support. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and economic liberalization in China have left North Korea without its biggest benefactors, even as it has remained located between one of east Asia's most successful market-oriented economies (South Korea) and what has become one of the world's greatest export-oriented economies (China).

Thomas DOLAN

A Chinese text on the subject of divine reward and punishment, translated into Korean.
The “Commander of Three Armies,” the general of a Ming dynasty force sent to help Korea resist Japanese invasion.

Further Reading

The Korean War was a bloody attempt by the opposing governments of North and South Korea to reunify the divided country by force. China supported North Korea, while the United Nations, led by the United States, supported South Korea.

The Korean War was fought between North Korea and South Korea from 1950 until 1953 as each country attempted to reunify Korea (which had been divided after World War II) under its respective government. North Korea was supported by China, and South Korea was supported by U.S.-led United Nations troops.

On 25 June 1950 North Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, which had been established as the border between the two Koreas, and invaded their southern neighbor. At the time of the invasion the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was less than one year old. China’s post–World War II civil war exacerbated its domestic, social, and economic chaos, which had begun in 1937 when Japan had invaded and occupied China’s east coast. The PRC was bolstered by the February 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. Nonetheless, in June 1950 the PRC was an infant state whose immediate goal, apart from survival, was to recapture Taiwan from the fledgling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang [KMT]) soldiers and politicians. The PRC was hardly in a position to confront the world’s superpower, but that is what it did.

Kim Il Sung, leader of North Korea, wanted to unify the peninsula and establish a Communist economic structure. However, he was blocked by the Western-backed Syngman Rhee, president of South Korea. Kim Il Sung believed that the southern peasants would support communism and that his invasion would galvanize a grass-roots movement in favor of communism.

One month before the invasion Kim met with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong in Beijing, and Kim told the CCP leadership that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had approved the plan for a southern advance. Although Mao urged caution, he promised support to North Korea and vowed that China would enter the war should the United States intervene. It is possible that Mao did not know the exact date when Kim would cross into South Korea, but he and the CCP were fully aware of North Korea’s impending actions.

North Korean forces swept south in a blitzkrieg-like push that forced the South Korean and U.S. forces into the southeast area around Pusan. On the day of the invasion the United States called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which passed a resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and a return to the antebellum border arrangement on the peninsula. Two days later, on 27 June, the United Nations agreed to provide assistance to the retreating South Korean forces.

U.S. president Harry Truman responded to Kim’s invasion by ordering the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Straits. Mao declared that this action demonstrated the true imperialistic colors of the United States.

Through the summer of 1950 North Korean forces advanced and occupied almost the entire peninsula. However, on 15 September, on the peninsula’s western region...
of Inchon, U.S. general Douglas MacArthur, the U.N. commander, and his forces landed and began to push the North Korean army back to its original position, north of the thirty-eighth parallel. The sudden reversal of momentum in the war alarmed Mao. As South Korean and U.S. forces neared the thirty-eighth parallel, China feared that the United States might use Korea as a stepping-stone to China. Mao and the CCP politburo met to discuss the continued advance of U.S. forces. Zhou Enlai communicated to an Indian official that China would intervene should U.S. forces step north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

Caution Outvoted

On 7 October the U.S. First Cavalry Division crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. The next day Mao decided to send an army of Chinese troops called the “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV) across the Yalu River and into the peninsula. This action was taken after weeks of debate among the CCP leadership. Some of the CCP elite, such as Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai, expressed grave concerns about a potential war between the United States and China. They argued that apart from China’s domestic, economic, political, and social crises, the United States was the planet’s greatest power and the only nation with atomic weapons. Furthermore, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had just finished fighting a brutal civil war and was in the process of downsizing. Although Mao and the other CCP leaders appreciated these challenges, other considerations outweighed the cautious voices. First was Mao’s earlier promise to Kim. If China did not come to North Korea’s defense, all of Asia would consider China an unreliable ally. Second, some in the CCP believed that a confrontation between the United States and the PRC was inevitable. The three areas where this would most likely take place, according to Mao, were in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Of the three locations, Mao thought that the Chinese would do best in Korea because of its proximity to China and its favorable terrain. Most importantly, if the United States successfully united Korea with a pro-capitalist government, China would have a 1,000-kilometer-plus border that it would have to defend.
Mao appointed Peng Dehuai, a remarkable military strategist, to lead the CPV army and insisted that the most important element of the initial CPV engagement was that of surprise. MacArthur did not take the Chinese force seriously, and his underestimation of the CPV was, Mao believed, to China's strategic advantage. Indeed, MacArthur was so confident that he stated publicly that he would be completely victorious by Thanksgiving and that U.S. troops would be home by Christmas.

Mao's 8 October 1950 decision to enter the conflict was predicated, in part, on Stalin's commitment to support the CPV invasion with air cover. However, on 10 October Stalin gave notice that the Soviet Union would not supply air cover for the CPV. The Soviet leader feared that if Soviet planes and pilots engaged the U.S. Air Force, the peninsula war would escalate into a third world war.

Various North Korean and PRC leaders felt betrayed by Stalin. Stalin had approved Kim's plan to move south of the thirty-eighth parallel; he had encouraged Mao to send Chinese troops to North Korea's aid. And now that North Korea and the PRC desperately needed the support of the Soviet military, Stalin reneged on his commitments.

Faced with the realities of a demoralized, reeling North Korean army and no Soviet air support, Mao nonetheless pursued an aggressive course of action; he ordered Peng to proceed with the CPV move across the Yalu River.

Truman Reassured

At this same time, on 15 October President Truman met with MacArthur on Wake Island in the Pacific Ocean. The general assured his commander that the Chinese forces were weak and demoralized and that even should the Chinese cross the Yalu River, they did not have sufficient transports to quickly move large numbers of soldiers across the river. MacArthur's impressive Inchon landing and subsequent victories added to his legendary self-confidence, and at Wake he exuded authority and a mistaken omniscient view of the Korean War.

Close to 400,000 CPV troops began crossing the Yalu on 19 October, and six days later at the Unsan-Onjong region the Chinese caught the United Nations Command (UNC) and South Korean forces by surprise. Thousands of U.S. and South Korean soldiers were killed or captured. The news of CPV successes delighted Mao and Stalin. Both leaders encouraged Peng to use these initial victories as momentum to push the enemy forces not only south of the thirty-eighth parallel but also out of Seoul, the south's capital city. Mao also instructed Peng to concentrate on defeating the South Korean forces, which would leave the U.S. forces bereft of indigenous allies and make them appear as imperialist invaders to the local population.

These sideline suggestions and orders began an ominous cycle of frustrations for the Communist leaders. Peng resented Stalin giving suggestions that would expose the CPV to dangerous counterattacks. At one point Peng suggested that if Stalin wanted the CPV to move farther south, then the Soviet leader should send his own troops to the peninsula. Peng even found Mao's orders somewhat unrealistic. Peng was unwilling to throw caution to the wind and carry through with an all-out offensive against the retreating UNC. He was concerned about the possibilities of his army being spread too thin and cut off from needed supplies. MacArthur's successful Inchon landing was still fresh on his mind, and he feared another such powerful counterattack.

Between 19 October and 21 December the CPV launched three offensives against the UNC. Zhou Enlai wanted to combine this military success with a diplomatic victory. On 17 January 1951 Zhou proposed that a multinational conference convene to discuss foreign troop withdrawal from Korea and the return of Taiwan to the PRC.

Zhou's hope for a quick end to the war ended just eight days later when U.S. general Matthew Ridgway followed his military instincts and launched a counterattack against the unprepared CPV, taking the CPV leadership by surprise. Mao ordered Peng to launch a counterattack, and this strategic gamble led to the first major CPV defeat on the peninsula. Both armies dug in, and the skirmishes that followed included alternate victories and defeats for the CPV.

MacArthur Sacked

After UNC victories during the 1951 winter campaign MacArthur publicly stated that the CPV's losses might be just the first phase of the eventual PRC defeat. He noted that China's eastern seaboard might be the next UNC
target and that the United States might bring Kuomintang troops back to the mainland from Taiwan. President Truman viewed MacArthur's unauthorized public statements as needlessly provocative. On 11 April MacArthur was relieved of duty. Several weeks later the CPV, under pressure from Mao, launched its fifth offensive, which resulted in an estimated 100,000 CPV casualties. This military debacle finally convinced Mao that sheer numbers and combat bravery were insufficient against a technologically superior enemy. On 26 May Mao ordered Peng to dig in along the thirty-eighth parallel and to abandon the human wave of attacks against the UNC.

During the summer of 1951 both sides stepped up diplomatic efforts because of the ever-increasing likelihood of a military stalemate on the peninsula. General Ridgway, having replaced MacArthur, proposed a parley at Won-San Harbor. Peng rejected the location but accepted the idea of a face-to-face meeting between the two sides. Mao insisted that the meeting take place at Kaesong, a site near the thirty-eighth parallel. The negotiations were productive, and it became clear to the United States that the real authority in North Korea was Peng, who took his orders directly from Mao.

Two disagreements led to an impasse at the Kaesong talks. The first disagreement was over the suggested border between North and South Korea. The Chinese and the North Koreans insisted on the antebellum border along the thirty-eighth parallel. Ridgway and other U.S. advisors and politicians claimed that a return to the thirty-eighth parallel border would mean that the United States had fought for nothing and that Kim Il Sung would have no consequences for this unprovoked aggression. The United States suggested that the border be located somewhere between the Yalu River and the current location of the UNC troops, which was well north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Mao rejected this suggestion and insisted on a thirty-eighth parallel division.

The second disagreement concerned the exchange of prisoners. The Chinese assumed that the United States would observe the Geneva Convention and that a free exchange of prisoners on all sides would conclude hostilities. However, the United States insisted that all prisoners be afforded an opportunity to choose whether to defect to the enemy or return to their homeland. Many of the CPV and North Korean soldiers were demoralized by their experience during the war, and the United States encouraged the POWs to defect and live with greater freedom in South Korea, Taiwan, or other capitalist-friendly nations.

Compromise Reached

The two sides could not get past these two issues, and so the war continued for the next two years. These years were punctuated by excessively costly victories on both sides; battles resembled the give-and-take of World War I trench warfare.

Several events took place that encouraged Mao and Zhou Enlai to compromise on the POW issue. On the domestic front China was eager to launch its first five-year Soviet-model economic plan. Mao was keen to launch China into a dramatic economic recovery, and this was difficult to achieve given the budget drain of the CPV. Indeed, the PRC was able to keep its army on the Korean battlefields only through Soviet loans. The PRC leaders were also aware of growing CPV morale problems. Inadequate basic supplies translated into summers of hunger and winters of frostbite for the CPV. Furthermore, the North Korean economy was incapable of sustaining a civil war.

The United States was also seeking peace while concomitantly demonstrating its fighting resolve throughout 1952. On 24 October 1952 Secretary of State Dean Acheson
addressed the U.N. General Assembly and stated that the United States would not compromise with regard to POW exchanges. The U.N. suggested that neutral parties tackle the POW problem. The next month an Indian diplomat suggested a compromise whereby every POW could meet with neutral-country diplomats and freely express his or her relocation preference. Zhou Enlai rejected this suggestion, and talks stalled again.

On 5 March 1953 Joseph Stalin died. Two weeks later the Soviet Union’s top officials encouraged Mao to compromise on the POW issue. This softer line coincided with the Soviets’ hope for better relations with the United States. By the end of March Zhou agreed to the proposal that neutral parties could interview POWs who were uncertain about repatriation. This represented a diplomatic defeat for the PRC, but it was difficult to ignore the wishes of the Soviet Union.

On 13 June 1953 the POW compromise was reached, and both sides prepared to exchange prisoners. However, South Korean president Syngman Rhee was unhappy with the agreement and released fifty Chinese prisoners without the prescribed interviews. China responded on 13 July with its last major offensive. Both sides were tired of fighting, and the United States insisted that Rhee had acted on his own and that this would not happen again.

Two weeks later, on 27 July, the signed armistice brought the war to an end. All parties had to compromise. The United States settled for the thirty-eighth parallel border, and the Chinese agreed to a negotiated repatriation of prisoners.

**POWs Repatriated**

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), made up of personnel from India, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, took custody of all nonrepatriated prisoners to ascertain if the prisoners wanted to return to their home countries. The final numbers were not flattering for the PRC. The UNC returned 75,801 POWS. The CPV returned 12,773 prisoners, of which 3,326 were U.S. POWs. However, 14,227 Chinese prisoners met with the NNRC and expressed their desire to defect from the PRC. On the other side, only twenty-one U.S. POWs defected to the Communist states. U.S. officials claimed that these numbers demonstrated the tyrannical nature of the PRC.

The PRC’s participation in the Korean War was both a blessing and a curse for the embryonic state. On the positive side the Korean War united the Chinese. Mao
preached the gospel of anti-imperialism, economic equality, and human dignity. He and his lieutenants rallied the Chinese around the belief that the United States on the Korean Peninsula represented a century-long continuation of Western imperialism and economic exploitation in East Asia. A national PRC movement entitled “Resist America and Aid Korea” illustrated the Chinese unity that came about because of the war. Further, the Chinese people believed that they had finally stood up against the West. Mao, the son of a peasant, had fought the great United States to a standstill. The CCP and its top officials gained domestic credibility because of the CPV triumphs in Korea. The PRC’s stock also rose at an international level. Despite MacArthur’s claim to the contrary, the PRC and its army were not paper tigers. Peng brilliantly led the CPV against overwhelming odds. The world took notice of the PRC, even if the United States would wait until 1979 to recognize the twentieth century’s most populous country.

However, for all these advantages, the Korean War had dire consequences for the PRC. First and foremost was the human cost. An estimated 3 million people perished during the war, making it, after the two world wars, the third-costliest war in the twentieth century. As many as 1 million Chinese soldiers lost their lives in the war. This loss could never be repaid.

The war also chilled relations between the PRC and the USSR. Some among the PRC leadership accused the Soviet Union of being a merchant of death. They believed that Stalin had pushed China into the war and then used the war to keep China weak. In fact, China had to borrow money from the Soviet Union to fight this war—a debt that would be repaid on the backs of the farmers during the 1959–1961 Great Leap Forward.

For all of China’s global prestige in fighting the United States to a standstill, the Korean War made China an international outlaw. The U.N. condemned Kim Il Sung, and the international forces in Korea fought under the United Nations Command. Although the United States might have used the UNC as an excuse to send thousands of U.S. troops, the CPV was fighting the United Nations. A generation would pass before the PRC could join the U.N.

Finally, the Korean War irrevocably changed the PRC’s plans with regard to Taiwan. Mao intended to re-incorporate the island into the PRC in August 1950. Plans were drawn up, and the United States intimated that it was finished with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang [GMD]) and its leadership. Truman’s decision to protect Taiwan gave the KMT badly needed protection and aid. Thus, although China found security from Western imperialists on its Korean border, it entered the twenty-first century still unsure of its future with Taiwan.

Current relations between the Koreas and China are relatively good. In fact, political leaders around the world look to China to keep a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea from threatening neighboring states. South Korea and China enjoy cordial relations, but part of this is due to the lingering animosity both feel toward Japan for what Japan did in both countries during World War II.

Shelton WOODS

Further Reading

Kumarajiva

Jiúmóluóshí 鸠摩罗什

344–413 CE Translator of Buddhist works

Kumarajiva translated into Chinese about one hundred Mahayana Buddhist texts written in Prakrit and Sanskrit.

Kumarajiva may be credited with bringing to China the critical texts of Mahayana Buddhism by way of his translation into Chinese of previously unavailable Prakrit and Sanskrit works. Kumarajiva, given his Indian background, bears only one name; it is Sanskrit and means, “a youthful soul,” or “eternally youthful.”

Kumarajiva (344–413 CE) was born in Kucha, in China’s present-day Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. His mother, Jiva, is thought to have been the daughter of the king of Kucha. Kumarajiva’s father is thought to have been from India and to have converted to Buddhism and come to Kucha to participate in its thriving Buddhist community. Scholars do not know what connection Kumarajiva continued to have with his father, although Kumarajiva’s mother had him educated at the local monastery, where he excelled in learning. His mother later took him to Kashmir, where he continued his studies. By the time he was twelve, mother and son relocated to the oasis city of Turfan. There Kumarajiva dedicated himself to the Mahayana doctrine of Buddhism.

Kumarajiva’s learning brought him renown at a young age. The king of Kucha requested that he return to the city of his birth and instruct the royal children. Kumarajiva consented and returned to Kucha, where a newly built monastery awaited him. At this stage of his life he began a rigorous study of the Perfection of Wisdom texts. Many sages and monks came to him to be instructed in the doctrines of the Middle Way. Perhaps at this time his mother, who was now a Buddhist nun, traveled to Kashmir, never to return.

Kucha was attacked by the Chinese in 384, and many of its residents were captured and taken east. Among the captured was Kumarajiva, now forty years old. He probably learned Chinese during his captivity of nearly seventeen years. Thus, when he arrived in the city of Changan in 401, he found company among the Buddhists there. They were eager to learn more about their faith. In this way Kumarajiva came to serve Emperor Yao Xing, whom Kumarajiva began to instruct in Buddhist precepts. Kumarajiva, realizing that Buddhist scriptures in Chinese were scarce, began translating texts that he considered essential to a proper understanding of Mahayana. The task of translation was critical because Prakrit and Sanskrit terms were often difficult to render into Chinese. The normal practice was to use approximations, often drawn from Daoism, which yielded inaccurate and clumsy results.

Therefore, Kumarajiva crafted a Chinese vocabulary that allowed readers immediate access to concepts central to Buddhism, such as the notion of the void and the essential emptiness of the self.

The emperor, to facilitate these translations, founded a school devoted to this undertaking. Many monks from India, Kucha, and central Asia came to learn and to expound. During the next twelve years Kumarajiva rendered into Chinese about one hundred Buddhist texts. He died in Changan.

Nirmal DASS

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Kumarajiva translated Buddhist texts at the White Horse Temple in Luoyang, China.

PHOTO BY FANGHONG.

Further Reading


The Kunlun Mountains are a sparsely populated 2,500-kilometer-long mountain range that constitutes the physical border between Tibet and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in Western China. It is crossed by the Qinghai-Tibet railway, the highest in the world.

The Kunlun mountain range is about 2,500 kilometers long and runs southeast to northwest on the northwestern border of the Tibetan Plateau. The mountain range stretches from the Pamir Highlands in central Asia to central China, where it forks out into three ranges: the Altun Shan range, the Arkatag range, and the Hoh Xil (Kekexili) range. The Kunlun range constitutes a physical border between Tibet and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and extends into Qinghai Province. The width of the range varies but seldom exceeds 200 kilometers. The height of the mountains varies between 4,000 and 7,000 meters, and in the higher western part, where the range is composed of three parallel ridges, peaks such as Kongur and Muztagata reach more than 7,500 meters. The southern slopes fade into the 1,500-meter lower Tibetan Plateau, while the northern slopes are extremely steep. On the Tibetan-Xinjiang border, the Kunlun range has a glaciated area of about 4,000 square kilometers, and the glacial streams of the northern slopes are important for the oases in the Taklimakan Desert.

Above 3,500 meters the Kunlun range has annual average temperatures below zero, and highs and lows may reach 24˚C and −45˚C, respectively. The climate is dry, with an average precipitation of less than 300 millimeters annually. The mountains consist mostly of snow-covered peaks and areas, with no or sparse vegetation interspersed with marsh and wetland formed by melting ice and overflowing rivers. In spite of the extreme climatic conditions, the region has a prolific wildlife population, with more than two hundred species, including a population of about four thousand antelopes that migrates from the southern Tibetan plateau during the summer to give birth. These are under state protection along with the wild donkey, the wild yak, the brown bear, the snow leopard, and several other species.

The range is thinly populated by pastoral nomads whose economy is based on yak, sheep, goats, and, to a lesser extent, cattle. People do little farming in the region. Gold deposits have been discovered at Kaihungbei in the southeastern part of the Kunlun range. The Golmud-Lhasa section of the Qinghai-Tibet railway, which opened 1 July 2006, passes the eastern section of the Kunlun range through the Tanggula Pass 5,231 meters above sea level. The highest situated railway station in the world is located nearby at 5,072 meters. Active fault zones are located along the central Kunlun mountain area, which experienced an earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale on 14 November 2001.

Since at least the third century BCE the Kunlun Mountains have been known in Chinese literature as a mythical realm, a paradise in which the legendary Queen Mother...
of the West (Xiwangmu) resided. This realm was the far west where the sun sets but also the place where the Earth meets the sky and thus the axis mundi (turning point of the world) and the place from which people were thought to ascend to immortality. In later Daoist religion the legend of the Queen Mother and her court of immortals in the Western Paradise was greatly expanded.

Bent NIELSEN

**Kunlun**

A poem written in 1935 about Min Mountain, part of the Kunlun Mountain range, by China political leader Mao Zedong.

Now I bid Kunlun:
You needn’t be so high,
Nor need you so many snows.
Could I but lean against the sky and unsheathe my sword
To cleave you into three pieces?
One be sent to Europe,
One be presented to America,
And here in the Orient one remains.
A peaceful world,
And in the whole globe it would be as cold or warm as this is.


Further Reading


Kunqu

Kūnqu 崑曲

Kunqu is a highly classical form of Chinese opera, characterized by an elegant musical and performance style. Favored by the educated elite and the court, kunqu exerted a powerful influence on the history of Chinese theater. The last two centuries saw an overall decline in the performance of kunqu, but it survives to this day, enjoying government and international support.

Kunqu, a regional operastyle, was the dramatic style of the educated elite from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Its music, delicate and usually in four-four time, is dominated by the large side-blown flute (dizi).

Originally an obscure music form, kunqu was fashioned into a body of elegant song by Wei Liangfu (c. 1502–c.1588), whose disciple Liang Chenyu (1520–c.1593) wrote the first recognized kunqu drama. The initial home of kunqu was Suzhou and nearby Kunshan and Taicang, Jiangsu Province, but it spread widely, in particular to Beijing.

Kunqu spawned a significant literature, illustrated by three outstanding works. One is the love fantasy Peony Pavilion (Mudan ting) by China’s most famous playwright, Tang Xianzu (1550–1616). The Palace of Eternal Youth (Changsheng dian) by Hong Sheng (1645–1704) dramatizes historical events of the mid-eighth century, notably Emperor Xuanzong’s love affair with the famous beauty Yang Guifei. Peach Blossom Fan (Taohua shan) by Kong Shangren (1648–1718), a direct descendant of Confucius, also concerns historical events but in the context of a fictional love story. Because the events took place mainly from 1643 to 1645, within living memory, and portrayed the ruling Manchus negatively, Kong was dismissed from office, and the play never did as well as its masterwork status warranted.

The educated elite often purchased children, whom they trained as actors to form private troupes, some men taking actresses as concubines. The troupes performed for special occasions or for guests, especially during banquets, some mansions even having their own stage. Because the dramas were long, individual scenes were performed. Public professional kunqu troupes also existed, most of them all-male, although brothels could support female troupes. Records indicate that public performances of complete kunqu could last three days and nights.

Early in his reign the Qianlong emperor (1736–1795) set up a body at court to organize drama, mostly kunqu. The actors were initially court eunuchs, but when Qianlong made his first southern visit in 1751 he began to recruit actors from Jiangsu Province. Occasions for court drama included popular festivals or birthdays or weddings in the imperial family.

Kunqu influenced (and was also influenced by) Beijing Opera but declined in competition with this and other regional opera styles. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) devastated the areas in which kunqu was especially popular, and consequently kunqu itself. The twentieth century featured several attempts to revive kunqu, but
modernization and reform processes were inimical to this highly classical drama. In 1921 some enthusiastic amateurs set up a training school, but its impact did not survive the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945). The People's Republic of China (founded in 1949) took over kunqu and established troupes and training schools. It gave patronage and encouragement to the greatest of twentieth-century kunqu actors and theorists, Yu Zhenfei (1902–1993), and reformed selected plays to conform to the government's political canons. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) put an end to this revival attempt.

The reform period since 1978 has included further efforts to resuscitate kunqu. In May 2001 the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recognized it as a “Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity.” The Jiangsu Provincial Kunju Troupe (Jiangsu sheng Kunju yuan) was a main leader of performance revivals of classical masterworks, including a revised three-evening version of *Peony Pavilion* performed at the Beijing Music Festival in 2004 and a two-evening version of *Peach Blossom Fan* in 2006.

**Colin MACKERRAS**

### Further Reading


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**From Peony Pavilion**

The first lines from one of the most famous examples of kunqu, *The Peony Pavilion*:

Prologue Speaker:

By busy world rejected, in my own world of retreat I pondered a hundred schemes finding joy in none. Daylong I polished verses for the bowels' torture for the telling of “love, in all life hardest to tell.”

Dawns warmed and twilights shadowed my White Camellia Hall till “with red candle I welcomed friends” — and always “the hills and streams raised high my powers.” Let me only keep faith with the history of this longing, of the road that led through three incarnations to the peony pavilion.

Lacquerware

Lacquerware—objects made of wood, metal, or porcelain to which layers of lacquer have been applied—first developed as an art form in China and dates from about 1600 BCE. Carved lacquer is a uniquely Chinese achievement and is considered lacquer art in its pure form.

Lacquerware refers to wares that are made of wood, metal, or porcelain to which lacquer has been applied. Lacquer is the resin or sap of the lacquer (Rhus verniciflua) or varnish tree, which is native to central and southern China and perhaps to Japan. When lacquer is applied to wood, metal, or porcelain, it gives the ware a smooth, hard, transparent, and shiny surface. People in China and Japan have used true or Far Eastern Asian lacquerware since ancient times.

Artists have used the sap of the lacquer tree as a protective and decorative varnish for both art objects and household objects. Artists apply the lacquer in thin layers on wooden objects or inlay it on metal objects. The lacquer, when solidified, also has been used as a medium for sculpture. Lacquerware, like porcelain, has been much appreciated not only in Asia but also Europe, where people have collected it since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many lacquerware items were beautifully decorated, and many that were household utensils gave durable, waterproof service in households in Asia, where wood was once plentiful. Wood fashioned into lacquerware was versatile, as shown by the wide range of objects included among the wares.

East Asian lacquer is different from the lacquer that forms the basis of some of the varnishes used in japanning (applying varnish to yield a hard, brilliant finish) of European furniture from the sixteenth century onward. Differences exist in chemical composition and sources: The English resin lac or shellac comes from a substance deposited on trees by certain species of insects.

Two broad categories of lacquer objects exist. In one category the lacquer has been applied largely to protect and to decorate. Therefore, the application of lacquer does not change the form of the objects, such as wooden chairs, that are so decorated. In the second class the objects, such as containers, are made mostly of leather, supported by a nonlacquer core. The core can be wood, hemp cloth, or metal and is encased in a lacquer coating thick enough to modify the form of the object. The lacquer coating gives the object a fleshy, plump shape that can be decorated by carving or by painting and inlaying.

Lacquer objects—including all in the second category and any in the first category in which lacquer forms a considerable part of the decoration—are works of art. Lacquer as an art form developed in China and dates from about 1600 BCE during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). Artists created pictorial or surfaced decoration and also carved lacquer. The techniques of qiāngjīn (engraved gold), diāoqì (carved lacquer), and diāotìán (filled in) gradually evolved after the tenth century. Carved lacquer is a uniquely Chinese achievement and is considered lacquer art in its pure form.
Range of Objects

Lacquerware included objects ranging from containers—such as bowls, cups, vases, coffers, and bamboo baskets—to chopsticks, screens, and even suits of leather armor. The lacquer vases produced in Soochow, China, resembled fine porcelain with their carvings on wood stained in coral and lacquered. These objects were crafted for the emperor during the Ch’ien Lung period (1736–1796) of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and were among the treasures used in the summer palace. Other types of lacquerware include Japanese ware of black and gold inlaid with silver, gold, and mother-of-pearl. Japanese and Chinese screens of lacquered, gilt, and painted wood are familiar not only in Asian institutions and homes today but also in fine art museums. Often well-known artists or copyists paint these screens by hand.

Modern lacquerware from Korea and Japan is highly finished in appearance when compared with lacquerware made in China and other parts of Southeast Asia. The Straits Chinese or Peranakan society in Southeast Asia reproduced lacquered basketry, originally made in China, to carry special gifts offered to deities in temples or during occasions such as festivals and weddings. Lacquerware objects remain important in most Southeast and East Asian households, although they tend to be more expensive than objects made of plastic or ceramic.

OOI Giok-Ling

Further Reading

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 temporarily guaranteed commercial relations for Americans in China at a time when Japan was challenging U.S. interests with its advances onto the Asian mainland. The agreement symbolized Washington’s and Tokyo’s cooperation during World War I, but was quickly replaced by renewed rivalry when the United States pursued the Open Door policy in opposition to Japan’s quest for empire.

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement (2 November 1917), signed by United States secretary of state Robert Lansing (1864–1928) and Japan’s special envoy Ishii Kikujiro (1865–1945), was the culmination of two months of talks on the American–Japanese rivalry in China and temporarily settled the two nations’ conflict over competing commercial interests. The agreement made several major points: (1) the government of the United States recognized that Japan had special interests in China; (2) the governments of the United States and Japan denied that they planned to infringe in any way on the independence or territorial integrity of China; and (3) both governments would always adhere to the principle of the so-called Open Door or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

The talks which led up to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement took place during World War I (1914–1918), a time when China was in a state of political disintegration. China’s capital, Beijing, was under the control of warlord Duan Jirui, and the remainder of the country was in the hands of either warlords or foreign interests. Although China was an ally of the United States and Japan during the war, it remained weak and subject to imperialist exploitation in the years immediately following the fall of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Japanese actions in China during World War I, in particular the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands in January 1915 that pushed the Chinese to submit to widespread economic and political concessions, caused the administration of Woodrow Wilson to seek ways to curb Japanese ambitions in China. Despite the public show of cooperation that the Lansing-Ishii agreement represented, relations between the Washington and Tokyo continued to be tense. Statesmen from both nations acknowledged that their interests in China were in conflict.

The origins of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement lie in the U.S. government’s desire to secure access to trade in China after other great powers, such as Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan had already carved out spheres of influence there. From 1899 to 1900, U.S. secretary of state John Hay implemented an “Open Door” concept in China through a series of notes addressed to leaders of the powers involved, which asked them to respect the integrity of China’s government and guarantee access to China’s markets. The Open Door policy would, in theory, provide equal trading opportunities in China for all nationalities. These diplomatic notes were neither binding nor effective, but served as the beginning of a principle adhered to by subsequent U.S. presidents.

By 1908 tensions between the United States and Japan had so deteriorated that rumors of war between the two
nations were heard at the highest levels of the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. Americans feared that Japanese expansion had eclipsed concerns about American competition with European powers in Asia. Additionally, the U.S. government was working to curtail Asian immigration to the United States and, in an ironic contradiction of the Open Door policy, to restrict access to American markets by Chinese and Japanese merchants. The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, the terms of which served as a preamble to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, resolved the conflict temporarily. Both nations pledged to maintain the status quo in Asia, to recognize China’s independence, and to adhere to the Open Door policy. With the Root-Takahira Agreement, the United States also recognized Japan’s annexation of Korea and its movement into Manchuria, while the Japanese agreed to slow emigration to the United States.

World War I brought the U.S.-Japanese rivalry to the forefront once again despite the reality that both nations had become allies in the fight against Germany. Consequently, Viscount Ishii traveled to the United States on a two-month goodwill tour that culminated with an “Exchange of Notes” that formalized the Lansing-Ishii Agreement and outlined the two nations’ commitments to their policies in China. Despite the cordial reception Ishii enjoyed in the United States, tensions between Washington and Tokyo soon resurfaced. In 1923 the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was nullified when the administration of Warren Harding moved to emphasize the Open Door policy. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement postponed a conflict that would continue to intensify until reaching its climax with World War II.

June GRASSO

Further Readings

Photo of Feng Guozhang, acting president of the Republic of China, and his staff, taken in Peking on 10 Oct 1917.
Lansing-Ishii Agreement

Center: Viscount Ishii, Japanese ambassador to the United States, with reception committee in New York, 1917. Left, Albert H. Gary, Chairman of the United States Steel Corporation; right, R. A. C. Smith, dock commissioner and member of reception committee.


Lao She was the penname of Shu Qingchun, a writer of humorous novels, short stories, and plays that praise the Communist Chinese regime.

Shu Qingchun, who wrote under the pen name Lao She, was one of modern China’s most celebrated humorists; his satirical novels, short stories, and plays are highly appreciated. He is also known for his sympathy for the underprivileged. After graduating from Beijing Teacher’s College in 1924 he went to England, where he taught Mandarin Chinese, studied at the School of Oriental and African Studies, and was inspired by reading the novels of British writer Charles Dickens.

When Lao returned to China in 1930, he had already written three novels and had achieved a reputation as a humorous writer, and he continued to write while teaching. During the War of Resistance against Japan (known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945) he was head of the All-China Anti-Japanese Writers Federation, and in 1946 accepted a cultural grant from the U.S. Department of State. He stayed in the United States for three years, returning to China in 1949 after the founding of the People’s Republic. He participated in a number state- and party-sponsored cultural and organizations. But at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution
LAO She • Lǎo Shè • 老舍

From Rickshaw Boy

An excerpt from Lao She’s famous novel, which was produced as a film in China in 1982.

The rickshaw men in Peking form several groups. Those who are young and strong and spring of leg rent good-looking rickshaws and work all day. They take their rickshaws out when they feel like it and they quit when they feel like it. They begin their day by going to wait at rickshaw stands or the residences of the wealthy. They specialize in waiting for a customer who wants a fast trip. They might get a dollar or two just like that if it’s a good job. Having struck it rich they might take the rest of the day off. It doesn’t matter to them—if they haven’t made a deal on how much rent they’ll have to pay to the rickshaw agency. The members of this band of brothers generally have two hopes: either to be hired full time, or to buy a rickshaw. In the latter case it doesn’t make much different if they work for a family full time or get their fares in the streets; the rickshaw is their own.

Compare to the first group to all those who are older, or to all those who, due to their physical condition, are lacking in vigor when they run, or to all those who, because of their families, do not dare waste one day. Most of these men pull almost new rickshaws. Man and rickshaw look equally good so these men can maintain the proper dignity when the time comes to ask for the fare. The men in this group work either all day or on the late after and evening shift. Those who work late, from four p.m. to dawn, do so because they have the stamina for it. They don’t care if it is winter or summer. Of course it takes a lot more attentiveness and skill to work at night than in the daytime; naturally you earn somewhat more money . . . Hsian Tzu, before the events which produced the nickname “Camel,” was a comparatively independent rickshaw man. That is to say, he belonged to that group made up of the young and the strong who also owned their own rickshaws. His rickshaw, his life, everything was in his own hands. He was a top-ranking rickshaw man.


(1966–1976) he was publicly denounced as a counterrevolutionary and tortured; in October 1966 he was either murdered or driven to commit suicide.

By the time of his death, Lao had written more than twenty plays in praise of the Communist Chinese regime. Among his most famous works are the 1938 novel Luo-tuo Xiangzi (Xiangzi the Camel, also known as Rickshaw Boy) and the 1957 play Chaguan (Teahouse). Rickshaw Boy, the story of a peasant who suffers hardship and degradation after a brief period of success as a rickshaw puller in Beijing, became a best-seller in the United States when a bowdlerized English translation, with new characters and a happy ending, was published in 1945. A film of the original version was made in 1982.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading


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Laozi is the name of the foundational text of Daoist philosophy and religion. The name “Laozi” also refers to the supposed author of that text.

Laozi, a book also known as The Way and Its Power (Daodejing, Tao te ching) or The Book of Five-Thousand Characters (because it contains a little more than that number of Chinese characters), refers to the text that set forth in eighty-one poems the principles of Daoist philosophy and religion; its alleged author is also known as Laozi.

Laozi: The Person

Scholars debate the historical authenticity and dates of Laozi the person. The name “Laozi” means “master Lao” or the “old master.” Because the text that bears this name is a composite work, drawing on a variety of sources and sayings, and the classical Chinese language does not clearly distinguish between singular and plural, the word laozi could mean “the old masters.” Sima Qian’s (145–86 BCE) Records of the Grand Historian (c. 99–98 BCE) contains a biography of Laozi, but by that time the identity of Laozi was already in question, and Sima probably put together a “life” of Laozi from conflicting or competing sources. Daoists celebrate anonymity, and the author(s) of the Laozi (Daodejing) appear(s) to have achieved it. The biography proposes that most likely Laozi was Li Er, also known as Li Dan, who was born in Juren village in the state of Chu. An ancient legend, contained in the Records of the Grand Historian, relates a meeting between the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) and Laozi. Some scholars use that story to date Laozi to the sixth century BCE. Others use the story to argue that Laozi did not exist. Based on textual analysis some scholars date the text and its author(s) to the fourth or third centuries BCE. Some texts, such as The Annals of Lü Buwei and the Zhuangzi, contain sayings attributed to Lao Dan. Because those sayings are similar to passages in the Daodejing, some scholars believe that Lao Dan is Master Lao. One legend relates that Laozi was discouraged and decided to leave China. The border guard, Yin Xi, realized that a wise philosopher was about to depart, so he refused to allow Laozi to pass until Laozi recorded his wisdom. Legend has it that Laozi wrote the Daodejing before heading westward.

The expression laozi also could mean “old boy.” There is an ancient legend that Laozi was born at the age of sixty. His mother’s side opened up, and the old boy entered the world with gray hair and the ability to speak. Laozi began to undergo a process of deification in the early Han dynasty (206 BCE–25 CE), and by the later Han dynasty (25–220 CE) Laozi was considered to be an incarnation of the god Lord Lao (Laojun).

There are conflicting versions of what happened to Laozi after leaving China. Some claim that he returned to China and was buried in his hometown of Juren, which is the modern city of Luyi in Henan Province, where a tomb bearing his name can be found today. Some claim he died in India after teaching the Buddha. Others claim that he is immortal and did not die. Laozi is known as the “hidden sage.”
Laozi: The Book

The book that bears the name Laozi consists of two sections: the Daojing (chapters 1–37) and the Dejing (chapters 38–81). Hence the work is known as the Daodejing. In 1973 at Mawangdui near Zhangsha in Hunan Province, a copy of the text was excavated from a tomb that was sealed in 168 BCE. That copy of the text reverses the order of the two sections, beginning with the Dejing, closing with the Daojing. Some propose that this order is significant by placing emphasis on the power (de) over the abstract Way (dao). In 1993 a copy of part of the Laozi written on bamboo slips was excavated from a tomb at Guodian, Jingmen city in Hubei.

Wang Bi (226–249 CE) wrote the most illuminating philosophical commentary on the Laozi. Before the excavations of the text, the Wang Bi redaction was the oldest, most complete, extant version. Hence, the Wang Bi version is the one translated, and chapter references in this article are to the Wang Bi redaction. One significant difference between the Wang Bi version and the excavated versions is that the older excavated versions do not attack Confucian virtues in the direct manner that the Wang Bi version does. The religious Xianger commentary (late second century CE) is older than Wang Bi’s, but it is not complete. The Heshanggong (Master on the Banks of the Yellow River, c. first–second century CE) commentary offers another religious interpretation of the text as a meditation manual.

The Laozi contains such famous sayings as “repay ill will with beneficence” (ch. 63) and “a journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step” (ch. 64). The text has been translated into many languages and more times into English than the Bible. It is the most important text for early, philosophical, and religious Daoism. The Laozi proposes that the Way (dao) is the cosmic source, generating heaven, Earth, and the myriad things and creatures. The term dao is merely a label for an invisible, spontaneous, effortless process of generation, maintenance, and decay. The Way is empty yet fills all things. It is flexible, soft, avoids friction, and contains complementary opposites. Everything is connected to the Way by its instantiated power (de). People, especially the sage rulers, are urged to follow the spontaneous, effortless, and noncontrolling operations of the Way. People should act by not taking purposeful action (wuwei). They should have no or few desires. They should avoid cunning and technical knowledge. The Laozi encourages people to live simply and to be generous. The text realizes the realities of war and advocates deploying troops when necessary, but it advises that the victor cannot be arrogant about the slaughter. It celebrates the feminine, soft approach. It suggests that people return to the simplicity of a newborn infant or the uncarved block, being authentic and genuine. The text has been used for self-cultivation, meditation, rulership, and, more recently, management insights.

James D. Sellmann

Further Reading


Latin America–China Relations ▶
Prior to the market-oriented reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese presence in Latin America was minimal. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, political, economic, and cultural exchanges between China and Latin America have seen a dramatic rise. China has become the third largest trading partner of Latin America and a significant presence in the region.

Contacts between China and Latin America can be traced back to the 1560s, when Spanish galleons (known as “Manila galleons”) sailed the Pacific Ocean between the Philippine port of Manila and Mexico, then called New Spain. Chinese and other Asian merchants developed a thriving trade with New Spain, exporting mainly silks, porcelains, fabric, and jewelry. China imported from the region such goods as silver, shoes, hats, wine, olive oil, and soap.

From 1847 to 1874 about 225,000 Chinese coolies (Chinese indentured laborers), under eight-year contracts, almost all male, were sent to Cuba (to labor in sugar plantations) and Peru (to work in the deadly guano fields). Chinese immigrants began entering Mexico at exactly the same time the United States enacted Chinese exclusion and Mexico promoted immigration. Numbering over twenty-four thousand, the Chinese became one of the largest immigrant communities in Mexico by 1927. Apart from the Manila galleon trade, early contact between China and Latin America arose from emigration.

From the 1870s to the early twentieth century, the Qing (1644–1912) government of China established diplomatic relations with Peru, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and Panama. The diplomatic missions not only helped protect the rights of the indentured laborers from China but also promoted trade between the two regions.

During the pre-Cuban Revolution period no Latin American state recognized China. Chinese involvement in the Korean War and domestic problems meant that less attention could be devoted to low-priority area such as Latin America. China’s history of sponsoring Communist revolution in the developing world alienated a large number of governments in Latin America. The Cuban Revolution in 1959 provided the People’s Republic of China (PRC) an opportunity to break the U.S. policy of “containing China” and to establish its diplomatic links in Latin America. Latin America was seen as a tool that could be used against the U.S. interests. Fidel Castro’s victory in 1959, for example, attracted immediate political support from China. In the 1960s China also voiced support for other Latin American countries’ efforts against the United States. When the United States sent troops to deal with the political crisis in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, PRC leader Mao Zedong denounced the United States in strong terms. Except for Cuba, China made no diplomatic breakthroughs in the Western Hemisphere in the 1960s. By the 1970s most of the trade and cultural exchanges between China and Latin America were concentrated on Cuba. China’s trade with the rest of Latin America was minuscule.
In 1970 Chile, under Salvador Allende, became the first South American country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. On 11 September 1973, the Allende administration was overthrown by a military coup. China and Chile maintained their diplomatic relations, although exchanges and contacts between them were limited. After the PRC’s admittance to the United Nations and the U.S.-China rapprochement, Chinese diplomatic representation in Latin America increased, and by 1980 the number of Chinese embassies had risen to twelve. Yet China was not a major aid donor and did not participate in Latin America’s multilateral institutions.

The late 1970s marked a turning point in Sino–Latin American relations. After nearly thirty years of Maoist rule, China embarked on a more pragmatic and outward-looking program of economic development that focused primarily on exports, foreign investment, technology and closer ties with the West. Chinese support for Communist parties, revolutionary movements, and radical governments was disappearing. Normal and often friendly relations are being conducted with many governments in the region. Economic interactions have intensified, and financial, commercial, investment, and technical ties have been formed where, in general, few existed before. A fast-growing overseas Chinese community exists in Latin America, and the overseas Chinese are taking an important role in bridging the business interests of China and countries in which they reside.

China views Latin America as a strategic battlefield in its fight against Taiwan. Latin America has long been a stronghold for Taiwan’s diplomacy. Taiwan maintains diplomatic ties with twelve of the thirty-five countries in the region. Both Taipei (capital of Taiwan) and Beijing have been consistent providers of financial assistance to those countries that maintained official relations. Both have set up trade offices in the countries with which they don’t have a diplomatic relationship, often the first step toward switching recognition.

Before the 1990s Chinese leaders seldom visited Latin America, but in recent years more frequent exchanges of high-level visits have occurred between China and Latin America. Chinese leaders are spending more time visiting and hosting counterparts from Latin American countries to build personal relationships and to discuss cooperation in areas of mutual trust. In addition to state visits, China has increased its participation in regional international
organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2004 China achieved observer status at the Organization of American States (OAS) and since 1993 has sought to become a full member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Meanwhile China increased exchanges with representatives of congressional, military, and nongovernmental organizations in Latin America. Even the Chinese Communist Party has established relations with many political parties in the region. An increasing number of Latin American countries were designated as “tourist destinations,” a status that allows Chinese tour groups to travel to these countries without travel restrictions, thus promoting further bilateral interaction. With booming trade relations China became the number-three user of the Panama Canal, behind only the United States and Japan. In September 2004 China sent a peacekeeping contingent to Haiti, marking Beijing’s first deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere.

China’s trade and investment in Latin America have soared since the late 1990s. In 2006 bilateral trade hit $70 billion, an all-time high, compared with only $7 billion in 2000. China has become second only to the United States as an importer of commodities and goods from Latin America. Enormous changes also took place in the composition of Chinese exports to Latin America. Prior to the 1980s China’s exports to the region were confined to textiles and some raw materials. In recent years, alongside sustained increases in exports of textiles, those of automobiles, tractors, motorcycles, TVs, computers, electrical appliances, and farm machinery rose rapidly. Under the Chinese policy of modernization, imports from Latin America, such as crude oil, copper, tin, bauxite, iron ore, zinc, and manganese, are of prime importance. Latin American agricultural exports of wheat and soybeans are important items for Chinese consumption. In the going-out strategy (acquisition of exploration and operation rights in overseas oil and gas fields) for energy security, Latin America was identified as one of the three major regions (with Russia / Central Asia and the Middle East / Africa) that may become China’s emerging energy suppliers.

China’s growing presence in the manufacturing sector in Latin America presents enormous challenge for countries such as Mexico and Argentina began to levy high antidumping taxes against China in the 1990s. Fierce competition exists between China and Mexico and Central America for the U.S. market as China replaced Mexico and Central America as the biggest exporter of textiles and clothing to the United States.

Chinese investment in Latin America grew rapidly in the early twenty-first century. The cumulative stock of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America was $4.6 billion in 2003. By 2006 the figure had grown to $19.7 billion. That was about half of the country’s total investments abroad that year. Almost 96 percent of that FDI went to tax havens such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Excluding the tax havens, Chinese FDI in the southwestern hemisphere concentrated most heavily in Brazil ($130 million), followed by Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba. Chinese direct investments in Latin America are concentrated in the energy and mining sectors.

China’s most important relationship in the region is with Brazil, with which China shares goals of seeking a leading role in international affairs and constraining U.S. power. China supported Brazil’s bid for permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council. Brazil is China’s largest trade partner in Latin America, and China is Brazil’s third-largest trading partner in the world. The two have teamed up in trade talks to demand better terms for developing countries. In 2006 Brazil’s exports to China totaled $12.9 billion, up from $676 million in 1999. Its trade surplus with China that year stood at $5.5 billion. China and Brazil have been cooperating in the development of satellites for surveying the Earth’s resources. Satellites were launched in 1999 and 2003; agreement has also been reached on the launch of third and fourth satellites. In addition, the two sides have cooperated in energy and infrastructure development and aircraft manufacturing.

In 2005 China signed its first-ever free trade agreement (FTA) with a non-Asian country, Chile. The FTA immediately eliminates tariffs on 92 percent of Chile’s exports to China and 50 percent of the products that China sends to Chile. Bilateral trade, now around $8.8 billion annually, grew 24 percent in 2006, making China Chile’s second-most important trading partner after the United States. Now the world’s largest consumer of copper, China receives about 20 percent of its copper imports from Chile.
China has also placed particular emphasis on its relations with Venezuela, intending to make the country China’s major energy supplier. While on his fourth visit to China in 2006, President Hugo Chávez announced plans for a six-fold increase in sales to China over the next decade. In 2005 Venezuela signed a deal for China to build and launch a satellite for Venezuela in 2008. Chinese-Venezuelan trade was $4.34 billion in 2006, a record level and up 102.5 percent from a year earlier.

China’s relations with Cuba have undergone significant evolution since the late 1980s. The two countries had been adversaries, given Sino-Soviet tensions from the early 1960s until the end of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s the two countries have cooperated closely on many international issues. China supports Cuba’s right to determine its own political system and its protests against U.S. sanctions. In return, Cuba endorses China’s positions on human rights and the Taiwan issue. China promised to invest in a Cuban nickel operation, which could bring millions of dollars to Cuba in taxes and royalties. This investment could boost production in one of Cuba’s most important industries and pump badly needed funds into Cuba’s weak and heavily indebted economy. China emerged as Cuba’s second-largest trading partner, fueled by China’s interest in Cuba’s nickel reserves, the third largest in the world. China is now second only to Venezuela as Cuba’s largest trade partner. Trade between Cuba and China ballooned to $1.8 billion in 2006, double the amount of the previous year, as China rose from fourth to second place among Cuba’s most important trading partners, displacing Spain and Canada.

Latin America has become a vital source of energy, natural resources, and foodstuffs for China. Latin American countries have given increasing priority to their relations with China and view investments by and trade with China in their countries as an alternative to their reliance on the United States. Countries such as Cuba and Venezuela view China as a new ally as they distance themselves from traditional partners such as Europe and the United States and carry out a new, multipolar foreign policy. A vibrant commercial relationship elevates China’s political posture in Latin America. Through a mixture of development aid, trade ties, direct investment, and high-level political exchange, China has developed into a new but increasingly important player in Latin America. In the foreseeable future Chinese influence in Latin America is likely to grow. Yet, to date commercial interaction has been the mainspring of Sino–Latin American relations, and China has moved cautiously from a radical to a more pragmatic approach to achieve its goals in Latin America.

Further Reading


China’s legal system, unlike legal systems of other great early civilizations, never sought divine sanction, nor was the government’s right to administer justice limited by religious authority or an independent judiciary. Administering justice was an important imperial function.

Early in China’s history, society was regulated by the ethical teachings of Confucius (551–479 BCE) and his disciples, which defined proper civilized behavior. In the Confucian worldview, civilized people were expected to observe the proper rites. And yet laws were needed to control people who disregarded or violated acceptable conduct.

Rule of Law

The first comprehensive legal system in China was created by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), which ended feudalism and the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). The Qin legal code was based on Legalist principles of the rule of law. The Legalists were a group of thinkers who emerged during the Warring States period and dominated the Qin state before it unified the Chinese world. The Legalists advocated absolute control by a central authority and were radically opposed to Confucians in nearly every way. They believed that humankind was innately selfish and that society could function only if people recognized that as a fact. Punishment for even small crimes was stern, and no one—not even the prince—was above the law. Many scholars believe that the harshness of the Qin legal system contributed to that dynasty’s short duration.

Series of Codes

The succeeding Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE) began with the easing of the harsh provisions of the Qin legal system. Liu Bang (256–195 BCE), founder of the Han dynasty, reportedly said when he entered the capital of the defeated Qin: “Gentlemen, for a long time you have suffered beneath the harsh laws of Qin. Those who criticized the government were wiped out along with their families; those who gathered to talk in private were executed in the public market... I hereby promise you a code of laws consisting of three articles only: One, he who kills anyone shall suffer death; two, he who wounds another or steals shall be punished according to the gravity of the offense; three, for the rest I abolish all the laws of Qin” (de Bary et al. 2000, 233).

But the Confucian scholars who came to dominate the Han administration found that ethical principles were in themselves inadequate for ruling an empire and thus detailed laws were necessary for governance. In time elaborate law codes were enacted and supplemented by voluminous commentaries and case information to guide the judge in procedures and sentencing. The Han code has not survived in its entirety. But the codes of succeeding
dynasties, beginning with the codes of the Sui (581–618 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties, were based on the Han code.

The Tang code, promulgated in 653 CE, has survived in its entirety. It contained 501 articles grouped under twelve headings. It became the basis of later Chinese dynastic codes and the Japanese legal code. Subsequent dynasties—including the Song (960–1279), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1912)—issued legal codes based on those of its predecessor, with modifications. But whereas the Qin code was absolute, egalitarian, and to be rigidly enforced, the later codes were relativistic and conditional. For example, the sentencing for a murderer would depend on who murdered whom and under what circumstances. Thus the killing of a father by a son, regardless of circumstances, was more severely punished than if the father killed the son. In other words, the law was invoked to support public morality because the killing of a father by a son, regardless of circumstance, was a heinous crime, whereas a father had the right to punish a son for bad behavior. However, the Legalist concept of mutual responsibility by members of the same family or among neighbors continued to be applied.

The Chinese code of the imperial era was primarily penal and administrative. A legal profession did not exist. The magistrate of the county was also its chief judicial official who acted as investigator, prosecutor, jury, and judge. The state had little interest in what is called civil law in modern society. Civil law cases were usually handled by clan and village elders and professional and guild leaders who resolved civil disputes where possible, based on commonly accepted moral principles. Although the magistrates and governors who were required to judge legal disputes were not trained in law, they were expected to be conversant with its major provisions and acquainted with previous case decisions. They were, however, aided by legal advisors and secretaries who specialized in legal issues. The exceptions were the judicial commissioners, who presided over the highest provincial courts, and the experts at the capital who reviewed important cases for the Ministry of Punishment, one of the six ministries of the central government; they were specialists in the law.

In criminal cases the magistrate was allowed to use torture in interrogating both the plaintiff and the accused, usually in the form of beating under prescribed conditions. The accused was usually imprisoned during the court proceedings. Sentences for serious cases were automatically reviewed by tribunals of higher officials, all the way up to the Ministry of Punishment. The review boards determined whether the relevant laws were properly applied and whether the magistrate had been unjust or had acted oppressively. Both parties in a legal dispute were allowed to appeal the decisions of lower courts. Capital cases were reviewed by the emperor under solemn circumstances; some emperors even fasted before reviewing death sentences. The goal of the process was to leave as little discretion as possible in the hands of the officials who had sat in judgment and to ensure that no errors had been committed. Judges who went beyond the legal bounds or whose judgments were erroneous were severely punished.

**Punishment**

Judged by modern standards, the punishments carried out were cruel and harsh. Imprisonment was not part of the regular punishment system. There were several categories of punishment for those judged guilty. The type of punishment varied from one era to another. The most serious offenders were punished by death: decapitation, strangulation, and cutting the offender in two at the waist. Regarding particularly heinous crimes, such as treason, family members could also be put to death to avoid future consequences. The death penalty was sometimes commuted to exile, enslavement, or emasculation, and the condemned were sometimes allowed to commit suicide.

For a less serious crime, the punishment could be exile from home, the distance depending on the degree of the crime. Exile was usually to unpleasant places—the harsh desert or steppe areas in the north or northwest, for example, or the malarial southern regions. Exiles could sometimes take their families with them. Usually they were not required to work but had to report to the local authorities at stipulated intervals to prove that they had not escaped. Offenders could also be sentenced to hard labor for a term of years, usually in state construction projects, in state-run mines, or along the frontiers. Sometimes military service was be substituted for exile.

Other forms of punishment also existed and varied,
depending on the era and the nature and severity of the crime. For example, for certain crimes the convicted person’s punishment was to wear, for a stipulated period, the cangue (a heavy wooden collar worn around the neck, similar to the pillory used in England and early America). The purpose was public shaming of the convict. Tattooing on the face was also used as a punishment as a way to shame the convicted and to prevent him from escaping. Certain crimes were punished during some eras by amputation of the nose, ear, or a limb. Another form of punishment was being beaten with a heavy or light bamboo rod. The size of the rod and the number of strikes depended on the seriousness of the crime. Monetary fines were sometimes accepted in lieu of other punishments. The amount varied, again depending on the era and the seriousness of the crime, and the status and age of the offender.

Amnesties
Amnesties were imperial acts of grace that exempted a person from punishment or reduced the punishment of various classes of criminals. They were announced to commemorate victories in war, as thanksgiving for a new emperor’s accession to the throne, to celebrate a long reign, or some other auspicious occasion. They could be general amnesties or specific amnesties applied only to particular classes of criminals. Amnesties often did not apply to those who had committed the most heinous crimes. More amnesties were granted during the Tang and Song than were granted during the Ming and Qing dynasties. This was probably due to the custom of granting leniency and reducing the punishment originally imposed that was already built into the legal review systems of the Ming and Qing.

Jiu-hwa Lo UPSHUR

Further Reading

Circumstances Affect the Punishment

T’ien Tsung-pao had a five-year-old son... One day during her absence the child dawdled over his meal. His father told him to hurry, but he willfully dropped his bowl and broke it. Tsung-pao was angry and spanked his son, who cried. The boy’s stepmother, afraid that her mother-in-law would be unhappy about this, tried to calm the child. He kept on crying, upon which his stepmother slapped him... [The grandmother] was angry and scolded her son and daughter-in-law. Her son did not dare to argue with her. He begged their neighbor to comfort her. When she went to her room to rest, he went out to buy some wine for her to drink in the evening. His wife did not dare to enter into her mother-in-law’s room. The latter could not overcome her anger and hung herself. The Ministry of Justice considered that the child had deserved the disciplining he received at the hands of his parents and that the disciplining, since it occurred during the grandmother’s absence, could not be considered as having been performed in disobedience of her instructions, and that therefore her suicide could not have been anticipated. The case was held to be excusable and one deserving of pity.

Chinese leaders recognize the value of ethnic minority integration, but have maintained power by appointing ethnic Han to many important positions. Understanding the changing role of minorities in Chinese politics is essential for comprehending China’s transforming political landscape.

The changing role of ethnic minorities in Chinese politics is helping to transform the political landscape. Recent problems in the Tibetan regions of China and in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have highlighted the challenges that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faces in governing a Han-dominant but multiethnic China. While authorities have recruited and promoted more non-Han leaders in recent years to carry out the state’s policies and to demonstrate affirmative action to the public, they also want to make sure that Han Chinese leaders are firmly in charge. How China handles the “nationalities question” will be a crucial determinant of social stability and economic development in the future.

Ethnic Distribution

Han Chinese account for an estimated 91.5 percent of the total population of the country, or 1.2 billion of the 1.33 billion people in China. In addition to the majority Han, the Chinese government officially recognizes fifty-five other nationalities, or ethnic minorities, numbering approximately 106 million people. Although the ethnic minority population constitutes only 8.5 percent of the population, the geographic area of those political units under the autonomous administration of ethnic minorities accounts for 64 percent of the total area of the country.

These ethnic minorities vary greatly in terms of their population size. Eighteen of them exceed 1 million people: Zhuang, Manchu, Hui, Miao, Uyghur, Tujia, Yi, Mongol, Tibetan, Buyi, Dong, Yao, Korean, Bai, Hani, Kazakh, Li, and Dai. The largest ethnic minority, the Zhuang, had more than 16 million people in 2000 when China conducted its fifth national census. By contrast, the seven smallest ethnic minorities have populations of fewer than 10,000. The smallest ethnic group is the Lhoba, a group that resides in Tibet. This ethnic minority had only 2,965 people in 2000.

The Chinese government’s one-child policy, first adopted in 1979, has not been applied to many ethnic minority groups, which is one reason some groups’ populations are growing. In general, ethnic minority families can have two or even three children. Rural farmers and herdsmen in Tibet face no restrictions in terms of the number of children they can have.

The growth rate of the ethnic minority groups varies widely from one group to another. With the exception of Zhuang and Manchu, all other minority groups had much faster growth rates than those of the Han between 1990 and 2000. The low growth rate of the Zhuang and Manchu is largely due to the fact that they are well integrated into the national community. Many members in these two groups are so intermarried that they have lost their...
distinctive cultural identities. A large number of people in these two groups presumably identify themselves as Han rather than as ethnic minorities.

Although Han Chinese have a relatively lower population growth rate in comparison with most of the ethnic minority groups in the country, the absolute number of Han nonetheless increased by nearly 117 million people between 1990 and 2000. According to one official Chinese source, in three minority autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia), the number of Han has already surpassed that of the minority groups, while in Xinjiang the Han account for 40 percent of the total population.

### Minority Participation

One strategy for reconciling ethnic tensions in Han-dominant China has been to recruit more ethnic minority elites into the political establishment. Chinese authorities have made a concerted effort in recent years to promote ethnic minority elites to leadership positions. As the ethnic minority population grew rapidly over the last half of the twentieth century, the number of ethnic minority cadres also significantly increased. According to official Chinese sources, the number of ethnic minority cadres at all levels of leadership increased from about 10,000 in 1950 to almost 3 million in 2007. CCP leaders have been explicit about the necessity of recruiting and promoting more ethnic elites into the party-state leadership.

Soon after becoming a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1993, Hu Jintao made a long and important speech at the national conference on the promotion of ethnic minority cadres. Hu argued that recruiting and promoting ethnic minority leaders was a major strategic objective for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), one that would determine whether China could resolve its ethnic problems and whether the Chinese state could achieve long-term sociopolitical stability. Hu particularly emphasized that the CCP should provide more educational and training opportunities as well as leadership experiences for young ethnic minority cadres.

One important development in terms of promoting ethnic minority leaders has been in the realm of legislation. In 2002, for example, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) revised the Law of Ethnic Minority Autonomous Areas of the People’s Republic of China. The revised law now specifies that the top post of the local government in all ethnic minority autonomous areas should be held by a leader who hails from the same ethnic minority background as the majority of the citizens in that area.

In 2008, for the first time in PRC history, all of the governors of China’s five provincial-level ethnic minority autonomous regions—the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region—had ethnic minority backgrounds.

However, the CCP has maintained its firm control over these provinces by giving the most important leadership posts—the party secretary positions—to cadres who come from Han Chinese backgrounds. In 2008 none of the party secretary posts in any of the five provincial-level minority autonomous regions were held by an ethnic minority leader.

In 2008 all of the heads of China’s 155 local governments that had status as ethnic minority autonomous areas—including the 5 provincial-level regions (qu 区), 30 prefectures (zhou 州) and 120 counties (xian 县 or qi 旗)—were non-Han ethnic minority leaders. The head of the local government is considered the second-highest-ranking official in a given administrative jurisdiction, second only to the party secretary. Ethnic minority leaders have occupied more seats on this important decision-making body in the reform era than they did during the Mao era.

In the five national congresses held between 1987 and 2007, ethnic minority members usually constituted from about 10 percent to 11 percent, almost double their numbers from the five congresses of earlier periods. Forty ethnic minority leaders serve on the Seventeenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (in session from 2007 to 2012) as both full and alternate members. The Hui, Zhuang, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Uygur ethnic groups have the highest representation on the Seventeenth CC, and Tibetan, Mongolian, Hui, Manchu, Miao, and Yi minority groups are well represented among the so-called fifth generation of leaders, those born between 1950 and 1965. Most of them work in the provincial leadership, including four (6.6 percent) full
Leadership—Ethnic Minority

Opportunities Limited

While ethnic leaders have been making political inroads, most of the highest level positions are still reserved for the Han. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, only three ethnic minority leaders have served on the all-important Politburo, the body of leaders that oversees the CCP. From the Thirteenth Party Congress to the Fifteenth Party Congress, a period of 15 years between 1987 and 2002, no ethnic minorities served on the Politburo. As of yet, no ethnic minority leader has ever risen to membership on the Politburo Standing Committee, the top leadership of the CCP.

In 2008 a Mongolian and former governor of Inner Mongolia was appointed minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. In 2008 three ethnic minority leaders were serving on the State Council, the chief administrative authority of PRC. But among the twenty-eight ministers on the State Council, only one member was from an ethnic minority. Two ethnic minority leaders were serving as vice chairs of the NPC, and five ethnic minority leaders were serving as vice chairs of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Only one ethnic minority leader was serving as provincial party secretary in China’s thirty-one provincial-level administrations.

Future Implications

For understandable reasons, the Chinese Communist Party is unwilling to give up its power over personnel appointments, particularly in China’s five ethnic minority autonomous regions. The growing ethnic tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang have led Chinese authorities to conclude that they need to exert tighter control over these regions. This has meant appointing Han Chinese leaders to serve in the most important posts in these administrative units. At the same time, top Chinese leaders have recognized the value of having ethnic minority cadres serve in the party–state elite, both for propaganda purposes as well as to inspire minority peoples to view the system as containing opportunities for their own advancement and, therefore, work within the system rather than against it. Those ethnic minority elites who have been appointed by the CCP Organization Department have usually gone through a great deal of scrutiny to make sure that they are loyal to the Communist regime and will carry out the orders of the party’s national leadership.

As in many other countries, ethnic identity in China is becoming an increasingly important political issue. The demonstrations in Tibet in 2008 and the worldwide protests they helped fuel over the Olympic torch rally suggest that ethnic tensions in China may constitute a major liability for the country’s future stability and territorial integrity. How top Chinese leaders handle ethnic tensions and how effectively they recruit ethnic minorities into the political establishment will be not only crucial determinants of social stability going forward but also major criteria for China’s international image.

Cheng LI

Further Reading


What will China's sociopolitical structure and leadership be like in the year 2020? The three most commonly perceived political scenarios range from the emergence of a democratic China; prolonged instability and an evolving social scene; or a resilient, authoritarian regime.

Progressing toward the year 2020, analysts see three possible political scenarios for China in 2020: a nation that will become a stable constitutional democracy; a country that will collapse and be left in a state of prolonged civil war, domestic chaos, and massive human exodus; and, with its combination of a market economy and authoritarian political system, a China that will be very like what it is today but far more institutionalized. But China's political structure is unlikely to develop along a direct, linear trajectory. Which road China ultimately takes will depend on the interplay of current political trends, key players in decision-making roles, and demographic factors.

Democratic China

Changes in society and the political system have the potential to contribute to a Chinese democracy. In the social domain, by 2030 some 300–400 million people are expected to have moved from the countryside to urban areas. The urbanization rate of the country is projected to increase from 39 percent in 2002 to 60 percent by 2020. This resettlement, which will probably represent the largest urbanization drive in human history, will likely be accompanied by an unprecedented rapid rise of the Chinese middle class, projected to be 520 million people by 2025. According to the Chinese government's current strategic plans, by 2020 China is slated to become a well-off society (xiaokang shehui 小康社会). Projections point to per capita income as high as 67,150 yuan ($9,800) in 2020, depending on economic conditions. (China's per capita income in 2008 was estimated at 41,797 yuan, or $6,100.)

The ongoing technology revolution is changing the way in which information and ideas are disseminated. Experts believe that 1 billion Chinese people—approximately 70 percent of the country's population—will be using cell phones by 2020. This number will exceed that of the United States, Europe, and Japan combined. With such unprecedented telecommunication penetration paired with continued technological innovation, no government can effectively control the flow of information. Such a flow of information could lead to independent media that in all likelihood will lead to greater cultural and political pluralism in the country.

Other societal changes include the rise of civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations, which are no longer banned in China; an increase in law school students; and an increase in registered lawyers. Many lawyers and legal professionals devote their careers to protecting the interests of vulnerable social groups. A new Chinese name, lawyers for human rights protection (weiquan lüshi 维权律师), has been recently created to
describe this emerging group. It is reasonable to expect that lawyers will become an even more important political force by 2020. Some will continue to work outside the political establishment to challenge abuses of power while other activist lawyers may become political leaders.

In the political arena in 2020, the so-called fifth-generation leaders—those who were born in the 1950s and early 1960s—will likely rise to the highest levels of the Chinese government. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership will become increasingly diversified in terms of professional background and political experience. Entrepreneurs will constitute an important part of the governing elite in 2020 as China’s market economy takes hold.

Foreign-educated returnees (haiguipai 海归派) will also compete for high offices. Since the year 2000, about 120,000 Chinese students have gone to study abroad every year. The annual number is expected to increase to 300,000 by 2020. These foreign-trained returnees will contribute to the international diffusion of norms and the spread of democratic ideas in China.

The most important political change occurring in China is a trend toward checks and balances in the leadership. Chinese political leaders are not a monolithic group with the same values, outlooks, and policy preferences. And the ruling party is no longer led by a strongman, like Mao or Deng, but instead consists of two competing elite groups: a so-called populist coalition and a so-called elitist coalition. Chinese leaders have begun using the term inner-party democracy (dangnei minzhu 党内民主) to describe the idea of checks and balances within its leadership. This had led to a kind of bipartisanship in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or what could be called a one party–two factions formula.

The elitist group represents the interest of the coastal region and prioritizes economic growth. The populist group often voices the concerns of the inland regions and advocates social justice and social cohesion. These two groups are almost equally powerful, partly because their expertise and leadership skills complement each other. Though competing on certain issues, these groups are willing to cooperate on others. They share goals for the survival of the CCP at home and for China’s rise abroad. This need to cooperate occasionally also makes bipartisanship, with Chinese characteristics, a sustainable proposition for the near future.

This political mechanism, however, will not remain stagnant. It will inevitably make political lobbying more transparent, factional politics more legitimate, and elections more regular and genuine. If so, it is not difficult to imagine that the CCP will split along the lines of an elitist coalition and a populist coalition after about fifteen more years of this inner-party bipartisanship. In 2020 the elections and competition within the CCP may extend to general elections in the country; consequently, the intraparty democracy may well be transformed into a constitutional democracy.

Chaotic China

One of the gravest concerns regarding China’s quest for political democracy is that the transition may be painful and violent and could result in prolonged chaos. The status of prolonged chaos has more to do with the daunting demographic challenges that China will confront in the years to come than with political differences.

Economic disparity has become one of the greatest problems the country faces. Within a generation China has been transformed from one of the most equitable countries in the world, in terms of income distribution, to one of the least equitable. In addition, rampant official corruption, growing rural discontent, environmental degradation, a major health crisis, the absence of a social safety net, and frequent industrial accidents could contribute to social unrest.

The ongoing large-scale urbanization in China is not only creating an urban middle class but also increasing the number of urban poor and unemployed people. Population pressures will be overwhelming as the country’s working-age population reaches 955 million by 2020, compared with 732 million in 1995. China’s economic development cannot generate enough jobs to absorb so many people.

The middle-class lifestyle in the urban areas is likely to make China’s environmental challenges more acute. More money means more cars. More cars will naturally lead to more air pollution. The number of registered motor vehicles in Beijing, for example, was 2.7 million in 2006, and a thousand new cars hit the streets each day.

Nationwide, approximately 300 million people lack access to clean drinking water, and 400 million people live in areas with dangerously high levels of air pollution.
One-third of China’s land has been polluted by acid rain. Some scholars in environmental studies believe that China may need to deal with 20–30 million environmental refugees every year by 2020.

China’s medical and health-service system is woefully inadequate for all but the affluent. Approximately 45 percent of urban residents and 80 percent of the rural population have no medical insurance. Furthermore, China is rapidly becoming an aging society. One study found that the elderly (defined as those over the age of 60) comprise roughly 12 percent of China’s total population, but by 2020 this number is projected to increase to roughly 17 percent, about 243 million people.

There are, of course, other triggering factors, including grand-scale corruption scandals, tensions between the central and local governments, conflicting interests between civilian and military leadership, a global financial crisis that may hit the Chinese middle class particularly hard, ethnic frictions in Xinjiang and Tibet, Chinese xenophobia against foreign companies, military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait or with Japan, and a possible nuclear disaster on the Korean Peninsula. Each of these factors could undermine the stability of the Chinese regime.

Around 2022 the fifth generation of Chinese leaders will likely pass power to the so-called sixth generation of leaders who are mainly from single-child families. The sixth-generation leaders, though cosmopolitan and well educated, are characteristically incapable of dealing with crises. Consequently, a series of snowballing events could take place in 2020: The central government loses its control over provincial administrations, the CCP no longer functions, the military splits, civil war breaks out, hoodlums cause looting all over the country, and a massive Chinese exodus leads migrants to every corner of the world.

Adaptable China

China’s authoritarian system is not stagnant, however; its resiliency and ability to adjust to new environments and to introduce legal, administrative, social, and political reforms make the system sustainable.

Recently proposed new developmental strategies may contribute to the continued growth of the Chinese economy in the 2010s and beyond. These strategies include more balanced regional development, domestic demand-driven growth, technological research and innovation (especially in the areas of biotechnology and nanotechnology), and the overseas expansion of Chinese firms. A more sustainable economic development—and a more equal distribution of resources and wealth in the country—will give the CCP more political capital and thus more legitimacy for its rule.

Meanwhile, the various problems in democratic countries—such as increases in economic disparity, voting corruption, political nepotism, election flaws, inefficiency—will make democracy less appealing to the Chinese people. In the eyes of many, an authoritarian, stable, prosperous China can be a credible political alternative to Western models of democracy.

Some major events—most noticeably the 2008 Olympic Games that were held in Beijing, the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, the possible 2018 FIFA World Cup in China, and the 2020 landing of China’s lunar rover (or even astronauts) on the moon—will further magnify the governing capacity of the ruling party. These developments and hypotheses suggest that by 2020 China will neither have made the transition to democracy nor have become chaotic. Instead, China will remain under the authoritarian rule of a ninety-nine-year-old Chinese Communist Party.

Enigmatic China

Although one political scenario can lead to another, China’s political trajectory will by no means develop along a straight path. The country can embark on one direction without necessarily experiencing another. Despite enormous differences in the three contrasting scenarios—democratization, disintegration, and adaptation—all three of these futures share some factors and trends. Examples include the strong impact of the information and technology revolutions, China’s demographic challenges, cultural and social pluralism, and the continued growth of nationalistic sentiment.

What China’s domestic political landscape will look like in the year 2020 will largely depend on the interplay of current political trends, the new players who have recently emerged, and the demographic factors that will
be important in the future. Yet, like any other country, China’s future can have multiple possibilities. China analysts may not agree on what China’s most likely 2020 scenario will be, but any thoughtful and intelligent forecast about China will perhaps come to the same conclusion: The trajectory of this fast-growing economic powerhouse will have profound implications not only for the millions of Chinese people but also for the world community.

Cheng Li
Adapted with permission from “China in the Year 2020: Three Political Scenarios,” by Cheng Li in Asia Policy, number 4 (July 2007), 17–29.

Further Reading
Lee Teng-hui was the first Taiwanese native to lead the government and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang/Kuomintang) in Taiwan. His leadership brought full democracy to Taiwan. Since 2000 former president Lee has become an outspoken advocate of Taiwanese nationalism.

Born in 1923 when Taiwan was a Japanese colony, Lee Teng-hui attended Christian schools as a boy and then received a Japanese education until 1945, when he returned to Taiwan. In the 1950s Lee was among the first generation of Taiwanese students to undertake graduate studies in the United States. He alternated between studying in the United States and working for the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, a successful joint Chinese Nationalist–U.S. land reform program for Taiwan. Taiwan's land reform stressed legal procedures combined with agricultural improvement projects and economic development. It contrasted sharply to the Communist Party's populist, confiscatory, and often violent land reform on the Chinese mainland.

In 1968 Lee earned a PhD in agricultural economics from Cornell University. Back in Taiwan he emerged as a rising Taiwanese Christian in the Nationalist Party. He served as mayor of Taipei before he was elevated to Taiwan's vice presidency in 1984. Lee's elevation marked acceptance by the mainland Nationalist Party of that fact that its future is tied to Taiwan and needs support from the Taiwanese. When President Chiang Ching-kuo, who did much to further Lee's career, died in 1988, Lee succeeded him. Lee served as president until 2000 and won his last four-year term as the first popularly elected president of Taiwan. Lee's outspoken advocacy of Taiwan's cultural differences from China and his unflinching support for Taiwan's political independence from the Chinese mainland earned him the deep enmity of the Beijing leadership as well as strong criticism in Taiwan.

After stepping down from the presidency Lee Teng-hui has used his stature as Taiwan's senior statesman to advocate even more forcefully for Taiwan nationalism. He has repeatedly spoken of Taiwan's "de facto independence." He opposes reconciliation with the People's Republic of China because he fears that Taiwan would lose its separate government and come under Beijing's control. He was critical of President Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party during their leadership from 2001 to 2008 as well as criticizing the policies of President Ma Ying-jeou and the Nationalist Party since they returned to power in May 2008.

David D. BUCK

Further Reading
LEE, Ang

Lǐ’Ān 李安

b. 1954  Film director

Best known in the West for films like Sense and Sensibility (1995) and Brokeback Mountain (2005), Ang Lee has directed films in both Chinese and English whose popularity and themes have transcended international boundaries. Both Lee and his films have won Academy Awards and gained critical acclaim for their treatment of sensitive subjects.

Born 23 October 1954 in Pingtung, Taiwan, Ang Lee is the first Asian director to be awarded an Academy Award for best director. His films have increased the international audience for Chinese-language films, while the critical success of his English-language films demonstrates his mastery of the universal art of film. Many of his films explore the encounter between different cultures and between tradition and modernity, while the tragic impossibility of true love is also a common theme.

Lee’s parents moved to Taiwan from mainland China at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. After completing a college degree in Taiwan and serving in the army, Lee came to the United States in 1979 and received a master’s degree in fine arts from New York University. He worked with classmate Spike Lee, and his thesis film project Fine Line (1984) won a prestigious award at NYU.

Lee’s first two films, Pushing Hands (1992) and The Wedding Banquet (1993), both filmed in the United States, were based on stories of Taiwanese Americans; they both focused on the themes of cultural and generational differences. Pushing Hands tells the story of a martial arts teacher who emigrates from Taiwan to live with his son in New York, but then moves out due to differing ideas about family and life. The Wedding Banquet is a comedic family melodrama about a gay Taiwanese immigrant to the United States who plans to hide his true identity from his parents by marrying a woman.

Lee returned to Taiwan to make the comedic but socially discerning film Eat Drink Man Woman (1995) about the strained relationships between a widowed father and his three unmarried daughters in Taipei. After gaining international acclaim, Hollywood recruited Lee to make Sense and Sensibility (1995), which was nominated for seven Academy Awards, and then The Ice Storm (1997) and Ride with the Devil (1999).

Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), which merged the Chinese martial arts genre with a Western-style romance, became the highest grossing foreign film in many countries and won an Academy Award for Best Foreign-Language Film. The film encouraged other leading film directors in China, including Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, to market Chinese martial-art fantasies as blockbusters for global consumption.

Lee’s disappointment with his first big-budget Hollywood film, Hulk (2003), was followed by one of his greatest and most controversial cinematic accomplishments to date, Brokeback Mountain (2005). The film reinvented the traditional American film genre of the Western as a compassionate tale about the homosexual relationship between two Wyoming cowboys. It won countless
awards around the globe and earned Lee an Oscar for Best Director.

Lee’s Lust, Caution (2007), based on a short story by celebrated Chinese author Eileen Chang (Zhang Ailing), is set in Shanghai in the 1940s during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The film tells the story of a university student who enters into a relationship with the man she is to seduce in order to facilitate his assassination for collaborating with the Japanese occupiers. Although scenes considered overly erotic or political were edited out, the Chinese government permitted the theatrical release of the film. The uncut version circulated as pirated DVDs and was readily downloadable on the Internet in China. Some mainland Chinese even traveled to Hong Kong to view the uncut version. The difference in these versions generated a debate about the right of mainland Chinese to view “uncensored” films, and ultimately lead actress Tang Wei was reprimanded by the Chinese government for her participation in the film’s erotic scenes.

Ang Lee’s career demonstrates that an ethnic Chinese can break into Hollywood, leaving his mark on the industry to become one of the most celebrated directors throughout the world. His deep understanding of both the Chinese way of life and Western traditions lends a unique aspect to his filmmaking.

Jonathan NOBLE

Further Reading
Since the third century, China has always consisted of a strong central government. The emperor’s decrees were law, changing only with dynasties, until 1912’s revolution. Throughout the modern era, one concept has remained: the government as a centralized bureaucratic autocracy.

Westerners think about law as a formal system, with such features as contracts, a bench, and bar. Throughout its history some of China’s most prominent thinkers have shown hostility to what Westerners think of as law. Just as Western missionaries took it upon themselves to correct the defective Chinese system of religion, Western jurists have felt impelled to show the Chinese what a proper legal system is. Initially, the Chinese were unimpressed. Eventually, however, succumbed to Western arguments—backed by Western arms—and established a new European-style legal system. But traces of the legal system developed in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), which are unlike anything Westerners think of as law, remain.

**Western Legal Perspectives**

Westerners think of a legal system primarily as a social institution within which persons (individuals, groups of individuals, or even the state) can make claims against other persons and have these resolved by a neutral judge of fact and law: the court. Normally, persons are represented by lawyers. Westerners also tend to think that the laws applied by the courts will deal with private law, torts, contracts, property, and the like. An organized bar, judicial independence, separation of powers, and some judicial review of administrative acts are also institutions that Westerners expect. These are all aspects of a familiar legal system. They reflect the point of view of law formed by Roman law.

In the fourth century BCE, when Roman law was developing, Rome was a small and predominantly agricultural community with a weak government. The legal problems that Roman law dealt with were the resolution of disputes between private individuals that arose out of torts, simple contracts, and succession. In addition, there were problems of status, both because Roman society was sharply divided (patricians, plebeians, and slaves) and because Romans distinguished themselves from the citizens of other states. Although Roman society soon changed radically, the focus of Roman law had been set.

By the second century CE, Rome was enormous and headed by an emperor whose status and power were unequalled. Nevertheless, civil law, the basic law of the empire, continued to look at society from the point of view of individuals, and its basic concerns were those of individuals.

Civil law remains at the heart of Western law. Western jurists use a model of the universe composed of discrete entities—persons—who create legal obligations by the exercise of their individual wills. They also assume that these persons can get their disputes resolved by professionally trained judges. These persons are no longer human beings but the central figures of the legal system.
They are sometimes called rights bearers. Even the state can appear as a person in a domestic lawsuit. States are the persons of public international law, whose terminology and structure are based on Roman private law.

**Traditional Chinese Law and Codes**

From the Chinese point of view, the central element of their legal system was a body of rules promulgated by the emperor. The system of government that developed in China after its unification in the third century consisted of a strong central government headed by the emperor, who ruled through a highly centralized bureaucracy. The emperor’s power was absolute. There was no doctrine of separation of powers.

The collection of rules is called a code. Each dynasty had its own code—for example, the Great Ming Code, the Qing Code—according to the name of the dynasty. Since the formal legal system was an integral part of the governing apparatus of the empire, when the empire collapsed in the early part of the twentieth century, the legal system disappeared along with everything else. Before that, there is clear continuity from the Tang dynasty to the end of the Qing (1912), and, most likely, the tradition stretches back many centuries before the Tang.

During most of the period for which there is a clear documented tradition (653–1911), the Chinese legal system governed a territory and a population that was greater than that governed by Roman law. In addition to governing China itself, China’s legal system formed the basis of the formal legal systems of nations subject to its influence, most notably Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. It was only when Roman law spread beyond Europe that it began to exceed Chinese law in scope.

In addition to the codes themselves, there were annotations to the codes and many other collections of statutes.
and regulations still in effect. There were also thousands of decisions in cases that arose under the codes, in addition to studies of customary law in which elements of what we would call family and commercial law can be found.

It is best to regard the code as a treatise of sorts, but not in the sense of Western law. The Qing Code, the final code in the tradition, is the product of a great deal of thought. The rules show much refinement. There are many cross-references. It comes close to constituting a scientific analysis of what the Chinese regarded as law. It is not just a compendium of rules, and the rules themselves have been refined and harmonized to a considerable degree. General principles have been factored out. It is a true code that represents the considered view of some of China’s leading jurists as to how to think about what law is. It showed the way to analyze legal problems and provided methods for applying legal rules to them.

By the end of the Qing dynasty, the code was not the direct or immediate basis of decision for most cases (although it contains detailed rules). Rather, the cited authority would most likely have been a li, a set of detailed rules normally based on decisions or interpretations by officials at the highest level of the central government. They were printed following the article of the code to which they referred.

If there was an applicable li, or statute, it was applied instead of the statute. In addition, there were a number of statutes and regulations outside the code. This is also the case in Western law. Precedent plays an enormous role, as do the opinions of eminent authorities and, on occasion, other statutes and regulations. Nevertheless, the code remains at the heart of the system, and serves as the basis for organizing instruction in civil law. The same holds true for Chinese codes.

The Chinese code was a directive to district magistrates telling them when to punish and precisely what punishment to inflict in any circumstances perceived by the state to be legally significant; that is, as injurious to the emperor. District magistrates, the lowest ranking officials who represented the central government, were the emperor in miniature. They exercised all the powers of the state in many functions, including collecting taxes, providing for defense, carrying on public works, conducting

A performance of a courtroom scene from theatrical production, Anhui Province.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
religious ceremonies, supervising examinations for entry into the civil service, and deciding cases. Deciding cases was simply one administrative task among many, an aspect of the magistrates’ general charge to keep order. Magistrates adjudicated cases but were not judges in the Western sense.

**Imperial Law**

By the time the legal system was formalized, the primary obligation of every Chinese was to fulfill the duties assigned by the emperor. The law was concerned with the enforcement of imperial policy. All human activities had to be carried on to fit into his scheme for directing society. Consequently, imperial law took note of human activity only as it was perceived to affect imperial policies. Thus many aspects of marriage were dealt with since marriage and the family system were basic to the nation. An institution similar to the English mortgage, the dian, was given considerable space because it was important to know who owned land so that the government could collect taxes on it.

Tang emperor Li Shimin remarked, “The wise emperor governs his officials; he does not govern the people.” The primary focus of imperial law was the regulation of the official activities of bureaucrats, their conduct or their failure to carry out their duties. Such matters have been dealt with in the United States by internal regulations of government offices. But they are not regarded as being part of the American legal system, except on the rare occasions when they are relevant to some action that is being brought in the regular courts, such as a wrongful discharge.

**Judicial Process**

The code was administered by career civil servants who were selected by competitive examinations based on the Chinese classics. Law was not one of the subjects tested. There were no facilities for training jurists, although some magistrates might have picked up some legal knowledge on the job.

The system was not based on the idea of rights and their enforcement. The adversary trial, which Westerners regard as standard, did not exist in connection with enforcing the code. No lawyers represented parties at a trial. Instead, when a magistrate took jurisdiction over a case, he called in all interested parties and interrogated them. If there was significant, real, nontestimonial evidence, such as a corpse, he examined it. Finding the facts was regarded as much more difficult and important than finding the law, something that the magistrate tended anyway to leave to his clerk. The magistrate made a preliminary decision, and it was reviewed in exactly the same way that superior officials would have reviewed a decision to increase the area’s tax assessment, simply a part of the system of bureaucratic control.

The proceeding could be quite dreadful for everyone. All persons concerned, including complainants and witnesses, were usually imprisoned pending conclusion of the matter. Interrogation often involved torture. The least severe punishment, beating, could nevertheless be crippling or even fatal. Despite this, the system seemed to function in a way the government found satisfactory, and it was not so unbearable as to cause the populace to revolt. With minor changes, it survived for many centuries.

**Informal Legal System of Traditional China**

Along with the formal legal system of imperial China, there was also an informal system. For example, though the code did not deal much with contracts or other commercial matters, the Chinese had an active and sophisticated commerce. They had developed devices similar to negotiable instruments and had a number of business arrangements, such as agencies and partnerships. It was possible to get disputes over these matters resolved by magistrates, but the people used other devices, such as mediation by village elders or guild procedures. There were even persons who performed many of the functions of lawyers, such as drafting complaints and appeals. An elaborate body dealt with such matters as tenancy, debts, and family law. The Chinese did not think of such matters as legal.

**Contact with the West**

Everything in China changed following contact with the West in the nineteenth century. Initially, the Chinese government refused to let Europeans enter China
or do business in the country, except in a small area near Guangzhou (Canton). The Europeans insisted on being permitted to trade inside China and carried on a series of wars to achieve their aims. Once they got in, the Europeans did not wish to be subject to Chinese law, which they regarded as barbarous. They forced the Chinese to let them have their own courts for both criminal and civil matters. This principle was called extraterritoriality.

There were certain areas in important Chinese cities, notably Shanghai, that were self-governing foreign enclaves (called foreign concessions); thus in parts of China, foreign legal systems were functioning in place of the Chinese system. This led to a movement to establish a Western-style legal system in China. It was thought that a Western-style system would get rid of extraterritoriality. In addition, some Chinese intellectuals believed that European legal systems were superior.

**Republican Legal System**

This movement accelerated after 1912 when the Guomindang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, came to power. The new government’s institutions were essentially based on those of the United States, modified by Sun Yat-sen to reflect his sense of China’s needs and traditions, as well as by his perception of American progressivism at the time. As the Republican government grew stronger, it attempted to establish a Western-style legal system. In addition to establishing a system of courts, it enacted a series of Western-style codes. These are the so-called Six Laws: the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, and administrative law. The Six Laws served as subject-matter headings under which other laws could be placed. For example, the company law (corporation code) was placed under the heading Civil Code.

About this time Chinese began to study Western law abroad in Europe, North America, and Japan. In Japan Western-style faculties of law were well established, and Western codes had been adopted. Western-style law schools also began to develop in China. Legal education was organized after the European model. Both in the law departments of state universities, such as Nanking Central University, and in private universities, usually Western missionary institutions, Western-style codes were explicated in the European manner, though sometimes according to the American case method. Although a few law schools remained open during the Cultural Revolution, legal education came to a halt until after Mao died and did not revive until 1978 or 1979.

It is difficult to say what the effect of all this legal
activity was. It seems certain that it had no effect on the lives of the vast majority of Chinese who were peasants (over 80 percent). They lived the lives that had always been theirs. Mostly concerned with survival, they arranged their family affairs as they always had, made arrangements with or punished local criminals, and tried to avoid the government and its tax collectors. Since many urban Chinese had got used to a Western legal system because of their dealings with Westerners, and in some cases because they lived under it in the foreign concessions, there was some use of the new Western system in civil as well as criminal matters.

Law in Maoist China

When the war with Japan ended in 1945, the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists resumed. Reestablishing and strengthening the prewar legal system was a low priority, although a new constitution was promulgated. The Communists won the war in 1949, and one of the first acts of the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) was to repeal all the laws of the old Nationalist government. Gradually, the judges from the old government were purged, and the law professors were either purged or retrained.

This did not mean, however, that there were no laws or law education. Most of the Western-style law schools continued to function through much of the first decade of the PRC. Initially, the same professors taught the same material that had been taught before Communist rule. Within a few years, they were either replaced or reeducated, usually by their former students who were trained in Soviet law by Soviet teachers sent to China, or by Chinese who had studied in the Soviet Union.

Most of the leaders of the new government had little education, and few had studied law. Many of those who had such knowledge survived and remained in China and were used by the new government to help frame the new legal system. They became quite visible after the change in policy that resulted in the formation of a completely different system after 1978.

The China that began on 1 October 1949 had within it two legal traditions that had not been destroyed. One was the concept of law as an aspect of the government of a centralized bureaucratic autocracy. This approach to law was inherent in the system of government that the Communists inherited. The second was the Western concept of law, a system based on individual rights and administered by impartial professional tribunals separated from the administration. This system was overtly rejected by the Communists when they took power, but to the extent that they thought about legal systems, this was what they had in mind. They had adopted the Western definition of a legal system while rejecting the system itself.

There was a new legal system, but it was fragmented and local and did not deal with many of the problems faced by the government of a densely populated area with significant industry and trade and large cities. And, as
always in China, it was not easy to escape the past. To control the entire country, it was felt necessary to adopt the traditional Chinese device of a centralized bureaucracy, with the consequence that many characteristics of the imperial government remained. The whole society was organized to fulfill the purposes of the central government. Individuals were subjects who were to do what they were told so the purposes of the government could be fulfilled. There was no concept of rights or separation of powers. The influence of the past was not limited to the traces of the empire. The Republican period had also left its mark, particularly the Six Laws and the system that enforced them. But the Communists also developed some novel institutions in the base area of laws they continue to use. In addition, they began immediately to enact new legislation.

**Law Based on Ideology**

The important new element that shaped the new institutions and changed the old was the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese call it “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought,” also known in the West as Maoism. Marxism in any form is a very complicated doctrine; therefore, what follows here is basic and generalized.

The most important basic theory is the belief that there are laws that govern human society that are quite as definite and demonstrable as the laws of physics, and that these laws had been discovered through Marx. The life of mankind is a linear process, not a static reality. It is in constant flux. The key to the changes that occur in society is found in the productive forces. As these develop, products in excess of need appear, and some individuals appropriate the product of the work of others. The relations of production further determine the whole range of phenomena to which Marx gives the name *superstructure*. This includes all political institutions, especially the state, all organized religion, political associations, laws and customs, and finally human consciousness expressed in ideas about the world, religious beliefs, forms of artistic creation, and the doctrines of law, politics, philosophy, and morality. Thus legal institutions and legal relations are, in essence, ephemeral. They are elements of the class struggle created by the class that controls the means of production in order to maintain its position. As the class struggle progresses, and a new class takes over, the institutions will change to reflect the desires and needs of the new rulers.

The only real right at this stage is the right—and indeed the duty—of the proletariat and its instrument, the Communist Party, to eliminate the domination of the bourgeoisie and establish the socialist system. Crime is a symptom of a defective society.

Marxism, as the Chinese understood it, affected many changes in attitude toward traditional institutions that caused them to disappear or suffer radical change. At the same time, it provided a sort of glue that kept society together. The governing ideology helped the Chinese to...
form new institutions to replace the old and deal with new conditions. Nowhere was this more evident than in the law. Marxism required the elimination of the old system. At the same time, it provided a conceptual framework for the construction of a new one.

The question of who owns or can own property or how interests in the property are transferred or even the question “what is to be done when A kills B?” are not what the Chinese legal system is about. The legal system is always about benefiting and protecting the interests of the ruling class, as are all other social institutions.

The divisions of bourgeois social analysis—religion, law, education, commerce, and industry—do not necessarily reflect the way a Communist would view the same society. To persist in looking for institutions that Westerners regard as legal is futile. Still less do the divisions Westerners give to law have any meaning. Public law, private law, property, torts, succession, all have no real significance. Even if institutions are given the same names that we use, such as contracts, the meaning will be different.

While it is possible to retain the appearance of a bourgeois legal system—courts, codes, lawyers—in the period of transition to Communism, the system will, in fact, have changed radically. Perhaps the most important thing to change is the notion of permanence. Since every social and governmental institution is simply a device for enforcing the control of the ruling class, none has any independent existence or validity. Due process and all the apparatus of human-rights protection may be preserved or established if the existence of those institutions is perceived by the party to be in the interest of the revolution, but if they do not assist that process, they will not be permitted to exist. Thus it would be possible to have the right to counsel, the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself, and the right of appeal before an independent judiciary. It is possible at any moment to change the rules. If it is regarded as harmful to the revolution to recognize private ownership and the state’s duty to compensate the owner for expropriation, this right will not be recognized, and there will be no compensation. If enforcement of a contract right, such as a right to demand repayment of a loan, is regarded as not useful, the right will not be enforced.

Many of these concepts are embodied in the formal legal system of present-day China. However, they mean little in practice, but it is possible to conceive of a Communist society in which such a system is operative for a significant period. There seem to have been some tentative moves in that direction in China in the late 1980s, but they were brought to a halt by the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.

THOUGHT REFORM

The principal technique for achieving and advancing change in thinking on the mass level was the campaign, or movement, (yundong). On an individual level, the technique was thought reform, sometimes called brainwashing. Thought reform must be considered in any treatment of the Chinese legal system during the Maoist years. Both the campaign and thought reform were used to accomplish purposes that Westerners would not recognize as legal—backing national policies, such as opposing the United States and aiding Korea, for instance. But they can also be used to deal with what Westerners regard as legal matters, such as land ownership, marriage, tax collection, and crime. There was an effort to have those accused of crime not merely to confess but also to change their thinking. This policy continued to the end of the Maoist years. Confessions continued to be the rule. Whether they resulted from thought reform or physical coercion or a combination is not clear.

The campaign and individual thought reform were effective, on the whole, and fit the general aim of the party. They were, however, time consuming and not always practical. To accomplish the varying tasks of government, it was much more practical simply to issue orders. Since China was so large, it was also necessary to make use of a bureaucracy to carry out most programs. Orders were issued by a particular ministry and these would be transmitted through subordinate levels to local offices for enforcement.

The precise way this was done is not completely clear. Many of the statutes and regulations, even today, are classified as being for internal use (secret), and are not available to foreigners or even to most Chinese. Those that are generally available consist for the most part of statutes, directives, and regulations of the central government, though there are also many local regulations. There were at least two kinds of statutes: general directives, such as Several Provisions of the State Council Regarding Improvement of the Food Control System, and precise, narrow rules, such as Notification by the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications on the Regulations Governing the Time Limits for Refunds on Money Orders and for Making Inquiries About Them. The common feature of all these laws, from those dealing with the most important interests of the state to those concerned with relatively trivial matters, is that they are almost entirely directed toward government officials, not to the public, just as in the days of imperial law. However, the rules of the PRC are much more pervasive since the control of the whole society, especially the economy, is much greater than was that of the imperial government.

**JUDICIAL PROCESS IN THE PRC**

In the early days of the PRC, the system of courts was carried over from the Nationalist period, even though all the laws of that government were repealed. These courts continued to function where they had functioned before, particularly in the large cities. It was necessary to retain not only the courts but also a number of nationalist judges and to recruit new ones from the existing pool of law school graduates, although they were later replaced with loyal party members.

It is not clear just when the old system disappeared, but certainly by the time of the first formal constitution in 1954, the new system had been established. On paper this consisted of a familiar hierarchical court system that went from a people’s court at the local level to the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing with two intermediate appellate courts in between.

One important use of the courts was to serve as the vehicle for the confiscation of foreign assets. Claims were filed against foreign concerns for back taxes, wages unjustly withheld from workers, fines for violation of regulations, and other infractions.

Once all industrial, commercial, and agricultural property was nationalized, there could be no commercial litigation unless the various state enterprises sued...
each other, which seems to have happened quite often. Apparently there was no formalized system of arbitrating disputes among state enterprises as there was in the Soviet Union. But there was some civil litigation between private citizens. The civil suit was usually part of an effort by local party officials to get the parties to settle their differences. Courts were active participants in this process, but judges did not act as independent adjudicators and did not give what Westerners would regard as legal reasons for their actions.

Most treatment of crime, including punishments, was handled by the Security Administration—the police. A trial was the final formal step in an administrative proceeding that took place within the Security Administration. It was usually only a formality whereby a sentence already determined was formally adjudged for the record, although it could be public if such a proceeding was regarded as useful in educating the masses. In any case it simply confirmed a decision that had already been made. This is not to say that local officials acted without supervision or without reference to rules. They were subject to rigorous supervision by their direct superiors as well as by other agencies, particularly the party. They were expected to follow the rules and policy directives of their superiors and to make complete reports and keep accurate records to show they had done so.

The dominant fact about the legal system is that it was and is a part of the political-legal system composed of the Security Administration, the procuracy (a state agency that supervised the observance of the law), and the courts. This made it possible to coordinate both policymaking and its implementation. The Security Administration was much larger than either the procuracy or the courts, and officials in the Security Administration were often transferred laterally to the procuracy or courts, maintaining the subservience of the courts to the police. The overlapping identities of these organizations became even more obvious in the 1960s and was recognized in the 1975 constitution, when the procuracy disappeared.

But even if the courts and procuracy had been equal in power to the Security Administration, the fact that they all worked together as a system shows that there was no concept of judicial independence, no separation of powers. At best there was a separation of functions. Adjudication was seen as one function of government; the police and procuratorial functions were others.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there remained a significant group of people who were trained in European law, either in its capitalist or socialist form, who continued to work in the field, at least in an academic way, until the Cultural Revolution. Although their work was not visible, this meant that when, in the late 1970s, there was a change in attitude toward Western institutions and contacts, there was a cadre of jurists able to draft Western-style codes and reopen the Western-style law schools. In the majority of cases, their knowledge was entirely theoretical. They had never actually used the law they taught or studied in the kind of society for which it was designed. Still, they had an awareness of Western concepts and institutions.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), most traces of a formal legal system disappeared, although there were still courts.

Law after 1979

While traces of the imperial Chinese legal tradition and that of Republican China are present in the legal system of the new regime that arose after 1978, the most obvious influences are those of the Mao years. After Mao died in September 1976, the faction led by Deng Xiaoping prevailed.

Two elements of the policy of the new regime are especially relevant for law. One was the opening to the outside, which meant that China would welcome foreign investment and technology and would increase foreign contacts by means of allowing Chinese to go abroad and foreigners to come to China. This plan required a legal framework that would reassure foreigners of the safety of their dealings with China. The second was the emphasis on the importance of the rule of law. What this meant to the Chinese officials who propounded it is not clear. None of them had any personal experience of a Western legal system, and they certainly did not intend to give up much power. Most of them had suffered during the Cultural Revolution, however, and they seem to have been searching for a more regularized society, one in which people behaved by rules according to established procedures. They apparently wanted at least to reduce the importance of the campaign and to get rid of the doctrine that policy is law.
All institutions associated, however vaguely, with the concept of law were revived or established. Codes of law, law schools, courts, lawyers, and legal publications appeared in vast numbers. The result has been the establishment of something that looks like a Western legal system.

The new legal system that has been established in China on paper since 1978 may eventually become such a system in fact. As Chinese society changes, new institutions will probably emerge that are neither Western nor traditionally Chinese. The village and township enterprises are an example. It is very difficult to fit them into either Western or traditional Chinese concepts of ownership or business organization. One fact remains: Chinese law, past and present, has to be examined on its own terms. Categories of Western law do not work. In China there is simply one body of law.

The ultimate form of the Chinese legal system cannot be predicted. It seems likely that it will continue to look like a Western system but contain the influence of its own traditions in ways hard to foresee. It will almost certainly be significantly different from the legal systems of the West.

William C. JONES (dec.)

Further Reading


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Legalism was a school of thought that advocated strict adherence to the law of a single iron-fisted ruler as the only way to combat humankind’s inherent selfishness. Legalists have been frowned on as rigid totalitarians for most of China’s history; nonetheless, they have been very influential on later policymakers.

The Legalist philosophy was based on thinking that emerged during the turbulence of China’s Warring States period (475–221 BCE). The Legalists advocated absolute control by a central authority and were radically opposed to Confucianism in nearly every way. While Confucianists believed that a well-balanced society would result if every person knew his or her place in society, behaved morally, and adhered to an ancient system of rituals, the Legalists were more cynical in their outlook: They believed that humankind was innately selfish and that society could flourish only if people recognized that fact. One long-standing tradition the Legalists bequeathed to China was the idea of the rule of law, which advocated that no one, not even the prince, was above the law.

The principles that would combine to form the Legalist doctrine were aimed at rejuvenating a state by promoting agricultural development and at strengthening military power. But due to the ruthless application of these doctrines by the rulers of the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), which united China into an empire for the first time, Legalism became vilified as a philosophy for centuries to come.

**Fa, Shu, and Shi**

Three groups of thinkers from the Warring States period, with separate but related points of focus, coalesced during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) into the single school known as Legalism. (For the purposes of this discussion, the terms Legalist and Legalism are applied to the three groups and their principles as they developed and eventually synthesized.) The thinkers had been known separately as the scholars of fa (law), shu (statecraft), or shi (power of position).

*Shi* can be translated as “power,” or “authority derived from position.” Shen Dao 慎到 (c. 350–275 BCE) was an itinerant scholar who stressed the importance of *shi* for rulers in maintaining their absolute governance over the people. He held that instead of talent and wisdom, power derived from position was what enabled the potent ruler to subdue the masses. He used a metaphor: “If one uses a weak bow, but the arrow is yet carried high, then it is the wind which speeds up the arrow.” In other words, if men of talent are subjugated by worthless men, it is because the latter possess the power derived from their position, not because they are inherently better people. The ruler’s subjects do not dare to disobey him, not because they love him, but because they fear his power.

*Shu*, meaning “statecraft,” or “methods of governing,” was the second point stressed by the Legalists. An early
thinker who stressed shu was Shen Buhai 申不害 (d. 337 BCE), a minister in the state of Han. His works have not survived, but his ideas were influential for later thinkers, namely Han Fei Zi 韓非子 (c. 280–233 BCE), originally a prince of the state of Han but who defected to the state of Qin and later came to epitomize the Legalist school by encompassing many previous lines of thinking into his own.

The ideal ruler, according to Shen Buhai, achieved shu by simultaneously keeping close tabs on his ministers and delegating responsibility to them. In this way the ruler could save his energy for more important matters, such as remaining in power. Han Fei Zi built on the ideas of Shen Buhai, writing that the ruler should wield shu by keeping his methods secret and unfathomable to his inferiors. If his underlings were unable to guess his weaknesses, the ruler would have the advantage.

Fa (law) was perhaps the most important point advocated by the Legalists. Shang Yang 商鞅 (c. 390–338 BCE), an influential minister in the state of Qin, was an early Legalist who advocated strict (but evenly applied) governance by law. He was a reformist of the time who initiated the establishment of new laws for the state of Qin.

The state of Qin had been greatly strengthened by adopting Legalist policies to promote its agricultural production and military power. But it was not until the ruling of the first emperor of Qin, when he had successfully conquered various states and unified the whole empire, that a series of policies adhering to the Legalist doctrine were enacted, including the reorganization of the country into counties and prefectures. Under the new system, power was concentrated in the central administration. The country was divided into forty prefectures, and the assignment of the local officials to their stations was (in theory) decided by ability and merit. In addition, the standardization of weights and measures was implemented, and the rewarding of farmers who cultivated wasteland and the denigration of merchants and scholars (whom Lord Shang thought of as parasites) were practiced. Shang Yang himself came to a bad end: After the crown prince (whose nose was once cut off upon Shang Yang’s orders) came to power upon the death of the king, he ordered Shang Yang to be torn apart by horse-drawn chariots and his entire family executed.

Han Fei Zi—who was born a century after Shang Yang, became an enthusiastic believer and disseminator of Shang’s ideas, and also came to a bad end, being forced to commit suicide in prison—had this to say about the importance of fa:

In his rule of a state, the Sage does not depend on men doing good of themselves, but makes it so that they can do no wrong. Within the frontiers of a state, there are no more than ten people who do good of themselves, whereas if one makes it so that the people can do no wrong, the entire state can be kept peaceful. He who rules a country makes use of the majority and neglects the few, and so does not concern himself with virtue but with law. (From the “The Conspicuous Schools” of “The Treatises of Han Fei Zi,” cited in Liao)

In this way Han Fei (the Zi of the name means “master”) foreshadowed the thinking of Niccolò Machiavelli, who in Italy 1,700 years later wrote about the ideal prince who rules by power rather than by morals.

Legalism versus Confucianism, Daoism, and Mohism

In opposition to Confucianists such as Mencius (372–289 BCE), who insisted on the goodness of human nature and held that the evil behavior of human beings could be rectified by conforming to ancient standards of decorum and ritual, Han Fei and the Legalists believed in the fundamental evilness of human nature. Only by putting people’s collective self-interest to good use could the ideal ruler stay in power.

This also put them in opposition to the two other major schools of thought vying for position at the time. Daoism, a vastly influential school of thought, held that only by keeping to the laws of nature (Dao, “the Way”) would the ideal moral state be reached. Mohism, founded on the teachings of Mo Ti (c. 470–390 BCE), taught the importance of universal love, treating everybody, not just family members (as Confucianists taught), with due respect and love. These schools of thought were not always mutually exclusive, and it must be remembered that the thinkers
themselves did not think of themselves as Legalists. Shen Dao, for instance, is considered both a Daoist and a Legalist, thinking, as he did, that nature was an amoral force to be obeyed. The wise ruler knew how to use this fact to his advantage.

Han Fei was the first to combine the three core ideas of Legalism. He believed that *shi*, *shu*, and *fa* could not be neglected: To make an arrow straight by stretching or to make a wheel round by bending, it is necessary to use external force. According to Han Fei, the external force being used is none other than the power of the ruler: *shi*. Laws and methods are equally indispensable, but without power or authority by which to carry them into practice, the ruler is ineffective.

When there is the ability but not the power (*shi*), even the talented will be unable to rule the evil. Thus, when Yao [who, as an ancient Sage, became an ordinary man, he was unable to govern three persons. This was not because he was unworthy, but because of the lowliness of his position. And when he became the emperor, his order was put into implementation and his prohibition was effective. This was due to the loftiness of his position. (From “Arguing on Shi” in “The Treatises of Han Fei Zi,” cited in Liao)

The core concept of the Legalists was to insist on the importance of a single, unified set of laws applied uniformly. According to Han Fei, ruling the state with laws also meant that once the laws were formulated and put into practice, any doctrine of private individuals objecting to the laws should be taken as heterodoxy (dissent) and be prohibited, because those heterodox doctrines would weaken the efficacy of the laws. There was no possibility of debate or resolution of differences for the Legalists.

Under the Qin regime, the first in Chinese history to adopt a philosophy as a method of governance, dissent became punishable by death under the influence of the Legalists. As Han Fei said: “There can not be words of two men that are equally authoritative, nor can there be two laws that are both the best. Therefore words not in accord with laws and commands must be prohibited.” (From “On Argument” in “The Treatises of Han Fei Zi,” cited in Liao)

Han Fei insisted that since all people acted in their own interests, it should be better to leave them alone in mutual competition. As he saw it, selfishness was what made the system of rewards and punishments both possible and necessary. Therefore, he opposed the equal division of land advocated by Confucius. He said: “Now for the superior to collect from the rich man so as to distribute to the poor home, is to take from the industrious and the economical and give to the wasteful and the lazy. To wish thus to lead the people to increased activity and frugality is impossible.” (From “The Conspicuous Schools” in “The Treatises of Han Fei Zi,” cited in Liao)

He went into further detail:

When a man sells his services as a farmhand, the master will give him good food at the expense of his own family, and pay him money and cloth. This is not because he loves the farmhand. The master says: “In this way, his plough of the ground will go deeper and his sowing of seeds will be more active.” The farmhand, on the other hand, exerts all his skill cultivating the fields. This is not because he loves his master. The farmhand says: “In this way, I shall have good soup, and money and cloth will come easily.” Thus, he expends his strength as if between them there were a bond of love such as that of father and son. Yet their hearts are centered on utility, and they both harbor the idea of serving themselves. (From “Collection of Legendary Stories” in “The Treatises of Han Fei Zi,” cited in Liao)

Han Fei was an advocate of the absolute monarch. The absolute monarch needed the absolute authority of the ruler. Drawing on the ideas of his Legalist-influencing forerunners, Han Fei designed a set of strategies for the feudal ruler to maintain highly concentrated power. Han Fei faced a turbulent society. The traditional society that had been ruled by means of mores and rites was in the process of collapse during the Warring States period. New opportunities opened to the landlords and farmers as well as to a number of merchants. The nobles at various levels either tried hard to keep their existing social status or attempted to get more power, as the original privileges did not matter in a changing society.
The Qin dynasty lasted a mere fourteen years, a victim of peasant uprisings and infighting. Because local officials were frightened to report insurrections, fearing that by doing so they could be accused of criticizing the central government (a potentially fatal error), peasant uprisings spread across the land. The peasantry had been subjected to years of forced labor on various large-scale projects, not to mention the regime’s disastrous economic policies that treated merchants as parasites and executed entire families as criminals. Many of the ideas of the Legalists, however, lived on far beyond the short life of the Qin dynasty, the only dynasty in Chinese history to attempt to govern by Legalist doctrine.

YU Qiyu and Bill SIEVER

Further Reading


Lenovo (联想 Lianxiang) is the largest producer of personal computers (PCs) in China and the fourth-largest PC manufacturer worldwide behind Dell, Hewlett-Packard, and Acer. The company, which also sells supercomputers and mobile phones, gained worldwide attention in 2004 for its acquisition of IBM’s personal computing business.

Lenovo controls roughly 30 percent of the Chinese PC market and about 7.4 percent of the global market. More than three-quarters of its twenty-five thousand employees are based in China. For the year 2006–2007 Lenovo reported revenues of $14.6 billion. Lenovo’s headquarters is located in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Founded in 1984 by Liu Chuanzhi (b. 1944), Lenovo began as ICT Co., a distributor and service-based provider of information technology (IT) products under the auspices of the Institute of Computer Technology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The company started with an initial capital investment of RMB200,000 ($85,900). The company initially focused on installing and testing imported computers and training new users. In 1987 the company expanded into distribution of foreign brands, namely AST and Hewlett-Packard. In 1989 the company was renamed “Legend Group Co.”

Lenovo’s growth in the 1990s received a boost from the then deputy minister of electronics Hu Qili (b. 1929), who told the company’s management that “China should have its own IBM” (Ling 2006, 129). Having received its license to produce PCs in 1991, Lenovo (then Legend) began to manufacture and sell PCs under its own brand. The removal of high import tariffs in 1992 created an opening for multinational firms to gain market share; Lenovo responded with an aggressive strategy that included selling PCs with the latest technology, designing its computers specifically to suit Chinese customers, and competing in price.

Lenovo was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1994. A year later Lenovo produced 105,780 computers, surpassing the production of its rival Great Wall to rank first among Chinese PC makers. Also in 1995 for the first time the company’s investment partners formalized their holdings in writing. The Chinese Academy of Sciences held 20 percent of the company, the academy’s Institute of Computer Technology held 45 percent, and the employees’ shareholder group held 35 percent.

During the 1990s Chinese consumers’ purchasing power increased, but Lenovo faced a difficult market because of both tightening profit margins in the global computer industry and Chinese consumers’ stagnant demand for personal computers. On 15 March 1996, “after countless setbacks, Lenovo’s computers for the first time appeared on the marketplace as a serious contender” (Ling 2006, 241). By lowering its prices substantially, Lenovo successfully challenged multinational competitors for market share. Foreign brands’ market share declined from 73 percent in 1993 to 40 percent in 1996.
Growth Strategy

By 1997 Lenovo had emerged as the most successful domestic computer company in the Chinese market, which itself had grown to be the second-largest personal computer market in Asia after Japan. In 2002 Lenovo initiated a plan to sell its PCs in markets outside of Asia. But Lenovo reassessed its approach after meeting renewed competition within China, and the company’s top management adopted a strategy of growth through mergers and acquisitions. By 2004 Legend had formally changed its logo and English-language name to “Lenovo.”

In 2004 International Business Machines (IBM) and Lenovo reached a deal for the sale of IBM’s PC unit that totaled $1.75 billion and gave IBM an 18 percent stake in Lenovo. Under the agreement Lenovo gained the right to use the IBM brand for five years and to use the ThinkPad trademark as well as to access IBM’s distribution network. The deal vaulted Lenovo from ninth to third place among computer manufacturers worldwide behind Dell and Hewlett-Packard. Under the terms of the merger Lenovo founder Liu Chuanzhi stepped down from his post as Lenovo chief executive officer but held the post of vice chairman of Legend Holdings, Lenovo’s parent company. Yuanqing Yang became chairman of the board, and a U.S. citizen became chief executive.

Mixed Reviews

The sale of IBM’s PC unit to Lenovo was viewed in China as a sign of the country’s arrival in the global economy; some people in the United States, however, expressed caution at the acquisition of a major U.S. brand by a Chinese firm with government ties. The Commission on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) undertook a multi-agency review to assess potential national security implications of the acquisition. CFIUS eventually approved the acquisition. In 2006 the U.S. Department of State bought sixteen thousand desktop PCs from Lenovo, touching off a public debate that resulted in the department’s decision to keep the Lenovo computers off of its classified network.

Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC unit has shifted the company’s sources of earnings. Prior to the purchase a majority of Lenovo’s sales occurred inside China, with an estimated 50 percent of sales going to the Chinese government. By comparison, in 2006 Lenovo reported sales of $14 billion total, with less than $4 billion from China. Lenovo’s corporate strategy includes building a supply chain outside China to be as effective as the one inside China and expanding its PC business market share beyond Asia.

The rise of Lenovo and firms from other industrializing countries to corporate multinational status marks a growing trend in international business. “Being newcomers in the global competitive race, these firms have found niches others ignored and have conceived innovative strategies others disdained but that are, in fact, better suited to an interconnected world and volatile new markets” (van Agtmael 2007, 6). Lenovo became the first Chinese company to sponsor the Olympics with its backing of the 2008 Beijing Games. Lenovo’s successful acquisition of a major U.S. brand is also notable compared with the unsuccessful acquisition by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) of the U.S. oil company Unocal in 2005.

A new labor law imposed by the Chinese government in 2007 may have a significant impact on Lenovo’s cost structure. The law sets minimum wage and severance pay for workers and creates open-ended terms of employment for employees who have completed two terms of service.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2008, Lenovo launched its IdeaPad notebook computers in the United States, France, Russia, and South Africa. But with the onset of the global financial crisis at the end of the year, Lenovo, as well as other companies in the IT business, faces significant challenges.

Matthew E. CHEN

Further Reading


Discussions with Lenovo CEO Yang Yuanqing

Here are highlights from a 30-minute interview with Yang at Lenovo's Morrisville headquarters.

**Why Lenovo is losing U.S. market share:** It's not losing ground in its prime market: large U.S. corporations. The problem is that corporate giants have slowed their spending—making the consumer segment, as well as small and mid-sized businesses, more important than ever. Unfortunately for Lenovo, those markets play to the company's weaknesses. Indeed, it only entered the U.S. consumer market last year. "That is why, overall, we lose market share," Yang said.

**The strategy for regaining share:** "Speed is the key," Yang said. "In each function, you should measure what is the previous development cycle. That must be speeded up. What is your shipment time? That must be speeded up. What is your time to prepare a marketing campaign? If previously we have to spend three months, right now I wish we could cut that to just one month or a couple of weeks."

"That's why we have a COO here," Yang added. "He will help me with the daily operations."

**On becoming CEO again:** Although some have interpreted the management shuffle as a demotion for Yang, he said he prefers being in an operational role. Moreover, he said he instigated the return of Liu Chuanzhi as chairman so that he could focus more time on the business and less on the board of directors.

**On acquiring IBM's PC business:** "I think it was the right decision," he said. "If we didn't have this deal, I think Lenovo today would be [in worse shape]. We would only be a local player." Smaller computer companies, he added, are losing market share to the top 5 PC makers.

**The global PC market:** "We are dependent on the overall macro-economy. I believe this year will still be tough. Maybe the overall PC market will be flat or even shrinking. But in some markets, I am... more optimistic, like in China and some emerging markets."

**On his decision to live in the triangle:** "We have a big operation here. I already understand our Chinese business very well. To come here, to live here, will help me to understand not only our global business, but also our team here... I have learned a lot over the past three or four years.


Lhasa, as capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, is Tibet’s political and religious center. It is the home of the Dalai Lamas, Tibet’s spiritual leaders.

Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region and historically capital of the Tibetan state, is situated in the central region of U-Tsang on the Kyushu River at a height of 3,650 meters.

The name Lha-sa (pronounced Ha-sa) in Tibetan means “divine ground,” and Lhasa has always played a combined religious and political role. The city has had two main phases: Lhasa was established as the capital by the first Buddhist king, Songtsen Gampo (609?–649 ce), in the seventh century ce to house Jowo, the sacred image of Buddha. Using geomancy (divination by means of figures or lines or geographic features), people determined that the heart of Tibet, where the image should be kept, was in an island on a lake on the site of today’s Lhasa. After the demon of the lake was subdued, a temple was built for the statue and called the “Jokhang” (House of the Lord Buddha). The Jokhang is Lhasa’s holiest shrine. The next phase was in the seventeenth century, when Lhasa was reestablished as the capital of the Dalai Lamas, the Tibetan spiritual leaders. The Potala Palace was built on the Marpo-Ri (Red Hill) as the center for the joint religious and secular government of Tibet.

Around the Jokhang is the Barkhor, or circumambulation path, along which pilgrims walk or prostrate themselves. The Norbulingka, the summer palace of the Dalai Lamas, lies to the west. Other sites include the ancient Ramoche temple. The historic monasteries of Ganden, Drepung, and Sera, headquarters of the dominant Yellow Hat sect of the Dalai Lamas, are close to Lhasa and have wielded enormous influence over the city.

Since Chinese rule modern Lhasa has expanded, dwarfing the Tibetan area, large parts of which have been demolished. Lhasa suffered during the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and was extensively damaged in the 1960s during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In the 1980s the Chinese began restoration work, and a Chinese city expanded in the area to house the administration and business. Today the Tibet Heritage Fund has helped to preserve some areas of historic Lhasa around the Barkhor.

Modern Lhasa has been described variously as drab, featureless, or like a bustling frontier town. Under the Chinese plan of modernizing Tibet and developing its economy, small-scale manufacturing, beer brewing, and now...
the Internet have come to the city. Lhasa’s importance as a pilgrimage center for Tibetans and as a tourist destination has allowed it to preserve some of its main features, while the Chinese plan for Tibet has created a completely new city. China has ambitious plans for Lhasa as part of its policy of developing the western regions of the People’s Republic, including building the world’s highest railroad linking Lhasa to the nearest railhead in Qinghai Province.

In March 2008 anti-Chinese riots led to several deaths of both Han Chinese and demonstrators and embarrassed China in its Olympics year.

Michael KOWALEWSKI

Further Reading


Li Bai has come to be regarded as a poet par excellence of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). Although he achieved a level of fame in early mid-life, his talent was not recognized by the Tang emperor. Li’s poetry can be characterized by his strong passion, his use of powerful rhetorical devices, and the innovative changes he made to traditional verse forms.

Li Bai (also known as Li Bo) is regarded, along with Du Fu (712–770 CE), as one of the leading literary figures to emerge from the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) golden age of poetry. Li is traditionally called the “poet transcendent,” an appellation that befits his poetic style and characteristics.

The life of Li Bai is legendary. His courtesy name “Tai-bai” (the Chinese term for the planet Venus) was adopted because the planet appeared in his mother’s dream when she was about to give birth to him. (A courtesy name, or zi, is a two-syllable pseudonym that replaced the given name, but was never used in conjunction with the family name, of an educated Chinese man.) Some people suggested that Li was descended from an ethnic minority, but most believe that Li’s grandfather moved the family from the heartland of China to inner Asia and that Li’s father moved to Shu (modern Sichuan Province) when Li was a child. Li regarded Shu as his homeland because he grew up there before leaving at the age of twenty-six.

Li’s worldview was idiosyncratic. On the one hand he was interested in Daoist immortality and was once converted to Daoism, but on the other hand he wished to serve the court, a standard desire of a Confucian gentleman. This synthesis might have come from his wide range of interests since youth in such subjects as Confucian classics, philosophical treatises, swordsmanship, and archery.

Traveling occupied a large part of Li’s life. Leaving Shu as a young man he sailed down the Yangzi (Chang) River and participated in a carefree lifestyle—drinking, meeting celebrities, sharing whatever wealth he could with needy friends—all the while cultivating the persona of a wildly obsessed poet. Later Li Bai journeyed to central-east China. On the recommendation of his Daoist friend Wu Yun (d. 778), Li was appointed at the age of forty-one as a scholar of the Hanlin Academy in the capital Chang’an (modern Xi’an). Li quickly became famous after the poet He Zhizhang (659–744 CE), upon reading Li’s poem “The Road to Shu Is Harsh,” praised him as “a transcendent banished from Heaven” (Meng Qi, 28). But soon afterward Li offended powerful officials and the emperor himself; he was sent away from court and lost his position at the academy. Thereafter, Li wandered from place to place in despair and poverty.

The appeal of Li’s poetry comes from his strong passion, powerful rhetorical devices, and, above all, creativity. Li wrote in traditional poetic forms but made innovative changes, such as special arrangements of verse length, rhythm, tonal pattern, and repetition. Like all traditional writers, Li borrowed extensively from earlier texts, and the most poignant provenance of Li’s diction and imagery
The Poetry of Li Bai

**DRINKING ALONE UNDER THE MOON**

A jug of wine among the flowers . . .
I drink alone; there is no one with me.
Raising my cup, I invite the bright moon.
Together with my shadow, it makes three persons.
Alas, the moon does not know how to drink,
And my shadow follows me thoughtlessly.
But, still, I have these temporary friends.
We shall enjoy ourselves before the spring passes away.
I sing, and the moon cheers me.
I dance, and my shadow joins me.
While I am conscious, we associate happily.
After I am intoxicated, we separate completely.
To seek a friendship without passions
I look up and think of long distance of the Milky Way.


was the Zhuangzi, a book about the life and thoughts of Zhuang Zhou (mid-fourth to late third century BCE), a foundational philosopher of early Daoism. These borrowed elements were often recouched in hyperbolic language, thereby assuming new life in his poetry.

Li’s authorial voice is presented in many guises—as a recluse, a transcendent, a warrior, a homesick traveler, a drinker, the lonely wife missing her absent husband, and even the mythological Peng Bird and Celestial Horse. These personas find their best presentations in his valedictory verse, poetry of the frontier, love songs (mostly in the yuefu [ballad] mode), accounts of historical events with remarks, landscape poetry, poems of personal frustration, and Daoist cantos.

Li’s disappointment over his lack of recognition by the emperor permeates much of his poetry. His idiosyncrasies and perceived lack of success laid the groundwork for a poetic legacy as bright as Venus itself. Li Bai ended his life—according to legend that is perhaps reinforced by the title of one of his most well-known poems, “Drinking Alone under the Moon”—in an attempt to embrace the moon’s reflection on a lake.

Timothy Wai Keung CHAN

**Further Reading**


Meng Qi . (870s [1986]). *Benshi shi*. In Ding Fubao (Ed.), *Lidai shihua xubian*, (pp. 1–22). Beijing: Zhonghua.


Li Dazhao was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. Under his lead, the party organized a labor movement and cooperated with others, including anti-Communist factions, in an effort to achieve national unification. Li’s other important contribution was his innovative modification of Marxism to suit uniquely Chinese conditions, an adaptation that helped socialism take root in China.

Born in Leting, Hebei Province, to a land-owning family, Li Dazhao acquired a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese peasantry, which later influenced his theoretical innovation in the application of Marxism in China. In 1913 Li went to Japan and enrolled at Waseda University, where he studied political science and began to learn about Marxism. In mid-1916 Li returned to China, participating in the antimonarchical restoration movement against warlord Yuan Shi-kai. In 1918 Li took a job as head librarian at Beijing University, where he learned more about the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and encountered Mao Zedong, who later became the leader of Communist China. Meanwhile Li wrote numerous articles to promote modernization and democratization as effective self-strengthening means to fight domestic warlords and foreign imperialists. Some of Li’s articles were published in the journal *New Youth*, whose founder was Chen Duxiu, the other cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The May Fourth Movement of 1919 turned Li to the Marxist camp. In the September 1919 issue of *New Youth* Li introduced Marxism to his Chinese audience, followed by another article on the Bolshevik Revolution three months later. In both works Li argued that Communism was the only way to save China from foreign imperialism. Li argued that mobilization of the proletariat and violent revolution were essential and justified. Li’s ideas were well received, and numerous Marxist study groups were founded, with Li heading the Beijing branch, Chen the Shanghai branch, and Mao the Changsha branch. Meanwhile Li and Chen explored the idea of forming a Communist party.

With Soviet Comintern assistance, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded on 1 July 1921, in Shanghai, and Li served on the executive committee in the Beijing area. In 1924, at the Comintern’s instructions, Li led the CCP to join Sun Yat-sen’s Guomindang.
intending to create a united front to protect the growth of the infant CCP. Li was elected to the GMD’s Central Executive Committee, where he gained resources to support his works in north China. This cooperation between the CCP and the GMD was called the “First United Front,” and the primary task was national unification by eliminating warlordism.

During his stay in the north until his death in 1927 Li concentrated on the labor movement and united-front endeavors to accomplish national unification. In the meantime he continued to promote and modify Marxism to fit China’s unique conditions. In 1923 Li published a work entitled Populism, in which he argued that all people are equal and enjoy the same political rights regardless of socioeconomic status. Li also enlarged the Marxist concept of the proletariat by including peasants. Given China’s mass peasantry, Li stressed its potential revolutionary value and urged party members to go to the countryside to recruit and mobilize the peasants. Li also formulated a number of military tactics and operational strategies, emphasizing the manipulation of China’s vast rural hinterland. All these strategies had direct bearings on Mao, whose final accession to power in 1949 was to a large extent due to the tailor-made tactics and strategies to suit Chinese conditions that Li had formulated two decades earlier. By the same token, this Chinese variant of Communism was accountable for the tense relationship between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union from time to time.

Li’s overt antiwarlordism, however, had irritated Zhang Zuolin, who at the height of Li’s revolutionary activities in the mid-1920s, controlled the Beijing government. In 1926 Li’s activities were driven underground when Zhang ordered his arrest. Li found refuge in the Soviet Embassy. Gaining foreign acquiescence, Zhang’s army marched into the Beijing Legation and raided the Soviet Embassy. Li was arrested on 6 April 1927, and executed on 28 April 1927.

LAW Yuk-fun

Further Reading
Li Hongzhang was one of China’s most influential officials during the late nineteenth century. As the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) struggled to adjust to domestic uprisings and the intrusion of Western nations, Li emerged as the nation’s foremost military leader, diplomat, industrialist, and reformer.

Li Hongzhang was born in Hefei, Anwei (modern Anhui) Province, the second son of a successful landowner and scholar-official. He earned the jinshi degree (in the Chinese civil service examination system, the highest degree a scholar could attain) at the age of only twenty-four and earned an appointment to the prestigious Hanlin Academy in Beijing, where he became the protégé of an eminent official, Zeng Guofan. In 1853 Li returned to his hometown to help his father establish a local militia to defend the region against Nian rebels. Five years later he left Anwei for Jiangxi Province to join Zeng and his powerful Hunan (Xiang) Army in combating anti-Qing Taiping rebels in southern China. From these auspicious beginnings Li would go on to become one of the Qing dynasty’s (1644–1912) foremost military leaders, a valuable contributor to China’s efforts at self-strengthening in technology and defense, and a renowned diplomat.

In 1861 Li was appointed governor of Jiangsu Province and arrived the next year in Shanghai with his newly organized militia, known as the “Huai Army.” Hand-picked generals and loyal troops made this one of the finest military forces in China. Working in conjunction with Zeng’s army and foreign troops of the Ever Victorious Army, Li was finally able to crush the Taiping Rebellion in 1864. He was rewarded for his military accomplishments with an appointment as imperial commissioner to suppress the Nian Rebellion and promotion to governor-general of Hunan and Hubei provinces. After a difficult campaign against the Nian rebels in Anwei Province, Li finally brought the uprising to an end in August 1868. For his success in pacifying the region, Li was awarded the honorific title of Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent.

Foreign Diplomacy

In response to the Tianjin Massacre of 21 June 1870, in which a French consul and eighteen other foreigners, including ten Catholic nuns, were killed by a Chinese mob, Li marched his Huai Army to Tianjin as a show of force. En route he was reassigned as governor-general of Zhili Province, replacing his ailing mentor, Zeng Guofan, in this politically sensitive post. During his twenty-five-year tenure in Zhili, Li became China’s chief negotiator of critical issues with foreign powers. In 1876 he concluded the Chefoo Convention with Great Britain, regulating trade along China’s border with Burma (Myanmar). In 1883 he defused a tense situation in Korea between Chinese and Japanese troops but that same year was unable to prevent French advances in Vietnam. The subsequent Sino-French war (1884–1885) resulted in the near-total destruction of China’s southern fleet and a relatively quick
victory for the French. Li negotiated the convention ending this conflict, which recognized France's suzerainty (dominion) over Vietnam. In 1894 smoldering tensions in Korea erupted into war between China and Japan. Again China was quickly defeated, and Li was called to negotiate a settlement. The Treaty of Shimonoseki formally ending the hostilities granted Japan an indemnity of 230 million tael (a value based on the weight of silver) and ceded Chinese territory, including the island of Formosa and the Pescadores. Stipulations might have been more severe if Li had not been wounded by a Japanese fanatic during negotiations. Nevertheless, Li bore the brunt of criticism for this humiliating treaty and for the loss of his northern fleet during the war. He was reassigned to non-political posts but still conducted one more controversial negotiation. In 1896, while in St. Petersburg, Russia, to attend the coronation of Czar Nicholas II, Li and Count Witte signed an agreement allowing Russia railroad rights through Mongolia and Manchuria. Li was again criticized for ceding Chinese territory, and rumors circulated that he had accepted a huge bribe.

Reform and Industry

Perhaps even more significant than his military and political service was Li Hongzhang's contributions to China's self-strengthening. In 1872 he created the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company, one of the era's most successful government-private joint enterprises, which proved highly effective in competition with foreign shipping firms. In 1878 he constructed a modern textile factory in Shanghai to counter increased foreign imports. In order to improve communications, he built a national
telegraph line that linked China’s major cities and connected Chinese officials and businessmen to the world via the international telegraph cable. He was also instrumental in promoting the use of railroads, building one of the first to facilitate the transportation of coal from the Kaiping mines.

Li believed that a strong state needs a strong military. In the 1880s he established arsenals in Tianjin to produce ammunition for the army’s imported rifles and purchased modern gunboats for his northern fleet stationed at Weihaiwei in Shandong Province. He sent promising naval students to Europe for training and invited foreign experts to teach at his new Tianjin Naval Academy. By 1882 Li’s northern fleet consisted of twelve formidable gunboats and cruisers staffed by Western-trained officers and engineers, and the combined navies of the country now included fifty steam warships—half of which were constructed in Chinese shipyards.

Implications

In the early 1890s Li Hongzhang reached the apex of his career. On his seventieth birthday in 1892 he was showered with gifts by the emperor and empress dowager, honoring his contributions to China’s stability and modernization. However, despite his success in implementing self-strengthening programs in technology and defense, China proved no match in conflicts with European or Japanese troops. Military defeats and the humiliating stipulations of the Treaty of Shimonoseki cast a shadow over his career, and bribery claims associated with the Russian railroad lease through northern China further clouded his legacy. He died of illness just two months after concluding negotiations with foreign powers over the Boxer Rebellion.

Daniel J. MEISSNER

Further Reading

Li Peng, son of Zhou Enlai, was premier of the PRC from 1988 until 1998. He achieved notoriety for supporting the crackdown during the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Li also took steps to rein in China's high inflation in the 90s and begin sweeping reforms of state-owned enterprises.

Born in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, Li Peng is the orphaned son of a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worker and was adopted by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976). Li was trained as a hydroelectric power engineer in Moscow from 1948 to 1955. After his return to China he was the director and chief engineer at several power plants from 1956 to 1966 and later held various bureaucratic or party positions relating to power generation. In 1979, partly because of the backing of his stepmother, CCP Central Committee member Deng Yingchao (1904–1997), Li began a swift ascent up the hierarchy, first as deputy minister of power production (1981), then as a member of the Central Committee (1982) and vice premier in charge of energy and communications (1983). In 1985 he became a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo and in 1988 became premier, a post he held until 1998.

Li achieved his greatest notoriety during the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Strongly opposed to the student takeover of the square, he was perceived as patronizing during meetings with student leaders and was heckled at a televised meeting with hospitalized hunger strikers. He sided with other hard-liners against Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919), who was removed as party leader. Later news media and students frequently referred to Li as the “butcher of Beijing” for being the first official to publicly support the People’s Liberation Army’s bloody crackdown on students during the night of 3–4 June.

After 1989 Li cooperated with CCP leader Jiang Zemin and economics czar Zhu Rongji to rein in China’s high inflation and begin sweeping reforms of state-owned enterprises. Elected chair of the National People’s Congress despite an unprecedented two hundred negative votes in 1998, Li remains an influential voice in policymaking.

Joel CAMPBELL

Further Reading
Li Qingzhao is considered to be China’s foremost woman poet. She wrote during the Song dynasty; only a hundred of her poems have survived.

Li Qingzhao was born in the city of Jinan in the province of Shandong. Her family belonged to the upper echelons of northern Song dynasty (960–1279) society, and she likely had made a name for herself as a poet, calligrapher, and painter well before she was married at the age of seventeen to Zhao Mingcheng, the son of a royal minister in the court of the Song emperor.

These were halcyon days for Qingzhao, and the few poems of hers that survive from this period are filled with expressions of bliss and include descriptions of married life that suggest that her husband shared in those very things that were important to Qingzhao, such as literary pursuits, artistic endeavors, art collecting, and politics of the court. Chief among these pursuits was book collecting, and soon their library contained some of the choicest volumes of the Song period. The couple wrote delicate poems to each other, especially when Mingcheng had to be away to attend to the demands of his position.

Their world changed abruptly, however, in 1127 with the fall of Bianliang (Kaifeng) to the invading Jurchen, who had emerged from northern Manchuria and who quickly consolidated their rule by abducting the northern Song emperor, Qinzong, along with most of the royal family; Qinzong was exiled to a remote part of northern Manchuria. During this time of chaos the house in which Qingzhao and Mingcheng lived was burned, resulting in the loss of most of the things the couple had collected over the years, including their valuable books. They hastily gathered what belongings remained and fled with them to a new home in Nanjing, but this place of refuge could never equal the home they had lost. By 1129 Zhao Mingcheng was dead. This came as a cruel blow to Qingzhao; her husband had been the foundation of her life. The poems from this period of her life are filled with bleak hopelessness, wherein the best she can do is safeguard the things remaining from her once-happy life in Jinan, namely, the poetry the couple had written to each other.

One of the first acts of the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234) when it established its rule was to dismiss all the officials who had worked for the previous emperor. Because she belonged to the class of society that had served the Song emperor, Qingzhao’s financial position grew somewhat precarious, and by 1132 she was living in rented rooms. Of the many poems she and her husband had written she now possessed only a meager collection; the rest had been pilfered by various people she had dealt with as she wandered from one place to the next. But she diligently set about publishing what remained of her books in a series of volumes entitled Jin shi lu (Record of Bronze and Steel), in which she meticulously set down an accounting of the artifacts and artwork she and her late husband had collected. In the final volume of the series Li Qingzhao wrote a moving memoir of her married life. Some evidence indicates that she remarried in later years, although briefly; but this is a point of contention. The last record of her comes from Zhejiang Province, after which she disappears from
The Poetry of Li Qingzhao

The heavens join with the clouds.
The great waves merge with the fog.
The Milky Way appears
Turning overhead.
A thousand sails dance.
I am rapt away to the place of the Supreme,
And here the words of Heaven,
Asking me where I am going.
I answer, “It is a long road, alas,
Far beyond the sunset.”

I try to put it into verse
But my words amaze me.
The huge roc bird is flying
On a ninety thousand mile wind.
O wind, do not stop
Until my little boat has been blown
To the Immortal Islands
In the Eastern Sea.


Further Reading


China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Li Shangyin lived a precarious existence during a tumultuous age—six emperors ruled during his lifetime. Although Li is best known as a “love poet” who expressed his sorrows and struggles in the context of unrequited or thwarted romance, the label doesn’t account for his artistic depth and range. Nearly six hundred of his poems survive and have been studied and admired for centuries.

Li Shangyin was a literatus-official who lived during the chaotic waning years of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). His zi, or courtesy name—a two-syllable pseudonym that replaced a given name, but was never used in conjunction with the family name, of an educated Chinese man—was Yishan. Although he never achieved an official post higher than the fifth level (out of nine), remarkably he survived the turbulence of continual court purges, regime changes, mass murder, and revolution that dominated the political atmosphere of his day. The statistic often cited in relation to the chaotic political backdrop of Li Shangyin’s writings is that six emperors ruled during his life. As a result, Li often struggled to survive in the combat between at least two powerful political factions to which he was obligated to appeal for support and livelihood. The instability that dominates Li’s biography enables his readers to understand why his poems are full of heart-rending sorrow and despair.

Li often expressed his despair in poems of unrequited or severed romance. It was conventional in traditional poetry to guise political appeals in romantic allegory, and Li elevated this kind of writing to an unprecedented level of sophistication. His four-poem suite “The Terrace of Yan,” for example, may be profitably read as an expression of genuine romantic despair. His famous “Untitled Poems” are usually read as multilayered compositions, with a surface mimesis (imitation) concerning romantic interludes and other layers that communicate sadness over political and moral decline or appeal to possible political patrons. Many of Li’s romantic poems also refer and allude to fantastic myths and colorful historical legends. Although Li continues to be referred to today in major monographs as the greatest “love poet” of the tradition, this appellation does not suffice in connoting his range or depth.

Li has been admired over the centuries as the greatest master, after Du Fu (712–770), of heptasyllabic (seven-syllable) regulated verse. More than half of his 598 poems...
extant poems are written in this form, of which the majority of his "Untitled Poems" deserve to be called masterpieces. Whereas Du Fu is usually considered the greatest writer of regulated verse, Li Shangyin achieves the more romantic, ambiguous, refined, and allusive presentation in this form.

A major field of Li Shangyin studies consists of detailed exploration of his regulated poem, "The Brocade Zither." Considered both his pièce de résistance and a concentrated exhibition of all his poetic virtues, the poem is also difficult. For most readers "The Brocade Zither" concerns Li's regrets over lost love, but some readers observe that the unexpected shifts among allusions, images, and the texture of the poetic language reveal the poem as a meditation on the unreliability of language in capturing the illusive memory.

Indeed, "beauty in ambiguity" best describes Li Shangyin's overall poetic contribution. This idiosyncrasy of Li's poems led Liang Qichao (1873–1929) to write his famous assessment of Li Shangyin: "I cannot figure out what Yishan's poems are about...but I feel they are beautiful" (cited in Wu 1998,169).

Further Reading


Tyler C. PIKE

LI Shizhen ▶
Li Shizhen 李时珍

Li Shizhen was a scholar of medicine and natural history who flourished during the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Though he wrote several poems and medical treatises, Li is best known as the author of the *Compendium of Materia Medica* (*Bencao gangmu* 本草纲目, 1596), an encyclopedic work on Chinese medical drugs.

Li Shizhen was born and raised in the district of Qizhou (now in Hubei Province), where his family enjoyed a comfortable reputation in the medical profession. His grandfather had made his living as a traveling bell doctor, a class of physicians that was looked down upon by some for openly peddling medical skills to make money. Li’s father, Li Yanwen, had enjoyed a relatively secure reputation as a medical scholar, treating patients and composing a number of treatises on diagnostic methods and local products such as mugwort and ginseng.

Li was briefly installed in a medical position at the imperial palace but spent the majority of his young adulthood treating local patients and traveling extensively in order to compile research for his medical works. Li moved back to Qizhou in 1561. He lived in a garden house that he dubbed “a hermit’s dwelling” after a favorite line in the *Classic of Poetry* and took the zi (or courtesy name, a two-character pseudonym that replaced a given name, but was never used in conjunction with a family name, of an educated Chinese man) of “Binhu” (Near the Lake) to mark this new phase of his life.

Li spent the remainder of his life writing such varied texts as a volume of poetry, a treatise on a dappled snake indigenous to Qizhou, and monographs on several topics of medical theory. Only a few of these works have survived, including three treatises on pulse diagnosis: the *Binhu maixue* (Binhu’s Study of Vessels), the *Qijing baimai kao* (Studies of the Eight Irregular Vessels), and the *Maijue kaozheng* (Rhymed Investigation into the Vessels). Only two of Li’s poems, both written for close friends and fellow scholars from Hubei, are extant.

The work for which Li is best known is *Compendium of Materia Medica* (*Bencao gangmu*, 1596), an encyclopedic work on Chinese medical drugs. Li intended to update, correct, and expand current knowledge of Chinese medical drugs and to that end spent thirty years researching medical and nonmedical texts, interviewing local people, and conducting experiments with plants, animals, and stones. The result was a massive text of fifty-two *juan* (roughly equivalent to chapters) and almost 2 million characters, including descriptions of 1,892 medical drugs. Li died before the work was published, with his family overseeing its printing and distribution.

Li Shizhen and his work continued to gain notoriety after his death. Li was reinvented as the figurehead of traditional Chinese medicine under Mao Zedong’s rule of the Chinese Communist Party. He was reimagined as a model barefoot doctor in books and propaganda posters and in films such as *Li Shizhen* (1956). He is currently
hailed in China as a founding father of Chinese science and medicine and has been memorialized in stamps, statues, and television programs.

Carla NAPPI

Further Reading


Page from the *Bencao gangmu*, or the *Compendium of Materia Medica*, written by the physician Li Shizhen (1518–1593). This edition was published by Tai he tang in 1655.
Liang Qichao 梁啟超
1873–1929 Scholar and essayist

Liang Qichao 梁啟超 formed the moderate Progressive Party after the Republican Revolution of 1911 and twice served as a cabinet-level minister. He later withdrew to a life of teaching and scholarship.

Liang Qichao was a reform-minded scholar and essayist who rose to prominence after the humiliating defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). In 1898 he was among the leading participants of the ill-fated Hundred Days of Reform sponsored by the progressive Guangxu emperor. After the reactionary restoration of Empress Dowager Cixi, Liang fled to Japan, where for the next fourteen years he edited a series of influential journals and wrote an impressive range of persuasive essays and monographs advocating political reform or revolution and introducing his contemporaries to Western liberalism, nationalism, and science.

In the aftermath of the Republican Revolution of 1911, Liang returned to China and formed the moderate Progressive Party (Jinbudang), which contended with the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in the nascent National Assembly. He twice served as a cabinet-level minister. With the onset of warlordism in 1917 Liang withdrew to a life of teaching and scholarship during which he wrote prolifically on Chinese culture, literature, and history. These later writings reflected his predominant aspiration for a new cultural synthesis in China that would combine the most worthy and enduring elements of Chinese Confucianism with the social and political principles of Western liberalism.

Photograph of Liang Qichao from the 17 April 1901 issue of the Tung Wah News.

Further Reading

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Liaoning Province

Liaoning Province is in the southern part of northeast China. Bounded by the Yellow and Bo Hai seas in the south, with a coastline 2,187 kilometers (1,359 miles) long, Liaoning covers a total area of 145,900 square kilometers: slightly smaller than Nepal. It is surrounded by Jilin and Hebei provinces, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and North Korea. The Liao River, the principal waterway of the province, flows through the middle of Liaoning from north to south. The Yalu River on the eastern fringe forms the boundary between China and North Korea. The Liaodong Peninsula juts out between the Yellow and Bo Hai seas from the landmass. Liaoning has a zigzag coast and many rocky islands and fine natural harbors. It had an estimated population of 42.98 million in 2007. Ethnic groups living there include Man, Mongolians, Koreans, and Xibo.

Liaoning has a temperate continental monsoonal climate, with hot, rainy summers; long, cold winters with little snow; and short, windy springs. It has an average annual temperature of 6º–11º C (43º–53º F), a frost-free period of 130–180 days, and a mean annual precipitation of 400–1,000 millimeters (15–39 inches), which decreases notably from southeast to northwest.

Liaoning grows sorghum, maize, rice, and soybeans and the cash crops of cotton, tobacco, and peanuts. It is also the major grower of tussah, or wild, silk in China. The apples of southern Liaoning and the pears of western Liaoning are known throughout China. The province is a rich source of ginseng and pilose antler, valuable ingredients for traditional Chinese medicines. The fishery industry is developed along the coast.

Liaoning contains rich mineral resources, especially iron ore and coal. Fushun and Fuxin, popularly called the “coal capital” and the “coal sea,” produce top-quality coal at the largest opencast mining centers in China. With a well-grounded heavy industry, Liaoning is one of China’s major industrial bases. It leads the country in the production of iron and steel, aluminum, sulfuric acid, soda ash, heavy machinery, magnesia, and talcun. With its railway mileage exceeding 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles) of tracks, Liaoning has the densest network of rail lines in the country.

Shenyang, the provincial capital, is the largest city of northeast China, with an estimated 2007 population of 7.1 million. It is one of China’s economic, communications, and cultural centers. Shenyang is known throughout China for its machine-building industry.

Dalian, the most famous city in Liaoning, lies at the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. One of the most beautiful cities in China, it is a tourist paradise, with
European-style architecture framing its skyline and miles of beaches along its oceanfront.

Di BAI

Further Reading


Liaozhai Zhiyi
Liáozháih āi Zhìyì
聊齋志異

Liaozhai Zhiyi 聊齋志異 (Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio) is a Chinese collection of short stories famous for its many fables describing the interaction between humans and supernatural beings such as ghosts, fox-spirits, and a host of immortal creatures and spectres.

The short stories comprising the collection Liaozhai Zhiyi (Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio) were compiled and written by Pu Songling (1640–1715). Pu was born into a merchant family of modest means in Zichuan, 100 kilometers east of Ji’nan in modern Shandong Province. Having passed the county civil service examination with distinctions, he repeatedly failed at the provincial level until, at the age of fifty, he stopped trying. Pu made a living working as a secretary and tutor and spent most of his life collecting stories and writing them down. In his preface of 1679 Pu acknowledged his indebtedness to traditional “recordings of the weird” (zhi guai) and “transmissions of the odd” (chuan qi) in works such as Gan Bao’s (early fourth century) Soushen ji (Records of Investigations of Spirits). Liaozhai Zhiyi is based on a variety of traditional and contemporary sources, and Pu embellished and expanded many of the stories.

Various handwritten copies were in circulation after 1679, and for the next thirty years Pu added stories to the manuscript. In spite of his financial struggles, Pu turned down a substantial offer for the manuscript made by a Shandong official around 1693, and his last manuscript copy was kept in the family after his death. From a postface written by Pu’s grandson Pu Lide (1683–1739) in 1739 it appears that handwritten copies were in great demand, and in 1766 the first printed edition of 431 stories appeared in Hangzhou. Since then handwritten manuscript copies containing some sixty stories not included in the printed edition have surfaced.

The stories are written in the literary language and characterized by a tight composition, numerous classical allusions, and Pu’s masterly sense of economy with words. He copies and develops different genres such as journal notes or historical biographies. Examples of the former include observations on strange events that have no story line, whereas the latter, based on real-life events, have plots progressing in chronological order. Liaozhai Zhiyi is primarily celebrated for the many stories depicting the interaction between humans and supernatural beings such as ghosts, fox-spirits, and a host of immortal creatures and spectres.

Although Pu freely mixes reality with fantasy and dreams, his description of Chinese society in the early years of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) seems true to life. Most of the stories fall into two categories: romantic love stories, which praise purity and fidelity, or scathing pieces of social criticism, which target corrupt bureaucrats and landowners. A common theme is the confrontation between the passive frustrated scholar and the assertive woman who may be a benign spirit or an evil demon or even human. Several scholars have noted Pu’s interest in and favorable treatment of women, who are
Seizing A Fox

A common theme of the short stories found in the Liaozhai Zhiyi involve interaction between humans and super-natural beings such as fox-spirits as seen in this excerpt from Pu Sonling’s “Seizing A Fox.”

A certain Mr. Sun, an uncle of one of my distant relatives by marriage, had always been a gutsy man. Once, while taking a day-time nap, he felt a vague sensation of a creature mounting his bed and then his own body rocking and swinging upwards, as if floating on a puff of clouds and fog. He thought to himself, “Could this be a succubi (ya hu, literally, “oppressing fox”)? He took a peek at the creature, which was the size of a cat, with yellow fur and green snout, stealthily crawling toward him alongside his feet, as if trying to avoid waking him up. The creature slowly crept against his body; first his feet then his thighs fell numb as it touched them. As soon as it reached his abdomen, however, Sun abruptly sat up, hunched down, and grabbed its neck. The creature cried in distress but was unable to break loose. Sun urgently summoned his wife, who then tied up the creature with a sash around its waist. Clasping both ends of the sash, Sun laughed at the creature, “I have heard that you are skilled at transformation, now I am going to see with my own eyes how you are able to do it.” Before he was done speaking, however, the creature suddenly sucked in its abdomen to the size of a straw, almost slipping away. Greatly taken aback, Sun firmly clutched it with renewed force, but this time it swelled its abdomen until it was thicker than a rice bowl and so hard that it did not give in to Sun’s tight grip. As Sun instinctively loosened his hands, the creature again shrank. Fearing that it might break free, Sun urged his wife to kill it. She frantically looked around, unable to find a knife. Sun momentarily looked to his left to indicate to her where one was. When he turned back, he found in his hands only a sash tied in the shape of a noose, the creature having already disappeared.


often positively contrasted with their feeble spouses. Pu’s satirical criticism of society, which not surprisingly took aim at the official civil service examination system, has earned him labels such as “proto-Marxist” and “anti-Manchu.” Liaozhai Zhiyi has inspired scores of plays and films and has been translated into English several times.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading


The Lifan Yuan (Office to Administer Foreign Barbarians), established in 1638, was the Qing dynasty’s principal organization for supervising the tribute system, during which outsiders brought (but mainly received) gifts to the Chinese court. It persisted in this important role until nearly the end of the dynasty when pressures exerted by the outside world, principally contact with Western powers, caused change.

Imperial Chinese foreign policy, whatever the pragmatic reality, was always rooted in a Confucian tributary system whereby outsiders—“barbarians”—had the obligation, in the well-known words of the Chinese philosopher Mencius, to “come to court and bear tribute” and thus recognize the superior virtue of the Chinese ruler. This was true even if in reality the gifts usually returned by the emperor in exchange for the tribute exceeded its value by a substantial margin.

Various agencies supervised such actions throughout imperial history and often intervened in the countries from which tribute came to express the superior power and position of China and to ensure the continued maintenance of the tribute system and thus the traditional order itself. The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was no exception. Among the agencies supervising the tribute system and trade and the countries involved was the Lifan Yuan (Office to Administer Foreign Barbarians), established in 1638 and staffed by Manchu, that is, members of the multinational banners that constituted the core military and social groups of early Qing society. It was created by renaming an older agency, that of Mongolian affairs, even before the formal accession of the dynasty. Governing the operations of the office was a special set of rules and regulations that provided the basis for the operations of the Lifan Yuan for almost the entire Qing period and embodied long-term Chinese experience in dealing with outside peoples.

The Lifan Yuan later co-existed with the traditional Board of Rites (libu, one of six boards in the Qing government), the board with which tribute bearers, real or alleged, from the West and south were most likely to come into contact. As set up, the Lifan Yuan, which held nearly ministerial authority and was unique in its power in the Qing system, had charge of Qing relations with the Mongols associated primarily with what is now Inner Mongolia. This was an important function since the Manchu were then closely allied with Mongol princes by marriage, had borrowed the alphabet and key elements of their culture from the Mongols, and were heavily reliant on Mongol riders to back up their military striking power. Mongolia, as well as Manchuria, also bordered on Russia, and almost immediately the Lifan Yuan had dealings with that Western and at the same time Inner Asian power. Russia became the first country with which China signed a treaty as an equal (Treaty of Kiakhta, 1727), but the fiction of tribute participation continued to be asserted.

Later the authority of the Lifan Yuan, along with Qing power itself, was extended more generally westward to take charge of virtually all relationships with the peoples...
of Inner Asia. Here the driving force was Qing conquest of the Mongols and the gaining of a paramount influence in Tibet and in Xinjiang, an area that in the later nineteenth century became a Chinese province to counter Russian ambitions (and is now the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region). Key events were the various Qing campaigns against the Dzungars and their eventual defeat, the gradual absorption of all of Mongolia (by the mid-eighteenth century), and the imposition of a Qing protectorate in Tibet to replace that of the Dzungars.

Although the central Asian trade of the old Silk Roads was no longer what it once was with the new maritime age, and although the central Asian states were no longer that menacing to China with the coming of gunpowder empires, a substantial flow of goods still existed. This flow was worth administering, and trade could be manipulated to bring the peoples and states involved under greater Chinese influence, thus the importance of the Lifan Yuan. This was particularly true for Mongolia, where the Qing pursued an active policy of economic divide and conquer, rewarding some with luxury goods and food, blockading others.

Although primarily an administrative organization, the Lifan Yuan carried on a considerable research on the peoples and cultures with which it was involved and provided language experts to the Qing government. The latter was an old tradition, and many foreign texts survive from antiquity in editions produced to train translators involved in the tribute trade, including what is now known as the Secret History of the Mongols, the Chinese version being originally intended to train Ming translators in using Mongolian documents. Among reference works produced by the Qing Lifan Yuan, or in whose production the Qing agency cooperated, were encyclopedias, often well illustrated, sometimes with hand-drawn color pictures, of strange customs and of the strange peoples offering tribute. Here, too, the officers of the Qing agency followed old precedents. One such book from the Song dynasty (960–1279), for example, deals extensively with the overseas trade upon which the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) was dependent. A significant part of the agency’s activities was providing special quarters for visiting envoys and their assistants, staging official banquets and other entertainments, and collecting and codifying law codes connected with tribute relationships and the countries involved, particularly Mongolia, and even some specially administered Buddhist temples. Buddhism was then the common religion of the Manchu themselves, their Mongol allies, and Tibet, the central authority for the Tibetan Buddhism involved, thus the eagerness of the Manchu to control it. The Lifan Yuan also had control of a system of subordinate agencies and of individually ranked religious and secular princes.

Although it remained a part of Qing government organization almost until the end, the Lifan Yuan declined considerably in importance as the role of Inner Asia in Qing life decreased. By the nineteenth century relations with Western powers were of far more significance, leading to an increasing reorganization of Qing government to try to respond better to the modern world; this modern world included Russian pressure in Turkistan, where the Russians attempted to seize some Qing domains taking advantage of the large-scale rebellion there. In 1861 the Lifan Yuan became China’s first real foreign ministry, the Zongli Yamen, an event marking the real end of traditional tribute relationships as the West kicked the door open.

Paul D. BUELL

Further Reading
Lin Biao was a military leader of the Chinese Communist forces and a propagandist for Mao Zedong. He died under mysterious circumstances in a plane crash in 1971; the plane was headed to Russia, where it was said he intended to defect. He was tried posthumously with the Gang of Four in 1980–81.

Lin Biao was a prominent general at the end of China’s Civil War, served as defense minister of the People’s Republic and finally as vice-chairman to Mao Zedong. The circumstances surrounding his death in 1971 were concealed until the government released an official statement in 1972 saying that Lin had been part of a failed conspiracy to depose Mao.

Early Career

Lin Biao, the son of a factory worker, was born in either 1907 or 1908 in Hubei Province. He attended Whampoa Military Academy where he was a member of the Socialist Youth League. Lin’s distinguished military career began in the Nationalist army, but he deserted to join the Communists in 1927. Lin commanded a Red Army corps during the Long March (1934–1935) and headed the Red Academy at the new Communist base at Yan’an. Lin was among the youngest and best of the Communist generals during the War of Resistance against the Japanese (also known as the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945). His genius for partisan warfare played a critical role in helping the forces of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) defeat Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists in Manchuria. He led the Red Army into Beijing in 1949.

Rise in Communist Party

Lin held several positions in the Communist Party and military hierarchy, although illness during the 1950’s may have hindered his career. After Lin became Minister of Defense in 1959, Mao relied on him to keep the People’s Liberation Army loyal and under control of the Communist Party in the period leading up to and during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Lin is credited with the propaganda campaign of the 1960s. Called Mao’s “best student,” he compiled and wrote the forward to the collection of Mao’s quotations that became known as The Little Red Book. In 1966, Lin was elevated to the second-ranking position in the Chinese Communist party, and thus became Mao’s heir apparent.

Fall from Grace

Perhaps in part because public adulation of Lin rivaled that of Mao, tensions arose between the two. Mao spoke publicly in 1971 about his anger at Lin’s opposition to Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife) at the Second Plenum. Lin’s son Lin Liguo, a deputy director of the Department of Operations of China’s Air Force, apparently openly discussed opposition to Mao. Lin disappeared in September 1971,
and a purge of army leaders was conducted immediately after. In 1972 an official statement said that Lin and his family died in an airplane crash in Mongolia on 13 September 1971. Lin and his son were said to be part of a conspiracy to usurp supreme Party leadership (“Project 571”) and were said to be fleeing to the Soviet Union to seek sanctuary after the coup’s failure. In 1973, the Central Committee expelled Lin from the Communist Party posthumously, and in 1976, he was tried posthumously with the Gang of Four.

Further Reading


Charles DOBBS and Nicole MUCHMORE
From the earliest times in China verse dominated literary composition, while forms of opera and prose fiction developed into the most ambitious genres beginning in the fourteenth century. Experiments with features of Western literature in the early twentieth century grew steadily into a highly Westernized array of literature that largely displaced pre-twentieth-century forms.

Prior to the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) musical lyrics alone were discussed as a class of composition apart from history and philosophy, and prose narratives, whether factual or fictive, appeared almost entirely embedded in the work of historians and philosophers. The most ancient poetic texts are found in the Shijing (Book or Classic of Poetry or Songs) and the Chuci (Elegies of Chu). The 305 extant lyrics in the Shijing date between 1000 and 700 BCE, when the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) court collected them from different regions of the realm. Written largely in four-word, rhymed lines, the shi (verses) vary in length and range from eulogies for royal ancestral rites to depictions by unknown authors of daily routines and intimate life. The Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) praised them for their contributions to moral philosophy, and later philosophers and poets quoted them widely, giving them a prominent place in the curriculum of Confucian education. The verses thereby greatly influenced techniques of description and imagery throughout the history of Chinese poetry. The most authoritative edition, by Mao Heng and his son, Mao Chang, in the late first or early second century CE, stresses the relationship of the poems to emotion as distinct from other forms of composition.

The Chuci comprises a second early tradition of verse known as the sao form, which is associated with the ancient state of Chu (770–721 BCE) or with the region (roughly modern Hunan Province). In sao the natural imagery alluding to moral qualities that is also often found in the Shijing is more lush and ultimately part of a visionary, shamanic world of spirits, souls, and deities through which the living and the dead journey in search of emotional and spiritual fulfillment. Such a world frames the first poem attributed to a historical figure, the “Li sao” (Encountering Sorrow) by Qu Yuan, who describes a fantastic journey: Qu, having been slandered by fellow Chu courtiers who want the king to reject Qu’s proposal for a strategic alliance, sets out upon his exile in search of a deity to validate his moral stature.

The records of the Han dynasty preserved samples of anonymous folk ballads (yuefu) of varying line length collected by the imperial Music Bureau and also shi verse composed in a new form of five-syllable lines. Eventually members of the cultural elite composed in yuefu and five-syllable-line shi style, among them Cai Yan (Cai Wenji, b. 177 CE), one of the earliest female poets credited by name, who recounted her lengthy captivity in a foreign tribe in a five-syllable-line shi poem. At the same time the sao form inspired members of the cultural elite to create a variant in rhymed prose, or prose poetry, called fu. The fu prose-poem began in homage to Qu Yuan as a way to
reflect on the misfortunes of official service, but as a vehicle for elaborate vocabulary it was then appropriated to describe the pleasures and wonders of imperial life. The increasing stylization of language in the *fu* resulted in a form of parallel prose written in alternating phrases of four and six syllables, known as the “four-six style” (*siliu wen* or *pianti wen*), which would last as an important style until the early twentieth century.

## Prose Narrative

The expansion of Daoist thought and its interaction with the arrival of Buddhism from central Asia during the Han dynasty stimulated imagination about both the geography of exotic regions and the realms of the supernatural. The court scholar Liu Xin (46 BCE–23 CE) compiled the fantastic geography of the *Shanhai jing* (Classic of Hills and Seas) as information on arcana (mysterious bits of knowledge) and anomalies necessary to governing the empire. After the collapse of the Han dynasty the number of published collections of short anecdotes of spirits increased, many edited by men of official standing writing unofficially, such as the 464 stories that an official historian, Gan Bao (317–420), published, not among his historical records but under the title *Sou shen ji* (Search for the Supernatural). Buddhist- and Daoist-inspired biographies, imitating the form but varying from the content of official historical biographies, also appeared, as did biographical anecdotes, also departing from official historical accounts, most famously in the studies of personal qualities attributed to historical figures in *Shi shuo xin yu* (New Anecdotes of Tales of the World) by a prince, Liu Yiqing (420–479). The single most famous story handed down from the post-Han North and South Dynasties (220–589) still inspires contemporary writing. This is the “Tao hua yuan” (Peach Blossom Spring), which the poet Tao Qian (Tao Yuanming, 365–427) included in his sequel collection to Gan Bao’s supernatural tales; it is a Daoist-inspired story of a fisherman who discovers a utopian community of refugees that has remained unknown for centuries. The growing body of prose narratives set in known historical and geographic contexts, but devoted to characters and situations not confirmed by official records, developed during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) into vividly and intimately depicted stories called *chuanqi* (communicating the unusual or romances), a category that included famous love stories.

## Later Poetic Forms

The interaction of Chinese empires with central Asia resulted in even more innovations than the legacy of Buddhism, and these innovations included new forms of poetry. The first of these was *lüshi* (regulated verse), inspired by the prosody of Indian Sanskrit poetry, a genre studied by Shen Yue (441–513). This form dictated an arrangement of phonological tones within rhymed lines of five or seven syllables, organized in parallel couplets and normally limited to either eight lines or four lines (*jueju*). Its most celebrated practitioner, Du Fu (712–770), acquired a reputation that has lasted to the present. Like all writers before the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), Du Fu served as an official, and his devotion in his verse to the welfare of the empire made him the epitome of the poet as scholar-official. No topic represented in his poetry, whether history, landscape, or daily life, was removed from considerations of affairs of state or the needs of its subjects. Du Fu’s ability to bring what was considered a plain, often humorous, voice and a Confucian sense of mission to a form as ornate as regulated verse fulfilled fundamental criteria for evaluating poetry that had been articulated in previous centuries in major studies of the art, such as the *Shi pin* (Evaluation of Poetry) by Zhong Rong (469?–518) and *Wenxin diaolong* (Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons) by Liu Xie (b. 465).

Yet, in Du Fu’s own time the most popular poet (although not admired by the Tang court) was a follower of Daoism, Li Bai (Li Bo, 701–762). In Li Bai’s poetry landscape offers a release from historically defined duty and an inspiration to envision a realm of Daoist deities and resources to unlock the alchemical secrets of immortality, invoking an intimacy between his wine-inebriated persona and the cosmos. Ultimately, the pairing of Du Fu with Li Bai as the two greatest poetic geniuses served the tradition of the cultural elite themselves as the keepers both of the Confucian society and the Daoist knowledge of cosmic existence. Nor did this tradition exclude appreciation of Buddhism as a layman, exemplified most famously in the poetry of a contemporary official, Wang Wei (701–761).
By the late ninth century central Asia again contributed to poetry through a new musical form for which the lyrics were known as *ci* (song lyrics). Composed for entertainment, often by professional women entertainers, each tune required a different form, and each lyric was known by the title of the tune for which it was written. Although women as professional entertainers had composed *shi* poetry, such as the gifted public relations courtesan of a governor of Sichuan Province, Xue Tao (770–830), the newer *ci* form was initially regarded as outside the range of writing by which men of the cultural elite were evaluated as scholar-officials. The ability of Li Qingzhao (1083–1149?) to evoke the pleasures of her youthful life with her husband, then the sadness of widowhood and aging, as well as to theorize about poetry, made her the most famous woman poet in Chinese history. But men writing in the *ci* form to express emotion—the sadness of Li Yü (937–978) over the loss of his kingdom, for example, and the exquisitely sympathetic observations of courtesans by Qin Guan (1049–1100)—were not listed among the greatest male poets, despite their talent. This divide, one of formal and gender and social conventions, was broken by Su Dongpo (Su Shi, 1037–1101) when he began writing and distributing *ci* poetry on occasions and on topics that called for *shi* verse. Moreover, his *shi* poems both acknowledged and broke free of the models established by the Tang poets. His innovations inspired generations of writers since, among them Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong, who in the twentieth century used the *ci* form for some of his most famous poems on revolution and conquest.

By the thirteenth century musical inspiration for verse was shifting again, this time to a form known as *qu*, similar to *ci* but written in sets of new tunes for the growing genre of music theater. Thus, although volumes of single verses in *qu* form were published, the most famous authors were the playwrights of the thirteenth-century music theater.

**Oral and Performing Literature**

Music theater, or forms of opera, developed into the most ambitious genre of performing literature, the earliest written examples of which are the *chantefable* (French for "song-story") of Buddhist proselytizers in the tenth century known in Chinese as *bianwen* (transformation texts). These popular tales were written down in the vernacular in which they were recited and sung, providing a major early example of spoken language at a time when writing remained dominated by classical and literary styles commonly used among the cultural elite. By the twelfth century performance had also developed into music theater in varying forms. After the consolidation of the Mongol Yuan dynasty the northern *zaju* (variety act) opera dominated, offering vernacular dialogue interspersed with songs in the *qu* verse form according to prescribed suites. The centerpiece is *Xi xiang ji* (Western Chamber) by Wang Shifu, a romantic comedy of illicit love between a poor, young scholar and the daughter of the widow of a powerful official. The most prolific and revered playwright, Guan Hanqing, is best known for his operas of common people struggling against injustice, epitomized by crime and court case melodramas, such as *Dou E yuan* (Injustice to Dou E), in which an innocent woman allows
herself to be executed for a crime in order to spare her mother-in-law, also wrongly accused.

The growing interest in and patronage of opera among ruling families and officials eventually brought greater status to playwrights, especially after a southern form of opera, eventually known as chuanqi (romance), developed a new musical form in an expanded and more elaborate drama. In 1367, as the Yuan dynasty was falling to the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), a retired official, Gao Ming, completed a southern opera entitled Pipa ji (Lute); it remains one of China’s most enduring opera stories. The plot involves a young man, Cai Bojie, who must leave his wife Wuniang and his parents to take his civil service examination in the capital; after placing first in the exams he is implored to stay and marry the daughter of a high-ranking official. Wuniang, enduring hardship, takes care of Cai’s parents throughout a period of famine (some trickery and deception keeps Cai unaware of their plight). When the parents die Wuniang goes to the capital to be reunited with her husband, taking her lute to earn some money along the way. The Ming court viewed the dilemma of the male protagonist—whether to obey his emperor or serve his parents—with enthusiasm, thus promoting the high status of opera among the cultural elite.

As a literary form opera reached its peak after musical revisions known as kunqu (Kun songs) in mid-sixteenth century; kunqu were often so lengthy that a complete performance could often take more than a single day. Tang Xianzu (b. 1550) is the acknowledged master of this era of opera. His Mudan ting (Peony Pavilion), about the power of passionate love first to take the life of a young girl through love sickness and then to restore her through the lover of her dreams, runs to fifty-five scenes. The vitality of kunqu as a literary form lasted through the seventeenth century, when Hong Sheng completed Chang sheng dian (Palace of Eternal Youth, 1688) about the ruinous but irresistible love of the Tang dynasty emperor Ming Huang for his consort, Yang Guifei. Also Kong Shangren, a descendent of Confucius, authored Taohua shan (Peach Blossom Fan, 1699) about the fall of the Ming dynasty. During the eighteenth century patronage of the theater increasingly turned to short performances of scenes abstracted and revised from the operas of previous centuries. Toward the end of the century Qing dynasty (1644–1912) royalty showed a preference for a newer form of music theater that came to be known as Jingju (Peking [Beijing] Opera). Featuring more ambitious movement in the acrobatics of stage combatants, Jingju turned decidedly toward performance art and away from literary ambition.

**Fiction**

The attention that oral and performing literature paid both to the drama of ordinary folk and to exciting historical figures provided a great impetus to the development of vernacular and semivernacular fiction from at least the fourteenth century, when the first novels are known to have appeared. While the short story (huaben) greatly expanded vivid accounts of ordinary people, culminating in the three collections (Sanyan) written by an official, Feng Menglong (1574–1646), the novel at first provided elaborate syntheses of sources on historically based legends already popular in theaters. The earliest of the widely read novels, Sanguo yanyi (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), attributed to Luo Guanzhong but later commonly read in an edition edited by Mao Zonggang in 1622–1623, gathers a wide range of sources on the heroes of warfare after the collapse of the Han dynasty. The historical genre exemplified by Three Kingdoms was followed by the inspiration of legend, as in the masterfully written but brutal novel of bandit life, Shuihu zhuan (Water Margin or Outlaws of the Marsh; earliest known edition 1540), and then by historical fantasy in Xiyou ji (Journey to the West; earliest extant edition 1592) by Wu Cheng’en, in which a monkey endowed with magical powers is made to accompany a monk, known in actual history, and his companions on a journey to central Asia in search of Buddhist texts.

In the early seventeenth century various editions of the novel Jin ping mei (Plum in the Golden Vase) were published, depicting the life of a wealthy, corrupt pharmacist and his wives and concubines. Although it is most famous for its pornographic passages (excised from all twentieth-century editions), it would inspire later novels of domestic life. Thus, the relationship of one young boy with his sisters, female cousins, and maid servants in the extended household of an aristocratic family provides the main narrative in the most famous novel, known alternately as Shitou ji (Story of the Stone) and Hong lou
meng (Dream of the Red Chamber or Dream of Red Mansions), attributed to Cao Xueqin but believed to have been revised after his death for its published editions in 1791 and 1792.

Twentieth-Century Literature

The variety of novels increased throughout the nineteenth century, and novels increased in numbers after 1900 as Confucian culture waned and the cultural elite began to shift toward responding to Western cultures. In 1917 scholars educated overseas rebelled entirely against the cultural leadership of older generations, first in an essay by Hu Shi (1891–1962) that advocated eliminating the use of classical Chinese and then in a vernacular short story by Lu Xun (Zhou Shuren, 1881–1936), "Kuangren riji" (Madman’s Diary, 1918), which condemned Confucian moral vision after the manner of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity in Europe. Although the tradition of Chinese poetry maintained some status, Chinese writers turned largely to writing fiction for newspapers and magazines following Western models. A series of partially autobiographical novels by young writers struggling with modernity in the 1920s culminated in Jia (Family, 1931–1932) by the anarchist Ba Jin (1904–2005). The first playwright to write full-length spoken dramas that were successful with audiences, Cao Yu (Wan Jiabao, 1910–1996), also focused on family conflicts. During the 1930s novels dealt increasingly with political issues. Mao Dun (Shen Yanbing, 1896–1981) promoted the growing Marxist vision of the collapse of capitalism during the Great Depression in Ziye (Midnight, 1933); the plight of the poor was explored in Luotuo Xiangzi (Camel Lucky Boy or Rickshaw, 1937) by Lao She (Shu Qingchun, 1898–1966). The period of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China primarily as the Second Sino-Japanese War) produced important propaganda, most famously the Communist innovative opera depicting a peasant girl exploited by a landlord, Bai mao nü (White-Haired Girl, 1945), but also some of the most admired fiction of life among the educated elite of the occupied city of Shanghai, including the short stories of Zhang Ailing (Eileen Chang, 1920–1995) in Chuanqi (Romances) and the novel Wei cheng (Fortress Besieged, 1945) by Qian Zhongshu (1910–1998), whose wife, Yang Jiang (b. 1911), wrote popular spoken dramas.

After 1949 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China, writers under both the Kuomintang (Guomindang, Chinese Nationalist Party) on Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland pursued themes of their civil war. During the 1960s university students in Taiwan began to turn to modernist fiction, best known through the short stories of Bai Xianyong (b. 1937), Taibeiren (People of Taipei, 1971), and the novels of Wang Wenxing (b. 1939), Jia bian (Family Catastrophe, 1973) and Beihai de ren (Backed against the Sea, 1981). A politically dissident literature followed in the 1970s, then a large, diverse movement in the 1980s and 1990s to restore dominance in literature to the subethnic populations historically inhabiting the island, then feminist literature before the turn of the century.

Movements such as those on Taiwan remained distinctly minor trends or were completely suppressed on the mainland. Until the late 1970s, after the end of Maoist leadership, literature largely followed concepts developed in the Soviet Union in support of agricultural collectivization, representing the history of the revolution and providing models of good workers, peasants, and soldiers. Ding Ling (Jiang Bingzhi, 1904–1986), a widowed veteran of the revolutionary movements, produced the most noted novels of this period, Taiyang zhao zai Sangganhe shang (Sun Shines on the Sanggan River, 1948), about the challenges of land reform. The shift in cultural policy from such prescriptions to a prescriptive censorship in the late 1970s led to a wide range of creativity, from the modernist verse by poets such as Bei Dao (Zhao Zhenkai, b. 1949) to fiction featuring satire by Wang Shuo (b. 1958), social criticism and alternative history by Mo Yan (b. 1956), a major new emphasis on female subjectivity by Wang Anyi (b. 1954) and other women writers, and views inspired by ethnic minority cultures, such as the novels of Tibetan culture by Alai (b. 1959). Visionary literature of a collective unconscious appeared in Ling shan (Soul Mountain, 1990) by a modernist writer living in France, Gao Xingjian (b. 1940), who in 2000 was awarded the first Nobel Prize for Literature given to a Chinese writer.

Edward M. GUNN
Further Reading


Trees have already been made into a boat.

木已成舟

Mù yǐ chéng zhōu
Known in the West as “The Little Red Book,” *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* 毛泽东语录 is a thirty-three-chapter collection of 427 quotes from Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong. It was a linchpin in the early stages of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), representing the essence of Mao’s ideas, officially known as “Mao Zedong Thought.”

Hundreds of millions of copies and numerous versions of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* were printed and were almost ubiquitous in China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), to use the era’s official name. Students, soldiers, workers, and peasants read from and discussed the book—its thirty-three chapters brimming with 427 of Mao’s quotations—at frequent study meetings where they could share their ideas about how to apply Mao’s teachings to daily life. Such groups allowed even the illiterate access to Mao’s thought and writings.

The Little Red Book was originally printed, distributed, and studied within the People’s Liberation Army in 1964 under Defense Minister Lin Biao, Mao’s strongest ally during the early period of the Cultural Revolution. Its purpose was to provide a shortcut to understanding the works of Mao, thus helping China to avoid the errors that had undermined socialism in the Soviet Union, errors that were seen as severely influencing the very nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. As Lin Biao’s star rose, the cult of Mao, including not only The Little Red Book but also much more, spread throughout China. Lin was later rightly accused of encouraging the cult for his own purposes. Although in 1970 Mao criticized the cult as excessive, he, too, saw it as useful. During this period the book, most frequently with an opening inscription in Lin Biao’s handwriting, became both an icon to be waved and a beacon of correctness to be applied in daily life.

*Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* highlights Maoist concepts, including the necessity of the leadership of the Communist Party, the importance and duration of class struggle, why U.S. imperialism was a paper tiger, the need to ceaselessly and selflessly struggle to overcome all obstacles to serve the needs of the people, towing the mass line (that is, taking the unsystematic ideas of the masses, having the Communist Party make them into systematic policies that are then returned to and carried out by the masses), and his attitudes toward self-reliance, equality (but not feminism) for women, criticism, and self-criticism.

Mao Zedong Thought, the CCP’s name for Mao’s ideas, has been criticized primarily for overemphasizing class struggle, particularly for not having clear definitions of the classes and ignoring objective factors in favor of the ability of human will to overcome all obstacles. But the Little Red Book had additional flaws. It resulted from and perpetuated a view that complex problems can be solved with simplistic answers. While Mao’s Thought
did provide an underlying unity throughout China, this simplification allowed conflicting groups to use different quotes to support different positions, a practice known as “waving the Red Flag to fight the Red Flag.”

After Lin died in 1971, discredited by allegations that he led a coup attempt against Mao, the Little Red Book began to be downplayed. After the 1981 party verdict that pronounced the Cultural Revolution to have been an error, the book faded into obscurity. Subsequently it was commoditized into Cultural Revolution memorabilia. Today originals and reproductions in various languages are available for sale in gift shops around Beijing and elsewhere.

Richard LEVY

Further Reading
LIU Gongquan

Liu Gongquan was a calligrapher of China’s Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). He was also a professor and tutor of the Hanlin Academy for three emperors.

Born during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), Liu Gongquan, also known as Liu Chengxuan, was from a family of intellectuals in Yao County in Shaanxi Province. His grandfather and elder brother Liu Gongcuo were well-known writers and calligraphers. Although Liu was talented in poetry and calligraphy, he did not achieve his scholar (jinshi) degree until he was about thirty. Well versed in the Confucian classics, he was given a post as a recorder of civil matters in the country. For most of Liu’s career he served as a professor and tutor of the Hanlin Academy for three emperors: Muzong (reigned 821–824 CE), Jingzong (reigned 825–825 CE), and Wenzong (reigned 826–840 CE). It was not an ideal job for an ambitious man, but Liu accepted his place with ease. Because all three emperors were also lovers of calligraphy, Liu had a friendly relationship with them and was known to criticize the emperors for their misdeeds.

When he was young, Liu surprised others with his talents in poetry, especially couplets, and music. During the reign of Wenzong, Liu was known to compose a poem in three steps, twice as fast as Caozhi (192–232 CE), who finished a poem in seven steps. Once when Emperor Wenzong (reigned 841–846 CE) was angry with a palace maid, he was pacified when Liu presented him with a poem written in Liu’s beautiful calligraphy. Not only was the maid forgiven, but also Liu was also rewarded with two rolls of colorful brocade.

In calligraphy critics rank Liu Gongquan with another Tang master, Yan Zhenqing (709–785 CE). Both artists were best in the standard (kai) script, with Yan’s brushstrokes described as “fleshy and round,” whereas Liu’s were “boney and thin.” The works of the two are described as “Yan tendons and Liu bones.” Liu also shared with Yan another virtue: He spoke the truth in the face of power and danger. To the Emperor Muzong, who was a puppet ruler manipulated by powerful factions in court, Liu used a metaphor to give advice. When asked the way to handle a brush, Liu responded: “When the heart is straight, so will [be] the brush.” Muzong understood and was touched.

Although Liu was adept in all three scripts of calligraphy—the standard (kai), the running (xing), and the cursive (cao)—his best can be found in the first. His standard script combined the styles of Chung Yu (151–230 CE), Wang Xizhi (303–379 CE), Ouyang Sun (557–641 CE), and Yan Zhenqing (709–785 CE). “The Army of Divine Strategy’s Record of Imperial Virtue Stele” of 843 and “Stele for the Xuanmi Pagoda” of 841 are handed down to posterity via ink rubbings. Liu’s standard script was so valued in his time that an official would lose face if he could not obtain Liu’s writings in his late parents’ epitaph. Foreigners traveled to the Tang capital of Chang’an (Xi’an) to ask for Liu’s writings, which brought him great fortune. Liu spent

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his time collecting books, calligraphy, inkstones, and brushes. As a calligrapher, Liu was particular about brushes, the best of which were made of slender bamboo for easy handling and bristles of long goat hair for ink absorption.

Because Liu was not ambitious and did not join political factions in court, he was exempted from political upheavals. Leading a life of art and leisure, Liu was probably the longest-living calligrapher in Chinese history when he died at the age of eighty-eight.

Fatima WU

Further Reading


Liu Shaoqi was a leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) whose career symbolized the political struggles in the People’s Republic of China during Mao Zedong’s era. Although it was once thought Liu would be Mao’s successor he was accused in 1966, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, of siding with capitalists. He was physically abused by the Red Guard, expelled from the CCP, and died in prison.

In 1956 he boldly proposed to reform China’s economy, a proposal that eventually cost him his life. Liu, with Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), general secretary of the CCP, insisted that China’s socialism should focus on increasing the productivity and development of China’s economy. Liu increased his power in the CCP in 1959 when he replaced Mao Zedong as chairman of the PRC. However, Mao retained chairmanship of the CCP and was in charge of the daily work of the PRC and CCP before the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Liu Shaoqi supported Mao’s plans during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960). However, Liu began to clash with Mao in 1960 over economic policy. In 1961, Liu made a forty-four-day trip to his hometown, in Hunan Province, in order to determine how much the Great Leap Forward damaged the Chinese economy. It had been forty years since Liu left his hometown; it would also be his last visit to his birthplace before he died. During his tour of Hunan Liu determined that the damage to the Chinese economy was 70 percent due to human mistakes (meaning economic policy) and 30 percent due to natural disaster. In 1962, Liu Shaoqi made the important speech at the seven-thousand-person congress in Beijing. His report did not please Mao. While Mao preferred rapid development based on the labor of the Chinese masses, Liu preferred a slower growth, placing economic reliance on a small nucleus of technical experts.

In 1966, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Liu was accused of “taking the capitalist road,” having committed “counterrevolutionary crimes,” and being “China’s Khrushchev.” Liu and his wife, Wang Guangmei (1921–2006), were arrested in 1968. In 1946...
Wang Guangmei, who had good education and spoke English well, had been a translator for U.S. secretary of state George Marshall (1880–1959), who mediated unsuccessful peace talks between the Communists and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang). Her intellectual performance eventually raised the ire of Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing (1914–1991), during the Cultural Revolution.

Liu Shaoqi was physically abused by the Red Guards (students who admired Mao during the Cultural Revolution), expelled from the CCP in 1968, and died in Kaifeng in 1969. Red Guards discovered him lying dead on the floor of his prison cell, apparently the victim of medical neglect; his family was not informed for three years after he died (and the rest of the Chinese people were not notified for another ten years).

The CCP rehabilitated Liu’s name in 1980 but only after fourteen years of humiliating damage to his reputation. According to Wang Guangmei’s recollection, Liu Shaoqi had said, “If this (Cultural Revolution) is continuing, our nation will be destroyed. This is not a part of Marx-Leninism. I need to write a letter to Mao Zedong” (cited in Wang 2000). Even though Liu’s life was at risk during the chaotic period, he worried about China’s future, not his own. When Deng Xiaoping delivered the eulogy at Liu’s funeral on 17 May 1980, Deng never mentioned any responsibility or mistakes by Mao Zedong, who had allowed the Gang of Four to abuse Liu’s human rights. Today Liu Shaoqi has a museum in his memory, which also commemorates the former Chinese first lady, Wang Guangmei, in Hunan Province.

Further Reading


Champion hurdler Liu Xiang was the first Chinese man to earn a gold medal in an Olympics track event, winning the 100-meter hurdles at the 2004 Summer Games. The achievement earned him national popularity and global sponsorship, and made him the embodiment of China’s dreams for the 2008 Olympics, until a hamstring injury forced him to pull out of competition.

Liu Xiang was the first Chinese man to win a gold medal in track at the Olympics, completing the 110-meter hurdles at the 2004 Summer Games in Athens in 12.91 seconds to match what was then the world record in the event. Already known to insiders and followers of the sport for his accomplishments as a youth champion, he became an immediate public sensation in China, where media hailed his victory as a repudiation of China’s “sick man of Asia” legacy and an assertion that “yellow men can run.” His dramatic win also translated to instantaneous marketability, bringing endorsement deals with Visa, Coca-Cola, Nike, China Mobile, and other companies that have made him one of China’s wealthiest athletes, second only to basketball player Yao Ming. His celebrity also generated outsized expectations for his performance at the 2008 Beijing Olympics—dreams of another gold that were dashed dramatically when a hamstring injury forced Liu to abandon competition three steps into his opening heat for his signature event.

A Shanghai native who began training as a high jumper at age twelve and switched to hurdles at fifteen, Liu Xiang already was a junior record holder in several events and had won gold in the 110-meter hurdles at the World Student Games in Beijing and the East Asian Games in Osaka in 2001, and at the Asian Championships in Manila and the Asian Games in Pusan, South Korea, in 2002. A confident and stylish performer, Liu expressed astonishment at his winning time in Athens because even in training he’d never finished the event in under 13 seconds. He then went on to break the world record, set thirteen years earlier by Welshman Colin Jackson, with a time of 12.88 seconds at a July 2006 competition in Lausanne, Switzerland—just two days shy of his twenty-third birthday.

Liu Xiang has long emulated 1996 Olympian and four-time world champion Allen Johnson of the United States, whom he bested for the first time a few months before the Athens Olympics. Liu and Johnson continue to vie in the 110 meters, with Liu beating Johnson at the hallowed Prefontaine Classic in Eugene, Oregon, in May 2006, and Johnson beating Liu at the track World Cup in Athens in September 2006. Overall, Liu had a stellar year in 2006, culminating in a gold medal at the Asian Games in Qatar in December. In the first half of 2007 he won five of six international contests. Liu prides himself on having trained entirely in China and has a close working relationship with the coach, Sun Haiping, who first recognized Liu’s hurdling potential—the two share an apartment at their Shanghai training center. Liu also
has a reputation for independence, carving his own way through the Chinese sports system and resisting conventions of overtraining. He is known to enjoy karaoke, and his hip youthfulness and sense of fun have played well with corporate sponsors. One TV ad for Visa showed him racing kangaroos. In a deal with Amway, reportedly worth $1.25 million, he represents Nutrilite, a leading global brand of vitamins, minerals, and dietary supplements. *Forbes* magazine’s 2007 list of Chinese celebrity rankings put Liu Xiang second in terms of “social influence” after Yao Ming and fourth in income; his yearly earnings were estimated at $2.5 million.

Liu Xiang briefly came under criticism for signing on as a celebrity spokesman for a Chinese tobacco giant, Baisha Corporation, and Chinese sports authorities gave notice that Olympic athletes might have to refrain from commercial endorsements in the period leading up to the 2008 Beijing Games. But the threat never materialized. After Liu’s withdrawal several of his main sponsors—including Coca-Cola, Nike, and Visa—reaffirmed that he would remain an important advertising icon, although anticipated appearances in post-Olympic celebratory ads were dropped. Meanwhile his athletic attainments continued to generate privileges, including unusual academic status: Nominally a college student when he won gold in Athens, he subsequently was admitted to a doctoral program in sports studies at East China Normal University, evidence of what the *Shanghai Daily* called “a typical Chinese style, cross-field meritocracy” (Longman, 2008).

In December 2008 Liu underwent surgery on his right Achilles’ tendon in Houston. A widely watched Coke commercial on television, featuring Liu and his father, helped kick off the Year of the Ox in January 2009.

**Judy POLUMBAUM**

**Further Reading**


The Long March

Chángzhēng 长征

The Long March of 1934–1935, one of the seminal events of the twentieth century, had far-reaching implications not only for China but also for the rest of the world. Its most significant outcome, aside from fostering a Chinese Communist Party independent of the Soviet Union, was the rise of Mao Zedong as the party’s primary leader and theorist.

The 9,600 kilometer (6,000-mile) journey of retreat of the Chinese Communists in 1934 and 1935 has been glorified in party lore as the Long March. During the Nationalist-Communist Civil War, Communist forces marched from southeast to northwest China, across Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Shaanxi, to establish the Communist revolutionary base in an area beyond the control of the Nationalist troops under Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), leader of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party). Historians consider the Long March a landmark in the history of modern China. This was the time when the Chinese Communist movement started to forge its own destiny, independent of the Bolsheviks and other foreign revolutionaries. And this was the time that Mao Zedong (1893–1976) became the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The Jiangxi Soviet

The CCP was founded in the early 1920s. In 1924 the Guomindang agreed to form a united front with the CCP in return for Soviet aid. But in 1927, after successfully subduing warlords in the north, the Guomindang launched a bloody purge against all Communists in areas under the Guomindang’s control. Communist cadres were forced underground. In the early 1930s, the Communists had about fifteen bases in rural south-central China, but the purge had shattered their links with the central committee in Shanghai. The CCP, then led by a group of Moscow-trained Chinese students known as the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks, depended heavily on support from the Soviet Union. In 1931 the central committee moved its headquarters from Shanghai to Jiangxi Province in northern China and declared the local government a soviet (an elected government council of the CCP). Mao’s ideology came to influence the Jiangxi Soviet, which was originally dominated by the Moscow-trained leaders, many of whom were defenders of the Soviet Union’s concept of revolution by urban workers. Mao believed that the revolution in China could be won with the help of the peasants, who made up the bulk of the population. Under the military threat of the Nationalists, the Chinese Communists ignored their Soviet advisers and forged their own tactics. Mao and his followers gained the support of the peasants by expropriating and redistributing land in the soviet region.
Between 1930 and 1934, the Nationalists launched a series of military campaigns against the Communists in an attempt to wipe out their bases. Using guerrilla warfare tactics developed by Mao, the Communists held off four campaigns. In October 1933, the Nationalists launched a fifth campaign. With guidance from German advisers, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized some 700,000 men who built a series of cement blockhouses around the Communist camps to barricade the soviet areas in Jiangxi. About a million people died because of the ensuing economic blockade and later military actions. The Communists switched tactics from guerilla warfare to positional warfare, the strategy of defending military bases. But against the better-armed Nationalist forces, the Communists suffered severe losses. By mid-1934, the Red Army, the name of the Communists forces at that time, was defeated and in retreat. Also in 1934, the Communist central committee removed Mao from CCP leadership.

Retreat

On 15 October 1934, 86,000 Communist military personnel, along with 30,000 party officials and civilian party members, broke through the blockade and fled westward. At first, there was confusion over the direction and leadership of the retreat. Eventually, Zhu De (1886–1976) and Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) assumed leadership, and Mao’s guerilla tactics were again employed. Along the way the Communists were frequently bombarded and attacked by the Nationalist forces and suffered great losses. The demoralized Communists reached Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in early 1935. While there, Mao gathered support from his followers and defeated the Soviet-trained faction in a session of the CCP Politburo, which, by chance, lacked a quorum. Mao became the actual leader of the Communist Chinese Party, a party now under complete Chinese control.

The Long March continued as the Communists proceeded toward Shaanxi. Mao’s Jiangxi contingent was later joined by the Second Front Army headed by He Long (1896–1969) from its base in Hunan, and the Fourth Front Army under Zhang Guodao (1897–1979) from its base in the Sichuan-Shaanxi border area. Following a power struggle between Mao and Zhang, Zhang moved his group toward southwestern China. Mao marched his troops toward northern Shaanxi, northwest China, where Gao Gang (1902–1955) had established a Communist base. Most of the route was mountainous, with few motor roads and resources. To maintain marching speed along the route, the Communists discarded their heavy equipment and even food and medicines.

Over the yearlong, 9,600 kilometer march, the Communist troops crossed eighteen mountain ranges and...
twenty-four rivers, averaging about twenty-seven kilometers (seventeen miles) a day. When the Long March started from Jiangxi, there were about 100,000 followers. Many new recruits joined along the way, but some left to mobilize the peasantry, some died on the way, and others simply abandoned the endeavor. By the time the march reached Zunyi in January 1935, 50 percent to 80 percent who had started out were lost. When these survivors finally reached Shaanxi in October 1935, only the leaders and a small number of the troops remained.

In mid-1936, the remnants of several Red armies gathered in northern Shaanxi and set up their headquarters in Yenan. By December the Red Army had grown to 30,000 men. The army, now secure and defended in the mountains and difficult terrain of Shaanxi, regrouped and planned its strategy against the Nationalists.

A Lasting Legacy

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Long March was the ascendancy of Mao as paramount theorist and leader of the CCP. During this time Mao began to develop his unique version of Communist theory, which included a dramatic changes in party-mobilization policies. His views overrode the Soviet orthodoxy of an urban-based revolution and became the CCP’s strategy of establishing itself in the countryside. The Communists had gained much support from peasants along the route of the march. From then on CCP doctrine decreed that imported Marxism was less important to China than China’s unique history, culture, and economy. Mao believed that the Chinese Revolution should be led by the huge rural population, not the small number of urban workers.

The Long March helped launch the careers of new and strong national political leaders. Most of the later prominent leaders of the CCP—including Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), Zhu De, and Lin Piao (1906–1971)—participated in the march. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, these Long March veterans became top-ranking political leaders.

The establishment of the CCP’s new base in northern Shaanxi in 1935 had significant implications for Nationalist-CCP relations and for the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War). The base was surrounded by desert on the west and the Huang (Yellow) River on the east. Although the topography and the lack of motor roads in the region made Shaanxi a defensible area, a local shortage of food and other resources made the new base vulnerable to Nationalists attack. But when the war with Japan broke out, the northwest became an important strategic base from which a war of resistance was organized. The Long March had inflamed Chinese nationalism and inspired Chinese troops in the face of advancing Japanese armies. Ultimately, and most important, the Long March helped to transform and consolidate the Chinese Communist Party’s strength and influence inside and outside China.

Stephanie Po-yin CHUNG

Further Reading

Longmen Grottoes
Lónmén Shíkū 龙门石窟

In 494 CE work began on the rock-cut cave temples at Longmen, located approximately 14 kilometers south of Luoyang 洛阳 on the Yi River 伊河. With more than 2,300 caves and 100,000 statues and reliefs carved over a 250-year period, Longmen holds some of the finest examples of large-scale Buddhist carvings in China.

In 494, when the Northern Wei (386–534 CE) capital was moved 482 kilometers south from Pingcheng (near modern-day Datong) to Luoyang, work began on the rock-cut cave temples at Longmen. The cliffs at Longmen reminded the Northern Wei rulers of the ridge at Yungang, just west of their former capital, where previously they had sponsored a program of cave-temple construction. However, the stone at Longmen—a hard, closely grained, and dense limestone—was quite different from the sandstone at Yungang and allowed for more detailed carving. With more than 2,300 caves and 100,000 statues and reliefs carved over a 250-year period, Longmen holds some of the finest examples of large-scale Buddhist carvings in China.

Longmen is located approximately 14 kilometers south of Luoyang on the Yi River. Cliffs line both sides of the river bank, giving rise to its full name, Yique Longmen (Dragon Gates of the Yi River). The majority of the cave-temples are found on the north side. Inscriptions at the site attest to the wide range of donors, including emperors and empresses, members of the aristocracy, imperial eunuchs, local officials, and monks and nuns. The largest statue is 17 meters in height.

Activity at Longmen began under Northern Wei ruler Xiaowen Di (reigned 471–499) and continued almost without interruption until Luoyang was sacked in 755 during the An Lushan Rebellion. The Guyang Cave, conceived in 493 when the emperor decided to move the capital, is the earliest cave, and it, along with the Binyang Cave (begun in 505 under Xuanwu Di, reigned 499–515), follows iconography that reflects the early sixth-century interest in the Lotus sutra (Fahua jing) as the main teaching text for this popular form of Buddhism.

The most impressive sculpture at the site is the group found at the Fengxian temple, also known as “Cave 19.” Commissioned by Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) emperor Gaozong (reigned 650–683), work was begun in 672 and completed in 675. The central image of Vairocana (the Great Illuminator or Supreme Buddha, one of the Five Great Transcendental or Wisdom Buddhas popular during the Tang dynasty) is 17 meters in height, including the 4.5-meter pedestal. Vairocana is flanked on each side by his disciples, Ananda and Kasyapa; a bodhisattva (deity) in each corner; and two guardian figures on each side wall. Wu Zetian (625–705), who would become China’s only female ruler, was a devout Buddhist and contributed a large sum of money to the construction of this temple. Some believe that the facial features of Vairocana were modeled after those of Wu. Originally a wooden canopy covered these figures but is no longer extant, and only the
square holes in the rock where the timbers would have been inserted remain.

The site has suffered from weathering, vandalism, and looting over the centuries, beginning with the violent anti-Buddhist persecution of 845 under Tang dynasty ruler Wuzong (reigned 840–846). The worst damage occurred in the 1920s and 1930s when the publication of photographs of the statuary attracted the attention of unscrupulous dealers and antiquities collectors worldwide. Even so, Longmen remains as one of the most spectacular examples of Buddhist stone sculpture in China, particularly of the Northern Wei and Tang dynasties, and was named a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2000.

Catherine PAGANI

Further Reading

Chinese tradition often attributes inventions to a legendary person, and Lu Ban, based on a real person named Gongshu Ban (who lived late sixth to early fifth century BCE), is regarded as the creator of many of the tools of carpentry, such as saws, squares, and planes.

China has a tradition of attributing an invention or a series of related inventions to a deified or legendary person. Lu Ban is therefore worshiped as the originator of many of the tools used in carpentry in the same way that Cang Ji is venerated as the author of Chinese characters and Cai Lun the creator of paper.

The real person behind the consecrated Lu Ban was said to be Gongshu Ban (507–442 BCE). Lu Ban was simply his nickname meaning “Ban from the state of Lu.” He was either a skilled artisan or emancipated slave from the state of Lu in the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BCE). The great Confucian Mencius (372–289 BCE) gave Gongshu Ban, or Lu Ban, credit for inventing the first quchi (carpenter’s square). Many historical records claim that Lu Ban was also behind the invention of such tools and devices as the bao (plane), modou (ink marker), chi (ruler), ju (saw), zian (drill), shuan (bolt), xie (peg), chan (shovel), san (umbrella), lulu (windlass, a machine for hoisting and hauling), and shimo (millstone). These records include Gushi kao (Examination of Ancient History) by Qiao Zhou (201–270), Shiwu ganzhu (Of All Things) by Huang Yizheng (around 1601), and Wuyuan (Origin of Things) by Luo Qi of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644).

Some of the contraptions are even associated with Lu Ban’s family members, suggesting that they had a part in their creation. For example, the little hook attached to the tip of the line from an ink marker is called a banmu (Ban’s mother), and the little fixture on a bench that catches a piece of wood while it is planed is named bangqi (Ban’s wife).

Many tales have been told about Lu Ban and his inventions. A textbook classic tells that one day Lu Ban was assigned to build a large palace in a limited time. The only tools available at the time were axes, which were very inefficient when it came to felling trees and separating timber into lumber. He was told that if he and his fellow workers failed to meet the deadline, they would face serious punishment, which usually meant decapitation. Worried, Lu Ban went to the mountain to oversee the loggers. He grabbed what he could lay his hands on to clamber up when something cut his fingers. Ignoring the pain and bleeding, the curious Lu Ban studied the object that had hurt him. The discovery of a serrated leaf of grass gave him an idea: A metal blade with notches and sharp projections would cut into wood as fast as the teeth of the leaf cut into his hand. And it would speed up lumbering significantly. Hence the ju (saw) came into existence. But not all Chinese believe in this tale. The ethnic Yao in China ascribed the creation of the ju to Yayou, a deity working for the Yao’s mother goddess, Miluotuo.

Haiwang YUAN

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Deity of Artisans

The artisan deity Lu Ban, known also as Gongshu Pan or Kungshu Phan, is discussed by China scholar Joseph Needham in his seven-volume Science & Civilisation of China.

Just now we read Fu Hsuan’s reference to Kungshu Phan, the greatest of all the tutelary deities of artisans. In spite of the fact that much of what was handed down about him is clearly legend, there is no reason to doubt his real existence in the State of Lu (hence his other name, Lu Pan) in the 5th century, and we shall meet him from time to time in connection with kites and other devices. He lives in proverbs, for instance “brandishing one’s adze at the door of Lu Pan” (Lu Pan men chhien lung fu tzu), which is as much as to say, in our less elegant idiom, “teaching one’s grandmother to suck eggs.”

...Here is the place to mention a curious little work called the Lu Pan Ching (Lu Pan’s Manual), which circulated widely in the recent past among China’s craftsmen. As it seems not to have been studied by any sinologist, some descriptions of it may be appropriate. Its author or compiler, Ssucheng Wu-jung, and its editors, Chang Yen and chou Yen, are quite dateless, but much of its content is so archaic that one gains the impression of dealing with material some of which might well go back at least to the Sung. Anything so traditional will always be hard to date.

The book opens with a series of illustrations showing operations of constructional joinery, sawyers at work, and various kinds of houses, bridges and pavilions, partly built or completed… Then there follows, after a legendary biography of Kungshu Phan, a mass of detail about the cutting of timber in forests, the erection of pillars and the characteristic houses, furniture, the wheel barrow, the square-pallet chain pump, the piston bellows, the abacus and many other things. Precise specifications and dimensions are all interspersed with lore about lucky and unlucky days, samples of charms and appropriate sacrifices. As the book proceeds the magical element preponderates more and more over the technical, and thus at the end we find a “physiognomy” of buildings, directions for exorcistic and luck-bearing incantations, and descriptions of permanent protective cantrips. The whole work, therefore, which deserves serious study, constitutes a unique piece of traditional technology and folklore.


Further Reading


Zhongguo jian zhu yu wen hua shu xi. Beijing Shi: Hua wen chu ban she.


Lu Xun is the best known of modern Chinese writers both at home and abroad. A pioneer in the May Fourth Movement–inspired new literature of the early 1900s, he specialized in the short story, endowing this genre with new form and content. He also experimented with form, writing prose poetry and many volumes of satirical, combative essays known as zawen 杂文.

Born into a declining scholar-official family in Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, Lu Xun (his real name was Zhou Shuren 周树仁; he was the older brother of Zhou Zuoren, a leading essayist and social critic) received a traditional education before entering modern-style schools in Nanjing. In 1902 he was sent to study in Japan on a government scholarship. He studied medicine for two years before switching to literature because he felt that only literature could cure Chinese people’s “spiritual illness.” As a writer, he would wield his pen like a surgeon’s scalpel to dissect this illness so that a cure might be found. Most of his best-known stories were devoted to the exposure of what was wrong with the Chinese society and the Chinese national character. His other literary endeavors included a study of the history of Chinese fiction and translations of Russian, East European, and Japanese writers.

His Fiction: Exposing China’s Spiritual Illness

“Diary of a Madman” (“Kuangren riji” 狂人日记), the first story Lu Xun wrote in the vernacular language, borrows its title from the Russian writer Nikolai Gogol and records a madman’s delusion that people all want to eat him. Beneath this pseudo-medical case of persecution complex, the story is a devastating indictment of traditional China as a cannibalistic society and traditional Chinese culture as a man-eating culture. On every page of Chinese history the Madman sees the words “Confucian virtue and morality,” but in between the lines are
the words “eat people.” After the Madman is cured he no longer has this strange vision and becomes an official. The implication of this story is clear: It takes a madman to see the truth and have the courage to tell it. In saying what the sane people dare not say, the writer is also a madman. Lu Xun gives his story a double structure: The fragmented diary has a preface written in classical Chinese by an implied author. The conventional values voiced in the preface form an ironic contrast to the Madman’s insight. To counter this gloomy view of Chinese culture, the story ends with a plea to save the children.

Closely related to the theme of cannibalism is the story “Medicine” ("Yao" 药), in which an executed revolutionary’s blood is used as “medicine” to cure consumption. A blood-soaked bun becomes a symbol of the ignorance and cruelty of the Chinese masses. The revolutionary who sacrificed his life for his countrymen is jeered by them as another madman. The futility of his sacrifice is further revealed when the two bereaved mothers meet in a graveyard—one whose son had taken the “medicine,” the other whose son had provided the “medicine.” The death of the two young men (whose surnames Hua and Xia 夏 stand for an old name for China) indicates Lu Xun’s pessimistic view of the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary’s blood cannot cure his benighted countrymen. The story “My Old Home” (“Guxiang” 故乡), based on a trip that Lu Xun took to his hometown, raises the question of the barriers between intellectuals and peasants. The first-person narrator’s fond memory of the happy and idyllic time that he shared with his childhood playmate Runtu 潦土 forms a sharp contrast to the invisible wall that now separates them. Runtu addresses the narrator as “Master,” and the two old friends face each other in awkward silence. Unable to bridge the social divide between himself and his peasant other, the narrator pins his hope on the future. In a note similar to the Madman’s plea to save the children, he hopes the younger generation will have a new life.

The story “New Year’s Sacrifice” (“Zhufu” 祝福) also features an intellectual first-person narrator and a peasant protagonist. Whereas Runtu’s physical and moral deterioration could be attributed to his hard life as a peasant, the tragedy of the peasant woman Xianglin Sao 祥林嫂 in this story is caused by the ignorance and superstition of the Chinese peasantry. Having lost both of her husbands and her young son, she is regarded as a cursed woman by the villagers and her employer. Her ostracism is so complete that even the harrowing tale of her baby being eaten by a wolf fails to elicit any interest, let alone sympathy, from her audience after her story loses its sensational appeal. Her repeated attempts to verbalize this shocking event in her life make her a laughingstock in the village. In despair, she turns to the narrator for enlightenment on what happens after a person dies. His well-meaning but evasive response fails to ease her torment. The story ends on an ironic note: Xianglin Sao is found dead just as the villagers prepare to celebrate the New Year. The woman they tormented to death symbolically becomes the “sacrifice” they offer to the gods to secure good fortune. The ineffectual intellectuals and suffering peasants portrayed in these two stories represent the two major themes of modern Chinese literature. The use of the mediating first-person narrator in these two stories is also an innovation not found in traditional Chinese fiction.

“The True Story of Ah Q” ("Ah Q zhengzhuan” 阿Q正传) is Lu Xun’s major work of fiction. In this so-called official biography (zhengzhuan) he adopts a mock epic structure to depict the physical needs and misadventures of someone from the lowest stratum of the Chinese society. Ah Q, whose real name Lu Xun professes not to know, is the Chinese Everyman. His ignorance, his cowardice,
his habit of bullying the weak and cowering before the strong, and a long list of other character defects represent the negative traits in the Chinese national character. His self-delusion in turning humiliating defeats into “moral victories” has given rise to the expression “Ah Q spirit”—a spirit that has also infected the Chinese people. Furthermore, his inability to defend himself against the village bullies parallels China’s inability to defend itself against foreign countries. In making this character a symbol of national affliction and national shame, Lu Xun fulfills his mission of exposing Chinese people’s “spiritual illness.”

His Prose Poetry: Self-Examination

In his prose poetry collections Wild Grass (Yecao) Lu Xun turns his critical examination to himself. He once remarked that he dissected himself even more harshly than he dissected others. The twenty-three poems in this collection show more affinity with Western modernism than with classical Chinese poetry in their evocations of the subconscious. Some of the pieces are lyrical, others symbolic and allegorical, and together they reveal a surreal world of eerie dreams and frightening visions. He told his wife that these works expressed the “darkness” and “nothingness” that he felt. In exposing his inner torment to public view, Lu Xun was unique among modern Chinese poets. For him writing was a form of probing the self and society.

His Essays: Social Satire

Besides being a spiritual doctor to the Chinese people, Lu Xun was a cultural warrior. His zawen (critical and satirical essays) were his weapon against his critics and enemies from both the right and the left. Disillusioned by the repressive Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang 国民党) regime, Lu Xun in his later years increasingly leaned toward the Communist cause. He was elected to a leadership position in the League of Left-Wing Writers, but he never joined the Communist Party. As a writer, he could not surrender his independence to party doctrines. He believed that good literary works cannot be produced by orders; he was also aware that the League did not produce any good works. Despite his reservations about leftist literature and his falling out with the Communist cadres who ran the League, he was canonized by Mao Zedong as “a great writer, a great thinker and revolutionary” (quoted in Hsia 1971, 29). The proletarian revolutionary literature needed a standard bearer of Lu Xun’s stature. However, Lu Xun’s legacy should rest on his literary achievements, not on the use of him for political purposes.

Shiao-ling YU

Further Reading


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Lushan Conference
Lúshān Huìyì 庐山会议

The Lushan Conference (Plenum) was held in 1959 to discuss China’s Great Leap Forward, an effort to initiate projects to increase agricultural and industrial production. Although the Leap had some success, Mao Zedong’s policies were criticized, and the withdrawal of Soviet experts and natural disasters led to starvation and near economic paralysis. Despite this, the Leap is considered a catalyst for the Cultural Revolution.

The Lushan Conference refers to the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in Lushan (Jiangxi Province) in July–August 1959. The main topic of discussion was the Great Leap Forward, which refers to the first three years of China’s Second Five-Year Plan (1958–63). The Leap was an effort to rapidly modernize and industrialize China by relying on its vast population and human potential. This plan broke with past Soviet industrialization practices under Stalin and contributed to the break between China and the Soviet Union.

The Leap built on the prior three stages of collectivization of Chinese agriculture: mutual aid teams followed by low-level agricultural producers’ cooperatives, and then, in 1955, by high-level agricultural producers’ cooperatives with one hundred to three hundred families. The move to high-level cooperatives, though in many ways voluntary, also produced dissent within party leadership and resistance by many peasants. Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who was both Chairman of the CCP and President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), was among the strongest advocates of rapid, though voluntary, collectivization. Mao contended that the collectivization of agriculture not only could precede the mechanization of agriculture, but also would provide the conditions and resources necessary for the mechanization of agriculture.

The Leap had some success in creating structures for and initiating industrialization, water conservancy, irrigation projects and educational opportunities in the countryside. It created communes that united up to hundreds of high-level cooperatives and tens of thousands of people. The communes promoted collective labor, virtually egalitarian incomes within work units, as well as nurseries for children and canteens where people could eat their fill—in part to free up women for social labor. The Leap also mobilized millions of peasants to build backyard steel furnaces to produce steel for local needs. Additionally, by pressuring communes to outperform each other, the Leap attempted to increase significantly agricultural production, but overall the efforts described here never achieved their goals and to some degree had serious negative consequences.

As early as February–March 1959, many of the errors of the Leap were becoming apparent. In his speeches in early 1959, Mao supported the overall direction of the Leap while calling for moderation in many aspects, for example: not eliminating wage differentials or equalizing wages at this time; underreporting, rather than over reporting, production to allow some leeway in planning; maintaining ownership at the brigade rather than commune level.
thus pre-empting “leveling” between units; and allowing
more time for analysis before moving forward with
the Leap (Mao ... wansui [1967–69] 1974). But Mao was
subjected to significant criticism, and in April 1959 he re-
signed as president of the PRC, ceding the position to Liu
Shaoqi. Mao maintained his position as chairman of the
party until the position as president was abolished in 1968
with Liu’s disappearance during the Cultural Revolution.
In 1970, shortly prior to his death, Lin Biao advocated
resurrection of that position (for himself).

When the Lushan Plenum began in July 1959, the Leap
was at the head of the nation’s agenda. At the Plenum, Min-
ister of Defense and long-time Communist revolutionary
Peng Dehuai wrote a letter to Mao strongly criticizing the
Leap, Mao, and what Peng called “petit-bourgeois fanati-
cism” (Qui Jin 1999). Mao accepted many criticisms of the
Leap and criticized his own role in contributing to the
errors of the Leap, acknowledging his own responsibil-
ity for the unrealistic goal of producing 10.7 million tons
of steel (and the associated backyard steel furnaces) and
for propagating the communes. Yet he continued to argue
that the Leap was positive; he suggested moderating cer-
tain aspects—such as allowing the weak communes to
fail rather than maintaining them all (as leftists proposed)
or eliminating them all (as rightists proposed)—and en-
couraged more efficient planning. Mao called for others
to take responsibility for their roles in establishing the
goal for steel production, promoting the communes and
helping to undermine state planning. Perhaps more sig-
nificantly and somewhat contradictorily, Mao argued that
Peng’s criticisms were not just errors of judgment by a
comrade, but rather demonstrated that Peng was acting
as an enemy of socialism. But Mao gave no clear crite-
ria for what made these criticisms an attack on socialism.
The lack of criteria subsequently created significant prob-
lems in the Cultural Revolution in that much of the chaos
resulted from the fact that individuals were denounced
based on having “capitalist thoughts” or “opposing Mao”
despite the fact that Mao’s Thought had contradictory
elements and that no clear criteria of what constituted
socialist or communist were ever established.

As a result of Mao’s criticism following the Lushan
Conference, Peng Dehuai was removed from his position
as Defense Minister and replaced by Lin Biao (who be-
came Mao’s closest “comrade-in-arms” during the early
part of the Cultural Revolution until he died in 1971,”
ally fled after leading a coup attempt against
Mao). But many officials who agreed with Peng remained
in high-level positions within the party. In 1962, Liu Sha-
qo tried to reverse the dismissal of Peng, and Peng him-
self wrote an 80,000-character letter requesting a reversal
of the verdict. Several years later, Wu Han, a vice mayor
of Beijing, wrote a play entitled Hai Rui Dismissed from
Office, as an allegory to call for Peng’s reinstatement. The
critique of this play was one of the opening salvos of the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Peng was jailed
and mistreated in prison, dying without public acknowl-
dgment in November 1974. In 1978 the CCP reversed
the verdict on him.

Despite modifications to the Lushan Conference,
the Leap continued. Many communes exaggerated
their grain output to get recognition as outstanding
supporters of the Leap, the result of which was that the
state collected excessive grain as taxes, leaving inade-
quate amounts of food and seed. By late 1959 and early
1960, the situation in the countryside became quite
dire, which was exacerbated by other factors. The So-
viet Union broke relations with China and in July 1960
withdrew its technical experts, blueprints, and aid. This
was due in part because of disagreements over foreign
policy and in part because of significant differences over
the nature of socialism and communism. In addition,
drought and floods in many parts of China from 1959 to
1962 made the situation even worse. As a result, during
“The Three Bad Years” (1959–1962) it is estimated that
up to thirty million people died of starvation. Mao was
pushed to the sidelines and less radical policies, associ-
ated with President Liu Shaoqi and party general secre-
tary Deng Xiaoping, were implemented. These policies
helped to resuscitate China’s economy to a significant
degree; however, they also allowed increasing inequality
and corruption throughout China. In Mao’s eyes, these
policies increased the gap between the leaders and the
masses and began to sow the seeds of capitalism. This
perception was a key to Mao’s call in the mid 1960s for a
radical remaking of China’s communist revolution and
the overthrow of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others
as capitalist roaders in the party.

In many ways the Lushan Plenum set the stage for
the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s criticism of Peng was
a harbinger of his argument that class struggle contin-
ues under socialism. Although criticized by many as a

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deviation from Marxism and Leninism, the notions of the continuation of class struggle under socialism and the need for continuous revolution were key elements of the Cultural Revolution. The struggle for Peng Dehuai’s rehabilitation, the characterization of the Leap, and the subsequent period under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were integral to the Cultural Revolution.

Richard LEVY

Further Reading


MA Ying-jeou

Mǎ Yīnɡ jīǔ 马英九

b. 1950 President of Taiwan (2008– )

Elected president of Taiwan in 2008 after having served as mayor of Taipei, Ma Ying-jeou has become very popular, particularly with young people, for his stands against corruption and for working toward improving the international status of Taiwan as well as economic relations with mainland China.

During Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election campaign, Kuomintang (KMT) candidate—and eventual winner—Ma Ying-jeou was often dubbed “Taiwan’s Obama” by the Taiwanese media because of his ability to mesmerize youthful voters at campaign events. Like Barack Obama, he attended Harvard Law School. Ma, at 58, is young by Chinese political standards; he is tall, physically fit, and photogenic. He also has a reputation as a “clean” politician who had run a popular administration as the elected mayor of Taipei, Taiwan’s capital city. Ma stood out at a time when Taiwan’s national politics were clouded with near-daily accusations of corruption, known as “black gold” politics. Ma is the son of a prominent KMT official from Hunan province in China who had served under Chiang Kai-shek. Ma’s father followed Chiang to Taiwan. Ma himself was born in Hong Kong on 13 July 1950.

A bright student, Ma graduated from the prestigious National Taiwan University in 1972 and then came to the United States to study law, first at New York University, where he received a master of law degree, then at Harvard Law School under the tutelage of Jerome Cohen, the renowned scholar of Chinese law. Ma received his doctorate of juridical science degree from Harvard Law School in 1981. He speaks flawless English.


Because the old KMT had become very corrupt, Ma attempted a major reform as the party’s first elected chairman from 2005 to 2007, focusing on matters such as curtailting bribery. Then, after he decided to run for the presidency, he concentrated on formulating his own campaign. He was elected president by a landslide in March of 2008 for a four-year term ending in 2012. Ma won 54.5 percent of the vote, compared with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rival Frank Hsieh’s 41.6 percent, winning by more than 2.2 million votes. Under Taiwan’s constitution, Ma is permitted to run for a second four-year term should he choose to do so.

President Ma has stated three major policy goals: 1) to improve relations with both China and the United States, 2) to revive Taiwan’s sluggish economy, and 3) to improve Taiwan’s international standing. In respect to his first goal, Ma immediately sent his vice president—elect Vincent Siew to China and negotiated...
Ma Ying-jeou, the current president of Taiwan, is a member of the Kuomintang, Taiwan’s Nationalist party. He is often called “Taiwan’s Obama” by the Taiwanese media.

with Chinese president Hu Jintao at the Boao Forum for Asia held in Hainan, China, 11–13 April 2008. Former U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell, who also attended the Boao Forum, remarked that the Hu–Siew meeting was “very good news for the region,” and that “the two sides now have begun down a new path.” As for revitalizing the economy, Ma specifically stated that he wanted to increase economic ties with the mainland by opening Taiwan to direct tourism and encouraging investment across the Taiwan Strait. He also stressed that he wanted to avoid using war as an instrument of policy. Finally, he has sought to improve Taiwan’s international stature with China’s support rather than following his predecessor’s adversarial approach, which had antagonized China and had only resulted in fewer nations recognizing Taiwan’s government diplomatically. Ma personally received a special senior envoy from China, Chen Yun-lin, Chairman of China’s ARATS (Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait) on 6 November 2008, in Taiwan’s official guest house in Taipei amidst massive protests by DPP members.

Winberg CHAI

Further Reading
On 20 December 1999 the former Portuguese-administered territory of Macao (Aomen) reverted to Chinese rule. After Hong Kong, Macao became the second Special Administrative Region of China governed by a Basic Law or mini-constitution. The Macao Basic Law underwrites a high degree of autonomy but differs with its Hong Kong counterpart on details especially relating to local history and culture.
Importantly, Chapter 1 (5) of the Basic Law states that the “previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years” (Basic Law). Although maintaining a high degree of autonomy, the Macao SAR is short of being an independent jurisdiction, especially because Beijing retains control over foreign affairs and defense. Even so, Macao is party to a range of international conventions, organizations, and agreements under the “Macao, China” name with the concurrence of the central government.

Under the Basic Law Macao retains its Portuguese legal system and retains Portuguese as an official language alongside Chinese. The Macao SAR reserves independent judicial power with the right to final adjudication. Freedom of speech, habeas corpus (a writ inquiring into the legality of the restraint of a person who is imprisoned), freedom of conscience, and religious freedom are all upheld. The Basic Law underwrites the interests of people of Portuguese descent, a reference to the Macanese or Eurasian component of Macao society.

Certain economic practices in Macao are also secured, namely the maintenance of the pataca currency, along with free port status. Macao’s casino industry, the major prop of the local economy, is not specifically mentioned in the Basic Law, but Beijing has sanctioned the industry in separate discussions.

Although the presence of the People’s Liberation Army in Macao was not expected to be required, the presence was conceded by Portugal after an outburst of triad-based (Chinese underworld) violent crime, which—mysteriously—abated after the handover.

The Basic Law provides for a Legislative Council term of four years with powers to introduce bills and pass legislation. Currently the council has twelve elected members,

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_Evidence of Portuguese culture and style is still visible in many areas of Macao._

_PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN._
ten indirectly elected members, and seven appointed members. The method for forming the council can be changed with support from a two-thirds majority with the consent of the chief executive. In turn, the central government reserves the right to appoint or remove the chief executive, currently Edmund Ho Hau-Wah serving out his second five-year term.

Although the Basic Law is silent on the question of full democracy, it remains to be seen whether civil society support for a fully elected legislature will gain momentum as in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, Macao residents have actively canvassed for good governance, especially as the casino-driven economic economy has created income disparities. High-level corruption in Macao has also incurred the displeasure of the central government.

Geoffrey GUNN

Further Reading

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Macao—History

Àomén lishì 澳门历史

520,400 est. 2007 pop.

Macao, one of two special administrative districts in China, began as a Portuguese colony in 1557 and became the center of Sino-European trade. In 1999 Portugal returned Macao to China. Today Macao is one of the most densely populated places in the world and the only place in China where gambling is legal.

Regardless of the reason, the territory became an important base of operations for Portuguese merchants in East Asia. Reporting to authorities in Goa, India, the Portuguese governor in Macao oversaw a vibrant trade with the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and later the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), and his city was an important headquarters for the Jesuit missionary movement in East Asia.

Other European powers, especially the Dutch, were jealous of Portugal's position in Macao, and several times Macao had to defend itself from attacks by the Dutch East India Company. The colony did shelter the families of English and Dutch merchants who were involved in the China trade at Guangzhou (Canton) 100 kilometers to the north. Regulations there prohibited merchants from residing permanently in the city and family members from accompanying them on trading missions. In 1635, with the expulsion of all foreigners (except for a few Dutch traders) from Japan, Macao became the center of Sino-European trade until the end of the eighteenth century.

After the First Opium War (1839–1842) was fought and four new ports opened to foreign trade, Macao suffered a decline in its importance as a point of commerce on the China coast. However, the Portuguese remained in Macao, although much of the trade with the Qing dynasty moved to Shanghai and Hong Kong. In 1845 João Ferreira do Amaral, governor of Macao, ended the practice of paying the Chinese an annual rent of five hundred silver taels and evicted Chinese customs officials from Macao. In 1887 China and Portugal signed a treaty that recognized Portuguese sovereignty over the colony. Although Macao was now a foreign-controlled possession on the China coast, Macao’s importance continued to decline.

The territory of Macao (Macau or, as it is known in Chinese, Aomen) in southern China was a Portuguese colony for more than four centuries (1557–1999). The territory consists of a narrow peninsula in southern Guangdong Province and the islands of Taipa and Coloane. Its population, combined with the territory’s small area (23.5 square kilometers), makes it one of the most densely populated places in the world.

The Portuguese name Macao possibly was derived from either the Ma Kwok (Cantonese) temple that has stood in the city of Macao since the fourteenth century or the Cantonese term Ama-ngao (Bay of the Goddess A Ma, the patron of sailors and fishermen). The Portuguese settled Macao in 1557 and named the site "Provação do Nome de Deos na China" (Settlement in the Name of God in China). Scholars do not know why Chinese authorities let the Portuguese establish a colony. Possible explanations are that the territory was small and of little value and that the presence of the foreigners would encourage trade or that the Portuguese were being rewarded for their perceived assistance in driving away local pirates.
as Hong Kong’s grew. During World War II in Asia and the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945) Macao experienced a short revival as a safe haven because of Portuguese neutrality.

The governments of China and Portugal in 1987 concluded negotiations for the return of Macao to Chinese rule on 20 December 1999. Macao is governed by a Basic Law (miniconstitution), which underwrites a high degree of autonomy. Under the Basic Law Macao retains its Portuguese legal system and retains Portuguese as an official language alongside Chinese.

The return of Macao to the “motherland” was an important occasion for the leadership in Beijing and for many other Chinese. The return of the last of the foreign-controlled territories to Chinese rule—like the earlier return of Hong Kong by England in 1997—ended almost two centuries of unequal treaties that were a source of humiliation for many Chinese. The return also signified that a new, stronger China had at last come of age as an equal player on the world stage. China hopes that successes in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special Administrative Region under the “one country, two systems” banner will pave the way for the reunification of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

The Macao Special Administrative Region economy features trade, the local fishing industry, and some light manufacturing, but tourism and gambling predominate. Gambling is illegal elsewhere in China but permitted in Macao, where Chinese tourists represent 70–80 percent of Macao’s casino visitors. During the mid-1990s the colony was plagued by violence as Chinese criminal gangs, or triads, from Hong Kong moved into Macao before the return of Hong Kong. These gangs battled for control of the colony’s gambling establishments, drug trade, and prostitution. The Macao Special Administrative Region continues to be a popular holiday destination for residents of Hong Kong, and its economy is being more closely integrated with that of the neighboring Zhuhai Special Economic Zone.

Robert John PERRINS

Further Reading


China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
China’s machinery and equipment industry, now one of the world’s largest, has undergone many ups and downs since its beginnings in the 1860s. Several wars and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) caused downturns in production, while the onset of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward in 1958 caused a spike in production at the cost of quality. Today it is the second largest industry in the country.

China’s machinery and equipment industry has grown from three government-sponsored military factories established in the 1860s to become the second largest industry in the country. It generated profits of US$22.5 billion in 2004 on total output of US$395 billion, contributing 16.2 percent of the country’s industrial gains. Ranked fourth in the world, the machine-building industry is one of the main locomotives behind China’s impressive economic growth.

History of Development

By 1933, China’s machine industry included 226 machine-building factories, 63 plants for manufacturing electrical equipment, and 34 shipbuilding and locomotive repair plants, all of which accounted for 2 percent of China’s total industrial gross output. Japan, which occupied Manchuria and north China from 1931 to 1945, expanded the industry substantially to support its war effort. By 1940, the number of machine factories had more than tripled to 968.

Interest in mechanical engineering grew during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War). The China Mechanical Engineering Society was established, and engineers began experimenting with materials, internal combustion engines, and substitute fuels in the simple laboratories of the National Bureau of Industrial Research. In the interior areas under the control of China’s nationalist Guomindang government, private industrialists and the state combined efforts to build many machine factories. Unfortunately, only 77 remained in operation by 1947.

Production was disrupted in 1945 when the Soviet army occupied Manchuria and dismantled half the machine factories. From 1946 to 1949 civil war between the Guomindang and the Communists created further disruptions, and by the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the machinery industry accounted for only 2.7 percent of total gross industrial output, a minimal increase from 1933.

In its early development plans, the Communist government gave the machine-building industry high priority, acknowledging its importance for national defense and technological advancement. By 1952, pushed by the needs of the Korean War (1950–1953) and aided by Soviet technical assistance, the machine industry had recovered to its 1947 level. In its First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), the state allocated 2.6 percent of total investment in industrial capital (RMB16.9 million) to machine building. Imports
of machinery and transport equipment were encouraged. But the Western policies of isolating China limited it to importing technology from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In 1956, China ratified the Long-term Program for Science and Technology to encourage the development of precision machines, jet engines, and other high-performance equipment. The Ministry of Mechanical Industry established academies and institutes on its own and in partnership with universities. In 1958, the Soviet Union signed an agreement to aid China in major scientific research projects, including the design and manufacture of large-scale equipment, precision machines, and precision instruments. From 1950 to 1965, China sent more than 16,000 students to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for training.

The launch of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 led to a sharp rise in machinery production, but much of it was unusable because quality had been sacrificed in the frenzy to increase domestic output. By 1960, imports of machinery and transportation equipment reached a peak of US$840 million. Nevertheless, the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, coupled with the withdrawal of Soviet assistance after the breakdown of relations in the early 1960s, created a setback from which the industry took years to recover.

With Soviet ties severed and imports at a low of $100 million in 1965, China turned to advancing its science and technology on its own. Engineers focused on developing high-quality equipment and digesting the technology earlier imported from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But progress was slow. During the 1950s, the machinery industry had applied more energy to manufacturing products and equipment than to research and development. This meant that basic technologies and machining techniques remained backward.

Nevertheless, the machine industry continued to grow. The value of its output reached RMB¥9.7 billion in 1965, more than doubling its 1957 value of RMB¥3.5 billion. And in 1966, it contributed 12 percent of total gross industrial output. By the early 1970s, China was producing high-precision machine tools, large equipment such as 30,000-ton hydraulic presses, 300,000-kilowatt hydro-power generators, oil-refining equipment, and fertilizer production equipment.

The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought scientific research to a halt. Government agencies were paralyzed, universities and colleges were shut down, and many scientists and technicians suffered persecution. Imports of advanced technology stopped. But in 1972, with the PRC’s admission to the United Nations and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and a number of Western countries, technical imports from advanced capitalist economies began. In 1973, imports of machinery and transportation equipment from

Heavy machinery plant in Beijing. In the early days of the People’s Republic of China the Communist government gave the machine-building industry high priority. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen
noncommunist countries reached US$501 million, or 63 percent, surpassing for the first time those from Communist countries (US$296 million).

**Modern Development**

China's technical imports accelerated after economic reforms began in 1978. The industry had focused on the industrial and defense sectors in the past but now paid more attention to the agricultural and consumer goods sectors. Emphasis shifted from importing complete sets of equipment to importing single techniques, and from building new enterprises to updating existing ones. Advanced technologies were imported through joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises (legal since 1980), and cooperative enterprises. With the increase in advanced imports and joint ventures, China's mechanical products and technology improved. The industry acquired numerical-controlled machine tools and industrial robots. By the late 1980s, 85 percent of China's mechanical products were being produced domestically. By 1996, there were nearly 5,300 officially approved foreign-funded ventures, with a total direct investment of approximately US$5.5 billion.

The industry grew at an average annual rate of 16 percent from 1984 to 1989, and 24 percent from 1990 to 1995. Growth slowed to 10 percent in 1997 and again in 1999. But China's overall economy experienced phenomenal growth in the early twenty-first century. Real gross domestic product rose by 9.5 percent annually from 1990 to 2004. China's expanding industrial sector provided the fuel for much of that growth. And as manufacturing grows, so does the need for machinery. In 2007, the output of China's machinery industry grew by 32 percent to a record high of RMB¥1 trillion (US$146 billion), according to the China Machinery Industry Federation (CMIF). It was the fifth consecutive year that growth surpassed 20 percent. China had succeeded in transforming itself from a net machinery importer to a net exporter.

Considerable technological advancement has been accomplished through imports and indigenization. Advanced manufacturing methods have been widely adopted in areas such as casting, forging, welding, heat treatment, and surface protection, while microelectronic technology has been spreading along with the Computerized Integrated Manufacturing System.

A significant portion of China's growing share of world trade can be attributed to the machinery and equipment industry. In 2004, total imports for the country reached US$561.4 billion, and exports climbed to US$593.4 billion. The machinery sector accounted for 45 percent of this trade. Machinery imports rose 31 percent in 2004 and exports 42.9 percent, according to the Ministry of
Commerce. Overseas trade in machinery and transportation equipment surpassed all other sectors except manufactured goods.

**Strengthening and Innovation**

In 2003, the government recognized the need to reinvigorate China’s traditional industrial “rustbelt” of the northeast. The three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang produced China’s first steel, machine tools, locomotives, and planes after 1949. But many of the state-owned machine factories there became outdated and less competitive after China shifted away from a planned economy. The government responded in 2003 with a plan to open the aging state-owned industries to private investment. The importance of this move to the government could be seen in the proportion of investment. In 2004, US$486.2 billion was invested in the northeast area, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, a far larger sum than the US$182.8 billion spent in the central region or the US$166.1 billion that went to the west.

The importance of strengthening the industry was also reflected in the spending of two of the country’s top machine-tool manufacturers, both located in Liaoning province. Dalian Machine Tool Group invested US$65 million in an upgrade that is expected to bring annual sales of US$1.2 billion in 2010. Shenyang Machine Tool Company spent approximately US$67 million on a new production line and another US$107 million on upgrading its factory to generate sales of nearly $750 million. Moreover, both companies have moved operations into Germany, one of the world’s top machine-building countries, giving them access to highly sophisticated technologies.

Clearly, China is building a significant machine and equipment industry, with its top enterprises making inroads into European and U.S. markets. And the industry is striving for innovation. According to the CMIF, the industry has bolstered its innovative capacity in the agriculture, construction, and power sectors with the development of a number of domestically produced, high-end equipment, such as cranes. Research is also under way on an electricity transmission project that is expected to produce the highest voltage, longest transmission distance, and highest transmission capacity in the world. Creative breakthroughs are also being made in energy-saving pollution-reduction equipment, infrastructure equipment, and high-end digital-control machine tools, the CMIF reported.

Robert Y. ENG

**Further Reading**


In a country with a long history of printing, it is somewhat surprising that magazines in China have been around for only slightly more than a hundred years. The development of magazines was slow during most of the twentieth century. But since the 1980s, magazines, like other mass media in China, have been growing to meet people’s demands.

Newspapers have a long history and deep influence in China. Magazines, on the other hand, are a more recent medium. The publication and distribution of magazines—including consumer publications, trade periodicals, and academic journals—has progressed slowly since the late nineteenth century. Not until the late 1980s had China begun to develop what might be called a magazine industry to complement the overall growth of mass media in the country. Magazines—both print and electronic—written in Chinese languages and published in the People’s Republic of China for Chinese readers are more diverse and popular than ever.

First Titles

The first Chinese-language magazine, in the modern sense of the word, was launched on 15 August 1815 when British missionary William Milne (1785–1822) founded Chinese Monthly Magazine in Malac. The publication ran from 1815 to 1822 and focused mainly on missionary affairs and ethical issues. In Guangzhou in 1833, Karl Friedrich August Gutzlaff (1803–1851), a German missionary, published Eastern Western Monthly Magazine, considered the first Chinese-language magazine published inside China.

Attempts to create magazines by Chinese publishers began in the 1880s. Even then, publishing was a risky business. It was not until the late 1890s, during the so-called Hundred Days Reform—a failed attempt at political, cultural, and educational reform in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912)—that periodicals arose. One of the most influential periodicals of the time was the Contemporary News Journal (Shiwu Bao, 旬刊) founded in Shanghai. Liang Qichao was the chief editor. He is known for his 70,000-word article calling for reforms that ran in twenty-one consecutive issues of the magazine. In 1904 Oriental Magazine was launched by a commercial print company. A general-interest publication, Oriental Magazine had the longest run of any Chinese magazine before the creation of the People’s Republic of China.

Twentieth Century

Politics was the prime subject matter for periodicals in the first half of the twentieth century. The first magazine issued by the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party was Guidance Weekly, which came out in 1922, only one year after the formation of the party. In the 1930s and 1940s, such titles as the Liberation Weekly, Military and
Politics in No. 8 Route Army, China Youth, China Worker, and the Illustrated Journal in Jin-Cha-Ji Area appeared.

Several cultural journals also appeared during this period, including Life Magazine managed by Zou Taofen (1895–1944), a Chinese correspondent, political commentator, and publisher, and The Observer organized by Chu Anping (1909–1966?), a Chinese scholar, intellectual, and noted liberal journalist. Chu went on in the 1950s to edit the Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao), a newspaper still being published.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the publishing industry underwent an overhaul resulting in the creation of many new publications. By 1956 the number of known periodicals had reached 790, most covering political ideology and Chinese culture. Some of the most influential periodicals in the 1950s and early 1960s were the political news magazine Study, the popular mass media magazine China Youth, and the academic journal Philosophy Research.

Magazine publishing—along with many other political, cultural, and educational enterprises—came to a crashing halt during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In 1970 only about twenty-one magazines were still being published.

New Issues

The all-important Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978—a turning point in Chinese history that led to the opening of China—called for not only economic reform but also intellectual and educational reform. The search for truth to support Marxist ideology shifted from pragmatism, such as professors working on farms with the peasants, to a more modern scientific approach. These types of ideas helped the magazine industry to revive, retool, and remain strong up to the present.

By 1978 some 930 magazines were being published; by 1988, more than 6,000. The industry enjoyed a growth spurt in the early 2000s. By 2007 there were 9,468 magazines generating about 17 billion yuan ($2.5 billion) a year. Advertising sales in magazines have continued to grow as well. In 2007 revenues reached 3 billion yuan ($439 million).

Magazine Genres

The types of magazines in China, as in the United States, are quite diverse. And, as in the United States, the number of e-zines is on the rise and taking their place alongside traditional printed periodicals. The Chinese State Press and Publication Administration classifies magazines published in China into seven major categories although there are a number of subcategories as well. In American publishing these are known as consumer, or popular, magazines. Following are the major categories along with some representative titles: general interest (City Weekend), social science (Global Weekly), science and technology (Newton: Science Online), culture and education (EduBridge), art and literature (Sounds of Rain), children’s (Comics World), fashion (Rayli), and pictorial (People’s Photography). These consumer magazines are for the general public, with a few exceptions. They focus on information, entertainment, and readability, and usually include photos or illustrations and advertising. Their circulation is high and their price low.

In addition, China's magazine industry includes three categories of specialty publications. Vocational journals (known as trade publications in the United States), such as Electronic Products China, report on the latest markets, products, and business management practices for a specific industry or profession. Most of their revenue comes from ads and sponsorship. Their circulation and price are comparatively low. Academic journals, such as Progress in Natural Science, are mainly academic papers and research reports. They focus on certain fields and specific readers. They have a small circulation, higher price, and few, if any, ads. Even more specialized are digests and catalogues that offer concise and updated information, literature citations, abstracts, and indexes based on the editing of vast databases. Their subscribers are largely organizations, companies, and libraries. Compared with the other specialty publications, their circulation is small and their price high.

Industry Challenges

Having achieved some success, the magazine industry has become aware of the need for industrial development. The
industry faces a number of challenges if it wants to build and maintain readership.

Most domestic magazines still fail to operate under the principles of a market economy and have not established a modern enterprise system. Some magazines rely heavily on local administrative power, and their circulation is largely limited to the administrative system or grassroots units. Many are more or less institutional organizations without an entrepreneurial approach. They stay far away from the market, thus hindering the development of a competitive market mechanism and depriving themselves of economic returns.

In addition, there is a lack of authoritative statistics concerning circulation and advertising revenue and an inadequate system of archiving and record keeping. It is difficult for a new magazine to obtain serial numbers from regulators, which hinders its development. Furthermore, even though there may be a large number of magazines on the market, material is limited. Magazines of a similar genre cover the same content. And only a few magazines have risen above the others to influence thought, culture, or the market. Finally, a scarcity of knowledgeable publishers and business managers and talented editors and writers prevents the industry from achieving higher status.

Positive Prospects
But in response to the steady development of China’s economy and the rise of disposal income for the average Chinese citizen, the central government has attached great importance to cultural development and prosperity; thus periodicals—print and electronic—have a promising future. The government has established regulations for the periodical market in order to be fully prepared for international challenges. A government-sponsored program gives priority to those influential periodicals enjoying favorable sales and good reputation.

The market for magazines, and all other mass media, in China is expanding. The market is China’s growing numbers of readers and Internet users with time and money who are demanding more illuminating, meaningful, and personalized material from their mass media providers. If the magazine industry adopts a market-driven strategy, it is bound to prosper.

SHAO Peiren and Wendell ANDERSON

Further Reading
The phenomenon of magnetism was discovered in ancient China. That discovery led to development of the compass in China. By the eleventh century the compass was in use in navigation and would be a tremendous aid to ocean-going vessels.

The discovery of magnetism and the development of the compass were among the greatest Chinese contributions to physics. Although references to magnetism in Chinese sources do not date before the third century BCE, knowledge of the phenomenon clearly was widespread by that time, and experiments were being conducted and documented by the first century CE. Many early lodestone (the mineral magnetite possessing polarity) devices existed, such as the “south-pointing spoon” of the first century CE (which may have been invented a century earlier), and there exist several intriguing references to the use of magnets to make “automatic” chessboards.

However, magnetism seems to have been used mainly in geomancy (divination by means of figures or lines or geographic features) until the tenth century. Geomancy (feng shui) was concerned with configuring human dwellings to harmonize with spiritual forces that inhabit them.

Sculpture depicting an early Chinese invention: the magnetic compass. The spoon-shaped needle is also called a lodestone, made from ferrites (magnetic oxides).
Chess and Magnetism

This excerpt from Thai-Phing Yu Lan, ch. 988 is followed by a discussion by China scholar Joseph Needham explaining that very early uses of magnetism can be found in the game of chess.

Take the blood of a cock and mix it with iron (filings) from the grinding of needles, pounding it will lodestone powder. In the day-time, put the paste on the heads of chess-men (chhi) and let it dry in the sun. Then put them on the board and they will constantly bounce against and repel one another.

Several things are noteworthy in the above. Exactly how it was that the magnetized chess-men were “animated” is not clear; they may have been lodestone balls with iron underneath the board, or some of them may have been lodestone while others were iron. Powdered magnetite would have little attractive power. The connection with needles is interesting, and suggests that the demonstration of polarity using needles may really have been older than we thought. But in any case the important thing is the association of the magnet with the men or pieces used in divinatory proto-chess.


The fact that knowledge of the compass was reserved for imperial magicians greatly limited its spread, and for many centuries the compass apparently served only as a tool for divination. Even after the compass passed into more general use, the primacy of river and canal traffic slowed the spread of the compass to ocean-going vessels. Nevertheless, many improvements and adaptations occurred in the form of compasses, culminating in their use in navigation by the eleventh century.

Two of the most important developments in the evolution of the compass were the use of a needle rather than a lodestone or piece of metal and the discovery of magnetic declination (the deviation between true or geographic north and the direction that a compass needle points). The magnetization of needles was an important step in the evolution of the compass because needles could float or be suspended by a thread and rotate with a great degree of freedom. Also, steel remains magnetized longer than iron, and it was relatively easy at an early date for people to make small needles of steel; compasses with steel needles could be used on long voyages. Steel came to China from India during the fifth century, but the Chinese quickly began to produce their own supplies. Evidence suggests that magnetized needles were used as early as the fourth century CE, and their superiority in the construction of compasses was quickly appreciated.

The discovery of declination also occurred relatively early, sometime between the seventh and tenth centuries. Although the influence of nonscientific divinatory practices was clearly prominent in the development of the compass, much research went into magnetism from the fifth century on.

Paul FORAGE

Further Reading

Manchu

Manzú 满族

The Manchus are the second largest (after the Zhuang) of China’s fifty-five official ethnic minority groups, numbering around 10 million people (2000 estimate). They overthrew the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) to establish China’s last imperial era, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

The Manchus (or Man) are a minority people who ruled China as the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). They are concentrated in the northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjian, as well as Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Their estimated 2000 population totalled 10.68 million. The Manchus are descended from peoples of northeastern Asia collectively called the “Tungus.” The Manchus also claim descent from rulers of the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234).

The Manchu tribes in the late sixteenth century were organized into a collective nation under the rule of their greatest chief, Nurhaci (1559–1626). Nurhaci’s successor, Abahai (1592–1643), changed the name of his people to Manchu in order to remove the historical memory that as Jurchens they had been under Chinese rule. The Manchus continued to increase in military power in the border region northeast of the Great Wall and eventually overthrew the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) to establish China’s last imperial era, the Qing, or Manchu, dynasty. The Manchus remained an important symbolic people in China during the twentieth century, as was shown by their being named in 1912 as one of the five races that constituted the new Republican China (1912–1949).

The Manchu language is a member of the Tungusic branch of the Altaic language family and has some structural similarities to Japanese, Mongolian, and Korean. During the Jurchen Jin dynasty Jurchen official documents were transcribed using a modified form of the Khitan script. In 1599, as part of his nation building, Nurhaci commissioned two scholars to modify the Mongolian

script in order to create a written form of the Manchu language. This form of written Manchu is called the “old Manchu script” because it was further modified in the 1620s by the addition of circles and dots, which removed some of the linguistic ambiguities that had resulted from the first attempt to modify the Mongolian script. This new script remained the standard form of written language throughout the Qing dynasty.

Few native speakers of Manchu remain in China, although volumes of the written script are preserved as official documents of the Qing dynasty in the national archive in Beijing and provincial archives in the northeast.

Robert John PERRINS

Further Reading
Manchuria, ancestral homeland of the Qing dynasty, for decades was the target of colonial aspirations by neighboring Japan and Russia. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria sparked war between China and Japan and China’s later involvement in World War II. China’s postwar Communist Party developed the region into an industrial heartland. Today three provinces make up Manchuria: Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning.

Manchuria is the ancestral homeland of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Chinese resistance to Qing rule was in part based on the fact that the Qing, as Manchus, were foreign invaders, although sinicized. Manchuria is also where World War II began for China.

Manchuria is the region of northeastern China comprising Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning (Fengtian) provinces. Chinese refer to Manchuria as “Dongbei” (Northeast) as part of a larger effort to distance the region’s history from the colonial overtures associated with the term Manchuria, which was partly the creation of Japanese and Russian imperialists who hoped that the term would imply the region’s separateness from the rest of China.

Manchuria, bordered to the southeast by Korea and to the north and northeast by Russia, originally was populated by a number of tribal groups, the largest of whom were Manchus, Mongols, and Tungus. The region is rich in natural resources, including timber and forest products, coal, iron, furs, and ginseng. During the twentieth century foreign occupiers and later Chinese administrators developed Manchuria’s transportation infrastructure and industrial base. Today the region is one of China’s most important industrial heartlands.

The presence of Han Chinese in Manchuria dates back to the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), when a prefecture was established on the Liaodong Peninsula at the southernmost point of Liaoning Province. During the reign of Wu Di (reigned 140–87 BCE), the fifth Han emperor, a more important Chinese presence was established in Manchuria when Wu Di encouraged the settlement of Chinese on the Liaodong Peninsula and in an area of what is today western Liaoning in order to strengthen the northern borders against the Xiongnu peoples. For much of China’s imperial past, however, the presence of Chinese in this region beyond the Great Wall was only minimal. The Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, after their conquest of China in the mid-seventeenth century, sought to preserve Manchuria as an undeveloped ancestral homeland. The early emperors, including Shunzhi (1638–1661), Kangxi (1654–1722), Yongzheng (1678–1735), and Qianlong (1711–1799), issued decrees, of dubious effectiveness, forbidding Chinese to settle in the region.

Fear of Russian Annexation

The Qing emperors, with the increasing Russian presence in the Far East during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, grew to fear Russian annexation of
The last of the old no-settlement decrees were repealed, and northern Chinese were encouraged to settle in Manchuria. During the mid-nineteenth century the arrival of French and British warships off the coast of southern Manchuria during the Opium Wars also reminded the Manchus that the region had strategic importance and that its population and fortifications should be developed. But these belated efforts by the Qing rulers were not effective, and by the 1890s they had largely lost Manchuria to foreign imperialists, first Russian and then Japanese.

In 1896, after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Qing rulers, now more worried about Japan’s colonial ambitions than Russia’s, allowed czarist Russia to construct the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria as a shortcut and as an alternative route to the Trans-Siberian Railway. Russia secured more concessions from a declining Manchu court in 1898, including a twenty-five-year lease on the southern portion of the Liaodong Peninsula and the right to build an additional southern route of the region’s railway that would bring the added advantage of having a year-round ice-free port as its terminus in the
new leasehold. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 the new Russian rights in southern Manchuria, together with the region’s railway and harbors at Dalian (“Dairen” in Japanese and “Dalny” in Russian) and Lushun (Port Arthur), were transferred to Japan.

### Japanese Colony

The Japanese governors of southern Manchuria continued to expand on Russia’s original plans, and their new colony boomed during the soybean boom of the late 1910s. But by the late 1920s tension was increasing as Japan’s colonial ambitions in Manchuria no longer could be satisfied by a small leasehold on the Liaodong Peninsula and with attempts by commanders in the local Japanese garrison force, the Guandong (Kwantung) Army, to control the region’s de facto ruler, warlord Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tsolín). The Guandong Army blew up a section of the Southern Manchurian Railway on 18 September 1931 and soon after launched an invasion of Manchuria, an event that triggered the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945) and China’s eventual involvement in World War II. In 1932 Japan proclaimed the birth of the “independent” nation of Manchukuo (Country of the Manchus). But in reality Manchukuo was a child of the Japanese military and a puppet state with no real independence. Manchuria remained under Japanese occupation until the end of the war in the Pacific in 1945, contributing raw materials to the home islands and playing an important role in the creation of Japan’s colonial ideology. Many Japanese viewed Manchuria not only as a strategic buffer zone between their empire and the Soviet Union but also as a colonial frontier, even a potential utopia, awaiting the arrival of intrepid Japanese settlers who would develop the region’s vast potential.

The Russians returned to Manchuria after Japan surrendered in 1945. Soviet troops, having resecured rights in the region at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 in return for a promise to enter the war against Japan, invaded Manchuria during the final days of the war in the Pacific. Russia plundered the region during the next couple of years, dismantling factories and sending them in pieces on railcars back to the Soviet Union. Because of Manchuria’s industrial capacity and abundant natural resources, during the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) between the Communists and the Nationalists the region was a hotly contested territory.

Since the 1950s China has developed Manchuria as its industrial heartland. The Fushun colliery, the steel mills at Anshan, the giant factories in the industrial cities of Shenyang (Mukden) and Changchun, and the commercial port of Dalian played vital roles in the industrialization strategies of the Chinese Communist Party. Industrial Manchuria, with the campaign to create a market economy in China during the late 1980s and early 1990s, began to experience new challenges. Many of the inefficient state-owned enterprises either closed or severely reduced their workforces. This development led to a high level of unemployment in a region that had been prosperous under the state-planned economy. Decades of industrialization have also created environmental problems in Manchuria, including high rates of respiratory diseases among its people and high levels of toxins in waterways. The ancestral homeland of the Manchus is now polluted and home to tens of millions of Han Chinese factory workers.

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**Further Reading**


In an attempt to bring China into a confrontation with Japan over control of Manchuria, Japanese troops used explosives to destroy a segment of the Manchurian railway. This bombing became known as the Manchurian Incident, and the events that followed positioned Japan for its attempt at Asian and Pacific conquest during World War II.

The Manchurian Incident (also called the “Mukden Incident,” the “September 18 Incident,” or the “Liu-tiaoguo [ditch worker] Incident”) occurred on 18 September 1931 when explosives destroyed a section of the South Manchurian railway near the city of Mukden (Shenyang) in Liaoning Province. Japanese troops stationed near the railroad were responsible for the bombing, which was intended to draw China into a confrontation with Japan over control of Manchuria. Although the Chinese government did not respond to the provocation by declaring war, Japan mobilized troops, occupied the region, and established the puppet state of Manchuguo.

Background

The Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the First Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 originally ceded Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores, and Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. France, Germany, and in particular Russia objected to Japanese control of Liaodong and pressured Japan to return the territory in exchange for an increased indemnity of 30 million taels (currency based on the weight of silver). Almost immediately Russia began construction of a new South Manchurian railway, linking Harbin (a major city on the East Manchurian railway) with Port Arthur (Lushan) on the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. These two rail lines, bisecting Manchuria and protected by 175,000 czarist troops, effectively brought the region under Russian control. The Japanese considered Russian aggrandizement in Manchuria a direct threat not only to their national security via a possible attack through Korea but also to their own imperialist ambitions in East Asia. The inevitable confrontation between the two began on 8 February 1904 when the Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet anchored at Port Arthur. Japan’s capture of Port Arthur in January 1905 and the destruction of the Baltic fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905 forced Russia to sue for peace. The Treaty of Portsmouth (5 September 1905) ending this conflict stipulated that Japan would assume Russian leases on the Liaodong Peninsula as well as control of the South Manchurian Railway. Both nations agreed to withdraw from Manchuria and to recognize China’s sovereignty over the region.

The collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) led to the rise of warlords in China. By the early 1920s one of the most powerful of these was Zhang Zuolin, who controlled all of Manchuria through his Fengtian Army, a well-equipped fighting force of 100,000 troops. At this time approximately ten thousand Japanese soldiers of the Guandong Army were also stationed in Manchuria.
to protect the railroad. Many young officers in this army were eager to spark a war with China in order to annex Manchuria as Japan had done to Korea in 1910. As Zhang was returning to Shenyang from Beijing on the morning of 4 June 1928, a bomb planted by one of these young officers exploded near his private train, killing him instantly. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the newly formed Nationalist government in Nanjing, cautioned against reprisals. Zhang’s son, Zhang Xueliang (known as the “Young Marshall”) took over his father’s position as warlord of Manchuria and agreed to follow Chiang’s directives. War was averted, although the situation remained tense and uncertain.

The Incident

In December 1928 Zhang Xueliang pledged his loyalty to the Nanjing government and much to Tokyo’s disappointment brought the three provinces of Manchuria back under China’s nominal control. He maintained a hard line in negotiations with the Japanese, refusing to approve any new concessions and seeking to recover those already granted. Meanwhile he continued to strengthen his armed forces, which increased to nearly 250,000 troops. Responding to critical economic issues at home, military and civilian officials in Tokyo were preparing to issue directives prohibiting deliberate provocation by Japanese
troops in Manchuria. As the window of opportunity began to close, young Japanese officers again took matters into their own hands. On 18 September 1931 they detonated explosives along the South Manchurian Railway on the outskirts of Mukden near the largest Chinese garrison in the region. Chinese soldiers investigating the explosion were fired upon by Japanese troops, who pursued them back to their barracks and attacked the garrison.

As news spread of the alleged Chinese attack, Tokyo cautioned restraint, but the military responded aggressively. The commander of Japanese forces in Korea dispatched troops across the border into southern Manchuria. The Guandong Army was quickly mobilized, fanning out to occupy Mukden and other major cities. Surprisingly the army met with only sporadic resistance. Under orders from Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang’s troops had been forbidden to engage the Japanese in battle. Moreover, within three months all of Zhang’s forces had been redeployed south of the Great Wall, leaving Manchuria completely in the hands of the Japanese.

Implications

The abandonment of Manchuria sparked massive protests in China. A virulent anti-Japanese boycott spread throughout China, raising fears in Shanghai’s foreign settlements of violent reprisals. In late January Japanese marines who had been landed in the city to protect its businesses and citizens clashed with Chinese troops. In retaliation the Japanese bombed Zhabei, a residential and industrial suburb of Shanghai, and invaded the city. After fierce fighting an armistice was signed in May 1932.

By that time two other major events related to the Manchurian Incident had transpired. In the first event, just days after the first shots were fired, the Japanese had already approached the last Qing emperor, Puyi, about the possibility of his restoration as head of a new Manchu state. In November he left Tianjin for Changchun and in March 1932 was installed as chief executive of the new state of Manchuguo. The second event was China’s appeal to the League of Nations demanding Japan’s withdrawal from Manchuria. In November the league sent a delegation to Manchuria headed by Lord Lytton of Great Britain to investigate the situation. Lytton’s report concluded that the Manchurian Incident was a Japanese fabrication and that Manchuguo was not a sovereign nation but rather a puppet state of the Japanese military. The League of Nations voted to uphold the findings of this report, and Japan responded by withdrawing from the organization.

Now firmly entrenched in Manchuria and isolated from the international community, Japan was poised to embark on its imperialist conquest of Asia and the Pacific during World War II.

Daniel J. MEISSNER

Further Reading


Mandarin

Guānhuà 官话
Pǔtōnghuà 普通话
Guóyǔ 国语

Mandarin is a linguistic term with four distinct senses: to early European missionaries Mandarin was the lingua franca of dynastic China; to the modern layman Mandarin refers to the standard language of present-day China; to the dialectologist Mandarin is the largest branch of Northern Chinese; whereas to the historical linguist Mandarin is synonymous with Premodern Chinese.

The term Mandarin is generally believed to be a translation of Chinese guanhua—literally “official talk,” which originated as a common language between speakers of different Chinese dialects. Out of this sense, the term grew to mean also the historical period dominated by this common language and the dialects descended from it. Finally, in the twentieth century, the term came to be equated with Modern Standard Chinese, the official language of the Chinese-speaking world, where it is also known as putonghua 普通话 (commoner’s language) or guoyu 国语 (national language).

Thus linguists view Mandarin in four different ways: (1) as a Chinese lingua franca, (2) as a branch of the northern Chinese dialect family, (3) as Premodern Chinese, and (4) as Modern Standard Chinese, also known as putonghua in mainland China, guoyu in Taiwan, and huayu in Singapore.

Mandarin as a Chinese Lingua Franca

Mandarin is believed to have originated as a common language among speakers of different Chinese dialects, loosely based on some form of northern Chinese. European missionary records suggest this prestige speech variety to be the dialect of Nanjing (Coblin 2000), with the accent of Beijing exerting growing influence towards the end of the nineteenth century. The Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci wrote in his travel journals (1583–1610) of a spoken language known as Quonhoa, which was used throughout the empire for civil and forensic purposes. He further explained that the Quonhoa dialect was typically used between visitors and natives of the provinces they visited, serving a function similar to that of the modern standard language today.

Mandarin as Modern Standard Chinese

The second sense of Mandarin focuses on the vicinity of Beijing—the Chinese capital for the past five hundred years—whose local speech presumably had a prestige that conflicted with the prestige status of the guanhua. Eventually, the shared language grew more like the everyday speech of Beijing. By the end of the nineteenth century, the two languages were similar. The remnant of the old guanhua became known as the literary stratum of Beijing
Mandarin, and the local vernacular as the colloquial stratum. There are minute pronunciation differences between the literary and colloquial strata. For example, the word to learn, which is pronounced xue in the literary stratum, is rendered xiao in colloquial Beijing. Similarly, the word for night watch, for example, is pronounced geng in literary Beijing, but jing in colloquial Beijing. Differences exist also in vocabulary, with guanhua leaning towards classical Chinese and colloquial Beijing being more abundant in localisms.

From the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to the early days of the Republican era (1912–1949), the recognition of Beijing Mandarin as a national standard took a more complex route. The uncertainty surrounding the status of Beijing Mandarin at the time is highlighted by a meeting of linguists who gathered in 1913 to decide upon the new official language. The linguists settled on a standard that was not the speech of the capital but an artificial language incorporating elements from major dialects. This decision was seen as a compromise between north and south. But it soon became clear that no one, not even the linguists themselves, could speak this artificial language, and the movement failed miserably.

In 1920 Professor Zhang Shiyi called for replacing the artificial standard with the speech of Beijing locals educated to the level of secondary school. Zhang’s proposal initially met with resistance from the original committee, but as the pieced-together national language crumbled, Beijing Mandarin took over as the national standard. In 1926, when the national language was revised, pronunciations were largely based on the literary readings of Beijing. The new national language, up to this point, had been known as guoyu (national language), to borrow a Japanese usage, and still goes by this name in Taiwan.

On the mainland, however, the national language underwent a second revision in 1955 and switched to the name putonghua (commoners’ language), what is normally translated now as Modern Standard Chinese. Differences between putonghua and guoyu are few, mainly in the adoption of colloquial pronunciations in the case of putonghua, whereas guoyu retains the 1926 literary norms. The 1955 revision successfully defined the nature of the

Modern Standard Chinese, as the official language of the Chinese-speaking world, came to be equated with the term Mandarin in lay usage. In the Chinese capital Beijing, the city most influential in shaping Mandarin, a large crowd assembles to watch the sunrise events at Tiananmen Square. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
national language, which, according to the 1955 National Language Reform Committee, “bases its pronunciation on the speech of Beijing, its lexicon on the core vocabulary of Northern Chinese, and its syntax on the norms of exemplary vernacular literature” (Li 1999, 32). In many ways this was not a revision but a restatement of natural rules that have governed the language since its inception in 1926.

Tone aside, Modern Standard Chinese contains between 398 and 419 syllables, depending on whether we are to include certain Beijing colloquialisms as part of the educated vocabulary. The syllable is traditionally analyzed into an initial consonant and a final, as shown in the tree diagram for the word niao, bird. (See table 1.)

“Final” in Chinese phonology refers to the syllable less the initial consonant (if any); in other words, the “final” is the medial plus the rime portion of the syllable. (See tables 2 and 3.) The possible initials and finals of Modern Standard Chinese are given in both pinyin romanization (in italics) and the International Phonetic Alphabet (in brackets).

Full syllables in Modern Standard Chinese carry one of four tones, which play a role in distinguishing word meaning. (See table 4.)

Tone 3 often rises when it occurs at the end of a sentence or utterance and is sometimes referred to as the dipping tone. In addition to full tones, grammatical particles, suffixes, and unstressed syllables in Mandarin Chinese are often stripped of their tonal value, a condition referred to as being in the neutral tone.

Mandarin, like most other varieties of Chinese, is relatively free of inflection. Nouns generally are not marked for case, number, or gender. Verbs need not agree with the person, number, or gender of the subject or object. As such, much essential information is encoded in the syntax (word order) of a sentence.

There is much controversy over word order in Mandarin. While the simple declarative sentence in Mandarin retains the subject-verb-object (SVO) order of Old Chinese (600 BCE–265 CE), Modern Standard Chinese contains characteristics of languages with the basic word order subject-object-verb (SOV). In the early 1980s, some linguists saw this as evidence that Mandarin Chinese was in the process of transitioning from SVO to SOV, most likely due to influence from the Altaic languages of northern China. But recent scholarship in language acquisition and actual samples of spoken

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**Table 1** Tree Diagram for the Word niao (bird)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>syllable</th>
<th>initial</th>
<th>final</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>medial</td>
<td>rime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nucleus</td>
<td>ending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n</em>  <em>i</em>  <em>a</em></td>
<td><em>o</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2** Modern Standard Chinese Initials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Pinyin (P)</th>
<th>IPA (IPA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labial</td>
<td>b [p]</td>
<td>p [pʰ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alveolar (non-sibilant)</td>
<td>d [t]</td>
<td>t [tʰ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alveolar (sibilant)</td>
<td>z [ts]</td>
<td>ts [sʰ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retroflex</td>
<td>zh [ts]</td>
<td>ts [sʰ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alveopalatal</td>
<td>j [ts]</td>
<td>ts [sʰ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velar</td>
<td>g [k]</td>
<td>k [kʰ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3** Modern Standard Chinese Finals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finals</th>
<th>Pinyin (P)</th>
<th>IPA (IPA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i [i]</td>
<td>i [i]</td>
<td>i [i]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a [a]</td>
<td>a [a]</td>
<td>a [a]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o [o]</td>
<td>o [o]</td>
<td>o [o]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e [ɛ]</td>
<td>e [ɛ]</td>
<td>e [ɛ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ai [ai]</td>
<td>ai [ai]</td>
<td>ai [ai]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ei [ei]</td>
<td>ei [ei]</td>
<td>ei [ei]</td>
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<tr>
<td>ou [ou]</td>
<td>ou [ou]</td>
<td>ou [ou]</td>
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<tr>
<td>an [an]</td>
<td>an [an]</td>
<td>an [an]</td>
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<tr>
<td>ang [an]</td>
<td>ang [an]</td>
<td>ang [an]</td>
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<tr>
<td>eng [en]</td>
<td>eng [en]</td>
<td>eng [en]</td>
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<tr>
<td>oeng [en]</td>
<td>oeng [en]</td>
<td>oeng [en]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ong [ou]</td>
<td>ong [ou]</td>
<td>ong [ou]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>er [ə]</td>
<td>er [ə]</td>
<td>er [ə]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4** Modern Standard Chinese Tones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Contour</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>HH</td>
<td>mà “mother”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>rising</td>
<td>LH</td>
<td>md “linen”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>LL</td>
<td>mà “horse”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>falling</td>
<td>HL</td>
<td>mà “to scold”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: H = high pitch; L = low pitch
Chinese have revealed that SOV structures in Mandarin are infrequent, marked forms that are not easily acquired by young children, and that such properties are not unusual in rigid SVO languages such as English and biblical Hebrew. The prevailing view, for now at least, seems to be that Mandarin Chinese, like most other languages of southern and southeastern China, is a typical SVO language.

Mandarin as a Branch of Northern Chinese

Mandarin, or guanhua, refers to a branch of Northern Chinese, which includes dialects used throughout most of northern and southwestern China, the majority of which are descended from or have had extensive contact with the guanhua lingua franca. Mandarin, in this context, refers to an entire dialect family, the largest family in the sinitic branch of Sino–Tibetan, in terms of both geographical distribution and number of speakers.

The Mandarin family is distinguished from other dialects of Chinese by way of five shared innovations: velar palatalization; spirantalization of initial /m/; merger of final /m/ with /n/; loss of initial /ŋ/; and the development of voiced obstruents into voiceless aspirated and unaspirated initials depending on tone.

Within the Mandarin family are three main divisions comprising eight subdialects (after Liu 1995): Southern Mandarin includes the Yangzi (Jianghuai guanhua) and Southwestern (Xinan guanhua) subdialects; Central Mandarin includes the Central Plains (Zhongyuan guanhua) and Northwestern (Lanyin guanhua) varieties; and Northern Mandarin includes Northeastern (Dongbei guanhua), North Central (Jilu guanhua), Peninsular (Jiaoliao guanhua), and Beijing Mandarin (Beijing guanhua).

Mandarin as Premodern Chinese

From the Tang dynasty (618–907) onward, the homeland of the shared northern Chinese language was successively occupied by peoples of Turkic, Mongol, and Tungus–Manchu stock, resulting in the drastic simplification of Middle Chinese (265–1269). The product of this simplification is described by Chinese linguistics also as guanhua, or Mandarin. Thus Mandarin is synonymous with what linguistics call Premodern Chinese and refers to the language of northern China from the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) to the present day.

Linguists further divide the Mandarin period into three parts. Early Mandarin (1269–1455) is typified by the opera manual Zhongyuan Yinyun (Rhymes of the Central Plains, 1324) by Zhou Deqing (1277–1365). Middle Mandarin (1455–1795) is preserved in Chinese–Korean language primers such as Hongmu Jeongun Yeokhun (Standard Rhymes of the Reign of Hongwu, Annotated and Transcribed, 1455) and Saseong Tonghae (Thorough Investigation of the Four Tones, 1517), as well as the Yunlue Huitong (Summary Compendium of Rhymes, 1642) and other Chinese rhyme...
manuals. Mandarin from the mid-nineteenth century to the present is considered to have changed very little and is referred to as Modern Mandarin or Modern Chinese.

Chris Wen-Chao LI

Further Reading
MAO Zedong
Máo Zédōng 毛泽东
1893–1976  Founder of the Chinese Communist Party

Mao Zedong was a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party and the architect of China’s Communist revolution. Some of his socialist policies failed, but his legacy as a firm nationalist leader and the “founding father” of an independent China still inspires post-Mao generations.

Mao Zedong, raised in central Hunan Province by a middle-class peasant family, was the leading architect of China’s twentieth-century Communist revolution. After receiving both a traditional education and a Westernized normal school training and being inspired by the antiforeign revolutionary nationalism of the May Fourth Movement, Mao in 1921 became a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

While cooperating with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) Mao worked on rural issues, serving as principal of the Sixth Session of the Peasant Movement Training Institute in 1926. He wrote one of his most important early works, “Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” just as the Communist alliance with the Nationalists unraveled in 1927. As the Communist Party collapsed in the urban areas, Mao retreated to the countryside. His view that the peasants, as the most oppressed social class, were the most revolutionary clashed with the more
traditional Communist view of other party leaders, who concentrated on China’s rather small industrial-worker class. Mao from 1927 to late 1934 championed the peasant struggle, building with Zhu De (1886–1976) and others the Red Army that used guerrilla tactics against GMD forces. Between late 1927 and late 1934 Mao headed a Communist base area in the Jiangxi region that for a brief time functioned as a Soviet republic but soon became the target of encirclement campaigns launched by Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Mao and others, forced to flee their bases in southeastern China, led the army to northwestern China on what became known as the “Long March.” Mao became the chairman of the CCP in 1935—a position he retained until his
death—and his views on the importance of the peasants to China’s revolution became dominant.

The takeover of Manchuria by Japan in 1932 and China’s War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War) caused Mao to shift his attention from internal struggle to the external imperialist threat. While the Communist Party fought anti-Japanese rear-guard actions from 1936 to 1945, Mao formed his views of a socialist revolution in China. He differed from traditional Marxist doctrine in the emphasis he put on peasants, but he retained the concepts of class struggle and the vanguard role of the party. In 1945 his concepts were enshrined in the CCP’s Seventh Congress constitution as “Mao Zedong Thought.”

During the war years nationalist spirit spread support for the CCP. In 1945 halfhearted attempts at a coalition government presaged civil war against the GMD. The Communist Party renamed its military the “People’s Liberation Army” (PLA) and used Mao’s strategy in North China of surrounding cities from the countryside to gain advantages over the GMD. This strategy led to the Communist victory by Mao, who in October 1949 oversaw the founding the People’s Republic of China. However, by the summer of 1950 China was drawn into Cold War struggles in Korea (Mao’s son was killed in U.S. bombing there) and fought U.N. forces to a draw, setting the stage for anti-Americanism triggered by continued U.S. support for the Nationalist government in Taiwan.

“Land to the Tiller”

On the domestic front Mao turned attention to China’s socialist transformation. The first priority was land reform. Vowing to keep the promise of “land to the tiller” made by Nationalist revolutionary Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), Mao pushed policies that by 1955–56 created the basic collectivization of newly distributed land into agricultural producers’ cooperatives. China, following the Soviet Union’s definition of socialism, also established basic state ownership of industry by the time the Eighth CCP Congress convened in 1957. While other party leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) and Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), were ready to consolidate early achievements, Mao, who was worried by the problems of corruption and bureaucracy, first invited and then quashed criticism by intellectuals in the Hundred Flowers initiative and the ensuing anti-Rightist campaigns against those who were deemed reactionary. Mao argued that consolidation could result in a loss of momentum, even reversal, by entrenching a new generation of elites. His campaign to achieve the natural socialist potential of the newly released peasant masses led to his policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958–59), which was aimed at creating a “new socialist man.” Rightist intellectuals and other party critics were to be reformed by physical labor, especially by working at the poorly conceived backyard steel furnaces, which, Mao promised, would allow China to overtake England in steel and iron production. This campaign also was meant to transfer technology to the countryside using the new People’s Communes as the economic, social, and political interface with the center. But famine and failures resulting from the Great Leap Forward created the first serious fissure within the CCP leadership and disillusion with Mao among the general Chinese population just as
he began to form his own cult of personality as the senior leader and, as he envisioned it, heir to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin within the international socialist camp.

Relations with the Soviet Union suffered, however, from Mao's failed policies. Criticism of his deviations from Soviet models led to Soviet withdrawal of technical experts. This withdrawal disrupted major infrastructure projects. Mao struck back by criticizing the Soviet Union for following the “capitalist road.” He defended his policies as the logical next step in the world socialist movement, a posture that worsened the Soviet-Sino split. In China, even as the country recovered from the disasters of the Great Leap Forward, Mao denounced many within the party for “taking the capitalist road” like the Soviets,

This statue of Mao Zedong with upraised hand evokes the pronouncement he made on 1 October 1949, the day the People’s Republic of China was born: “China has stood up.”
and for failing to continue the revolution. In response he launched the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Helped by General Lin Biao (1907–1971), who promoted the study of Mao’s ideas among the ranks of the PLA in the ubiquitous, Western-dubbed Little Red Book, Mao began his attack first against noncompliant party intellectuals and then against the central core of the party leadership, again accusing them of being “capitalist roaders.” By mobilizing the masses, especially Red Guard youth, closing schools, and using his own cult image, Mao intended to create a generation of revolutionary successors deserving of the sacrifices of parents’ and grandparents’ generation. But over-exuberant attacks on authority threatened chaos. Many party members were sent to May Seventh Cadre Schools (established after Mao’s 7 May 1966 directive, these rural schools demanded that students perform hard labor when not studying Mao’s philosophies. By the summer of 1968 Mao was sending hordes of students to the countryside to “learn from the peasants.” Mao institutionalized the Cultural Revolution at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 by forming Revolutionary Committees in government offices, factories, and communes. Mao also rewarded Lin Biao for his work in building the Mao cult by naming him as his successor.

Mao’s growing suspicion that he had been betrayed by Lin Biao, China’s admission to the United Nations, and continued Sino-Soviet border disputes prompted Mao in 1972 to invite U.S. president Richard Nixon to China, despite U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. From 1972 until Mao’s death in 1976, ideologues, including Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing (1914–1991), attempted to assert power under cover of Mao’s name.

Mao’s death concluded an era of radical ideological leadership in China, but his legacy as a firm nationalist leader and the “founding father” of an independent China still inspires post-Mao generations. Mao’s preserved body continues to lie in state in his mausoleum in Tiananmen Square, whereas the bodies of Stalin and Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin have been buried. While their statues have been removed from public places, Mao’s remain on display, and Mao souvenirs are still popular items among both Chinese and foreign tourists.

“People’s War”

In addition to their influence in China, Mao’s concepts of a “people’s war” using guerrilla tactics were adopted by Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh even during Mao’s lifetime. His ideas on this subject are also used in Western military training to teach counterinsurgency. In other parts of the world Maoist groups exist, such as the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, the Naxalite movement in India, and in 2008 the Maoists in Nepal who won a civil war under the leadership of the self-proclaimed Maoist leader Comrade Prachanda. These groups have emphasized Mao’s strategy of a peasant-led anti-imperialist, anti-bourgeoisie struggle to seizing power rather than his economic development model.

Dorothea A. L. MARTIN

Further Reading


The collected works of Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party from the 1930s to his death in 1976, are composed of his writings on political, military, economic, and philosophical affairs. Originally presented as the basis of Mao Zedong Thought, after his death this concept was revised to include the ideas of other CCP revolutionaries prior to 1949.

The collected works of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought, now defined as a scientific ideological system developed by early CCP revolutionaries applying Marxism-Leninism in a Chinese context, were an inspiration to revolutionaries around the world in the 1960s and 1970s as well as a linchpin of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Since Mao Zedong Thought began to be recognized as a unique and critical component of party ideology in the early 1940s, many collections of his works have been published in China. During the Revolutionary War period prior to 1949, several collections were published in China but, because of limited resources and wartime conditions, not in substantial numbers. The best-known collection is the four-volume Selected Works of Mao Zedong, published between 1952 (Volume 1) and 1960 (Volume 4) (and in English in the 1960s).

The Selected Works consists of carefully chosen and significantly edited pieces written by Mao between 1926—during the First United Front, a period from 1923 to 1927 during which the CCP united with the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in an attempt to unite China—and September 1949, less than a month before the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October. The pieces contain a wide range of political and political-economic analyses, beginning with “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” (March 1926) and including analyses of domestic and international situations, military writings discussing strategies and tactics from the revolutionary period, and some of his best-known philosophical writings, such as “On Practice” (July 1937) and “On Contradiction” (August 1937). They also include what later became known as the “Three Constantly Read Articles”: “In Memory of Norman Bethune” (December 1930), “Serve the People” (September 1944), and “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountain” (June 1945), which celebrated the revolutionary spirit of working for the public good and overcoming obstacles regardless of costs.

In the early 1960s additional collections, most famously the Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong, and numerous versions of Quotations from Chairman Mao (known in the West as the “Little Red Book”), were published, many under the sponsorship of Mao’s then-designated successor, Defense Minister Lin Biao (who later died allegedly fleeing after an attempted coup against Mao). But the Little Red Book isolated brief quotes from Mao’s work to be memorized and applied universally, thus virtually eliminating any real meaning. While providing an underlying basis for unity, the book allowed the quotes to be reduced
to slogans used in internecine (relating to conflict within a group) struggles. Two lesser-known but more substantial collections entitled *Long Live the Thought of Mao Zedong!* were published by unnamed sources during the Cultural Revolution. They contain Mao’s previously unpublished but significant works and speeches.

After Mao’s death the fifth volume of the *Selected Works*, including selected works through 1957, was published in 1977 in part as an unsuccessful effort by Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, to strengthen his own position. Finally, between 1993 and 1999 an additional eight-volume *Mao Zedong Works* was published, including over eight hundred works not included in the *Selected Works* but specifically excluding works associated with the Cultural Revolution, which the Chinese Communist Party in 1981 had labeled a mistake initiated by Mao.

Richard LEVY

**Further Reading**


Evaluation of China’s revolutionary founder, Chairman Mao, began in 1981 when Deng Xiaoping presided over an official resolution declaring Mao Zedong “chiefly responsible” for the disastrous Cultural Revolution. The resolution set in stone a political formula defining Mao as 70 percent good and 30 percent bad. Outside of China, however, more comprehensive literature presents Mao in a less positive light.

On 27 June 1981 China’s Communist Party formally adopted a posthumous evaluation of Chairman Mao Zedong that included some stark admissions about Mao’s responsibility for the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a ten-year-long social upheaval, and other grave errors. This official evaluation performed a delicate balancing act. It dimmed the luster of Mao by exposing his fallibility, and yet it preserved him on a pedestal as China’s most important revolutionary leader. Later the party’s official evaluation of Mao as mostly positive would come to be identified with the ratio 70 percent good, 30 percent bad.

Albeit a crude oversimplification, this 70:30 ratio reflected the bottom line of a hard-won consensus: China’s revolutionary founder was not to be debased, only demystified. The evaluation defined Mao’s “ultra-left excesses” as “errors” rather than “crimes.” His contribution to China’s revolutionary history, especially prior to 1956, was still assessed as glorious and indispensable. To underline the finality of this official evaluation, Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping informed a foreign journalist that Mao’s portrait would continue to occupy its customary place of honor in Tiananmen Square.

In issuing this partial rebuke of the deceased chairman, the post-Mao leadership indicated that it would not go so far as the Soviet Union had in renouncing its paramount leader. In 1956 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s so-called Secret Speech criticized Russian leader Joseph Stalin unspARINGLY as a crude and callous dictator. Only Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin was left standing as the untarnished pillar of party legitimacy. To dramatize Stalin’s ejection from the revolutionary canon, the Soviet leadership removed Stalin’s corpse from its initial resting place in the Lenin Mausoleum in 1961. In China, however, Mao was both the accomplisher of the revolution and the guiding force of state socialism post-1949. Mao loomed so large in China’s Communist Revolution that he was the equivalent of Lenin and Stalin combined. To displace Mao from the mausoleum or to remove his portrait from Tiananmen Square would mean leaving Communist China without a founding father. Even characterizing Mao as equally good and bad (50:50) might fatally wound the legitimacy of China’s Communist Party. Thus the party’s official evaluation was a stop-gap measure to forestall a more complete, open-ended assessment endangering the party’s hold on power. Mao’s towering personality pervaded party history like a colossal Buddha carved into a mountain. To destroy the icon threatened the integrity of the revolution itself.

The “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Mao Zedong, Evaluation of Píngjià Máo Zédōng 评价毛泽东
of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” was adopted at the convening of the Sixth Plenum in June 1981 on the eve of the sixtieth anniversary of the Communist Party’s founding. This watershed document ratified by the eleventh Central Committee announced the party’s intention to shed the unwanted skin of radical Maoism. Henceforth China would become a postrevolutionary society under the pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping. The government would avoid disorder at all costs. The painful experience of the Cultural Revolution had thoroughly discredited Mao’s advocacy of class struggle and revolutionary upheaval. The resolution sought to bury extremist thinking associated with Mao and to establish the theoretical foundation for China’s so-called Second Revolution. The resolution’s unanimous ratification consolidated Deng’s rise to power as a paramount leader just as an earlier resolution on party history in 1945 had signaled Mao Zedong’s triumph as a guiding theorist. Deng’s status as commander-in-chief was further consolidated by his election to the powerful position of chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee during the same session in which the 1981 resolution was adopted. Deng’s protégé, Hu Yaobang, was voted into the post of chairman of the Central Committee.

Deng Xiaoping used the resolution as a tool not only to deflate the residual influence of Mao’s policies but also to dislodge Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, from his post as chairman. Hua Guofeng resigned as chairman just as an earlier resolution on party history in 1945 had signaled Mao Zedong’s triumph as a guiding theorist. Deng’s status as commander-in-chief was further consolidated by his election to the powerful position of chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee during the same session in which the 1981 resolution was adopted. Deng’s protégé, Hu Yaobang, was voted into the post of chairman of the Central Committee.

Eroding Credibility

Even before his complicity in purging Deng was publicized, Hua Guofeng’s credibility as Mao’s successor had been rapidly eroding. Hua found himself consistently upstaged by his skilled rival, who was both well respected by the military and a veteran party administrator. By 1981 Deng’s rise to paramount status was a foregone conclusion. The resolution’s portrayal of Mao as decrepit in his final years helped to explain why it was necessary for Hua to exit his leadership post. Hua had positioned himself as Mao’s double, even modeling his physical appearance so that he closely resembled Mao.

The resolution positioned Deng Xiaoping and his allies favorably as sponsors of political reform. It conceded the party’s own errors in succumbing to ultraleftism and promised to adopt a middle course in the future and to return to regularized procedures and collective decision making within the party. The resolution also broke with Hua Guofeng’s previous strategy of blaming the rash excesses of the Cultural Revolution entirely on Mao’s henchmen, the so-called Gang of Four. The resolution made the bold assertion that Mao was “chiefly responsible” for instigating the “catastrophe.” Furthermore, the resolution placed the Cultural Revolution in quotation marks whenever it appeared in the text. This deliberate editorial strategy conveyed a subtle message controversial at the time. It suggested that Mao’s vaunted movement to revolutionize culture, the Cultural Revolution, was not merely a good thing spun out of control but a bad idea from start to finish.

As a twice-purged victim of the Cultural Revolution himself, Deng Xiaoping was able to persuasively differentiate himself from those who had spearheaded Cultural Revolution policies. He could use his affinity with those who had suffered as a political asset in his struggle to retire the remaining Maoists on the one hand and to quell rising social discontent on the other. The resolution proved popular with the Chinese public at a time when inhibitions were dissolving and anger at the party was mounting. The trial of the Gang of Four in 1980 had publicized atrocities committed during the Cultural Revolution and opened the floodgates to political criticism. A Democracy
Wall movement was gaining momentum in the nation’s capital. Deng Xiaoping made use of conspicuous public restlessness to press for bold reforms to regularize and institutionalize decision making within the party. Deng instigated new safeguards to prevent the egregious concentration of power at the top that Mao Zedong had proven able to accrue. However, Deng was determined to keep the groundswell of public opinion from threatening the party’s overall hold on power. The democracy movement was politically useful for him in his struggle against ideological conservatives, but he feared that spontaneous protest might snowball beyond the government’s control, as it had in Poland and other countries within the socialist bloc. The resolution was part of an official effort to define for the awakening public how much scrutiny of the past and criticism of the present would be tolerated.

Deng Xiaoping’s protégé, Hu Yaobang, chaired the committee charged with drafting the resolution, and Deng Xiaoping himself intervened repeatedly over the fifteen-month drafting of the document to shape its language and tone. The end product was kinder to Mao than originally conceived, softened as the drafting committee encountered opposition from entrenched Maoists in the party and military. Deng himself had served Mao as a loyal lieutenant for most of his career and would be inclined to take a mostly positive view out of deference for his predecessor’s indispensable role in spearheading the 1949 revolution. Deng also was aware of the destabilization caused by Khrushchev’s sweeping denunciation of Stalin in 1956.

**Diplomatic Protest**

Mao had reacted in anger to Khrushchev’s surprise assault on his predecessor’s memory because the pointed
A 1976 newspaper headline about the death of Mao, who lived to be eighty-two.
critique of Stalin as one who fostered a cult perverting party principles could be leveled at Mao himself. Mao considered Khrushchev’s treatment of his predecessor’s memory unbalanced, and he lodged a diplomatic protest suggesting that a 70 percent positive evaluation was more appropriate. With regard to his own record, Mao had requested that Deng as acting premier institute a similar retrospective evaluation of the Cultural Revolution (70 percent good, 30 percent bad), but Deng had demurred. These precedents may have swayed Deng’s decision to take a similar 70:30 approach to Mao’s own evaluation. Deng also recognized that even a deceased and diminished Mao continued to possess considerable charismatic appeal. For the Chinese people Mao’s personality was inseparable from the soul of the new nation. Deng could not extinguish residual love for Mao even if he had aspired to, so he might as well make use of it. But Mao’s popularity represented a double-edged sword for Deng and his allies because parts of Mao’s theoretical legacy were clearly at odds with the reformers’ plans for economic modernization. Indeed, Deng was pressing forward with the very market-based reforms, the notorious capitalist road, that Mao had famously denounced as “revisionist” during the Cultural Revolution.

Deng’s solution to this quandary was to downplay the significance of ideology altogether. He scaled back the pervasiveness of revolutionary politics in Chinese life in general so that economic modernization and education could come to the fore. To justify this move ideologically, Deng elevated Mao’s early slogans “Seek Truth from Facts” and “Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth” to positions of prominence. The resolution celebrated Mao’s most pragmatic sayings and used the authority of Mao’s own words to make a critique of radical Maoism. Thus the aging Mao was said to have departed from the transcendent, uncorrupted body of thought called Mao Zedong Thought. This set of guiding principles was not merely the product of one man but rather “the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party” (Resolution 1981, 29). The content of Mao Zedong Thought was defined vaguely as the “summary of the experiences that have been confirmed in the practice of the Chinese revolution” (Resolution 1981, 29). Thus Mao Zedong Thought was reconfigured to become something abiding but fluid, a spiritual resource for energizing society in whatever direction the current leadership felt was necessary. Deng and his allies attempted to transfer the charisma associated with Mao onto a streamlined set of Mao’s principles. Indeed, what the post-Mao leadership called Mao Zedong Thought was so narrowly construed that it should be distinguished from the more complete repertoire of what Mao said and did during his lifetime, a subject typically called “Maoism” or “Mao Studies” outside of China. The resolution’s redefinition of Mao Zedong Thought so negated Maoism’s radical core that some might say that the Deng regime performed a lobotomy on Mao’s ideological legacy. The critic of bureaucracy who called on the masses to rise up against the party during the Cultural Revolution had become something close to his opposite. Now Mao was a benign ancestor who presided over social order and safeguarded the Communist bureaucracy.

After decades of international isolation and political turmoil under Mao’s rule, the Chinese people in 1981 were understandably exhausted by revolutionary upheaval and yearned for a stable and prosperous society. Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic outlook on politics and his restoration of education and economic development as priorities for society promised a better future for China. The relatively candid nature of the resolution was applauded by many inside and outside of China as a welcome step toward more effective governance and greater public accountability. Indeed, the resolution was a more serious and forthright critical evaluation of party history than the Soviet Union had undertaken prior to the era of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the resolution of 1981 was governed by the political necessities of Deng Xiaoping’s consolidation of power and should not be accepted as the final word on Mao’s legacy. While it confronted the Cultural Revolution tragedy fairly candidly, it did not remove all the troubling skeletons from the closet. For example, it tiptoed past two catastrophic failings with which Mao was closely associated—the Anti-Rightist Campaign, a devastating purge that sent an estimated 700,000 intellectuals to perform hard labor in the countryside, and the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s ill-conceived campaign to overwhelmingly increase economic productivity by reorganizing Chinese agriculture. It gently described the arbitrary and ruinous Anti-Rightist Campaign as “entirely correct” but “too broad in scope.”
“Serious Difficulties”

With regard to Mao’s Great Leap Forward policies, retrospectively calculated to have caused 30 million deaths, the resolution merely refers obliquely to “serious difficulties” with the economy during the period from 1959 to 1961 and attributes much of the blame to “natural calamities and perfidious scrapping of contracts by the Soviet government” (Resolution 1981, 19). As suggested by these examples, the resolution’s evaluation of Mao contains many omissions and insufficiencies.

A more penetrating and complete evaluation of Mao and his legacy can be found in the large body of uncensored archival materials and critical literature devoted to Mao Studies outside of China. Recent scholarship based on party records and memoirs by those who had extensive contact with Mao, such as his private physician, Dr. Li, have knocked Mao further off his pedestal. Evaluations of Mao outside China are typically less favorable than the 70 percent good, 30 percent bad benchmark established by the 1981 resolution. Mao is now reckoned by some analysts to have brought about the deaths of more of his own people than any other leader in history. Stalin’s gulag claimed 15 million lives; Hitler’s extermination camps destroyed roughly half that number. But Mao’s repeated persecution campaigns to weed out bad social elements exceeded both in number, estimated to have caused as many as 70 million deaths. Khrushchev said of Mao that the Chinese leader treated people like “pieces of furniture.” Mao’s defenders would say that he was married to an ideal vision and that he steeled himself to defend revolution regardless of the human cost. Although his policies are controversial, Mao’s intellectual contributions continue to be admired, particularly among leftist thinkers. His main innovations to Marxist-Leninist theory and practice include his insistence on “study and investigation,” the need for frequent consultations between the leaders and the masses, and his flexibility in adapting theory to China’s specific local conditions, including his insight that farmers could be the agents of the Communist Revolution in China.

One Great Man

Most Chinese raised in the People’s Republic of China still reflexively view Mao as a hero and would not think it appropriate to compare their nation’s founder with so brutal a dictator as Stalin. (Ironically, Mao himself evaluated Stalin favorably as a firm and decisive leader.) The typical Chinese holds stubbornly to the memory of what Mao was in his heyday, a charismatic and unifying leader, rather than the detached and reckless instigator of destruction he became near the end of his life. Over time historical investigation may reveal that many of the contributions for which he is commonly credited were the work of others. Certainly Mao did not accomplish the rise of China completely on his own, as is sometimes implied. His ideas would have gone nowhere without the highly skilled implementation of administrators such as Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping or the strong work ethic and resilience of the Chinese people. Yet, Mao’s familiar countenance remains ubiquitous in China’s capital city today, conspicuously heralded as the One Great Man of New China on money, T-shirts, and key chains. Critical discussion of Mao remains politically sensitive and subject to censorship.

Momentous and Tragic

Like the first emperor, Qin Shi Huang Di, whose vast tomb was discovered in 1974 and whose iron-fisted, autocratic approach Mao came to admire, Mao’s impact on China was both momentous and tragic. Like Czar Peter the Great of Russia, Mao sought to drive a backward nation forward in the space of a single generation. He achieved rapid industrialization of China in several decades and fought two wars to defend neighboring countries from the military action of the United States (the Korean War and indirectly, the Vietnam War). While his actions resulted in some benefits to the Chinese state, what progress he made was clearly at the expense of China’s natural environment. His policies imposed a massive burden on the people of his generation. Mao’s ideological goals were just as ambitious as his modernization efforts. He sought to instill revolutionary consciousness in every person through systematic and repeated ideological education. Unlike Lenin, who emphasized the importance of party organization and the authority of an elite corps of professional revolutionaries to steer the masses, Mao charged entire social groups (whether peasants or student youth) to stage revolution for themselves and to derive
energy and insight from the revolutionary experience itself. Mao pursued a foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union after 1960 and aspired to make China the exemplary model of state socialism within the international socialist bloc during the Cultural Revolution. His idea to make revolution participatory inspired fanatical devotion and gave him a godlike status to rule as he wished. Thus the personality and policies of Mao Zedong left a deep imprint on the political culture of modern China, one that is both difficult to appraise and impossible to erase.

Shelley Drake HAWKS

Further Reading


Marriage in China is essentially universal; divorce is rare. The traditional family system is based on male kinship. Since the 1970s China’s family-planning policy has required couples who want a child to apply for permission.

For twenty-five hundred years, through relatively secure and stable times and through stormy and catastrophic times, China’s family system has provided continuity in the social structure. Clans based on male kinship, in keeping with the precepts of the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE), coordinated village life under the autocratic rule of dynasties and subordinate elites. Even today, after a century of drastic changes and social development, China’s family system remains remarkably similar to that of its historical pattern.

Historically the patriarchal system was perpetuated by marriages arranged between the family of the groom and a family, usually from another village, whose daughter was a suitable bride. So nearly universal was marriage that the vast majority of Chinese found their social place in this family structure. As the twenty-first century begins, the preceding century of modernization and liberation of women has not deeply shaken China’s patrilocal...
marriage (brides living with the groom’s family) and family system in the rural areas.

Ideal and Reality

Traditionally the ideal Confucian family was an extended family that consisted of three or four generations who lived under the same or nearby roofs. The highest-ranking male was supposed to make family decisions, perhaps in consultation with other male kin. All others in the rigid family hierarchy under him were to obey these decisions. Theoretically the result was family harmony. Land, tools, houses, animals, furniture, and other belongings were to be held by the extended family unit. When the patriarch of the family unit died or was unable to govern, his sons became the heads of their extended families, with family land and other possessions being distributed among them. The practice of ancestor worship supported this system as reverence for ancestors was extended to reverence for the living older generation, especially the patriarch. Sons were needed to preside at some of the ceremonies; daughters were not qualified.

Almost every male outranked almost every female, except that young boys had to obey grown women in the family. Females were considered to be perpetual outsiders because the marriage system brought a bride from an outside family and village into her husband’s family and village. Even daughters who were born into the extended family were regarded as low-status, temporary sojourners because they were destined to marry out.

Indeed, the reality bore some resemblance to this ideal because females and subordinate males were economically dependent on the patriarchal family and risked social isolation and even destitution or starvation if they rebelled against the system of patriarchal control. But people were not necessarily as compliant and submissive as portrayed in this harmonious ideal. Their different personalities, preferences, and perspectives naturally clashed with some of the expectations of the system. Poverty also mandated adjustments that were at odds with the prescribed scenario. Besides, most of the time demographic realities prevented achievement of the extended family ideal. Illness was common, and the death rate was high. Data from 1929 to 1931 indicate that females and males in rural farm families had life expectancies of only twenty-four and twenty-five years, respectively. The low life expectancy was caused in part by high infant and young child mortality rates (three-fifths of children died before age five). But even those children who survived to age five could expect to live only to age thirty-eight on average. It was notable when both parents in a nuclear family lived long enough to raise their children to adulthood. Families of three generations tended to last only a short time because death claimed the older generation and many in the younger generations. Families of four generations were very rare.

Twentieth-Century Changes

China entered the twentieth century with the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) in near collapse and imperialist and colonial powers encroaching on China from all sides. Qing government leaders and revolutionary leaders alike searched in desperation for a way to save China from disintegration and foreign incursion. They considered importing foreign ideas and systems, such as foreign-style military and industrial production, a new form of government (a republic or a democracy), and modern educational systems. Leading thinkers also noted that China’s autocratic and patriarchal marriage and family system was a powerful force that prevented or slowed necessary change. They therefore adopted ideologies that would overhaul the traditional family system. In particular, Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) leaders and Communist leaders opposed the practice of arranged marriage and supported equality between men and women. The Communists and the Nationalists also opposed the practice of female foot binding.

Marriage Law of 1950

China’s Communist government from the beginning was determined to overturn patriarchal family and marriage customs. In fact, the first major law passed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the Marriage Law of 1950, which outlawed arranged marriage, prostitution, polygamy, child marriage, and concubinage; it allowed divorce and free choice of marriage partners and set a minimum marriage age of eighteen for women.
and twenty for men. The government promoted male-female equality and weakened the economic power of the family, especially by collectivizing agriculture under the commune system.

The system of marriage underwent a slow transformation under the government’s leadership during the second half of the twentieth century. The average ages at marriage rose slowly during the early PRC decades and rose rapidly during the 1970s. The average age at first marriage from 1929 to 1931 had been 17.5 years for women and 21.3 years for men. By the late 1990s the average age at first marriage had risen to twenty-two for women and twenty-four for men. Some marriages are still arranged by the families, but law requires that marriages be registered and that the bride and groom tell the registration official that the marriage is voluntary. Today some marriages are love marriages, freely chosen by two young people, but most marriages are contracted through a system of introductions in which family, friends, or colleagues bring the man and woman and their families together. After a number of meetings, if the man and woman and their parents agree, the marriage is contracted.

Marriage remains essentially universal: In 2005, 99.3 percent of women ages thirty-five through thirty-nine had married, as had 95.2 percent of men in that age bracket. The remaining single men could not marry because of China’s shortage of women caused by earlier female infanticide and maltreatment of girls.

**Positions of Men and Women**

Traditionally males were so important and females so unimportant that many family genealogies recorded only males, generation after generation, ignoring the female half of the family. The birth of a male was cause to rejoice; from birth sons were groomed for eventual dominance. If food or money for medical treatment were scarce, these commodities were directed toward the boys and men. As China’s economy has industrialized, most of the nonagricultural jobs have gone to men, and men are still regarded as a family’s economic core.

Since coming to power the Chinese Communist Party has worked against this formidable belief system and with significant positive results. But even today most families, particularly rural families, believe that they must have a son. Objective reasons exist, such as the lack of an old-age security system in rural China. Parents feel that they need a son to care for them when they grow old; a daughter will marry out of the family, but a son will bring in a daughter-in-law to help care for them. And yet even if such practical needs can be met in other ways, the emotional preference for a son remains.

**Infanticide**

During imperial times female infanticide was common at all economic levels. Selective neglect of daughters also meant that they died throughout childhood. During the Communist period the killing of infants was outlawed; female infanticide and maltreatment of girls declined
gradually. The lowest point of female losses occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, when excess female child mortality (mortality beyond the expected rates) killed about 2 percent of girls in each birth cohort. But after introduction of the one-child family-planning policy in 1978 and 1979, excess deaths of girls rose suddenly to 3 percent of each birth cohort. Since the 1980s technology that can be used for sex-selective abortion of female fetuses has led to major losses of females in utero. Since 1999 China has had at least 120 boys per 100 girls at ages 0–4, one of the world’s worst gender imbalances. Analysis of data from successive Chinese censuses indicates that life-threatening discrimination against females is now confined mostly to the prenatal period and the first couple of years of life. Girls still experience discrimination after that, but the most recent data indicate that it seldom leads to death after the first two years of life.

One Child per Couple

During the 1950s and 1960s women in China averaged six births each. After the famine of the Great Leap Forward the government began to take seriously the need to slow population growth. Cities conducted a rigorous campaign to persuade or require couples to have fewer children. By 1966 urban fertility decreased to three births per woman. Then, during the early 1970s, the government conducted an increasingly compulsory campaign in the rural areas, demanding that couples cease childbearing at three births, then two births. During the late 1970s, based on population projections, the government determined that the only way to stop population growth soon was to require all couples to stop childbearing after one child. Financial incentives were given to couples who pledged to have only one child, with special education and health benefits given to that one child. Couples who resisted the one-child limit were penalized with fines, the required use of an intrauterine device (IUD) after one birth, forced abortion, and required sterilization (usually of the mother) after two or more births. Rural fertility dropped from 6.4 births per woman in 1970 to 3.1 in 1977; urban fertility dropped further to 1.6 births per woman. The nation’s population growth rate was reduced from almost 3 percent per year during the late 1960s (for a population doubling time of about twenty-five years) to 1.5 percent during the 1980s (for a doubling time of just under fifty years).

The most intense campaign of involuntary family planning was conducted in 1983 as medical teams went to villages to carry out forced sterilizations, abortions, and IUD insertions. This campaign led to a popular backlash, and the government temporarily lessened the coercion. Meanwhile, an associated increase in female infanticide worried the government. The demand for a son among rural families was so great that most provinces changed their rural family-planning policies to allow couples who had a firstborn daughter to have a second child but adhered to the one-child limit if the first child was a son.

Since the 1970s China’s family-planning policy has required couples who want a child to apply for permission...
to become pregnant and give birth. If authorities give couples a "birth quota," couples may proceed to have a child; otherwise they face potentially serious political and economic consequences. Insertion of an IUD is required after one birth for most women, and sterilization is required after a second birth whether the birth was allowed or not. These "passive" techniques of birth control will stop pregnancy even if the couple actually wants a child, which is why the government usually insists on these techniques. Of couples who use contraception, 40 percent choose to have one partner sterilized, and 51 percent use an IUD. Since the early 1990s the nation's fertility level has been below replacement-level fertility at about 1.6–1.8 births per woman. Since 1998 the population growth rate has been 0.5–1 percent per year, which is very low for a developing country.

Some international funding organizations and some governments have condemned this compulsory and often coercive family-planning program. In response China is conducting a pilot program in selected locations to implement a more client-friendly family-planning program. The program allows couples more choices of birth-control techniques, but couples still are not allowed to have more children than permitted before. China is the only country that has a compulsory family-planning program.

China's low death and birth rates, however, have had mainly positive effects. Today most Chinese people live to advanced years. Therefore educational and health and other financial investments in children and adults pay off because the recipients live relatively long lives and thus can contribute longer to society. Small numbers of births, combined with rising incomes, mean that each child can receive more food, health care, clothing, education, and attention than was the case with larger families in the past. Low fertility reduces female deaths from pregnancy and childbirth and frees women to pursue careers and opportunities beyond childrearing. Nonetheless, in many ways compulsory family planning is harmful to families, couples, and women. Those couples who love children and want another are usually prevented from having more than their quota. Family-planning clinics use either X-ray or ultrasound to inspect the abdomens of women every few months to confirm that their IUDs are still in place; frequent use of X-rays may harm the women's health. Forced abortions are often performed during the second and third trimesters, which is dangerous for the health of the mothers. Even putting aside such health issues, compulsory abdominal X-ray or ultrasound inspections, IUD insertions, sterilizations, and abortions are violations of women's bodies and of their rights.

As in the past, almost everyone in China now marries, and almost every couple has at least one child. This fact means that the family structure is very much intact despite low fertility. People currently mostly live as part of an extended family, a "stem" family (three generations living together but with just one son and his wife and child or children in the household), or a nuclear family (parents and children only). Often the families of the older parents—the sons and their spouses and children and sometimes the married daughters in urban areas—continue to have frequent contact even if they live in separate dwellings.

Low fertility and mortality, however, mean that China's population is aging. The proportion of elderly will rapidly increase in future decades; there is concern that the smaller numbers of children and grandchildren will be unable to cope with or financially support their elderly family members; and there is serious doubt about the government's ability to step into the breach.

Family and Economic Reform
Since the death of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1976) and the implementation of economic reforms (1978–79), the proportion of the population living in urban areas has increased from 18 percent to 45 percent. Urban life has weakened the patriarchal nature of the family (partly because access to agricultural land is not a factor), raised the status of women, decreased illiteracy, and raised educational levels.

Urban living, with all of its modern and Western influences, has also begun to affect China's two-parent, one-child family structure: Divorce rates are rising in China's larger cities, thus making the patrilineal nature of the family even more vulnerable for a fast-growing section of the population. But compared to the United States, where roughly one-third of all first marriages end in divorce—and despite the "sanctioning" of divorce by the CCP in the reformed Marriage Laws of 1950—the divorce rate in China overall remains extremely low: 1.2 percent of men and 0.8 percent of women. (The unbalanced statistics reflect the trend for ex-wives to remarry more often after the break-ups of their marriages than ex-husbands.)
Economic reforms have renewed the power of the family in rural China because the rights to use agricultural land, to make decisions about its use, and to sell the products for profit have reverted to the family unit from the communal production team. Wealth and income again belong to the patriarchal family unit, although the gradual shift from agriculture gives some decision-making power to the men and women who earn outside income. Rural marriage is still usually patrilocal and patrilineal. Limits on permanent migration out of the village continue to reinforce the rural family’s control over its members. Although temporary migration from a village is allowed, most migrants must assume that they cannot permanently leave the rural areas.

China’s strengthened rural family today is, from an economic standpoint, a flexible and positive force in the midst of rapid economic change. The rural family keeps its tiny pieces of arable land and farms them but also frees up its surplus laborers to work in rural industry or services or to migrate for work. The family diversifies its sources of income and spreads its risks across different economic sectors and into different places. It pools its resources for goals of the family. It supports its dependents—children, elderly, the underemployed and unemployed, the sick and disabled. This support is important because barely any social safety net exists in China’s vast rural areas.

**Source of Stability**

Today China’s rural families are robust in the face of considerable uncertainty. The transition from agriculture to nonagricultural sectors of the economy in rural China is occurring inside the family, as it has for the last century in rural families of the United States. The strong family is also helping urban China survive the destabilizing storms of massive layoffs of workers in state-owned industries and widespread loss of medical insurance benefits.

China’s traditional marriage and family systems have been buffeted by political attacks, communal farming, economic development, legal changes, the rising status of women, and foreign ideas and influences. Some changes, such as the decline of arranged marriage, have been deep and real. Within today’s families decision making is less hierarchical and more shared and consultative than it was in the past. No longer is ancestor worship a strong belief system.

Despite the real changes, China’s patrilocal and patrilineal family remains strong. It has survived and has enjoyed renewal because it works. As China moves toward a market economy, millions of people have to change what they do to earn a living. Millions are displaced or sidelined during the transition, and the dislocation and confusion are profound. China’s people need their families to fall back on, and people are doing what they can to keep their families intact. Marriage and family are surprisingly strong in China today, and they show few signs of weakening.

**Judith BANISTER**

**Further Reading**


Marriage, Imperial

Fēngjiān dìguó shìdài de hūnyīn
封建帝国时代的婚姻

In imperial China (211 BCE–1912 CE), the institution of marriage—which influenced succession and property rights—followed laws and customs based in both Chinese tradition and Confucian principles.

In Confucian China, as in most of the world, the family was the heart of society. Not surprisingly, many provisions in the legal codes of the successive dynasties dealt with the family. But customs and extralegal institutions including clans, guilds, and religious and professional associations also played important roles in the resolution of problems associated with disputes involving marriages, families, and property.

Among the five key human relationships in Confucian China, three pertained to the family: They were between parents and children, husband and wife, and elder and younger siblings. Reciprocal obligations governed the conduct of each person in a relationship, and in each case one party was superior to the other. For example, the parent, husband, and elder sibling were superior to the child, wife, and younger sibling respectively, assumed more responsibilities, and were accorded greater respect. The remaining two relationships were between ruler and subject, which paralleled that between parents and children, and between friends, a relationship essentially between equals. Confucian philosophy also taught that there were the Three Bonds that were fundamental in human society: They were between the ruler and subject, parents and children, and husband and wife. The fact that two of these three pertain to the family further bolsters the importance of that institution.

Marriage

The Chinese family was patrilineal, that is the main line was traced through the male, and patrilocal, meaning that a woman left her natal family to live with her husband’s family. She was subordinate to both her husband and his parents, but her status in her new family rose with age and the bearing of children, especially sons. Marriages were arranged by family elders, often through go-betweens; many among them were female professionals and were paid for their services. A betrothal involved presents from the groom’s family to the prospective bride, and there was sometimes a written contract. The breaking of a betrothal was a serious matter that could result in litigation. A bride entered marriage with a dowry, usually consisting of jewelry, clothing, and furnishings. Rarely did she receive landed property from her parents, because farm land and real estate usually went to male children. Although a married woman retained her own surname, her children took the surname of their father. If the bride had no brothers, a marriage contract could stipulate that the groom take up residence with his wife’s family and that their children assume her surname and inherit her property. Technically the husband controlled the money assets that a wife brought to a marriage.

The governments of successive dynasties strongly encouraged the institution of marriage and the raising of families, sometimes by drastically raising the poll tax on
unmarried adults. Most marriages were monogamous, although wealthy men sometimes took concubines. Although multigenerational extended families were exalted, in practice most ordinary people lived in nuclear families or three-generation families.

Divorces were permitted and could be initiated by either party, but were rare because a divorce involved not just two individuals but also their families. A husband could divorce his wife more easily than she could divorce him, and such issues as unfilial behavior towards his parents, barrenness, and incurable disease were legitimate reasons. Barrenness was seldom a cause for divorce, however, because often a husband would take a secondary wife or concubine, whose son would be “adopted” by his wife as their heir; alternately a boy who belonged to the same lineage as a husband would be adopted as an heir. But the legal codes of dynastic China protected a woman in marriage by prohibiting her husband from divorcing her under three circumstances: if she had observed mourning for either of her parents-in-law, if her husband’s family had risen in wealth and position since their marriage, or if she had no family of her own to return to. A wife could obtain a divorce with the intervention of a magistrate and for causes such as abuse or abandonment. Divorces were also permitted by mutual consent.

Women, especially those from middle- or upper-class families, were discouraged from remarriage upon widowhood. Many communities in premodern China erected tablets and arches to commemorate the lives and actions of chaste widows. Men, however, were under no such restrictions, and young widowers usually remarried. Although men clearly enjoyed rights superior to those enjoyed by women, Chinese society and families also practiced a division of labor where the wife and mother controlled the household. Sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law also owed obedience to both parents.

Succession and Property

Feudalism, where children inherited the status and rank of their fathers, had declined during the later centuries

One of the wedding traditions of wealthy families in imperial China was to transport the bride to her in-law’s house in a sedan chair.
of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) and ended with the Qin unification of China in 221 BCE; it was only briefly and partially reinstated during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Therefore succession by sons to a father’s position involved only the ruling families and a small number of nobles. Even among the royalty and nobility a man had only one wife, although his rank and the need to ensure the succession allowed him to have secondary consorts or concubines. Primogeniture prevailed: that is, the eldest son of the wife was heir, and if she had no son, the sons of the secondary consorts would succeed according to age and sometimes the rank of the mother. Occasionally the sons of a high-ranking official were entitled to hold a junior office without qualifying for it through the civil service exams.

Since traditional China was mainly an agricultural state, land was the main source of wealth. Daughters rarely received a portion of their parents’ landed property; usually this happened only if she had no brothers. The daughter’s inheritance was generally her dowry. All sons, including sons born by concubines, usually received equal shares of the parents’ landed property, with the eldest son sometimes receiving somewhat more because he usually assumed additional responsibilities in caring for aged parents and in conducting rites of ancestor worship. A widow received her deceased husband’s share as guardian for her minor sons. She would forfeit that right if she remarried. As a result of the custom that divided landed property among male heirs, huge landed estates were rare in imperial China.

Both legal statutes and customs played key roles in governing the lives of men and women. Most laws upheld customs and the moral consensus. As in other spheres of activity, men and women in imperial China tended to settle their disputes through arbitration and informal means, going to the courts only as a last resort. Finally, the fundamental principles that governed interpersonal relationships were based on Confucian ethics and predicated on hierarchy and reciprocity with the goal of achieving social harmony.

Jiu-hwa Lo UPSHUR

Further Reading

Martial Arts (Wushu)

Movements originating in fighting systems developed throughout China’s history have been stylized into routines touted for individual physical fitness and psychological well-being as well as contact sports and competitive exhibitions. China’s martial arts influenced those of other countries and have inspired literature and movies.

Wushu is a Chinese term usually translated as martial arts. Wu is associated with military and warfare; shu with the skill, way, or methods of doing an activity. Wushu describes Chinese martial traditions from their origins in early stone-age cultures to a wide variety of martially-inspired practices seen today. (The term gongfu, or kung-fu, often used in the West to refer to Chinese martial arts, is composed of two Chinese characters referring to the time and effort required to accomplish a task. The term can be applied to any human activity and is applied to martial arts only because of the time and effort required to become skilled in these arts.) Wushu, although primarily focused on fighting arts, has also long been associated with physical conditioning, dance, drama, meditative exercise, and competitive exhibition. The sophisticated repertoire of techniques coupled with philosophies of self-cultivation make wushu a vital aspect of China’s culture. Wushu has influenced the martial traditions of neighboring countries and eventually the rest of the world.

Origins and Development

The technological and social changes that have occurred during China’s long history are mirrored by the evolution of Chinese martial traditions. Fighting arts required a variety of defensive and offensive specializations, from basic hand-to-hand combat to complex techniques of large-scale warfare. An overview of the development of Chinese wushu helps clarify the significance of today’s martial arts.

Originating in the need for protection against other people and dangerous animals, Chinese martial systems naturally grew more complex as Chinese society grew more complex. The first fighting methods were designed for hand-to-hand combat: techniques were developed that used the hands, feet, elbows, knees, and head. These early skills were refined and supplemented by the use of hunting and farming tools made of wood and stone, including the club, spear, and knife. As metals came into use and basic technology developed, a variety of weaponry became available. Chinese society came to place more and more emphasis on warfare, and the martial arts became a specialized profession for many. With the advent of modern firearms in China, traditional martial arts were more commonly practiced as forms of exercise and sport.

Rudimentary forms of Chinese martial arts developed in the early Neolithic period. Basic fighting methods served to protect individuals, families, and clans. They also provided entertainment, as in games of “head buttting” in which contestants donned animal horns. By the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), wushu had already reached
A man practices martial arts in the morning on the grounds of the Temple of Heaven in Beijing. Photo by Tom Christensen.

...
But all too often the imperial political–military structure crumbled, leaving the commoners to fend for themselves. Other groups developed their own highly effective fighting systems. These groups often organized themselves around a common social bond, be it linguistic, social, or philosophic.

Because specially gifted individuals are credited with the creation of specific martial systems, their own families often retained hold of the tradition by passing on their knowledge from generation to generation. Their concerns were primarily for the security of family and clan. Their limited resources kept their focus on developing skills an individual fighter could employ, including weapons such as sword, spear, or knife. The conflicts they encountered were often with individuals or with small groups, so open-hand boxing skills were also of great importance.

Martial art styles were usually named for the people, places, or philosophic ideas associated with them. There are a few hundred known Chinese styles, but many more styles and substiles remain to be categorized. For simplicity, martial art styles are sometimes placed into general categories, such as Northern/Southern, Internal/External, or Daoist/Buddhist, and sometimes they are categorized according to their place of origin. The modern nanquan style of martial arts is derived from techniques developed in southern China.

Some Chinese martial arts developed in association with religious centers. Temples were often places of refuge during times of turmoil. They attracted a variety of people from all segments of Chinese society, including martial experts who came from near and far to live together, often discussing and comparing their knowledge. Some temples, such as the Buddhist temple of Shaolin in Henan Province, became universities where leading experts contributed to the preservation and evolution of the martial arts. The modern changquan style of martial arts is derived from techniques developed in southern China.

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China exemplified refined culture to surrounding Asian countries for many centuries. This holds true for Chinese martial traditions as well. The martial arts in Japan, Korea, and Indonesia, for example, were influenced by encounters with Chinese people, such as those occurring during trade, immigration, or war. Okinawan karate derived from China’s Fujian Province; the founder of Korean tae kwon do studied wushu while serving in the military in Manchuria.

Some martial traditions have become extinct due to the rise of modern weaponry. Nonetheless, in China many martial arts remain intact. The continued popularity of these arts is due, in part, to their pervasive presence in Chinese culture. Their historical importance has been the subject of many literary endeavors, including a separate martial arts genre. As moving art forms, the martial arts are valued living expressions of their developers’ creativity and genius. Martial art forms are also cherished for their therapeutic benefits, and in China the majority of people practicing a martial art do so primarily for this reason. However, the martial arts can be found in theatrical productions, self-defense classes, military training programs, entertainment industries, meditative practices, and sporting events. Knowledge of Asian martial arts likewise spread to the rest of the world, the movie industry being the most significant popularizer.

Modern Competitive Sport

Martial art exhibitions are a long-standing tradition in China. Competitions were held regularly in provinces, and now national and international competitions are held. Routines standardized by government regulations are taught in specialized martial art schools and in colleges having departments dedicated to wushu. Martial arts training is still held at Shaolin Temple.

Competitive martial art exhibitions have transformed traditional solo routines by selectively adapting elements from traditional systems and by incorporating gymnastic elements for greater visual effects. Matches between individuals, usually judged on a point system, place limitations on the type of techniques used. Taolu (forms) comprise basic movements (stances, kicks, punches, balances, jumps, sweeps, and throws). Competitions often highlight two major categories: changquan (long fist) and nanquan (southern fist). Changquan, the style associated with Shaolin monks, involves whirling, running, leaping, and acrobatics. Nanquan style, based on styles developed in southern China, is typically less acrobatic than changquan and features low stances and intricate hand movements. Taijiquan style is famous for its slow movements. Routines of any style may include stylized use of a “weapon.” For example, qiangshu is a changquan style using the qiang, or spear.
Sanchu (sparring) is another wushu event. This sport was influenced by Chinese boxing and Chinese wrestling. Both men and women compete.

The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Wushu Tournament, although not an official Olympic event, was sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee. Wang Xiaolin, secretary general of the International Wushu Federation and president of Chinese Wushu Association, described this tournament not only as a showcase but as a way to promote world understanding of Chinese culture. Taolu events for men and women (ten gold medals) included all three categories of forms. There were Sanchu events in three weight classes for men and in two weight classes for women, awarding a total of five gold medals. China led all countries in the number of medals won at this tournament, with eight of the fifteen gold medals. (Russia was second in medal count with two gold and three silver medals.)

Outlook

The martial arts are practiced for a variety of reasons in all parts of the world today. Some are either attracted to wushu or seek to suppress its practice because of its perceived violence. Martial sports competitions draw enthusiastic crowds. Such sporting events range from full-contact bouts with no rules, to no-contact tournaments with rules to prevent injuries and to ensure fairness in judging. The Beijing Olympic Games Wushu Tournament drew contestants from forty-three countries, a testimony to wushu’s international popularity; there is a need, however, for a single internationally recognized system for teaching, ranking, and judging. Still others desire to learn martial arts for the many potential physical and psychological benefits offered. Taijiquan, with its slow movements, is especially suited for the elderly. Martial arts studios for children promote the confidence-building aspects of the discipline. More than ever, individuals are attracted to the study of wushu not simply as a physical activity, but as a way of self-discovery.

Michael A. DeMARCO and Nicole MUCHMORE

Further Reading


William Alexander Parsons Martin was a Presbyterian missionary and a pioneer in modern Chinese state education. Through his translations and his work as an educator, Martin contributed to China’s growing global engagement during the late nineteenth century.

William Alexander Parsons Martin was born in Livonia, Indiana, into a family with strong ties to the missionary movement. He arrived in China in 1850 and worked until 1860 as a missionary in Ningbo, where he wrote his famous *Tiandao suyuan* (*Evidences of Christianity*). During these years he believed that the Taiping Rebellion was a means of creating a Christian China. In 1863 Martin founded the Presbyterian mission in Beijing soon after the city was opened to foreign residents. His work as an interpreter for the Sino-American Treaty of 1858, and his friendship with Robert Hart, an Irish-born diplomat who served in China, and the U.S. minister to China, Anson Burlingame (1820–1870), provided him with contacts to the Zongli Yamen, the new ministry responsible for foreign affairs. Under its tutelage Martin completed a translation of Henry Wheaton’s *Elements of International Law* (1836) into Chinese in April 1865. From 1869 to 1895 Martin served as president of the Tongwenguan, a school established in 1862 to help prepare Manchu and Chinese students for a career in the diplomatic service. During the 100-Day Reforms in the summer of 1898 Sun Jianai (1827–1909), president of the recently founded Imperial University (later Beijing University), asked Martin to serve as head of faculty.

When Boxer militias, obviously supported by the Chinese government, laid siege to the legation quarters in Beijing in June 1900, Martin was among hundreds of foreigners and Chinese Christians who had barricaded
themselves for weeks in the British legation. This experience briefly altered Martin’s usually optimistic stance on China. In his eyewitness account, Siege in Peking, and several newspaper articles he demanded punishment for China’s violations of international law. Martin, however, soon reversed his gloomy outlook, fully applauding the Chinese government’s post-Boxer reforms. From 1902 to 1905 Martin acted as head of the reformer Zhang Zhidong’s new university in Wuchang. From 1906 to his death in 1916 Martin served as an honorary missionary for the Presbyterian mission in Beijing.

In his sixty-six years in China Martin played an important role as a crosscultural communicator. His Chinese publications on law and modern science were meant to disperse what he considered to be Chinese superstitions and to demonstrate Western civilization as a harmonious interplay of the sciences and Christianity. His English publications, frequent articles in the New York Times, and several well-received books and research papers introduced Chinese civilization in a comparatively positive light. As a missionary, Martin played the role of a well-known maverick. His acceptance of Darwinism and his view of both Buddhism and Confucianism as meaningful predecessors to Christianity were not generally shared. His willingness to accept Chinese ancestral rites as generally compatible with Christianity and to bow in front of an image of the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) during school ceremonies repeatedly scandalized the missionary community in China.

Lydia GERBER

Further Reading

Throughout China’s long history massage has often been used by Chinese as a conservative treatment for many ailments such as sprained joints and impaired circulation. Developed around the ancient Chinese principles of yin and yang and the concept of qi, or life force, therapeutic massage remains a popular medical technique today.

Archaeological studies have shown that as early as 2700 BCE the Chinese in the Huang (Yellow) River Valley were using massage for healing purposes. During the period of Warring States (475–221 BCE), Bian Que, a legendary physician, was said to have used massage and acupuncture successfully to treat a patient suffering from shock. Today massage therapy is widely used as an alternative to surgical procedures and chemical treatment for a number of ailments and medical conditions.

The principles of massage developed alongside the basic principles of traditional Chinese medicine. The first principle is the theory of yin and yang. Simply stated, the concept of yin and yang in medicine accepts that the organs of the body are interrelated and that illness is caused by an imbalance in yin and yang, opposite yet complementary influences. The second basic principle is the belief in the flow of qi (vital energy, or life force) through certain channels of the body and through the collaterals, small blood vessels that the body develops and which can bypass a blockage in a larger blood vessel. In accord with
these beliefs, massage is thought to not only heal an injury at one particular location but also influence the entire body or parts of the body through encouraging energy to flow through the channels and collaterals that regulate the balance of yin and yang. Massage, then, is used to stimulate circulation, heal injuries, and treat disease.

Techniques in Chinese massage include rubbing, stroking, kneading, and tapping with the hands as well as with the healer’s arm and elbow on the patient’s body and extremities. The effect of manipulation through massage is directly related to the technique used—mild or powerful manipulations, vigorous or soft performance, quick or slow frequency—thus directing the flow of qi.

Therapeutic massage is used in China as a conservative treatment for orthopedic disorders such as tight shoulder muscles, lumbago, protrusion of a spinal disc, and joint sprains. Chinese orthopedic surgeons do not consider therapeutic massage and surgical treatment as opposites, but as complementary treatments. Therapeutic massage, using only the doctor’s hands, relieves the patient’s pain and avoids the side effects of chemical agents, such as repeated local injections of steroids. It can also frequently eliminate the side effects of unnecessary surgical procedures. In most Chinese hospitals today, a section of massage treatment is often affiliated with the department of physical therapy.

CHEN Bao–xing and Garé LeCOMPTE

Further Reading


Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, and four years later his mausoleum was completed in Nanjing City. The mausoleum has become a sacred place for Chinese separated by the Taiwan Strait. Magnificently designed, from the steps to the tomb itself, meanings are embedded in the architecture honoring the founding father and his comrades who fell in the fight against Qing rule.

Sun Yat-sen, forerunner of the revolution against the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and founder of the Republic of China, died of liver cancer in Beijing on 12 March 1925. Before his death he expressed the desire that his body be buried on Mount Zijin (Purple Mountain), also known as Mount Zhong (Bell Mountains), in Nanjing, capital of the Republic of China. His body was temporarily kept in the Biyun Temple (Temple of Azure Clouds) on the Xiangshan Mountain (Mount Fragrance) in Beijing until his official burial in Nanjing.

Building of the Mausoleum
On 5 May 1925, an advertisement was made to invite architects from home and abroad to design a mausoleum for Sun. Lu Yanzhi (1894–1929), a graduate of Cornell University and a renowned architect of modern China, was selected. Construction of the mausoleum began in June 1926 and was completed in the spring of 1929. The train that carried Sun’s body left Beijing on 26 May and arrived in Nanjing two days later. The body was then moved along a boulevard built specifically for that purpose, named Zhongshan Lu (Sun Yat-sen Road,) to the mausoleum site. A public memorial service was held for three days before Sun was laid to rest on 1 June 1929 in what is officially known as the Mausoleum of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Architecture of the Mausoleum
The mausoleum was built inside a cemetery park that occupies an area of about 7,413 hectares (18,317 acres) and extends north from the entrance toward the foot of Mount Zijin, against which the mausoleum structure rests. Seen from an aerial perspective the park evokes the shape of an alarm bell, representative of Sun’s call to action in behalf of the Chinese people. Along the axis of the symmetrically designed site is a string of buildings approached from an open paved space in the shape of a half-moon, the curved bottom of the bell. From there, in order, are a gateway, a gatehouse, a stele pavilion, a mourning hall, and lastly the mausoleum.

From the half-moon open space a three-lane, 392-step path of more than 480 meters (1,575 feet) leads upward toward the tomb, and is flanked by rows of trees. The concrete middle lane is 12 meters (39 feet) wide, and each of the asphalt side lanes is 4.2 meters (13.7 feet) wide. At the start of the tomb path towers a granite paifang (a memorial gateway in the Japanese torii style) with three arches.
Written on the transom of the middle arch is Dr. Sun’s motto: *bo’ai* (universal love). Next is the gatehouse, which is 16.5 meters (about 54 feet) high and 27 meters (about 88 feet) wide and has three archways. A path leads to a three-arch tomb gate, serving as the entrance of the mausoleum. Above the middle arch is a slab inscribed with Dr. Sun’s maxim: *Tianxia wei gong* (All under the sun is for the welfare of the public). Not far behind the gatehouse stands the granite pavilion housing a stele that is 9 meters (about 29 feet) tall and 4 meters (about 13 feet) wide. An inscription on the stele reads: “The Nationalist Party of China has buried Mr. President Sun Yat-sen here on the first day of the sixth month in the eighteenth year of the Republic of China.” The Nationalists did not eulogize Sun at length, as tradition dictated, arguing that no words could praise him enough.

After the stele pavilion the tomb path, with 290 steps left, becomes steeper, punctuated with eight platforms. On the fifth platform sit two large copper ding (tripod caldrons), donated by the then Shanghai municipal government. Two holes are visible in one of them, created by the shrapnel of the Japanese army sacking Nanjing in 1937. A pair of stone lions rests on the seventh platform.

At the end of the tomb path is the Mourning Hall, 30 meters (98.4 feet) long, 25 meters (82 feet) wide, and 29 meters (95 feet) high. Combining Chinese and Western styles, the Mourning Hall has a double-eave saddle roof and three archways decorated with copper latticework on the top. Above the archways is engraved the creed of the Kuomintang (Taiwan’s Nationalist Party)—“Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood”—which are the Three Principles of People put forward by Sun Yat-sen. Hanging between the eaves is a board bearing Dr. Sun’s handwriting that reads: *Tiandi zhengqi* (Uprightness between Heaven and Earth). Outside the hall a pair of 12.6-meter-tall (about 41 feet) huabiao (ornamental columns) guards it on either side. Inside, twelve marble columns hold up the hall. Ceramic tiles cover the floor and ceiling. The ceiling tiles form a mosaic.

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The Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, located in Nanjing, painted by Fu Pao-Shih (1904–1965), head of the Kiangsu Academy. The mausoleum was under construction for three years before its completion in 1929.
depicting the Kuomintang’s flag, a white sun in a sky-blue field. The upper half of the walls is decorated with artificial marble; the lower half, with black marble. A 4.6-meter-tall (15 feet) statue of Sun Yat-sen sits in the center of the hall. It was carved by the famous French sculptor Paul Arinsky from Italian white marble. Looking forward in his long gown, Sun holds an open book on his lap, signifying his wisdom. Around the foot of the statue, six relief sculptures represent some of his revolutionary activities. The Outline for National Reconstruction, drawn and penned by Sun, is inscribed on the walls on either side of the statue.

Behind the statue on the back wall of the Mourning Hall, a doorway opens to the tomb itself. Inscribed on a board above the two-leaved copper door in the front is, “Their noble spirits live forever,” which Sun had dedicated to those who died in the fight against the Qing army. On the single-leaved copper door behind are etched the characters, “The tomb of Mr. Sun Yat-sen.” The well-lit hemispherical burial chamber, forming the top of the bell seen in bird’s eye view, is 18 meters (59 feet) in diameter and 11 meters (36 feet) high. Its three-layered walls are fortified with granite, armored concrete, and artificial marble. A circular marble pit 4.3 meters (14 feet) in diameter and 1.6 meters (about 5.2 feet) deep is at the center of the chamber. It is surrounded with railings and floored with white ceramic tiles. A sarcophagus with a marble statue of Sun Yat-sen lying on top of it is situated in the pit. The statue was carved by a Czech sculptor known as Gorch. Some 5 meters (16.4 feet) beneath the sarcophagus, Sun’s body rests in an American-made copper coffin, 2.24 meters (about 7.35 feet) long, 0.8 meter (2.6 feet) wide, and 0.65 meter (2.1 feet) tall.

There are many auxiliary memorial buildings in the cemetery, including the Cottage of Eternal Admiration, the Burial Museum, the Buddhist Scripture Pavilion, a bandstand, and several other structures.

Recent Activities at the Mausoleum

Since the completion of the mausoleum, Chinese people have come to visit it every day. On 27 April 2005, Lien Chan, chairman of the Kuomintang, made his party’s first visit to the site since 1949. A week after the Kuomintang won the election and came into power again in Taiwan on 20 May 2008, Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and his entourage came to the mausoleum to visit Sun. Surprised by the structure’s excellent condition, Wu was profoundly thankful to the Nanjing people for taking good care of it in the past decades.

Haiwang YUAN

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China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Located at Lintong in Shaanxi Province, the mausoleum of the first emperor, Shi Huangdi of the Qin clan (reigned 246–210 BCE), is the site of one of greatest archaeological finds, in terms of physical content and historic importance. Most famous is 8,000-troop army of life-size terracotta figures—cavalry soldiers and infantrymen, horses and chariots—all positioned in proper military order.

The gigantic earth mound marking the underground burial chamber is 350 meters long on each side. The height of the mound is about 52 meters. A passage in the historian Sima Qian’s Shiji (Records of the Historian) recorded the grandeur of the burial chamber, noting that the chamber contained waterways filled with mercury, terrestrial topography, and depictions of heavenly constellations illuminated by candles made of whale oil so they could burn forever.

Sima Qian’s description has fascinated readers for more than two thousand years. Archaeological surveys and remote sensing technology in 2002 provided us with more tangible details of the lavishly constructed mausoleum. A massive sloped wall some 30 meters high, constructed with the pounded-earth technique, was detected above the burial chamber, which measures about 170 meters from east to west and 145 meters from north to south. Discoveries of fragments of ceramic tiles near the wall further indicate the existence of a large-scale underground palace beneath the mound.

Since the discovery in 1974 of the underground terracotta army located east of the burial mound outside the wall, Chinese archaeologists have uncovered more remains beyond those enclosed within the wall, suggesting that the first emperor’s mortuary precinct was far grander than previously believed. One hundred eighty-one pits (chambers) designated for different purposes have been found so far in an area of 56 square kilometers in and out of the mortuary precinct of the mausoleum.

To the west of the outer wall are cemeteries of workers and prisoners and sacrificial tombs. Sacrificial and animal tombs are located to the north. To the east are the famous terracotta army pits, including pits 1, 2, and 3, one unfinished pit, and other sacrificial tombs, including nearly one hundred chambers containing terracotta grooms and sacrifices of horses. Inscriptions on objects from those pits suggest the horses were part of the imperial stable.
In the western area between the inner and outer walls, from north to south, an administrative building site, administrative sites of mess officers, an accompanying cemetery, sacrificial animal pits, and stable pits have been identified. In the southeastern corner between the inner and outer walls are three pits: K9902, K9801 (pit of stone armor and helmets), and K9901, containing a bronze ding (three-legged cauldron) and terracotta acrobats.

Remains of a side hall and an accompanying cemetery were found to the north within the inner wall. The mausoleum in the central south is surrounded by a retiring hall in which the soul of the emperor could rest, more sacrificial pits, a bronze chariot pit, and a terracotta figure pit (K006). Archaeological surveys have found many other remains whose structure and function have not been fully identified yet.

**Bronze Chariot Models**

Two painted bronze chariot models, half the size of real chariots, were found in 1980 west of the burial mound within the inner wall. Each chariot, driven by a charioteer and pulled by a group of four horses, was intended to be the transport of the first emperor in the afterlife. Both chariots were primarily decorated with cloud motifs and geometric designs such as diamonds and squares and mainly painted with blue, green, and white colors, creating a dazzling effect. These two bronze chariots exemplify the excellent workmanship of that time. Each consists of 3,400 bronze parts, but one chariot is furnished with an additional 1,720 gold and silver ornaments.

Pit K006, south of the burial mound, was discovered in 2000. It contains twelve life-size standing terracotta figures, four bronze yue axes, a wooden chariot, and twenty horse sacrifices. Among those twelve figures, eight represent Qin government civil officials (identified by the ceramic knife hanging on their waist). More sacrificial pits, remains of architecture, and accompanying burials have been located north of the burial mound within the inner wall.

Pit K007 was discovered in 2001 between the inner and outer wall at the northwestern corner. An interesting discovery from this pit is forty-six vividly depicted bronze swans, geese, and a crane, all of which were displayed on each side of an artificial river. Fifteen additional terracotta figures in kneeling and sitting poses were uncovered from the same pit, suggesting they were hunters. The bronze crane, originally painted and carefully rendered in detail with feathers, stands elegantly on a cloud, indicated by two separate bronze bases attached to its feet. Its naturalistic depiction makes it a masterpiece of Qin dynasty art.

Historical records show that 720,000 laborers were conscripted from all over the Qin dynasty to build the mausoleum. The most impressive and best-known discovery in the underground complex is an 8,000-troop terracotta army. Photo by Yixuan Shuke.
The artist captured the moment that the crane plucked a worm from the water.

Representations of acrobats in different motions were found in pit K9901 southeast of the burial mound between the inner and outer wall. Each of the eleven painted, life-size terracotta figures is dressed in a tunic, with a robust body and a naked torso. A large bronze ding of 212 kilograms, likely used by the acrobats for a weightlifting performance, was found in the same pit. Another large pit, K9801, north of pit 9901, has yielded 150 suits of stone armor, 50 stone helmets, and a set of horse body armor. The suits of armor, composed of small pieces of stone plaques, were carefully sewn together with bronze wires.

Terracotta Army

The most impressive and best-known discovery in the mausoleum complex is the massive underground terracotta army from three pits 1.5 kilometers east of the burial mound. The incredible scale and grandness of the army have earned the army the title “eighth wonder of the world.” A museum has been built on site to protect this great cultural heritage and to allow tourists to visit.

The three pits are tunnel-like structures with brick floors separated by partitions constructed with pounded earth and covered by logs and lined with mats. Pit 1 is the largest, containing about six thousand terracotta figures, chariots, and horses all arranged in battle array in eleven trenches. They are identified as the replicas of the right imperial army, including cavalrymen and foot soldiers. Pit 2, in an irregular “L” shape, is about 20 meters north of pit 1. It was furnished with 1,400 figures arranged in four sections. In the eastern section are archers in standing and kneeling poses; in the southern section are war chariots each drawn by four horses; in the central part of the pit is a mixture of chariots, foot soldiers, and mounted soldiers; in the northern section are cavalrymen. They are the left imperial army. Pit 3, northwest of pit 1, covers an area of 524 square meters and contains sixty-eight soldiers, one chariot, and four horses. It is identified as the headquarters of the whole army. Unfurnished pit 4 was meant to contain the replicas of the central army. Some forty thousand bronze weapons were unearthed from three pits, giving us a comprehensive view of the armaments of the Qin dynasty.

Thousands Conscripted

The magnitude and diverse physiognomy of the terracotta warriors amaze many people. Manufacturing an army of eight thousand figures must have been a large-scale production supervised by the Qin central administration. Historical records show that 720,000 laborers were conscripted from all over the Qin dynasty to build the mausoleum. The project took thirty-seven years. The mobilization of resources and laborers for this project was unprecedented in Chinese history. Some eighty names were inscribed on the terracotta warriors, giving us some clues about the craftsmen who created them. Some artists came from the workshop at the Qin court; some were recruited from the area of the Qin capital Xianyang; artists from municipal and community workshops were also involved.

Although some body parts of the figures, such as the torsos, heads, and hands, were molded, headgear, attire, and facial features were carefully rendered in detail to show the rank and function of the individual soldiers. Bright colors such as red, blue, green, purple, and orange were applied originally on different parts of the sculptures to distinguish the armor and robe worn by the particular rank of the soldiers. Scholars have suggested that the color was applied in several steps: First a layer of lacquer was applied, followed by a white layer of coating; on top of that colors were brushed on.

Terracotta horses from the mausoleum of Qin Shi huang. PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL.
The first emperor’s underground kingdom is not just the reflection of his religious belief and his quest for immortality during the Qin dynasty but also an extravagant display of his ambition to rule China forever.

**Further Reading**


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Mawangdui Han Tombs

Three tombs of the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) have been discovered at Mawangdui in the eastern suburb of Changsha in Hunan Province. They belonged to the marquis of Dai, Li Cang, his consort, Lady Dai, and their son. These tombs have thousands of artifacts including bamboo objects, lacquerwares, musical instruments, ceramic vessels, wooden figures, silk paintings, garments and manuscripts.

The three Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) tombs at Mawangdui in the eastern suburb of Changsha in Hunan Province belonged to the marquis of Dai, Li Cang (tomb 2, d. 193 BCE), his consort, Lady Dai (tomb 1, d. after 168 BCE), whose name was Xin Zhui; and their son (tomb 3, d. 168 BCE). These burials, excavated from 1972 to 1974, were rectangular earthen pits with a ramp in the north and by two huge earthen mounds on the top, each about 40 meters in diameter and 16 meters in height.

The tomb of Lady Dai was the largest of the three, measuring 19.5 meters from north to south and 17.8 meters from east to west. The burial chamber was filled with 10,000 kilograms of charcoal and sealed with white (gaoling) clay 1–1.3 meters thick, a practice aimed at creating an environment with a stable temperature and humidity so the body of the deceased and accompanying burial goods could be well preserved. Astonishingly, the body of Lady Dai has survived more than two thousand years. In the four compartments of the outer coffin (guo) were fourteen hundred burial goods, including bamboo objects and strips, lacquerware, musical instruments, ceramic vessels, silks, and wooden figures. Among the burial goods was a plain silk garment described in the archeological report as “as thin as a cicada wing” and “as light as the mist.” It weighs only 49 grams, a marvelous example of advanced silk-making technology in early Han China.

The body of Lady Dai, dressed in two garments and wrapped in eighteen layers of shroud, was laid in four layers of painted coffins. The outermost coffin was painted with black lacquer, the second with more than 110 scenes showing mythical animals and figures traveling in clouds against a black background, and the third with auspicious motifs, including dragons, tigers, vermilion birds, and mythical figures in a vermilion ground. The innermost coffin was decorated with brocade and tied with six to seven layers of silk ribbons. A T-shaped silk painting about 2 meters long was draped over the innermost coffin. It is identified as feiyi (a flying garment) by some scholars based on the inventory list of the burial goods recorded on the bamboo strips. The painting was likely a funerary banner that depicted the soul of Lady Dai traveling from the underground to the world of the living and ascending to heaven. The underground world depicted in the lower section of the painting includes water creatures and a robust man holding the Earth; the middle section of the painting framed by two intertwined dragons in a bi (disk) represents the world of the living, showing family members mourning the death of Lady Dai and a portrait...
of her; on the top is the representation of heaven inhabited by dragons in swirling clouds and deer-like creatures ridden by mythical figures. A mythical figure shown entwined by a snake and identified as Fu Xi (male) or Nu Wa (female), the progenitor of the Chinese, stands in the center of heaven flanked by the sun with a raven and the moon; a toad appears at each corner.

The tomb of the marquis of Dai, tomb 2, has been severely looted. A major discovery from tomb 3 is twenty-eight individual manuscripts written on silk (boshu). Those manuscripts include different editions of ancient classics, such as the Zhouyi and Laozi, covering politics, warfare, astronomy, medicine, nutrition, physiognomy (the art of discovering temperament and character from outward appearance), and divination. Many of these editions had been thought to be irretrievably lost.

In addition, five hundred lacquerware items, including food and wine containers as well as furniture, were discovered in tombs 1 and 3. Many of them were manufactured at the official workshops at Chengdu, a major center of lacquer production in the Han dynasty.

Yan SUN

Further Reading


May First Labor Festival

Wǔ Yī Guójì Láodòngjié

The International Labor Day, known in China as the May First Labor Festival, or simply May First, is celebrated in previous and present Communist countries, although it originated in the United States.

International Labor Day is celebrated in China and many other countries on 1 May. The Chinese customarily call it Wuyi Lao dong ji e (May First Labor Festival) or simply Wuyi (May First). Ironically, the United States, where this international festival originated, celebrates its own Labor Day on the first Monday of September.

In the nineteenth century, working conditions in the industrial West were miserable. Workers labored from ten to sixteen hours a day. They struggled constantly to get their employers to sanction an eight-hour workday. In 1884 the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, which later became the American Federation of Labor, resolved that from 1 May 1886 eight hours would constitute a legal day’s labor. That day more than 300,000 workers across the United States went on strike. On 3 May violence broke out at the McCormick Reaper Works, in Chicago, resulting in the death of six strikers at the hands of the police. The next day, while a protest against police brutality was going on at the Haymarket Square, a bomb exploded and killed a police sergeant. In response the police fired back, and a conflict between the two sides left seven policemen and four workers dead. Later four strike leaders were tried and hanged for the incident.

In 1886 the Geneva Congress of the First International, led by Communist leaders in Europe, proposed that eight hours be the legal limit of a workday. In 1889 the restructured International, later known as the Second International, decided in Paris to set aside 1 May as a day when workers of the world gathered to fight for the eight-hour workday. In countries such as China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, and those in the former Soviet Bloc, 1 May has since become an official holiday.

In the 1950s China celebrated the May First Labor Festival by staging an annual parade in Beijing and other major cities. Model workers were sometimes given the honor of standing among national leaders on the Tiananmen rostrum in recognition of their exemplary performance. This tradition of publicly awarding model workers as a part of the Labor Festival remains, though ceremonies vary as time changes. Today it usually takes the form of a meeting broadcast from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where national leaders present plaques of awards to the best model workers selected from throughout the country.

In 1960 economic difficulties forced the government to give up expensive celebrations, such as the parade. During the early years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), each May First became an occasion for Mao Zedong to inspect his Red Guards gathered in Tiananmen Square. The celebration usually culminated with a show of fireworks. In the late 1970s and 1980s, however, organized and spontaneous recreational activities were held, mostly in parks, to celebrate the Labor Festival.

In 1999 China created three week-long holidays, known as the Gold Weeks, to encourage tourism with the purpose of boosting the economy. They were the May First Labor Festival, National Day, and the Chinese New Year.
While significantly adding to the national coffers, these Gold Weeks also strained transportation, caused damage to the natural environment, and created painful inconveniences for the crowding tourists. On 16 December 2007, China’s State Council called off the Gold Weeks of May and October, restoring them to one-day holidays.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading


International Labor Day had its roots in America during the 1800s, when unsafe conditions and 10 to 16 hour workdays for factory workers lead to the formation of labor unions and factory strikes.
May Fourth Movement
Wǔ Sì Yùndòng 五四运动

The May Fourth Movement is the name given to the collective effort made by intellectuals in China between 1915 and 1923 to cast off traditional Confucian values and undergo a cultural rejuvenation. A milestone of the era occurred on 4 May 1919 when demonstrators protested the treaty that ended World War I. The treaty recognized Japan’s claims to territory taken from China.

China during the 1910s and early 1920s suffered the twin plagues of imperialism and warlordism. Military commanders had seized control of various sections of the country, leading to incessant fighting. Numerous foreign powers, taking advantage of this situation, carved out spheres of influence along China’s coast. Despite this unsettled environment, this time—known either as the “May Fourth era” or the “New Culture era”—was a vibrant time for Chinese intellectuals. People called for cultural rejuvenation and a more modern worldview, arguing that without such changes China could not liberate itself from the oppressive forces of imperialism or warlordism or both. Advocates of “new culture” from various groups criticized many of China’s philosophical, literary, and social traditions between 1915 and 1923.

Genesis of May Fourth Era
Many historians suggest that the May Fourth era began with the publication of the journal Xin qingnian (New Youth) in 1915. The first issue, edited by Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), called on its readers to be cosmopolitan, progressive, utilitarian, and scientific. Chen, in short, asked China’s youth to cast off the old elements of society and to bring about a national reawakening. A frequent target of the journal was Confucianism, the preferred symbol of Chinese traditionalism. Confucianism, with its emphasis on filial piety, hierarchy, ritualism, and orthodoxy, was condemned as antimodern and regressive. Xin qingnian within a few months became an influential publication among China’s student population.

Center of Liberalism
After Chen was made dean of the School of Letters at Peking (Beijing) University in 1917 the university quickly became the locus of what was to become the May Fourth Movement. University president Cai Yuanpei (1867–1940) was committed to making the university a center of intellectual liberalism and academic freedom. Peking University by the late 1910s was a hotbed of intellectual debate among students, faculty members, and independent writers.

Cai also brought Hu Shi (1891–1962), a young literature professor, to the university. Hu, educated in the United States, believed that literature was at the heart of China’s cultural problems. China’s classical written language, with its emphasis on specialized norms, obscure vocabulary, and terse diction, was inaccessible to all but the most educated people. Hu suggested that the solution was to write in the vernacular, allowing people with
a more rudimentary education to participate in China’s world of letters. Hu argued in the pages of Xin qingnian that writers should discard stale literary phrases, avoid classical allusions, and stop imitating the ancients. Hu suggested that writers instead be true to their own feelings. Only then, he said, would they produce something with substance and meaning. This focus on vernacular literature (baihua) led to a greater democratization of China’s literary world.

Although Hu was a proponent of baihua, its greatest practitioner was Lu Xun (1881–1936), a frequent contributor to Xin qingnian. Lu Xun wrote short stories designed to jolt readers out of their cultural complacency. In “Kuanggren riji” (“Diary of a Madman”), one of his better-known stories from this period, the protagonist repeatedly sees the words “eat people” written in the margins of classical Confucian texts. The protagonist, convinced that he is living in a cannibalistic society, goes mad with suspicion. Lu Xun satirically demonstrated by the end of the story that the Confucian social order was based, figuratively if not literally, on cannibalism. Lu Xun, by shocking his readers with such imagery, hoped to awaken them to the need for cultural renewal.

Intellectuals of the era also called for democratization in the political arena. Chen argued in Xin qingnian that democracy and science formed the foundation of modern society. He claimed that many of China’s backward practices could be reformed or even eliminated with the assistance of Sai Xiansheng (Mr. Science) and De Xiansheng (Mr. Democracy). By 1919 these and other catchphrases circulated around Peking University and, by way of Xin qingnian, throughout China’s intellectual communities.

1919 Demonstrations

Although pinpointing the beginning of the May Fourth era is difficult, pinpointing its chronological focal point is less difficult. The term May Fourth Movement refers to the demonstrations of 4 May 1919. On that day angry students, educators, and urban workers gathered in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square to protest the Paris Peace Conference, which ended World War I. In August 1914 Japan had declared war on Germany and had occupied all German-held territories in China. Because China also had participated in the war against Germany, many people believed that China would regain control over the territories after the war. The Chinese delegates attending the conference, bolstered by their faith in self-determination as championed by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, were confident that the European powers would recognize the validity of their claims. But Japan’s delegates instead unveiled treaties signed by France, Britain, and Italy recognizing Japan’s demands in China.

In China public reaction to news of the treaties was quick and powerful. Upset citizens from throughout the Beijing area, led by students of Peking University, congregated to denounce Japan’s aggressive and underhanded maneuvering and to demand that China’s representatives reject the resulting treaty. The demonstrators, who eventually numbered in the thousands, marched through the streets until government troops restored order. Although the demonstration on 4 May lasted only a few hours, historians consider this event important in the development of modern Chinese nationalism.

In spite of the demonstration in Beijing, the peace conference ended, and Japan retained control of the Chinese territory (although the Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty). But the demonstration was far from insignificant. Similar demonstrations erupted throughout China in the days after 4 May. In addition, many intellectuals increased their demands for “national salvation” through cultural reform. The May Fourth demonstrations in many ways symbolized the concerns of the new culture advocates. As a result, the intellectual movement that swept through China between 1915 and 1923 is often referred to as the “May Fourth Movement.”

Aftermath and the Rise of Communism

The May Fourth Movement became increasingly ideological in the years after 1919. Advocates of socialism, anarchism, syndicalism (a revolutionary doctrine by which workers seize control of the economy and the government by direct means), and even pragmatism competed in the marketplace of ideas. During this time the Chinese Communist Party was formed in Shanghai in the summer of 1921. The party endorsed the antiestablishment ideals of the May Fourth Movement. Since then official Communist histories have depicted the May Fourth era as an era...
of great patriotic fervor, the transition between an old, bourgeois democracy and a new, proletarian democracy. Not surprisingly, 4 May continues to be a national holiday, and May Fourth intellectuals such as Lu Xun are celebrated as patriotic heroes.

China’s intellectual debates had become more political and less cultural by the mid-1920s as the iconoclasm of the earlier years was replaced by new orthodoxies and as political organizations expected their members to toe the party line. For this reason, most historians feel that 1923 was the approximate end of the May Fourth era. Other historians, however, feel that the advocates of the movement continued to be active well after 1923. Regardless, the May Fourth Movement, with its emphasis on science, democracy, and antitraditionalism, has cast a long shadow over modern Chinese history.

David L. KENLEY

Further Reading


Women and the May Fourth Movement

Many years after the May Fourth Movement of 1915–1923, Deng Yingchao recounted her experiences as a young woman and student at Tianjin Women’s Normal College during that unstable time in Chinese history.

What we did know intuitively was that alone we students did not have enough strength to save China from foreign powers. To awaken our compatriots we organized many speakers’ committees to spread propaganda among the people. I became the head of the speakers’ group in the Tianjin Women’s Patriotic Society and in the Tianjin Student Union. Frequently we gave speeches off campus. At first, we women did not dare give speeches on the street due to the feudal attitudes that then existed in China. So the female students went instead to places where people had gathered for an exhibition or a show, while the male students gave speeches in the street to passersby. There were always a lot of listeners. We told them why we should be united to save our country; that traitors in the government must be punished; and that people should have the right to freedom of assembly and association. We talked about the suffering of the Korean people after their country was conquered; and we publicly lodged our protests against the Northern warlord government that persecutes progressive students. Usually tears streamed down our cheeks when we gave our speeches and our listeners were often visibly moved.

Traditional Chinese medicine focuses on the body as a whole, and involves six main principles: the theory of yin–yang, the five elements, viscera, qi (life force), blood and body fluids, and the theory of the channels and collaterals. The principles of traditional Chinese medicine, though often intertwined with Western medicine, are still taught and practiced throughout China today.

The practice of medicine has a long unbroken history in China. Texts on traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) more than two thousand years old are still consulted by practitioners today. The most important ancient medical treatise is *Huangdi Nei Jing* (Yellow Emperor’s Canon of Medicine), also called the *Canon of Acupuncture*. It represents a monumental break from previous magical or supernatural healing systems in the East, much the same way the works of Hippocrates do in the West. This classic is the foundation for traditional Chinese medicine and continues to help the world’s largest health care system, which serves nearly 25 percent of the world’s population.

**Yin–Yang**

The concept of yin–yang rose from Confucian and Daoist philosophies. Yin–yang describes how opposing forces—such as motion/stillness, hot/cold, dark/light, male/female—are intertwined, interdependent, opposite yet equal. Yin–yang represents all the opposite principles in the universe. Each of these opposites produces the other. One cannot exist without the other. The doctrine of yin–yang influences every aspect of TCM’s theoretical system. It helps to explain the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the human body. Yin–yang theory directs clinical diagnosis and treatment.

The common treatment with medicinal herbs is based on yin–yang theory. The properties, tastes, and functions of medicinal herbs are carefully considered before being mixed. This is one reason why yin–yang theory is still taught in the colleges of traditional medicine. Without an understanding of yin–yang theory, practitioners cannot learn how to use Chinese medicinal herbs for proper treatment.

**Basic Principles of TCM**

The basic principles of TCM are the theory of yin–yang, the five elements, viscera, qi (life force), blood and body fluids, and the theory of the channels and collaterals.
THE FIVE ELEMENTS

More than 2,000 years ago the Chinese Naturalist School identified wood, fire, earth, metal, and water as five dynamic processes—not five types of inactive matter—that were basic to understanding the natural world. Later they developed principles of mutual creation, mutual closeness, and mutual destruction to explain relationships in the natural world. In addition to representing the natural world, the theory of the five elements provides guidance for physiology, pathology, diagnosis, and treatment in TCM. All the tissues and organs of the human body, as well as the emotions, can be classified according to the theory of the five elements. For example, the liver and gallbladder are associated with wood; the heart and small intestines, with fire; the spleen and stomach, with earth; the lungs and large intestines, with metal; and the kidneys and bladder, with water. When applied to medicine, the theory of five elements stresses the interrelationships among the internal organs, not their individual functioning.

THE VISCERA AND BOWELS

In TCM the internal organs of the human body are divided into three groups: the viscera, the extraordinary organs, and the bowels. The five viscera are the heart, liver, spleen, lungs, and kidneys. These yin organs preserve the body’s vital substances. The extraordinary organs are the brain, bones and bone marrow, blood vessels, uterus, and gallbladder, which is both an extraordinary organ and a bowel. The extraordinary organs are also called bowels, but their functions are different from those of the six bowels. The six bowels, which are yang organs, are the gallbladder, stomach, large intestine, small intestine, bladder, and the triple warmer (sanjiao). They work together to move and process food and water.

Triple warmer (also called triple heater or triple burner) appears only in TCM. It is a term for the concept of an organ that transfers energy. It also is involved with metabolism. The triple warmer is conceptualized as a large bowel containing all the internal organs. It is used to anatomically locate the body parts. The triple warmer has three parts. The upper warmer is the section of the body cavity above the diaphragm that contains the heart and lungs. The middle warmer is the section between the diaphragm and the navel that houses the spleen and stomach. The lower warmer is the section below the navel that houses the liver, kidneys, bladder, intestines, and uterus. The triple warmer controls the flow of qi through the body.

QI, BLOOD, AND BODY FLUIDS

TCM holds that qi, blood, and body fluids are the basic components of the body and help to maintain the body’s normal functions. Qi is especially important because it supplies the vital energy needed by all the organs and tissues of the body. Qi refers both to the vital substance, or life force, of the body and to the physiological functions

A medical worker at a neighborhood clinic applies acupuncture to the leg of a local resident. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
of the viscera, bowels, and channels and collaterals. In accordance with yin–yang theory, qi is yang and blood is yin; blood is the physical representation of qi.

**CHANNELS AND COLLATERALS**

Qi flows through the channels (jing), the main pathways running lengthwise through the body. Collaterals (luo) are branches of a channel in the system. The channels and collaterals circulate throughout the entire body, link with each other, and connect all the sections of the body to create an organic whole.

**Development of TCM**

The legendary ruler Shen Nung, who lived some 5,000 years ago, is considered the father of agriculture and herbal therapy. Huangdi, the mythical Yellow Emperor, born in 2704 BCE, according to legend, is considered the creator of ritual and of medicine and the compiler of the Nei Jing (Canon of Medicine). During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), doctors (yi) formed the first medical organization independent of priests and magicians (wu). This organization’s first known representative was said to have been Bian Que (430–350 BCE, but thought by some to be legendary), who used the pulse rate as a basis for diagnosis and prognosis. He has been credited with writing the Nanjing (The Classic of Difficulties).

Zhang Zhongjing (b. 158 BCE, in Nanyang, Henan Province), the Chinese Hippocrates, systematized the study of symptoms and the treatment of disease using drugs. Zhang’s masterwork is titled Shanghan Lun (Treatise on Fevers), the oldest clinical textbook in the world. While the Canon of Medicine listed only twelve prescriptions and five forms of drugs (pills, powders, pellets, tinctures, and teas), Zhang’s work listed 370 prescriptions and a greater number of drug forms, including emulsions. His prescriptions for treating dysentery, encephalitis B, pneumonia, and hepatitis are still appropriate today.

Hua Tuo (d. 208 CE) was the preeminent surgeon of the Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE). He contributed to the use of anesthetics, surgery involving opening the stomach area, and the practice of hydrotherapy. The Daoist alchemist and pathologist Ge Hong (284–364 CE) wrote a comprehensive medical handbook that covered such diverse ailments as infectious and parasitic diseases and neurological disorders. The first known monograph on surgery was a collection of procedures by Gong Qingxuan (d. 208 CE). Early surgery focused on the treatment of boils and ulcers, ailments of the upper classes.

The first state-sponsored medical schools in China opened in around 443. In 581, during the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE), the government opened the Imperial Medical Academy. Officials of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) expanded the academy in 624.

More medical classics appeared during the late Sui and early Tang eras. In 610 Chao Yuanfang and others compiled the medical classic Zhou Bing Yuan Ho Lun (General

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**Herbs used in traditional Chinese medicine are harvested from Mount Emei.** PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Treatise on the Causes and Symptom of Diseases), the earliest surviving work in China on the origins of diseases. Its fifty volumes are divided into seventy-six classifications listing some seventeen hundred disorders. Included in the book are details on pathology, descriptions of symptoms of many known diseases, and essays on internal medicine, surgery, gynecology, and pediatrics.

Sun Simiao (581–682), one of the giants of traditional Chinese medicine, wrote two books that updated earlier medical knowledge: Ji Bei Qian Jing Tao Fang (Prescriptions Worth a Thousand Gold Pieces for Emergencies) and Qian Jing Yao Fang (A Supplement to the Essential Prescriptions Worth a Thousand Gold Pieces). Sun believed in diet over drugs. His books deal with diet therapy, preventative

A vendor selling some scaly and armored critters whose byproducts are used for medicinal cures. The sixteenth-century text Compendium of Materia Medica included a number of non-plant classifications—from bugs and birds to beasts—that were components of early traditional pharmaceuticals. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
care, health preservation, acupuncture, and moxibustion (the burning of herbal leaves near the skin).

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), the Imperial Medical Bureau was established and the education of doctors in the principles of TCM became more important. Students were offered such courses as Plain Questions Classic on Medical Problems and Treatise on Febrile Diseases. In 1026 Instructor Wang Weiyi designed two life-sized bronze figures to use in his teaching of acupuncture and moxibustion. When used for testing, the figures were filled with water and coated with beeswax. When a student punctured the correct acupuncture point, water would issue from it.

Four famous medical schools opened during the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234) and the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Each school specialized in the diagnosis and treatment of certain diseases. They were the School of Cold and Cool, represented by Liu Wansu (1120–1200); the School of Attacking or Purging, headed by Zhang Congzheng (1156–1228); the School of Injuries of the Spleen and Stomach, headed by Li Dongyuan (1180–1251); and the school of Nourishing the Earth, founded by Zhu Zhenheng (1281–1358).

The 

*Bencao gangmu* (*Compendium of Materia Medica*) of Li Shizhen (1518–1593) appeared during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). It is perhaps the last great medical work written in China not influenced by Western scientific thought. *Compendium of Materia Medica* listed 1,892 medicines and more than 10,000 prescriptions. In addition to medical information, the work contained chapters on natural history, including a classification of mineral, vegetable, and animal products; chemical and industrial technology; geography; history; diet and nutrition; and other information. Li spent twenty-seven years compiling his encyclopedia. It is considered a major contribution to the development of pharmacology both in China and throughout the world and has been translated into all the languages of East Asia and the principal languages of the West.

Chinese doctors continued to correct ancient texts and develop new theories and procedures up through the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Wang Qinren (1768–1831) wrote *Corrections on the Errors of Medical Works*. Wang corrected the errors in autopsy procedures in ancient medical books, reemphasized the value of autopsy, and developed the theory that pooling or stagnation of blood would result in pain and disease.

To put these developments into a Western historical context, William Harvey published his seminal work on the circulation of blood in 1682. His work built upon the work of other earlier European scientists who had read the Arab studies of al-Nafis (1228). Metabolism, hormone disorders and therapy, and circadian rhythms were discussed in second-century BCE Chinese texts, 2,200 years before their acceptance in the West. Chinese doctors were ahead of their European counterparts by nearly a thousand years in attempting to identify and control diabetes (although they never connected the disease with the pancreas). Studies of the body’s immune system developed in China in the tenth century CE, which led to a vaccine to prevent smallpox, among other advances. European doctors did not develop a smallpox vaccine until the eighteenth century.

Around 1911 or 1912, in the early years of Republican China, the emphasis officially switched to Western medicine. President Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was a Western-trained physician who steered his country toward Western medicine. Nevertheless, most Chinese people continued to go to TCM practitioners.

The status of TCM was officially reinstated following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. By the 1950s experienced TCM practitioners were again producing texts with government support. By the time of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the official emphasis in general health care had shifted back to TCM from Western medicine. By then the body of written knowledge was sufficient to train the so-called barefoot doctors and provide them with a manual describing traditional treatments.

**Contemporary Development of TCM**

Since the early years of the twentieth century, with the popularization of Western medicine in China, Western medicine and traditional Chinese medicine have developed side by side. Chinese medical professionals have realized that TCM and Western medicine each has its own advantages. In the Chinese way of adapting ideas from outside to serve Chinese needs, efforts have been made to combine the knowledge and practices of the two schools. Much of this effort has come since the end of
the Cultural Revolution, when many Western-trained medical specialists returned from labor in the countryside and were assigned to TCM institutions. They have been conducting basic and clinical research, using modern rigorous methods, to determine the effectiveness of TCM treatments.

Traditional Chinese medicine is now widely practiced in China. New technologies, such as laser technology, are used to augment 2,000-year-old methods. The State Council has created the State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine of People's Republic of China, which is responsible for the regulation of the TCM industry. There is now an estimated 340,000 TCM practitioners; 1,500 TCM hospitals with some 100,000 beds; and 26 colleges and 30 academies of TCM in China.

CHEN Bao-xing and Garé LeCOMPTE

Further Reading

Prescribe the right medicine for a symptom.

對症下藥

Dui zheng xia yao

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MEI Lanfang

Méi Lánfāng 梅兰芳

1894–1961 Theatrical performer

Mei Lanfang was a famous theatrical performer who, like many male actors of his period, played women’s roles. He introduced Beijing (Peking) Opera to foreign audiences when he toured Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Mei Lanfang was a theatrical performer born in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province, who achieved international recognition for his portrayals of women during an era in which women’s roles were traditionally assigned to men. Born to a family of noted opera singers, Mei began studying at the Beijing (Peking) Opera when he was eight years old, making his stage debut at twelve. At the age of fourteen he joined the Xiliancheng Opera Company and gained a national reputation after a series of performances in Shanghai and elsewhere in China. Mei introduced Beijing Opera to foreign audiences when he toured Japan in 1919 and 1924, the United States in 1930, and the Soviet Union in 1932 and 1935. In 1937 he ceased performing and moved to Hong Kong after the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945) in protest of the Japanese invasion. He later returned to China and performed in films and on stage from 1946 until his death. He played more than one hundred characters, one of the most famous being the Flower-Shattering Diva. His distinctive style of dance became known as the “Mei Lanfang school.” A charismatic and modest person, he is remembered as one of the greatest performers in Chinese history.

Daniel OAKMAN

Illustration of Mei Lanfang by Anna Myers.

Further Reading


The philosopher Mencius was a follower of Confucius who advocated benevolent government based on the natural moral goodness of people. East Asian culture was greatly influenced by the teachings of Confucius and Mencius.

Mencius (385–303/302 BCE) was a third-generation follower of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE). He wanted to reform his era by advocating a system of benevolent government based on the natural moral goodness of humans.

The influence of Mencius in defining ancient Confucianism is second only to that of Confucius himself. Sima Qian’s Records of the Historian (Shiji) of the second century BCE tells us that Meng Ke (Mencius) was from the state of Zou, which neighbored the state of Lu. He studied with a disciple of Confucius’s grandson, Zisi (492–431 BCE). Like Confucius, Mencius traveled to various states looking for a worthy ruler. He held a minor post without any authority as guest minister or teacher under King Xuan of Qi (319–301 BCE). Unable to influence the political climate, he retired with Wan Zhang (flourished fourth century BCE) and other disciples to write the book of philosophy known as the Mencius.

Book of Mencius

The Book of Mencius is one of the Four Books of Confucianism. After the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the Mencius eclipsed the Xunzi. Unlike the Analects (Lunyu) of Confucius, the Mencius contains developed prose essays and detailed arguments. In keeping with most ancient Chinese texts, the Mencius employs arguments based on an appeal to the authority of the sage rulers of antiquity. It also makes regular use of argument by analogy.

Mencius believed that a person’s moral integrity is a matter of the heart-mind (xin). The emphasis on the inner quality of a person’s moral life marked a change from Confucius, who clearly delineated the inner from the outer. Person-to-person care or humanity (ren) remained the core value, the innermost quality of the heart-mind, and first among the four cardinal virtues. For Confucius, ren meant everything noble in the well-bred person, disinterested concern for others, and other subtle qualities. For Mencius, ren meant simply benevolence. According to Mencius, the other virtues such as rightness (yi), ritual action (li), and moral wisdom (zhi) are also qualities of the heart-mind. In contrast to Confucius’s general and vague teachings, Mencius’s design for humane rulership is practical and effective. Mencius advocated abating punishments, reducing taxes, improving crop yields, and ensuring that the people are trained in moral cultivation. Although his political agenda was more practical than Confucius’s, Mencius continued to advocate Confucius’s idea that the ruler has to be virtuous to properly order society and to maintain the throne. When the ruler sets the moral example and the common people follow that example, then there will be fewer crimes and less need for punishment. Mencius accepted the ancient teaching that heaven’s decree or mandate (tianming) sanctioned the ruler’s position on the throne. Hence, the moral cultivation
and development of the ruler were of the utmost importance. Mencius expanded the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which had been traditionally limited to natural disasters, to include peasant rebellion as a sign that the ruler had lost the mandate to rule. Sanctioning peasant rebellion as a reason to call for a ruler’s downfall naturally affected subsequent history. For Mencius the most important aspect of the state is the common people. The people take priority over the national symbols, the altars to the gods of grain and soil, and the ruler. The ideal for Mencius is a kind and moral government.

Human Nature

Mencius explicated the notion that human character is basically good, an idea that is only implied in the Analects. One of the theories of human nature popular during Mencius’s time was the view that human nature is nothing more than the biological drives and desires. In a debate with Mencius, Gaozi argued that human nature is the desire for food and sex. Mencius argued that people are basically or originally morally good. In this manner he could justify linking the Mandate of Heaven and rebellion. The natural world has built-in moral values, such as the Mandate of Heaven, and humans as part of the natural world also have innate or natural moral values. If naturally good peasants are forced to rebel, then there must be something wrong with the ruler’s virtue. The moral values are part of the human heart-mind, which is sometimes referred to as the “original heart-mind” or the “true heart-mind.” The moral values emanate from the heart-mind. The heart-mind of compassion is the starting point of benevolence (ren). The heart-mind of shame gives a person a sense of duty (yi). The heart-mind of courtesy and modesty inspires ritual observances (li). The heart-mind of right and wrong is the beginning of moral wisdom (zhi).

Mencius was rediscovered in the Song dynasty (960–1279) by the neo-Confucians, especially Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Zhu Xi codified the Book of Mencius as one of the Four Books, which served as a major part of the curriculum for the civil service examinations. As neo-Confucianism spread across East Asia, the Koreans and Japanese were reintroduced to Mencius’s teachings. Emphasis on the inner quality of the heart-mind, the four cardinal virtues, use of education to develop a person’s inner nature, and the practice of humane government are characteristics of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese neo-Confucianism that were originally derived from the ideas of Mencius. It is not an exaggeration to say that East Asian culture was shaped by the Kong-Meng (Confucius and Mencius) teachings.

James D. SELLMANN

Further Reading


Mencius on Human Nature

Mencius, a very influential third-generation follower of Confucius, believed in the natural moral goodness of humanity. From “On Human Nature”:

Everyone has a heart that is sensitive to the sufferings of others. The great kings of the past had this sort of sensitive heart and thus adopted compassionate policies. Bringing order to the realm is as easy as moving an object in your palm when you have a sensitive heart and put into practice compassionate policies. Let me give an example of what I mean when I say that everyone has a heart that is sensitive to the sufferings of others. Anyone today who suddenly saw a baby about to fall into a well would feel alarmed and concerned. It would not be because he wanted to improve his relations with the child’s parents, nor because he wanted a good reputation among his friends and neighbors, nor because he disliked hearing the child cry. From this it follows that anyone who lacks feelings of commiseration, shame, and courtesy or a sense of right and wrong is not a human being. From the feeling of commiseration benevolence grows; from the feeling of shame righteousness grows; from the feeling of courtesy ritual grows; from a sense of right and wrong wisdom grows.

Mi Fu, nicknamed “Madman Mi” lived an extraordinary life in his time. The Song artist and critic left behind great calligraphy pieces, poetry and books on painting. Mi’s artistic works carry heavy impact on Chinese art even today.

Mi Fu (also known as “Mi Yuanzhang”) was born in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province, during the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126 CE). Mi’s ancestors were the Hu minorities from Turkish tribes in northern China, from where they migrated to Xiangyang, Hebei Province, about five generations before Mi Fu was born. Mi had a strong tie with the imperial family because his mother served as the wet nurse to Madam Cao, the wife of the future Emperor Yingzong (reigned 1063–1067). Mi grew up in the palace compounds and began his career as the reviser of records of books and professor of painting and calligraphy. Later he served as secretary to the Board of Rites and then as military governor of Huaizhang. However, Mi’s real passion was in poetry, painting, calligraphy, artistic criticism, and connoisseurship. Mi, along with Huang Tingjian (1045–1105 CE), Su Shi (1036–1101), and Cai Xiang (1012–1067), was known as one of “the four great calligraphers of the Song dynasty.”

Mi was eccentric and peculiar in his behavior and appearance. Wherever he went, his outlandish clothing would attract a crowd. Legend tells that Mi always had water with him in order to clean his hands, especially when he was about to handle his art works, which he allowed no one to touch. He was seen bowing to a stone and addressing it as his brother because it was a collector’s item. In his time he was known as “Madman Mi.”

A sample of the calligraphy of Mi Fu (1051–1107), an artist, art critic, and calligrapher of the Northern Song dynasty.
As a painter, Mi was especially adept in nature scenery. Critics credited Mi as being the first Chinese artist who made use of dots (Mi dian) with lots of moisture on the brush tip to depict misty rivers and hills. Mi used brushes, paper sticks, dried sugarcane, and the calyx of a lotus plant to paint. *Spring Mountain and Pine Trees* and *Tower of the Rising Clouds* are two of his extant works.

However, Mi Fu is best known in Chinese history as a master calligrapher whose works exhibit creativity, freedom of expression, and a sense of spontaneity. After imitating past masters such as Wang Xizhi (303–379 CE), Wang Xianzhi (344–388 CE), Yan Zhenqing (709–785 CE), and Chu Suiliang (596–658 CE), Mi found that he was being confined within the rules and theories of old masters rather than expressing his own feelings. In his critical essays Mi wrote that to follow one's nature and sentiments at the time of composition is more important than to imitate the prescribed strokes of old masters. To Mi, art was about creativity and the expression of sentiments, not about styles or prestige. In terms of technique, Mi was also the first calligrapher who experimented with various brushstrokes using the front tip, side tip, and central tip, which allowed him to create more forms and styles. “Three Letters,” dated 1093, and “Poems Written at Huangzhou on the Cold Food Festival,” dated 1082, are examples of his fine calligraphy. His style is sometimes referred to as the kuangcao or mad cursive.

As a critic, Mi wrote books and essays, such as *Shu Shi* (History of Calligraphy), *Hua Shi* (History of Painting), and *Haiyue Mingyan* (Famous Words of Haiyue). He saw spontaneity and sentiments as integral components of art. Mi died at the age of fifty-six, survived by two sons and eight daughters. Only Mi Youren continued his father’s artistic legacy. About a dozen of Mi Fu’s original works are available today in museums in China, United States, and Europe.

Fatima WU

**Further Reading**


As one of the fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minority groups in China, the Miao have a long and rich history. They have demonstrated the highest level of ethnic adherence and tenacity despite migration and adaptation to new environments. In recent decades, because of wars and economic necessity, the Miao have established themselves in communities around the world.

The Miao, an ethnic group that originated in China, is the fifth-largest ethnic group in the country, numbering 8.94 million in 2000 (according to the Fifth National Census). (The Hmong, a branch of the Miao, make up about a third of the Miao population—there is no name for them in Chinese, however—and many Hmong as well have migrated to Southeast Asia and abroad.) The Miao inhabit the southern provinces of Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Hubei, as well as the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.

Miao Groups
During their long history, the Miao have acquired distinct visible ethnic traditions, such as the color of design of their women’s costumes, to differentiate one subgroup of the Miao from another. Miao in western Hunan are called Red Miao; those in southeastern Guizhou, Black Miao; and those in northwestern Guizhou and northeastern Yunnan, Big Flowery Miao. Other well-known group names include White Miao, Green Miao, Blue Miao, and Small Flowery Miao. As a result of the Ethnic Identification Project of the 1950s, all the subgroups living in different areas of China were given the unified name Miao and designated one of the fifty-five officially recognized ethnic groups in mainland China (fifty-six including the majority Han).

Through most of China’s history, all ethnic minorities were regarded as barbarians by Chinese speakers. The term *Miao* was often used with *man*, a generic term for “southern barbarians.” In some southern Chinese subdialects, *miao* was used as an adjective to describe a person as fierce or stubborn. The name Miao in itself is by no means derogatory in China. In Chinese the word means “young plant” or “offspring.” It has long existed as the name of an ethnic group and as a surname among the Han, the dominant ethnic group of China.

Miao Language and Writing
The Miao language belongs to the Miao-Yao subfamily of the Sino-Tibetan language family. Because of a long history of migration and scattered settlements in isolated mountain regions, the language has developed into scores of dialects, many of them mutually unintelligible. Based on their linguistic characteristics, locations, and extent of intelligibility, these dialects have been identified in three dialect areas: the Western Hunan (or Eastern), Eastern Guizhou (or Central), and Sichuan–Guizhou–Yunnan (or Western).
The Miao language was once only a spoken language. Linguists, working with native speakers, created a writing system in 1956. Four of the Miao dialects now use a romanized alphabetic writing system.

**Miao Culture**

The Miao have an extremely rich oral tradition, complete with mythologies, legends, histories, poems, dramas, operas, and songs. In Chinese historical literature, the recorded history of the Miao is as long as that of any other group in China. Chinese records contain information on Miao ethnic origin, migration, customs, social structure, economic activities, technical achievements, and relations with other ethnic groups and the state. Throughout their history, the Miao have demonstrated the highest level of ethnic adherence and tenacity.

The Miao follow a patrilineal descent system (descent through the father’s line) and a patronymic linkage...
system (a practice in which part of the son’s personal name comes from that of his father). Most young people are free to marry whom they please, but arranged marriage is also practiced in some areas. In western Hunan and Guizhou, cross-cousin marriage is practiced. This practice requires that one should marry one’s cross-cousin—mother’s brother’s child or father’s sister’s child—if such a person is available. Levirate, the custom whereby a man marries the widow of his deceased brother, is also practiced in many areas. Sororate, the custom whereby, when a man’s wife dies or is unable to bear children, her unmarried sister is given to him as a wife, is sometimes practiced among the Miao in Yunnan. Delayed-transfer marriage, the custom in which the bride does not live with her husband until two or three years after the wedding day, is a common practice among the Miao in Guizhou. Beyond the household grouping, relations are organized into lineages, subclans, and clans. One’s position in the kinship network and role in the ritual system of ancestral worship are important ways of defining the social status of a Miao person.

In addition to ancestral worship, the Miao practice animism (endowing inanimate objects and natural forces with life) and a type of shamanism. Christianity has been practiced by some Miao in Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan since the nineteenth century.

Agriculture has long been the traditional means of subsistence for the Miao, supplemented at times with fishing, hunting, and handcrafting; dyed batik cloth, a tourist favorite, has been produced by the Miao for over one thousand years. As in other regions of China and with other ethnic groups in recent decades, education has been developing rapidly in the Miao areas. Inside and outside of China, the Miao have their own teachers, lawyers, medical doctors, scientists, and engineers.

Chuan-kang SHIH

Further Reading


A Chinese holiday celebrated during the autumn season, Zhong Qiu celebrates family togetherness, which is symbolized by the roundness of the completely full moon. Though the true origin of this festival is unknown, and many of the traditions associated with it are derived from a range of tribes and countries, it is considered one of the most important festivals for the Chinese.

Zhong Qiu, also known as the “Mid-Autumn Festival” and the “Moon Festival,” is held on the fifteenth day of the eighth month of the lunar calendar and is the third-most important family reunion day for Chinese throughout the world (after the lunar Chinese New Year, which falls between late January and late February, and the tomb-sweeping Qing Ming Festival on 5 April). On the day of the Mid-Autumn Festival family members gather for the evening meal and afterward move outdoors to enjoy the full moon. The perfectly round and bright moon (yueyuan) signifies the complete togetherness (tuanyuan) of the family. Those who are away from their families during the festival feel sad for missing such an opportunity.

Two foods, the moon cake and the pomelo, are closely associated with the festival. The moon cake is baked with a flour-based shell surrounding a sweet bean-paste stuffing. A pomelo (or pummelo, *Citrus maxima*, *Citrus grandis*) is a citrus fruit that ripens in southern China around mid-autumn. Both foods are round, like the moon, and further strengthen the importance of family unification.

No consensus exists among sinologists as to when or where the Moon Festival originated. The scholar Wolfram Eberhard believed that it began rather late in Chinese history, perhaps in the post-Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE) era, and had one of two possible origins. The first was with the Yao tribe, who once had wide distribution in China’s southern provinces of Fujian, Hunan, and Guangdong.
The Yao people follow a lunar calendar, and the fifteenth day of the eighth month is actually the beginning of their New Year, which they celebrate by worshipping the Moon Goddess at night. The second possibility is that the festival originated in north China and Korea, where peasants harvested their crops of millet or sorghum by mid- to late September. (It should be noted as well that eating moon cake to celebrate the full moon was a practice of the Thai, another minority group that was once widespread in southwest China’s Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces.) Whatever the origin, the homogenizing process of unifying and standardizing local customs throughout Chinese dynastic history gradually blended these elements to become one major festival.

Folklore holds that Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), originated the now-abandoned practice of inserting a piece of paper inscribed with secret messages into a moon cake. According to legend, Zhu sent secret messages to encourage the Han Chinese to revolt against the occupying Mongols on the fifteenth day of the eighth month and succeeded in bringing down the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

**Mid-Autumn Moon Cake**

These dense cakes are sold in elaborate packaging across Asia in the autumn and often contain salted boiled eggs inside the sweet paste filling. This recipe is just a basic version; many variations can be found in cookbooks and online.

**Makes 2 dozen**

**Filling**
1 can (17½ ounces) lotus seed paste  
½ cup finely chopped walnuts

**Dough**
4 cups all-purpose flour  
½ teaspoon salt  
½-cup non-fat dried milk powder  
1 cup sugar  
3 eggs  
3 teaspoons baking powder  
½ cup solid shortening, melted and cooled

1 Mix lotus seed paste and walnuts together in a bowl; set aside.

2 Sift flour, milk powder, baking powder, and salt together into a bowl. In large bowl of electric mixer, beat eggs until uniform. Add sugar; beat for 10 minutes or until mixture falls in a thick ribbon. Add melted shortening; mix, and fold in flour mixture. Turn dough out on a lightly floured board; until smooth and satiny. Divide dough into 24 equal pieces.

3 To shape each moon cake, roll a piece of dough into a ball. Roll into 4-inch circle about ⅛-inch thick. Place 1 tablespoon of lotus seed paste mixture in center of dough circle, and seal with the edges of the dough. Lightly flour inside of moon cake press with 2-1/2 inch diameter cups. Place moon cake, seam side up, in mold; flatten dough slightly. Remove from mold, and place on ungreased baking sheet. Brush tops with egg yolk.

4 Bake in a preheated 375 degree F. oven for 30 minutes or until golden brown. Let cool.


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**Further Reading**


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Migrant workers are individuals who move from one location to another for work; they are sometimes referred to as labor migrants. The migrant population in China is unique, with a two track migration system that includes both permanent and temporary migrants. Migrant workers are an important factor in China’s industrialization and rapid transformation into a global economic power.

Population mobility in China was slow prior to the 1980s but has accelerated since then due largely to economic opportunities in cities. The hukou (household registration) regulations, a hierarchical system based on a person’s urban or rural residency, have sustained a two-track migration system, comprising elite permanent migrants and poor, unskilled, and exploited temporary migrants from the countryside. The second-generation rural migrant workers are more ready to establish roots in cities, which are also increasingly attracting skilled workers from overseas.

Population Movements
Prior to the 1980s

Historically, population mobility in China has been low. This reflects partly the agrarian nature of the economy, which bound people to the land. During the first decade of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), mobility increased as rural Chinese flocked to the city to escape collectivization, crop failures, and poverty and to search for work and economic opportunities. During the 1950s, in order to maintain stability, the Chinese state ratified various regulations on urban residence, which culminated with the hukou (household registration) regulations of 1958. These regulations assigned to rural and urban Chinese different institutional statuses and means of survival. Urban Chinese were allocated food, jobs, and state-subsidized welfare—resources denied to rural Chinese, who instead were expected to rely on farming for their livelihood. This system severely limited rural people’s ability to survive in urban areas, and as a result, rural-urban migration declined sharply during the 1960s.

At the same time, the Chinese state’s development plans, driven in large measure by political and ideological considerations, resulted in forced population movements. The Third Front program (1965–1971) moved factories and industrial workers from the eastern coastal region, which was considered vulnerable to outside attack, inland to remote and mountainous areas. And, during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the rustication movement sent millions of urban Chinese and cadres into the countryside to farm and work. In addition, Han Chinese were sent to minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang to consolidate Communist rule there.

Mobility in Post-Mao China

The economic reforms that began in 1978–79 paved the way for hukou reforms and relaxation of migration...
control, which in conjunction with marketization of food and other necessities have made it easier for rural Chinese to work in urban areas and have enabled overall mobility to rise. The Chinese censuses have documented that between the 1985 to 1990 and 1995 to 2000 periods, interprovincial migration flows surged from 11.5 million to 32.3 million, and intercounty migration flows increased from 35.3 million to 79.1 million. China’s intercounty migration rate of 7 percent for years 1995 to 2000 is still significantly lower than the United States’ 18-percent rate, but China is no longer an immobile society. Floating population, a stock measure of the total number of people not living at their place of hukou registration, increased from 22.6 million (2 percent of the population) in 1990 to 78.8 million (6 percent of the population) in 2000. When intracounty counts are included, then the floating population in 2000 was 144.4 million, or 12 percent of the nation’s population. Estimated to be 150 million in 2005, the floating population is projected to reach 200 million by 2015 and 250 million by 2025.

*Hukou* gave rise to a unique, two-track migration system in China. Permanent migrants are migrants who are registered at their destination; temporary migrants—the floating population—are those who are registered elsewhere. Permanent migrants comprise mainly employees sponsored by the state, educated and skilled workers, and students in higher-education institutes. The vast majority of temporary migrants are poorly educated, unskilled, rural people who seek work in urban areas but are denied *hukou* there. Between the 1985 to 1990 and 1995 to 2000 periods, the proportion of temporary migrants among all migrants rose from 46 percent to 74 percent, a clear indication that population movements in China are increasingly defined by market-driven, rural-urban labor migration. At the same time, state-planned migration continues to exist, especially due to massive construction projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and the Olympic facilities.

### Migrant Work as a Way of Life

Most rural-urban migrant workers in China are between their late teens and late twenties in age. Men constitute the majority of these migrants, but women’s representation has increased over time. Rural men and women, upon finishing elementary or junior secondary education, are motivated to find work in urban areas because in the countryside arable land is limited, the agricultural labor surplus is large, and farming and other rural activities are simply unable to lift them out of poverty. Many leave home for towns and cities in the same province, while others travel from poor, inland provinces such as Sichuan.
Hunan, and Anhui to coastal areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong’s Pearl River delta to work. Unlike the li tu bu li xiang (leaving the land but not the countryside) model, in which one does off-farm work but stays in the home village, with the li tu you li xiang model (leaving the land and the countryside), millions of Chinese leave their villages to work and return home infrequently, mostly during the Chinese New Year (or Spring Festival, usually in late January or early February). The winter snowstorms of 2008, however, prevented many people from returning home for the Spring Festival.

In the city, rural migrant workers tend to have “3D” jobs—jobs that are dirty, dangerous, and demanding—in such sectors as construction, domestic work, and manufacturing. Their labor is the key to China’s urbanization and industrialization, but they are exploited, discriminated against, and segregated from the rest of the urban society. While thriving migrant communities exist, such as the Zhejiang Village in Beijing, most rural migrant workers in cities lead a marginalized and vulnerable life.

Nonetheless, remittances from migrant work account for at least 20 percent and up to 40 percent of the annual income of the migrants’ households, funding large projects, such as house building or renovation and weddings, and improving the countryside’s standard of living. Throughout China’s countryside, migrant work has firmly established itself as a way of life and a necessary, desirable source of livelihood. The economic benefits of urban work are so attractive that rural migrants are willing to tolerate dividing their households, leaving behind their wives or the elderly to raise children and farm. A split-household arrangement has negative effects on spousal and parent-children relationships, but the high cost of housing, education, and health care in cities discourages migrants from bringing family with them. Circular migration, spending time working in the cities, returning home for some time, and then leaving for urban work again, can occur repeatedly.

China’s New Migrant Workers

The first generation of rural migrant workers—those who entered the workforce in the 1980s and 1990s—are now past their peak years for migrant work, and some have returned permanently to the countryside. Many rural youths, some having never engaged in agriculture, are repeating their parents’ path of circular migration. However, there is also evidence that young, rural Chinese as a whole are attaining higher levels of education, and more of them now hope to find permanent, more prestigious work in urban areas and leave the countryside for good.

China’s rapid economic growth has, at the same time, attracted migrant workers from outside. Many foreigners and overseas Chinese hold high-rank management and technical positions and constitute the so-called golden-collar elites in Chinese cities. High-end commercial housing, such as Taiwan Village in Shanghai, caters to these migrants. In addition, mainland Chinese students who have earned advanced degrees overseas are increasingly motivated to return, thanks to the rising demand for skilled, professional workers and the promise of more speedy social and economic mobility than they would find in non-Chinese, Western societies. At both ends of the socioeconomic spectrum, therefore, Chinese migrant workers are pursuing economic opportunities by moving to places where they hope to find not only jobs but also a niche.

The effects of the global financial crisis that began in 2008 are, no doubt, felt by China’s rural migrants. In February 2009, China’s Ministry of Agriculture reported that 20 million migrant workers recently lost their jobs, increasing the risk of social unrest. As one after another Chinese manufacturer goes out of business, migrant workers are the first to suffer. For a quarter of a century, rural migrants have provided the labor for China’s rapid industrialization and economic growth. Now, they must face the difficult dilemma between returning home to poverty and risking unemployment in the city.

C. Cindy Fan

Further Reading

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Accurate Chinese migration statistics are notoriously hard to come by. United Nations researchers once called the Chinese floating population—the largest migrant group inside China—“statistically invisible.” While reforms to statistical reporting systems have begun to emerge, the concept of interregional migration in China remains difficult to record.

Any meaningful analysis of Chinese migration must begin with an understanding of the hukou (household registration) system and its relationship with migration. In China, migration was an area of heavy state control in the past and active state regulation exists at present. People wanting to change residence permanently are required to get approval from one or more authorities. A change in residence is deemed legal only when it is formally approved and registered with the public security authorities. For urban dwellers, changing residence within the same city or town (to move to a new apartment, for instance) and residential changes caused by marriage are generally permitted.

Similar freedom is also given to rural residents moving within their rural area because of marriage or other family reasons. But formal (permanent) moves crossing city, town, or township boundaries are heavily regulated and require the possession of a migration permit issued by the public security authorities. The permit is granted only sparingly when there are extraordinary reasons and when it is seen as serving (or at least is not at odds with) the central or local state interests defined in various policies, such as controlling the growth of large cities. Hence, to an ordinary person without state connections, getting a migration permit for moves from rural to urban areas or from smaller cities to larger cities is still very hard, if not totally impossible. The hukou system in the prereform era functioned as a de facto internal passport mechanism; today it still serves many similar functions, although peasants can now travel to many places to take up jobs or stay with relatives temporarily. The catch is that temporary migrants are ineligible for many of the benefits and rights of permanent local residents.

Massive rural labor outflows (workers in search of employment) have been the most important aspect of China’s geographic mobility in the last quarter century. “Rural migrant labor” is defined as a working population (from the countryside) that moves to a destination without a local hukou. (See table 1.) By inference, it is a subset of the “floating population.” Most rural migrant labor is unskilled labor; only a small percentage are skilled craftsmen and traders, and these are often self-employed. A portion is seasonal, operating in synchronization with farm work schedules (the outflow is larger in winter when there is not much work on the farm). Numerous large-scale national surveys of rural migrant labor have been conducted, especially since the early 1990s, when this group started to increase quite rapidly. Many surveys of this kind are one-time studies and are not strictly
comparable; the national rural migrant labor estimates are usually derived from the percentages generated from these sample surveys.

Migration Trends since the Early 1980s

Some general migration trends are identifiable in the past twenty-five years. Despite the general surge in migration, the annual volume of hukou migrants has remained quite stable, at between 17 and 20 million. The rate has actually declined slightly, relative to the size of the Chinese population. An analysis of the figures from the Ministry of Public Security from 1993 through 2005 shows that between 80 and 90 percent of all hukou migrants were recorded in urban areas. The stability reflects strong government intervention in this area.

On the other hand, the size of the non-hukou migrant population has clearly been rising since the early 1980s. The “floating population” started to grow rapidly in the mid-1980s to about 70 million in 1988, then dropped somewhat from 1989 to 1991 due to an economic austerity program; it then regained momentum around 1992 through probably 1997, reaching 100 million at that point. The current figure is about 150 million. Similarly, between 1992 and 2006, the number of rural migrant laborers has more than doubled, from 53 million to 115 million.

The trend among the “temporary population” subset of the non-hukou migrants is much less consistent: two data points, 2000 and 2005, are far larger than the other years’ figures. The 2000 and 2005 figures are more supposedly accurate than the figures in other years because they are from a full census (in the case of the 2000 figures) or a 1 percent sample (in the case of the 2005 figures), while the data in other years draw from a 1-per-1,000 sample. Earlier research suggests that the 2000 census figure is, however, likely to be overcounted; it is also likely that the 1-per-1,000 samples may have undercounted the migrant population. If this same logic can be applied to the figures in 2005 and 2006, then it is reasonable to believe that the temporary population, defined as such, was between 130 and 150 million from 2005 to 2006.

Another careful examination of the data will show that there was a slowing down of migration from 1996 to 1999. For example, the temporary population in those years only inched up slightly; the average growth rate of rural migrant laborers also dwindled to 4.8 percent per year in the years between 1995 and 1998, compared with 7.3 percent per year from 1992 to 1995. It is believed that this slowdown in rural outflow was related to the sluggish performance of the urban economy, job competition from laid-off workers of urban state-owned enterprises (SOEs), increasingly protectionist policies used by local governments against recruitment of outsiders, and improvement in the rural economy, at least between 1996 and 1999.

The Geography of Migration

Significant disparities in wages between the urban and rural sectors and among regions underlie a great portion of labor migratory flows in China. The bulk of migratory flows in the last twenty-five years involves predominantly those who are not changing their hukou location (non-hukou migration), mainly rural migrant labor. The root cause is lack of sufficient gainful employment in the countryside in many agricultural provinces. Because of serious institutional barriers—mainly the hukou system—the rural and urban population segments and the labor markets operate as two largely separate circuits or strata. The choice for rural migrant labor is mainly between a farm job (or no job) at home and a low-end job in a city. Rural migrant labor moves across different geographic regions to benefit financially, which can be broadly considered in terms of the balance of the wage differentials and living cost differentials between the origin and the destination. Most rural migrants go to nearby towns outside the villages, but others cross thousands of miles to big cities on the coast. Two major sources of available data of a different nature allow us to examine the national geographic patterns of migration in the 1990s and beyond.

Population Data: Migration Importers and Exporters

The first source is the population data derived from full censuses (1990 and 2000) and the 1 percent national population surveys in 1987, 1995, and 2005. In the data covering migration flow, “migrant” is defined as a resident (staying
more than six months or one year in an administrative unit) who lived in a different administrative unit five years earlier. Those data, plus data from the 1982 census, also provide information on the size of the non-hukou population (migrant stock), based on roughly similar but not exactly the same criteria. The 1995 survey reports a total of 33.23 million migrants crossing county-level boundaries in the preceding five-year period. Seventy-two percent of the intercounty migration was within provinces; the remaining 28 percent (9.2 million) was interprovincial migration (IPM).

From 1995 to 2000 the volume of migration increased substantially. With the caveat that the 2000 census probably overcounted migrants, it appears that intercounty migration doubled between 1995 and 2000. Using information from a 1 percent microdata, one can also classify and estimate the flows by origin and destination. The predominant flow was from rural to urban areas (50.32 million), followed by urban to urban flows (45.70 million).

Total IPM volume has increased significantly since 1990, from only 9.2 million between 1990 and 1995 to 38 million between 2000 and 2005. The different definitions and procedures used for collecting the data obviously account for a small part of the increase; the remaining increase can be assumed to be real. IPM also accounts for an increasingly greater share of all intercounty migration in the 1990s, for example, from only 28 percent between 1990 and 1995 to 44 percent between 1995 and 2000. It is very likely that the same is also true in the first half of the decade. The high concentration in the coastal provinces continued to be maintained between 2000 and 2005 (55 percent). In the 1990s there was also significant convergence into one single province (Guangdong), which received 34 percent of all IPM between 1995 and 2000, compared with only 20 percent in the earlier period. The pattern was slightly altered from 2000 to 2005 by Zhejiang’s rapid rise to become the second net importer of labor, with a net intake of 11 percent. Guangdong dropped slightly to 27 percent in this period.

On the net exporter side, Sichuan, the largest exporter province, was the single dominant net exporter between 1990 and 1995 with −14 percent, far exceeding the second-place net exporter (Anhui, whose net IPM was −7 percent). Sichuan’s dominance was slightly eroded between 1995 and 2000 (net IPM −12 percent), partly because of the split of Chongqing from the province. More importantly, the second-, third-, and fourth-largest net exporters (Hunan, Anhui, and Jiangxi) all had net IPM values much closer to those of Sichuan between 1995 and 2000 (−7.6 to −9.0 percent), and that trend continues between 2000 and 2005; the four largest net exporters have about the same net IPM values (−7.4 to −8.4 percent). In other words, in those fifteen years, while there was a convergence of the IPM flows into one or two provinces, sources became more diverse. These changes seem to be related to the intensification of the regional industrial restructuring beginning in the late 1980s, whereby inland provinces lost proportionally more manufacturing jobs to the coastal provinces in the second half of the 1990s, giving rise, in particular, to the emergence of Guangdong as the industrial leader, indeed the “world’s factory.” The pattern appears to be consistent with the diffusionist paradigm of migration in which migration has been adopted as a labor strategy by an increasing number of households in a greater number of provinces in the noncoastal provinces.

Certain provinces experienced some interesting ups and downs during these three periods. Most striking is Zhejiang. For a time, migrants from this province went almost everywhere in the country (and to many parts of Europe too). But the province has gone from being a major net exporter of migrants (the seventh-largest net exporter between 1990 and 1995) to a top net importer of
migrants (the third-largest between 1995 and 2000 and second between 2000 and 2005). This shift is related to the economic success and industrial job growth of the province. On the other hand, the position of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has slipped in the ranking in the years since 1990. Its net IPM percentage dropped from about 5 percent between 1990 and 1995 to only 1 percent between 2000 and 2005.

The fact that the poorest and relatively populous provinces like Guizhou are not among the lowest in migration rank shows that it is not simply abject poverty that drives long-distance migration. While most provinces are predominantly either importers or exporters, there are some notable exceptions, such as Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Hubei, Hebei, and Zhejiang between 1990 and 1995; Jiangsu between 1995 and 2000, and Shandong and Hebei in both periods from 1995 to 2000 and 2000 and 2005. The fewer number of provinces in the more balanced in- and out-migration category is consistent with the greater regional economic specialization or polarization that took place in the 1990s. It is also interesting to note that Guangdong also registered a significant out-migration (1.7 million) in the latest period (2000–2005). A detailed examination of the 2005 data suggests that the out-migration was largely to the provinces from which in-migrants had originally come (such as Hunan and Jiangxi). The out-migration from Guangdong is likely a return migration rather than a diversion of migrant labor from Guangdong to other coastal provinces.

**Rural Labor Data and Surveys**

The second major set of migration data draws from national surveys of rural households done by the National Bureau of Statistics and rural migrant labor surveys undertaken by other agencies or research institutions. The data provide some direct and useful information about this special group. Because rural migrant labor, defined on the basis of migrants’ hukou status, is a rather unique Chinese phenomenon, some of the migration statistics compiled are less standard. The national estimates are all derived from large sample surveys that were conducted at different times, often using only broadly the same definition of rural migrant labor. As mentioned earlier, this kind of rural labor migration study covers only labor migration from the countryside, regardless of a migrant’s length of stay at the destination. Therefore, these surveys capture more comprehensively all labor migrants, in contrast to the census data, which exclude migrants staying in the destination less than six months or a year.

Available geographic data from three separate major national sample surveys undertaken in late 1993 (and early 1994), 1998, and 2004 are particularly useful. According to the 1993 study, the stock of rural migrant labor (those who participated in work outside their village, including seasonal labor) at the end of 1993 and early 1994 reached 51 million, accounting for about one-eighth (12.5 percent) of the country’s rural labor force. The flows were predominantly toward urban areas (77.9 percent). China’s central region was the largest source of rural migrant labor, having the highest labor out-migration rate (15.9 percent) and volume (22.8 million), followed by the western region (13.5 percent and 15.4 million). The eastern region had the lowest rate (8.5 percent) and the smallest volume. This pattern is broadly consistent with the findings of other studies of the early and mid-1990s. Because of the large size of the labor force in central provinces, this region accounted for 44 percent of the estimated total outflows. The low rate of out-migration in the eastern region is attributed to the high level of development of rural nonfarm enterprises in many villages and townships, which absorbed local and nearby rural labor. This is not the case for the central or western regions.

Nationally, a great portion of the movement was within counties (36 percent) and even more within migrants’ own provinces (71 percent) in 1994. A decade later, the overall labor out-migration rate almost doubled the rate in 1994 (from 12.5 to 23.8 percent). Among the three regions, the eastern region has gained a significant share of the migrant labor over time. Rural migrant labor was found almost entirely in cities and towns (94.3 percent), with a large percentage in large cities (62.4 percent).

A comparison of the 1993 data with another broadly similar national rural migrant labor survey from 1998 to 1999 reveals some interesting trends. Both of them report a stock of rural migrant labor of about 50 million. While the size and percentage of within-county migration remains quite stable (17–18 million, or 34–36 percent), there is a significant increase in the migration to other provinces, mostly to another region, between 1993 and 1998. This
means that rural migrants moved to farther destinations over time. This is consistent with what has been shown earlier based on 2000 census and 2005 mini-census data. Drastic increases in the number of migrants crossing both provincial and regional boundaries are obvious. In 1998, this group accounted for 31 percent of the migrant stock, whereas it accounted for only 18 percent in 1993.

Another regional comparison of the data in 1993 and 1998 in shows that the central region further consolidated its role as the largest source of rural migrant labor crossing provincial boundaries (55 percent in 1998 compared with 46 percent in 1993), and the eastern region is the destination of the vast majority of interprovincial rural migrant labor (increasing from 70 percent to 83 percent). Interprovincial rural migrant labor generated in and from the western region has witnessed the most rapid growth, with its share rising from about one-quarter to one-third in those five years. The share of out-of-province rural migrant labor in the eastern region, however, dwindled from about 30 percent to only about 11 percent of total interprovincial rural migrant labor in the same period.

Most of the interprovincial rural migrant labor in the eastern region stayed within the region (71–72 percent) throughout the 1990s. A large, and increasing, majority of the interprovincial rural migrant laborers from the central and western regions moved to the eastern region (87 percent from the central region and 79 percent from the western region). In terms of the regional outflow pattern, migrants from the western region followed the footsteps of migrants from the central region. Five years earlier, a large portion of out-of-province rural migrant labor (38 percent) from the western region moved within the same region. In the late 1990s, a much smaller percentage still did (14 percent), while almost three quarters of them moved to the eastern region. It has been argued that such moves placed migrants in the best position to benefit from the largest geographic wage disparities possible, and one would also expect that migration would narrow the spatial disparities.

Another comparison between 1998 and 2004 shows that the eastern region has further concentrated rural migrant labor, accounting for 70 percent of all migrants, as compared with only 38 percent in 1998. The two net exporting regions (central and western) show a similar trend; in terms of the destination distribution of all rural migrant labor, the central region still had a much higher percentage in the eastern region than the western region did (because the central region had a higher rate of out-of-province migration).

Guangdong and Sichuan, which are the two provinces with the largest net migration change (in-migration and out-migration, respectively) between 1995 and 2000, are also the provinces with the lowest and highest per capita GDP growth rates, respectively, in the same period. If we add the remittances migrants sent back to their hometowns to our calculus, the overall economic gains of migration to the sending provinces would be even greater. This postulate is consistent with the general pattern of higher rural income growth rates in locales associated with higher rates of out-migration (after controlling for other factors) in China.

Considering the Future

Although previous works have shown that China’s rising migration went hand-in-hand with an increase in regional disparities, one may argue that interregional migration actually helped to narrow spatial economic disparities. From a human capital perspective the Chinese government must continue to promote education and migration as a way to narrow the gaps between the coastal and inland provinces.

More importantly, migration is also closely tied to the reforms of the hukou system. Despite a good deal of official rhetoric about abolishing the hukou institution, the reality is quite different. Almost all the changes to the hukou system and new initiatives have had only marginal impact on weakening the foundation of the system—that is, the separation of two segments of population and discrimination based on that separation. The hukou system, directly and indirectly, continues to be a major barrier that prevents China’s rural population from settling in the city, maintaining the rural–urban “apartheid.” This problem has become more acute as rural migrant labor has become more and more permanent (rather than seasonal) with an increasing proportion of women and children. Increasingly, the problem migrants face is not just employment, but also education (for their children), health, and social security. Despite the good intentions of
the central government, local governments do not seem ready to implement any fundamental change to the hukou system.

Kam Wing CHAN

Further Reading


China’s intentions in modernizing its military are largely unclear to the outside world, but many experts believe that China wants to build forces that are superior to those of its regional peers, that create the option for quick action against Taiwan if necessary, and that are ultimately capable of defeating U.S. forces in a regional conflict.

China’s military modernization must be placed in the context of changes in the nature of warfare. Three related developments shape the current military environment. The first is the development of a high-tech, information-intensive style of combat, pioneered by the United States in the first Persian Gulf war. The second is the reaction of the United States’ potential opponents—such as China—to the conventional military superiority that this style of combat has given the United States. The third is the development of new kinds of weapons and new modes of attack. The conventional strength that the United States’ high-tech, information-intensive style of combat gives it means that potential opponents are likely to seek asymmetric advantage: They will avoid conflict where the United States is strong and attack where it is weak, and they will rely on unconventional weapons and tactics to do this.

In this context, certain conclusions about military modernization can be made by observing the kinds of military capabilities that China is acquiring, the military doctrine it is developing, and the nature of the exercises and training its forces undertake. But care must be taken in making these deductions about intent because China’s modernization could reflect military ambitions, a desire for improved defense, a wish to demonstrate prestige and status, or a combination of all of these.

Although an asymmetric approach explains some of what China is doing in its military modernization efforts, it is not the full explanation. China appears to be deeply concerned with prestige, with gaining international recognition and reclaiming its place among the great nations of the world. China would also like to be recognized as the paramount power in the Asia-Pacific region. Some of its military activities and acquisitions are made in the interests of prestige and influence, and China’s rivals for supremacy in Asia include not only the United States but also China’s powerful neighbors—India, Russia, and Japan.

Modernization

A decade ago, in terms of the sophistication of its arsenal, China’s military lagged behind not only large regional powers such as India but also behind smaller countries such as Korea and Singapore. China’s determination to develop a high-tech economy has always had a military component: It has always desired to close the gap between its military and the militaries of its neighbors and other great powers.

The notion of catching up with or even leapfrogging over Western nations has also been a theme for many decades in Chinese policy. The notion that China will be able to make rapid technological advances that allows it to
surpass other nations remains attractive in China, despite its many failed leapfrogging efforts, and the concept of leapfrogging reinforces Chinese thinking about the need to gain asymmetric advantage.

In fact, China could pursue two modernization strategies simultaneously; a long term strategy to build advanced defense industrial capabilities and powerful conventional forces (including a blue-water navy with an aircraft carrier and advanced submarines) and a near term strategy of acquiring asymmetric capabilities that may provide advantage over U.S. forces. The combination of advanced conventional forces and asymmetric capabilities will provide the basis for a modern military force.

China’s likely goals for its military modernization, however—regional primacy and local superiority over U.S. forces—will not be easy to attain. India, Russia, Japan, and even Korea all have formidable military forces, and the capabilities of U.S. forces far surpass those of these nations. Although the war in Iraq has seriously eroded U.S. ground force capabilities, U.S. air and naval forces remain superior to those of China or any other nation. The goal of regional supremacy is probably unattainable for China, absent major changes in the capabilities of the U.S. and other nations, but that does not mean China will stop pursuing it.

**Asymmetric Warfare**

U.S. experts view China’s military not as a peer to that of the United States but rather as an astute challenger. The challenge comes from a combination of increased conventional capabilities and from the pursuit of asymmetric advantage—using new weapons and tactics to attack an opponent in areas where it is weak or vulnerable. Seeking asymmetric advantage is not new, nor is China the only

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*Sailors from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)*.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
country to seek it. Potential U.S. opponents, including China, currently plan to gain asymmetric advantage to counter U.S. force-projection capabilities (the ability of the United States to rapidly deploy ships, aircraft, and troops to any region of the world, including northeast Asia); they are looking as well for ways to erode the U.S. military advantage by attacking information and communications assets, including satellites and networks.

China’s military is developing weapons and tactics programs to achieve these goals. The most dangerous of these programs are those targeting U.S. aircraft carriers. China has acquired many of the technologies that the Soviet Union developed to attack U.S. carriers, and China is refining those technologies and the tactics needed to use them. China is also developing sophisticated antisatellite capabilities as part of a larger strategy for information operations, but although it has expended considerable effort on both those fronts, neither has reached the stage where they pose much risk to U.S. military superiority.

Antisatellite Weapons

China’s antisatellite test in January 2007 received much attention in the West, but the test should not have been a surprise. The Chinese have been working on antisatellite weapons for at least a decade. The particular weapon China used in the test—a kinetic intercept of a low-Earth-orbit satellite—is the least sophisticated mode of antisatellite attack; the Soviets and the United States developed, tested, and abandoned that mode decades ago.

Public reports in the West speculate that China is also working on ground-based lasers and perhaps attack satellites. Other tactics that the Chinese might use against U.S. satellites include cyberattacks against the ground facilities and networks that control U.S. space assets or jamming of signals from satellites, in particular from the Global Positioning System (GPS).

Information Warfare

China’s antisatellite programs should be seen in the context of a larger effort to gain asymmetric advantage and to erode U.S. capabilities by attacking its information assets. Because a good portion of the U.S. advantage in combat comes from satellite data, potential opponents such as China are searching for ways to interfere with these services and the networks that support them. U.S. experts say the Chinese are also likely putting considerable work into denial and deception efforts—efforts to mislead opponents by denying them information about their military or by providing them with false information. These efforts include the jamming of satellite signals, interference with networks, and spoofing of targets. Spoofing can involve, for example, carefully studying the signature of

Red Army guards in formation at the Forbidden City. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
a target weapons system that the U.S. sensor collects and then duplicating that signature in a decoy. Such denial and deception tactics may actually be of greater concern to an opponent of China than are antisatellite efforts because a skillful combination of concealment, mobility, and deception has had some success against U.S. technical collection—that is, the collection of intelligence through the use of sensors (such as radar, infrared imagery, or photographs) or through the interception of radio signals or other electronic emissions.

As suggested earlier, denial and deception are one aspect of information warfare. If sensors collect erroneous data, the decisions based on that data also will be erroneous. Another information warfare tactic is to corrupt stored data or to damage the computer networks that process and distribute data and support decision making. Government sources in the United States say that China has targeted U.S. information systems as a vulnerable component of the U.S. style of combat.

Information technologies are a primary target for asymmetric attack. Information includes technological know-how, data, statistics, and news, and the networks and processing technologies that aggregate, process, and distribute information have become an integral part of U.S. power. Gaining information superiority, whether by knowing more than an opponent or by disrupting the opponent’s ability to know, has also become one of the keys to success in conflict in the twenty-first century.

Conflict in cyberspace is clandestine, so assessing intentions and risks can be difficult. The central point to consider in an assessment of cyber vulnerability and the consequences of a cyberattack is the linkage between information systems and military capability. If U.S. military capabilities depend heavily on information systems, cyberattacks will do great damage. If there is redundancy in information systems or if networks are resilient (that is, if they can recover quickly), cyberattacks will do much less damage. So far, vulnerability in a computer network has not automatically translated into a loss of military capability for the United States. The risks and consequences of a cyberattack are routinely overstated in the popular media; a cyberattack would not provide China with a decisive military advantage, U.S. military officials say.

One way to assess U.S. vulnerability and China’s ability to exploit that vulnerability is to ask whether a cyberattack by China launched a few days in advance of a military conflict could prevent U.S. carrier battle groups from deploying to the Taiwan Strait. China could attempt to interfere with telecommunications systems in an effort to prevent deployment, but a successful effort would have to simultaneously disrupt land lines, cell phones, the Internet, and satellite communications—a virtually impossible task in a nation with a highly developed communications infrastructure.

China could attempt to interfere with transportation, whether air traffic control or street traffic signals, to

A submarine of the shore of Shanghai, 1979. Building advanced aircraft carriers and submarines is part of China’s long-term defense strategy. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
make it more difficult for U.S. carrier crews to assemble, although it is hard to see what a cyberattack could add to the gridlock and overcrowding that occur routinely on bad days. China could attempt to interfere with the electrical grid, which could complicate and slow a ship’s departure. Perhaps hackers could take over broadcast radio and TV stations and play Chinese music and propaganda or change broadcast parameters in an effort to create radio interference. But these sorts of annoyances do not provide military advantage.

China also could attempt to interfere with the computer networks that support logistics and supply chains, but because any clash is likely to be a come-as-you-are conflict, there would be no immediate effect. The Chinese also could attempt to disrupt critical civilian infrastructure. This disruption would not seriously affect the deployment of U.S. forces, although it could put China at risk of widening any conflict in exchange for little benefit, since an attack against U.S. civilian infrastructures could easily prompt retaliatory measures.

Some experts worry that surreptitious, long-term cyberattacks on the U.S. economic system might seem attractive to China as a way to weaken the United States before a conflict, but the uncertain benefits of such attacks—and they are uncertain because they might not work and are as likely to damage the economy of China as that of the United States—would have to be weighed against the serious risk and damage that would occur if the effort were discovered.

A better strategy for China in information warfare would be to seek to increase an opponent’s uncertainty. Increasing opposing commanders’ uncertainty degrades the opponent’s effectiveness. Whereas a strategy of denial and deception aims to make opponents believe that they know what is happening (when, in fact, what they believe is wrong), an uncertainty strategy aims to make an opponent unsure about what is happening.

The techniques for carrying out an uncertainty strategy resemble those for carrying out a strategy of denial and deception. One may inject false information into the planning and decision processes of an opponent or manipulate information that is already in that system to make it untrustworthy. There is reason to believe that the Chinese routinely use false or misleading information to manipulate and confuse their opponents. China will more likely pursue an information strategy that seeks to expand uncertainty and confusion rather than unleash an improbable “electronic Pearl Harbor” that would offer only uncertain results.

**Miscalculation**

Overall, U.S. experts think, the United States is capable of handling the threat posed by China’s military modernization in all the areas mentioned. But one area of risk
deserves greater attention: the risk that the Chinese government would miscalculate the U.S. response and the international reaction to a military adventure and that the Chinese government would miscalculate the benefits and effect of antisatellite or cyberweapons on the military balance.

The Chinese clearly miscalculated the reaction to their January 2007 antisatellite test. They did not expect the global condemnation it received: The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s lack of preparation to answer questions about the test suggests that China expected a low-key reaction from other countries, and Chinese officials admit privately that the Foreign Ministry was not consulted or kept fully apprised of plans for the test. This miscalculation reflects a degree of parochialism in Chinese security policy, a lack of experience in international politics, and a certain degree of hubris born of China’s tremendous economic success.

This miscalculation makes it fair to ask if the Chinese could similarly miscalculate the balance of power in the region. Some U.S. experts say it is not inconceivable, for example, that China could overestimate the advantages provided by asymmetric attacks and overestimate the exhaustion of U.S. forces because of the war in Iraq. At times in the past—in 1914 or 1941, for example—authoritarian regimes have made such miscalculations and initiated conflicts that appeared unthinkable.

It is unlikely that China would make this sort of miscalculation, although defense spending has increased by more than 10 percent every year for the past two decades, with a 17 percent increase in 2008 and a 15 percent increase planned for 2009. Official figures probably understate actual spending by 10 percent to 20 percent, and spending on programs to develop asymmetric capabilities is usually concealed. China’s defense budget is now the second largest in the world; over the last two decades the People’s Liberation Army has changed from an overstaffed military with antiquated arms to a leaner force with modern equipment.

James A. LEWIS

Further Reading

Military, Imperial

Diguó jūndui 帝国军队

Beginning with the Han dynasty, the strength and allegiance of the Chinese army were determining factors in the rise and fall of imperial dynasties. China’s willingness to adopt Western science, technology, and other innovations in the first decade of the nineteenth century led to repeated defeats by Western countries and Japan that culminated in the revolution and the end of the imperial era.

Almost all dynasties in China began with a military success, and each ultimately rested on its military’s continued effectiveness. All of them had a dual concern pertaining to their military: how to control the military force to prevent powerful and ambitious generals from revolting and to suppress popular revolts when they occurred; and how to defend the country against invaders.

Citizen-Soldier System of the Han and Tang

During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), all males were required to register for military service at twenty, and were considered active for military service for a year, and as reservists until age fifty-six, during which time they would report for military duties for a month each year and could be called up for special campaigns. The logistical difficulties of the system led to the longevity of levying “substitute money” on all draft-eligible men to pay for volunteers. The practice of hiring alien tribesmen to serve as soldiers and the rise of mercenary armies loyal to local leaders contributed to the decline and fall of the Han dynasty.

The army of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) consisted of career soldiers from good families who enlisted for long-term service, starting at age twenty-one and retiring at sixty. Military service was esteemed, and good families, including the nobility, vied to have their sons accepted in the army. They formed six hundred garrisons and rotated between the capitals and frontier posts. But by the mid-eighth century the state had to rely on mercenaries recruited from friendly frontier-nomadic tribes. They were commanded by their own generals, such as An Lushan, who led them in rebellion from 755 CE to 763 CE. Since regional armies played an important part in putting down the An Lushan rebellion, they became a permanent feature of the late Tang, contributing to further weakening of the dynasty.

Song and Ming Military Systems

Neither the Song (960–1279) nor the Ming (1368–1644) dynasty suffered from military uprisings or attempted coups. This was due to the ascendancy of the civil service and its control over the military and to the establishment of a professional army with hereditary soldiers. Martial spirit declined as did esteem for soldiering as a career, as evident in the common saying: “The best iron is not to be used for nails; the best men are not to become soldiers.”
The Song dynasty was founded as the result of a mutiny; for this reason the early Song rulers followed a deliberate strategy of subordinating the army to civilian control and rotating commanders among different units to prevent the build up of esprit de corps between them. Song military strategy was based on static defense and diplomacy. Never able to control the northern steppes, where the best horses were bred, and unable to obtain them from the hostile nomads, the Song army relied on infantry forces. Wang Anshi, a tenth century reformer of the Song government, attempted to strengthen national defense and failed to meet their goals: He tried to organize the population into a militia similar to that of the Han and Tang times and to encourage the farmers to raise horses by subsidizing them. Dangerous neighbors kept the Song army large—over a million men—and the cost high. Horses raised by farmers for agriculture were ill suited to cavalry use. Song innovations and inventions for warfare included the military use of explosives in rockets and other projectiles and tank-like carts sheathed in iron plating. But the Song government found it was easier to pay the mighty nomadic neighbors annual tributes of silver and silk than to fight them, and consequently the dynasty produced few distinguished generals. The most famous and heroic among them was Yue Fei (1103–1142), who attempted to win back territory seized by the Jin, was betrayed, imprisoned on trumped-up charges, and murdered in jail.

The Ming army combined Tang and Song features. It relied on a professional and hereditary standing army as did the Song, numbering a million at the beginning of the dynasty and increasing to almost four million by its end. Military units were allocated land to farm in peacetime for their sustenance, though that was usually insufficient and they had to receive subsidies from the central government. It also raised militias from the populations for limited local needs. Rotation of commanders precluded the development of warlordism and forestalled revolts. There were few military innovations during the Ming; by the sixteenth century when Europeans arrived on the coast by ship, China was behind Europe in firearms technology. Thus the Ming government purchased firearms from Europeans and made imitations locally; they asked the Jesuit missionaries, then active in the Chinese court as specialists in astronomy and other scientific fields, to cast cannons, which the Jesuits did in order to acquire protection for their proselytizing activities. After the initial period of military expansion, the Ming government relied on static defense, rebuilding large sections of the Great Wall at its eastern end.

Armies of the Nomadic Dynasties

The Song dynasty was confronted by warlike nomadic neighbors. The two greatest threats to the Song originated from the northeast, beginning with the Liao dynasty, ruled by nomads called the Khitan, who seized lands in present day Manchuria and northeastern China from the
collapsing Tang empire. Too weak to confront it militarily, the Song rulers made peace with the Liao dynasty by paying its annual tribute of silk and silver. By the early twelfth century, a new nomadic people called Jurchen, from northern Manchuria, formed an alliance with the Song and defeated the (by then) decadent Liao rulers.

Subsequent land disputes between rulers (the Song and the Jurchen, who now called their rule the [Jurchen] Jin dynasty, 1125–1234) resulted in defeat of the Song, which ceded all of northern China to the Jin and paid massive tribute in silk and silver. Both the Jin and what remained of the Song (called the Southern Song because it only ruled southern China after 1127) were destroyed by the Mongols. The fifth grand Khan of the Mongols, Kubilai, reunited all Chinese lands under his rule and called it the Yuan dynasty in 1279.

The Liao (916–1125) and Jurchen Jin dynasties organized armies according to their tribal systems. Their strength lay in their cavalries and the martial spirit of their soldiers. Each recruited their Chinese subjects to form auxiliary and subordinate infantry units.

Chinggis Khan (also called Genghis Khan, 1164–1227) organized his Mongol warriors according to a centralized, decimal-based hierarchy of units called hundreds, thousands, and myriads (ten thousand); the armies were commanded by his family members and Mongol nobles. The most elite, consisting mostly of noblemen, formed the ruler’s palace guard. Below the Mongol units were auxiliaries of Central Asians, northern Chinese, and southern Chinese, in descending order of prestige. Chinese units were only issued arms when ordered into battle, and they had to return them when the fight was over. For their support, military units were granted land cultivated by Chinese slaves. The deterioration of the caliber of Mongol soldiers after decades of living a privileged life as occupiers of China contributed to the decline and fall of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

The rise of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was made possible by the banner system organized by dynastic founders Nurhachi and Abahai in the early seventeenth century. From the initial eight Manchu banners (each with a different colored or bordered banner or standard), eight Mongol and eight Han Chinese banners were added from the ranks of their early subject-allies, making a total of twenty-four. After conquering China, the elite banner units were stationed at strategic locations throughout the empire. These “bannermen” were hereditary soldiers and forbidden trades and other professions; they were supported by revenue from state lands. Additional but less prestigious units, called the Green Standard, or Banner, Army, were recruited among the general population for less vital garrison duties. Early Qing rulers maneuvered and hunted annually with banner units to keep up their fighting ability. The rise and decline of the Qing dynasty, following the pattern of the Yuan, paralleled the strength and decline of the banner armies as well, which had deteriorated to drone-like men by the late eighteenth century.

Whereas the Chinese civilization in general, and the Chinese military in particular, had been innovative and inventive, and therefore ahead of the West in many areas before the fifteenth century, it fell behind thereafter. Thus, although the Chinese discovered gunpowder and put it to military use, by the time Europeans arrived in China by sea in the sixteenth century, they had better cannons and muskets. Hence the late Ming and early Qing courts asked the Jesuits to cart cannons for them. But even in the early nineteenth century the Qing soldiers relied chiefly on swords, bows, and arrows.

The huge and growing gap in general and military technology between China and Europe resulted in China’s crushing defeat by Britain and France in the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century (1839–1842 and 1856–1860). Because Japan was quick to adopt Western sciences after its opening by the United States in 1834, Japan, too, easily defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). China’s defeat in foreign wars contributed to the decline and fall of the Qing dynasty—which ended with the founding of Republican China in 1911 and the subsequent abdication of the emperor a few months later in 1912—and to the end of imperialism itself.

**Further Reading**


The Min dialect group is the most divergent and complicated of China’s seven major languages. At least six Min subdialect groups exist.

Min is a geographic short term for “Fujian Province” in China. It is named after the largest river “Min jiang” in the province. Chinese dialectologists have used Min for decades as a linguistic term refering to the Min dialects. Among the seven major Chinese languages—Mandarin, Min, Wu, Yue, Gan, Hakka, and Xiang—the Min dialect group is the most divergent and complicated. Because Fujian is a mountainous province with few navigable rivers and little arable land, its topography has contributed both to the heterogeneity of the dialects and also to migration of people to other parts of China and overseas.

Before the 1960s, when dialect data were scant, the Min dialect group was roughly divided into two subgroups: Minnan (Southern Min) and Minbei (Northern Min). But studies done in the 1990s showed that at least six Min subdialect groups exist: Minbei (Northern Min), Minzhong (Central Min), Minnan (Southern Min), Mindong (Eastern Min), Puxian, and Shaoning. (See table 1.) Most of these groups are mutually unintelligible.

### Fuzhou Dialect

The Fuzhou dialect is a characteristic Mindong dialect whose speakers number more than 1 million and who are found not only in Fuzhou but also in Southeast Asian communities. The Fuzhou dialect, like other Chinese dialects, has differences in literary and colloquial readings for some lexical items but for fewer lexical items than is the case in Minnan (Southern Min).

Fuzhou has fourteen initial consonants \( p, p', m, t, t', n, l, ts, ts', s, k, k', ng, x \), seven vowels \( i, u, y, a, e, o \), seven tones, and just one paired-consonant ending: \( -ng/-q \). The velar nasal \( ng \) may occur alone and forms a syllabic nasal.

The Fuzhou dialect has a unique sound sandhi (sandhi is a term used to describe changes in the sounds of adjacent words), a phenomenon that is rarely found in other Chinese dialects. In words consisting of two syllables, not only does the tone of the first syllable undergo tonal value change, but also the consonant initial of the second syllable undergoes an assimilation change according to the articulation of the coda (syllable ending) of the preceding syllable. For example, the word for “movie” is composed

### Table 1: Speakers of Min Subdialects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIN DIALECT GROUP</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SPEAKERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minnan group</td>
<td>34.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindong group</td>
<td>7.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puxian group</td>
<td>2.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minbei group</td>
<td>2.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaojiang group</td>
<td>745,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minzhong group</td>
<td>683,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of two syllables: The first syllable, tieng⁶, means “electric”; the second syllable, ing⁳, means “shadow.” Together the two syllables create the compound word tieng⁵nging³, whose first-syllable tone and second-syllable consonant initial have changed.

At times not only the consonants but also the main vowels of the second syllables undergo sound sandhi and become different vowels or diphthongs (gliding monosyllabic speech sounds that start at or near the articulatory position for one vowel and move to or toward the position of another).

Fuzhou also has some grammatical features that differ from Mandarin (China’s national language). For example, in Fuzhou, for animal terms with a gender modifier, the gender modifier follows the head noun. That is, “male dog” is pronounced k’eing⁶xyng³ (dog-male), whereas in Mandarin the gender modifier precedes the head noun: xiong²gou³ (male-dog). This feature is shared by other Min dialects and other southern Chinese dialect groups such as Yue and Hakka. Another example is the presence of a perfective aspect marker to indicate completed action. The phrase “I have seen” in Fuzhou is tau⁶, whereas in Mandarin it is wo³kan⁴le (“I see [aspect]”), where [aspect] is a verbal category indicating that an action is viewed as completed or in progress.

**Amoy**

Native speakers of Minnan dialects are found not only in Fujian Province but also in the provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hainan Island, and Sichuan, and as well in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Taiwan. Minnan speakers are also found overseas in the Chinese communities of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Singapore. Minnan dialects have more than 30 million speakers; Amoy, which is spoken by more than 510,000 people, is representative of the group.

Every Chinese dialect has the phenomenon of literary and colloquial readings of characters. The Amoy dialect is known for having the most characters with both readings. The literary form is used only in reading the written language and when using a person’s formal name, whereas the colloquial form is used in all other oral communications. The difference between the literary and the colloquial pronunciation is so great that they can be treated as two parallel phonological (relating to the science of speech sounds) systems. For example, in literary Amoy the word blood is pronounced hui⁷, whereas in colloquial Amoy it is pronounced hui⁷.

Both literary Amoy and colloquial Amoy have six oral vowels (i, e, a, u, o, and ò), but colloquial Amoy has an additional five nasalized vowels (iⁿ, eⁿ, aⁿ, uⁿ, òⁿ). Literary Amoy has sixteen consonants (p, p’, b, m, t, t’, l, n, ts, ts’, s, k, k’, g, h, and ng); colloquial Amoy has one more consonant, the glottal stop, q, which occurs only in syllable final position. The stops p, t, k, and their counterpart nasals m, n, and ng can occur both in the syllable initial and final positions, whereas the other consonants can occur only in initial positions. The nasals m and ng can occur alone as syllabic syllables.

The Amoy dialect has seven basic tones. In both literary Amoy and colloquial Amoy, whenever a compound word or a phrase consists of two or more syllables, the syllables preceding the last one must undergo tone sandhi except when the last syllable is an atonic word (or an enclitic, meaning associated with a preceding word). For example, the word for “soy sauce” is the combination of tau⁶, meaning “bean,” and iu², meaning “oil.” The compound word is pronounced tau⁵iu².

Some of the grammatical features that set Fuzhou apart from Mandarin are also characteristic of Amoy. For example, like Fuzhou, Amoy’s gender markers for animals follow rather than precede the animal. Word order in some compound words is also reversed. For example, in Amoy “guest” is lang⁶k’eq⁷ (people-guest), whereas in Mandarin “guest” is ke⁴ren² (guest-people). Amoy also uses a perfective marker to show completed action.

**Jian’ou**

The Jian’ou dialect, with more than 437,000 native speakers, is a representative subdialect of the Minbei (Northern Min) dialect group. It is spoken by people in the northern part of Fujian Province. It contains fourteen initial consonants (p, p’, m, t, t’, n, l, ts, ts’, s, k, k’, x, ng), nine vowels (i, u, y, e, ê, ë, a, o, ò), six tones, and one consonant ending (-ng). Because of its adjacency to the Mindong dialect area, it shares some phonological features with
Fuzhou. For example, both have rounded front vowels (y, œ), more diphthong main vowels, and only one nasal ending (-ng).

**Yong’an**

Yong’an is a representative subdialect of the Minzhong (Central Min) dialect group, which is surrounded by Minbei dialect to its north, Minnan to its south, Mindong to its east, and Hakka to its west. It has both Min and Hakka dialect features. Native speakers of Yong’an number about 265,000. It has sixteen initial consonants (p, p’, m, t, t’, n/l, ts, ts’, s, tš, tš’, š, k, k’, x, ng), ten oral vowels (i, Ï, u, û, y, e, ø, a, o, â), four nasalized vowels (iₙ, on, aₙ, uₙ), and six tones. It contains two consonant endings, bilabial nasal -m and velar nasal -ng. The bilabial nasal m may occur alone as a syllabic syllable.

**Puxian**

The Puxian dialect (莆仙方言 Puxian fangyan) is spoken between Minnan and Mindong. Thus, it shares some linguistic features with Minnan and Mindong. Puxian is representative of this dialect group. Its native speakers number almost 1.5 million. It contains fourteen initial consonants (p, p’, m, t, t’, n, l, ts, ts’, s, tš, tš’, š, k, k’, x, ng), eleven vowels (i, u, ē, e, ø, a, o, ô, A), and six tones. It has two consonant endings, velar nasal -ng and glottal stop -q. The velar nasal may occur alone as a syllabic syllable. Puxian has sound sandhi similar to Mindong and a colloquial and literary system similar to that of the Minnan dialect.

**Shaowu**

Shaoning dialect 邵宁方言 (Shaoning fangyan) is spoken by people in the northwest part of Fujian Province. Shaowu is representative of this dialect group. Its native speakers number just more than 258,000. It is adjacent to Minbei to the east, Gan dialect (in Jiangxi Province) to the west, and Hakka dialect group to its south. Its status has been controversial for years, with some scholars claiming that Shaowu is a Min dialect, whereas others claim it is a Hakka dialect. Based on the historical sound changes and dialect specific lexicon, it currently is considered to be a hybrid dialect, a mixture of Hakka-Gan and Min. Shaowu has nineteen initial consonants (p, p’, m, f, v, t, t’, n, l, ts, ts’, s, tš, tš’, š, k, k’, x, ng), eight vowels (i, ī, u, ū, y, e, ë, a, o, ò), eight nasalized vowels (iₙ, on, aₙ, uₙ), and six tones. It has two consonant endings: an alveolar nasal -n and a velar nasal -ng. The velar nasal may occur alone as a syllabic syllable.

**Margaret Mian YAN**

**Further Reading**


China has extensive mineral resources that are critical to the development and success of a modern, economically diverse economy. As China increases foreign exports and domestic consumption of these resources, more attention must be paid to exploiting these resources in a sustainable fashion.

The huge size of China—nearly 9.6 million square kilometers—anticipates the considerable diversity of geologic and landform genesis processes that ultimately must be credited for the nation’s rich and extensive mineral resource base. As a consequence of the geologic forces (metamorphic, sedimentary, and igneous) that create and concentrate exploitable subsurface mineral resources under different environmental conditions over millions of years, the country has some of the most extensive mineral deposits on Earth.

China is at or near the top of the list of all nations in gross potentially exploitable reserves of many strategic metals and ores. For example, China in 2007 was first among all nations in the production of coal, crude steel, fertilizer (phosphate, potash), and chemical fibers. China is also among the world’s four top producers of antimony, tin, tungsten, and zinc, while ranking second in the production of salt, third in gold, fourth in silver, eighth in lead, and approximately sixth in crude petroleum. Uncertainty about the supply of crude petroleum underscores a number of common problems in the estimation of energy resources and reserves, since exploration is ongoing while domestic production varies significantly from year to year in response to the price of imports vis-à-vis domestic production costs.

Nevertheless, China’s diverse and extensive strategic mineral resources, exploited at ever-growing rates, guarantee that the nation will be a major player, as both an importer and exporter, in the global trade in many strategic minerals for the foreseeable future. Concerns among the international community tend to focus on the growth of China’s imports of energy resources, especially oil and natural gas, steel, gold, and silver, because of the effect these imports are already having on global markets and prices. Overlooked, however, is the fact that the country is an increasingly important exporter of raw and semi-processed minerals as well. China’s leading export minerals include tungsten, antimony, tin, magnesium, molybdenum, mercury, manganese, barite, and salt.

China’s extensive in-ground reserves and growing production of minerals and ores reflect only part of the story. But if China’s resources are evaluated on a per capita basis, concerns expressed by both domestic economic planners and the international community regarding current consumption levels and projected future shortages of metals and energy are more understandable. Per capita amounts of many of the same minerals and ores listed earlier are often quite low because of the nation’s population of 1.33 billion (2008). China’s population is projected to increase at least for the next quarter-century, while per capita consumption of energy and industrial metals or ores during this same period is expected to continue to skyrocket because of China’s racing economy—still predicated largely on manufacturing. This situation, then, is an
important point of departure in considering the nation’s reserves and contemporary use of important mineral resources. What is important is not simply how much a nation potentially has available in absolute terms, but rather how many people are dependent on the reserves as they move from the ground via manufacturing processes to the marketplace.

Indeed, realization among China’s top leaders that the nation’s economic growth will slow or stagnate without adequate supplies of industrially important minerals and nonrenewable organic sources of energy (coal, natural gas, petroleum) has prompted startlingly different foreign policy initiatives and “alliances” during the last decade. Despite the indisputable logic of such a pragmatic diplomacy, many in the international community have been taken by surprise by the pace and extent of China’s new roles on the international stage. Seldom can international trade and diplomacy be separated, and nowhere is this truer than in contemporary China. Foreign policy initiatives include controversial bilateral agreements with oil-rich nations such as Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela, but more important and potentially enduring are efforts to forge closer relations (and build pipelines) with Russia and other central Asian nations such as Kazakhstan. Furthermore, mutually beneficial aid-based diplomacy throughout Africa has placed Chinese engineers and construction teams in dozens of African nations. Chinese nationals are now routinely found building roads, irrigation systems, and dams as well as operating mines under contract and as joint ventures throughout the continent and more recently in many places in Southeast Asia. It should come as no surprise that many of these same nations are exporting growing volumes of ores and minerals (including organic fuels) to China while also serving as export markets for Chinese manufactured goods. An assessment of China’s mineral reserves, use, and consumption then must be viewed not as a set of arcane facts but rather as a critical factor influencing China’s international diplomacy actions and initiatives as the nation’s role in the global economy grows.

The Global Workshop

Since market-oriented economic reforms were instituted in December 1978, China’s economy as measured by gross national product (GNP) has grown at or near double-digit rates. Mineral resource use then is being driven both by increases in domestic consumption of energy and manufactured goods and by the nation’s more recent and expanding role as the “global workshop.” This remarkable increase in productivity fuels the use of domestic supplies of ores, metals, and energy resources at expanding rates. As the role of centralized planning in mining and metalurgy firms declines, prices, production, and consumption of strategic metals and energy resources are increasingly determined by international market prices—not by domestic availability.

For many heavy industrial firms, central planning once exclusively determined the sources of metals and energy used in production, and prices for these materials were set by the government. Increasingly the international price of these commodities determines if imports or domestic supplies are used by these same firms. This is not to say that the role of the state with respect to the management of mineral resources has diminished anywhere near the extent found in Western nations or Japan and South Korea. Domestic prices are still controlled by state-established “ceilings and floors,” and markets for many minerals and metals used in manufacturing are allowed to fluctuate only within this range. Although most light manufacturing firms have already made the transition from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to diverse forms of private ownership (private, publicly traded, joint ventures), the government has moved more cautiously in the case of mines, metal-processing and smelting companies, and energy-related firms. For example, crude petroleum markets are controlled almost exclusively by state-owned megafirms. Coal, on the other hand, is produced both by state-owned firms (including local government-owned firms) and private operations. Subsidies are still provided for state- or local-government-owned mines, smelting operations, and other processors, but these are now determined on a case-by-case basis as the country works to close inefficient and/or dangerous mines and processing plants. Clearly, however, the privatization of these operations is under way, with a growing number of firms—especially new ones—being encouraged to operate as private enterprises based on shareholding, even when local or provincial government monies are involved. Ironically, many of the most dangerous mines are privately owned or owned by local governments, and the central
government now finds itself in the uncharacteristic role of “protector of the working man,” trying to close dangerous small mines while facing resistance by local governments dependent on these revenues.

Typically mineral resources are grouped into three categories: energy resources, ferrous metals and ferroalloys, and nonferrous metals and minerals. (See table 1.) Extensive scientific resource surveys for all three categories initiated in the mid-1980s and conducted almost continuously since that time have resulted in much clearer assessments of mineral resources than at any other time in the nation’s long history.

China’s growing industrial might and its increasing production and consumption of minerals and industrial metals such as copper, iron, and tungsten are already having myriad impacts on global markets. A poignant example is the fact that prices for scrap steel (heavy melt scrap)—essentially flat in the United States for the preceding decade—almost tripled to $225 a ton from 2001 to 2007 on the back of massive increases in exports, with 50 percent of these exports going to China. This is good news for scrap yards but bad news for U.S. steel manufacturers who depend on scrap as a component in new manufactures, including automobiles and consumer durables such as appliances. A new industrial lobbying group representing metal processors in the United States was formed in 2000 in response to the instability that the growing economies of China and India have visited on prices and availability of scrap metal.

### Fossil Fuel Reserves

Nothing can be processed or manufactured without energy, and China’s growing participation in global energy markets has caused the greatest concern and greatest impacts to date on global markets. Simply put, China’s domestic reserves of fossil fuels are quite modest when compared with current and future domestic demand. Estimated oil reserves—although still changing because of ambitious exploration efforts often conducted jointly with international firms—range between 20 and 30 billion barrels. Estimated consumption is growing from about 5 percent to 7 percent per year (depending on the source), meaning that in twenty years or so China will be out of domestically produced oil. New technologies will extend this timeline slightly, but China will be one of the top two U.S. major petroleum buyers within a decade, and as noted earlier China has adopted a series of ambitious foreign policy initiatives directed at assuring supplies in anticipation of this demand. In addition to these political solutions, petroleum and natural gas exploration, especially in far western Xinjiang and the South China Sea, is a government priority. Shallow areas thought to have significant reserves within the South China Sea, such as areas around the Paracel and Spratley islands, are claimed by many nations, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. These multiple claims represent important barriers to production from these areas—even if greater deposits are identified.

In contrast to petroleum (vital for transportation), China has massive coal reserves, typically considered to be third behind those of the United States and Russia. Coal reserves are estimated to be 120 billion tons, which—at current rates of consumption—will last almost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy Resources</th>
<th>Tons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>332,640,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural Gas</td>
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<th>Ferrous Ores and Alloys</th>
<th>Tons</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>21,600,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>215,399,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromite</td>
<td>5,210,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vanadium</td>
<td>13,235,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Titanium</td>
<td>214,104,000</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonferrous and Nonmetal Resources</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>28,564,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead Metal</td>
<td>13,934,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zinc Metal</td>
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<td>Bauxite Ore</td>
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<td>Magnesite Ore</td>
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<td>Pyrite Ores</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phosphorite Ore</td>
<td>3,700,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaolin Clay</td>
<td>602,259,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

one hundred years. Of course, the dilemma in China as elsewhere is how to burn the coal cleanly and more efficiently and how to convert the coal to fuels that can be used for transportation.

Given expected shortages, the current high costs of coal conversion, and the political issues related to increased crude oil production, it should come as no surprise that China is investing heavily in nuclear power, hydropower, and alternative energy. Historically unprecedented hydropower dam construction, including the recently completed and controversial Three Gorges Dam, must be viewed in this context. Wind farms are increasingly common off the eastern coasts and in Xinjiang and Qinghai in the far west. Zoning and local resistance limit the growth of wind-generated energy in the United States, but, for a nation whose citizens must routinely accommodate cut-offs or partial brown-outs, having the lights go on when the switch is flipped is worth the loss of the “view.” Although all of these alternative efforts will undoubtedly help mitigate energy shortages, new technologies focused on converting coal to liquefied gas and an ambitious program for nuclear power plant construction are probably more important in the short to medium term of the next twenty years.

Distribution of Resources

The distribution of China’s mineral resources has an interesting “geography” that has had direct and enduring effects on the nation’s economic development. Except for a limited number of elements or compounds largely concentrated by sedimentary deposition or fluvial redistribution in basins, such as bauxite, salt, natural gas, coal, and petroleum, most ores and minerals are found in mountainous areas—as is the case in all nations. The massive heat and pressure generated through metamorphic and igneous processes work to concentrate ores and minerals into commercially exploitable deposits. Mountains and minerals then are closely associated. Most of China’s mountains are located in the western and central regions of the nation; as a consequence, so are most of China’s mines and commercially exploitable mineral deposits, although there are important exceptions, such as iron.
But the vast majority of the country’s population is concentrated in the large and rich alluvial areas of the east and southeast coasts or in the Sichuan Basin (Red Basin). In part the high population density in these areas is testimony to China’s agrarian past, but on all the continents people tend to concentrate within flat, well-watered coastal areas where transportation and the construction of cities are easier. This was true even before the global mercantile era began but is even more true since. Pacific maritime trade became vital to China’s economy from the Song dynasty (960–1279) to the present (albeit with a few interruptions during the dynastic era). Of course, greater concentrations of people resulted in greater concentrations of capital and wealth, which in turn meant that the lion’s share of the factories of all types that emerged during the past 150 years were largely located in these areas as well. This fact resulted in what might be thought of as a locational mismatch in which mineral and ore deposits are concentrated in the interior, whereas the firms that process these resources are most often located within the more prosperous eastern region. Massive investments in transportation (road and rail), especially since the Great West Development Plan was instituted in 2000, can in part be credited to efforts by Chinese planners to reduce transit costs for western-sourced raw materials moving to the factories within the east or, alternately, to establish more factories in the west that convert minerals and ores to higher value-added products through the manufacturing process. Greater industrial production in the west raises incomes and tax revenues for development while slowing the eastward migration of “the best and the brightest” as well. Still, at present imported metal products such as sheet steel or I-beams from more efficient plants in South Korea or Japan are often cheaper than the same products produced in interior China because of these high transportation costs.

Gregory VEECK

Further Reading

Ming and Qing Novels ▶
During the Ming and Qing dynasties, highly educated literati increasingly used the long fictional narrative as a popular vehicle to engage in sophisticated storytelling. Drawing on historical events and personal experience, and on popular tales, anecdotes, and legends, novels by these authors provide us with some of our most illuminating sources on Chinese life in the early modern period.

The Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties witnessed a great flowering of long prose narrative fiction, especially from the sixteenth century onward. Despite the relatively low status of fiction as a genre in Chinese culture, especially when compared with poetry, highly educated writers increasingly turned to novels in the Ming period to express their artistic visions and their moral critiques of society. Before the nineteenth century they tended to publish their works anonymously or under pseudonyms, but with the growing prosperity of the late Ming period and the rapid expansion of the printing industry their works of fiction found a large and growing readership. Confucian orthodoxy had long looked down on fiction as frivolous, morally suspect, and likely to lead readers astray with tales of sex, violence, and villainy. By the late Ming period defenders of fiction argued, to the contrary, that because fiction can capture and hold an audience’s rapt attention, it is in fact one of the best vehicles for the spread and popularization of humane and civilized values.

**Late Sixteenth Century**

In the late sixteenth century a number of great novels appeared, all of them based to some degree on shorter works and popular themes from previous eras; one even appropriates an historic figure, using much artistic license of course, and creates a fantastical group of animals to guide him on his journey.

**Romance of the Three Continents**

"Romance of the Three Kingdoms" (Sanguo zhi yanyi 三国志演義), a sweeping historical saga in 120 chapters based on actual historical figures and events, tells of China’s division into three competing kingdoms after the collapse of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). The focus on the story is the rise and fall of states based on the talent, wisdom, luck, and loyalty (or lack of loyalty) of its leading statesmen and generals. It was long popularly assumed in China that the Mandate of Heaven—the belief, dating from the Zhou dynasty in the eleventh century BCE, that a benevolent Heaven grants political power only to the moral leader—went to the most virtuous competitor for power, but in this story virtue is less decisive than ambition, cunning, determination, and at times blind luck or the unpredictable interventions of fate. Although highly fictionalized, "Romance of the Three Kingdoms" has given...
many ordinary Chinese their basic understanding of the dynamics of power in imperial Chinese history.

**WATER MARGIN**

*Water Margin* (*Shui hu zuan*, 水滸傳), is a long rambling narrative ranging from 71 to 124 chapters, depending on the edition, based on popular stories about a band of 108 outlaws from the thirteenth century. It has been famously translated in English as *Outlaws of the Marshes* by Sidney Shapiro in the 1970s, and in an adaptation by Pearl S. Buck called *All Men Are Brothers*. These rough and ready, larger-than-life heroes are forced into banditry by their impulsive but noble resistance to injustice and to the corruption of the imperial government. Many critics have complained about the violence and brutality in this novel, but most readers have relished the drama of the story and enjoyed its hard-drinking, fun-loving bandits who might murder without a moment's reflection but who would also gladly give up their lives for their fellow bandits. In a society where young people owed their elders and teachers automatic obedience, *Shui hu zhuan* has afforded each young generation the vicarious thrill of rebellion and defiance of authority.

**JOURNEY TO THE WEST**

*Journey to the West* (*Xiyouji*, 西遊記) is a fanciful retelling (in one hundred chapters) of the life of the Chinese monk Xuanzang, who journeyed to India in 629 CE and returned in 645 CE with hundreds of sacred Buddhist scriptures whose translation he oversaw for the rest of his life. In his fictional incarnation Xuanzang is a timid and fearful soul who succeeds despite himself with the able assistance of
four talking divine animal spirits, of whom the most important are the impetuous adventurer Monkey (Sun Wukong) and his lazy sidekick Pigsy. The comic interplay of these contrasting characters is quite captivating as they face a host of demons, ghosts, fallen angels, and monsters on their way through the mountains and deserts of central and Southwest Asia. The novel can be read as a Buddhist allegory of the quest for enlightenment, a gentle Daoist satire of human frailties, or a Confucian call to moderation in all things. However it is interpreted, it is above all a pleasurable adventure story and has enjoyed many modern incarnations in operas, films, and cartoons.

**GOLDEN LOTUS (JIN PING MEI)**

*Jin Ping Mei* is a different kind of novel, an erotic story of a hedonistic urban merchant, Ximen Qing, and his six wives (or to be more precise, one wife and five concubines or maids). The most ambitious of these women is Golden Lotus, who exploits Ximen Qing’s weaknesses to the extreme in order to triumph over her rivals for his affections. The daily lives of these urban pleasure addicts are chronicled with loving care by the narrator, who weaves together popular songs, plays, stories, and poems into a comprehensive portrait that, despite its erotic theme, he can claim as a moral tale because the protagonist dies two-thirds of the way through the story, a victim of his own excesses.

**Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries**

Many other notable novels were published in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although only two rivaled the aforementioned four works in their prominence: *The Scholars* and *Dream of the Red Chamber*.

**THE SCHOLARS**

*The Scholars* (Rulin waishi), written by a frustrated literati, Wu Jingzi (1701–1754), who failed the civil service examinations, is China’s first great satirical novel. With an unforgettable series of comic villains, heroes, and antiheroes, Wu Jingzi explored the pressures of competing for status in the eighteenth century when one could win fame and fortune by passing the examination—or by a whole variety of alternative strategies, including publishing one’s poetry or writing model examination essays, holding fashionable poetry parties in idyllic settings, selling or giving away one’s paintings, socializing with the successful and prominent, or even impersonating the famous in gullible circles.

**DREAM OF THE RED CHAMBER**

*Dream of the Red Chamber* (Honglou meng), also known as *Story of the Stone* (Shitou ji). is universally recognized as China’s greatest novel and was written by Cao Xueqin (d. 1764) at about the same time as Wu Jingzi worked on *The Scholars*. A masterpiece of narrative prose, the novel chronicles the gradual decline of the Jia family against the backdrop of a Buddhist-Daoist mythological framework. The novel emphasizes the themes of contrasting and alternating interplay of joy and sadness, good and evil, beauty and depravity, illusion and reality. No other Chinese novel succeeds as well as *Dream of the Red Chamber* in creating vivid and individualized characters of great psychological depth.

**Late Qing Novels**

Many other notable novels were published in the late Qing period. Many sequels to *Dream of the Red Chamber* were written, although most fell far short of Cao Xueqin’s narrative mastery. *Flowers in the Mirror* (Jinghua yuan) by Li Ruzhen, a fantasy novel from the early nineteenth century a bit like *Gulliver’s Travels*, portrays a series of societies that mirrors and/or satirizes Chinese society. In the late nineteenth century several novelists, including Liu E (1857–1909) and Wu Woyao (1867–1910), emulated Wu Jingzi in writing biting satirical portraits of Chinese society in, respectively, *The Travels of Lao Cao* (*Lao Can youji*) and *Bizarre Happenings Witnessed over Two Decades* (*Ershi nian mudu guai xianzhuang*). These exposés, written against the backdrop of China’s humiliating encounters with Western military and economic might, were powerful critiques of Chinese society, foreshadowing the critical and Western-influenced fiction of the May Fourth Movement in the 1920s.
All of these novels are among the most enjoyable and illuminating introductions to Chinese life in the Ming-Qing period.

Paul S. ROPP

Further Reading

Any book you open will benefit your mind.

开卷有益

Kāi juàn yǒu yì
The Ming dynasty was established by a peasant rebel who overthrew the Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Over the course of the Ming, the Chinese population grew dramatically—and although the Ming court and its bureaucracy grew increasingly ineffectual, trade, agriculture, and the arts flourished.

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was a period of dramatic transformation in the Chinese social and political order. The dynasty began with vigorous efforts by the court to consolidate imperial power and authority over the empire with a vision of stable agrarian society and a small, compliant bureaucracy. By the seventeenth century, a series of ineffective and retiring rulers presided over a vast and largely dysfunctional bureaucracy. By this time, Ming society had been thoroughly reshaped by the emergence of a dynamic economy, fed by elaborate market networks, a burgeoning agricultural sector, and flourishing artisan industries. Ming commodities—silk, porcelain, and tea—found their way to major cities around the globe and the increasingly monetized Ming economy was in turn fed by a dramatic influx of silver from Japan, Europe, and the New World.

Zhu, the Hongwu Emperor

The dynasty was founded in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398), a military man of peasant origins, driven by desperate poverty to become a Buddhist monk in his youth. In the chaos of the last decades of the Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), Zhu rose to the head of a rebel peasant army, his forces competing with other warlord groups in the southeast. In 1356, he succeeded in conquering Nanjing, one of the major urban centers in the region and an important Yuan stronghold. He renamed the city Yingtian, “Responding to Heaven,” a clear signal of his imperial ambitions. In 1368, months before his generals routed Mongol forces from the Yuan capital at Dadu (Beijing), he announced the establishment of the new dynasty, the Ming, meaning “Brilliance.” Some scholars have speculated that the name came from the emperor’s early religious associations with Buddhist millenarian groups.

Much of the early years of the dynasty were preoccupied with military concerns as Zhu consolidated the territorial boundaries of the Ming, driving back Mongol forces to the north and subduing non-Han tribes in Yunnan to the southwest. Under the founder’s reign, the Ming army eventually grew to 1 million soldiers. The ruler’s military concerns were reflected in the reign title that Zhu Yuanzhang chose for himself: Hongwu, or “Grand Martiality.” Although the emperor retained a number of scholarly advisors, many of his top officials were military men, some of whom were granted hereditary titles and were married into the imperial family.

Early Ming Institutions

The institutions of the early Ming were built largely along the lines of the preceding Yuan dynasty. A central
executive secretariat, directed by a chancellor, oversaw the central government with the six traditional ministries: Rites, Personnel, Revenue, Works, Justice, and War. Based upon the semi-autonomous regional administrative units of the Yuan, the Ming created a layer of provincial governments for the first time in Chinese history. An education system was established to teach Confucian principles and texts at a National University at the capital, with a network of schools in the prefectures and counties. A firm believer in the importance of law, the Hongwu emperor quickly ordered the creation and promulgation of a comprehensive law code.

The civil service examination system, implemented briefly and sporadically under the Yuan, was restored in 1370 as the primary means of civil service recruitment. Like the Yuan system, the curriculum was largely focused upon Song dynasty (960–1279) neo-Confucian teachings and commentaries on the Confucian Canon. The Hongwu emperor was ambivalent towards the examination system, suspending it in frustration after the second examinations in 1373. The system was restored in 1385 and remained in place until the end of the dynasty. The emperor remained deeply frustrated and suspicious of his government officials. He launched frequent and vicious purges of the bureaucracy, the military and the general populace, executing thousands in campaigns that destabilized and frequently paralyzed the young dynasty.

In 1380, the central administration was dramatically changed when the emperor charged the chancellor with treason, executed him, and abolished the position forever. The immediate effect was to transfer an overwhelming administrative burden to the emperor himself. The long-term effect was a less structured relationship between the emperor and his bureaucracy. Soon afterward, the Hongwu emperor appointed a small group of scholars chosen from the top echelons of the bureaucracy to advise him informally and relieve some of his administrative responsibilities. This body eventually evolved into the formalized institution of the Grand Secretariat, which remained at the top of the bureaucratic power structure for the rest of the imperial era.

The abolition of the chancellor position and the ferocious temperament of the founder were two of the several factors that laid the course for the autocratic nature of Ming government. While scholars have debated the degree of actual control that various Ming emperors had over the realm, their ability to exercise arbitrary power is unquestioned. Over the course of the dynasty, officials were frequently subjected to humiliation and public beatings, sometimes resulting in death. Independent surveillance networks established by the court intensified the risks of bureaucratic service.

In his drive to restore a stable order after the chaos he experienced in the late Yuan, the Ming founder established an array of social policies to regulate local society. He wrote elaborate admonitions to be posted in every community, urging the populace to live harmoniously and virtuously. Extensive travel was forbidden and commoners were only allowed to journey short distances from their homes. Local communities were responsible for the maintenance of order and for mutual surveillance. Local
wealthy families were charged with supervising the tax collection process. Registration of the population and the land was undertaken in the 1380s and early 1390s, with records that formed the basis for determining the tax, corvée (labor paid in lieu of taxes) and military service quotas of each community. Once these quotas were established, many of them remained fixed for nearly two centuries, until the tax system was significantly revised in the late sixteenth century. By then, official records bore little resemblance to the realities on the ground, as the population had doubled from the estimated 60–80 million in the beginning of the dynasty.

The Hongwu emperor also left behind strict governing regulations for his own imperial family. He clearly
established the rule of primogeniture, partially in reaction to the succession battles that plagued the Yuan. Several of his sons were set up as hereditary princes, strategically placed in charge of garrisoned fiefs throughout the realm. The princes were to enhance the military security of the empire, but strict orders were given not to interfere in affairs at the imperial court.

**Yongle Reign Begins**

After the founder’s death, this nascent political order was violently fractured by civil war in 1399, when one of his sons, Zhu Di, the Prince of Yan (modern Beijing), went to war against the imperial forces of the founder’s grandson, the twenty-two-year-old Jianwen emperor (reigned 1398–1402). Various princes were aggravated by imperial plans to rein in their power and resources, and the Prince of Yan clearly coveted the throne. The civil war devastated much of the countryside that had barely recovered from the warfare of the dynastic transition. By 1402, the armies of the Prince of Yan had reached Nanjing. The palace was burned to the ground in the battle, the Jianwen emperor dying in the flames (though some claimed that he miraculously escaped). Zhu Di thereupon ascended the throne as the Yongle emperor (reigned 1402–1424).

The course of the Ming dynasty was so dramatically reshaped by the Yongle reign that some historians have called it a “second founding” of the dynasty. The new emperor was deeply aware of the need to quickly rehabilitate the empire after the destructive civil war. Although he launched a severe purge against many of Jianwen’s top officials, Yongle deliberately charted policies to placate the wary scholar-official community. The civil service exams which had been erratically implemented in the early years of the dynasty were now regularized. He brooked no opposition to his policies, although he did not terrorize the bureaucracy in the way that his father had. He recruited large numbers of the literati into his service by commissioning several large scholarly works, including the *Yongle dadian* (Grand Compendium of the Yongle Reign), authoritative compilations of the Confucian Five Classics and Four Books, a massive anthology of neo-Confucian teachings, and a new expansive edition of the Buddhist scriptural canon, the *Tripitaka*.

Under Yongle’s direction, the capital was moved from Nanjing to Beijing, signaling that he intended the north to be center of military and political power in the realm. Here the emperor ordered the construction of the monumental “Forbidden City,” which served as the imperial palace complex until the fall of the Qing in 1912. The move of the capital was one of the largest projects of the Ming dynasty. The emperor relocated 10,000 households to establish a metropolitan population at Beijing and the move itself took most of Yongle’s reign to accomplish. Though no longer the capital, the region around Nanjing retained a special status as the “southern metropolitan district,” with several auxiliary branches of the administrative institutions of the capital.

In a departure from the domestically-focused vision of his father the founder, Yongle aimed to assert Ming political power and prestige as far beyond its borders as he could, launching several successful attacks on the Mongols to the north and a protracted and ill-fated military expedition into Vietnam. From 1405 to 1433, a series of flotillas were sent to project Ming power into the Indian Ocean. Commanded by the eunuch admiral Zheng He (1371–1433), these voyages reached destinations as far as Sri Lanka, the Persian Gulf and the coast of present-day Mogadishu. Numerous kingdoms on the Indian Ocean sent tribute to the Ming court. Eventually, the expeditions were abandoned, presumably for their strain on the imperial budget.

**Decline of Dynastic Power**

Successors to the Ming throne proved far less powerful and capable than the Hongwu or Yongle emperors. Over the course of the fifteenth century, the dynasty saw a diminution of imperial power and sway. One major incident in this declining prestige of the court was the capture of the Zhengtong emperor (reigned 1435–1449 and 1457–1465) during a raid against the Mongols in 1449. The return of the imperial hostage the following year caused further turmoil as his brother, the Jingtai emperor (reigned 1449–1457), had ascended the throne in the meantime, refusing to step down and placing his brother under house arrest instead. With the Mongols as a constant threat to the integrity of the empire, the Great Wall was continuously expanded and fortified as a bulwark against further incursions.
One factor that contributed to the volatility of the Ming political order was the influence of eunuchs at court. The Ming founder had stipulated that palace eunuchs be kept illiterate and be assigned only menial tasks. Yongle, however, had allowed eunuchs to be trained and frequently charged them with important tasks (such as the exploratory missions under Zheng He). Under subsequent emperors, eunuchs evolved into a powerful constituent force within the imperial court, frequently in control of the great wealth of the imperial household treasury. They also directed the fearsome Eastern Depot, an independent surveillance and interrogation apparatus that lay beyond the civil authorities. By the sixteenth century, the eunuch establishment numbered in the thousands. This network, with its base inside the imperial palace, was frequently at odds with the civil officials who had limited access to the palace grounds and the ear of the emperor. Historical records kept by Confucian scholars castigated the eunuchs for what they regarded as an unchecked and arbitrary abuse of their power and position.

**Rising Economy, Flourishing Arts**

The middle and late Ming period saw a steady rise in economic activity. Agricultural production flourished with the evolution of cash crops of cotton, sugar cane, and indigo. Porcelain and silk industries found ready markets, particularly in the southern urban centers of Nanjing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou. By the early sixteenth century demand for these goods had developed in major cities around the world. The Ming economy became increasingly monetized, a development that was recognized and accelerated by the imperial taxation reforms of the late sixteenth century that commuted all tax and corvée obligations into a single payment in silver.
After Yongle’s expansive forays, the court returned to the founder’s policies that discouraged and restricted foreign trade and foreign contact. By the sixteenth century, however, the court could do little to control the influx of traders from Portugal and other countries. In addition to traders, missionaries from the West arrived on Ming shores in the late sixteenth century. The most famous of these was Matteo Ricci (1551–1610). Ricci and a few of his fellow Jesuits, eventually made their way to Beijing, where they were received at court and eventually developed a rapport with members of the gentry scholar community.

The rising Ming economy fed the growth of an affluent gentry class, a blending of the scholar-elite clans and rising merchant families able to invest their wealth in books and tutors for their sons, hoping for success in the civil service examinations. This was particularly true in the Jiangnan region, just to the south of the Yangzi (Chang) River. This layer of society congregated in the great urban centers of Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Nanjing, while they dominated the resources of rural areas as absentee landlords. These cities were adorned with the ostentatious gardens and mansions of the very rich who competed to demonstrate their wealth and their refined tastes.

As the civil service examination system saw an increasing number of aspirants, quotas became increasingly restrictive and the chances of passing the exams to enter coveted positions in the civil service had become extremely slim. Under such competitive conditions, the examination essay evolved into a highly rigid format called the “Eight-Legged Essay,” a style bound up in strict rules. The examination system produced a vast number of unsuccessful and frustrated scholars who increasingly turned to other diversions and professions, contributing to a flourishing milieu of creative innovation in art, music, literature, and drama. The last century of the Ming saw the creation of some of China’s most famous novels, such as Journey to the West, or The Golden Lotus, as well as popular plays like Peony Pavilion. A vigorous publishing industry fed an avid readership with a wide range of books from cheap pulp to masterful multicolored, illustrated volumes of the literature of the day.

The arts of the late Ming were in large part inspired by a series of thinkers who offered revolutionary interpretations of the neo-Confucian tradition. Wang Yangming (1472–1529) had questioned early prescriptions of study as the means to moral enlightenment, arguing instead for an approach that focused upon the individual’s intuitive powers to think and act appropriately. Wang’s teachings attracted a large following, including scholars like Li Zhi (1527–1602), who argued that Confucians should aspire to the authenticity of the “child-like mind” and eschew the artifice and pretentious hypocrisy of the scholar-elite class. These thinkers valorized emotion, love, and desire as the truest modes of human expression, and these themes therefore figured prominently in the fiction, plays, and poetry of the day.

While the scholar-elite of the early Ming had generally identified with Confucian doctrines and practices, the late Ming gentry dabbled in an eclectic and syncretic array of Buddhist and Daoist teachings and a variety of popular religious practices. Numerous private academies and lay religious societies were formed as venues for study and discussion of ideas and beliefs and for the practice of charity and self-cultivation.

**Domestic and Foreign Disputes**

The political order of the Ming reached its nadir in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century under the reign of the Wanli emperor (reigned 1573–1620). This emperor found himself locked into disputes with an intransigent bureaucracy over various matters including the selection of an heir-apparent. Disillusioned, he refused to hold a court audience for twenty-five years. Pressing court matters, including key official appointments, were left undressed. For its part, the civil bureaucracy was fraught with corruption and contentious factions, paralyzed and incapable of addressing the serious issues of the day. The court came to be dominated by the dangerously powerful eunuch Wei Zhongxian (1568–1627), whose command brooked no opposition. Reformist contingents, such as the Donglin or Eastern Grove Society, moralistically campaigned against official corruption and against the dysfunctional court, but with little success.

The late Ming faced an array of problems that would have challenged the court and bureaucracy even if they had been performing well. The burgeoning economy now operated beyond the scope of governmental control, linked to world-wide systems of trade and dependent
upon a steady influx of foreign silver. When the flow was disrupted in the early seventeenth century, Ming markets fluctuated dramatically and unpredictably. Oppressed by heavy-handed tenancy conditions and caught up in the vicissitudes of the economy, peasants in the late Ming rose up in frequent rebellion.

Foreign threats were a matter of constant concern. Pirates, many of them from Japan, preyed upon international traders and attacked Ming coastal communities with marauding forays that ranged far inland. The threat of Mongol invasion persisted throughout the dynasty. And in the northeast Manchurian tribes began to coalesce into powerful new military groups that threatened Ming borders in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

REBELLION AND RESISTANCE

In the 1620s and 1630s, poor harvests and other natural catastrophes led open rebellion in various parts of the empire and an army of peasants under the leadership of a brigand named Li Zicheng (c. 1605–1645) overran the capital in 1644. In a famous fateful decision, Wu Sangui (1612–1678), a Ming general charged with protecting the eastern end of the Great Wall, invited Manchu armies through the pass to help drive back the rebels. The combined Manchu and Ming forces routed Li Zicheng’s forces from Beijing, but then the Manchus placed their own ruler on the throne and declared the new Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

Southern resistance to the Manchu conquest continued through much of the seventeenth century as remnants of the imperial family maintained the semblance of a court in exile until their capture in Burma (Myanmar) in 1661. Resistance against the Qing persisted well into the 1680s, when Ming loyalist forces in Taiwan were finally subdued. Under the Qing, the Ming continued to play such an important role in the scholarly imagination; as anti-Manchu sentiment grew in the nineteenth century, calls were frequently made to “Oppose the Qing and Restore the Ming!”

Peter B. DITMANSON

Further Reading


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Ming Maritime Expeditions
Míng Cháo hánghải huódòng
明朝航海活动

The Ming Maritime Expeditions of the early fifteenth century, led by the court eunuch Zheng He, were China’s greatest explorations before the twentieth century. The seven expeditions to Asia and Africa were for purposes of trade and diplomacy, not exploration.

During the early years of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) China, rather than viewing itself as the Middle Kingdom, which its name 中国 (zhongguo) implies, sent explorers to sea in the seven Ming Maritime Expeditions. The world beyond its borders was not entirely unknown to China; invasions by land had been common throughout China’s history, and Japan was close by sea. But China’s self-sufficiency had precluded any need for maritime commerce, and the expeditions shifted the nation’s attention to a world much larger than was commonly known.

The Ming Maritime Expeditions were led by Zheng He (郑和, also transliterated as “Chong Ho,” 1371–1433) and are generally regarded as China’s greatest explorations before the twentieth century. They were completed decades before European explorers of the late fifteenth century discovered North America.

In the late 1990s several popular books described the expeditions as a departure from Chinese isolationism. But during the fourteenth century Chinese merchants had engaged in trade with the same regions that Zheng He visited decades later. The difference between the trade missions of the late Mongol era (to the mid-thirteenth century) and the Ming Maritime Expeditions is that trade during the late Mongol era (Yuan dynasty, 1279–1368) was carried out by private merchants, whereas those of the early Ming dynasty were funded and organized by the Chinese government.

Much of the change in the Chinese perception of the outside world was the result of moving the capital from Peking (Beijing) to Nanking (Nanjing), which had better access to the sea and to shipping trade routes. The government-supported Ming Maritime Expeditions began with the third Ming emperor, Zhu Di 朱棣, during his reign as the Yongle (永樂, also transliterated as “Yung-lo”) emperor (1402–1424) and ended with a single voyage authorized by his successor and grandson Zhu Zhanji 朱瞻基, the Xuande 宣德 emperor from 1425 to 1435.

Although commercial trade served its own purposes, government-organized expeditions helped to support the tributary state system. This political arrangement helped to establish China as the hegemon (influencer) among all the countries with which it dealt, with the lesser countries sending emissaries and gifts to the Chinese capital and China extending its protection to those countries.

At his birth during Zheng He was named “Ma He” (“Ma” was short for “Muhammad”), and his family’s Muslim religion was tolerated. But in 1368 the Yuan dynasty collapsed, and with the rise of the Ming dynasty this toleration ended, and Ma He’s family was killed. As a young boy, Ma He was castrated but lived to serve the Ming dynasty as a eunuch. He was particularly useful to his new emperor because as a young child Ma He had...
hearing his grandfather’s stories of traveling to Mecca for the hajj (pilgrimage). Although commercial traders had traveled to such regions, official missions for the purposes of diplomacy had not been made until Ma He, under his new name “Zheng He” as an attendant to Emperor Zhu Di, was authorized to plan a series of missions for trade and diplomacy.

Using the resources of the Ming empire, Zheng He directed the building of a fleet of “treasure ships” based on the design of traditional transport ships but far larger. The exact size of the largest of these ships is uncertain because of inconsistent standards of measurement, but even conservative estimates would have given the ships lengths in excess of 122 meters. In addition to the large transport ships, Zheng He’s fleet included naval ship to provide defense, ships to carry animals, including horses, and ships to carry supplies. To prepare for the long expeditions, Zheng He undertook shorter voyages to Japan before departing on the first of the Ming Maritime Expeditions in late 1405.

The expeditions were not voyages of discovery. Maps of the coasts of Asia and Africa had been made before the expeditions began, and maritime trade from China and other countries had been going on for centuries. The Ming expeditions were not for trade as much as for the diplomatic expansion of China’s influence.

**First Voyage**

The first of the expeditions had the goal of reaching the western Indian city of Calicut (modern Kozhikode). The fleet of more than 250 ships and 27,000 men departed Nanjing in July 1405, traveling south to Taiping in Fujian Province. Navigation in sailing ships of the time relied on favorable winds, so the fleet had to wait until late that year to depart for its first stop in the kingdom of Champa, where the city of Qui Nhon is located in modern Vietnam.

From Champa the Ming fleet continued southward to Majapahit on the island of Java in what is now Indonesia. From there the fleet proceeded northwest to Sumatra, then through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. Then, as now, ships in the Strait of Malacca were in danger from pirates.

After the fleet was clear of the straits, it continued west for an unsuccessful visit with the king of Ceylon (modern Sri Lanka). Recognizing that the Chinese were not welcome there, Zheng He continued to the fleet’s destination of Calicut. Feeling properly received by the ruler there, the Chinese engaged in several months of trading the materials they had brought for other goods native to India. The stay in Calicut was not simply for purposes of trade; the fleet had to wait for the seasonal shift of the trade winds for its return to China. On the return voyage Zheng He captured the pirate Chen Zuyi in the Strait of Malacca, destroyed or captured several of the pirate’s ships, and brought Chen Zuyi back to Nanjing to be executed. The fleet arrived home in early 1407. Because of the success of this voyage, Zheng He was ordered to prepare immediately for another.

**Second Voyage**

The second voyage of the Ming fleet was to return to Calicut with stops at Champa and Java, as had the first voyage. The fleet also stopped in Siam (modern Thailand) and the Indian kingdom of Cochin (Kochi), located south of Calicut. However, Zheng He did not accompany the fleet on this voyage; instead the fleet was commanded by two other eunuchs who took part in ceremonies recognizing Mana Vikraman, the new king of Calicut. In 1407 the fleet returned to China, where it remained for two years.

**Third Voyage**

The third voyage was more ambitious than the first two, going to countries and ports that had not been visited on the earlier expeditions. Zheng He had to deal with several difficult diplomatic and military confrontations. Leaving Nanjing in late 1409, the fleet proceeded as usual to Champa, then passed through the Strait of Malacca, this time stopping at the port of Malacca. One of the reasons for visiting Malacca was to reinforce the diplomatic relationship between Malacca and China because the king of Siam had challenged Malacca’s relationship with the Ming empire.
From Malacca the fleet continued to Sumatra, then on to Ceylon in an attempt to improve relations with the island. However, Ceylon was in the midst of a civil war, and Zheng He’s diplomacy was rebuffed by one of the warring factions. The Ming fleet continued to Kollam, a port city south of Cochin, then to Cochin and Calicut for a third visit.

Zheng He then returned to Ceylon to deal with the insubordination he had received on his previous visit. Accounts of how he dealt with this matter differ: He either captured the royal family of Ceylon or captured the leader of the group who had rebuffed him earlier. In any case, Zheng He took his captives back to China in June of 1411. His captives were pardoned and returned to Ceylon.

Fourth Voyage

The fourth expedition, which again was led by Zheng He, was the most far-ranging of all the voyages. After two years in China the fleet departed in 1413, visiting the ports that had been visited before (Champa, Java, Malacca, Sumatra, Ceylon, Cochin, and Calicut). The fleet continued westward as far as Hormuz, the entry to the Persian Gulf, where the fleet traded its goods for those of the Arab world.

The fleet had divided in two on this voyage, with another of the royal eunuchs, Yang Min, visiting the western Indian kingdom of Bengal (modern Bangladesh). The king of Bengal gave Yang Min an exotic gift for the Chinese emperor: a giraffe. For the Chinese who had never seen such a creature, the giraffe was mistaken for the mythical beast qilin 麒麟, a form of dragon known to other east Asian cultures (kirin in Japanese, girin 기린 in Korean). Zheng He’s portion of the fleet traveled as far south as Mogadishu in what is now Somalia before returning to Nanjing in the summer of 1415.

The next year a major engineering project that would lead to the end of the Ming voyages was completed. The Grand Canal 大运河, which extended from Hongzhou southwest of Shanghai to Peking (modern Beijing), a distance of nearly 1,800 kilometers, was repaired. This canal
had been completed in the sixth century (Sui dynasty, 581–618 CE) but had fallen into disrepair because of annual floods. Part of the Ming dynasty’s engineering projects included the repair of the canal.

**Fifth Voyage**

The Chinese emperor ordered Zheng He to embark on another voyage in late 1416; this voyage began in 1417 when the winds became favorable. Much as the fourth voyage had progressed, the fifth voyage of the Ming fleet visited the usual ports in southeast Asia before continuing to the Maldives Islands, Hormuz, Mogadishu, Kenya, and Aden. This expedition had diplomatic goals as well as trade, and in particular Zheng He was to establish better relations with the Muslims who ruled much of this part of the world. The fleet returned to China in 1419.

**Sixth Voyage**

The sixth expedition was the shortest for Zheng He, who left with the fleet in early 1421 but returned with a part of it later that year. The rest of the fleet continued to Hormuz, east Africa, and ports on the Arabian Peninsula under the command of another of the court eunuchs. The longer voyage returned foreign diplomats to their home countries before it returned to China in 1422.

**Seventh and Final Voyage**

The final voyage of the Ming fleet was to be the grandest; some accounts claim that more than three hundred ships sailed. The fleet had been in its home waters for more than six years before departing China in late 1430 or early 1431. Nevertheless, Zheng He visited the usual ports of Champa, Java, Palembang on Sumatra, Malacca, Ceylon, and Calicut, and one part of the fleet went on to Hormuz and other places on the Arabian Peninsula. After the fleet joined up at Calicut during its return voyage, Zheng He died while the fleet was at sea.

The end of Ming exploration came with the death of Emperor Zhu Di and the ascent of his grandson Zhu Zhanji. Zhu Zhanji’s views of the outside world were more typical of leaders other than Zhu Di, and China returned to its isolation. The ships of the Ming fleet fell into disrepair. The Ming Maritime Expeditions had greatly expanded the range of China’s tributary states, but the end of the expeditions would eventually reduce the influence of China in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean littoral (coastal region).

**Further Reading**


The archives of the Ming and Qing, probably fifteen to twenty million items, offer an invaluable source of information about China’s final two dynasties. Nearly all documents in all collections have been sorted and catalogued. Most are housed in Beijing or Taipei, Taiwan, a number in other Chinese localities, fewer overseas—and some are available online.

The Ming-Qing Archives, a world-class cultural property, are a valuable inheritance from China’s last two dynasties, the Ming (1368–1643) and the Qing (1644–1912). Scattered across several Chinese-language areas, the small number of Ming survivals and the large number of Qing survivals are found principally in Beijing and Taipei, Taiwan, but also in local installations all across the country. Smaller holdings exist overseas, principally in Japan, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. These archives are of vast size, estimated to number 15–20 million items, with new discoveries coming to light from time to time. The Ming portion is small, possibly seven thousand items, while the remainder derive from the Qing. They constitute one of the largest premodern archives in the world.

The Ming holdings differ significantly from the Qing in that they offer a range of topics, variety of languages (Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, Uygur, and others, in addition to Chinese), and sufficient serial runs to allow serious research. Most items are paper documents, many on rag-content paper so acid-free that it holds up after hundreds of years. A few were written on fine, patterned silk and sometimes wrapped in envelopes of silk glued to paper. Some items are wooden: audience tallies (green-headed sticks) that allowed a man into the imperial presence for a formal audience, wooden boxes for dispatching memorials (provincial reports), and boards covered in expensive silk to safeguard important imperial edicts in transit. Some documents have great beauty, decorated with borders of the imperial dragon motifs or embroidered on fine silk woven with imperial symbols such as the five-clawed dragon and the dragon’s symbols of clouds, waves, and fiery pearls. Reports destined for the emperor’s eyes bore clear, well-formed characters, but file copies were often scribbled in scrawls now difficult to decipher. Although most documents arrived on paper of a nondescript buff color, auspicious news often received the special treatment of a yellow background (yellow being the imperial color), and funeral matters were inscribed on stark white.

For the most part these were government, not private or commercial, documents. Their topics reflect government concerns, but much was covered under that rubric. Narratives of war and rebellion can be researched in the meticulous detail that their original authors used to plot military campaigns from grand strategy and troop deployments down to purchases of transport camels and carts, with food provisions calculated for both the army’s “big eaters” and those of normal size and appetites. Political life from court to county may be traced here. The archives preserve evidence of official interest in the civil service examinations, thousands of which survive, as well as records of imperial audiences, promotions, demotions,
Ming-Qing Archives

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Míng-Qīng dàngʼànguǎn

punishments, and retirements. The files bring to life court
cases of the dispossessed, the down-and-out, the landless, and the uneducated. It is possible to examine the
economy through reports on taxation, customs dues,
harvests, and weather all across the realm. The purely
chronological assemblages of memorials were found so
unwieldy that they could not be retained in that order
and instead in Beijing today are filed in eighteen principal
and more than a hundred subcategories, the eighteen being Domestic Administration, Military Affairs, Finance,
Agriculture, Industry, Law, Foreign Relations, Natural
Phenomena, Imperialist Aggression against China, Water Conservancy, Popular Movements, Minority Peoples,
Literary and Cultural Matters, Communications, Commercial Activities, Public Works, Religion, and a final capacious category for everything else, Miscellaneous; the
Taibei palace memorial holdings are filed chronologically
but indexed under 80 subject-headings. These categories
will supply a clue to the research munificence of these
documents, which led one enthusiast to exclaim: “There
is nothing [these archives] do not have!”

Archives Not Complete
Nonetheless, these government archives lack a great deal,
most of which cannot be located elsewhere in China. First,
China’s earlier archives have not survived well. Original
government documents from before the Ming dynasty
are rare, but many were copied in full or excerpted for historical writing, and new finds occasionally turn up, especially in ancient tomb burials and the dry desert climate
of China’s west. Fire, from both the lanterns used to read
the documents at night and the end-of-dynasty warfare,
was an ever-present threat. To avoid conflagration, one
ancient archive was built with a surrounding moat, and
the tax records for the entire Ming dynasty were housed
on islands in a Nanjing lake. But such extreme precautions
failed to save these holdings, and nothing now remains of
either one. Insects were another archival scourge. Carelessness, lack of funds, and purposeful destruction of evidence have also resulted in the loss of materials. The Ming
dynasty had a copying program for a small number of its
documents, and this continued after the Ming fall. The
major Qing precautionary method for dealing with possible losses took shape during the eighteenth century and

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relied on a massive copying program for selected innercourt items, first undertaken every five years and later every three. As a result, two, three, and sometimes as many
as five or even six copies of certain Grand Council record
books now repose in the archives.
Second, private writings, such as personal diaries, letters, and family records, have not survived well and generally have not found their way into archival installations,
although the Confucian family archives, which stretch
back nearly a millennium, are an exception. Prosperous
families frequently published their genealogies, many of
which can now be tracked through a modern reprint program. Another recent genealogical project scoured Taiwan for family records such as land and other commercial
contracts, photographed them, and deposited six copies
at various sites on Taiwan and in the west.
The hundreds of local archives in China are not known
to contain any Ming documents, but three have fine Qing
survivals reaching back to the seventeenth century. More
commonly, survivals date from after the middle of the
nineteenth century, but most local archives have no materials before the Republican era beginning in 1912. These
may exhibit some variations in file categories, but in theory the China mainland local archives follow a recentlyimposed universal plan.
Little is known about how the Ming archives were
classified, stored, and retrieved, although a few findinglists (inventories) and one detailed history of their
island-housed tax records exist (Houhu zhi). Much more
is known about the Qing because several finding-lists as
well as rules and descriptions have come down to us. Most
of the Qing central government archives were divided
between the old outer-court (waichao) types of materials,
which continued in use from the Ming, and inner-court
(neiting) documents, chiefly those of the Grand Council.
There were finding-lists for portions of these holdings.
The Grand Secretariat kept a log of incoming reports and
court responses known as “The Register of Silken [Imperial] Words” (Silun bu), silk being a commodity of great
value and beauty anciently associated with the emperor.
The Grand Council’s principal document register was
known as “The Register of [Matters] As They Came to
Hand” (Suishou dengji) and logged both incoming and
outgoing documents. Both lists were written up on a daily
basis, so the resulting order was chronological and formed
an index to the full-text copies of the documents, most

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of which (with a few exceptions, for military campaigns or other important subjects, for instance) were also filed chronologically. In addition to incoming reports and court responses recorded directly on the reports, there were record books of copied documents, some arranged according to type of document—a record of high-level deliberations, Yifu dang, for example—and others by subject (chiefly military campaigns). Lest this description create an aura of thorough and orderly competence, however, a reminder of the incipient chaos that prevailed in some quarters exists in the form of an eighteenth-century observation of the situation in one of the outer-court storage vaults: “One could reach one’s arm into the dust at random,” the observer wrote, “and pull out a treasure.”

Finding-List Centers

In recent years large finding-list centers (Quanguo lishi dang’an ziliao mulu zhongxin) have been developed for some holdings. Three, for instance, are concerned with what are known as “Historical Archives” (lishi dang’an), that is, those before 1949: Ming-Qing (1368–1912), the Republic (1912–1949), and the history of the Communist Revolution (up to only 1949). So far the Ming-Qing list seems to be the most advanced and when completed will provide a finding-list for both central and local government files. Uniform file categories and other consistent methods of archiving will assist this project. At present the Ming-Qing finding-list appears to be available only on-site in China. Some other finding-lists are available both online and on-site, with indexes of both open and closed files at fond, case, and document level. Some discrepancies have been found between the online and in-situ versions.

Beatrice S. BARTLETT

Further Reading


Missionary Education ▶
Although their presence in China stretched back many centuries, the Christian missionaries’ most productive period in the country lasted from the early nineteenth to the twentieth century. Missionaries were often the target of political and societal backlash, and their efforts at reform eventually shifted focus from evangelism to education.

Christian missionaries came to China as early as the eighth century, but the first extended presence there for the purpose of spreading Christianity on a permanent basis did not come until the so-called Age of Discovery, when European nations sought to establish footholds in North America, Africa, South Asia, and East Asia. The first Europeans to travel to China by sea were the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. In 1541, the Spanish Jesuit priest Francis Xavier (1506–1552) was sent to spread Christianity to Asia. He was followed later in that century by more Jesuits, including Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), the best-known Christian missionary to China from the sixteenth century, but other than maintaining a Christian presence, no substantial progress in spreading Christianity was made because of the competition between Jesuits, Franciscans, and Dominicans. By the early eighteenth century, Christian missionaries were banned from China.
Nineteenth-Century Uprisings

Protestant missionaries arrived in China in the early nineteenth century, and their first efforts at education came not to the Chinese, but to each other. Unlike the Catholic missionaries, who had been able to establish themselves because of their ability to learn the Chinese language, but who did not try to pass on their knowledge to future generations of missionaries, the Protestants not only learned Chinese for themselves but assembled dictionaries and basic grammar texts for their successors.

Although China had made diplomatic inroads to Malacca in the fifteenth century, by the late 1700s it was under Dutch control. The Christian missionaries worked with Chinese immigrants and workers in Malacca. One of the earliest missionary schools for Chinese was established in Malacca, where William Milne (1785–1822) taught Chinese converts and assisted Robert Morrison (1782–1834) with his translation of the Bible into Chinese.

The efforts of Christian missionaries were undercut by a general antiforeigner sentiment by the Chinese government. Much of the antagonism stemmed from the unequal treaties that opened certain Chinese ports to the Europeans and Americans to facilitate trade in favor of the Westerners. The treaty ports were forced upon China by the Europeans in the aftermath of the First Opium War (1839–1842), which was waged by Great Britain against China in order to preserve opium trade with the Chinese. (China had tried to ban the import of opium because of the damage it was doing to the health of those Chinese who used it.) These feelings were aggravated in Chinese society by the missionaries’ belief that they, instead of the Chinese elite, held the keys to salvation and stability. Educated Westerners, including missionaries, saw the Chinese as a materialistic culture that needed to be reformed; the Chinese saw the missionaries, whose presence was more powerfully felt after the Second Opium War (1856–1860), as simply another aspect of foreign intervention. This was reinforced by the Taiping Rebellion of 1850–1864, which was rooted in an extremist ideology that combined Christian belief with pre-Confucian utopian ideals; it resulted in the deaths of between 20 and 30 million Chinese.

During the Taiping Rebellion, Hong Xiuquan, a village teacher turned self-proclaimed “king” of recruited militants, attempted forcefully to reform Chinese society along Western cultural lines. The huge number of deaths he and his followers caused led the Chinese government to suppress Christian missionary efforts. After the rebellion the most successful missionaries were the French Roman Catholic missionaries. France was not considered by the Chinese government’s foreign ministry to be as intrusive as other European nations, and agreements were made with France that permitted missionary activities as long as they...
did not interfere with Chinese society; the French were charged with restricting their own missionaries in this regard. Missionaries were permitted to convert the Chinese to Christianity, but the names of those converted had to be reported to Chinese authorities. Christianity in China during the 1860s was tolerated but not encouraged.

In the late 1860s, Chinese sentiments against Christians were inflamed by rumors that Chinese children were being killed by the Europeans to make medicine. These rumors incited uprisings in Yangzhou in 1868. Similar rumors led to the Tianjin Massacre of 1870, which resulted in the deaths of twenty-one foreign missionaries and dozens of Chinese Christians and led to a general decline in relations between the Chinese government and Christian missionaries.

The antiforeigner campaign of the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists, known to Westerners as the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1900), was an attempt by reactionary Chinese to expel foreigners and restore the emperor, as had been done in Japan during the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The Boxers’ siege of foreign legations (including the embassies of Russia, France, Japan, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary) was defeated by an international force, and these eight nations forced the resulting Boxer Protocol on the Chinese government, demanding reparations of 450 million taels of silver (one tael of silver this represented would have a value in 1868 of nearly $33 billion. The short-term result of the Boxer Protocol was a further weakening of control by the Chinese imperial government; a long-term result was the recognition by the Chinese that this government could not serve their needs, which set the stage for rebellion in the form of Chinese nationalism.

While the Boxer Rebellion was not antimissionary as much it was anti-foreigner, it did result in the deaths of nearly 19,000 Chinese Christians and over 200 Catholic and Protestant missionaries.

**Twentieth-Century Missions**

The activities of Christian missionaries in China increased in the early twentieth century, due in part to the rise in Chinese nationalism led by Sun Yat-sen, who had accepted Christianity while studying in Hawaii. In particular, efforts were made by Protestant missionaries to spread their work into China’s interior. Although much of the education was provided through preaching in English and conducting meetings among converts, formal schools were being established to meet both the physical and spiritual needs of the Chinese Christians. Reviews of mission reports indicate that prior to 1916 the primary emphasis was on the evangelical efforts of Western missionaries, but after that date the majority of reports dealt with formal schools for boys, girls, and the disabled. By 1921 the Interior China Mission headquartered in Kaifeng in Henan had established day schools and boarding schools for boys and girls at both primary and secondary school levels. These, in addition to the separate schools for Chinese men and women, had enrolled over a thousand students by that time.

There was conflict between Chinese schools and missionary schools in the early twentieth century. While Chinese schools taught a generally standard curriculum, the schools run by Western missionaries focused on Christian religious education. These missionary schools were seen as heterodox, or unconventional, by the Chinese elite, although many of them recognized the value of Western science, technology, and other ideas. The conflict between the two types of schools was largely one of misperception: Because Chinese schools that taught from classic Chinese writings focused on Daoist teaching of “the Way,” while the missionary schools taught a very different focus, the Western schools were seen as a threat to the stability of society. Ironically, it was the establishment of Chinese universities, not missionary schools, that would lead to intellectual challenges to governmental authority.

Nevertheless, the efforts of missionary educators continued to expand into the interior of China until the factional fighting between the Nationalist government and warlords in the more remote areas made the missionary activities too dangerous. All Americans, including missionaries, were ordered by the United States consul to leave China in 1927. Although many Americans complied, others remained and were joined by even more missionaries. Viola Humphreys (1887–1939), who had spent seven years in Kaifeng in 1920s, returned to supervise missionary activities and schools there after she had attended college in Texas from 1928 to 1929. Her efforts included evangelism, schools for boys and girls, a kindergarten, and...
a Goodwill Center, as well as health care assistance for students in her schools from a Chinese physician. Zemma Hare (1893–1941), an American Southern Baptist active in Kaifeng, directed the Women’s Bible School there. The students at this school were adult Chinese women who had to read the Gospel of Mark in Chinese prior to admission. This encouraged development of literacy in a segment of Chinese society in which it had traditionally not been valued.

By the 1930s the Chinese government had established its own universities. Most of these national universities (guoli, 国立) were concentrated in the major city areas of Peking (Beijing, 北京), Shanghai (上海), Nanking (南京, 南京), and Canton (Guangzhou, 广州). The various missionary groups in China by this time had also established their own colleges, some of which were located in these regions, but many of the missionary colleges were located in more rural areas. The focus of education was also different: While the national universities were specialized, the missionary colleges were established along British and American models of the liberal arts college, and a large number of their graduates became teachers in other missionary schools.

As the international situation deteriorated in China with Japan’s invasion, conditions for foreigners in general, and missionaries in particular, deteriorated as well. The presence of foreign diplomats and clergy interfered with Japanese activities because these foreigners, under some degree of diplomatic protection, could serve as witnesses to the atrocities committed by the Japanese. One of the most heroic efforts of Western Christian missionaries in China was made by those who confronted the Japanese during their invasion and occupation of Nanking in 1937. During her second assignment to China, the American Wilhelmina Vautrin (1886–1941) founded Ginling College 金陵女子学院 in Nanking and worked with other Westerners to protect the citizens of that city. By establishing the Nanking Safety Zone 南京安全区, Vautrin and ten other Westerners provided an area of limited protection to the students in the college as well as hundreds of thousands of other Chinese.

The disruption caused by the war with Japan and the Chinese Civil War set back missionary efforts and education, and the victory of the Communists over the Nationalists further hurt Christian evangelism and education in China. The worst of this occurred during the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命, 1966–1976). Like the Boxer Rebellion, this was both an antiforeigner and anti-modern movement that sought to implement the teachings and political thought of Mao Zedong (毛泽东, 1893–1976) on society. The end of the Cultural Revolution permitted a return to efforts by Christian and Islamic missionaries to bring religion and religious education to the People’s Republic of China.

Within ten years both religions were active again, but Chinese Christians had begun to see themselves in a very different way. They viewed the evangelism of the past as a form of colonialism, and felt that the leaders of the Western churches had treated Chinese converts as less than equal. The Chinese government has appeared to take a supportive role in permitting religious activities, but this has, in fact, led to a greater separation from the Vatican and from Protestant leaders and doctrine in the West. It
is particularly difficult for Chinese Catholics because of the Chinese government’s one-child policy, which is at odds with the Catholic prohibition on birth control and abortion.

Since Western missionaries began bringing religion and Western-style education to China in the early nineteenth century, China has changed drastically. Interestingly, many of the innovations brought by Christians, such as educating women and the physically handicapped and the liberal arts education, are now accepted as aspects of social justice under China’s modern socialist system. Missionary schools had only worked with physically disabled students, but China now claims that it also works with “intellectually disabled” students as well (although only about 1 percent of disabled students there receive special education). The focus of Christian (and Muslim) missionaries in China today is evangelism; over one hundred of them were expelled before the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

Thomas P. DOLAN

Further Reading

Mobile Communications

Yídòng méi tī chuán bō de fā zhǎn
移动媒体传播的发展

Mobile phones are easily accessible and wildly popular in China. More than half the population uses mobile phones. The technology is improving and the telecommunications industry is growing to better serve the demands of China’s enthusiastic mobile phone users.

In Guangzhou on 21 November 1987, a young man named Xu Feng became the first mobile (cell) phone user in China when he bought an NEC simulative mobile phone for ¥20,000 (about $2,900). It did not take long after that for the popularity of mobile communications to soar in China.

The use of mobile phones in China exploded in the 1990s after Groupe Spécial Mobile, or Global System for Mobile communications (GSM), was introduced from Europe. GSM is the most popular standard for mobile phone use in the world. China is the largest GSM market in the world.

Millions of Users

China is the world’s largest mobile phone market, judging by the sheer number of users. By August 2008, according to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the number of mobile phone subscribers in China had reached more than 616 million, nearly half the population. China ranked low, however, in terms of the ratio of users. In 2008 there were 411.5 subscribers per 1,000 people, a ranking of 121 of 222 countries surveyed. By comparison the United States had 890.3 subscribers per 1,000 people (ranked 68th); Taiwan, 1,060.3 (30th); Hong Kong, 1,503.1 (5th); and Macao, 1,723.7 (1st).

By June 2008, there were 253 million Internet users) in China. The number of people surfing the Internet with mobile phones had reached 73 million, about 29 percent of all Internet users.

The cost of mobile phones and subscription rates are high in China, compared to the charges in Western countries. But the booming mobile market and the battle for market share has spurred aggressive price cutting by the country’s mobile operators.

Users’ Choices

China’s telecommunication enterprises provide the full range of services available in developed countries. Services include nationwide fixed-line telephone services; wireless application protocol (WAP) for mobile banking, stock trading, news, weather reports, and e-mail; and GSM and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) networks for data services for businesses, voice mail, call forwarding, call waiting, conference calls, Internet protocol telephony, multimedia message service (MMS), and short message service (SMS), also known as text messaging.

SMS is one of the most popular services among the Chinese people. During 2006 each mobile user in China sent an average of 967 text messages. Chinese mobile users sent more than 400 billion text messages between January and July 2008. Tianjin, a large city in northern coastal
China, launched the first Chinese-language mobile phone short message service in China in 1997. SMS and SMS-based information services began spreading rapidly after China Mobile, Ltd., a state-owned telecommunications enterprise, launched the Monternet Plan in November 2000. This was the first so-called mobile value-added service available in China. Monternet (Mobile+Internet) acts as a bridge between mobile devices and Internet-based and other digital information services.

SMS is popular in China because the number of Chinese mobile phone subscribers is large, the market for SMS services is well developed, and subscribers like to be able to obtain instant information at any place and at any time. In addition, SMS seems to fit in with the Chinese culture. Many Chinese of all ages are reluctant to leave voice messages but not text messages. And a new kind of popular literature has developed through SMS use. People are sharing gossip, news, views, and jokes (even political jokes) in ways unavailable before. The SMS and WAP lead to more freedom of expression in China, for it is impossible for government to control information that is conveyed almost instantly.

SMS also provides an economical way to communicate. The end-user price for sending and receiving a message is ¥0.10 (about 1.5 cents). A one-minute call costs ¥0.50 (about 8 cents) to ¥0.60 (about 9 cents), and the long distance charge for mobile service is ¥0.70 (about 10.5 cents) per minute.

Service Providers
A number of services providers have sprung up in recent year to serve China’s growing mobile and Internet communication needs. Following are brief profiles of some of the most important providers.

China Mobile Communications Company (China Mobile) is the world’s largest mobile phone company, by number of subscribers. The company had some 407 million GSM subscribers as of April 2008 and a 67 percent share of the Chinese mobile market. China Mobile is a state-owned enterprise established in 1997 as a spin-off from China Telecom, the largest fixed-line phone provider in China. China Mobile also owns Pakel in Pakistan and China Tietong, the third largest broadband Internet service provider in China. China Mobile was the first enterprise from mainland China to be included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.

China Unicom (Hong Kong), Ltd., better known as China Unicom, was incorporated in 2000 in Hong Kong. As of June 2008, it had 127.6 million GSM subscribers. China Unicom is one of the largest publicly owned telecommunications providers in China. Its stocks are traded on the Hong Kong, Shanghai, and New York stock exchanges.

In 2008 China Unicom merged with China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong), Ltd., or China Netcom, a major provider serving northern China that held about 109 million fixed-line phone users and 23.3 million broadband subscribers. The new enterprise integrates wireless and fixed-line services.

China Unicom sold its CDMA service to China Telecommunications Corporation (China Telecom) for ¥110 billion (about $16 billion) in 2008. China Telecom has invested billions of yuan to upgrade its CDMA network.

Huawei Technologies Company, Ltd., and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company, Ltd., (ZTE Corp.) are two of the major suppliers of telecommunications equipment and networks. Huawei provides next-generation telecommunications networks and serves thirty-five of the world’s top fifty operators. At the end of June 2008, Huawei had more than 87,000 employees, of whom 42 percent were dedicated to research and development. ZTE Corp. is one of the major equipment vendors for China Mobile’s TD-SCDMA network, a homegrown third-generation (3G) mobile phone standard. TD-SCDMA, or Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access, is a 3G mobile telecommunications standard, being pursued and designed in China by the Chinese Academy of Telecommunications Technology. TD-SCDMA will soon be put into commercial use encouraged by the Chinese government.

Fifth Medium
In China the mobile phone is known as the fifth medium, following newspapers, radio, TV, and the Internet. In recent years China’s newspaper groups have set up SMS and MMS news services as an alternative way for traditional media to disseminate news. The China Women Daily was the first MMS newspaper in China. But SMS and MMS
newspapers have not been attracting new subscribers, and expenditures for these types of services are high for providers. Nevertheless, the mobile phone industry’s status continues to grow.

In 2002 the mobile phone SMS sector was even credited for saving the Chinese Internet. The three biggest portal websites in China were in danger of being removed from the NASDAQ, the largest U.S. stock market, because of slow business. Netease became the first profitable website in China with its network games and short message services. Shortly after, Sina, Sohu, Tom, and other websites were also able to generate high profits through short message value-added services. As a result, the Chinese value-added SMS market enjoyed five years of rapid development.

Now traditional advertisers flock to the mobile phone as the new medium. Third-generation audiences have become the target groups for advertising in recent years. The legality of sending advertisements to mobile subscribers has been questioned, however. It is seen as the equivalent of sending junk e-mails and junk mail. If there is no solution for the issue of developing legitimate and ethical mobile phone-based advertising approaches, the market development of the mobile phone as a new medium may be greatly restricted.

Rules and Regulations

As expected, the mobile communications industry in China is highly regulated. In addition to many rules enforced by minor state agencies and local bureaus, the two main acts that govern the industry are the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Telecommunications (telecommunication regulations) and the State Council’s Measures for Administration of Internet Information Services (administrative rules), both promulgated in 2000. These regulations are important for a number
of reasons besides stipulating fair business practices. They fulfill China's commitment to World Trade Organization guidelines for the telecommunications industry. They opened the way for direct foreign participation in the telecom sector, which before 2000 was forbidden to foreigners. They established that the market would be competitive (no more state-owned monopolies). And they promoted development, transparency, fairness, and impartiality in the marketplace.

**Future Communications**

The future of mobile communications in China, as in most of the rest of the world, seems to lie in the so-called third-generation mobile phone technology (3G), which operates on a different radio frequency than earlier networks did and provides improved voice clarity and greater access to global roaming between networks. Also, 3G can support applications that require extensive bandwidth, such as video, full Internet access, and video conferencing.

But 3G technology and licensing have been slow to arrive, so China has created a network based on its own technology called Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA). While this new technology has potential, it is not yet fully developed or operational, unlike its foreign rivals WCDMA and CDMA2000. Because the government is aggressively promoting TD-SCDMA, operators in China have not been allowed to build WCDMA and CDMA2000 networks.

China Mobile has been under increasing pressure to embrace TD-SCDMA technology. The company has been criticized for not giving full support to the homegrown standard. Nevertheless, China Mobile has invested ¥14.6 billion (about $2.1 billion) to build a commercial trial network based on TD-SCDMA technology in eight cities. If the trial is successful, commercial applications would follow and give TD-SCDMA the upper hand in China, and possibly in other parts of the world. Once 3G phones are seen as being multimedia and networking devices as much as they are telephony tools, it is likely that their many advanced uses will proliferate and usership will increase.

The initial investments in new technologies are huge, but the prospect is exciting to China's telecommunication industry and its millions of subscribers. Mobile communications, which have become a fundamental part of Chinese life, will most likely become even more essential.

*Wenbo KUANG*

**Further Reading**


The Mogao Caves, dug in sandstone cliffs outside Dunhuang from 366 CE to the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), contain more than two thousand statues and more than 45,000 square meters of murals. Texts discovered in 1900 provide a rare source for the study of Chinese religion, literature, art, history, and daily life.

The Mogao Caves, 492 of which are preserved, were dug in the sandstone cliffs outside the city of Dunhuang 敦煌 in Gansu Province, from 366 CE to the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Dunhuang, an oasis in a desert where travelers along the Silk Roads stopped to rest and resupply, served as a workshop where for more than a thousand years Chinese and central Asian arts mixed. Some of the most impressive creations in Chinese art history, such as the mural depicting the Flying Apsara 飞天 Musicians, were born in the caves. Of the more than two thousand statues and more than 45,000 square meters of murals, most depict Buddhist history, legends, and ways of life as China interacted via the Silk Roads with central Asia and beyond. Today Dunhuang is an important center for the study of Buddhism, Buddhist arts, and the Silk Roads.

Thousand Buddha Cliff outside of Nanjing, Jiangsu Province. This sacred place dates back to the fifth century, although many additions have been made over the centuries. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
In 1900 Wang Yuanlu (d. 1931), a Daoist monk, discovered in a sealed cave more than fifty thousand pieces of paintings and handwritten texts dating from the fourth to the fourteenth centuries. The texts were written mainly in Chinese or Tibetan, but some were written in Sanskrit and a half dozen other languages. In addition to a large number of works on Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, the texts contain accounting books, historical records, court records, literary works, and works on geography, astrology, mathematics, medicine, and so on. The texts, encyclopedic in their scope, provide a rare source for the study of Chinese religion, literature, art, history, and daily life.

As part of Wang’s efforts to raise money to rebuild a nearby monastery, which he renamed “Sanqinggong” (三清宮 the Daoist Trinity Palace), Wang sold some of his discoveries to smugglers from Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Russia. Between 1907 and 1925 Dunhuang witnessed an exodus of some of its most valued relics, which are today held in Britain, India, Japan, the United States, France, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Turkey, and Korea. The Museum of Dunhuang Hidden Library, located in Sanqinggong, opened in 2000 to tell the story of the Dunhuang treasures. The Mogao Caves are a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural (UNESCO) World Natural and Cultural Heritage Site.

Jian-Zhong LIN

Further Reading
Mongolia has long been a bone of contention between Russia and China. Russia historically has seen Mongolia as a buffer state, whereas China historically has seen Mongolia as part of China. Although Mongolia has achieved varying levels of independence since 1911, subsequent political instability and war in both China and Russia—and Mongolia’s current geopolitical position between both countries—complicates relations among all three.

When Russia pushed into the Far East and China pushed its domination north of the Great Wall in the early twentieth century, Mongolia became an arena of the “Great Game”—the struggle for empire between China and Russia. Mongolia’s leader at the time, the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu (holy venerable lord) Khutukhtu (1874–1924), called Mongolia’s geopolitical position a “critical condition, like piled up eggs, in the midst of neighboring nations.”

Russia historically has regarded Mongolia as a buffer state, whereas China historically has regarded Mongolia as part of China. But after the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912) fell, Mongolia asserted—and has since preserved—its independence as a nation in the midst of two great powers. Russia’s policy initially strove to preserve Mongolian autonomy, but it did not support Mongolian independence in order to maintain China-Russia relations and not alarm Japan. After 1917 the Soviet Union eventually did support Mongolian independence but was not firm in that support. China, however, persistently tried to absorb Mongolia into the new Chinese nation.

1911 Revolution and Mongolian Independence

After the Chinese revolution in October 1911, Mongolia declared independence in December 1911 and proclaimed the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu leader of the independent Mongolian nation. Mongolia had enjoyed a special relationship with the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912) court, and Mongolians believed that Mongolia was not an integral part of China. China maintained that Mongolia was indeed an integral part of the country but did not have the military strength to force the integration of Mongolia into the new Chinese republic.

Russia’s czarist government also was debating policy toward Mongolia. Russia had not recognized the independence of Mongolia but was providing Urga—as the Mongolian capital, Ulaanbaatar, then was called—military, political, and financial support. In Japanese-Russian negotiations as early as 1907 Russia considered partitioning Mongolia into inner and outer zones, with Japanese and Russian spheres of influence, respectively.

During the period from 1911 to 1915 Mongolia, Russia, and China held convoluted negotiations, including

Menggu-Zhongguo-Eluosi de waijiao guanxi
蒙古, 中国, 俄罗斯的外交关系
secret bilateral talks, and did much military posturing, which in June 1915 resulted in a tripartite agreement that gave the broadest possible autonomy for outer Mongolia and would make possible its eventual total independence from China. The agreement included provisions on taxes, trade, and other matters but no boundary agreement, but a neutral zone was established between outer and inner Mongolia.

China rejected the agreement after the 1917 Russian revolution, and under pressure from China the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu in November 1919 petitioned for the abolition of Mongolia’s autonomy, a petition with which China gladly complied. But the reassertion of Chinese control of Mongolia did not last long: Mongolia became a battlefield during the Russian civil war, and the White Russians (anti-Bolsheviks) drove the Chinese from Urga in 1921, only to be defeated themselves by the Bolsheviks.

Mongolian People’s Republic
With the blessings of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu and the Soviet Union, Mongolian revolutionaries established a Marxist regime in Urga in 1921. But the Soviet Union, like czarist Russia, continued to view Mongolia as a bargaining chip in its dealings with China. The Soviet Union in May 1924 recognized China’s “full sovereignty” over outer Mongolia. A month later, however, after the death of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, Mongolia declared
its independence as the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR). China’s own internal problems kept it from reasserting control over Mongolia; the most that China could do was protest the Soviet-Mongolian agreements.

At the Yalta Conference two decades later Mongolian independence was bolstered when the Allied powers agreed that the status quo in Mongolia should be preserved after the war. After a plebiscite (a vote by which the people of a country express an opinion for or against a proposal especially on a choice of government or ruler) in Mongolia overwhelmingly favored independence, the Chinese Nationalist government grudgingly recognized Mongolia’s independence in 1946.

**Quest for Influence**

China’s Communists also were reluctant to recognize Mongolia’s independence and harbored irredentist sentiments. (Irredentism is political or state policy directed toward reincorporating a territory that was historically or ethnically related to that state but which has fallen under the control of another.) Even before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in a January–February 1949 meeting with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s personal liaison to the Chinese Communists, Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) raised the question of the Soviet Union’s attitude concerning the unification of outer and inner Mongolia.

Mao again raised the question with Stalin directly while in Moscow in February 1950. Mao expressed his desire for the eventual “reunion” of Mongolia with China, but he did not let his irredentist dreams prevent the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet treaty. The Soviet Union and MPR were uneasy about China’s ambitions in Mongolia and demanded that China acknowledge Mongolia’s independence.

In spite of that declaration, in October 1954 China raised the question again during the first visit Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) made to China after the death of Stalin. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), under great pressure from Mao, reluctantly raised the issue with Khrushchev. According to Khrushchev’s memoirs, he declined to speak for Mongolia but did not voice strong opposition. Although the Soviet Union may have refused to reconsider the status of the MPR, it did acquiesce to China’s assuming a more dominant role in Mongolia.

Soviet complacency over China’s ambitions in Mongolia soon turned to alarm as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the late 1950s. The Soviet Union responded to the Chinese challenge, and Mongolia was caught in the middle of the Soviet-Chinese dispute. Mongolia’s initial wish was to remain neutral, and one official said the Soviet-Chinese dispute would not affect Mongolia’s relations with China or the Soviet Union. But Mongolia’s precarious geopolitical situation made it impossible to remain neutral for long. Mongolia took a pro-Soviet position after the open split between China and the Soviet Union occurred at the Twenty-second Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in October 1961. In June 1962 Mongolia became the first Asian state to become a full member of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). This move was a clear indication that Mongolia would closely cooperate with the Soviet Union to the exclusion of China.

China, in its attempt to gain influence in Ulaanbaatar, appealed to Mongolian nationalism. In 1962, during the commemoration of the eight hundredth anniversary of Mongolian conqueror Chinggis (also spelled Genghis) Khan’s birth, Mongolia dedicated a statue at a location believed to have been his birthplace. China also celebrated the birthday and supported Mongolia’s festivities. China, with both racist and nationalistic overtones, characterized Chinggis Khan as a positive “cultural force.” The Soviets Union, not surprisingly, criticized the celebrations, characterizing Chinggis Khan as a reactionary “who had overrun, looted, and burned most of what was then Russia” and saying that his “bloody invasions” were a “great historical tragedy” (Hersch 1963, 1).

**Current Situation**

On 16 December 1962 China announced that Mongolian leader Tsedenbal (1916–1991) would come to Beijing to sign a treaty to settle the boundary. After demarcating the boundary, a treaty was signed in Ulaanbaatar on 2 July 1964. The agreement closed a long chapter in Mongolian-Chinese relations. But in spite of the treaty China and Mongolia remain sensitive about their historical relationship.
Mongolia-China-Russia relations entered a new period in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mongolia conducted a peaceful transition to democracy and a multiparty political system. This newfound independence re-invigorated Mongolian nationalism. China and Russia still control parts of historical Mongolia, and pan-Mongolian sentiments are somewhat alarming. China is sensitive to the growing popular influence of Mongolia on its Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and represses any expression of Mongolian nationalism among Chinese Mongols.

Geopolitics remains a concern. Russia needs Mongolia to act as a buffer to shield it from China as China becomes an economic and military power. And the legacy of the Chinese empire apparently lingers in the minds of some Chinese: China's State Security Ministry in 1992 revived the specter of Chinese irredentism when it said: “As of now, the Mongolian region comprises three parts that belong to three countries”—the Russian regions of Tuva and Buryatia, Mongolia, and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region—but “the Mongolian region has from ancient times been Chinese territory” (China stakes a claim to all of the Mongolias, 1992).

Eric HYER

Further Reading


China stakes a claim to all of the Mongolias. (1992, April 30). International Herald Tribune.


China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire's authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Monument to the People’s Heroes

Rénmín Yìngxióng Jìniànbèi

The Monument to the People’s Heroes is dedicated to those who helped transform post-Imperialist China. Its placement in Tiananmen Square along the north-south axis of Beijing shattered the traditional cosmological significance of that axis as the orientation used to site the grand and imposing imperial places—while asserting a symbolic transition to China as a modern, socialist state.

With its imposing monuments, striking vastness, and elegiac history, Tiananmen Square in Beijing is an unrivaled iconic space in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The square’s makeover, from a relic of the imperial domain with associated cosmic qualities into a public arena celebrating socialist aspirations, took place over the past half century with the incremental insertion of symbolic architectural statements.

Key among these statements were the creation and placement of the Monument to the People’s Heroes during the first decade after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The monument was designed by renowned architect Liang Sicheng in collaboration with his wife, Lin Huiyin, who debated with others from 1951 onward as to whether the monument should be like a pagoda or a pavilion. Ultimately the consensus was to construct an imposing spire somewhat similar to a traditional stone memorial stele. The obelisk was completed in 1958 atop a plinth upon which marble relief panels narrate the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from the First Opium War through the civil war. In chronological order in a clockwise direction from the east side, the panels depict the burning of opium during the Opium War (1939–1942); the Jintian village uprising during the Taiping Rebellion in 1851; the Wuchang Uprising during the 1911 revolution; the May Fourth Movement in 1919; the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925; the Nanchang Uprising in 1927; the War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945; and the successful crossing of the Yangzi (Chang) River in 1949 that presaged the liberation of Nanjing. In addition, two panels present words drafted by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong with calligraphy by Premier Zhou Enlai: “Eternal glory to the Heroes of the People who laid down their lives in the People’s War of Liberation and the People’s Revolution in the past three years! Eternal glory to the Heroes of the People who laid down their lives in the People’s War of Liberation and the People’s Revolution in the past thirty years! Eternal glory to the Heroes of the People who, from 1840 laid down their lives in the many struggles against domestic and foreign enemies and for national independence and the freedom and well-being of the people!”

Unlike the surrounding imposing buildings flanking the square, the 37-meter-tall granite obelisk, with an overall footprint of 3,000 square meters, many people felt, disrupted the cosmological axial design of imperial times. According to the art historian Wu Hung, the specific placement of the obelisk was “an attempt to put a punctuation mark in the flow of history, to separate the past from the present” (Wu 2005). The construction

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of Chairman Mao’s mausoleum just to the south of the Monument to the People’s Heroes in the autumn of 1976 irretrievably separated any lingering significance of the historic north-south longitudinal axis based upon gates and palaces of the imperial past.

Over the past thirty years, since the death of Zhou Enlai in 1976, the obelisk has become a site of protest in addition to one of memory. In May and June 1989, sparked by the death of former CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang, TV viewers worldwide witnessed the emergence of a democracy movement as well as its subsequent suppression in Tiananmen Square in the shadow of the Monument to the People’s Heroes.

Ronald G. KNAPP

Further Reading

The Moso is a minority ethnic group in southwest China, officially classified, against their will, as a subgroup of the Naxi people. Women, not men, are at the center of Moso culture. The Moso practice a unique visiting system of sexual union in which conjugal partners do not marry or share the same household, and household organization is matrilineal.

The Moso, also known as the Mosuo, Na, or Naze, are a Chinese minority ethnic group living on the border of the southwestern provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. No census data of the Moso are published, as they are officially classified as a subgroup of the Naxi, a large ethnic minority in China. The Moso population, estimated to be around forty thousand, live in a microclimate suitable for farming, have long since developed irrigation techniques to benefit agriculture and fishing techniques; the Moso were a relatively self-sufficient population for until recent modern times.

The Moso language belongs to the Yi branch of the Tibeto-Burman subfamily of the Sino-Tibetan family. It is a spoken language without written form. The Moso have their own religion, the Ddaba religion, which is a combination of nature worship, spirit worship, and ancestral worship. Since the mid-sixteenth century, however, the religious life of the Moso has been strongly influenced by Tibetan Buddhism.

Sexual and Reproductive Institutions

The most conspicuous feature of Moso culture is tises, literally meaning "walking back and forth," a visiting system...
that is the normal sexual and reproductive institution. Even though marriage was introduced to Moso society in the thirteenth century, it has not been adopted by most of the people. Up to recent decades, tisese differed from marriage in that it was noncontractual (no binding force to maintain the relationship), nonobligatory (no obligation between the two partners), and nonexclusive (no requirement to be loyal). The common practice was for each of the two partners to work and eat in their matrilineal households respectively. The man visited the woman, stayed with her overnight, and went back to his own household the next morning. The only prerequisite for a tisese relationship was a mutual agreement between the man and the woman to allow sexual access to each other. Children born to such a union belong to the household in which they were born, usually the mother’s household. As Moso culture has been changing rapidly in recent decades, tisese has been losing the nonexclusive and nonobligatory features.

**Kinship and Family**

Women, and not men, are the center of Moso culture. The Moso practice matrilineal descent (tracing parent-child links only through the mother’s line). In their unique kinship system, there are neither terms to address any relatives on the father’s side, nor any terms for “in-law” relatives. There is only one term for each gender in each upper generation (namely, one term for mother and all her sisters, one term for all grandmother’s brothers and her male maternal cousins, etc.). The father, if known, is usually addressed with the same term as the mother’s brother. A man’s responsibility for the next generation is to help with raising his sisters’ children. The children whom he begot are the responsibility of their mother’s brothers.

As both cause and effect of tisese, most Moso live in households formed by three to four generations of blood relatives related through the mother. Members of such a matrilineal grand household include the mother’s mother and her siblings, as well as the children of the mother’s mother’s sisters; the mother and her siblings, as well as the children of her sisters; and the mother’s own children. Thus, in contrast to most other societies, the number and gender of children of cohabitating sisters is of primary importance for the Moso, not the number and gender of offspring of a particular couple. Special attention is given to the first girl born in each generation, as it is she who will ensure the continuation of the household. Because there are no married couples in a typical Moso household, the nuclear family is not a norm among the Moso.

**Further Reading**

Chuan-kang SHIH


Mount Emei
Éméi Shān

Mount Emei (Emei Shan) is considered to be the birthplace of Buddhism in China, with temples and monasteries dating from the late Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Twenty are still in operation today, helping to make the mountain one of China’s most popular tourist attractions. The area became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996.

Mount Emei is the highest and most important of the four sacred Buddhist mountains of China and has attracted pilgrims and visitors for the last two thousand years. Located in Sichuan Province about 135 kilometers south of the provincial capital Chengdu, Mount Emei covers an area of more than 300 square kilometers and incorporates three mountains, the highest of which is Wanfoding (Peak of Ten Thousand Buddhas), reaching 3,099 meters.

The word Emei means “high eyebrows” and alludes to the resemblance between two facing peaks and the refined features of a traditional Chinese beauty. To the north and east the mountains rise steeply from the Sichuan basin and cover four climatic zones, from subtropical to subalpine, with snow-covered peaks in winter. The craggy southern cliffs are crossed by narrow canyons in all directions. Mount Emei has an impressive diversity of flora and fauna. More than three thousand species of plants have been identified, of which more than one hundred are rare herbs and medical plants endemic to the mountains. Birds and other wildlife are almost as abundant; scores of bird species are found only at Mount Emei, while the most visible representatives of animal life are the ubiquitous monkeys, which have grown accustomed to the crowds of people visiting the area.

Experts believe that the first Buddhist temples in China were located at Mount Emei. The earliest temples and monasteries were built during the later Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) in honor of the bodhisattva (a being that refrains from entering nirvana in order to save others and is worshipped as a deity) Samantabhadra (Puxian in Chinese), who is usually depicted riding on a white elephant with six tusks. Of the more than 150 temples and monasteries constructed over the centuries, about twenty are operating today. Set on a slope at the foot of the mountains are the recently renovated four main halls of the Baoguo (preserve the country) temple, built between 1573 and 1619. The temple houses a 3.5-meter-high Buddha made of porcelain and dating to 1415 as well as seven 20-meter-high gilded Buddhas. About 1 kilometer farther west lies the Fuhu (hidden tiger) temple, which has a 7-meter-high red copper pagoda containing more than 4,700 images of Buddha.

Closer to the peak at 1,020 meters above sea level is the Wannian (ten thousand years) temple, which is the largest on Mount Emei and traces its history back to the fourth century. All wooden structures were destroyed in a fire in 1946, but the temple was rebuilt in 1953. An Indian-style brick hall constructed during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) contains a 7.35-meter-high gilded statue of Samantabhadra sitting on a white elephant. The statue was cast during the Song dynasty (960–1279) and weighs 56 metric
tons. Both the Wannian temple and the Golden Peak at 3,077 meters above sea level can be reached by cable car. The Bright Hall at the Golden Peak, which was destroyed in a fire in 1972, was replaced by a new structure in 1990, and recently a new statue of a four-faced Samantabhadra sitting on four elephants has been erected in front of the hall. This 48-meter-high gilded bronze figure is situated at the top of a long staircase flanked by white elephants carrying gilded Buddhist symbols. In 1996 Mount Emei and the neighboring 71-meter-high Buddha at Leshan were added to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) list of World Heritage Sites, and Mount Emei is one of China’s main tourist attractions.

Fortunately, both sites escaped severe damage from the earthquake that struck Sichuan Province on 12 May, 2008.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading

The city of Leshan boasts a several-hundred-foot-high statue of Buddha carved out of rock. A boat ride that passes the statue is popular with tourists who hike and climb in the area, as much for the imposing view of the Buddha as for the chance to rest. PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL, WWW.PAULNOLL.COM.
Mount Tai

Tài Shān 泰山

A sacred and scenic site since prehistoric times, Mount Tai (Taishan), in Shandong Province, has figured in the lives of Chinese elite and Chinese commoners; it maintains its hold on the Chinese imagination to this day.

Mount Tai (Taishan) is a sacred mountain in Shandong province, 450 kilometers south of Beijing. The mountain has been significant to Daoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, nationalism, and imperial ritual. At 1,545 meters Mount Tai, the highest peak in the North China Plain, was the site of prehistoric agricultural rain worship. In 1987 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designated Mount Tai a World Heritage Site.

Sacred Rites

Beginning in the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), Mount Tai became the chief of four sacred mountains (yue) used for imperial legitimation rites at cardinal compass points: Mount Tai (Eastern Peak, or Dongyue), Mount Heng (southern, or Nanyue), Mount Hua (western, or Xiyue), and Mount Heng (northern, or Beiyue). The Book of History, a compilation of documents going back to the sixth century BCE, describes the sage rulers Shun and Yao completing essential circuits of the mountains. By the late Zhou or early Han period (206 BCE–220 CE) a fifth, central peak, Mount Song (Zhongyue) was added to the collection of Daoist sacred mountains.

Special imperial legitimation rites dedicated to heaven were performed by emperors on top of Mount Tai, and special rites to earth on a hill at the base of the mountain. First performed by Qin Shihuangdi in 219 BCE, the rites legitimated an emperor’s rulership and commended his virtues. Emperor Han Wudi (reigned 140–87 BCE) performed these rituals several times. Both Qin Shihuangdi and Han Wudi linked their performances with their quests for immortality. Only four later emperors performed these solemn rites: Guangwudi (reigned 25–57 CE), Gaozong (reigned 650–683), Xuanzong (reigned 713–756), and Zhenzong (reigned 998–1022).

According to the fourth-century BCE text Mencius, Confucius climbed Mount Tai. Many admirers of Confucius have followed in his footsteps, ascending the slopes of Mount Tai in hopes of increasing their sagacity. In the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) a Confucian temple was built on the mountain.

Mount Tai and Life, Death

Because the sun rises in the east, Mount Tai, as the eastern sacred peak, was seen as the source of all life and therefore the leader of the five sacred peaks. By the late first century BCE people believed the mountain presided over death; by the middle of the second century CE, when people died, they were said to “return to Mount Tai.” Buddhist beliefs about reincarnation and an underworld were gradually integrated with indigenous Chinese beliefs until
by the seventh century many Chinese believed that souls returned to Mount Tai and passed through a series of ten courts in the underworld, where they were judged and punished before rebirth. The personified god of Mount Tai was the judge in the seventh court. Popular worship of this god centered on reducing the period of suffering for recently departed relatives. The vast majority of pilgrims during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and the early Ming dynasty journeyed to worship the god of Mount Tai as a judge in the underworld.

By 1550 the popularity of the god of Mount Tai had diminished greatly. In contrast, the popularity of the goddess of Mount Tai, Bixia Yuanjun, steadily increased over the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (when Guanyin, a Buddhist goddess, and Mazu, a Daoist goddess, also became popular). The goddess of Mount Tai is an important northern Chinese fertility deity, although she continues to be appealed to for more general well-being and success. Accordingly, women of childbearing age prayed and still pray to her, especially for sons. Assistant goddesses specialize in eye ailments and aspects of pregnancy or infancy—for example, conception, delivery, nursing, and smallpox (which was contracted in infancy or early childhood). Pilgrimages to the Bixia temple on top of the mountain were extremely popular during the late imperial period from the mid-Ming (c. 1500) onward through the Qing (1644–1912), averaging at least 400,000 people a year, mostly traveling from within 350 kilometers.

During the late imperial period literati from the entire country made the trip, often when passing near the mountain on official business. Most of them sought inspiration through communing with nature, viewing historic sites, admiring the content and calligraphy of inscriptions, reciting poems about the mountain by famous poets such as Li Bai (Bo) (701–762) and Du Fu (712–770), and writing their own reflections about Mount Tai in poetry and prose.

Two important visitors to Mount Tai during the late imperial period were the Manchu emperors Kangxi (r. 1662–1722) and Qianlong (reigned 1661–1795) of the Qing dynasty. Both rejected the idea of performing the feng and shan rituals because they were not actually ancient rites found in any classical texts and because the rituals implied that rulership could reach a point of perfection. Kangxi used visits to the mountain to demonstrate to the Han Chinese elite that the Manchu understood and respected Chinese practices and history. Qianlong used the mountain to further his own aggrandizement, even having the text of several of his poems engraved as the largest inscription on the mountain.

Continuing Religious Site

The mountain also became an important symbol of Han Chinese nationalism. The governments of Republican China (1912–1949) and People’s Republic of China (1949–present) both sought to secularize the sacred mountain. Publications and laws criticized many of the religious practices on the mountain as superstitious and sought to focus visitors’ attentions on historic and natural sites. Despite these attempts, religious worship on the mountain thrived during the Republican period. After 1949 religious worship across the country was restricted. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) all temples were closed and the primarily Daoist resident monks and nuns sent away to perform secular work elsewhere.

With the economic reforms of the 1980s came a lessening of restrictions on religion. The government undertook many restoration projects on the mountain, including restoration of many temples. Religious practitioners were again allowed to reside in some temples. While the majority of visitors today would not identify themselves as religious pilgrims and the Communist party remains officially atheist, religious practice on Mount Tai continues to flourish.

Internationally the mountain has gained greater visibility. Many overseas Chinese include a visit to Mount Tai when in China. In 1987 UNESCO named Mount Tai a World Heritage Site. The Chinese government chose to include Mount Tai as one of the Chinese sites for an international New Year’s Day 2000 broadcast. In 2005 the baby panda born in the National Zoo in Washington, D.C., was named Taishan after more than 200,000 Internet votes from around the world.

Brian R. DOTT

Further Reading

A Guided Pilgrimage

While there is much written about pilgrimages to the sacred Mount Tai (Taishan), there is often no mention of paid and guided tours of the mountain, an early form of spiritual tourism. Chang Tai, a seventeenth-century member of the Chinese literati, chronicles his experiences on a guided “pilgrimage” to Mount Tai.

The company sets a fixed rate for renting rooms, hiring sedan chairs, and paying mountain fees. Visitors are charged on the basis of three classes: upper, middle, and lower. All the visitors are met upon their arrival, entertained when they descend from the summit, and escorted when they leave. Each day there are several thousand visitors... The guides are from about a dozen families. On an average day eight thousand to nine thousand visitors come, while the number can reach twenty thousand on the first day of spring. The entrance fee is collected at twelve fen per person, so the annual collection amounts to two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand taels. The magnitude of Mount T’ai, alas, can be measured by the number of the guides or the amount of the fees!


Mount Wudang

Wūdāng Shān 武当山

Wudang Shan (Mount Wudang) is located in northwest Hubei Province, central eastern China, near the city of Shiyan. It is also known as Taihe Mountain. The highest peak, Tianzhu Feng (Heaven-Supporting Pillar), rises 1,612 meters above sea level, and the mountain includes seventy-two peaks, cliffs, ravines, caves, and water pools.

One of the most sacred places in Daoism (and one of 72 blessed sites), Mount Wudang is famous for its complex of palaces and temples, which date from the Yuan (1279–1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. The oldest of the Taoist temples, Wulong (Five Dragon Temple), dates from the early Tang dynasty (617–906).

The mountain’s fame began in the late thirteenth century, as it was thought to be the place where the god Zhenwu (Perfected Warrior) became an immortal, and the mountain is a reminder of Zhenwu’s spirit. The Nanya Temple (Nanyangong) marks the site where Zhenwu achieved immortality. During the first thirty years of the Ming dynasty the Hongwu emperor began patronage of the mountain and established a cult of Zhenwu.

The Ming emperor Cheng Zu (also known as the the Yongle emperor), a Daoist, began the construction of thirty-three halls and monasteries in 1412, perhaps the best known of which are the Golden Pavilion (Jindian).
on the peak, the Purple Cloud Temple (Zixiaogong), and Nanyan Temple. The temple complex covers more than 1.6 million square meters and contains eight main temples, two monasteries, thirty-six hermitages, and many lesser temples. One of the largest temples, Yuxugong, which covered six hectares, burned in 1745 and only part of it remains today. Wudang, and specifically the Yuzhen Temple (Yuzhengong), is also known as the birthplace of Wudang shadow boxing, or wudang taiyi wuxing. This martial art, known as Tai Chi in the West, was most likely developed by the Wudang Daoist Zhang Sanfeng (1391–1458), who is thought to have been inspired by witnessing a fight between a crane (or magpie) and a cobra. The Wudang temple complex was largely abandoned during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) but has since been restored and has become popular with tourists. The Yuzhen Temple burned in 2003 but the golden statue of Zhang Sanfeng had already been removed and escaped the flames. The palace and temple complex on Wudang was inscribed on the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage List in 1994.

Michael PRETES

Further Reading

So long as the green mountains are preserved, there will be no shortage of firewood supply.

留得青山在，不怕没柴烧

Liú dé qīng shān zài, bú pà méi chái shāo

Moxibustion
Moxibustion is a healing art of traditional Chinese medicine in which herbs are burned to stimulate acupuncture points on the body of a patient. Today it is commonly practiced in conjunction with acupuncture and Western medical procedures.

Moxibustion, as a healing art of traditional Chinese medicine, cannot be separated from acupuncture, which is the practice of inserting fine needles through the skin at specific points to cure disease or relieve pain. By definition *moxibustion* means the use of *moxa* (a Japanese term for wormwood, *Artemisia vulgaris*) as a cautery (an agent used to burn, sear, or destroy tissue) by igniting it close to the skin. *Moxa* is a soft, woolly mass prepared from the young leaves of various wormwoods of Eastern Asia.

Moxibustion treatment is conducted with *moxa* rolls or sticks, which, after being ignited, can be held by the doctor’s hand at a distance of three centimeters or so from the selected acupuncture points for ten to fifteen minutes, resulting in a *moxa* cauterization effect. Moxibustion, therefore, can also be defined as the process of burning herbs to stimulate acupuncture points. With special indications such as acute abdominal pain caused by cold, facial muscle atrophy of unknown etiology (the cause of a disease or abnormal condition), and so forth, a thin, small slice of ginger as an insulator can be put at the site of the acupoint between the ignited *moxa* roll and the skin. The patient may feel heat at the acupoint. Alternatively,
theory and principles of channels and collaterals must be learned to master the art of both moxibustion and acupuncture. In traditional Chinese medicine channels are the main trunks that run lengthwise through the body, and collaterals are their connecting branches. Together they connect the superficial, interior, upper, and lower parts of the body. Qi (life energy) courses through the channels.

The concept of administering moxibustion (or moxibustion plus acupuncture) is based on providing heat stimulation at the acupuncture points along the channels and collaterals. The effects are twofold. First is local hyperthermia therapy, and second is the effect on remote organs along the channels and collaterals. The selection of the moxibustion and acupoints is done according to the indications of the disorder.

Moxibustion and acupuncture today are practiced in departments of traditional Chinese medicine and in many Chinese hospitals, where traditional Chinese medicine is integrated with Western medicine. Research has concluded that serious adverse events are rare in the standard practice of moxibustion and acupuncture.

CHEN Bao-xing and Garé LeCOMPTE

Further Reading
The philosopher Mozi and the school he founded offered a popular alternative to Confucian teachings. Mozi was unique among ancient philosophers in his belief that if an idea has been handed down from the ancient sages but does not benefit the people, it should be rejected.

Mozi (Master Mo) was born in the state of either Song or Lu. He later served as a high official in Song. Scholars believe, because he was an artisan and because his philosophy and his images and analogies drawn from technical crafts were practical, that Mozi came from the lower classes. In fact, King Hui of Chu (488–432 BCE) refused to grant Mozi an audience supposedly because of Mozi's low status. Some scholars believe that when Mozi was young he studied the teachings of the philosopher Confucius; Mozi's essays clearly attack the major tenants of Confucianism. Ancient texts do not show Mozi in debate with Confucian scholars; rather, they show him in debate with Gongshu Ban, Chu's chief military strategist, regarding "Cloud ladders," wheel-driven ramps that could scale city walls. Mozi convinced the king of Chu not to employ the ladder militarily against Song, an act that represents Mozi's values of loving everybody and defending the underdog.

The Mohist school that Mozi founded was a popular alternative to Confucian teachings. The school developed standards for evidence, proof, argument, and definition but died out by the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Modern scholars have revitalized interest in the school's early development of logic.

The Mozi (the philosophical text compiled by Mohists from Mozi's thought) clearly attacks Confucian values. Mozi and his disciples opposed the extravagant use of rituals and music. They especially opposed elaborate funerals, which were an important part of Confucian ancestor veneration. The Mohists favored a utilitarian approach (relating to a doctrine that the useful is the good and that the determining consideration of right conduct should be the usefulness of its consequences) and denounced elaborate court music, ritual, and funerals because such activities wasted state resources that could be used to benefit the people. The Mohists also denounced offensive warfare. Mozi rejected the Confucian concept of destiny (ming), and his text does not mention the aristocratic Confucian distinction between the "prince of virtue," or gentleman, and the "petty person." Mozi especially rejected the Confucian clan value of differing levels of love, instead advocating jianai (love for everyone). Mozi's idea of love for everyone possibly came from the Confucian ideal of empathy (shu). Love for everyone is based on treating other families, states, and persons as if they were one's own. However, Mozi's idea of love for everyone is not correctly translated as universal love because jian implies "for each," not "for all," and in this context love is moral concern, not deep emotional affection. Mozi regarded concern for every person as the unifying principle of morality. Later Mohists believed that love for everyone entails a notion of moral equality but not social equality.

The Mohist school was well organized under a grand master during the fourth and third centuries BCE. But
by the end of that time the school split into three sects that differed in their interpretation of the teachings of Mozi, and each denounced the others as heretics. The three sects were the purists, the compromisers, and the reactionaries. Mohists who took office were expected to donate money to the organization, and the grand master could remove them from office. The sects taught ten basic principles contained in the ten core essays of the *Mozi*: elevation (or promotion) of the worthy, conforming upwards, concern for every person, thrift in utilization, thrift in funerals, rejection of aggression, heaven’s intent, elucidating ghosts, rejection of music, and rejection of destiny. Many chapters of the *Mozi* have three versions, which are probably derived from the three sects.

Because Mohist doctrines were new, Mohists had to argue on their own behalf, a development that began systematic debate in ancient China. The expressions “to argue out alternatives,” “to distinguish,” and “rational discourse” were first used in the *Mozi*. The *Mozi* also suggests that the correctness of an idea is not dependent on the person who thought it. Whereas Confucians expect thinkers to both talk about and exemplify the way, Mohists discuss ideas based on the ideas’ merits regardless of who presents them.

Mozi presented three criteria to evaluate arguments: roots, evidence, and use. A position is accepted if its roots can be traced to practices of the ancient sages. A position is assented to if it is in accord with the understanding of the masses and if, when applied in the administration of the state or in the punishment of wrongdoers, it brings benefit to the people. The utilitarian and practical focus of Mozi’s philosophy is notable. He was unique among ancient moralists in the belief that if an idea or practice has been handed down from the ancient sages but does not benefit the people, it should be rejected. Such utilitarian or pragmatic concerns are the basis of many of his criticisms of Confucianism.

James D. SELLMANN

**Further Reading**


Chinese contemporary music encompasses a huge popular music industry spanning most of East Asia, a vibrant concert music scene in all of the major cities, and modern arrangements of traditional material.

Contemporary Chinese popular and classical music, although often incorporating Western elements such as symphonic form or rhythmic patterns, remains grounded in Chinese culture through the use of traditional instruments or melodies, through the use of subject matter from Chinese history, and through the use of modalities that allude to Chinese arts or philosophy.

Modern Interpretations of Traditional Chinese Music

By the early twentieth century, Chinese traditional music had already been influenced by increased international communication, especially in the large Eastern cities. Musicians such as Liu Tianhua, who also studied Western music, composed new pieces for erhu (two-stringed fiddle) and pipa (lute). During the civil war between the Nationalist and Communist forces, Mao Zedong outlined a new agenda for the arts, which he felt should serve the common people and the Party. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, this plan was implemented throughout the nation, with the exception of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other areas outside of Communist control. Because traditional music was thought to be useful for education and propaganda,
conservatories in the major cities created departments and began offering programs in these genres, along with Western music. Although many forms of traditional music thrived with government support, repertoires and instruments that were associated with religious practices and Confucian elitism, such as the guqin (a plucked seven-stringed instrument), were less fortunate. Ideological focus in music and other art forms reached an extreme point during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when the performing arts under Madame Mao (Jiang Qing) were largely restricted to music associated with the “model pieces” (yangbanxi 票板戏). These works combined traditional opera instruments and styles with Western ballet and symphonic music and featured heroic proletarian figures and large-scale choreography with dancers bearing rifles. After the fall of the Gang of Four, traditional music again enjoyed government sponsorship, and experimentation with modern adaptations continued, but without overt political requirements.

**Popular Music**

In terms of musical structure, Chinese popular music generally adheres to international norms of style, and most of its unique features are related to language and vocal

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A pop singer giving a performance at a hotel in Hefei, Anhui Province. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
inflections. The two most common languages used in popular music are Mandarin (in “Mandopop”) and Cantonese (in “Cantopop”), but other dialects are also used. The earliest genre of Chinese popular music, known as Shidaiqu 時代曲, was developed in Shanghai by Li Jinhui 黎锦辉 and others during the 1920s, and spread to other regions, even during the chaotic years of Japanese occupation and civil war. Often using traditional-sounding melodies accompanied by Western instruments such as piano and woodwinds, Shidaiqu was one of the earliest international popular music styles. After 1949 popular music with Western influence was discouraged in mainland China, where it was labeled as immoral, and it was quickly displaced by government-sponsored music more consistent with Marxist ideology. During this time, however, Chinese popular music continued to thrive in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other enclaves. These areas became an essential part of a huge pan-Asian popular music culture which now spans almost all of East Asia—as reflected by a lively concert scene in the cities, a growing recording industry, fan clubs, karaoke bars and marketing targeted to promote the culture through the full range of electronic and print media.

One of many performers whose career illustrates the pan-Asian trend is vocalist Teresa Teng (Deng Lijun 鄧麗君), who became a pop music icon. Born in Taiwan in 1953, Teng rose to fame in the 1960s and became popular in Japan after signing a recording contract with Polydor Japan in 1973. Teresa Teng’s recordings in the Mandarin language were very popular in mainland China as well as Taiwan; she also recorded in Cantonese, Japanese, and English. Toward the end of the twentieth century, harder-edged forms of popular music also became prominent, including the work of rock musicians like Cui Jian 崔健. Even louder genres such as heavy metal soon appeared. Although censorship of lyrics and visual content is still a factor in China, an increasingly broad range of styles are available to audiences as popular music continues to diversify and become more accessible.

Western and Symphonic Music

In the early twentieth century, the study of Western music was encouraged by participants in the New Culture Movement (Xin Wenhua Yundong 新文化运动) who associated Western music with the transformational possibilities of Western democracy and science. In 1927 the National College of Music, which was later to become
the Shanghai Conservatory of Music, was established, and more Chinese musicians were able to study Western music within China. Other musicians decided to study Western music in Europe. One of the most well-known of these was Xian Xinghai, who studied in France, and returned to China to teach and write music, including his Yellow River Cantata (1939), which used the metaphor of the mighty river to inspire resistance to the Japanese invasion. This work integrates Chinese instruments and echoes of Chinese traditional music, such as martial music and local folk song, into a Western symphonic structure.

The stylistic gap between familiar popular and folk styles on one hand and more dissonant academic music on the other was more noticeable outside of the People’s Republic of China until the end of the Cultural Revolution. For example the composer Chou Wen-chung (周文中), who grew up in China but studied and worked in the United States, was able to develop a highly individualized modern style inspired by Chinese calligraphy. A younger Chinese composer who successfully merged modern compositional techniques with traditional aesthetics is Tan Dun, who studied at the Central Conservatory in Beijing after the end of the Cultural Revolution, and who quickly rose to international fame. Whether to use the term “Western” to describe these composers is debatable, since they are so firmly grounded in Chinese culture. For example, Tan Dun’s 2006 opera, The First Emperor, is based on characters from the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), and Chou Wen-chung has created a musical modality based on transformations that characterize the I Ching. Dun also used the medium of film to blur the distinctions between classical and popular music, composing the score for director Ang Lee’s martial arts film Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, released in 2000. Through film and other media, more international audiences have been exposed to music by Chinese composers and performances by Chinese musicians.

John MYERS

Further Reading


Chinese traditional music, developed to accompany ritual and with pentatonic melodies that reach back to the thirteenth century, is characterized by instrumental variation on set tunes and percussive patterns. Instruments are often specific to a musical genre and context of performance: silk-stringed instruments and bamboo lutes for tea house performances and zithers for personal meditation, for example.

Music is part of Chinese community life. Much of Chinese traditional music, from folk songs to opera and from region to region, is based on ancient qupai, stock melodies performed on traditional instruments. Although some genres, such as the music performed in imperial courts, were lost during the social upheavals of the twentieth century, much of traditional music remains alive today, either performed traditionally or combined with Western instrumentation.

Origins

China’s diverse musical traditions and regional styles should be seen as part of a wider overview of music in Asia. Many instruments and musical genres, like the drum and shawm (a woodwind instrument) bands (guchui), the pipa (a four-string plucked lute), and the yangqin (a hammered dulcimer played with bamboo beaters) were brought to China from the the Near East and Central Asia.

Much Chinese music is linked to ritual contexts, from the Confucian rituals of the imperial court to those of village weddings, funerals, and festivals. The ritual music of the imperial court was imbued with complex Confucian theories that linked musical sound to the stability of the empire and the turning of the seasons. This music was lost at the beginning of the twentieth century with the abdication of the last emperor, but court entertainment music has been partially preserved in the beautiful instrumental traditions of Buddhist temples and village ritual ensembles.

Many of the melodies used in traditional Chinese music are drawn from a stock of melodies (qupai), distinct melodic units with titles that may be set to a variety of texts, found in varying forms in instrumental music and narrative song and opera genres across China. The titles or labels of these melodies are drawn from the Song dynasty (960–1279) poetry of the ninth and tenth centuries; the melodies themselves can be traced back to the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

Characteristics

The aesthetics of Chinese music, with its emphasis on harmony, restraint, and conformity to tradition is linked to the need for correct, nondeviating observance of ritual. Variation and reinterpretation of existing melodies are
prized over creation of the new. Generally, Chinese melodies are built on the pentatonic (five tones) scale, with two more pitches used as embellishment and for modulation. Stock melodies, called qupai, are identified by titles or labels. Variations of the skeletal qupai are distinguished by the speed, meter, and the degree of ornamentation. Each musical instrument ornaments (jiahua, loosely “adds flowers to”) the skeletal notes in its own way, creating a delicate variety of sounds. Meter is marked by banyan (beats and “eyes,” or secondary beats), based on the beats of the ban (wood clapper). In theory, ban is marked by a stroke of the clapper and yan by the stroke of the drum or woodblock. The resulting metrical pattern is analogous to a time signature. The most common traditional musical notation (gongchepu) uses symbols based on the heptatonic (seven-tone) scale. Notation serves as a basic guide, recording only the skeletal notes (guganyin) of a melody.

**Genres, Performers, and their Instruments**

Shawm bands are groups of musicians, usually male and traditionally low class, who perform daily life celebration music in and around their villages, most regularly at weddings, funerals, and market fairs. Each region has its own repertoire and style.

More widespread are the amateur silk and bamboo (sizhu) instrumental ensembles often found in urban tea-houses. They are named for the silk strings of the erhu (a two-stringed fiddle) and sanxian (a three-stringed lute) and the bamboo of the dizi (a transverse flute). Sizhu ensembles, whose repertoire is based on qupai or titled melodies, are most commonly found in central-eastern and southern China. Percussion ensembles of gongs, cymbals, and drum are also widespread.

The costumes and painted faces of the warrior (hualian), clown (chou), and woman warrior (wudan) and the stylized movements of actors are representative of traditional conventions of Chinese high opera such as the Beijing Opera. Traditional musical components include use of titled melodies, altered to fit the words of arias, and set percussion patterns that represent different characters and different dramatic situations. A drummer serves as conductor, directing the actors’ movements and leading a percussion ensemble that accompanies the dramatic action. Regional opera, performed at rural temple fairs or public theaters in town, draws on the same stock of melodies and stories taken from popular novels, but the music may be simpler, utilizing solo narrative songs, accompanied by percussion or sanxian lute.

A separate vocal genre is that of rural folk songs, often called mountain songs (shan’ge). Folk song is strongly tied to locality, so there is great regional variation. The most beautiful are thought to be the songs of northwest China, especially the bitter songs (suanqu’er) of the boat pullers on the Huang (Yellow) River and the camel drivers on the Silk Roads.

Few traditional genres are performed by women, but in folk-song festivals held in the northwest and linked to the temple fairs, men and women gather in groups to sing improvised, often crude sexual lyrics. Such occasions lie outside the normally strict Confucian morality of village life. Another genre with women performers is the southern narrative song genre of nanguan, in which vocals are accompanied by the wooden clapper, pipa and sanxian lutes, xiao (flute), and erxian (two-stringed fiddle).

Distinct from the ensembles and community context of shawm bands, silk and bamboo groups, opera, and folk songs is the unique and ancient musical tradition of the guqin (a seven-stringed zither). This instrument, played for personal refinement and meditation of gentlemen-scholars, has come to be emblematic of Chinese music. Its tunes are thought to be programmatic, describing a scene or story, and much traditional literature is devoted to tales of disciples who perfectly understood the mood and images their master’s playing evoked. The guqin has its own special complex notation, and its performance traditionally involves an element of historical research: interpretation and reworking of centuries-old scores and their commentaries, themselves based on still earlier notations.

**Modernization and Westernization**

All of these traditional genres still thrive in contemporary China, but the twentieth century brought modernization
and Westernization to Chinese music. Western instruments, theories, and attitudes were introduced, and a musical schooling system and new professional troupes and orchestras were established.

The Communist revolution in 1949 brought with it attacks on traditional culture along with extensive reworking of folk music to produce revolutionary folk songs. Model operas (yangbanxi), which the Communist cultural authorities used to instruct people by using revolutionary models as characters, feature elements of traditional music and proletarian protagonists. After the excesses of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the loosening of social controls in the 1980s brought about a great revival of traditional music alongside its old ritual contexts. It also permitted the swift rise of a booming industry of pop and rock music that has been promoted on television and through ubiquitous karaoke bars. The rock music of Cui Jian combines traditional Chinese and Western instruments and adds Western rock cadences to traditional Chinese melodies. Several modern Chinese composers have also achieved international recognition with works that draw in part on Chinese traditions. Tan Dun, who wrote the score for the movie Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, composed the symphony Li Sao, based on a fourth-century BCE Hunan lament, to be played by a Western symphony orchestra. An integral part of China’s history and identity both in style and instrumentation, traditional music in China continues to evolve its way into modernity.

Rachel HARRIS

Further Reading


Pass oneself off as one of the Yu pipe players in an ensemble.

滥竽充数
làn yú chōng shù
Chinese musical instruments have been evolving since the first millennia BCE, when instruments of “eight sounds” were developed and categorized according to their material composition. International contact led to adoption and adaptation of instruments developed elsewhere. In the modern era Chinese music incorporates both Western and traditional Chinese instrumentation.

China’s musical instruments have evolved in ways that express China’s aesthetic connections with the beauty and power of nature. While traditional instruments have sometimes been associated with specific regions and ethnicities within China, they have also been an important component of an emerging national musical identity, usually grounded in elements shared by groups within China’s Han majority.

Earliest Instruments

Both literary and archeological records reveal the importance of musical instruments from the very beginning of Chinese civilization. Literary records credited the legendary first emperors with the invention of various instruments, and some of the earliest, including the bianqing (suspended stones) and bianzhong (suspended bells), were used in court rituals. Both are still used in Confucian ceremonies. These instruments are sets of tuned idiophones (instruments whose sound is produced by vibrations of the material of the instrument); they are made of stone and bronze, respectively, and are mounted on wooded frames. The character for music, 乐 yueh, is derived from an ancient representation of these instruments. A much softer ancient instrument,
the *guqin* 古琴, a bridgeless zither, was favored by Confucius, who admired its subtle qualities. Over centuries, an extensive written body of solos was developed for this instrument, which well-educated scholars considered to be an essential vehicle for personal aesthetic refinement. Another zither, the harp-like *zheng* 箜篌, which has strings suspended on moveable bridges, evolved somewhat later, and formed the prototype for the Japanese *koto* and other East Asian instruments.

### Instruments of “Eight Sounds”

During the time of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), instruments were classified according to their material composition and associated sound qualities. These categories, known as *bayin* 八音 (eight sounds), included the following: silk, bamboo, stone, wood, metal, clay, gourd, and skin. Through correlative cosmology, these categories were connected with the primary directions and seasons of the year. Court rituals were supposed to harmonize the earthly realm with the cosmos, and officials took responsibility to see that instruments were tuned properly for this purpose. The *sheng* 竹筚篥, an ancient mouth organ, was used to represent the gourd category because of its gourd resonating chamber, although its sound pipes were made of bamboo. The *sheng*, a distant instrumental relative of the Western pipe organ, is still in use today, although modern instruments have sound chambers made of other materials. While prehistoric flutes made of bone have been found by archeologists, bamboo flutes flourished throughout most of recorded history, and are used extensively in regional ensemble music. The most popular bamboo flutes today are the *dizi* 笛子, a transverse flute, and the *xiao* 竹, a vertical flute.

The softer and more stationary instruments were used for indoor music, while louder and more mobile percussion and wind instruments were used outdoors, originally for processions. These indoor and outdoor ensemble traditions evolved in diverse regional styles. The softer ensemble traditions are often referred to generically as *sizhu* (silk and bamboo), borrowing two of the ancient “eight sound” categories to emphasize the importance of stringed instruments and flutes, even though the ensembles may include other kinds of instruments. The outdoor ensembles include many kinds of drums and often include the piercing sound of the *suona* 噗吶, a double reed instrument related to the Indian *shenai* and Western...
The shorter, fatter flute is a dizī 箫子. The longer, thinner flute with a notch on one end (also of darker wood) is a xiao 箫. The wooden fish (also called a “temple block” by Western musicians) is a muyu 木鱼. Photo by Anna Myers.

oboé. A generic term for these louder ensembles is gu-chui (“drums and winds,” although some ensembles may include other kinds of instruments). Along with a great variety of drums, which formed the “skin” category of the “eight sounds,” numerous bells, cymbals, and gongs were developed.

International Influences

As China’s borders expanded, contact with Central Asian and other cultures along the Silk Roads led to musical exchanges, and plucked lutes entered China during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Central Asian and Indian

A musician playing the zheng. Photo by Paul and Bernice Noll, www.paulnoll.com.”

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plucked lutes influenced the development of the Chinese pipa 琵琶 and ruan 琵。

Centuries later, during another phase of increased international contact during the Mongol period [Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)], the bowed lutes were introduced, and the two-string fiddle, the erhu 二胡, and related instruments became important in regional ensemble and dramatic music. The last imported instrument to be widely adopted during the dynastic period was the yangqin 扬琴, a hammered dulcimer derived from Central Asian instruments such as the santur. The yangqin entered China during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), and
despite being called “the foreign instrument,” its distinctive articulation became part of many ensemble genres. Indigenous instruments continued to evolve as well, and special gongs were developed to accent the libretti of regional opera genres with rising and falling pitches.

Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries

In the twentieth century, the bowed instruments of the huqin family were expanded to facilitate large ensembles, roughly paralleling the string section of the Western orchestra. Originally based on arrangements of traditional “silk and bamboo” repertoire primarily from southern regions, the inclusion of regional chamber music in a more nationalized style was centered in urban communities and paralleled the practice of Western music. The traditional genres continued to flourish in diasporic communities as well as within China. Traditional Chinese instruments were also combined with Western instruments in concerti and symphonic works. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Chinese instruments were used in the eight revolutionary operas, although use of the guqin with its elite associations, and other instruments associated with religious ritual, was discouraged. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, modern composers such as Tan Dun continued to experiment with combinations of Chinese traditional and Western instruments. The cellist Yo-Yo Ma, inspired by earlier periods of contact between civilizations, established the Silk Road Project, led concerts worldwide and commissioned many new works in blended musical styles and instrumentation. Chinese traditional instruments, reflecting several millennia of culture, form a significant part of the global orchestra.

John MYERS

Further Reading
While it is now common for Chinese to adopt a Western name, the act of naming in China is considered both a challenge and an art. A given name often reflects the hopes and aspirations parents have for their child, and because the given names are so personalized, one's identity and personality is often deduced simply from their name.

Choosing a name for a newborn is an important decision for all parents, even for the “parents” of companies (think of Google). But for Chinese parents the process of naming their infants is even more important; it reflects a complex aspect of their culture and has characteristics very different from Western naming systems. Chinese names can be chosen from a vast range of words, rather than being limited to religious or other origins. Chinese names are easily distinguished from any other names in the world. In the West parents usually name their children from a list of established names, such as Peter, François, Günther, Carlos, or Antonio. The Chinese, on the other hand, create personalized names by choosing words from a vast vocabulary that bestows unique meaning or significance.

Personalized Names
In the Chinese dictionary there is a wide choice of words that can be coined as names, although in practice some words are used more often than others are. It is often a challenge and an art to choose suitable and meaningful words as names. Embedded in most Chinese names are the parents’ aspirations and hopes for their children. Since a Chinese person knows the meaning of a specific name, it is often possible to understand what one’s parents had hoped for their child. And, since a person is addressed by his or her name throughout life whether he or she likes it, a person’s identity and perceived personality (until better known by others) are consciously or unconsciously associated with the name, whether or not he or she likes it.

The character for name 名 (ming) is made up of two components, twilight (xié) and mouth 口 (kou). Before the invention of electric light bulbs, in twilight hours when vision was poor, one needed to speak out his or her name to be identified, hence the concept of “name.”

Even today people subconsciously build up a mental picture of someone based on his or her picture, voice, and name. A good name is an excellent image builder. Names are coined from words that project esteemed character traits, such as beauty, confidence, excellence, grace, happiness, intelligence, a loving and caring nature, loyalty, tranquility, successfulness, trustworthiness, and ability to acquire wealth.

Chinese Naming System
A typical Chinese name has two or three elements. A name usually indicates that the person is of Chinese (Han) origin. The first element is the surname, or family name,  (xing, 姓), the remaining one or two names are
the given name (ming 名). Take the following name as an example: Chin Hon Fah 陈汉华. Chin is the surname and Hon Fah is the given name.

Placing the surname before the given name is consistent with the hierarchy of relationships. It is an acknowledgement that the parents’ and ancestors’ name is more important than one’s own name. Mistaking the surname as a given name or vice versa is often a source of confusion and embarrassment.

If one chooses to address a Chinese person by his or her given name, and that name consists of two words, it is important to realize that both words are used when addressing the person. The concept of a middle name, as it is known in the West, does not exist in Chinese. In the example mentioned earlier, Mr. Chin Hon Fah should be addressed as Hon Fah rather than as Hon or Fah.

Some Chinese names can be written in various ways in English, such as Chin Hon Fah, Chin Hon-Fah, or Chin Honfah. Mr. Chin living in Western society would probably place his surname last. His name would then become Hon Fah Chin or H. F. Chin.

The surname Chin, or Chen 陈, is the fifth most common surname in the Chinese naming system, with some 54.4 million people sharing it. It is the most common surname in Fujian, Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Zhejiang. Other spellings include Chan (Cantonese); Chang; Chén; Chern; Chin or Ching (Hakka); Ciin Dan (Hainan); Ding; Tan (Hokkien, Teochew); Tchen; Ting; Tjin (Indonesian); Tran (Vietnamese); and Zen.

Chinese Using Christian Names

Many people in Southeast Asia and in the West might know their ethnic Chinese friends by their Christian names. The Chinese are great survivors and adapt easily to new environments. Some have made their name easier for their friends, teachers, employers, and government authorities by adopting a Christian name, even though in some cases they might not be Christian by faith. Nevertheless, most keep their Chinese surname, thereby maintaining their ethnic identity.

If Mr. Chin were to adopt a Christian name such as Peter, his name would become either Peter Chin Hon Fah or Peter Chin or Peter H. F. Chin. In Indonesia and Thailand, most ethnic Chinese were coerced, induced, or otherwise legally required to adopt a local name. (The Indonesian government has relaxed this ruling in recent years.)

Westerners Adopting Chinese Names

In recent years some Westerners, in particular those living or working in China, have acquired Chinese names for academic, business, cultural, personal, or professional reasons. This practice aims to facilitate pronunciation of Western names, in most cases creating better rapport and closer relationships in the host country.

Chinese names can be acquired in two ways: direct translation of the Western name or adoption of a Chinese-style name with three elements, a single word for the surname and two words for the given name. Either way, it is important to be aware of the visual image connected with the name.

Chinese Names and Harmony

The traditional Chinese psyche believes in harmony and balance among various elements or entities in nature. One of the unique features in the Chinese naming system lies in its ability to harmonize with nature, in particular creating balance among the five determinant elements: metal, fire, water, wood, and earth. These elements are reflected in one’s personality, character, relationships with others, health issues, and cycles of ups and downs in life. An individual at birth would have an inherent combination of the five elements. Through a prudent choice of naming words, some people believe that it is possible to supplement any deficiency inherent at birth and rebalance the elements.

Yit-Seng YOW

Further Reading


Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu Province. The city for a while was the capital of the Ming dynasty and of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Party. In 1937 and 1938 many thousands of residents of the city were victims of war crimes by the Japanese army.

Nanjing (Nanking), the capital of Jiangsu Province in central eastern China, is located on the southern bank of the Yangzi (Chang) River. Nanjing has played an important role in Chinese history. Indeed, the city’s name means “southern capital,” and Nanjing was the capital of the kingdom of Wu (220–280 CE) and several other minor dynasties between the third and sixth centuries before becoming the capital of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) between 1368 and 1421. In the early 1420s Yung Lo (reigned 1403–1424), the third Ming emperor, moved the capital to Beijing, the “northern capital.”

However, Nanjing continued to play an important role in the administration and economy of the lower Yangzi River area during the later Ming and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties because of its proximity to the major river of central China and the Grand Canal, which linked the southern part of the empire to the administrative north. During the Taiping Rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century Nanjing was the rebels’ capital between 1853 and 1864.

After the October 1911 revolution the new president, Sun Yat-sen, proclaimed the founding of the Republic of China (1912–1949) in Nanjing. Between 1927 and 1937 the city again was the national capital under Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang). In December 1937 Nanjing was captured by the Japanese army, beginning the Nanjing Massacre, one of the worst atrocities of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945), known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War. The victorious Japanese armies raped and killed many of the local civilian population, which resulted in the name given to the massacre by the Chinese, “The Rape of Nanjing.” Between 100,000 and 300,000 Chinese had been killed by the time order was restored six weeks later. (The exact numbers have been the subject of some dispute, in part depending on whether the source is Chinese or Japanese. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal concluded that
Whither the Nanking government?

During the Civil War (1945–1949) between the Communists and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, also spelled Kuomintang), Nanjing (known as Nanking at the time) became the capital of Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek. This extract comes from Mao Zedong’s statement of 4 April 1949, “Whither the Nanking Government?”

Two roads are open to the Nanking Kuomintang government and its military and administrative personnel. Either they cling to the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals and its master, U.S. imperialism, that is, continue to be the enemy of the people and so perish together with the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals in the People’s War of Liberation. Or they come over to the people, that is, break with the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals and U.S. imperialism, perform meritorious service in the People’s War of Liberation to atone for their crimes and so obtain clemency and understanding from the people. There is no third road…The massacre which occurred in Nanking on April 1 was no accident. It was the inevitable result of the actions taken by the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin to protect Chiang Kai-shek, his sworn followers and the forces of U.S. aggression. It was the result of the absurd trumpeting about “honourable peace on an equal footing” by the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin and by the sworn followers of Chiang Kai-shek, which had the purpose of countering the Chinese Communist Party’s eight terms for peace, and particularly the punishment of war criminals. Now that the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin has sent its delegation to Peiping to negotiate peace with the Communist Party of China and has indicated its willingness to accept the Communist Party’s eight terms as the basis for negotiations, it should, if it has the slightest good faith, start by dealing with the Nanking Massacre, arrest and severely punish the chief criminals, Chiang Kai-shek, Tang En-po and Chang Yao-ming, arrest and severely punish the thugs of the secret police in Nanking and Shanghai and arrest and severely punish the chief counter-revolutionaries, who are obstinately opposing peace, actively disrupting the peace negotiations and actively preparing to resist the advance of the People’s Liberation Army to the south of the Yangtze River. “Until Ching Fu is done away with, the crisis in the state of Lu will not be over.” Until the war criminals are eliminated, there will be no peace in the country. Isn’t this truth clear enough by now?


Further Reading
Japanese troops invaded and occupied Nanjing from November 1937 to February 1938. More than 200,000—possibly as many as 300,000, although exact numbers are in dispute—unarmed Chinese civilians and soldiers were killed during the six-week massacre.

The Nanjing Massacre (also known as the “Nanking Massacre” or the “Rape of Nanjing”) is the name given to the war crimes committed by Japanese troops during their invasion and occupation of Nanjing from November 1937 to February 1938. These crimes included the execution or murder of at least 200,000 unarmed Chinese soldiers and civilians, the rape and torture of about twenty thousand women and girls, the dismembering of human bodies, and the slaughter of domestic and farm animals.

The massacre was not restricted to Nanjing, which was the capital of Republican China (1912–1949) but rather occurred along the line of march of Japanese general Matsui Iwane’s Tenth Army and the Shanghai Expeditionary Force from Hangzhou—the landing site—through Shanghai.

The Nanjing Massacre was one of the worst atrocities committed by the Japanese in China during the eight-year period from 1937 to 1945. The massacre—resulting in the deaths of approximately 250,000 Chinese civilians and unarmed soldiers, the rape of many women and girls, and the destruction of cattle and other animals—remains a painful scar on China’s collective memory.
and into Nanjing. The massacre was contained only after establishment of the Japanese puppet government of Nanjing in March 1938. General Matsui was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and was sentenced to hang.

The massacre was well reported by the English-language press, but its memory was obscured for some years by the refusal of the Japanese government to admit to the massacre and by the failure of the Chinese government to raise the issue internationally. Not until the 1980s did the Chinese begin a serious study of the massacre. After careful research of burial records, documents, and interviews, researchers concluded that the massacre took the lives of nearly 300,000, a figure significantly greater than the estimate of 200,000 given by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

Corroboration of these numbers is important because the nationalist movement in Japan is attempting to deny the legitimacy of the war crimes tribunal. For the nationalist movement the war was a just and patriotic struggle against Western domination. China confirms and possibly exaggerates the tribunal’s findings in order to convince Asians that Japan has been and remains a threat to other Asian nations. The massacre has inspired artistic representations by both Japanese and Chinese artists, and the International Committee to Study the Nanjing Massacre has commissioned a symphonic requiem entitled Hun Qiao (Bridge of Spirits) to honor the victims. The search for the truth and meaningfulness of the Nanjing Massacre will be remembered in various ways for decades.

Richard C. KAGAN

Further Reading

National Committee on United States–China Relations

The National Committee on United States–China Relations, founded in 1966 by a coalition of academic, civic, religious, and business leaders, is a network of prominent Americans who have influenced U.S. government policy (unofficially and officially) toward China. Through its educational outreach and exchange programs, it has created communities at all levels amongst people and institutions concerned with Sino–American relations.

Left to right: Robert Scalapino, Stephen A. Orlins, and Lucien Pye, at the 3 May 2006 NCUSCR program “Past as Prologue.” For more than forty years the National Committee on United States–China Relations has sponsored educational and outreach programs aimed to help Americans gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of China. COURTESY OF NCUSCR.
U.S. Table Tennis Association) the Chinese Ping-Pong team’s famous tour of the United States, an event that captured world attention and was covered by all the major newspapers and television networks.

**Formation of the National Committee**

Diplomatic ties with China moved to Taiwan when the Communist Party took control of the mainland in 1949. Soon after, the “proxy war” (Korean War) put the United States and China into indirect military conflict. Through the 1950s and into the 1960s, the “China Lobby,” staunch anti-Communists said to be funded by the Kuomintang, had the support of many in Congress. An organization called the Committee of One Million actively opposed any U.S. engagement with the PRC.

The Committee was founded soon after two groundbreaking conferences on U.S.-China policy held in 1964 and 1965. A one-day “Institute on China Today” was held in Sproul Hall at University of California–Berkeley on 9
December 1964 with an overflow crowd of over one thousand. Speakers included Clare Booth Luce and Henry Luce, and unprecedented press attention seemed to lift what had been an unofficial ban on public debate about China policy. Buoyed by this success, the organizers soon arranged to hold a “National Conference on the United States and China” in Washington, D.C. on 28–30 April 1965. Participants included China scholars, policy experts, business people, religious and labor leaders, and State Department officials Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Robert W. Barnett and Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland, as well as representatives from the Republic of China (Taiwan) Foreign Ministry. Two senators, George McGovern and Peter H. Dominick, who held opposing views on China, nonetheless sent a joint invitation to their Senate colleagues and shared a platform at the conference.

The advisory and program committees for these conferences formed the basis for what was established in 1966 as a nonprofit educational organization, the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The Berkeley conference had been jointly organized by the San Francisco–based World Affairs Council, the University of California–Berkeley Department of Political Science, and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker social justice organization dedicated to alleviating poverty and promoting peace. Cecil Thomas, the AFSC’s associate peace secretary and director of the Berkeley YMCA, considered engagement a means to end bloodshed and help the PRC deal with what was known to be widespread poverty (20–40 million Chinese died of starvation between 1959 and 1962). He became the National Committee’s first executive director.

Members of the Committee had widely different views (on the Vietnam War, for example), and the Committee’s first proposal to the Ford Foundation described it simply as a “group of prominent Americans, representative of industry, the academic world, the professions, labor, the churches, and of the nation’s major geographic areas.” The Committee was vehemently committed to non-advocacy,
balance, and diversity because it was so clear that the public discourse the members sought would not be successful if the Committee’s membership could be tagged as partisan or biased.

While the Committee’s public mission was solely educational, it was connected, focused, and gave a common platform to leaders from many sectors. The result was, many observers say, influence on government policies during a period when there was considerable disagreement about how best to deal with other global powers and with Communist leadership—especially given that the McCarthy era was still fresh in the minds of many Americans. U.S. presidents wanted to move closer to normalization of relations with China but faced much resistance in Congress. By privately advising Johnson in 1968 and Nixon in 1970 in their dealings with Communist China, members of the National Committee played a vital role in the move towards normalization.

**Programs 1970 to 2000**

During the years leading up to normalization in 1979, the National Committee encouraged thoughtful discussion about China policy among Americans. The founders (who included some of the giants of the China field such as Robert Scalapino, A. Doak Barnett, Alexander...
Eckstein and Lucien Pye) also believed that direct dialogue between Americans and Chinese would lead to improved understanding and then to stable and productive relations, and to enhanced academic and business cooperation. Exchange programs, tours with Congressional leaders, and hosting events with visiting Chinese officials has been part of the Committee’s work since its earliest days.

The National Committee became the principal organization conducting public policy and other exchanges between China and the United States, and helped to shift U.S. policy and public opinion during the years leading up to the reopening of diplomatic relations in 1979. It worked with other organizations, such as the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People’s Republic of China (CSCPRC), also founded in 1966 but focusing on academic, scientific and scholarly exchanges, and helped in the early formation of other sister organizations such as the National Council on U.S.-China Trade (now the U.S.-China Business Council) and the Center for U.S.-China Arts Exchange.

In the 1980s the Committee expanded its work beyond its 1970s exchanges in civic affairs, education, performing arts, and athletics to a variety of fields, promoting sustained interchange between influential Chinese and Americans in governance, the media, urban planning, international relations, and economic planning and management. In the mid-1980s, the National Committee established the first formal, ongoing Track II (unofficial) discussion, the U.S.-China Dialogue, an off-the-record gathering of leading citizens of China and America; it was held another ten times before coming to an end in 2002.

While continuing its programs of the past, the decade of the 1990s saw a focus on rule of law, legislative affairs and the expansion of civil society in China. These programs included regular exchanges of city mayors and municipal and provincial leaders, with an emphasis on urban planning, infrastructure development, sustainable development and related environmental concerns; programs in judicial training and exchanges of senior judges, including a 1996 trip to China by U.S. supreme court justice Anthony M. Kennedy; and exchanges and programs focused on banking and economic policy development, journalism, NGO and foundation development, human rights, public health and economic development.

**Programs from 2000 on: Evolving Role in Global Cooperation**

The National Committee is a network of more than 750 Americans from all parts of the country and nearly one
hundred corporations and professional firms. They bring many different perspectives on issues and priorities in U.S.-China relations, but share a commitment to ongoing public education and the enabling of face-to-face contact. Members of the Committee and its board of directors include many distinguished citizens: former secretaries of state Madeleine K. Albright, Henry A. Kissinger, and Condoleezza Rice and other former cabinet secretaries; all of the former American ambassadors to China; Richard Holbrooke, former chair of the Asia Society and Special Envoy to Afghanistan; leading scholars of the past several decades such as Jerome A. Cohen, Harry Harding, David Lampton, Nick Lardy, Kenneth Lieberthal, Susan Shirk, and Ezra Vogel; and Maurice R. Greenberg and many other corporate executives interested in China.

The National Committee’s continuity of experience and depth of associations in Greater China and the United States continue to support its ongoing mission. New programs are regularly developed in response to shifting needs and opportunities, while the National Committee remains true to the founders’ purpose of helping Americans gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of China and, thereby, insuring a thoughtful, effective U.S. policy on China. These programs have been developed in relation to three main goals.

**Informing Policy Leaders and Opinion Shapers**

Programs have included delegations of members of congress and congressional staffers to China; special briefings for new congressional members; delegations of municipal and state leaders to exchange best practices in city and state governance; a Policy Leaders Orientation Program.
that provides an in-depth view of American society, history and politics to Chinese officials and consular officers. A series of in-depth briefings on China for military officers are designed to broaden their knowledge and understanding of China, its culture, society, and politics, in an effort to enhance their dealings in the region.

**DEVELOPING THE CAPACITY OF NEXT-GENERATION POLICY LEADERS**

The National Committee is focused on investment in the next generation of American and Chinese leaders by creating meaningful opportunities for outstanding American and Chinese young professionals and students to interact with one another. Programs include the Young Leaders Forum, established in 2002 for under-forty-year-old American and Chinese leaders in many fields, in which those leaders explore substantive issues together and develop collaborative relationships. Annual retreats alternate between a U.S. and China locale. The 2008 Forum, held in Washington State, was designed around the theme of “Discovery.” Young Leaders Forum Fellows, including government officials, authors, university leaders, entrepreneurs, musicians, and artists, discussed with one another how their personal discoveries came about and influenced their lives.

Other programs include the Public Intellectuals Program, which nurtures the younger generation of leading American China scholars, giving them the skills and opportunity to inform policy and public opinion; and the U.S.-China Student Leaders Exchange Program, which provides exchange opportunities for Presidential Scholars (specially selected American graduating high school seniors) and promising Chinese students.

**FACILITATING THE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS**

The National Committee expands knowledge about China by Americans and the United States by Chinese through exchange of professionals in a variety of fields (be it education, energy and the environment, the media, rule of law, etc.). The Teachers Exchange Program provides full academic-year opportunities for Chinese (K–12) teachers to teach (usually Chinese language and culture) in the United States and American teachers to teach (usually English as a second language) in China. One teacher described the experience of American teachers in Chinese middle schools as invigorating personally and professionally: Teachers in this program are loved and respected in China. They bring back more information and understanding of China into the classroom, but they more critically examine what they teach, how they teach, what should change, and appreciate more the very best things in American education.

The Committee also has a rich and varied public education program that regularly provides timely information directly from leading specialists on major issues of U.S.-China relations through seminars, panel programs, publications, e-mail briefings and conference calls. These offerings are coordinated with the National Committee’s Web site (www.ncuscr.org), which provides video, audio, and transcripts from selected programs, as well
as selected publications. Recent public programs have included CHINA Town Hall, a program on China conducted simultaneously in thirty-five American cities in cooperation with the local World Affairs Councils and other policy and educational institutions, and “Once Upon a Time in Beijing,” a panel featuring all five living former U.S. ambassadors to China reflecting on their tenures in China and the future of U.S.-China relations.

The National Committee has long benefited from the experience and expertise of its staff leadership. President Stephen A. Orlins speaks fluent Mandarin and was a member of the State Department legal team that created the framework for the historic opening in 1979. He has also served as president of Lehman Brothers Asia and as managing director of Carlyle Asia. Former presidents and executive directors John Holden, David M. Lampton, Arthur Rosen, and Preston Schoyer also had extensive China experience. Vice president Jan Berris has been with the National Committee since 1971 and has managed and led hundreds of delegations between the United States and China, including the 1972 Chinese Ping Pong Team, the first PRC group to visit the United States. The Committee has had a long line of distinguished chairpersons whose prestige and influence has been of great help to the organization; the latest is The Honorable Carla Hills, former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Trade Representative.

In the early years, the focus of the National Committee was on public education and outreach programs; private talks with leaders at the highest level and public policy conversations contributed to normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Efforts now are more far-reaching: seminars and exchange programs for public officials, professionals, and students not only provide briefing for current leaders but develop new ones.

Further Reading


The Editors
After the Communist Party of China defeated the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), 1 October became National Day, in lieu of 10 October, the traditional anniversary of the overthrow of the last Qing emperor. (Taiwan still celebrates 10 October.) Celebrations of the new National Day on the mainland have gone through various forms in accordance with different political, economic, and social changes.

The Chinese on the mainland celebrate their National Day on 1 October while those on the island of Taiwan celebrate the day the Republic of China replaced the Qing Dynasty, 10 October 1911. (The emperor did not abdicate, however, until February 1912.) The day the Japanese surrendered to the Chinese, 3 September 1945, brought to an end the anti-Japanese alliance between the Communists led by Mao Zedong and the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek; the two factions immediately turned against each other again. After the fall of Nanjing, the seat of the Nationalist government, on 23 April 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his army retreated to Taiwan. On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed...
the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the rostrum of Tiananmen Square in Beijing, in front of 300,000 people gathered there.

On 2 December 1949, the Central People’s Government of the PRC passed a resolution to set aside 1 October as Guoqingjie (National Celebration Day), or National Day, in English. Most Chinese customarily call it Guoqing (National Celebration) or simply Shiyi (October First). Since the return of Hong Kong (1997) and Macao (1999) to the Chinese sovereignty, National Day has also been celebrated in those territories.

From 1950 to 1959, National Day was routinely celebrated with a military parade in Tiananmen Square. The parade was discontinued in 1960 when the central government enforced stringent economic policies to combat widespread famine. Mass assemblies and processions took over in the 1960s. Starting from the early 1970s, organized and voluntary parties took place in parks throughout the country as a major form of National Day celebrations. From 1985 to 1999, organized activities gave way to individual choices. To boost the economy by encouraging tourism, the government created three controversial “Gold Weeks” in 1999 out of the festivals of Labor Day, National Day, and the Chinese New Year, making each a week-long holiday. An increasing number of Chinese people chose to spend the holiday touring the country and the world (first Southeast Asia and later Europe). In December 2007 National Day, along with Labor Day, was reestablished as a one-day holiday.

An unwritten rule regulates the observance of National Day. Every tenth anniversary, there should a grand celebration and every fifth, a lesser one. Inconsistently following this rule, two military parades took place, one on the thirty-eighth anniversary in 1984 and the other on the fiftieth in 1999.

A national reception in the Great Hall of the People, as a token of thanks to foreigners working in China along with Chinese dignitaries, has become part of the National Day tradition. A top national leader customarily presides over the ceremony. Chinese embassies also hold receptions for overseas Chinese and dignitaries of hosting countries. Usually a fireworks display is held in cities nationwide. The one in Hong Kong at the Victoria Harbor is an exceptional spectacle, favored by residents as well as tourists.

Plans for a grand celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 2009 were muted by the global economic crisis that began in the autumn of 2008. A newspaper report in January 2009 claimed that the traditional military parades would “showcase strength and transparency” and would be a “‘warm but frugal and cost-effective’ show of the most sophisticated current weapon systems.”

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading


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National Resources Commission

Guójiā Zīyuán Wěiyuánhuì

The National Resources Commission was the leading Nationalist government economic bureaucracy in charge of heavy industrial reconstruction during the 1930s and 1940s. NRC activities brought about a tremendous expansion of state-owned heavy industries, laid the material foundation for the War of Resistance against Japan, and contributed to the formation of China’s state enterprise system.

The National Resources Commission (NRC) grew out of the National Defense Planning Commission (NDPC) that the Nationalist government created in November 1932. NRC activities brought about a tremendous expansion of state-owned heavy industries, laid the material foundation for the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War), and contributed to the formation of China’s state enterprise system.

Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and its attack on Shanghai in January 1932 motivated the creation of the NDPC. Recognizing the necessity of preparing China for further Japanese aggression, Qian Changzhao, then deputy minister of the Ministry of Education, suggested to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in late 1931 that a national defense planning commission be created. Chiang accepted Qian’s suggestion and asked Qian to draw up a list of would-be members of the proposed commission. After lengthy preparation the NDPC was formally established on 1 November 1932. Although the commission was placed under the General Staff of the Military Affairs Commission, it reported directly to Chiang, who served as president of both commissions. Weng Wen-hao was appointed secretary-general, and Qian Changzhao deputy secretary-general.

The NDPC was staffed by technocrats of various professions. It had thirty-nine members at the time of its establishment. In 1934 the commission recruited many new members, raising the original thirty-nine to well over one hundred. Among the commission members were humanists and social scientists, economists, industrial and financial leaders, electrical engineers, and mining, chemical, and weaponry experts. Until 1934 the commission consisted of a secretariat and seven sections: military affairs; international affairs; economics and finance; raw materials and manufacturing; transportation and communications; land, population, and foodstuffs; and cultural affairs. The commission conducted investigations and gathered statistics in areas of raw materials and manufacturing, transportation and communications, and economics and finance in preparation for defense planning.

New Name, New Duties

In April 1935 the NDPC was renamed the National Resources Commission (NRC) and placed under the jurisdiction of the Military Affairs Commission. Although Chiang continued to serve as president, and Weng Wen-hao and Qian Changzhao remained secretary-general and deputy secretary-general, respectively, changes
were clearly discernible in the commission’s organizational structure and definition of functions. In addition to the original investigation and statistics divisions, the NRC created three new offices and two divisions: offices of electrical engineering, metallurgy, and mining, a secretariat, and a planning division. At the same time, the NRC’s mission was redefined as investigation, statistical survey, and study of human and material resources; planning and reconstruction of resources; and planning of resource mobilization.

The 1935 reorganization marked an important change in purpose and direction. The original three departments in military affairs, international affairs, and education and culture ceased to exist. During the next three years the NRC changed its orientation from resource investigation and planning to heavy industrial reconstruction. In effect, the organization was transformed from Chiang’s brain trust to an organization in charge of industrial development, a change that manifested itself in the Three-Year Plan for Heavy Industrial Reconstruction completed in 1936. Compared with earlier government plans, it had several distinct characteristics: It was based on a large amount of data that experts gathered through systematic investigation. Heavy industry would receive the lion’s share of investment capital. Geographically most planned factories were to be built in interior provinces such as Hunan and Jiangxi for fear of further Japanese aggression. Finally, unlike in previous plans, most projects went according to the plan. Among some thirty planned factories and collieries, twenty-one had begun to be constructed by the time the war of resistance broke out in July 1937.

The outbreak of war and the relocation of the Nationalist government to Chongqing led to further changes in the NRC’s organization and activities. In March 1938 the Nationalist government placed the NRC under the jurisdiction of the newly created Ministry of Economic Affairs. Although Weng Wenhao and Qian Changzhao continued to lead the commission, their official titles were changed from secretary-general and deputy secretary-general to director and deputy director, respectively. More important, the function of the NRC was redefined to include the creation and management of basic industries, the development of mining resources and management of important collieries, and the creation and management of power plants.

The change of function gave rise to corresponding changes in the NRC’s organizational structure. Under the director and deputy director were four new divisions, four sections, and one committee: the secretariat, divisions of industry, mining, and electric power; sections of technology, economic research, accounting, and material purchase; and a committee of finance. Four years later the NRC further modified its organizational structure to reflect its expansion of activities. By now it had under its
jurisdiction seven divisions and two sections: the secretariat, divisions of industry, mining, electric power, material purchase, finance, and accounting; and sections of technology and economic research. The NRC had by 1938 become a bona fide technocracy in charge of directing heavy industrial development as well as managing enterprises under its jurisdiction.

**National Defense**

During the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945) the NRC drafted several plans designed to foster the development of heavy industries and related national defense industries. Overall the NRC established in China's interior roughly 130 state-owned enterprises in energy, petroleum, iron and steel, machinery, alcohol, and electric industries, drawing investment capital primarily from the annual budget appropriation from the state treasury. In 1940 the share of the NRC in the state budget reached its highest point during the war, accounting for 2.8 percent. After the war ended the NRC expanded its operations as it took over or confiscated enterprises controlled or managed by the Japanese and their Chinese collaborators. In June 1946 the Nationalist government removed the NRC from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan. In 1949 the NRC was again placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. By then the NRC had thirty thousand staff members and more than six hundred thousand workers. After 1949 some NRC personnel followed the Nationalist regime to Taiwan, but many stayed in mainland China and joined the Communist government, including key NRC leaders Weng Wenhao and Qian Changzhao. Virtually all NRC enterprises and corporations remained state-owned enterprises or were reorganized as state-owned enterprises after the Communist takeover.

In short, the NRC was the leading Nationalist economic bureaucracy in charge of heavy industrial reconstruction during the 1930s and 1940s. NRC activities brought about a tremendous expansion of state-owned heavy industries, laid the material foundation for the War of Resistance against Japan, and contributed to the formation of China’s state enterprise system.

**Morris L. BIAN**

**Further Reading**


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**Begin to dig a well only when one feels thirsty.**

**臨渴掘井**

**Lín kě jué jǐng**
National Taiwan University, founded by the Japanese colonial government in 1928, is the largest and most prestigious university in Taiwan.

The National Taiwan University is the oldest university in Taiwan. Its antecedent was the Taihoku (Taipei) Imperial University, founded by the Japanese colonial government in 1928. When the Taihoku University was first established, it had only two colleges with sixty students. It was then expanded to include five colleges with 382 students before the end of World War II.

Following Taiwan’s retrocession to Chinese sovereignty in 1945, the Nationalist government resumed the administration of the Taihoku University and renamed it National Taiwan University. Lo Tsung-lo, a Japan-trained botanist, was appointed by the Ministry of Education as the first president. During the 1950s, Japanese-trained scholars gradually faded away in academic circles. Since then, the position of NTU presidency was dominated by American-trained scholars. In the 2000 academic year, the university had in total ten colleges and eighty...
The campus of the National Taiwan University, the oldest university in the Republic of China (Taiwan). Over the past seventy years, the university has produced many prominent people in various fields. Its motto is “Integrity, Diligence, Patriotism, and Philanthropy.” As a symbol of growth and nurturing, the university chose to plant a row of palm trees along the avenue that leads to the library. PHOTO BY ALLEN TIMOTHY CHAN.

departments and graduate institutes with a student body of more than 27,000. And in the 2007 academic year, the university had in total eleven colleges and 152 departments and graduate institutes with a student body of more than 32,000.

Over the past seventy years, the National Taiwan University produced many prominent people in various fields. According to 2005 statistics of the U.S. National Science Foundation, 1,190 graduates from National Taiwan University acquired a doctor’s degree in the United States from 1999 to 2003, ranking eleventh in the world. Among them, 376 received doctorates in engineering and life science, ranking second and ninth in the world, respectively. Furthermore, as of 2006, well-known alumni of National Taiwan University includes twenty domestic university presidents and ninety-one members of Academia Sinica, among which one member was awarded the Nobel Prize and at least fifteen were admitted to the U.S. Academy of Sciences. In political circles since the 1990s, its graduates have increasingly replaced politicians trained by universities in the Chinese mainland before 1949, and have occupied most of the minister-level positions within the government.

CHANG Jui-te

Further Reading
Natural Preserve Zones were established in 1956 in China. The following years saw a slow increase in numbers, from nineteen zones designated in 1956 to fifty-nine in 1979. As of 2007, 303 natural preserves on the national level had been set up throughout China’s provinces and Autonomous Regions to preserve the unique natural scenic beauty and the biodiversity of rare or endangered animal and plant species.

Natural Preserve Zones were established in 1956 in China. The following years saw a slow increase in numbers, from nineteen zones designated in 1956 to fifty-nine in 1979. As of 2007, 303 natural preserves on the national level had been set up throughout China’s provinces and Autonomous Regions to preserve the unique natural scenic beauty and the biodiversity of rare or endangered animal and plant species.

The establishment of natural preserve zones—also called nature reserve zones—marked a milestone in China’s growing awareness of and efforts at environmental protection. The first such zone was established in 1956. China had nineteen zones by 1965 and fifty-nine by 1979, many of which were later devastated due to lack of attention during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). By 1985, 360 natural preserve zones, found throughout China’s provinces and Autonomous Regions (A.R.s), had been designated as a result of the Environmental Protection Law issued in 1979, followed by a series of laws and decrees for natural environment and resources protection.

Natural preserve zones are usually designated by legislatures on different administrative levels, ranging from state departments to provincial governments to county governments. By 1990, 606 natural preserve zones on all levels had been set up after passage of the China Nature Protection Compendia in 1978. As of August 2007, 303 nature reserve zones at the national level had been established, and there were 2,349 nature reserves (of all levels) covering 1.5 million square kilometers, or some 15.6 percent China’s land territory.

Dinghushan (Guangdong Province) was the first national natural preserve zone, established in 1956. Dinghushan has a lake on its summit in the shape of a ding (an ancient cooking and sacrificial utensil with two loop handles and three legs), hence its name. With its lush forests, the preserve is celebrated as a “living museum of natural history” and “the gene reserve” for south China biological species.

Changbaishan Nature Reserve (southeastern Jilin Province) was set up in 1960 and promoted to a national natural preserve zone in 1986. It is the zone in China incorporated into the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Man and the Biosphere (MAB) Program. Changbaishan includes forest (16,081 hectares, 87.9 percent coverage), grassland (5,683 hectares), lakes, volcanoes, hot springs, and rare animals and vegetation. Changbaishan is noted for its biodiversity; 59 of its 1,255 known wildlife species and 25 of its 2,277 known wild plant species are classified under first-class national protection. Tianchi 天池 (Celestial Pool, 402 hectares) is a volcanic lake, the deepest lake in China (reaching a depth of 312.7 meters). A dozen hot springs (60°C–82°C) cluster around Tianchi, reflecting the Changbai Waterfall.

Wolong 卧龙 National Nature Reserve (northwestern Sichuan Province, 200,000 hectares), the third largest in the nation, was established in 1963. As the first natural resource-protection special administrative district founded...
in China, Wolong was integrated into the UNESCO MAB program in 1980. As the core area for giant panda protection and research, Wolong was named a World Natural Heritage site in 2006, providing a habitat for more than fifty species of wildlife, three hundred species of birds, and other rare species.

“Pure Buddhist Mountain”

Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (northeastern Guizhou Province) was established in 1978, promoted to a national nature reserve in 1986, and enlisted in the UNESCO MAB Protection Network in the same year. Fanjingshan, meaning “pure Buddhist mountain,” has had a national reputation since the sixteenth century for its cultural heritage of numerous Buddha temples, attracting pilgrims to its beauty. Its steles (carved or inscribed stone slabs or pillars used for commemorative purposes) showcase the treasures of traditional Chinese calligraphy. In a religious sense the colorful halo appearing on the summit is a sign of auspiciousness.

Wuyishan National Nature Reserve (northern Fujian Province) was established in 1979 and integrated into the UNESCO MAB Program in 1986. The reserve has the largest and best-preserved semi-subtropical forest ecosystem on the same latitude in the world. In addition to the precious animal and plant species that inhabit this reserve, Wuyishan is noted for its scenic landscape.

Xilin Gol National Natural Reserve (Inner Mongolia A. R., 1.1 million hectares) was designated in 1985 and promoted to a national nature reserve in 1997. It was incorporated into the UNESCO MAB Program in 1987. Xilin Gol is the first grassland reserve in the nation established for precious wildlife and plant species.

To date, twenty-eight national nature reserve zones have been incorporated into the UNESCO MAB Program, including the zones discussed earlier. Additional natural preserve zones integrated into the UNESCO MAB Program (listed chronologically and followed by what they are meant to protect) include:

- Shenlongjia Nature Reserve (1990) in Hubei Province (golden monkey, dove tree, and other endangered primitive plants and animals)
- Mount Bogda Nature Reserve (1990) in Xinjiang Uygur A. R. (endangered animals, including swans and leopards)
- Yancheng Nature Reserve (1992) in Jiangsu Province (red-crowned crane and other precious birds)
- Xishuangbanna Nature Reserve (1992) in Yunnan Province (tropical rainforest ecosystem)
Natural Preserve Zones

- Tianmushan Nature Reserve (1996) in Zhejiang Province (subtropical forest ecosystem)  
- Fenglin Nature Reserve (1997) in Heilongjiang Province (red pine)  
- Nanlu Islands Nature Reserve (1997) in Zhejiang Province (wildlife, plants, natural scenery, and cultural landscape)  
- Baishuijiang Nature Reserve (2000) in Gansu Province (giant panda)  
- Gaoligongshan Nature Reserve (2000) in Yunnan Province (subtropical animals and plants)  
- Baotianman Nature Reserve (2001) in Henan Province (temperate-subtropical ecotone [relating to a transition area between two adjacent ecological communities] ecosystem)  
- Foping Nature Reserve (2004) in Shaanxi Province (giant panda and other rare animals and plants)  
- Xingkaihu Nature Reserve (2006) in Heilongjiang Province (high-altitude wetland ecosystem)  

The list of natural preserve zones will enlarge year by year. In January 2008 the SEPAC (State Environment Protection Administration of China) established an additional nineteen national nature reserve zones: Bahuashan (Beijing Municipality); Upper Reaches of the Luanhe River and Maojingba (Hebei Province); Daqingshan (Inner Mongolia A. R.); Zhenbaodaoy Wetland, Hongxing Wetland, and Shuanghe (Heilongjiang Province); Junzfeng (Fujian Province); Poyang Lake Nanji Wetland and Matoushan (Jiangxi Province); Kunyuushan (Shandong Province); Qizimeishan (Hubei Province); Jiemuxi, Bamianshan, and Leizhou Rare Marine Creatures (Guangdong Province); Jinzhongshan Mrs Hume’s Bar-tailed Pheasant (Guangxi Zhuang A. R.); Diaoluoshan (Hainan Province); Haizishan (Sichuan Province); and Tianhuashan (Shaanxi Province).

Further Reading

Natural Resource Preservation

Zirán zīyúán de bǎohù 自然资源的保护

Claiming a land territory of 9.6 million square kilometers and a marine territory of 4.72 million square kilometers, China once was considered to be a vast territory with abundant resources. But since the late 1970s the country has increasingly found its natural resources limited, given its huge population of 1.33 billion.

With the recognition of its limits in natural resources and the impact of these limits on its growth, China has intensified its efforts to preserve natural resources since the 1980s. A legal framework, currently with twenty-five laws and over 2,000 administrative decrees and regulations, has been set up to preserve and rationalize the use of natural resources, but while it needs to be perfected, the country lacks an administrative body to oversee the preservation of natural resources and an efficient regime to enforce the laws.

Limits

Land has been regarded as the source of life in China since ancient times, and inequitable distribution of land ownership was the cause of many peasant uprisings and revolutions. The first action that the new government took after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 was to redistribute land among the country’s vast peasantry populace, who accounted for more than 90 percent of the population. Even though China actually annulled private ownership of land in the late 1960s, land has remained its most precious natural resource. Yet, China’s per capita land area is 0.8 hectare, only 29 percent of the world average, although China ranks third in the world in terms of total land mass. Because more than two-thirds of China’s land territory is covered by hills and mountains—many denying accessibility—and deserts, China’s arable farmland is meager at 0.11 hectare per capita, one-third of the world average.

These limited land resources, arable farmland in particular, are giving way to urbanization, mining, and desertification. From 1993 to 2003 alone, according to the Ministry of Land and Resources, China lost 6.6 million hectares of arable farmland, mainly to urban expansion and desertification.

China has felt its disadvantages in other resources as well. China leads the world in reserves of a number of minerals, but after they are divided by its population, the quantity drops below average. Among China’s 171 discovered varieties of minerals, 45 are in low per capita quantity, less than half of the world average. The per capita quantity of petroleum is merely 11 percent of the world average, and that of natural gas is only 4.5 percent.

Since 1949 the People’s Republic of China has basically followed the concept of self-reliance and based its development on its own resources, although since the 1990s it has relied more and more on importation of such resources as petroleum, iron ore, and timber. With the recognition of its limits in natural resources and the impact of these limits on its growth, China has taken efforts to preserve its natural resources.
Legislation

China has yet to enact a general law on the preservation of natural resources, but the revised Constitution in 1978 incorporates the provision that the state protect the environment and natural resources, which marks the first time that environmental protection and preservation of natural resources entered the country’s fundamental law. The Law of Environmental Protection enacted in December 1989 covers all the natural and human elements that may affect human subsistence and development, embracing water, marine, land, mineral, forestry, grassland, wildlife resources, and natural and cultural heritages. This means that the Chinese concept of environmental protection covers natural resources as well. Twenty-five laws and more than two thousand administrative decrees and regulations focus on or are related to the preservation of designated natural resources, including land, mineral, energy, forestry, grassland, wildlife, water, fisheries, marine, and space resources. These laws constitute a legal framework aimed to rationalize the use of natural resources and guarantee a coordinated and harmonious development of human society and nature. China is also a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, two UN documents that call for the preservation of natural resources.
Chinese law stipulates that all natural resources in China belong to the state. Part of forests, land, and water in rural areas can be collectively owned, but individuals can obtain the right only to use rather than to own these resources. Although laws permit legitimate transfer of this "right to use" resources such as with land, no individual or organization can sell land per se.

The main goal of legislation regarding the preservation of land resources is to maintain the size of farmland, preventing its further shrinkage from urban expansion. Governments at various levels must have their respective master plans that divide land into three categories: farmland, land for construction and other use, and barren wasteland. Each category has specific regulations, and deterioration, devastation, encroachment, and acquisition of cropland are not allowed. Although laws encourage organizations and individuals to reclaim wild land under the prerequisite of protecting and improving the ecosystem and guarding against wetland erosion and desertification, with priority given to farming, the laws forbid any reclamation at the cost of forests, grassland, and lakes. Since 1998 action has been taken to return farmland so reclaimed to forests, grassland, and lakes.

The same principle is applied to the preservation of wetlands, wildlife, and marine aquatic products. With a forest coverage of 18.1 percent, compared with the world average of 30 percent, China has yet to enact a general law on the preservation of natural resources, but a 1989 Law of Environmental Protection broadly defines them as water, marine, land, mineral, forestry, grassland, wildlife resources, and natural and cultural heritages. 

**Photo by Wen Bo.**
30 percent, China ranks 130th in forest coverage in the world and is among the most impoverished in forest resources. Between the 1950s and the 1990s the area of natural wetlands shrank by 36 percent, and 15 to 20 percent of wildlife species are on the verge of extinction. In order to preserve these resources, China has adopted laws to ban the logging of natural forests in the upper reaches of main river systems, to stop the reclamation of wetlands in the northeast, to ban the hunting of endangered wildlife species, and to enforce periodic fishing bans along the coast. Meanwhile, a quota system is imposed on logging of artificial forests; the rate of consumption must not surpass the rate of forestation.

Laws on the preservation of grassland resources prohibit overgrazing and digging shrubs or medicinal herbs in desertified or semidesertified grassland areas, lest the vulnerable vegetation be further damaged.

Legislation regarding mineral resources highlights the principles of exploiting resources in the course of protecting resources and vice versa. Although the state forbids private ownership of mineral resources, exploration and mining rights can be granted to qualified investors. Mining enterprises are levied resource taxes and compensations and are obligated to recover any cropland, grassland, or forests damaged by mining. All environmental/resource laws have provisions of legal liability. Violations can incur punishment ranging from penalties to imprisonment or even capital punishment.

**Saving Energy**

China relies on multipurpose and economical use of its natural resources, particularly minerals and energy, as a means to preserve these precious resources. As a rapidly developing country with an annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate averaging above 9 percent for the past twenty-eight years, China is an energy-consuming giant. Because of backward technologies, however, China lags far behind industrialized countries in energy efficiency. According to the *Energy Development Report of China 2007*, prepared by the International Energy Agency, China’s energy consumption for every $1 million of GDP is 2.5 times that of the United States, 5 times that of the European Union, and 9 times that of Japan.

However, the Chinese government has always advocated reducing consumption and saving energy. Between 1980 and 2000 the country managed an average GDP growth rate of 9.7 percent at an average energy consumption growth rate of 4.6 percent. At the end of 2005 China went further to set a target of reducing its energy consumption by 20 percent between 2006 and 2010. The central government has signed energy-saving accountability pacts with governors, and failure to reach the energy-saving goal may affect the promotion of concerned officials. In 2006 the yearly growth rate of per unit of GDP energy consumption dropped by 1.2 percent, and during the first six months of 2007 the figure dropped by 2.78 percent. Although these figures fell short of the annual reduction rate of 4 percent, the progress has boosted China’s confidence in accomplishing the 20 percent reduction rate by 2010. Meanwhile, China has accelerated the pace to develop renewable energy resources, including hydropower, wind power, biogas, and solar energy.

**Nature Reserves**

With more than 30,000 species of higher plants and 6,266 species of vertebrates, China is rich in wildlife resources. Yet, low forest coverage, soil erosion, desertification, and deforestation and other human exploitation have led to the reduction of biodiversity and endangered the domains of wildlife. Statistics from the State Forestry Administration indicate that 44 percent of wild fauna and 29 percent of wild flora are yet to stabilize.

China places a priority on setting up nature reserves and takes the establishment of such reserves as a measurement of the nation’s level of civilization. Since 1956, when China set up its first nature reserve at Dinghushan in Guangdong Province, the country has established 2,349 nature reserves covering 1.5 million square kilometers, or 15.6 percent of the country’s land territory. The reserves have preserved ecosystems ranging from forests, grasslands, alpine meadows, deserts, wetlands, and inland water areas to marine and offshore areas. The reserves include rare and endangered species of wildlife, distributed from the “roof of the world” on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to marshlands in the coastal areas. The current annual budget for the national reserves is 445 million yuan.

Although the nature reserves disallow any attempt at economic development, dereliction of duty in management does occur, coupled with unauthorized tourism and
other misconduct. These factors constitute challenges to the preservation of natural resources in the reserves. Residents who had lived in the spheres of the reserves before their establishment may also pose problems, and their attempts at subsistence could jeopardize the ecosystem. For instance, in some reserves where vegetation is vulnerable, local residents’ daily need for firewood may conflict with preservation. Measures have been taken to institutionalize the regime so that local communities can share the benefits of the preservation of natural resources and to transform the communities into allies of preservation.

Similar problems occur in legislation. As Zhou Ke, law professor at Renmin University, has observed, most legislation related to the preservation of natural resources has been centered on the prevention of pollution, whereas legislation related to the preservation of natural resources is absent. Although the two often go hand-in-hand, environmental protection and preservation of natural resources cannot be mutually substituted. Some scholars have proposed that China have a basic law specific to the preservation of natural resources.

Xiong LEI

Regime

Although the Environment and Resources Protection Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature, is in charge of legislation and supervision of work in preservation, China lacks an administrative body to oversee the preservation of natural resources. The preservation of resources is, in fact, distributed among several government organs, and each organ can be responsible for both the exploitation and the preservation of resources. For instance, the State Forestry Administration is charged with timber industry oversight, forestation, and preservation of forest resources. Likewise, the Ministry of Water Resources taps the country’s hydropower potential, builds hydropower projects, and preserves water resources. This arrangement may raise the issue of conflicts of interest over the exploitation and conservation of resources. The State Environmental Protection Administration is above such conflicts of interest but is believed to be preoccupied with environmental protection rather than preservation of natural resources.

Further Reading

Needham Research Institute

Li Yuēsè Yánjiūsuǒ 李约瑟研究所

Founded by the scholar Joseph Needham (1900–1995), the Needham Research Institute provides facilities and research materials for specialists in the history of East Asian, especially Chinese, contributions to science and medicine. Resources include an extensive document library and other materials on East Asian science and culture and a program of seminars by scholars from around the world.

The mission of the Needham Research Institute, founded by scholar Joseph Needham (1900–1995), is to provide scholars with excellent facilities for research into the history of science, technology, and medicine in East Asia, most prominently China. The Institute, which houses the East Asian History of Science Library and is home to the Science and Civilisation in China project, is situated in west Cambridge, England, on the grounds of the University of Cambridge’s Robinson College.

History

The Institute was founded in 1976 by the Cambridge University biochemist Joseph Needham, who focused his work beginning in 1937 on investigations of the scientific and technical contributions of the Chinese people to human culture. These investigations became the Science and Civilisation in China project, which resulted in the publication of an ongoing series of volumes by Needham and his collaborators covering Chinese accomplishments in science and applied technology throughout history. Joseph Needham assembled a unique collection of Chinese, Japanese, and Western language materials. The collection is the basis of the East Asian History of Science Library. The Institute’s building, completed in 1987, was designed to include references to Chinese architecture as a way to reflect the nature of the work done there. Temple-like columns, octagon-shaped door and window openings, and the use of traditional Chinese colors on the exterior are among such features.

Resources for Scholars

Scholars working in the Institute typically include collaborators on the Science and Civilisation in China project, established academics on sabbatical, doctoral and post-doctoral researchers on one-year fellowships, and other shorter term visitors from around the world. The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation is one of several organizations who fund fellowships to United States–based East Asia scholars and researchers for study at Needham Research Institute.

Open to all scholars, the library collection contains primary and secondary works in Chinese, English, Korean, Japanese, and other languages on the history of traditional East Asian science, technology, and medicine. The core of the collection includes correspondence, notes, photographs, maps, and other material assembled by Needham and Lu Gwei-Djen as part of their research.
for the series of publications *Science and Civilisation in China*. Since the early 1990s, the library has invested in purchases of recent Chinese publications, especially in the areas of the history of Chinese mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and archaeology. The Library also has a modest collection of several hundred traditional Chinese thread-bound books, with some old and rare editions. The library is working to develop its collection of materials on the history of science, technology, and medicine in other parts of East Asia, such as Japan and Korea.

The Institute sponsors a program of seminars held weekly throughout the academic year. Seminar topics for 2009 include, among others, “Peacocks and Poetry: Image and Text in Qing Illusionistic Painting,” and “Agricultural Technologies for the Alleviation of Natural Disasters in *Qimin yaoshu*” (an early Chinese monograph on agriculture).

### Administration and Funding

Responsibility for the management of the Institute rests with the Trustees of the Needham Research Institute, which is a registered charitable trust. Until 2002, the Trust was directed by Professor Ho Peng Yoke, a member of Academia Sinica, who worked without salary to develop the Institute’s international contacts and to investigate fund-raising possibilities. In October 2003, the Institute appointed a full-time salaried Director, Christopher Cullen. Professor Cullen, who originally trained as an engineer, is an Honorary Professor of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and president of the International Society for the History of East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine. The Institute, as an independent foundation, receives no public funds. Its main income comes from its endowment, which is administered by the Trustees of the Needham Research Institute, but it is also active and successful in obtaining funding from foundations, including the East Asian History of Science Trust. A substantial donation from the Chinese Civilisation Educational Trust in Hong Kong funded the new full-time Directorship.

**The Editors**

### Further Reading


Joseph Needham, a biochemist from the University of Cambridge, became fascinated with Chinese culture. His major work, *Science and Civilisation in China*, documents Chinese achievements in science, mathematics, technology, and medicine. Denounced in the West for supporting claims of Americans’ use of biological weapons in Manchuria, his continued work on *Science and Civilisation* brought renewed respect.

Needham in China

Needham’s interest in China was piqued by the three visiting scholars, so he started learning Mandarin Chinese from one of the young women, Lu Guizhen, who became his mistress and lifelong companion. During World War II, Needham was sent to China to work with Chinese scientists escaping the Japanese invasion. The scholars were attempting to re-establish their universities away from the invading forces, and Needham arrived to aid in their escape and to help preserve archives and artifacts that belonged to the universities. Needham traveled on eleven expeditions throughout China and had many remarkable adventures along the way. During his first stay in China, Needham was a fellow of both the Royal Society and British Academy, and the director of the Sino-British Science Cooperation Office in Chongqing (1942–1946). During this time he wrote his first publication, *Chinese Science*, which combined the two subjects which engrossed him throughout his life: Chinese civilization and science.

In 1946 Needham left China and took up a position as the chair of the Natural Sciences division at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—a division that had not previously existed, but with Needham’s insistence was initiated in Paris that same year. After two years in this position he returned to England to teach and begin work on his *Science and Civilisation in China*, one of the most ambitious historical projects of the twentieth century. It was to be a complete exploration of China’s scientific and technological past. At first, Needham thought that his survey might be no more than eight hundred pages long, but he later expanded the work to seven volumes embracing all aspects of Chinese physics, mathematics, chemistry, astronomy, agriculture, and engineering. As he investigated each tradition, Needham uncovered more and more evidence...
of Chinese contributions in these fields. Joined in his effort by many leading Chinese, European, and American experts, *Science and Civilisation in China* includes seventeen volumes with an additional dozen in preparation under the supervision of the Publications Board of the Needham Research Institute. Other important works by Needham and his collaborators include *The Grand Titration* (1969), which explores the reasons why the Chinese, whose achievements in science and technology were the most advanced the world from the first through the fifteenth centuries, were overtaken by Europeans in the Renaissance, and *Heavenly Clockwork* (1960), a detailed and fully illustrated account of astronomical and mechanical clocks in medieval China.

**Needham's Grand Question**

The encyclopedic scale of *Science and Civilisation in China* is explained by the scale of the central question Needham sought to address in his work: why, despite China’s early scientific and technological sophistication, the scientific and industrial revolutions were experienced first in Europe, and not in China. Needham’s answer was to look at the imperial bureaucracy. This official elite, he believed, might have initially supported technological innovation, but later stifled curiosity and prevented the widespread application of new ideas and techniques in areas outside of elite interests.

**Needham’s Worldview**

Needham’s reputation is marred by criticisms of his politics and his work. He supported the Chinese revolution in the late 1940s, and after 1949 became sympathetic to the Communist government. During the Korean War, he supported Chinese claims that Americans used biological warfare against the Communists, a claim that has never been proven. He was blacklisted by the United States government until the 1970s.

Outside Cambridge, Joseph Needham’s interest in the history of Chinese science also stimulated many Asian scholars’ exploration and documentation of their own scientific past. The founding of many prominent research institutes and museums in China, Japan, and Korea devoted to Asian science, technology, and medicine are in part due to Needham’s enthusiasm and encouragement.

Joseph Needham died at the age of ninety-four at his home in Cambridge. In 2008, the University of
Cambridge chair of Chinese was renamed the Joseph Needham Professorship of Chinese History, Science, and Civilisation.

Terence RUSSELL

Further Reading


Neo-Confucianism, beginning in the eleventh century, was a revival of classical Confucian values with new interpretations. It focused on self-cultivation, emphasizing development of rational, moral, and affective natures so that the heart and mind entered into “one body” with Heaven and Earth and all creation.

Beginning during the Song dynasty (960–1279) in the eleventh century, neo-Confucianism was a major reformulation of Confucianism that brought a revival of classical Confucian study and thought. Confucian values, texts, and practices were reworded and reinterpreted, mirroring the changed cultural conditions of the Song dynasty. Neo-Confucianism also reacted to the religious and philosophical challenges from Daoism and Buddhism in the postclassical age of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) and Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE).

The late Song scholar, philosopher, and teacher Zhu Xi (1130–1200) summed up many of the contributions of this Confucian revival. His teachings became so dominant in East Asia that Zhu’s “learning” came later primarily to be identified as neo-Confucianism. Earlier this learning had been known as the “Learning of the Way” (dao xue), the “Learning of Human Nature and Principle” (xingli xue), the “Learning of the Sages” (sheng xue), the “Learning of Principle” (li xue), and the “Learning of the Mind-and-Heart” (xin xue). These referred to important aspects of the larger learning that inspired a new cultural era in East Asia and subsequently came to represent its tradition. To modernizers of the twentieth century it represented the past from which they wanted to break.

“Great Peace and Order”

Neo-Confucianism sprang from a revived concern for civil government as opposed to warlordism during the late ninth and early tenth centuries. It sought to bring about “Great Peace and Order” (Taiping) by establishing civilized institutions. The statesman Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) expressed the ideal of public service at this time in his characterization of the Confucian ideal of the noble person as “first in worrying about the world’s worries and last in enjoying its pleasures” (de Bary and Bloom 1999, 596). Using the rulership ideal of the Confucian philosopher Mencius, Fan articulated the solicitude that a ruler should have, placing first the welfare of the ruled, in contrast to the Buddhist bodhisattva (a being that refrains from entering nirvana in order to save others and is worshipped as a deity), who first sought the peace of nirvana before returning to share it with others.

Fan attempted reforms in education and the political economy, but he also invited the scholar-teacher Hu Yuan (993–1059) to court. Hu as an educator emphasized the principles and implementation of classical Confucianism through studies in mathematics, law, military arts, and water control. The statesman Wang Anshi (1021–1086) advocated many of Fan Zhongyan’s reformist ideals, especially in the civil service and education. Wang stressed government intervention in the economy and a policy that
Neo-Confucianism, which sprang from a revived concern for civil government as opposed to warlordism during the late ninth and early tenth centuries, sought to bring about “Great Peace and Order” by establishing civilized institutions. It brought together theories from the philosophies of Confucius, Laozi, and Buddha. Here we see the premier philosophical leaders of China portrayed as “three vinegar tasters,” each reacting to the taste of the vinegar in their own way.

would achieve a type of welfare state. His policies, which claimed the approval of the Confucian classics, especially the Zhou li (Rites of Zhou), nevertheless were considered “New Laws” because of their innovations.

Several philosophical speculations, in response to the challenge of Mahayana Buddhism, sought a better metaphysical foundation for the new civil order. These speculations later were incorporated in Zhu Xi’s system. Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), in contrast to the Buddhist view of impermanence and the insubstantiality of all things, based his philosophy on the I Ching (Classic of Changes) and characterized the Way (dao) as a process of creation and re-creation in which change is marked by growth and renewal rather than by continual negation. Zhou perceived this Way not only as limitless (wuji) but also as a path to perfecting the natures of all things (taiji). As an alternative to attaining Buddhahood (a state of perfect enlightenment sought in Buddhism), Zhou advocated the cultivation of sagehood—the perfection of spirituality based on intellectual and moral values.

Zhang Zai (1020–1077) was another thinker of the Song dynasty. His ideas were incorporated into Zhu Xi’s later synthesis. Zhang affirmed qì—the psychophysical substance—as the vital force in all things and advocated an ethical cultivation designed to achieve unity with all creation in his Xi ming (Western Inscription). The Cheng brothers were two other thinkers of the Song dynasty. Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1077) advocated cultivating sagehood to achieve the “Humanness which forms one body with Heaven and Earth and all things” (de Bary and Bloom 1999, 694). The Chens perceived the “one body” to be a compound of qì and a generic and genetic principle (li) inherent in all things, which forms an inner principle for growth. People were to deal with principle, in both a rational and a moral sense, in both its diversity and unity. Humanness meant the empathetic attraction among all things and was differentiated according to the relations of factors such as rightness in relation to rulers or filiality (relating to a son or daughter) in relation to parents.

Zhu Xi compiled these concepts and others of his predecessors in a guide for self-cultivation entitled Jinsi-lu (A Record of Recent Thought or Thinking about Things Near-at-Hand). In addition he wrote commentaries on classic texts—the Analects of Confucius, the text of Mencius, the Da Xue (Great Learning), and the Zhong yong (Doctrine of the Mean). These are referred to as the “Four Books.” The Zhong yong and the Da Xue were chapters taken from the classic Li ji (Record of Rites). Zhu, in his prefaces to the Zhong yong and the Da Xue, urged individual cultivation and universal schooling as the basis for all public morality and governance. He urged using moral judgment and intellectual investigation to reach an empathetic understanding of all things. In the Zhong yong preface he wrote of the succession to or repossession of the Way of the Sages as being based on classical texts and on the recognition of basic principles in those texts by insightful people, in contrast to private experience communicated from mind to mind through Zen lineages. In
addition Zhu urged a technique of self-control and self-examination, called the “Method of the Mind.” It encouraged people to exercise proper value judgments to achieve unity with all things.

Zhu wrote another anthology, *Xiao xue* (Elementary Learning) in further pursuit of the educational ideal at the center of his philosophy. This anthology addressed self-development and the training of young people in the home and in social relations. *Xiao xue* and the Four Books became standard texts in the neo-Confucian curriculum, along with *Zhu Zi jiali* (Family Ritual of Zhu Xi), which was Zhu’s simplified guide to family rituals.

Zhu, through these new versions of old texts, reshaped the classical Confucian tradition into a form that could be disseminated easily through the new medium of printed books. As a local official, Zhu also created guidelines for local schools, for the organization of community organizations, and for community granaries. These organizations became models for village life in much of East Asia. His lectures to the emperor on the classics became a standard practice in the courts of China and Korea. In short, neo-Confucianism, as Zhu Xi shaped it, was not only a systematic philosophy but also a cultural program.

Zhu Xi was often at odds with the Song court, which condemned his teachings as heterodox. Thus, the propagation of his ideas depended on his followers in local schools. The Mongol emperor Kubilai Khan (1215–1294) recognized the wide acceptance of Zhu’s teachings among Confucian scholars and authorized the teachings as official instruction in state schools. In 1314–1315 Zhu’s texts became the basis of the Chinese civil service examinations and remained so until 1905, when they were abolished. Meanwhile, Korean scholars at the court of the Yuan dynasty (1267–1368) returned to Korea with Zhu’s teachings. In Korea the Choson dynasty (1392–1910) made these teachings the official state teachings.

**Ming and Qing Dynasties**

Wang Yangming (1472–1529) during the Ming dynasty concentrated on the inner sources of moral sensibility to inspired a teaching that he perceived as being too given to book learning and too routinized in conduct. Wang encouraged disciples to respond spontaneously to the moral promptings of the heart-and-mind (which he called “innate knowledge or knowing”). Luo Qinshun (1465–1547), Wang’s contemporary and critic, tried to restore the balance in favor of objective learning and normative standards that were less given to subjective interpretation. The Donglin school subsequently reacted against the moral relativism that the more subjective branches of the Wang Yangming school seemed to fall into. However, the attempt to rescue the late Ming dynasty from both moral and intellectual decline did not prevent the dynasty from falling to the Manchus, who, after conquering China, reaffirmed Zhu Xi’s teachings as orthodox.

In fact, during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), with Zhu Xi’s texts established in the civil service examinations and neo-Confucian scholarship promoted by the Manchu court, neo-Confucianism dominated the official scene. But in independent scholarly research the resolution of philosophical issues brought more critical scrutiny of the classics as the basis of authority on matters of orthodoxy and authenticity. The school of evidential learning, which developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had mastered textual criticism that advanced this critical scrutiny. The leading figure in evidential learning was Gu Yanwu (1613–1682).

Such critical scrutiny extended to some of the metaphysical elements in Zhu Xi’s philosophy of human nature. The moralistic rigor of the early Zhu Xi school yielded to a perspective more accepting of human desire. However, the basic curriculum in most schools remained the texts as edited and interpreted by Zhu Xi. Into the late nineteenth century the general frame of intellectual reference...
and the terms of educated discourse, even among Zhu Xi’s critics, remained within the orbit of his thought. Also, because he had paid so much attention to the reform of social and political institutions, the encyclopedic learning and historical scholarship he encouraged continued to manifest themselves in statecraft studies, increasingly critical of many institutions of the dynasty. An example is Waiting for the Dawn (Mingyi daifanglu) by Hung Zongsi (1610–1695). Its critical stance later would have a bearing on the readiness of late Qing scholars to consider alternatives to established institutions and corrupt practices.

Korea and Japan

This great variety of neo-Confucian activity existed as well in Korea’s Choson dynasty. The new teaching had already been introduced to Korea under the preceding Koryo dynasty (918–1392), which had long been dominated by Buddhism. The new teaching inspired a new generation of scholars. They installed neo-Confucianism as the official ideology of the Choson regime.

One of the leading Choson neo-Confucian scholars was Yi Toegye (1502–1570), who stressed self-cultivation through the emphasis of reverence as a basic virtue and quiet sitting as a form of personal exercise. Yi also presented a variety of scholarly studies similar to those of Zhu Xi and became the model of Zhu Xi learning in Korea.

Shortly after Toegye, Yi Yulgok (1536–1584) expanded studies in the Zhu Xi school and laid the foundation for silhak (substantial learning or practical learning), which in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries expressed an interest in the Western studies that were made available through Jesuit missionaries in Beijing. The neo-Confucian texts and curriculum remained standard in Korean education and provided the terms of educated discourse throughout this time.

In Japan the texts of Zhu Xi became available through Japanese Zen monks traveling in China during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. However, for the most part the study of Zhu’s works had a low priority until Japan’s unification and contacts with Korean scholarship in the late sixteenth century gave a new impetus to neo-Confucian studies. Former Zen monks such as Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), Fujiwara Seika (1561–1619), and Yamazaki Ansai (1618–1682) promoted neo-Confucian studies. Razan established a school under the patronage of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), founder of the Tokugawa shogunate (1600/1603–1868), and Razan’s successors were given the hereditary patronage of the shoguns until the Tokugawa era ended.

Tokugawa Japan had no institution equivalent to the examination systems and civil bureaucracies in China and Korea to be a standard of official orthodoxy. Instead independent schools embraced different lines of study. For example, Yamazaki Ansai stressed culture of the mind-and-heart with adherence to Zhu Xi and the practice of quiet sitting. Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714) popularized neo-Confucian ethics as shared by different classes and status functions but also participated in empirical studies of nature. The Mito school emphasized the Confucian concepts of loyalty and dynastic history. In Osaka residents supported a local school, the Kaitokudo, that taught neo-Confucian ethics oriented to the merchant class.

Scholars eventually challenged some Song era aspects of neo-Confucianism as being manifestations of the subversive influence of Buddhism rather than true innovations of original Confucian ideals. A military instructor of the samurai class, Yamaga Soko (1622–1685), decried the contemplative tendencies of Song neo-Confucianism, especially quiet sitting. He felt they were unsuitable for a samurai. Ogyu Sorai (1666–1728) proclaimed that Confucianism could be understood only in the context of early Chinese history and society as shown in the Chinese classics and that Confucianism was applicable to Japan only in the context of Japanese institutions and their historical development. Ito Jinsai (1627–1705) taught a fundamentalist brand of Confucianism that emphasized humaneness as taught in the texts of Confucius and Mencius. Each of these forms of Confucian revisionism made a claim to a fundamentalism based on new readings of classical texts.

During the late Tokugawa shogunate independent schools proliferated and created a wide variety of scholarship. Some of the scholarship was oriented toward Japanese tradition and some of it toward Western learning. The basic texts used in most schools were based on the neo-Confucian curriculum set by Zhu Xi until the imperial restoration and renovation of the Meiji period (1868–1912). The moral and intellectual formation of most
educated east Asians continued to be based on this neo-Confucian discourse into the late nineteenth century. This teaching concentrated on self-cultivation in a social context and emphasized the development of rational, moral, and affective nature so that the mind-and-heart entered empathetically, through practical action and shared principles, into “one body” with Heaven and Earth and all creation.

Wm. Theodore de BARY

Further Reading


Flowing water never goes bad; door hubs never gather termites.

流水平不腐，户枢不蠹

Liú shuǐ bù fǔ, hù shū bù dù
Nestorians refer to Christians who follow Nestorius, a leader of an early Eastern Christian tradition. Persecution for heresy forced the Nestorians toward Central and East Asia, including China. As the first generation of Christians coming to China, they arrived in the Tang court in the early seventh century, and remained in the country for two hundred years.

Christianity was introduced to China during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and became widely known as “Jingjiao” (Luminous Teaching) during the Tianqi period (1625–1627) of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) after the discovery of a luminous stele (a carved or inscribed stone slab or pillar used for commemorative purposes). Modern scholars identify this form of Christianity as Nestorianism, one of the churches of the East led by Nestorius (386–451 CE).

Persecution for heresy had forced the Nestorians toward Central and East Asia, including China. Although Nestorianism is mentioned in traditional Chinese sources, the most important historical sources have been the Nestorian Stele, discovered in Chang’an (modern Xi’an in Shaanxi Province) in the seventeenth century, five Nestorian manuscripts written in Chinese and recovered from Dunhuang (Gansu Province), and numerous tomb inscriptions found in Inner Mongolia and Quanzhou in the modern period. According to these sources, Nestorianism was introduced to China by Alopen in 635. At that time, acting under an imperial edict from the Emperor Taizong, the Nestorians first translated their scriptures into Chinese and established a Nestorian church in Chang’an. After that many Nestorians came to China either by land from Central Asia or by sea from Persia (Iran). The Nestorian Stele was erected in 781, a time of relative prosperity for Chinese Nestorianism. It is said to have been inscribed by a Nestorian priest named “Adam” (“Jingjing” in Chinese) with the sponsorship of a larger congregation. The stele offers a brief but thorough history of Nestorianism in Tang China. According to manuscript sources, the Nestorian leader Adam translated about thirty-five scriptures into Chinese. Several of these translations survived as the manuscripts from Dunhuang; one of them is identified as Gloria in excelsis Deo in Syriac texts. However, after 845 the Nestorians virtually disappeared in Chinese sources, having suffered political persecution under the reign of the Emperor Wuzong. They fled from central China and settled in peripheral regions, especially Samarqand and Turfan. Tomb inscriptions show that Nestorianism experienced a modest revival in several regions during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), especially in Inner Mongolia and a few coastal cities in southeast China such as Zhenjiang and Quanzhou. But after the fourteenth century Nestorianism vanished from in China again, this time for good.

**Doctrine, Ethnicity, and Languages**

Nestorius was banished by the Council of Ephesus in 431 for his heretical views regarding Jesus as both a man and a divine son. A doctrine with similar views was introduced...
to China. Other Nestorian doctrines preserved in Chinese translations concern the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; God the creator; Jesus the savior; and the concept of original sin. Although the Nestorians left many sources written in Chinese, it is doubtful if any of these Nestorians were ethnic Chinese themselves. It is clear that the majority of Nestorians in China were Iranian-speaking people. During the Tang dynasty most Nestorians seem to have lived in large cities, such as Dunhuang, Chang’an, Luoyang, and perhaps Cheng’du, which naturally attracted foreign merchants. According to the Nestorian Stele from Chang’an and a Nestorian scriptural

Fragment of a Nestorian painting. Nestorians, the first generation of Christians coming to China, arrived in the early seventh century, and remained in China for two hundred years. A stele said to have been inscribed by a Nestorian priest named Adam relates a history of the religion during the Tang dynasty. PHOTO COURTESY OF CHEN HUA'IYU.
pillar from Luoyang, all the Nestorians named in Chinese sources were clearly either Sogdians or Persians. A tomb epitaph found in Xi’an belongs to a Nestorian family from Persia, even though the family received a Chinese surname identical to the emperor’s and many of the family members served in the Tang imperial government. But no Chinese sources provide any evidence of the views that Chinese intellectuals and common people may have held regarding Nestorianism.

Psalms written in Syriac have been uncovered from Dunhuang and elsewhere. Numerous Nestorian manuscripts were found in an abandoned monastery in Bulayiq, Turfan, all of which were written in either Syriac or other central Asian languages, especially Sogdian and Turkic-Uygur. None was written in Chinese. These manuscripts date from the ninth to the thirteenth century, when the Chinese empire had no sovereignty over this area. The discovery of these Syriac manuscripts indicates that Nestorians in China kept Syriac as their church language. Yet, Nestorians of different ethnicities also used their own languages during their religious activities. All tomb inscriptions from the Yuan dynasty are written in bilingual form, either Turkic-Uygur and Chinese or Syriac and Turkic-Uygur.

Nestorian Scroll. After 845 CE accounts of the Nestorians virtually disappeared in Chinese sources. Having suffered political persecution under the reign of the Emperor Wuzong, they fled from central China and settled in peripheral regions, especially Samarqand and Turfan. PHOTO COURTESY OF CHEN HUAIYU.
Nestorianism and Other Religions in China

When Nestorianism came to China, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism dominated the religious life of the Chinese people. Nestorians borrowed a lot of loanwords (words taken from another language and at least partly naturalized) from the texts of these three religions. Buddhism had a particularly close connection with Nestorianism. The Nestorian leader Adam tried a collaborative translation project with Buddhist monks, but the Tang emperor suspended this project. Adam’s translations borrowed a lot of terms, phrases, and usages from Buddhist texts, although he adapted their meanings considerably.

Daoism was the official ideology in the Tang dynasty, and it seems that the Nestorian Stele also borrowed many Daoist terms. At one time the Tang government confused Nestorianism with Zoroastrianism. The Nestorian church was ordered by the government to change its name from “Persian Church” (bosi si) to “Byzantine Church” (daqin si) in 745 when the Tang government realized that Nestorianism was originally from the eastern Roman area. In Chinese sources Nestorianism, Manichaeism, and Zoroastrianism were often referred to as the “three foreign religions” (or “barbarian religions,” yijiao or hujiao), in contrast to the three domestic religions, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. In 845 all foreign-origin religions, including Buddhism and Nestorianism, suffered...
political persecution. This persecution was partly because of the increased isolationism that began to develop in the Tang government after the An Lushan Rebellion (755–763) nearly a century before. In sum, Nestorianism embarked on its journey to China when the Tang empire was open to all religions but suffered when the Tang empire began to decline.

Huaiyu CHEN

Further Reading
During the early twentieth century, many classically educated Chinese intellectuals, disillusioned with a weak and inefficient government, advocated for a new Chinese culture based not on Confucian values, but instead on Western-style ideals and thought. The resulting New Culture Movement inspired revolutionary leaders—radical and conservative—to reform China’s intellectual, political, and social traditions, thus shaping modern China.

The term “New Culture Movement” refers to a short span of time in the early twentieth century when Chinese intellectuals, influenced by knowledge and events from abroad, hastily and passionately set new directions in intellectual, social, political, and cultural trends. It is often used synonymously with the “May Fourth Movement.” Historians tend to use the years 1915 and 1923 to delineate the beginning and ending of this event, but they disagree about what constitutes its most salient aspects. Some see the movement primarily as a watershed in revolutionizing literary and intellectual consciousness, as a form of Chinese Renaissance or Enlightenment (Hu Shi, Benjamin Schwartz, and Vera Schwarcz, to name just a few); others see it as a political awakening that enabled the rise of Chinese Communism (Mao Zedong and mainland Chinese Marxist historians); still others view it as a two-tiered process by which cultural iconoclasm eventually led to political radicalism (Chow Tse-tsung, Joseph Chen, and others); and others consider it to be neither cultural Renaissance nor Enlightenment, but a multidimensional and multidirectional movement of both radical and conservative ideas (Yu Yingshi and others).

But all authorities concur that a defining moment in this process was the May Fourth demonstration of 1919, when over three thousand students marched on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square to protest the negative outcome of the Treaty of Versailles. The stipulations of the treaty, negotiated in Paris from January to June 1919, led the Allies to turn over German-controlled territory in Shandong Province to Japan instead of China, whose hope had been buoyed by Woodrow Wilson’s call for national self-determination. This incident signaled a new chapter in Chinese political and intellectual history because the demonstrators were young students who came of age after the elimination of the civil-service exams in 1905, a system that had reinforced Confucian values and provided a path toward official success for many centuries. Informed by Western political ideologies introduced mainly from Japan, they railed against the government for selling out to the same Japanese and Western imperialist powers. Most importantly, they were joined by merchants, laborers, and other hitherto apolitical segments of the Chinese population.

The New Culture Movement, therefore, not only signified a time when intellectuals reexamined all aspects of society, including its literary, intellectual, and philosophical underpinnings, in an attempt to save the country, but it also inaugurated a period in which new social groups experimented with disparate political ideologies, foreshadowing the eventual showdown between the Nationalists and the Communists in the ensuing decades.
Decline of Imperial China

The year 1915 is often considered the start of the New Culture Movement, not only because it marked the founding of the most influential magazine of the period, Youth (Qingnian), later renamed New Youth (Xin Qingnian), but also because it was the year that President Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) of the Republic of China was issued the infamous Twenty-One Demands by Japan. On 18 January the Japanese minister to China secretly presented Yuan with a list of conditions that would give Japan effective control of the whole country. The effete Chinese government, under the threat of war, leaked the terms of this onerous document in the national and foreign press, and won a great deal of moral support both at home and abroad. After Japan presented an ultimatum on 7 May, China acquiesced to most of the terms on 9 May. Public indignation was roused to an unprecedented height, and these two dates were marked as National Humiliation Days.

Japan could confront China with such brazen aggressiveness because by the early twentieth century, the political and socioeconomic conditions in China had deteriorated to a point of no return. Beginning with the First Opium War (1839–1842), China endured a series of disastrous military defeats at the hands of the West and Japan, and with each loss the Chinese ceded more territorial control and millions of ounces of silver in indemnity payments. China’s humiliating defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 cost the dynasty 200 million taels of silver and the island of Taiwan, among other indignities. The debacle of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 resulted in an indemnity payment of 450 million taels to eight foreign nations, a sum more than four times the annual income of the state. Internally, a series of rebellions that began in the 1850s and 1860s brought more hardship on the people, and weakened the control of the central government. The Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) occasioned the loss of approximately 20 million lives and nearly toppled the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Several serious famines and floods in the second half of the nineteenth century led to further social unrest, and the situation was aggravated by a corrupt bureaucracy that could not relieve the sufferings of the people. Opium addiction and unemployment contributed to the demoralization and turmoil of society. Beset by internal disorder and external encroachments, the dynasty was teetering on the verge of extinction at the turn of the twentieth century.

The New Republic

As anti-Manchu revolutionary societies began to appear across China, Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance, formed in 1905 in Japan, became the most popular and well-organized group. Composed of intellectuals and secret-society members, these revolutionary societies staged uprisings in various parts of the country, and succeeded in overthrowing the Qing in October of 1911 (the emperor abdicated in February 1912). Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) assumed the office of the provisional president of the
Republic of China on 1 January 1912, but soon yielded the office to Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), who had superior military power. In an effort to stem Yuan’s increasing political ambition, the Revolutionary Alliance absorbed four other political parties and was renamed the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) under Song Jiaoren in 1912. Song’s assassination in 1913 was widely believed to have been ordered by Yuan. In an effort to halt Yuan’s growing dictatorial ambitions, the revolutionaries in the Nationalist Party launched a second revolution. It collapsed in a short few months, whereupon Yuan became unstoppable. At the onset of World War I in Europe, Yuan was preparing for his role as emperor. He died of illness in 1916, after which the country endured a decade of warlordism. By 1918 the country was roughly divided into the northern government, controlled by warlords of the Beiyang faction under Duan Qirui, and the southern government of Sun Yat-sen, backed by Chen Jiongming and other southern warlords.

China’s decision to join World War I by sending laborers to Europe for the Allies was made in the hope that an Allied victory would gain the return of the Jiaozhou Peninsula, which was ceded to Germany in 1898. Woodrow Wilson’s advocacy of national self-determination had raised the hopes of the Chinese people. It was therefore a devastating blow to learn that Britain, France, and Italy had signed secret treaties with Japan in 1917 backing its claims to Germany’s rights in China. Their disappointment turned to fury when the Japanese diplomats in Paris further disclosed that Duan Qirui’s government had negotiated a secret loan in 1918 for the construction of railroads in Shandong, and not only had pledged the property and the income of the two railroads to Japan, but also agreed to a seven-point Japanese proposal with regard to management and policing of the railroads.

When news of this development reached the Chinese public on 3 May 1919, the students of Beijing University, with the support of Chancellor Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), decided to move up the date of a planned demonstration on 7 May to mark National Humiliation Day. On 4 May, over three thousand students from thirteen colleges and universities in Beijing gathered at Tiananmen Square, protesting the treachery of their own government and the aggression of the foreign powers and urging the Chinese delegates in Paris not to sign the treaty. The demonstration began peacefully but turned violent as the marchers arrived in front of the residence of the pro-Japanese minister of communications, Cao Rulin, and were forced back by the police. Angry students set fire to Cao’s residence, and a few were arrested by the police. After an initial period of confusion, the government adopted a hard-line approach by arresting thousands of students. This act only increased the indignation of the public. As a result, sympathy strikes by students spread to more than twenty cities within a month. In Shanghai, the Federation of All Organizations of China was formed on 5 June, linking merchant and labor groups, the press, and the student union. On 16 June a Student Union of the Republic of China was established with representatives from several cities and provinces. The public uproar finally forced the resignation of the three pro-Japanese officials who were targets of the May Fourth demonstration. Duan resigned in the following year, as the struggle for power continued throughout the country.

The political and cultural iconoclasm that characterized the New Culture Movement grew out of changes in the late Qing period. As the dynastic center spun out of control, a breathing space was provided for opponents of the political and cultural status quo to voice their discontent without recrimination. Deeply concerned with the breakdown of the Qing state, Chinese intellectuals initiated a soul-searching examination of all aspects of their world—from religion, philosophy, politics, literature, and epistemology to the nature and direction of China’s modernization. Most significantly, they questioned the viability of Confucianism as doctrinal canon for a new China. The revisionist and reformist writings of individuals such as Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Tan Sitong (1865–1898), as well as Yan Fu’s (1854–1921) translations of Herbert Spencer, Montesquieu, and numerous Western philosophers and thinkers forged a link between evolutionary change and social and political progress in the minds of their readers. While Yan Fu focused on the material learning of the West, Liang Qichao (1873–1929), Kang’s most famous disciple, believed that China needed to overhaul its legal, educational, and bureaucratic systems in order to create a new citizen, “one whose character would be based on “civic activism, respect for human rights and a spirit of adventure” (Chang Hao 1971, 216). Yan and Liang were also among the first intellectuals to discuss social Darwinism, suggesting that the concept of
"great harmony" (datong) was compatible with the concept of socialism, thus providing a "scientific" alternative for the May Fourth generation to counter the hegemony of Confucianism. In doing so, they severed the link between the Confucian spiritual order and the sociopolitical system, freeing the May Fourth intellectuals to embrace a scientific world view and to entertain the concepts of democracy, socialism, anarchism, and communism as possibilities for China.

Reforms and New Youth

Even as the late Qing reformers were adopting Western political ideas and denouncing aspects of their own cultural heritage, a concern for the future of the country was uppermost in their minds. Nationalism, in the sense of a patriotic concern with China’s future, was arguably the dominant theme in the writings of most Chinese intellectuals from the 1890s onward. In October 1905, Sun Yat-sen laid out a program to save the nation in his revolutionary paper People’s Journal, articulating the “Three People’s Principles”: nationalism (minzuzhuyi), democracy (minquanzhuyi), and socialism (minshengzhuyi). Sun’s journal was instrumental in broadening the discourse on socialism in the first decade of the twentieth century. Two of the editors of the People’s Journal, Liu Shipei (1884–1919) and Zhang Binglin (1868–1936), espoused anarchist principles in the paper. Liu founded an anarchist group in Tokyo in 1907. Calling for the overthrow of the state and of all ideas and institutions that inhibit freedom, such as the Confucian ideology and the family, the anarchists envisioned a universal brotherhood based on mutual assistance, grounded on the principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need” (Gasster 1969, 164). They drew inspiration variously from Laozi and the Daoist thesis of nonstriving (wuwei), or the theory that one does only what comes naturally, as well as from strands of Mahayana Buddhism and Kropotkin’s concept of mutual aid. While anarchism was one voice among a plethora of socialist doctrines in the early decades of twentieth-century China, historians have long recognized the important role of anarchists in paving the way for the Chinese acceptance of communism. They credit anarchists with radicalizing the discourse on change, for bringing together laborers and intellectuals in work-study programs, for elevating the importance of labor, and for hailing the Russian Revolution as a universal social revolution.

Many of the intellectual debates of the New Culture Movement took place within the pages of the New Youth magazine, particularly before its transformation into an organ of the Chinese Communist Party in 1923. Founded in Shanghai in 1915 by Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), who went on to establish the first Chinese Communist cell in 1920 and the party itself in 1921, the magazine targeted high school and university students, and reached a monthly circulation of over 10,000 copies at its height. In 1917, when Chancellor Cai Yuanpei invited Chen to become the Dean of the School of Letters at Beijing University, Chen added many faculty members to the editorial board of the magazine. His opening salvo—“To Youth”—summarizes his already-radical views. In this article Chen Duxiu called on the new generation to become independent, progressive, aggressive, cosmopolitan, utilitarian, and scientific in order to save the country. By addressing the young generation, Chen encouraged their direct political and social involvement in society. He followed this essay with a discussion on French civilization and credited France for contributing three gifts to mankind: democracy, evolutionism, and socialism. “Science” and “democracy” became the rallying cry of the generation who came of age with the New Youth magazine, and “tradition” became the common enemy. As Chen stated in defending his magazine from detractors: “In order to advocate Mr. Democracy, we are obliged to oppose Confucianism, the codes of rituals, chastity of women, traditional ethics, and old-fashioned politics; in order to advocate Mr. Science, we have to oppose traditional arts and traditional religion” (Chen Duxiu 1926, 10–11).

One of the most important achievements of the New Culture Movement was the vernacularization of the written language. In 1917 Hu Shi (1891–1962) published his “Some Tentative Suggestions for the Reform of Chinese Literature” in New Youth, in which he called for a new literature that did not imitate the ancients, one that emphasized substance over form, one that was devoid of clichés, and one that embraced the language of popular literature. Hu declared that the classical written Chinese was a dead language, and that only the spoken, or vernacular
Chinese, was a living language and therefore it was the only appropriate medium for the creation of a living Chinese literature. Chen Duxiu responded enthusiastically, and together they denounced the fundamental assumption of Chinese literary theory, which was the idea that literature must convey the Way (dao), or the moral principles of the Confucian teaching. Chen proposed instead that Chinese literature adopt the style of realism found in European literature, in order to reflect life’s contemporary problems. Like most of his contemporaries, Chen possessed a somewhat simplistic understanding of European literature as progressing in a linear fashion from classicism, romanticism, and realism to naturalism.

Ironically, in order to earn the respect of their fellow intellectuals, the contributors to New Youth at first felt compelled to display their erudition by making frequent allusions to classical texts and by composing “new” poetry in a classical form. Eventually New Youth launched a campaign in 1918 for editors and readers to create poetry, plays, and translations purely in the vernacular style. In the process they created a new genre, the short essay, which became a powerful vehicle for social commentary. As Hu Shi issued a call for “a literature in the national language, and a literary national language,” (Hu Shi 1918) readers set up hundreds of literary societies in response. Along with Lu Xun (1881–1936), one of the greatest writers in Chinese literature, Hu Shi and his colleagues—including not only Chen Duxiu, Qian Xuantong, Shen Yinmo, Li Dazhao, and Zhou Zuoren, but also their students, Fu Sinian, Luo Jialun, Zhu Zhiqing, and Ye Shaojun—spearheaded the new literary movement. By March of 1920 the Ministry of Education in Beijing decreed that school textbooks should be written in the vernacular language, and within a year the vernacular language was officially recognized as the national language.

A dominant theme in the new literature of the New Culture Movement was the desire on the part of the Chinese writers to save their nation. Lu Xun’s short story “Iron House” poignantly captured the despair of someone who could not awaken a nation because its people were in deep slumber and oblivious to their imminent demise. The intense subjectivism of the literature of the period was manifested in an intense preoccupation with the self, and with a celebration of individualism. Stories revolving around the theme of love replaced that of propriety, as love became symbolic of freedom and the new morality. Women’s issues became prominent in the writings of the New Culture Movement, touching on topics such as women’s education, the concept of chastity, and the practice of forced marriage. Eight or more new women’s publications appeared during this period. Ibsen’s Nora became an emblem of the May Fourth generation, symbolizing women’s increasing self-assertion and individualism. But women’s suffrage was not yet granted, and Lu Xun’s pointed question of what happens after Nora leaves home was met with silence. In Miss Sophie’s Dairy, the respected female author Ding Ling (1904–1986), blazed a new literary trail by creating a female protagonist who reveals her sexual desires for two men, shocking her audience. In 1921 the manifesto of the Association for Literary Societies proclaimed for the first time that writers were a professional group dedicated to the practice of literature as an independent vocation. The emancipation of the literary form and language during the New Culture Movement led to the development of a rich body of short stories, novels, and the founding of literary societies such as the Crescent Moon Society, the Creation Society, and the Association for Literary Societies in the 1920s.

Another major feature of the New Culture Movement was the use of scientific methodology in reexamining China’s past. At first Chinese intellectuals understood Western science simply as the use of Baconian inductionism, which emphasized observation and the accrual of data; they were relatively unconcerned with the speculative element in the collection of these facts. Hu Shi, Gu Jiegang, and Fu Sinian embarked on projects to “reorganize the national heritage,” and produced new histories of philosophy, folk literature, and philological treatise using “scientific” methodology. The study of archaeology became an important “scientific” tool to determine the veracity of claims to Chinese antiquity. Ding Wenjiang, a geologist and one of the few trained scientists among the New Culture intellectuals, even advocated eugenics and a scientific bureaucracy to transform society. Chen used the concept of “science” to attack the stultifying and superstitious customs of Chinese society, from arranged marriage to foot binding, while others called for a “scientific” way of living, complete with pointers on personal hygiene.

The impulse to employ scientific perspectives in evaluating all phenomena had a significant impact in the
realm of politics. Influenced by social Darwinism, the May Fourth intellectuals perceived that socialism represented the most advanced state of political evolution. The success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 further enhanced the prestige of socialism and communism. As a high school student in Hunan, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) formed the New People’s Study Society, and some of its members eventually became leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. By the end of 1919, a Society for the Study of Socialism was established at Beijing University under the protection of Chancellor Cai Yuanpei; it soon split into different organizations studying guild socialism, anarchism, and syndicalism. In 1920, under Li Dazhao’s (1888–1927) leadership, some of its members regrouped to create the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory. Other societies involved a mixture of educators, journalists, writers, and students. The most notable of these was the Young China Association, whose members initially devoted themselves to the study of economic and social problems both at home and abroad.

The search for solutions for a better society led the faculty and students of the Beijing higher institutions to experiment with living arrangements. Zhou Zuoren (1885–1967), Lu Xun’s younger brother, was enamored of the Japanese utopian social movement, in particular the atarashiki mura (new village) concept introduced by Mushakoji Saneatsu, which he and Lu Xun discussed extensively both in New Youth and in New Tide, a magazine formed by students of Beijing University in 1918 and supported by the faculty. Inspired by the new village and work-study concepts, these students organized the Work-and-Learning Mutual Assistance Corps in several big cities in China in 1919. This was a short-lived attempt to adopt a new style of living with the ultimate aim of creating a utopian society. In the same year, students from Beijing Higher Normal College founded the Work-and-Study Society, also attempting to build a society modeled on the work-and-study units. Inspired by their teachers, students formed organizations and study groups enthusiastically to do their part to save the country. Student demonstrations proliferated after the May Fourth incident, totaling more than 125 significant protests in 1922 alone.

By the early 1920s, disillusionment with the republican system of government at home and with the tragedy of World War I led many to reexamine the limitations of Western-inspired notions of science and democracy. Opposing this torrential trend to tear down China’s cultural heritage was a group of scholars associated with the 1922 journal Critical Review, based in the National Southeastern University in Nanjing. Led by Mei Guangdi (1890–1945) and Wu Mi (1894–1978), two scholars educated under Irving Babbit (1865–1933) at Harvard University, they argued that the transcendental moral order and the moral value of literature in Confucianism could be re-fashioned to fit the new age. They aimed to propagate Babbit’s interpretation of New Humanism in China by forging their own understanding of Confucianism. Similarly Feng Youlan used Western philosophical methods to reevaluate Zhu Xi’s once-orthodox interpretation of Confucianism. Because they wrote in classical Chinese and vehemently opposed the literary revolution, they have been branded “conservatives” in the conventional literature on the New Culture Movement. But recent scholarship suggests that their complete rejection of all previous interpretations of Confucianism was arguably an act as revolutionary and radical as those who endorsed the vernacular movement.

**Political Implications of the New Culture Movement**

Perhaps more than at any other time in the last two thousand years of Chinese history, the New Culture Movement became a crucible for the transformation of the political conviction of Chinese intellectuals. From this period onward, intellectuals could be generally classified into four groups: the liberals, the radicals, the members of the Nationalist Party, and the members of the Progressive Party. The liberals were an ill-defined group who generally advocated democracy but tended to stay out of practical politics. The early radicals were anarchists or socialists, but not yet converted to Marxism. Hu Shi, China’s most famous liberal, wrote an article titled “More Study of Problems, Less Talk of ‘isms’” in July 1919, suggesting that focusing on practical studies of specific problems, and not on high-sounding theoretical doctrines, was the only way to solve China’s problems. Li Dazhao, by then committed to Marxism, countered that “isms” were crucial in formulating a structural framework to elucidate
the problems. Hu Shi replied that civilization was created incrementally, and that the solution to societal problems must also proceed “by inches and by drops.” Li, however, argued that society needed a complete transformation in economic structure in order to progress.

During this time, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, the mystic and poet Rabindranath Tagore, and Russian Comintern agents all visited China, adding the weight of Western political authority, and sometimes their own practical knowledge and experience. In the early 1920s, while members of the Progressive Party, associated with Liang Qichao, espoused a form of guild socialism inspired by Bertrand Russell and Henri Bergson, the Nationalist Party found itself divided between a southern revolutionary faction under Sun Yat-sen, and a northern parliamentarian faction struggling with the warlord-dominated government in Beijing. Committed to a socialist vision for China, Sun Yat-sen aligned with the leftists in endorsing Leninist party organization and welcoming Russian advisers into his fold. Meanwhile, Chen Duxiu, also contacted by Comintern agents, formed the first Shanghai Communist cell in 1920, which formally became the Chinese Communist Party in the following year. From the early 1920s until this day, Chinese history has been profoundly shaped by the struggle between the two major parties inspired by the ideas and politics of the New Culture Movement.

Anne Shen CHAO

Further reading


Hu Shi. (1918, April). Discussion on a constructive literary revolution. Xin Qingnian [New Youth], 4(4) 289–306


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**Only when all contribute their firewood can they build up a strong fire.**

**Zhòng rén shí chái huǒ yàn gāo**

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In February 1934, a time when tensions between the Nationalist and Communist parties were high—and the Japanese threat loomed—Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life Movement. Chiang believed that outward changes in behavior would strengthen and toughen the inner spirits of the people, and hence strengthen the country. Controversy surrounds the impetus of the New Life Movement, questioning whether it stems from Confucian, Christian, or fascist thought.

On 19 February 1934 Nationalist Party (Guomindang) leader Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) launched the New Life Movement (Xin shēnghuó yǔndòng) during a speech in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province. The New Life Movement was designed to revitalize the spirit of the people through a series of campaigns orchestrated to improve their customs and social habits. The movement attempted to utilize traditional ethics and behavior modification to achieve a revolution in living. Changes in hygiene and behavior, it was believed, would lead to China’s moral revitalization and thus the strengthening of the nation-state. In Chinese history nothing similar to the size, organization, and methods of the New Life Movement had ever been attempted. Eleanor Roosevelt and Soong May-ling, wife of Chiang Kai-shek. Madame Chiang was one of the most public proponents of the New Life Movement, which was designed by Chiang to improve the customs and social habits of the dispirited Chinese people. As the threat of Japanese invasion loomed in 1936, and the movement was in decline, Chiang turned over the day-to-day activities to Madame Chiang and the U.S. missionary reformer George Shepherd.
Movement had been seen, making it one of the most intriguing events of the Republican era (1912–1949).

**Historical Background**

The New Life Movement was set in motion alongside the fifth Bandit Extermination Campaign in 1934 to remove the Communists from their base in Jiangxi, but its origins can be traced back to the late 1920s. In the first of three stages of the national revolution of party leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the Nationalist Party embarked on the Northern Expedition in 1926 to unify the country militarily. As the expedition swept north defeating the warlord armies who had held a stranglehold on China since 1916, a split occurred between the Nationalists and Communists who were conducting the Northern Expedition jointly as part of their United Front strategy. As the split widened the Nationalists began a policy designed to eliminate all Communists from Chinese politics; the effort included the 12 April 1927 White Terror in which thousands of alleged Communists were executed. To survive, the remaining Communists fled to Jiangxi, where they established a rural base area. From 1930 to 1934 Chiang and the Nationalists initiated a series of so-called Bandit Extermination Campaigns to wipe out the surviving Communists. During the fifth and final extermination campaign the Nationalists drove the Communists from their base area and onto the Long March, a military retreat lasting more than a year and covering roughly 6,000 miles. To recover the former base area and reeducate those people “poisoned” with Communist ideology, Chiang set the New Life Movement in motion. Quickly dissatisfied with the limited scope of the movement, he gave a series of four more speeches in which he outlined a national movement for a new life.

**Theory of the New Life**

Chiang Kai-shek’s five speeches constitute the ideological basis of the New Life Movement. The lives of Chinese, he claimed, were notable for their filthiness, hedonism, laziness, and decrepitude—in sum, Chinese were living lives that were barbaric and unreasonable. To resolve these problems Chiang called for the revival of what he termed the four virtues: propriety or disciplined behavior; righteousness or proper behavior; integrity or clear discernment; and shame or earnest conscientiousness. Although the four virtues harkened back to traditional ethics, they were reinterpreted to suit modern circumstances. Along with these four cardinal virtues were the eight qualities of orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, promptness, exactness, harmoniousness, and dignity. The four cardinal virtues and eight qualities were to be applied to the basics of life—clothing, food, residence, and behavior—and Chiang spelled out in ninety-six prescriptions for how to do it. The prescriptions for the people were so detailed that they governed the minutiae of everyday life, an example of which can be seen in the following: People should wear simple, utilitarian clothing, dress neatly, avoid nakedness, remove their hats indoors, wash their bedding, and purchase national products; people should eat only clean food, use washed utensils, consume local produce, keep regular meal hours, avoid noise when eating, sit correctly, follow proper table manners, and avoid smoking; people should keep their homes clean, use simple furniture, air out their houses, properly dispose of garbage, eliminate rats, flies, and mosquitoes, and display the national flag on holidays; people would be orderly in public, walk on the left side of the street, not spit, urinate, or sneeze in public, avoid crowding and pushing, stand at attention for the national anthem, and avoid gambling, prostitution, and the use of opium.

According to Chiang’s theory, respect for the four virtues and application of the eight qualities to food, clothing, residence, and behavior would allow the Chinese people to create a new life of public morality that would, if each person correctly followed this path, jointly revitalize the spirit of the people and the country. The revitilization of the country would produce a more rational environment in which the people’s lives would become beneficially more artistic, more productive, and more militarized. Focusing on the arts would eliminate the vulgar social habits and customs of the people; productivity would increase the people’s material well-being and create self-reliance; and militarization would discipline the people and teach them to defend themselves.

**Implementation of the New Life Movement**

To ensure the success of the movement the work was to be carried out as a threefold process: investigation of current conditions and difficult obstacles, detailed planning of
the various steps to be taken, and the actual implementation of the plans. In all things the slogans of “From the Simple to the Complex” and “From the Self to Others” were to be followed.

The first step was for the workers of the movement to instruct the people in the purpose and aims of the new life. After a campaign was under way inspectors would be sent out to check the results and make necessary recommendations for further improvement. After a campaign was successful—no campaigns were ever fully successful—a new campaign could be launched. Throughout this process strict rules were to be applied: (1) Only superiors had the right to interfere in the daily life of others, and friends could only encourage each other; (2) the movement could be carried out only during leisure hours or vacation time; (3) and all movement funds were to be raised and dispensed by movement members or local government but never from the general public.

Although purportedly driven by popular participation the New Life Movement was entirely planned and carried out by the Nationalist Party through the New Life Movement Promotion Associations.

New Life Movement Promotion Associations

In the weeks after Chiang’s speeches numerous New Life Movement Promotion Associations were established around the country to guide the mass rallies at which New Life Movement ideology was disseminated to the people. The associations consisted of provincial organizations, municipal associations that were in large cities independent of provincial oversight, railroad associations overlapping multiple provinces, county associations, and overseas associations for Chinese living abroad.

The New Life Movement Promotion Associations were staffed by at least one member of the following bodies: the provincial government, the provincial Nationalist Party organization, the Bureau of Civil Affairs, the Bureau of Education, the Bureau of Public Safety, local military authorities, and leaders of local civic groups. The director of the railroad, chief of the railroad police, and the railroad Nationalist Party organization led the railroad associations. Overseas associations consisted of members of the local Chinese consulate, the local Nationalist Party branch, local Chinese schools, merchant’s guilds, and various Chinese organizations. As this list makes clear, Nationalist Party members controlled all promotion associations.

The first actual association was founded at Nanchang on 21 February, and it immediately planned and carried out the first public meeting at the Nanchang Athletic Grounds on 11 March; activities such as street sweeping were emphasized. During March and April nine provinces and three municipalities established New Life Movement Promotion Associations. By the end of the first year fifteen provinces, three municipalities, and nine railway centers had New Life associations. The movement continued to grow through 1937, by which time there were nineteen provincial, five municipal, twelve railroad, thirteen hundred county, and ten overseas associations (two in Japan, two in Korea, two in Southeast Asia, as well as one each in Macao, Timor, Mexico City, and Lima, Peru).

New Life Movement Voluntary Service Groups

The New Life Movement Promotion Associations were largely advisory bodies, while the actual work of the movement fell to a series of more permanent institutions, including the military police, the regular police, and the Boy Scouts. To assist these organizations the promotion associations created a number of voluntary service groups such as the Jiangxi Youth Vacation Service Corps, the Merchants Members, and the Women Civil Service Corps. These voluntary service corps carried out the actual work of the movement by leading movements such as the antirat and anti-mosquito campaigns. On a national basis the Women’s New Life Movement Voluntary Service Corps, led by Chiang Kai-shek’s wife Song Meiling (1897–2003), was established in thirteen provinces and focused on leading women into the New Life Movement by emphasizing activities such as cooking, sewing, and child care. but also educational activities such as literacy training.

Christians in the New Life Movement

By 1936 the movement began to lose its momentum as more immediate problems such as the encroachment of...
Japan into Manchuria took the focus off the New Life Movement. During this decline Chiang and the more prominent members of the movement turned over the day-to-day activities to Madame Chiang and the U.S. missionary reformer George Shepherd, who was placed in direct charge of the movement in early 1936. In this second, less-promoted phase the emphasis moved from mass meetings and national campaigns to more focus on intensive training of promotion association members and more emphasis on inspecting various problems throughout the country.

Both foreign and Chinese Christians, especially Protestants, supported the New Life Movement as an attempt to modernize China’s ancient teachings—propriety, righteousness, integrity, and shame. They also felt that the stress on changing “un-Christian” habits such as public spitting or urinating would help civilize the Chinese. The Christians did object to some of the more anti-female emphasis of the movement and wanted more freedom for women, but overall they found the New Life doctrines entirely compatible with Christian teachings and thus supported them. The New Life Movement emphasis on social service and cleanliness especially commended itself to Christians. Chiang Kai-shek himself was a Christian, leading some early commentators to go so far as to claim that the entire New Life Movement was based on the fundamentals of Christianity. Despite new measures and the involvement of service-oriented Christians, however, the Japanese invasion of China on 7 July 1937 began to quiet the movement. Although it survived in government propaganda manuals throughout World War II, the New Life Movement slowly faded from the national spotlight in 1937.

Despite the poor results of the New Life Movement, it was one of the largest and most unique government-led “popular” movements in Chinese history. Its methods were unusual and its goals sometimes obscure, but it remains one of the most misunderstood and historically interesting episodes in modern Chinese history.

Lane J. HARRIS

Further Reading


The New Rural Reconstruction Movement refers to mainly non-governmental efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s to improve the governance and conditions of China’s countryside. The movement has been greatly influenced by the work of public intellectuals such as agricultural scholar Wen Tiejun, who argued against a reliance on neo-liberal economic strategies.

The New Rural Reconstruction Movement 新农村建设运动 grew from a loose alliance among intellectuals, activists, officials, and members of the public in the 1990s and early 2000s that called attention to the plight of the countryside, whose problems they blamed on globalization and neo-liberal policies which relied on market incentives. Although leaders were inspired by international counterparts (especially those in Kerela, South India, an agrarian area with an extremely high literacy rate), used a range of cosmopolitan theory, and saw China’s rural problem in global terms, in their choice of a name they evoked China’s own Rural Reconstruction Movement of the 1920s and the 1930s. Rather than joining opposition to the government, NRRM encouraged and supported official reform efforts and prodded China’s leaders to address the problems.

In their analysis, they determined that China’s rural problem grew out of economic reform programs in the late 1970s and early 1980s which gradually dissolved the commune system in order to allow small-scale family farmers to enter the market. At first, farm family income grew rapidly, but growth leveled off by the mid 1980s. While government planners turned their attention to promoting export growth and as urban families enjoyed rapid rises in their standard of living, individual farm families now were expected to pay for schooling, health care, and social welfare, responsibilities which originally had been the commune’s. In addition, farmers faced price fluctuations; pollution from chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and local small-scale industry, much of which was owned by outside investors; insecurity of land tenure; lack of accountability among local officials; growing corruption; and inequalities between the areas which had access to the sources of growth (such as large cities and coastal provinces) and rural areas, especially inland ones.

Starting in the early 1990s, farmers protested more often and about a wider range of issues. In 1994, there were 10,000 protests, according to China’s Public Security Ministry, in 2003 there were some 58,000, and in 2005 there were 87,000 incidents of protest involving an estimated 3.76 million people. In eastern China, where urban expansion made land more valuable, protests no longer focused only on traditional complaints such as taxation and corruption, but on the seizure of farmland by local officials for roads, power plants, dams, factories, waste dumps, and housing projects for city-dwellers.

As these protests gained strength, a generation came of age that had gained practical experience during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and had trained in the intellectually cosmopolitan period of reform. As these government administrators, members of Party think tanks, and academics expanded their knowledge
of western political theory and increased their contacts abroad, their thinking went beyond (but did not totally reject) Maoism, especially its concerns with social equity. They observed that rural problems were not unique to China but also occurred in other developing countries, leading them to conclude that Mao’s leftist policies and the Cultural Revolution were not the cause. In fact, a New Left group suggested that China’s rural problems had grown after the rejection of Maoism and the adoption of pure reliance on the success of the market, that is, not from the failure of open trade policies such as those suggested by the World Bank, but from their very success in creating wealth among limited groups. Accordingly, in the years leading up to China’s entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, there was growing concern among activists that to enter the WTO would be unfavorable to China’s farmers.

According to Wen Tiejun, NRR’s leading theorist and organizer, the Maoist policy of economic independence from the world capitalist system had been necessary, and the government had successfully fostered industrialization, but these policies left villages in a weak position. The breakup of the commune produced individual plots too small to use technology efficiently and farmers were once again at the mercy of economic planners who favored exports, heavy industry, and the cities over the countryside. To solve these contradictions, further market reforms were not the right strategy. Rural life had to be reconstructed. Wen, born in Beijing in 1951, spent eleven years in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution before becoming a field worker and researcher for the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1987 he became dean of the School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development at People’s University in Beijing, where he founded the Center for Rural Reconstruction. Wen coined the term sannong wenti (“three rural problems”), which includes nongmin (“farmers” or “peasants”), nongcun (“villages” or “rural society”), and nongye (“agriculture”). He and his associates did not want to be called part of China’s New Left, especially in the aftermath of the 1989 anti-government democracy protests. Still, many NRRM members shared New Left doubts about World Bank neo-liberal policies and the pure reliance on market strategies.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, a loose grouping of university faculty, researchers in government research institutes, officials, and independent journalists created an urgent awareness of village problems. Li Changping, a township party secretary, created a furor with his letter to Premier Zhu Rongji explaining the plight of peasants burdened with taxes and local officials. Li told his story in a bestselling book, but he left his village in frustration to look for work in Shenzhen, the Special Economic Zone which epitomized globalized market capitalism. Cao Jingping, a professor of sociology at East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai, spent years conducting field research and interviews in Henan Province.

Farmer with geese at a Shanghai Commune. The plight of the countryside after the Great Leap Forward was placed of the shoulders of Chairman Mao. The loose alliance of intellectuals, activists, officials, and members of the public that make up the New Rural Reconstruction Movement blame the plight of the countryside in the twenty-first century on globalization and neo-liberal policies. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
His 2005 book *Huanghe bian di Zhongguo* advocated organization from the top down, waiting until the peasants had been uplifted to eventually give them power. Yu Jianrong, a rural development scholar, focused on the areas of Hunan Province which Mao had studied in the 1920s. Like Mao, Yu declared that farmers were not passive or ignorant but canny in their organization of protests and knowledgeable of laws and regulations. Li Yuanxing, a professor of sociology at Anhui University, echoed the arguments developed by Liang Shuming, Fei Xiaotong, and others in the 1930s, concluding that China, unlike the west, could not rely on urbanization to take rural workers out of the village to work in factories. The widest impact was made by two independent journalists, Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao, whose indignation roused the public. Their series of dramatic reports in the respected journal *Dushi* exposed petty village despots who tortured and even murdered farm leaders for challenging their illegal acts. In one month the public bought 100,000 copies of their book, *Zhongguo Nongmindiaocha* (Beijing: Renminwenxue, 2004) translated as *Will the Boat Sink the Water? The Life of China’s Peasants* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).

Anti-globalization protesters in other developing countries argued that the rural crisis was not local or temporary or superficial, nor could it be addressed by further economic development or urbanization. NRR called for a turn away from reliance on economic strategies, especially capitalist economic strategies, in favor of cultural and social reconstruction. In 2002, NRR activists visited the People’s Science Movement in Kerala, India. The Kerala movement included Maoists and took inspiration from Gandhi and from Mao, but Kerala had achieved social revolution without the violence of China’s Cultural Revolution. Kerala’s high literacy rates, successful health system, and economic progress were the result of large numbers of trained organizers working from the bottom up and organizing on a community level.

Wen Tiejun disagreed with rural economists who argued that private land ownership rights, specialization, and increased marketization would leave the farm community better off. Wen and his colleagues concluded that only through cooperative economics could farmers overcome their structural handicaps of small scale and inefficient technology. Although they were inspired by these foreign examples, they chose as their model the wide range of domestic cultural, economic, and political reforms that Y.C. James Yen had developed in the 1930s. In 2003 Wen and his colleagues took the opportunity to put their theories into practice by establishing the James Yen Institute of Rural Reconstruction headquartered in Zhaicheng Village, in Ding County, Hebei Province, where James Yen’s headquarters were during the Republican period (1912–1949). The James Yen Institute was among a number of NGOs which recruited college graduates and local activists to organize rural schools, clinics, and cooperatives in order to develop new community institutions and foster community consciousness. The reform groups also conducted clinics to introduce organic farming and appropriate technology to compensate for dangerous overuse of pesticides.
and chemicals. However, the most important change was the development of rural consciousness. Despite these reforms, it became clear that effective reform was possible on a small scale and could not be spread on a national scale, nor could private groups deal with the problems of labor surplus and migration, corruption, inefficient technology, reform of land rights, and discrimination.

When Wen Jiabao's national administration came into office in 2004, public intellectuals and party elites agreed that a rural crisis existed but there was no consensus on what to do about it. Premier Wen declared to the National People's Congress in March 2004 that “constructing a New Socialist Countryside” (jianshe shehui zhuyi xin non-gu) was the “most important of all important issues.” (Renmin ribao; People's Daily Overseas edition, March 5, 2004, quoted in Thogersen, p. 230). His discussion revolved around “three rural problems,” those described by Wen Tiejun. Wen Tiejun was widely consulted both in China and abroad as he deepened his critique of Western style development. In 2008 the party announced plans to allow farmers to buy and sell land rights, but it remained to be seen whether individual ownership and increased marketization could address the concerns raised by Wen and others without a substantial government commitment to local community organizing and social investment.

Charles W. HAYFORD

Further Reading
New Year (Spring Festival)
Nónglì Nián (Chūnjié) 农历年（春节）

Spring Festival, or Chinese Lunar New Year, is as important to the Chinese in China and around the world as Christmas is to the West. It has a legendary origin and a rich tradition of celebrations including ancestor worship, fireworks, feasting, shopping, gift-giving, and, most important, reuniting with family. Lasting fifteen days, the Spring Festival season ends with a Lantern Festival.

The Spring Festival, or Chinese Lunar New Year (Nongli Nian), is the most important seasonal festival in China. It marks the end of the old year and the beginning of the new. Unlike the Western New Year, the Lunar New Year is not fixed to a particular date but instead is determined by the phase of the moon. The new year traditionally begins on the first new moon of the first lunar month of the year, usually in late January or early February. The festival, however, extends from the sixteenth day of the twelfth month to the fifteen day of the first month. It is the longest festival in China’s calendar of festivals and affects every aspect of life.

An Ancient Celebration
The Chinese character for the word nian (year) sheds some light on the festival’s origins. Its oracle-bone glyph indicates a person carrying a bundle of grain. Records show that more than 3,000 years ago the Chinese already had begun celebrating their harvests and offering sacrifices to their ancestors at the beginning of the new year. A legend, however, tells a different story. Nian was a long-horned monster preying on humans every New Year’s Eve. A god taught them to survive this attack by decorating their houses in red, keeping all their lights on, and burning bamboo to create loud crackling noises. Because “to survive Nian,” or guonian, sounds like “to celebrate the year,” the festival tradition came into being.

The traditional (pre-twentieth century) Chinese calendar followed the movement of the moon in determining the yearly cycles. Each month begins with the new moon on the first day, reaches its midpoint (or full moon) on the fifteenth, and ends the month with the descending moon on the twenty-ninth or thirtieth day. This yearly cycle contains twelve months, numerically named (the first month, the second month, and so forth), each having between twenty-eight and thirty days, for a total of 354 days. In general, traditional Chinese used this lunar calendar (yinli) as the reference point to record or plan personal events, such as a birth date, wedding, and funeral (in feng shui calculations) and seasonal festivals. Following this system, the Lunar New Year’s Eve falls on the evening of the thirtieth day of the twelfth month.

Calendar Reckoning
In spite of its importance in predicting the rhythm of the moon, especially the appearance of the full moon, the lunar calendar is incompatible with the rotation of
the sun, which dictates that the yearly cycle should be 365.24 days. To accommodate the discrepancy between the sun and the moon in determining the length of the yearly cycle, a solar calculation system was inserted in ancient China around 104 BCE. This solar calendar divides the yearly cycle into twenty-four solar “nodes” (jie or jieqi) spaced approximately fifteen or sixteen days apart to reach the total of 365 days. The primary nodes are the spring equinox 春分, summer solstice 夏至, autumn equinox 秋分, and winter solstice 冬至.

The juxtaposition of these two calendar systems, however, puts the Chinese New Year, which is based on the period between successive new moons, at odds with the solar calendar of the year. Throughout much of Chinese dynastic history, from the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) to the early twentieth century, the reconciliation of the two incompatible reckoning systems had become one of the major official responsibilities through the issuing of the imperial calendar (huangli) by the court each year. The imperial calendar uses the lunar cycle to calculate major annual events but affixes the solar nodes alongside to indicate major seasonal changes and the time for proper agricultural activities.

The Nationalist Revolution in 1911–1912 and the Communist Revolution in 1949 not only brought about fundamental changes in political institutions but also removed the lunar calendar as the official reckoning system of the year in an attempt to “modernize” China. The Gregorian calendar was adopted as the official calendar, and New Year’s Day was moved to 1 January of each year. At the same time, the Lunar New Year was renamed the Spring Festival.

The adoption of the Gregorian calendar, however, has not dampened popular enthusiasm for the Lunar New Year, nor has it resolved the difficulty in timing the exact day of the holiday. Even today the date of the Spring Festival still fluctuates between 21 January and 20 February and is determined year by year. To accommodate the time needed for celebrating the Spring Festival—invariably called Spring Vacation in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—all yearly plans of major activities, both public and private, must be individually shaped.
A Family Celebration

Weeks before New Year’s Day, the Chinese go on a shopping spree as Westerners do before Christmas. They shop for food, presents, decorations, and clothing. Presents vary in different regions. Southerners prefer flowers while northerners like pastry and wines. Today, more and more Chinese emphasize the significance of gifts regardless of its monetary values.

Businesses large and small celebrate this festival season with a year-end banquet, generally around mid- to late January. Bonuses of cash in red envelopes are given to employees so that they can travel home for the holiday. In China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the year-end banquet also signals the beginning of the Lunar New Year holiday season. Most businesses close or curtail operations throughout the holiday season.

The twenty-fourth day of the twelfth lunar month (somewhere between late January and early February) marks the second major ritual that involves individual families. This is the day when each family sends its residential kitchen god back to heaven to report to the Jade Emperor, the ruler of heaven. It is customary for each family to prepare sweet foods, like *tángguā* (a kind of malt-sugar candy) or foods made from glutinous rice as sacrifices to the kitchen god. The belief is that with his mouth full of sticky and sweet rice, the kitchen god can mumble only a few sweet words when he makes the yearly report about the family to the Jade Emperor.

On New Year’s Eve, all family members gather for the evening meal. By lighting incense before the meal, the head of the family symbolically invites the departed ancestors and deities to join the occasion. The food served at the evening meal varies from region to region. Generally, these houses in southern China are decorated for the New Year. Small paintings and calligraphy honor the Kitchen God and other auspicious guardians who will keep the evil spirits away from the door. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

These houses in southern China are decorated for the New Year. Small paintings and calligraphy honor the Kitchen God and other auspicious guardians who will keep the evil spirits away from the door. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
northerners eat jiaozi (dumplings) as the entree while southerners eat niangao (rice cakes), both supplemented with plenty of meat and vegetable dishes. There are several explanations for the significance of jiaozi. One is that the first character of the word jiao 饺 is homophonic with 交, which means “intersect,” and the second character zi 子 means zishi or “the time of zi,” which refers to the three hours across the midnight. Jiaozi 饺子 thus means the time that connects the past and the new year and jiaozi 饺子 becomes the food for New Year celebration. The word niangao is a pun for “life improved year after year.” Almost all Chinese eat fish 魚 as part of the feast because it is homonymous with the Chinese word for “abundance” 余; the character is a combination of clothing and food.

After the meal, children pay respects to their parents by bowing (in China) or kowtowing (in Taiwan and Hong Kong) to them. In return parents give their children money in red envelopes. At midnight children and their parents light fireworks, as Americans do on the evening of Independence Day, but they all do it at the same time and in a much larger scale, so much so that the entire sky is lit up. Families stay awake through the night, leaving on all the lights in the house, a tradition known as shousui (watching the year in).

Worshipping ancestors is the first ritual on the morning of New Year’s Day. Traditionally, the Chinese then put on new clothes and visit their kin, friends, and neighbors. In the past people wandered out to greet anyone who crossed their path, but today text-message greetings...
have increasingly replaced physical visits. In traditional neighborhoods people attend public dragon dancing performances put on by teams of young men who practice martial arts and dancing throughout the year to prepare for the festivities.

The celebrations generally last three to five days while businesses are closed. On the fifth day, businesses start to operate after a ceremony of welcoming the god of wealth, and people begin to go back to work and their routines. Many taboos enforced during the first few days of the New Year season are lifted. For instance, people can dump their trash without fear of casting out their family fortune in the process. The fifth day, known as powu (breaking out of the fifth), is thus celebrated with the eating of jiaozi. Despite this winding down of celebration, the New Year season lingers till the fifteenth day of the month when it reaches its climax.

This day is the Lantern Festival, also known as the Yuanxiao Festival (yuanxiao means “the night of the first yuan,” one of three divisions in the year in ancient China). There are several legends about its otherwise unknown origins. It is believed that a god told humans to light their communities with lanterns to cheat the Emperor of Heaven, who was about to destroy them by the fire of his wrath. Others argue that because deng (lantern) is close to the word ding (population), lantern display is a way of wishing for fertility.

The traditional food of the Lantern Festival, originally called fuyuanzi (floating balls), later adopted the name of yuanxiao in the north and tangyuan (soup balls) in the south. Shaped like meatballs of different sizes, yuanxiao is made of glutinous rice with a candied or meaty stuffing and served with the soup in which it is boiled. Its round shape resembles the full moon that appears that night and symbolizes family unity and harmony.
People pour into the streets to celebrate. During the day people are entertained by shehuo, shows put on mostly by amateurs. The performances include various kinds of folk dances, such as the dragon dance, lion dance, yangge dance (rural folk dance), hanchuan (folk dance with model boat, donkey, and other props), gaoqiao (stilts), and a variety of drum dances. The evening is brightly lit by a fabulous display of lanterns of all sizes, shapes, and materials. Especially catchy among the lanterns are those in the shapes of assorted real and imaginary animals and popular figures appearing in Chinese classics and legends. Clusters of lanterns can be stacked in the shape of a large tortoise, known as aoshan, and can be built into a gate tower called xiulou. Lanterns are everywhere: hung in the air, placed on the ground, and floating on the water. The night concludes with a magnificent display of fireworks.

Like the other traditions of the Chinese New Year, those of the Lantern Festival also vary from place to place. People on the Pescadores archipelago of Taiwan, for instance, observe the custom of qigui (begging for turtles) in addition to the display of lanterns. Temples exhibit turtle-shaped lucky symbols made of all kinds of rice and allow worshipers to take them home. Dubbed pingangui (turtle of peace and security), a rice turtle taken home is believed to bring good luck to the family that houses it.

A Worldwide Party

Though a festival of the Han Chinese, the Spring Festival is also celebrated by twenty-nine of the fifty-five ethnic minorities in China. As a result of cultural diffusion, it is also part of traditions in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Chinese immigrants have also brought Spring Festival celebrations to their adoptive countries throughout the world.

HUANG Shu-min and Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading


Newspaper Development

Newspapers have existed in China for more than a thousand years. Always changing and evolving with Chinese history, they have served a variety of purposes, from informing readers about government activities and current affairs to keeping ordinary people up-to-date on the lives of celebrities. Today’s state-run newspapers face the challenge of operating in dual roles: as ideological instruments and players in a competitive media industry.

Chronologically, the development of Chinese newspapers can be divided roughly into three phases. First, before the nineteenth century, China’s newspapers were mostly government gazettes that served to facilitate communication between the central court and local officials. The second phase is from the nineteenth century to 1949. Modern newspapers emerged in this period. The earliest ones were initiated by Western missionaries. Later, when Chinese started to set up their own newsrooms, they mostly published civilian papers, although party-sponsored papers also appeared in this period. The mainstream trend for newspapers of the time was to serve as a forum for intellectuals to voice their political voices. The third phase started after the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, and it can be further divided into two stages: from 1949 to 1976, when most newspapers were strictly operated and regulated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); and from the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 to the present. China’s newspapers at this period are characterized by large variety, diverse content, and the modern “newspaper group” model.

Government Gazettes in Ancient China

Somewhere between 776 and 835, in the middle of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), local authorities from different locations stationed agencies in the national capital (Chang’ān, or today’s Xi’an city in Shaanxi Province) to collect information and intelligence. The officers of these agencies would sporadically send back either documents published by the imperial court or intelligence they had gathered to affiliated local lords so the lords could keep abreast of occurrences in the central government. These bulletins later evolved into official gazettes, whose sources were controlled by the central government. The contents of these publications included the emperor’s orders, appointments of officials, and ministers’ reports to the emperor, as well as information about the royal family. The content and function of these gazettes, which were copied by various local agents, remained unchanged even though methods of circulation and modes of regulation varied from reign to reign. The gazettes remained an instrument to facilitate communication across local governments in the realm of the throne, but they had no unifying title and were all named differently. Because the earliest agencies sent to the national capital by local governments were called Di, starting from the Song Dynasty (960–1279) the gazettes they published were gradually named Di Bao. During the Song
Newspapers in China have evolved from government gazettes that fostered communication between the central imperial court and local officials to the cosmopolitan newspapers of today. Modern, appealing, reader friendly—and available early in the day—they feature not only the news but coverage of sports, entertainment, and fashion trends. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.

dynasty the general public was allowed to copy and spread the Di Bao. In the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), civilian-operated agencies that copied the gazettes appeared, and agencies printing and selling government gazettes surfaced in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). These developments helped the public access information to some extent. Starting with the Song dynasty, gazettes emerged that were not published by the government. But they were banned by the dynastic governments and doomed to extinction.

From the Late Qing Dynasty to 1949

China’s modern newspapers were started by foreigners in the nineteenth century. Missionaries were the pioneers, followed by businessmen and politicians. The Chinese began to run their own newspapers in the 1870s. At the end of the 1890s, civilian newspapers reached their peak in number. From August 1896 to September 1898 alone, more than seventy newspapers were launched in China, double the total number of newspapers established by Chinese in the previous twenty years (Ding, 1998, 87). Confronted with the booming civilian newspapers and backed up by the central government, some local authorities in the Qing dynasty started to launch their own official newspapers in 1901 in an attempt to influence public opinion and check the effects of civilian papers. Since these official papers mainly carried news of laws that had been passed, administrative directives, and government documents—and most of them were distributed free to different government agencies and schools—their impact
on public opinion was minimal. They were no rival to the prosperous civilian newspapers.

At the threshold of the twentieth century civilian newspapers thrived. After the imperial dictatorship was toppled and a new republic was set up, the development of civilian newspapers picked up pace. Meanwhile, due to frequent and fierce conflicts between parties and military tycoons, civilian newspapers were diversified to become organs of different political interests, and often integrity fell victim to the fluctuations of party conflicts.

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in 1921, the party newspaper systems for the CCP and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) gradually took shape and matured. The ruling GMD established national news-regulation institutions. After about a decade, the CCP build its own party newspaper system and its basic paradigms, which would exert profound influence on China's newspaper industry after 1949. Though some other party newspapers survived, most merely scraped by and their influence was limited, at best.

But private newspapers were never extinct. Some of them emphasized business operation and expansion, and the prototype of the modern newspaper group can be detected among them. Some cherished the ideal of free expression and neutrality to win professional prestige and become leaders in shaping national public opinion. Some popular tabloids focused on women and the personal lives of celebrities.

The pattern for the literati to comment on politics was still an integral part of China's newspaper industry at that time. Taking advantage of newspapers, intellectuals promulgated modern science, voiced political opinions and criticism, and motivated the masses. Hence, among the large variety of newspapers, the majority were still devoted to political opinion. This trend for intellectuals to voice political opinions via newspapers was a result, in part, of the political movement to rescue the country from the despair and decline in the late-Qing period and of the tradition for intellectuals to serve their country. Yet as the fight between the CCP and the GMD escalated at the end of the 1940s, the world that tolerated diversified politics and opinions was no longer viable, and intellectuals had to identify with one party or the other. After the GMD met its Waterloo, so to speak, in 1949, the model for intellectuals to run newspapers vanished.

Newspapers in the People’s Republic of China

When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the CCP immediately built its own newspaper system. Apart from the People’s Daily, the official newspaper for the CCP’s central committee, the main emphasis was to establish party newspapers at the provincial level. Gradually, these efforts were extended to the local cities and counties, so that a party newspaper framework featuring the four levels of central committee, province, local cities, and counties was set up. Moreover, non-CCP parties, professional associations, and social groups also started or revived their newspapers, and some private civilian newspapers also survived.

But after 1953, private newspapers were nonexistent and public newspapers centering on CCP information became the dominant players. Over the years the number of newspapers fluctuated according to the domestic economy and the political situation. Yet as these fluctuations mainly affected specialized industry papers, county-level papers, or newspapers run by enterprises, their impact on the overall structure was minimal. In 1965, China had a total of 413 newspapers. When the ten-year Cultural Revolution started in 1966, newspapers were either closed or seized and their numbers dwindled drastically. In 1970, only forty-two newspapers had survived nationwide (Wu 2008, 483).

In 1976, the Cultural Revolution ended, and China’s newspaper industry caught its breath again. By 1978, there were 186 papers in China; at the end of 1995, this number had skyrocketed to 2,089. The quantitative boost invariably triggered major restructuring of the newspaper industry. Before 1978, the newspaper industry was very primitive, featuring only the different levels of party papers and a very small number of industry, enterprise-based, and evening newspapers. At the end of the twentieth century, although party papers were still the mainstream, an industry characterized by variety, diversity, and multiple levels had taken shape. Correspondingly, the function of newspapers went beyond publicity and political mobilization.

In 1979, the government permitted China’s newspapers to be “a public cause in nature but business in
practice,” (Li, 2003, 104–105), a designation that confirmed the newspapers’ roles as party organs as well as their independence as business entities. Newspapers had to practice business policies independently and be self-supporting. In 1993, the newspaper industry became the third largest in China, and it was acknowledged officially that newspapers had ideological functions as well as fiscal responsibilities. The political and theoretical preconditions for marketing newspapers were satisfied. Pushed by these notions and policies, in the thirty years since 1978, China’s newspaper industry reformed itself completely and rapidly to adapt to the development of a market economy. The reform of China’s newspaper industry could be divided into the following stages.

**EXPANSION AND POPULARIZATION**

In the 1980s, the increase in the amount of information was the focus of newspaper expansions. Numerous papers emerged during this period to carry news, especially economic reports. Meanwhile, other newspapers enlarged their pages to contain more information.

Changes took place at the operational level, too, with advertising playing a significant role for the first time and many newspaper companies beginning to do their own distribution.

In the 1990s, China’s newspapers embarked on its popularization process. At the beginning of the decade, magazine-like weekend newspapers featuring society news, crime stories, and human interest stories became the rage. They depended on sales for profit. In the mid-1990s, evening newspapers took the place of the weekend newspapers, which were criticized for their vulgarity. Propelled by large subscriptions and advertising income, the number of evening newspapers grew from 48 to 180 during the decade. The evening newspapers focused on local news, and their content was relevant to the daily concerns of ordinary households.

But at the end of the 1990s, cosmopolitan newspapers featuring a wide-ranging array of information useful in daily life, with coverage of sports, entertainment, and fashion, became the trend. Compared with evening newspapers, cosmopolitan newspapers were modern, good looking, and reader friendly, and they were available earlier in the day. They were welcomed by city residents, especially the younger generation. Ever since the first cosmopolitan newspaper hit the market in 1995, the format has won out over that of the evening newspapers, catching the fancy of the entire nation. Pressured by cosmopolitan newspapers, 70 percent of evening newspapers at the time were forced to print earlier than scheduled to vie for readers. Yet that wasn’t enough to give them a competitive edge, and China’s popular newspapers gradually became the main players of the market.

**NEWSPAPER GROUPS**

From the end of the 1990s to the early twenty-first century, many party-controlled newspapers merged into groups. The growth of newspapers was quantitatively remarkable, but overlaps in market positioning and the small scale of operations made for vicious competition. More seriously, these problems weakened government regulation of public opinion and undermined the influence of the party newspapers. In 1994 the process of establishing newspaper groups began, and in 1996 the first “merger,” Guangzhou Daily Newspaper Group, was officially launched. Over the next five years, forty newspaper groups were approved by the state. Most of these groups were based on existing party newspapers, which usually became the flagships for six to twelve newspapers, magazines, websites, and other businesses. The establishment of newspaper groups symbolized the adjustment and variation of China’s state-run newspapers under new circumstances. A different mode of operation was put into effect.

After reforms over three decades, China had 1,926 newspapers at the end of 2007, and advertisement revenue reached RMB¥312.6 billion (about US$44.7 billion) in 2006 (Li, 2008, 4, 7)

**General Characteristics and Problems**

Today’s newspaper industry in China has several characteristics. First, it functions both as an ideological instrument and as a part of the information industry. Second, it has multiple identities: As an ideological institution, newspapers must serve as government and party organs; as content providers, they must satisfy the needs of consumers and provide services; as public-service providers,
they must prioritize public interest and promote civility and social progress; and as businesses, they must survive and make profits. In terms of overseeing content and circulation, newspaper groups are divided by administrative districts, and each group covers only one district.

Presently, China’s newspapers are facing multiple challenges. The dual identities of newspaper groups endow them with the nominal independence of legal entities. Yet, the appointment of newsroom leadership, the major operational decisions, the distribution of vital resources, and the editorial policy decisions all reside in different levels of party organizations. Operationally, these groups also have to be self-supporting. Content production and business operations are separated, in that contents are planned and controlled by party organs and governments of different levels while marketing decisions have to cater to the fluctuating reader tastes. Multiple roles conflict sometimes. The political obligations on newspapers are compulsory, yet survival hangs on independent business procedures. Caught in such conflicting demands, neither the social responsibility of the press nor professional ethics of practitioners can be guaranteed. Also, the division of newspaper groups by administrative districts fosters regional monopoly and weakened market competition. The call for a cross-regional, cross-industry and cross-media newspaper group becomes an empty slogan if the scale and competitiveness of newspaper groups can’t be effectively boosted.

HUANG Dan

Further Reading
The 92 Consensus is a face-saving agreement reached in 1992 between China and Taiwan—technically still at war—in which both entities acknowledged the “one China” principle, but with different interpretations of how that principle would be defined. The consensus is the foundation for all negotiations between the two governments.

The 92 Consensus is an agreement that addresses the principle by which the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) believe that only one China exists: Mainland China and the Republic of China on Taiwan agree that both belong to the same China but agree to disagree on the definition of that one China. The 92 Consensus allows the two countries to negotiate even though they are technically still at war as a legacy of the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) that followed the 1945 surrender of Japan, which ended World War II.

The agreement’s name refers to a 1992 meeting in Hong Kong between unofficial representatives of both governments during which both sides came to their “one China” consensus. Although this debate may seem purely semantic, the 92 Consensus remains the foundation for all relations between China and Taiwan, and when its premise was questioned during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan, China refused to negotiate with representatives of the Taiwanese government.

The groundwork for the 92 Consensus began after Taiwan and China established respective semiofficial organizations to negotiate with each other in 1991. Taiwan organized the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), and China organized the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Immediately thereafter the two sides began to negotiate technical matters, such as extradition policies for criminals, registration of professional and business licenses, and recognition of college degrees. However, talks stalled because China insisted that Taiwan accept the “one China” principle as a precondition for further negotiations, and Taiwan refused. Finally a compromise was reached at a meeting in Hong Kong on 30 October 1991.

Under this compromise both sides agreed that there is but “one China” while acknowledging that two political entities exist under the “one China” principle. This oral agreement was to be submitted to their respective governments in Beijing and Taipei for final approval.

On 3 November 1991 China’s ARATS sent a cable to Taiwan’s SEF stating that ARATS would “respect and accept” the Hong Kong oral agreement with the provision that certain points could be renegotiated in the future. This cable was published by Xinhua, China’s official news agency.

In response Taiwan’s SEF in 1992 published its own reply in a press release disseminated by media outlets in Taiwan: “We (the SEF) will express the concrete content of the oral statement (on one China) in line with the ‘Guidelines for National Unification’ and the resolution on ‘one China’ adopted by the National Unification Council [under the President’s office] on August 1 of this year (1992)” (Su Chi and Cheng An-kuo 2002, 92). All Taiwanese media publicized this reply as the “92 Consensus.”
Of course, Taiwan considers the “one China” as its Republic of China on Taiwan, whereas Beijing regards the “one China” as its People’s Republic of China. However, based on this agreement to disagree, the chairmen of ARATS (Wang Daohan) and SEF (C. F. Koo) held their first meeting in Singapore in April 1993 and negotiated several binding agreements. Thus they were able to lay the foundation for future cultural, economic, and other peaceful exchanges between the two sides for a number of years until Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian openly repudiated the 92 Consensus. As a result the PRC immediately canceled all meetings between ARATS and SEF.

However, after winning the election in 2008 Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou accepted the 92 Consensus, and both sides resumed negotiations, resulting in the establishment of offices of ARATS and SEF in each other’s capital to conduct official business more efficiently.

Although the 92 Consensus may seem convoluted from a Western point of view, it allows the two governments effectively to “save face” so that they can negotiate peacefully in spite of the fact that they are technically still at war.

Winberg CHAI

Further Reading

Things will develop in the opposite direction when they become extreme.

物极必反

Wù jí bì fǎn
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region

Níngxià Huízú Zìzhìqū 宁夏回族自治区

6.1 million est. 2007 pop. 66,000 square km

Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region is one of the smallest regions in terms of both population and size in China. It is home to the five largest ethnic groups in the country: Han Chinese (China’s majority ethnicity), Mongolians, Manchus, Tibetans (Zang) and Muslim Huis, for whom the region is named. Islam is the dominant religion; Ningxia has an estimated three thousand mosques.

Livestock raising and agriculture are the major economic activities. Herbs and berries, such as the wolfberry (goji) are harvested for medical use; sheepskins and precious stones are among the region’s other natural resources.

Because of its altitude and cold weather, Ningxia’s natural conditions are relatively adverse. The central part of the region is dry land and desert. The Wulin plain, where most of the region’s agriculture is to be found, lies to the north, with the Huang (Yellow) River passing through it. The percentage of forest-covered land is only 4.85 percent and soil erosion is common. Several irrigation canals built during the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties, taking advantage of the Huang’s waters, are still in use.

Indeed, water shortage is a big problem for Ningxia. It is one of the poorest regions of China; its precipitation is low, and water from rainfall evaporates quickly year around. To improve this situation, the central government has helped the Ningxia Autonomous Region build irrigation projects, which are expected to improve the ecosystem and natural environment of the dryland areas of Ningxia.

Ningxia’s population distribution is uneven geographically, and so is its economic development level. In the better-irrigated areas in the north, the land is relatively...
densely populated, whereas in the dryland areas and high altitude areas of the south, population is sparse and the living standard is lower.

Yinchuan, with an estimated 2006 population of 1.42 million, is the capital and the political and economic center. Its history of more than 1,300 years and more than sixty historical sites, including mosques, pagodas, pavilions, temples, and imperial tombs, make it a popular tourist destination. The Hui people make up an estimated one-quarter of the city's population.

Di BAI

Further Reading

Varying factors have brought non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into the limelight in the late twentieth century, and China’s NGOs are no exception. Although “civil society” is a still-developing and often contested concept in China, the growing presence of NGOs has remained strong. But the impact of global recession—whether it peaks the Chinese sense of social justice or patriotic duty—will no doubt affect the future of China’s NGOs.
International Context and Discourse

Various factors brought NGOs and the broader concept of “civil society” into global currency during the closing decades of the twentieth century. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe drew the attention of political scientists to citizen movements such as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. In Western countries (where civil rights movements already had a rich history) environmental pressure groups played a prominent role in highlighting ecological concerns and in debates around the notion of “sustainable development.” The end of apartheid in South Africa also gave a boost to transnational pressure-group advocacy, which made a significant contribution to that momentous change.

At much the same time, some international development NGOs based in Western countries and a growing caucus of citizen organizations in, especially, Latin America, South Asia, and the Philippines, were calling for more “participatory” approaches to development in contrast to what they saw as inequitable “trickle-down” growth models promoted by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These institutions were encouraging developing-country governments to cede economic control to market forces and, in the name of fiscal prudence, to limit their ambitions in social provision. But while their economic orthodoxy remained firmly pro-market, the international financial institutions (and developed-country government aid agencies) also came to see NGOs as performing a useful function in “correcting market failures,” in meeting some of the service delivery functions from which many states were retreating, and in improving “governance” through, for example, citizen pressure for greater government accountability and respect for human rights.

Thus, from various perspectives, the late twentieth century saw growing global enthusiasm for NGOs. To a certain extent an international discourse of human rights began to eclipse the ideologies of “right” and “left” and there was, arguably, some shift in political initiative and opinion making from mainstream parties to “civil society” groups and media. According to one American scholar the era was seeing a “global associational revolution” marked by “a striking upsurge . . . in organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations” (Salamon, 1994). Certainly, by the 1990s, NGOs were visible global actors and there was widespread agreement on the desirability of a (non-government, non-business) “third sector” or “civil society.” This led many international observers to look for, and some to encourage, its emergence in China.

Chinese Context and Discourse

Despite reform and opening, China seemed to buck, or at least to resist, nearly all of the trends described above. In the late 1980s a “Democracy Wall” movement, led mainly by students and intellectuals, sought political reforms to match economic reform. This was comparable to citizen movements in Eastern Europe but, far from causing the political régime to crumble, it was forcibly suppressed during the summer of 1989—notably through the violent dispersal of a mass gathering in Tiananmen Square causing hundreds (or, according to some estimates, thousands) of deaths. “Reform and opening” did mean that the state was relinquishing its virtual monopoly on economic activity; but this was a gradual retreat, not the “big bang” or “shock therapy” liberalization prescribed by the Washington Consensus of neo-liberal economics. In social provision, the Chinese Communist Party and government were by the late 1980s actively calling on social forces (shehui liliang) to subsidize and fill gaps in state services. Government agencies were at the time establishing public fundraising foundations to advance state-directed philanthropy and creating professional, trade, and industry associations in order both to promote exchange with international bodies and to pass some of the functions of contracting economic ministries to intermediary organizations.

All of this was firmly couched in a rhetoric of state leadership to which social forces were subordinate. At the same time, although the preamble to many Chinese laws stated that their purpose was to protect the rights and interests of specific constituencies, and although the government signed various international rights conventions, there was little official interest in the generic idea of human rights. The Communist leadership was adamant that
China’s development was sui generis, emphasizing that development processes must have “Chinese characteristics” and asserting the collective “right to development” against the political rights of the individual.

Formal Associational Sphere and State-Sponsored Philanthropy

From China’s 1949 “liberation” until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, all associational activity was mediated through state and Communist Party channels. Alongside the Party, People’s Governments, rural communes, and urban neighborhood committees, a number of “mass organizations” ensured dissemination of the Party line to diverse social constituencies. Prominent examples were the All-China Confederation of Trade Unions (established in 1925), All-China Women’s Federation (1949), and All-China Youth Federation (1949). Replicating state administrative tiers, these typically had provincial, county, urban district, and in some cases rural township branches. The Women’s Federation generally had one or two cadres in every village. A handful of other official bodies, such as the China Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (1954), coordinated international exchange and promotional efforts.

The 1980s saw significant growth of what became known internationally as China’s “Government-Organized NGO” (GONGO) sector. Groups such as the China Association for International Understanding (1981) and China Education Association for International Exchange (1981) were formed to promote international linkages. Others, such as the China Family Planning Association (1981), were established to support the work of line ministries (in this case, the State Family Planning Commission). The Women’s Federation created a China Children and Teenagers Fund (1981) and a China Women’s Development Foundation (1988). A China Disabled Persons Federation (1988) was established under the personal leadership of Deng Pufang (a son of the then-prominent leader, Deng Xiaoping), who had been paralyzed during the political violence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The Youth Federation created a Youth Development Foundation (1989) whose flagship Project Hope was notably successful. During its first ten years it raised, from individual and corporate donors, US$200 million to build rural primary schools and sponsor school drop-outs from poor families to resume their education. Several line ministries also established their own national foundations. Few enjoyed Project Hope’s fundraising success, but the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ China Charities Federation (1994) managed to create a national network of foundations, mainly supporting Civil Affairs work in the localities. Their efficacy was, however, limited by their being required to absorb government staff during successive rounds of bureaucratic streamlining.

Also during the 1980s and 1990s the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (1953), originally established as a mass organization to rally the few remaining private entrepreneurs behind the Party line, was revived as the parent body of a growing number of industry-specific trade and manufacturers’ associations. (These are generally regarded as having been broadly successful in facilitating government-industry communication, resolving disputes and facilitating industry growth [Wexler, Ying, & Young, 2007]). The All-China Association of Science and Technology (1958), the mass organization designed to capture scientists and technicians, similarly became an umbrella organization for professional associations in specific sectors and for farmers technical associations.

As the mass organizations sought new roles appropriate to the reform and opening era, some Women’s Federation cadres showed interest in moving towards a more independent, NGO identity. (Others, however, did not; it must be emphasized that the attitudes, approaches and work of these national organizations varies considerably from locality to locality.) Debate around these issues was stimulated when, in 1995, the Federation hosted in Beijing a UN World Conference on Women. This also encouraged some women to create more independent groups, in many cases enjoying the institutional shelter of the Federation.

Quasi-independent legal existence became possible for social organizations (shehui tuanti). These are membership organizations that can, in theory, be started by private citizens; but in practice the regulations for their registration and management (introduced in 1989, in the wake of the Tiananmen suppression, and revised slightly in 1998) are highly restrictive. In order to register, an
organization must have at least fifty members, start-up capital, and office premises. Further, it must obtain the agreement of a government or Communist Party agency to act as its “leading and management unit” (zhuguan danwei), implicitly accountable for any trouble the group might cause: only then can it apply to register with the Civil Affairs authorities. This need for government patronage is a clear constraint on independence and it is hard for private citizens to achieve registration unless they have good connections with local officials and/or are proposing activities that enjoy explicit government backing. Furthermore, social organizations are not allowed to engage in public fundraising, which is a right reserved to GONGOs.

Nevertheless by the mid-1990s some 180,000 social organizations were registered in different localities across the country. Very many of these were leisure or recreational groups such as literary circles or calligraphy clubs, but some embraced charitable or public-interest ends.

In 1998, parallel regulations (with identical supervision and management requirements) were introduced for ‘people-run non-enterprise units’ (minban feiqiye danwei). This was a new category apparently designed to capture and formalize the status of numerous social service facilities—from private kindergartens to tearooms for senior citizens—that had been established by government agencies, neighborhood committees or private citizens. Registrations in this new category were initially slow but by the early twenty-first century numbered tens of thousands.

“Corporatism” or Managed Transition?

Scholarly studies in the mid-1990s highlighted the limitations of civil society in China (White, Howell, and Xiaoyuan, 1996). Some scholars perceived a model of state “corporatism” whereby the state sought to co-opt and control newly arising social forces and to crush those that it could not control (Chan and Unger, 1995). (Examples of the latter include, as well as Democracy Wall, the quasi-Buddhist Falun Gong movement, which was once registered as a social organization but was proscribed in the late 1990s.) Other writers argued that the GONGO sector was spreading social initiative to institutions bound less tightly to the Communist Party and might be a half-way house to a more autonomous sphere—as seemed to be borne out by the willingness of some GONGOs to sponsor some citizen-initiated groups (Young, 2001). Yet others argued that closeness to government offered distinct advantages over autonomy. One scholar noted in 2000: “New social organizations … can have considerable impact on the policy-making process by retaining strong linkages to the party and state, far more than if they were to try to create an organization with complete operational autonomy” (Saich, 2000). The point was arguably illustrated by the achievements of a national campaign against domestic violence jointly undertaken in the early 2000s by the Women’s Federation and a cluster of more independent women’s groups. Unlike some earlier Federation activities this seemed to be chosen not by senior leaders but by women activists. Because of the Federation’s involvement, the campaign was able to draw other state actors, including the police and legislators, into a range of practical and legislative interventions (Young, 2004).

The Independent Sector and “Grass Roots”

Despite the advantages of state linkages there were, by the mid-1990s, signs of a more autonomous NGO community emerging, comprising new organizations that soon began to identify themselves as “grassroots (caogeng) NGOs.” Some managed to register as social organizations; some as “people-run, non-enterprise work units.” Others were unable to do so, but registered instead as businesses in order to have at least some legal status. Some did not bother to register at all.

An independent pioneer was the Amity Foundation, established in 1985 by the Protestant church in Jiangsu Province. By 2000 this had an annual budget of around US$6 million (derived almost exclusively from overseas church groups) devoted to social welfare, education, and rural development projects broadly similar to those implemented by international NGOs. The YMCA of China, established in the early twentieth century but dormant throughout the Maoist years, was also resurfacing by the early 1990s, and active in urban community projects, especially in Shanghai. By 2000, Catholic, Islamic, and Buddhist service organizations were also operating.
Other initiatives came from determined individuals. An early example was a woman named Meng Weina who set up Guangzhou Zhiling (1985), a nonprofit school for intellectually impaired children. This at first met fierce resistance from local authorities who ordered the school to close, but it has since flourished to the extent that Meng’s renamed Huiling NGO now has branches in several cities. Dozens of other NGOs, often started by parents of disabled children and young people, now offer disability care and support services and, in some fields (such as autism) are moving towards informal federation.

Pioneering women’s groups included the Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Centre (1988), and Rural Women (1993), a magazine that went on to offer skills training and support services to migrant women workers.

Several centers, generally attached to law schools, offered pro-bono advice and advocacy in the broader sense of trying, through legal representation in high-profile cases where rights had been grossly abused, to broaden public rights awareness and discussion. The pioneer in this field, based in Hubei Province, was the Center for the Protection of the Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens (1992). Some later adopters of the template focused on specific sectors: notably, the Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal Services (1995) and the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (1998), both based in Beijing.

Some NGOs grew out of academic research and were geared towards policy influence and advocacy. Examples include the Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (1995), established in Yunnan Province by researchers from the Kunming Botany Institute, and the Pesticides Eco-Alternatives Center (2001) created by entomologists, also in Yunnan.

The environment was a fertile area for grassroots activism. Liang Congjie, the grandson of a reform-minded Qing court official, started Friends of Nature (1994) and a TV journalist, Liao Xiaoyi created Global Village of Beijing (1996). Initially these groups limited their activities to environmental education, but this soon attracted copious media coverage (from media thirsty for a new kind of story) that helped unleash a proliferation of similar groups across the country. There are now at least one hundred environmental NGOs formed independently by private citizens in China and some of these explicitly seek a “public supervision” (gonggong jiandu) watchdog role.

Grassroots groups also tackled the highly sensitive issues of HIV/AIDS (Aizhixing, 1994) and labor rights (Migrant Workers Document Handling Centre, 1998).

The great majority of these NGOs were urban initiatives, but some more rural (and ethnic minority) “bamboo shoots” (the epithet comes from the proliferation of such organizations “like bamboo shoots after rain”) also appeared in the late 1990s. One example was the Sanchuan Development Association (1997) in Qinghai Province. Others have followed.

All of the groups named above were profiled in a 2001 China Development Brief report, “250 Chinese NGOs: Civil Society in the Making” and remain active, although most have found it hard to grow and scale up their activities. The following years were marked by rapid but chaotic growth of the independent sector. Some established groups split. Some new ones lasted only a few months, but many more managed to weather the difficulties of fundraising constraints, an uncertain policy environment and lack of NGO management experience. There are now almost certainly thousands of independent organizations in China that—although they may desire and seek government linkages—think of and describe themselves not according to any Chinese taxonomy but as NGOs. This is still small compared to China’s vastness. Other sources suggest much higher figures. The official English language China Daily claims, rather breathlessly, that “there are 3 million NGOs in China” (which would make one per 400 citizens) while the World Bank quotes estimates of over 1 million (Working to build trust, 2007).

**Government-NGO Relations**

Government attitudes to independent NGOs remain ambivalent. Many local governments are still suspicious, but others have welcomed service provider groups and even some, such as Community Action/Shining Stone (2002) that work on issues of local governance. In central government, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, under whose jurisdiction NGOs fall, seems to have gradually moved from regarding this as an administrative burden to seeing the sector as an asset, and has launched a series of initiatives to promote philanthropy. (Revised regulations on foundations, introduced in 2004, at last made possible the creation of fully private foundations; the Ministry is keen
to channel some of China’s new, private wealth to “social welfare.”) The Ministry of Environmental Protection has been receptive to public participation in monitoring and protection. The State Council’s Leading Group for Poverty Reduction has also considered NGOs as a potential means for more effective targeting and delivery of poverty reduction programs. In the early 2000s, this all appeared consistent with a broader picture of a developing civil society whose other elements included an increasingly adventurous media, more independent scholarship and an emerging legal profession some of whose members took rights and “rule of law” seriously. China’s culture of government seemed gradually to be embracing a notion of public participation that was still technocratic, falling short of democratic accountability, but that went well beyond “mass mobilization.” The Communist Party appeared to be shifting towards a more consultative kind of authoritarianism.

But social stability is a perennial concern of Chinese authorities, and some continued to see NGOs as a threat. Various reasons for this can be adduced. Firstly, international advocacy groups like the International Campaign for Tibet, Human Rights Watch, Sweatshop Watch and numerous environmental groups almost certainly struck China’s political leaders as implacable critics—even wanting to “pull up the ladder” and stop China from developing. The Communist leadership had no wish to see this kind of activism spread to China and conservatives tended to suspect Chinese NGOs of harboring unpatriotic or “un-Chinese” elements (in much the same way that American conservatives feared “un-American” citizens during the Cold War). Secondly, despite government efforts to control its impact, the Internet (and other communication technologies) had clear potential to empower domestic activists. Thirdly, the turn of the century saw a rising tide of rural unrest as social and economic inequalities sharpened against a background of unchecked government corruption. Protests, some of which concerned intolerable pollution, were generally spontaneous and had nothing to do with NGOs—the grassroots groups, who overwhelmingly saw themselves as contributing to the “harmonious society” that was the stated objective of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s administration, avoided confrontational approaches and wanted closer and more cooperative relationships with government agencies. But some NGOs were becoming more self-confident and assertive in advocacy efforts and messages and at least some individuals and informal groups (often styling themselves “rights defenders”) were adopting overtly dissident positions.

Government concerns were heightened by “color revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), and the role in fomenting them allegedly played by U.S. public and private funding agencies. This prompted a two-year investigation of international organizations working in China and local NGOs receiving funding from overseas. (Given the legal constraints on local fund-raising, many grassroots NGOs rely heavily on international funding.) As a result of this investigation a few groups and publications were closed down in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics, and the chilly atmosphere of heightened security served as a warning to others.

This, however, seemed less a general crack down than an effort to tidy up and manage the sector. The Ministry of Civil Affairs has repeatedly promised new regulations to this effect—but, given the extreme difficulty of framing laws that facilitate the “right” sort of NGO and prohibit the “wrong” sort, and given the long delays in previous legislative ruminations, no one should hold their breath. Another, more evident management pattern is the growing use of GONGOs to serve not in a state monopoly but in a filtering and supervisory position. One GONGO, the Chinese Association of STD and AIDS Prevention and Control (1993) was in 2007 lined up as a retailer, to grassroots organizations, of wholesale funds emanating from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Another GONGO, the China Legal Aid Foundation (1997) has for several years been making grants to grassroots legal aid organizations. More recently—and partly in response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where many grassroots groups joined relief efforts—grants to the grassroots have been awarded by the China Red Cross Society (1904; but since 1949 firmly under the Ministry of Public Health administrative control). Furthermore, a new GONGO, the China NGO Network for International Exchanges, was set up at the end of 2005—color-revolution scare year—in an apparent bid to shepherd the many grassroots NGO representatives who were heading out of China to international conferences, and to guide the many international NGOs representatives landing in Beijing to look for local partners. Recent policy thus appears to fall somewhere between the “corporatist” and
“transitional” strategies mentioned above: control, but relatively loose control with some room for independent experimentation.

Impossible to tell at this juncture are the impacts of global recession on China’s NGOs. As millions of unemployed migrant workers troop back to their villages of origin—no longer required in the export processing zones and less affordable to urban elites accustomed to having their dishes, clothes, and streets cleaned by peasants—some grassroots NGOs may be fired by stronger feelings of social injustice. Or (as happened to a large extent in the 2003 SARS crisis), they may be infused with a sense of patriotic duty to keep the nation on track to glory. Or they may be torn in two directions at once. About all that can be said with some certainty is that public space and associational freedoms in China will, in the foreseeable future, remain contested.

Nick YOUNG

Further Readings

China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Once nicknamed China’s industrial heartland, the northeast region has been in economic decline. In an attempt to develop this region on a par with the country’s economic success, a plan was proposed in 2003 to revitalize and reform the region’s economic structure and upgrade its technology. While challenges such as reallocation of laid-off workers remain, the region has reported an increase in foreign investment.

In 2003 Wen Jiabao, premier of China’s State Council, announced a plan to revitalize the three northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. Wen Jiabao confirmed that the central government would support the three provinces in their efforts to reform their economic structure and to upgrade technology. China aims to convert the northeast region into a national and even a world-class industrial base for equipment manufacturing and the extraction and processing of raw materials.

Since establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the manufacturing structure of the northeast region has been based on heavy industry: the production of steel, machine tools, locomotives, and airplanes. But over time the economic efficiency of many companies in the area has deteriorated, since most of them are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As these companies have become less competitive, the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly and opening more and more to overseas investment.

The recent economic success of China is associated with Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping’s reforms that started in 1978–1979. The reforms encouraged entrepreneurship, introduced market elements into economic relations, triggered modern industrialization, and opened the door to foreign direct investment (FDI).

Northeast China faces many challenges: injection of new investment, restructuring of state-owned enterprises, improvement of the social security network, reform of the financial system, improvement of the investment environment, and strengthening of the infrastructure. Once China’s industrial heartland, the northeast region has declined into a “rust belt.” The northeast revitalization plan is the second such plan launched by the Chinese government in recent years, following the Develop the West project that started in 2000. The goal of these plans is to minimize economic discrepancies across the regions of China. The plan to revive the northeast was inspired by the economic success of China’s coastal areas such as the Yangzi (Chang) River delta and the Pearl River delta.

A key challenge to the northeast revitalization plan is the reallocation of laid-off workers. The region suffered massive layoffs of state-owned enterprise employees—nearly 10 million workers. The unemployed are engaged in constant protesting, which creates an element of political instability. The unemployment rate in the northeast is 10–15 percent. Russia, China’s neighbor in the north, has consistently expressed concerns about illegal cross-border immigration.

In the early 1990s the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) created a plan to revitalize northeast China and to promote regional cooperation in northeast
Asia. The Tumen River plan was intended to receive $30 billion for infrastructure development to create an international transport, trade, and industry hub on the Tumen River, which separates China, North Korea, and Russia, but due to lack of financial input from those three governments the UNDP project was not successful. Since the Chinese government announced its determination to prioritize the northeastern region in 2003, the UNDP is considering reviving its project.

Since 2003 the provinces in the northeast have reported an increase in foreign investment. The process of revival is supervised by a special branch of the central government, the Office for Revitalizing the Old Industrial Base in Northeast China under the State Council. Goals include rejuvenating the region, subjecting it to structural adjustments, and improving its investment environment.

Jilin Province is home to China’s first automobile maker, the First Automobile Works (FAW), which has a longstanding joint venture with Volkswagen. The province attracted more than $1.19 billion in contractual foreign investment in 2004. In Jilin Province foreign investors are encouraged to buy into state-owned firms. Wang Min, acting governor of Jilin, announced that his province intends to revitalize through the development of new industries and a focus on education, science, and environmental improvement. However, Jilin Province is still struggling as the worst-performing and poorest province in the northeast. The province lacks a coastline, oil reserves, and a developed private sector. In Changchun, Jilin Province, nearly 80 percent of economic output is generated by just one giant state-owned enterprise: the First Automobile Works.

Shenyang, capital of Liaoning Province, brought in more than $1.47 billion in foreign investment in 2004—52.9 percent more than in the previous year, according to the city government statistical bureau. To draw more foreign investment, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces named 2004 the “Year of Improving Investment Environment” and the “Year of Investment and Construction.” Zhang Wenyue, governor of Liaoning, announced that his province aims to maintain sustainable economic growth and to strive for a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $3,000 by 2010.

The inflow of foreign investment to the three northeastern provinces totaled a record high of $3.4 billion in the first half of 2004. Foreign investment goes to such sectors as equipment manufacturing, raw materials, chemicals, electromechanical products, modern agriculture, high tech, and automobiles.

China hopes to make the northeast region part of the country’s economic success story. Although the government talks about creating jobs in the private sector, state officials continue to focus on rescuing northeastern state-owned, capital-intensive, heavy industries from bankruptcy. Critics of the current government efforts argue that what the northeast needs is diversification of its industrial base and creation of labor-intensive jobs in the private sector. But since 2003 the region has attracted a large volume of foreign direct investment.

Irina AERVITZ

Further Reading
The desire for a return to the past, to a golden age, has often driven change in Chinese life, including the arts and letters. Such longing for the past was sometimes a response to current societal ills, as was the case with The Old Prose Movement in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE).

Literary innovation or even literary reform in the Chinese context has often meant the restoration of antiquity, the return to styles and modes of the past, where purity of expression was thought to be found. This is in keeping with the Confucian ideal of the past as the location of perfection and the present as a falling away from that golden epoch. The Old Prose Movement, or Classical Prose Movement (guwen yundong), which emerged during the middle years of the Tang dynasty (618–907), was part of this call to return to the past. Leaders of the movement, including the scholar-poet Han Yu (768–825), favored imitating the literary prose styles of the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties. To Han Yu and his fellow intellectuals, the literary fashion practiced during the period of the Tang was unsatisfactory.

Causes of Change

The Old Prose Movement, however, should not be seen as literary nostalgia. It is often thought that this movement sought to return moral gravity to literature, which had been abandoned for flashy style. This view does not accurately describe the reasons why such a movement came to the forefront. The causes of change are found in the political and cultural instability that followed the An Lushan rebellion (755) that brought chaos to northern China, in the form of decentralization of power, and dire economic and cultural consequences.

One aspect of this disorder was a sense of insecurity that the intellectual classes felt. The culture they had come to believe in, as worthy and stable, had suddenly been destroyed by the rebellion. These men looked for reasons for the disaster and concluded that they themselves were to blame because they, and the men of their class, had over time forsaken the morality of old that had provided not only structure to society but also a sense of continuity. The problem, therefore, was a moral one. Moral corruption had brought about political and cultural turmoil.

Private Experience

The Old Prose Movement used the past to critique the present, and it did so by broadening the reach of literary activity. In the past the concern of the writer had been to grapple with the larger forces that affected society and the individual. Literary concern centered upon social, political, and intellectual questions. Han added a fourth aspect: private and interior life. This new concern has been attributed
The Old Prose Movement was a belief among Tang dynasty scholars that a return to the writings styles of the past was necessary to combat the moral corruption that had brought about political and cultural turmoil during their time. This Chinese study offers a tranquil environment for reading and writing. Photo by Yixuan Shuke.

to the volatility in society after the An Lushan rebellion, where the only surety was the self and its protection, as well as private experience. Han favored a direct, personalized style and the use of colloquial expressions over formal ones. He also sought to record the individual’s reaction to external forces. This reaction becomes a guide for constructing a personal morality through which the individual may make sense of a fragmented social structure. Further, Han felt that the disintegration of morality was linked to the general weakening of Confucianism. He attributed this weakening to an external force, Buddhism, which he denounced as dangerous to the Chinese way of life.

Han’s concerns were shared by his friend the scholar-official Liu Zongyuan (773–819), who also regarded the utilitarian aspect of literary culture the most vital. His famous dictum, “Literature is to illuminate the [Confucian] Way,” was a motto of the Old Prose Movement. Confucian morality could be made known only by doing what the ancient sages had done. He advocated elucidating Confucianism for the people of his time by way of the tradition. Thus literary skill without moral content was useless; writing that was beautiful and attractive could also be morally wrong. He also gave a very specific definition to the Way. It was a morally correct attitude to life that could be learned by entering into a dialog with the sages of the past through intensive study of the Five Classics and the various texts of the One Hundred Schools, the many books of history and literature that addressed political and cultural attitudes and were so popular with the Confucians.

The desire to enter into a dialog with the sages was a way to acquire a clear and precise style of writing, which for Liu was important because it was a way to engage in life through the written word. Literary activity was not entertainment, nor was it merely intellectual activity; rather, it was a way to life itself. Therefore, the prose that he valued was one that contained depth, clarity, restraint, fullness and range, simplicity, precision, and gravity.

The Old Prose Movement initiated by Han Yu and developed by Liu Zongyuan was more than a style. It began with an affirmation that the past contains moral value that must be continually recouped by way of literary and intellectual engagement with life. More forcefully, this movement sought to find and reestablish a unified culture, after the fragmentation brought about the An Lushan rebellion, by recognizing that content must determine form, that writing is the search for a moral center, and that literacy culture is not merely cultural production; it is wisdom about life.
Legacy

The Old Prose Movement did not last beyond its two main proponents, perhaps because the influence of Buddhism, as well as Daoism, was gaining ground in China, so that engagement with life was tempered by a desire to understand the ways of the soul and the cosmos. However, during the Song period (960–1279), the movement enjoyed a brief revival with the works of Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072) and Su Shi (1037–1101). Thereafter, the movement retained very little popularity.

It was a unique aspect of Chinese literary culture in that it sought perfection in the past; perhaps for this reason its influence was limited and it has had little effect on later Chinese literary production.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


The 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing was China’s first chance to host the world’s biggest sporting extravaganza. It provided an opportunity for China to showcase both ancient heritage and modern aspirations. Substantial investments in necessary infrastructure and sponsorship accelerated China’s integration with the global economy.

When Beijing hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics, the event was saturated with cultural meaning, economic expectations, and political significance. The world’s biggest sports extravaganza, hosted for the first time by China and for only the third time by an Asian country, represented a chance for China to showcase both ancient heritage and modern aspirations. It also provided a catalyst for substantial investments in infrastructure and accelerated China’s integration with the global economy—while signaling pride and acceptance on the world stage and a boost to China’s international stature.

Some 200 nations participated in the Beijing games, bringing 10,500 athletes and 20,000 sports officials to town, along with nearly 22,000 accredited media representatives, more than 10,000 unaccredited journalists, and half a million spectators and tourists. The activities unfolded 8–24 August at thirty-one venues in Beijing and six venues in other locales, including Hong Kong, followed by the Paralympics 6–17 September.

Chinese endeavors to earn international acceptance and respect through athletic performance go back to the late nineteenth century and the importation of modern forms of competitive sports, largely in conjunction with Western missionary activities. But decades passed before...
China began to make a mark on the Olympic movement, and half a century more passed before China began to emerge as an Olympic powerhouse.

The earliest Chinese representation at the games consisted of an official observer at Amsterdam in 1928; the first Chinese athletes entered the games in Los Angeles in 1932. In 1958 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) severed ties with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) over the IOC’s inclusion of Taiwan as the Republic of China; not until 1979, coinciding with China’s redirection of development strategy and reopening to the outside world, did the PRC come back into the Olympic fold, with Taiwan taking part as the Chinese Taipei team.

China won fifteen gold medals in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, sixteen at the 1992 Barcelona games, and sixteen in Atlanta in 1996. Intensified training of elite athletes in a broader array of Olympic sports brought the count up to twenty-eight gold medals and a total of fifty-nine medals at Sydney in 2000 and thirty-two gold medals and a total of sixty-three medals at Athens in 2004; China now ranks third in the medals total after the United States and Russia. By contrast, China’s Winter Games achievements are much more modest: a cumulative harvest of three gold, fourteen silver, and fourteen bronze medals over the period 1980–2006.

China’s strengths have been in precision sports such as diving, shooting, table tennis, and badminton, with consistent excellence in weightlifting as well. National icons emerging from the Summer Games range from marksman Xu Haifeng, 1984 winner of China’s first Olympic gold, to Liu Xiang, whose 2004 victory in the 110-meter hurdles made him the first Chinese man to win an Olympic track event. Woman diver Fu Mingxia won two gold medals in Atlanta and four in Sydney; the men’s gymnastics team brought home a gold from Sydney; and Chinese partners won the women’s tennis doubles in Athens.

Firing the Imagination: The Olympic Torch

The 2008 Olympic torch relay took place from 25 March to 8 August 2008, prior to the Olympic Games. It lasted 130 days and carried the torch 137,000 kilometers—the longest distance of any Olympic torch relay. After being lit in Olympia, Greece, the torch traveled to the Panathinaiko Stadium in Athens and then went to Beijing. From there, the torch followed a route passing through six continents. The torch specifically visited cities on the Silk Roads, symbolizing ancient links between China and the rest of the world. The relay also included a successful attempt to carry the flame to the top of Mount Everest, which it attained May 8, 2008.

The torch traveled to twenty countries around the world, including the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, and then made its way through Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao before visiting 113 cities in China. It arrived at its final destination in Beijing on 8 August 2008.

The relay itself will probably be remembered for its political significance, as its widely-publicized route became one of the most regularly covered subjects in the media all over the globe, and because it took place during a period of significant publicity regarding China’s internal turmoil in the Tibet region. Because of this widespread coverage, it then became a prime target for people who wished to protest the central Chinese governing body, on Tibet and other issues. At several locations, including Islamabad, Delhi, and in Indonesia, the torch’s route was cut short, due to security concerns. In other places, only enhanced security was necessary. Nevertheless, the torch arrived safely in Beijing exactly on time. The relay and the Olympics events themselves went on smoothly, despite whorls of debate on the periphery.
Along with the intensified spotlight on athletic prowess, China’s hospitality, organizational abilities, people-moving facilities, command of security, air, weather, and much else came under scrutiny leading up to the geopolitical crucible of the 2008 games. Beijing initially had sought to host the 2000 Olympics, losing out to Sydney in 1993 by a mere two votes at a time when international disapproval of China’s military suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations remained strong. The city’s second bid culminated on 13 July 2001, with joyous celebrations in that same plaza greeting the news that the IOC had selected Beijing for 2008.

The selection was buoyed by public opinion at home; an IOC poll had found 96 percent support for the bid among Chinese urban residents. Beijing pledged to mount a “green,” “high-tech,” and “humanistic” Olympics, with an estimated $400 million going into construction and preparations; about a third of the budget was earmarked for an ambitious environmental protection program that included relocation of entire industrial centers. Relentless road building and subway expansion changed the city map constantly. A recruitment campaign to enlist 100,000 volunteers drew more than four times that number of applicants.

When Beijing made its Olympic bid in 2001, typical Western headlines read, “China Doesn’t Deserve the Olympics” and “Unwelcome Bid from Beijing.” During the bid process, multiple petitions were sent to Chinese leaders, the IOC, a number of national governments, and human rights groups. The U.S. Congress debated a resolution in opposition to the bid.

The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (known by the acronym BOCOG), in coordination with the municipal government and to the cheerleading of mass media, orchestrated a prolonged buildup to the games, marking occasions 2 years, 500 days, 1 year, 100 days, and finally 50 days before the opening ceremonies. The unveiling of slogans, mascots, and a uniquely designed Beijing National Stadium, known as the “Bird’s Nest,” hosted the track and field events at the 2008 Olympics. The stadium is pictured here under construction. Photo by Tom Christensen.
songs, and other trappings provided cause for additional press conferences and celebrations. Meanwhile the city launched drives to replace poorly translated signage and improve public sanitation and local civility.

Echoes of ancient culture were captured in the games’ official emblem, a figure in the form of a traditional artistic seal; its postmodern face arose in the imposing steel-wrapped National Stadium, also known as the “Bird’s Nest,” and the National Aquatics Center, or “Water Cube.” The mascots, five cute characters modeled on animals and introduced as the “Friendlies,” later changed to “Fuwas,” translated well to official Olympics merchandise ranging from T-shirts, hats, and key chains to stuffed animals. The games’ official slogan was “One world, one dream.”

China’s athletic hopes for 2008 were particularly high; an Olympic host country typically experiences a boost in medal count due to athletes’ familiarity with venues and home crowd support. In addition, as host, China automatically gained entrance to some sports in which otherwise it would have had to compete for inclusion, including baseball, softball, and soccer; while China’s women were strong contenders in soccer and softball, the men would have been unlikely to qualify in soccer and baseball.

Given the important role of corporate sponsorships in the Olympics, against the backdrop of China’s galloping economic growth and the promise of future expansion in productivity markets, the Beijing games were seen as a boon for business, both domestic and transnational. Concern for possible “losers” of the games, including residents displaced by construction, along with recognition of the value of historic preservation in promoting tourism, ultimately strengthened policies and programs to save what was left of the old city—but not before new construction, most unrelated to the Olympics, had replaced much of Old Beijing. Meanwhile calls by various organizations abroad, including Reporters Without Borders and the Save Darfur campaign, to boycott the Beijing games on human rights grounds appeared to have little traction; many observers still saw the games as a force for social and political improvement.

The Beijing Games will probably be remembered by history as a significant milestone for the PRC, but it has yet to be seen whether or not it will be considered a turning point, as some have hoped. Athletically, many records were broken, including significant achievements by Chinese athletes in both traditionally strong and traditionally weak events. Potential rivalry between the United States and China was muffled by the fact that by using different standards both sides were able to claim victory.
in the medal count: the Americans counted overall medals, including silver and bronze, and the Chinese counted only gold medals. There were also some unfortunate incidents, including the sad injuries of the Chinese track superstar, Liu Xiang, and the tragic death of a family member of the U.S. men’s volleyball team. Despite these setbacks, the 2008 Olympics will most likely be remembered for its lavish opening ceremonies, its careful and firm planning and security, and the emergence of a China with a strong national identity and desire to express itself as an equal in the modern world.

Judy POLUMBAUM

Further Reading


A drop of sweat spent in a drill is a drop of blood saved in a battle.

平时多流汗，战时少流血

Pingshí duō liú hàn, zhàn shí shǎo liúxuè
Although a Chinese educator introduced the idea and ideals of the Olympic Games to his country in 1908, China’s participation in the Olympics didn’t begin until 1932—and was then interrupted because of World War II and the “two-China” conflict. After re-entering the competition in 1984, China quickly moved up the medals rank, eventually hosting the Games in Beijing in 2008.

In August 1908, the fourth modern Olympic Games took place in London, and it was there—in the city that will host the 2012 Games—that the first steps were taken to set China on the path to Olympic glory. Even though China was not yet a member of the International Olympic Committee and Chinese athletes did not compete, an influential Chinese educator, Zhang Boling 张伯苓, the principal of Nankai University 南开大学, was in London, on his way to visit several schools and universities in Britain. He was impressed by the principle of the Olympics—fair play 公平竞争. He returned to China in October and introduced the idea—and ideals—of the Olympic Games to his students in Tianjin 天津.

After Zhang’s introduction, students of Nankai University held a seminar that would become famous for asking the “Three Questions about the Olympics.” These questions were: When would China send its first athlete to participate in the Olympic Games? When would Chinese athletes win their first gold medal at the Olympic Games? When would the Olympic Games be held in China?

It took the Chinese twenty-four years to answer the first question. In 1932 China sent Liu Changchun 刘长春, a sprinter, to participate in the Olympics in Los Angeles. He was eliminated in the earliest of the preliminary heats. It was another seventy-six years before the second question was answered. On 29 July 1984, Xu Haifeng 许海峰 won China’s first gold medal, in another Los Angeles Olympics. And it took a full century to provide an answer to the final question—“When would the Olympic Games be held in China?”—as the Games at last came to China in August 2008.

On 13 July 2001, Juan Antonio Samaranch, then president of the International Olympic Committee, announced in Moscow that Beijing would host the twenty-ninth Olympic Games in 2008. Hosting these Games proved controversial in many ways, but it also came to be a symbol of China’s “linking up with international standards” —the biggest event in China since the Communist revolution of 1949. Acclaimed Chinese filmmaker Zhang Yimou 张艺谋— the director of the lavish opening and closing ceremonies at the 2008 Beijing Olympics—spoke for the nation when he said: “It is not just an opening ceremony for the Olympics—it is a way of showing China to the world and what is happening today.”

China’s Olympic Dream

Examining China’s role in history, especially over the last two centuries, helps to explain why the Olympics mean so much to the Chinese. China, the world’s oldest civilization, cherishes the memory of its long
supremacy at the center of the world and the knowledge that China has contributed greatly to global scholarship, philosophy, and scientific innovation. As a consequence, the Chinese people feel abiding pain and deep chagrin over what can only be described as repeated humiliations at the hands of the Western and Eastern imperialist powers in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.

Modern Chinese history is one of struggle and striving to restore national pride. The Olympic Games, the largest sport event and one of the biggest social and corporate enterprises in the world, became a stage upon which China could achieve some of its political, social, and economic objectives. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, sport has been a powerful tool, and in the Maoist era between 1949 and 1978 sport was for China, as well as for other nations, right at the center of politics and diplomacy—a way to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism.

Since the 1980s China’s sporting success has been regarded not only as evidence of ideological superiority and economic prosperity, but also a powerful symbol of national revival. The government and most of the Chinese people believed that Chinese athletes’ excellent performance in the Olympic Games was a powerful demonstration of China’s rising power and influence on the global stage.

### Changing Perceptions of Chinese Athleticism

Why has hosting the Olympic Games been so important to China for the last hundred years? The answer to this question begins with label “sick man of East Asia” (dongya bingfu). This label seems to have had its roots in the port city of Tianjin, where the North American YMCA was particularly active. YMCA educators seem to have held a stereotype of sickly, effeminate, overly intellectual Chinese men. A popular story circulated among Western physical educators about a British consul in Tianjin who invited a high Chinese official—the Daotai—to dinner and afterward personally demonstrated for him the game of tennis. When he asked the Daotai what he thought, the Daotai responded that the consul was covered in sweat, and it would be better to hire someone to play in his place.

This story made its way from the Western educators to their Chinese pupils and is still widely cited in China today as an example of the corruption of the “old society.” Also bolstering the stereotype of the sickly Chinese was the publication in 1911 of The Changing Chinese by Edward Ross, a prominent U.S. sociologist. In that book Ross complained that young men imitated the stooped shoulders of the scholar and wore broad-rimmed glasses even when they didn’t need them, so they could look like scholars. He decried what he perceived as a lack of admiration for martial virtues. And perhaps most damning of all, he said that the young men played tennis like girls.

Of course the notion of the effeminate, intellectual Chinese is strongly contradicted by the martial arts tradition. Indeed, one can argue that kung fu films, more than anything else, have erased the perception of the effeminate Chinese among young Westerners, who admire Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan, and Jet Li. Although the stereotype was not accurate, from early on it was taken to heart by Chinese nationalists dismayed at China’s weakness, and it was written into the narrative of national humiliation that has become the standard in China’s history. Chairman Mao was one of the reformers who took steps to make sure the stereotype would not apply to the country as a whole. In his first published article, “A Study of Physical Culture” (1917), he complained, “Exercise is important for physical education, but today most scholars are not interested in sports.” Throughout his political career, Mao held to the belief that yundong (“activity” or “movement”) was the remedy for the passivity and weakness that ailed China. Yundong is also one of the words that can be translated as “sport,” and it was the word used to label the endless political “campaigns” of the Maoist period.

Susan BROWNELL

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performances on the Olympic stage would be the best proof of China’s great achievements in economic reform and modernization. Brilliant victories achieved by Chinese athletes at the Olympics would not only show China’s ability to stand proudly and independently among the other nations of the world, but would also strengthen the national spirit and confident vision of its citizens. Most Chinese people believed they could witness the glory of China, feel proud of being Chinese, and experience unity as a great nation by participating in, and eventually hosting, the Olympic Games.

China’s Influence on the Olympics

The slogan of the 2008 Olympics was “One World, One Dream” and the Beijing Games were also characterized as “humanistic Olympics,” “green Olympics,” “high-tech Olympics.” These core concepts derive from shared international principles, but have also been influenced by Chinese cultural understandings about social interaction, environmental protection, and modernization.

The perception of some Western people and the Western media of what the Games would bring about was often different from what the majority of ordinary Chinese people might have hoped for. For the Chinese, especially the 94 percent of Beijing citizens who voted to support the Games, the Olympics provided the best opportunity to show the world the unique identity of the Chinese culture and its people. The Games provided the opportunity to invest in programs to control air and water pollution, which raised awareness of environmental issues. They provided job opportunities for many people, and thus contributed to raising living standards. At the same time, neighborhood streets became cleaner and public transportation improved. New construction and upgrades to the city’s infrastructure helped to ensure that Beijing will remain a first class world city after the Games.

Olympic Participation

The history of China’s participation in the Olympic Games can be divided into three periods: the latter part of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the Republic (1912–1949), and the People’s Republic (1949–present).

Long before the Olympic Movement spread to China, a few Western sports existed there. Some were military exercises imported from Europe and the United States, which were in accord with the Chinese martial spirit and could be used to support the traditional Chinese ideal of a unified regime known as the “Middle Kingdom” Zhongguo 中国. This regime, the Qing dynasty, had been deteriorating gradually in authority since the end of the eighteenth century, but still dominated the nation culturally as well as militarily. In addition, a number of Western sports that are now contested at the Olympics came to China in the nineteenth century, usually due to educators at missionary schools and universities, or under the auspices of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). The British brought modern soccer to Shanghai in 1856. Basketball, which originated in 1891 at the YMCA in Springfield, Massachusetts, arrived in China only four years later.

The first modern Olympic Games were held in 1896, thanks to the work of Pierre de Coubertin. Coubertin had traveled widely in England and the United States to learn about sport and physical education in private and public schools as well as in colleges and universities; he then convened a conference in Paris to discuss the revival of the ancient Olympic Games. The first modern Games were a huge success, with over sixty thousand people attending in the restored grand marble stadium at Olympia, Greece. Coubertin told the world that he had revived the Games with these goals:

1. as a cornerstone for health and cultural progress;
2. for education and character building;
3. for international understanding and peace;
4. for equal opportunity;
5. for fair and equal competition;
6. for cultural expression;
7. for beauty and excellence; and
8. for independence of sport as an instrument of social reform, rather than government legislation.

It is generally agreed that when the French envoy forwarded an invitation to the Chinese government to
participate in the first modern Olympic Games, officials showed no interest in taking part. In 1904, when the Third Olympic Games took place in St. Louis, the Chinese media began to report it. In 1907, before the Fourth Olympics took place in London, a few Chinese educators suggested that China should participate in the games. But there was no response from the Qing government and without it no other impetus sufficient to take China into international sporting competition. Nevertheless, the notion of such an event clearly intrigued some outward-looking Chinese educators.

The Qing dynasty, which had ruled China since 1644, was overthrown in the Republican revolution of 1911 (although the emperor refused to abdicate until 1912). In 1911 the YMCAs of the Philippines, China, and Japan proposed that an Asian Olympic Games among Asian countries be held every two years. In 1913 the first Asian Olympic Games took place in Manila, Philippines. It was an imitation of the Olympic Games including all the regulations, rules, ceremonies, and even the use of the English language. It was called the Far Eastern Olympiad. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) welcomed the games but suggested that the word Olympiad should not be used in the future. Therefore, in 1915 when the games took place in Shanghai, the name was changed to "Far Eastern Championship Games" (FECG). The IOC sent a telegram of congratulations to the games.


**China Enters the Olympics**

In 1928, when the Ninth Olympic Games took place in Amsterdam, China sent one observer, Song Ruhai. Then in 1932 China participated in the Tenth Olympics in Los Angeles by sending a single athlete, Liu Changchun 刘长春, a sprinter and national champion, and his coach to the games. After twenty-five days at sea, when Liu finally arrived in Los Angeles, he was too exhausted to perform well and was eliminated in the heats. Four years later, China sent its first substantial contingent: 141 Chinese athletes traveled to Berlin to compete in the Eleventh Olympic Games. They did not win a medal, but after World War II, when the Games resumed in London in 1948, China sent forty athletes. There was still no medal to take home in this Games, the last one before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Mao Zedong 毛泽东, defeated the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石, took over China, and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Nationalists fled to Taiwan. Both Communists and Nationalists claimed that they were the legitimate government of China. Thus began the era of the “two Chinas” in political and sports history.

The Communists lost no time in recognizing the
importance of the Olympic Games as an international stage on which China’s identity could be asserted. In 1952, when the Fifteenth Olympic Games took place in Helsinki, the IOC invited both Beijing and Taiwan to participate. Taiwan claimed that it could not “compete with Communist bandits on the same sports field” and withdrew from the games in protest.

China is said to have received the invitation from the IOC just one day before the opening ceremony. They managed, nonetheless, to send a delegation of forty to Helsinki one week later to raise the national flag at the Olympic Village and watch the last few events.

Beijing prepared to participate in the Melbourne Olympics in 1956. However, when it was informed that Taiwan would attend, Beijing withdrew, despite the fact that the qualifying events had taken place and more than fourteen hundred Chinese athletes from twenty-seven provinces, cities, and autonomous regions had attended the preparatory competitions in China, and ninety-two athletes had been selected for the PRC sports delegation and were waiting to go to the Olympics. Instead, Taiwan participated.

Two years later, in August 1958, disappointed with the IOC’s ambiguous attitude toward the “two Chinas,” the PRC withdrew its membership from the IOC. Therefore, between 1958 and 1980, Taiwan represented China at six Olympic Games.

The situation started to change in the 1970s. In 1972 Lord Killanin became the new president of the IOC, a position he would hold until 1980. He felt that the IOC should not continue to ignore the PRC and exclude one-fourth of the world’s population from the Olympic Movement and the games. He visited Beijing in 1977. The famous “Olympic formula” was produced in 1979 and China renewed its membership in the IOC. Taiwan, according to the Olympic formula, would change the name of its Olympic committee from the “Chinese Olympic Committee” to “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee” and change the name of its team from the “Chinese Olympic Team” to “China Taipei.” In this way both Beijing and Taiwan would be able to participate in the Olympics.

### PRC Reemerges at the Los Angeles Games

In 1984 at Los Angeles, the PRC reemerged at the Olympics after an absence of thirty-two years, and would strengthen its performance for the next twenty-four years. (See table 1.)

The PRC won fifteen gold medals and finished fourth in the gold medal tally in the 1984 Los Angeles Games. Although the good showing was partly attributed to the absence of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Germany, it excited the Chinese—from government officials to ordinary citizens. “Develop elite sport and make China a superpower in the world” became both a slogan and dream for the Chinese.

But the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, South Korea, were a nightmare for the Chinese. When two sport superpowers, the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Germany, returned to the Olympics, China’s gold medal tally shrunk to five. China had slipped from fourth to eleventh in gold medals.

In 1992 China fought back at the Barcelona Olympics. Although the Soviet Union had broken up into several

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**Table 1** China’s Participation in the Summer Olympics 1984–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Games</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Host City</th>
<th>Gold Medals</th>
<th>Silver Medals</th>
<th>Bronze Medals</th>
<th>Total Medals</th>
<th>Gold Medal Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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countries, it still took part in the Games as a unit under the name “Commonwealth of Independent States” (CIS). The two Germanys had reunited, and the country was even more powerful than before. Nevertheless, China won sixteen gold medals and returned to fourth place in the gold medal count.

In Atlanta in 1996, the Chinese again won sixteen gold medals and remained fourth on the gold medal count. But in Sydney in 2000, China achieved a historical breakthrough. It increased its gold medal count to twenty-eight and finished third.

In Athens in 2004, the Chinese competed in 203 events and won thirty-two gold, seventeen silver, and fourteen bronze medals. Among thirty-two gold medals, four were won in events traditionally dominated by Western athletes: track and field, swimming, rowing, and canoeing. With sixty-three medals in total, China finished third in the medal rankings after the United States and Russia. With thirty-two gold medals China beat the Russians and finished second to the United States. Furthermore, Chinese athletes established six world records, and they broke Olympic records twenty-one times.

After their triumph in Athens, the Cable News Network (CNN) commented: “In the six Olympic Games they have competed in, China has moved up the medal tally in world record time.” China had become one of the three superpowers, with the United States and Russia, in the Summer Olympics.

In the Beijing Olympics of 2008, China finally surpassed the United States in the number of champion athletes it brought home from the games. The games traditionally try to ignore the competition of nations between one another in overall medal counts, but in this case both China and the United States claimed victory, China according to the number of gold medals (51 as opposed to 36 for the U.S. athletes), and the United States according to overall medal counts (110, as opposed to China’s 100). The U.S. method would seem to imply that a country whose range of medals was more equally distributed (36 gold, 38 silver, and 36 bronze medals) had more athletic prowess than a country scoring 51 gold. But there is no doubt that China currently stands at the top of the world athletically until the 2012 Olympics in London.

FA N Hong

Further Reading


Conceiving a Green Olympics

China faces serious pollution problems, but its position as host of the 2008 Olympics provided a strong impetus for ecological reform while simultaneously creating opportunities for critics to say that the country is not doing enough, or doing it fast enough.

Originally, the environmental organization Greenpeace drafted the concept of a green Olympics for the 2000 Olympic Summer Games in Sydney. The International Olympic Committee subsequently mandated that all summer Olympic Games be green Olympics. In 2005, the United Nations Environment Programme and the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games agreed to try to make the summer Olympics of 2008 environmentally friendly. The Beijing Organizing Committee promised to make environmental protection a priority, not only in designing and construction of Olympic venues, but also through afforestation campaigns, beautification of urban and rural areas, increased public awareness, and promotion of green consumption.


One-Child Policy

As China’s political and economic systems have evolved, so has its approach to population control. Although the one-child-per-family policy remains firmly in place, it has changed as China has changed.

China’s current population control program has been both praised and criticized. It has been praised because it advocates—and, to a large degree, has achieved—adherence to a limit of one child per family, although the government has not entirely eliminated two-child or multichild families. The one-child policy is credited for helping to hasten China’s development by holding population numbers at a level lower than they otherwise would have been, thus reducing the consumption of resources and the demand for public goods. It has been criticized because its very institution was an assertion that the state could and should plan human reproduction in the same way it planned for the production of grain or steel. The act of human reproduction was put in service of economic production, and babies became subject to the same local quotas as other products were. Grain production had to go up; baby production had to go down.

Since its implementation in 1979, the one-child policy has produced a new generation of couples of childbearing age who take it for granted that they will have only one child, two at most. Where the number of children one wants declines, voluntary compliance increases, and the blunt, widespread use of coercion diminishes. It is important that the origins and evolution of the policy be understood, however, as any assessment of the demographic benefits that it has produced must take into consideration human and social costs.

The Early Years

From the creation of the People’s Republic in 1949, population pressures received the attention of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. During the first two decades of the Maoist era, however, the proper approach to demographic issues was hotly debated. Initially, Mao advocated population growth. He rejected the argument that China was overpopulated. Like Marx, he believed that the exploitative class systems of feudalism and imperialism, not overpopulation, were the causes of poverty, disease, and unemployment, and that those evils would disappear as capitalism was replaced by socialism.

In 1949 China’s population already numbered about a half billion, a staggering figure that many outside of China believed would prove an unbearable drag on the country’s attempts to develop. It was two decades before China began to make population control a state priority, but top officials in the CCP had already begun to worry about the dimensions of the problem and the pressures created by a large and rapidly growing population. When the results of China’s first national census were tallied in 1954, some began to speak in more practical ways about the burden of population growth and to recommend that China amend its population policy to provide more support for family-planning education and to allow the import of contraceptives.
Before these first steps could yield any meaningful results, the radicalization of domestic politics interrupted the campaign, and advocates of family planning were branded as Rightists, or enemies of the revolution. It was only in the wake of the famine resulting from the devastating economic and agricultural policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) that it became possible once again to speak openly of population growth and family planning. The Great Famine, as it is sometimes called, claimed some 30 million to 40 million excess deaths. The setbacks to agriculture and grain production were so grave that it took several years just to raise production to levels that had been achieved in the mid-1950s. On a per capita basis, grain production was not keeping up, and worried leaders decided to reintroduce the birth control campaign in the early and mid-1960s.

In 1965 Premier Zhou Enlai proposed the first national population control target: reducing the annual rate of population growth to 1 percent by the end of the century. But the political upheaval of the early years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) prevented any progress in population control.

**Developments in the 1970s**

By the early 1970s, Mao began to accept the idea of promoting birth control. Zhou became a strong advocate of explicit population planning and population control. China’s first nationwide targets were set in 1972. Zhou authorized the creation of an extensive family-planning bureaucracy to oversee implementation of the new policies; provide free access to contraceptives, abortions, and sterilizations; and monitor the enforcement of local birth targets.

Annual and five-year economic plans began to include national targets for population size and growth, targets that were then broken down to the provincial and local levels. Local officials who were responsible for meeting grain and steel production quotas now began to receive quotas for babies. In the early and mid-1970s, the campaign slogan was “later, longer, fewer,” promoting later marriage, longer spacing between births (three to five years), and fewer births (a two-child ideal and a three-child limit). By the middle 1970s, the goals had changed. The new slogan was “one is not too few, two is enough, three is too many.” In large cities young couples began to feel pressure to have only one child.

Looking back, China’s leaders and demographers have argued that the two-decade delay after 1949 was a fateful mistake. By the time the state began encouraging fertility control, a vast new generation of young people had already been born and was approaching childbearing age. As a result, even with declining fertility levels, demographic momentum meant continued growth of the total population. In 1979 China’s population hit the one billion mark.

**Instituting the One-Child Policy**

By 1979 China’s leaders were so concerned about the likely impact of population growth on their development plans that they took the extreme step of launching a one-child-per-couple policy—the most extensive and aggressive attempt ever made to subject childbearing to direct state control and regulation. China’s top demographers and scientists announced that if China were to achieve its economic goals by the year 2000, population had to be contained within 1.2 billion. The one-child-per-couple rule (which had some exceptions for special circumstances) was put in place to meet that goal.

To have a child, all couples of childbearing age, urban and rural, had to receive official birth permits from the state. Provinces drafted regulations that offered economic incentives to encourage policy compliance and imposed stiff punishment for policy violators. In China’s cities and towns, growing acceptance of the small-family norm, reinforced by the late-marriage policy and tight administrative control in workplaces and neighborhoods, brought the urban total fertility rate down from 3.3 in 1970 to about 1.5 by 1978, a remarkably low level for a developing country. With a large population of women about to enter their peak childbearing years, however, the state deemed even this low level inadequate.

To further suppress fertility and prevent more second births, state monitoring intensified in workplaces and neighborhoods. Monthly gynecological examinations for women of childbearing age, plus a system of marriage and birth permits provided by the work unit (danwei, the state system encompassing economic and social services, from
employment and housing to healthcare and retirement benefits), ensured that anyone attempting to have a second child was caught in a tight surveillance net.

**Challenges in Rural Areas**

Rural China, on the other hand, posed a far more difficult challenge. As in rural areas in other countries and times, life in rural China encouraged high levels of fertility. Agricultural work requires household labor, and unlike their urban counterparts, even very young children could be put to work in service of family income. Moreover, while urban couples had the promise of a state pension for retirement support, rural families had no such welfare safety net. Children were the only guarantee of old-age support, and the most destitute villagers were inevitably those who were alone and childless. Only a son could ensure that a couple would be spared such a fate. In addition to these practical considerations, the traditional emphasis on bearing sons to carry on the ancestral line remained very strong in the countryside. As a result, although rural fertility levels were cut in half between 1971 and 1979 (declining from approximately 6 to 3), much of rural China remained hostile to a two-child or one-child limit, including the rural cadres who would have to enforce the policy.

**Fang-shou Campaign Cycle**

During the Maoist era, mass campaigns were a basic method of policy implementation. As campaigns grew more radical, resistance began to build, unintended consequences and difficulties were revealed, and the pressure to retrench would mount. The campaign tide would begin to recede, and steps would be taken to repair the damage that had been done. This pattern of “intensification followed by relaxation,” the so-called *fang-shou* cycle, unfolded repeatedly in the 1980s and 1990s as attempts were made to meet ambitious and unrealistic targets for birth limits. In 1983, for example, the Deng regime responded to evidence of stagnant birth rates by deciding to launch a major sterilization campaign. The result was a fourfold increase in the number of tubal ligations performed in 1983, as compared with the previous year.

As the campaign began to play itself out and elite politics took a more liberal turn, a decision was made to modify the one-child policy to allow for more exceptions. Fearful of a breakdown of authority in the countryside and widespread anger over the one-child limit and the often brutal tactics used to enforce it, leaders in Beijing decided to simply concede the need for a son in the countryside. The rural policy became a one-son or two-child policy. This concession was made in the hopes of pacifying restless villagers and improving enforcement, but over a period of several years, the effect was to encourage local governments to relax their enforcement efforts. This policy slippage weakened central control over the levers of enforcement and provided support for experts and birth planning officials who argued that the policy should be more flexible. These officials believed that the same benefits could be achieved with less effort and more
compliance by altering the policy to respond to the nuances of family need. This more differentiated policy was put into place in the latter half of the 1980s, only to be upset by the events of May–June 1989, which ended in a military crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square and their supporters in Beijing and other cities around the country.

The martial atmosphere that returned to Chinese politics for the next few years made it possible to once again tighten local enforcement and to carry out another campaign, which was justified by the failure to meet the population targets for the five-year plan that ended in 1990.

**Developments in the 1990s**

As the political mood in Beijing began to moderate, debate over the merits of a campaign approach to population management renewed. More people began to argue that development was the key to achieving low fertility levels. While the language of population targets and birth quotas was still in use, one began to hear more about women’s reproductive health and local enforcement flexibility. And instead of relying on the punitive approach of harsh fines and penalties, new experiments in client-centered service were undertaken. Three factors contributed to weaken the conviction that a one-child policy was necessary.

First, the obsession with grain production levels and self-sufficiency began to subside as the economy continued to grow.

Second, China’s post-Deng leadership, though still extremely cautious regarding formal policy change, was more open to the increasingly sophisticated and nuanced analysis being provided by a new, highly trained group of demographers and policy specialists who pointed to two disturbing trends in China’s demographic structure: rapid population aging and a seriously imbalanced sex ratio at birth.

Third, in the decade after 1992, China began to participate more actively in international organizations and institutions and played host or sent delegations to a growing number of international conferences. This shift coincided with a period of heightened United Nations focus on the interrelated problems of environmental protection, population growth, and the rights and status of women; it was further encouraged by the global discourse on these subjects that ensued. When China implemented its one-child policy in 1979, the dominant theory was that population growth was a primary impediment to economic growth. In the 1980s, however, liberal critics argued that population growth was not necessarily an impediment to development. While conceding that population growth could hinder development under certain circumstances, liberals argued that it could sometimes be an asset. Similarly, the feminist critique argued that population control programs objectified women by treating them as mere targets of a birth control agenda, rather than as human beings whose maternal, health, and reproductive needs should be met. These two critiques eventually merged in the form of a new international agenda that emphasized reproductive health and rights and explicitly rejected the use of compulsion to achieve population goals.

China’s Outline Plan for Family Planning Work in
1995–2000 showed the influence of that new outlook. It stressed the impact of the socialist market economy on population control and the necessity of linking population control to economic development. The plan placed special emphasis on improving women’s educational levels to promote lower fertility, and it stressed the importance of protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the people. Similar language appeared in a white paper on family planning issued in 1995, though that paper also stressed the virtues of the one-child policy and the duty of China’s citizens to adopt birth control and limit childbirth.

**One-Child Policy in the Twenty-First Century**

Despite liberalization, China’s one-child policy remains firmly in place. China continues to set national five- and ten-year goals for population growth, and isolated cases of brutal campaigns to enforce local targets continue to appear. Beijing has consistently declined to make any significant change to the policy or to abandon the one-child family goal. As long as the leadership measures its overall economic success in per capita terms, as long as local officials have targets to meet and suffer penalties if they fail, birth planning will remain a fixture in China’s reform policies.

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**Further Reading**


The Open Door policy highlighted the contradictory attitude of the United States toward China, which combined high-minded ideals with blatant avarice and dreams of a special relationship in the pursuit of imperialist privilege. Diplomatic initiatives by the United States in 1899 and 1900 marked the clear articulation of this policy, which shaped Sino-U.S. relations for decades.

Commerce formed the basis for the first Sino-U.S. contact in the late 1700s. The Chinese, then under the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), had little interest in international trade and viewed the United States as similar to, but weaker than, the “barbarians” of Europe. After defeating China in the First Opium War, the British began the “unequal treaty” era with the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing. The United States was not far behind. In July 1844 the Qing government signed the Treaty of Wangxia with U.S. representatives, an agreement modeled on the Nanjing treaty. The Treaty of Wangxia was the first of many unequal treaties that the United States would sign with a declining Qing government.

Humanitarian interests entered into the relationship as many people in the United States were eager to change China through Christianity, education, and charity. U.S. citizens presented themselves as friends of China, often by contrasting themselves to Europeans. Neither side, however, was satisfied with the other. Chinese were disappointed to discover that U.S. claims of benevolence were not translated into changes to the unequal treaties. People of the United States went through cycles of unrealistic expectations followed by disillusionment as large-scale trade never materialized, missionaries were largely unsuccessful, and the Chinese had little interest in imitating U.S. political, economic, or social models. In particular, U.S. interests in China were always driven more by a potential market than by the reality of a poor country harboring deep, and often quite justified, suspicion of foreigners. Nevertheless, economic instability in the United States during the 1890s made the China market seem even more important.

The possibility of China’s collapse or its division in spheres of influence by the European powers and Japan spurred U.S. diplomats to act more assertively. Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895 raised concerns over Tokyo’s influence. In 1898 imperialist competition for China transformed as Europeans and Japanese moved from simply seeking privileges through unequal treaties to demanding more exclusive spheres of influence—often called “carving of the melon.” The Germans used the excuse of Chinese attacks on missionaries to occupy Qingdao, an important city on the southern coast of the Shandong Peninsula, while the British took Weihaiwei on Shandong’s northern coast. The French focused their attention on areas bordering French Indochina, including Yunnan and Guangxi provinces. The Russians increased their forces in Manchuria and in the port city of Lushun. The Japanese wished to spread their influence into Korea and from Taiwan into China. These spheres not only further undermined Qing sovereignty but also
threatened to exclude the United States from commercial opportunities.

Over the next two years the United States crafted a policy designed to seek a consensus among the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and Italy) to guarantee equal access to China’s market and resources and to preserve its territorial integrity. The United States advocated the Open Door policy because it provided a framework for business people, missionaries, educators, and diplomats to cooperate. Although such a policy offered an opportunity for the United States to highlight its ideals, the Open Door Notes were ultimately designed to preserve the advantages obtained in the unequal treaties. The notes also reflected limited U.S. interests and capabilities. U.S. leaders were not willing to risk military conflict in order to pursue limited trade with China but instead relied on persuasion.

In fact, the United States could not escape Old World diplomacy, and the United States was as much the transmitter as the originator of the first note. It was a British official in China who suggested to William W. Rockhill, the U.S. Department of State’s China expert, that a note be circulated to European powers to clarify the U.S. position. Alfred Hippisley, an official in the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service, had a vested interest in ensuring that he could collect the tariff on imports in a uniform manner throughout China. The service was a product of the unequal treaty system and was designed to ensure that the tariff was collected to pay indemnities owed to European powers. The tariff became one of the most important sources of income for the Qing government. Although the British were seeking a sphere of influence, they preferred to preserve the ideal of free trade throughout all of China. Rockhill modified the British draft and passed it along for the approval of U.S. Secretary of State John Hay.

The first Open Door Note, sent by Hay to the major European powers and Japan in September 1899, did not demand an end to spheres of influence. The United States requested that spheres protect the principle of equal access to the China market by ensuring that all nations’ merchants pay the same tariff and harbor fees. Further, the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service was to continue to collect all revenue on behalf of the Qing government. Most recipients acknowledged the note without making a clear commitment to accept its contents. Regardless of U.S. hopes, because of heated imperial competition elsewhere and concerns about maintaining the balance of power in Europe, the recipients had little interest in a conflict over access to China.

The Boxer Rebellion set the stage for the second note. The rebellion took place in north China, primarily in Shandong Province. Young and poor Chinese men attacked foreigners, such as businessmen or missionaries, and anyone connected to the West, particularly Chinese Christian converts. This violence enjoyed brief support from some officials, and the Qing court briefly championed the Boxers when it appeared that they might force the foreigners out of China. In the summer of 1900 the United States, along with most European nations and Japan, sent troops to crush the uprising and force the Qing government to sign yet another humiliating treaty. U.S. president William McKinley and Hay feared that other nations’ troops, especially the Japanese and the Russians, would never leave and would further erode Chinese sovereignty. In July 1900 Hay sent another note that called for the same economic access that the first note had detailed

“Looking south over the Russian trenches and magazine from the central fortifications ofNaNshan Hill, Manchuria.” Russian trenches in Manchuria, 1904. For the United States the Russian presence in China meant a threat to trade. STEREOSCOPIC PRINT, 1904, UNDERWOOD & UNDERWOOD.
but then added a request for all nations to respect the territorial integrity of China. The second note summarized U.S. goals clearly:

[T]he policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution [to the Boxer Rebellion] which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. (U.S. Department of State 1900)

Hay neither made threats nor offered incentives but simply stated U.S. expectations. The Europeans and Japanese replied politely. Great Britain was most supportive as London wished to focus on a commercial competition that it was well prepared to win rather than formal empire building in China.

Following the occupation of Beijing by an international military expedition that included the United States, the resulting treaty, the Boxer Protocol, required a huge indemnity from China. The United States, eager to differentiate itself from other nations, remitted its portion of the funds, using the money to fund education in China and to bring Chinese scholars to the United States.

The United States portrayed the Open Door Notes and the Boxer Protocol indemnity as proof of benevolence and a “special relationship.” Although Chinese hoped that the United States could provide the Western education that some felt necessary to modernize China and leverage against other powers, they also confronted the reality of continuing U.S. treaty privileges. In the late 1800s and early 1900s tensions increased due to discrimination against Chinese in the United States. All this occurred in the larger context of rising Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism. In fact, the Open Door policy would loom much larger in the memory of U.S. citizens than in the memory of most Chinese.

U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt largely followed McKinley’s China policy. His successor, William Howard Taft, created what became known as “Dollar Diplomacy” by attempting to use loans to help China modernize and limit the power of other imperialists. This practice added the unrestricted movement of capital to the Open Door policy ideal of free trade and equal access. Nevertheless, the United States continued to disappoint many Chinese. Following the 1911 revolution the United States supported Qing general turned president Yuan Shikai rather than the revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen.

People of the United States found themselves torn between sympathy for China and recognition of Japan’s military and economic power. Without vital interests to protect, the United States was willing to make compromises to the Open Door principle. The 1905 agreement between the then secretary of war William Howard Taft and Japanese prime minister Katsura Taro acknowledged the growing colonial empire of each nation. The agreement between Secretary of State Elihu Root and Japanese ambassador to the United States Takahira Kogoro implicitly recognized Japanese dominance of Manchuria in 1908. In the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 1917 Secretary of State Robert Lansing acknowledged to Viscount Ishii Kikujiro Japan’s “special interests in China,” an act that appeared to contradict the Open Door policy.

The Eight Power Treaty, signed in Washington in 1922, highlighted U.S. interests in reinvigorating the Open Door ideal, particularly as concerns over Japanese intentions and capabilities increased. The signatories—the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal—agreed to respect the “sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China” and to protect the “principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China” (Treaty 1922, 278). The Open Door principle became a key part of what the scholar Akira Iriye calls the “Washington Treaty System,” a series of agreements designed to preserve the status quo in eastern Asia.

Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and then China proper in 1937 marked the open repudiation of the Open Door policy. But U.S. limited interests and the focus on events in Europe meant that Washington did little to ensure commercial access or the territorial integrity of China. Only as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 did the United States act. In his message to Congress in December of 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt noted that:

At that time [the late 1800s] there was going on in China what has been called the “scramble for concessions.” There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of
the “open door” in China was laid down…. Ever since that day, we have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East. (Roosevelt 1941)

In this context the Open Door policy was less a driver of U.S. policy than a rhetorical justification for it. Roosevelt’s statement also illustrated a shift in emphasis in the Open Door policy as the unequal treaty era drew to a close. Discussions of commercial access, which meant the protection of unequal treaty rights, faded from the U.S. consciousness, and the Open Door policy increasingly highlighted protection of territorial integrity.

Since World War II the United States and China have been more skeptical of the Open Door policy. For example, influential scholars such as William Appleman Williams placed the policy squarely in the context of imperialism. Certainly the Chinese Communists offered a biting critique of U.S. intentions. In August 1949 Communist Party leader Mao Zedong stated that the Open Door principle was the basis for “U.S. imperialism over the past 109 years (since 1840 when the United States collaborated with Britain in the Opium War)” (Mao 1949). It was the arch-realist, U.S. president Richard Nixon, who openly confronted the complex legacy of the Open Door policy. On the eve of his historic trip to Beijing in February 1972, his annual foreign policy report acknowledged that the “open door’ doctrine of equal treatment for all foreigners carried ambiguity in Chinese eyes” (Nixon 1972).

China’s growing power and wealth made the Open Door policy unnecessary. Today U.S. pressure for market access is directed at the protectionist practices of the Beijing government rather than at European or Japanese imperialists, and discussions of territorial integrity immediately lead to the sensitive issue of Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland rather than China’s possible partitioning. But the ideals behind the Open Door policy—that the United States was, and is, a good friend to China and that this amity is entirely compatible with commercial interests—remain important to the relationship.

Steven PHILLIPS

Further Reading


In a conversation on 23 February 1972, President Richard Nixon, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger discussed the 1962 Indo-Chinese war, Sino-American normalization, and Sino-Soviet tensions, among other issues.


Jingju (Beijing Opera) is characterized by simple and spare stage sets, highly stylized gestures and movement, and elaborate costumes and headgear replicating those worn in the Ming-dynasty; it is historically renowned for the skill with which women’s roles were once portrayed by female impersonators.

Jingju (Beijing Opera or Peking Opera) is the style of regional opera that originated in Beijing late in the eighteenth century. Jingju is sometimes regarded as a national Chinese theater. It belongs to the Pihuang system of regional operas, which combines the two musical styles: xipi, which is vigorous and bright, and Erhuang, more lyrical and dark.

Origins and Development to 1900

The xipi and Erhuang styles first occurred together in Beijing in 1790 when actors of the Sanqing (Three Celebrations) Company came from Anhui Province. In time three others—Chuntai (Spring Stage), Sixi (Four Joys), and Hechun (Harmonious Spring)—joined the Sanqing to form the “four great Anhui companies” (sida Huiban). These dominated nineteenth-century Jingju, the Chuntai lasting until the Boxer Uprising led to the destruction of Beijing’s theater district in 1900.

Initially the most famous Jingju actors were female impersonators (nandan, literally “male female characters”). A system of indenture developed by which entrepreneurs bought little boys in Jiangsu and Anhui provinces under contract and took them to Beijing, teaching them the Jingju arts. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1866) stopped the practice of bringing boys from the south, but acting talent ran in families, and boys could be found in Beijing to carry on the tradition.

By the 1830s the nandan were joined by the great laosheng (old male) actors. The most famous was Cheng Changgeng (1811–1880) from Anhui, who led the Sanqing company from about 1845 until his death and developed the laosheng arts to such a degree that many still call him “the father” of Jingju. Many plays were considered the property of particular actors, but the playwrights are rarely known.

A man in a park sings in the style of a Beijing Opera performer. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
Despite a tradition of female warriors, male characters dominate the “military” (wū) plays, whereas in the “civilian” (wén) plays, which deal with family matters and romance, the female characters are just as important. Content is based on old dramas or novels. A major source of military plays was the novel Sanguo yanyi (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), which deals with the civil wars of the third century CE and includes incidents showing heroism, treachery, and skillful strategy. The military plays feature battle scenes, characterized by thrilling gymnastics displays.

From 1900 to 1949

The twentieth century featured profound change in society, culture and politics in China, a lot of which was inspired by the West. In fact, the term colonial modernity was coined to describe many of the processes of change. The most important actor—and the most famous China has ever produced—was Mei Lanfang (1894–1961), who brought the art of Chinese female impersonation to its highest level. He also introduced several major reforms. For instance, he took on female disciples and performed in plays with social content. One of them was the long Niehai bolan (Waves of the Sea of Sin, 1914) about prostitution, which featured a strong social message, realistic acting, and contemporary costumes. Like actors of previous times, Mei had a repertoire of plays that was special to him, but in contrast to tradition, Mei collaborated with a particular playwright, the scholar-theorist Qi Rushan (1877–1962), himself the author of many works of Jingju.

One group of thorough-going reformers was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In May 1942 CCP leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) declared that all art represents class interests and demanded that the CCP’s art should be propaganda for the revolution. This demand did not mean eliminating traditional opera, but it did mean reforming old plays to suit revolutionary purposes or writing new ones that showed rebels against the feudal system as positive and the old ruling classes as evil. In January 1944 Mao even wrote a letter of praise concerning the revolutionary Jingju called Bishang Liangshan (Forced Up Mt. Liang), which premiered the previous month in the CCP’s headquarters at Yan’an. Based on the traditional novel Shuihu zhuan (Water Margin) about the rebels of Mount Liang, the opera concerns how ruling-class oppression forces protagonist Lin Chong to throw in his lot with rebellion.

Performance

The traditional Jingju stage is square and bare, with simple properties, a carpet on the floor, and a curtain at the back but not the front. The basic role types are sheng (male), dan (female), jing (painted face), and chou (clown), the last usually a negative character and noted for the white patch on his nose. Jingju has many subtypes of sheng and dan indicating character, age, and other qualities. In contrast to stage simplicity, costumes and headgear are complex and colorful, matching status, gender, personality, and calling. Costumes copy the clothes of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), no matter when the play is set. Movements and gestures are highly stylized, with mime central to many of the civil (wén) plays.

Musically, Erhuang tends to be sedate, slow, and low, appropriate to serious contexts, whereas xipi is vivacious and higher, suited to more light-hearted circumstances. Both have two or four beats to the bar, but xipi also has quick free rhythms. The orchestra is small, with the two-stringed fiddle jinghu usually the dominating instrument, but the clapper (ban), drum, and cymbal are also important. Other instruments include the yueqin (moon guitar), the three-stringed sanxian, and the double-reeded suona.

People’s Republic

The CCP’s initial policy was to support Jingju but to reform content along the lines of Mao’s 1942 proposals. Many traditional Jingju were simply banned or never performed. The CCP tried to raise the social status of actors. For instance, Mei Lanfang was lionized and appointed to the National People’s Congress. Although the old nandan were supported, new female-role trainees were girls.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) reform was taken to extremes. Operas with traditional content were banned and replaced by some fifteen model revolutionary operas (yangban xi), most of them Jingju. Apart from the heavy propaganda and class content of these models, the old costumes and role types were eliminated and the music greatly changed, for example, with Western instruments added for heroic effect.

The reform period since the 1980s has included the revival of traditions and newly written Jingju plays. At the beginning of the twenty-first century about two hundred...
traditional plays are considered outstanding. Women play almost all female roles; the nandan having almost disappeared.

On the whole Jingju has not done well under reform. The number of troupes fell from 248 in 1978 to only 93 in 2006, and many of the audience are tourists. However, regular festivals are held, and Jingju retains a following not only in Beijing but also in other cities such as Shanghai and Wuhan.

Colin MACKERRAS

Further Reading

A small troupe performs an opera in the park. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
About 330 types of regional opera in five broad categories exist in China, the great majority of which are popular or folk theater; many have religious aspects as well. The government has supported regional operas as an art form that can reach the masses, but many Chinese, especially urban youth, have come to prefer more modern forms of entertainment.

Regional operas in China (difang xi 地方戏) consist of 330 or so traditional drama (xiqu 戏曲) types. Ranging from small-scale folk theaters, with casts of only two or three, to large-scale complex art forms, at the pinnacle of which are the Beijing Opera (Jingju) and Kunqu, almost all of the regional opera types take their names from their place of origin. Although a few stories are specifically local, the dramatized tales do not vary much from region to region, many being based on the ancient arts of storytellers, novels, and old dramas. While regional variations exist in such aspects as gesture, costumes, and makeup, the main differences among regional xiqu types lie in the music, including melodies and instrumentation, and the dialect of the lyrics and dialogue.

Origins and Development
Musical traces from the thirteenth century exist in such surviving xiqu types as the Liyuan xi (Pear Garden Drama) of southern Fujian Province. Already in existence at that time was the musical pattern called “joined-song structure” (lianquti), which means in essence that dramatists add words to existing and named tunes. By the Ming dynasty’s (1368–1644) later years another pattern called “beat-tune structure” (banqiangti) came into use, in which metrical and tune patterns are developed appropriate to the desired dramatic effect. Xiqu types originating in the south tended to follow the liantuqi pattern, those in the north the banqiangti. Beginning in the fifteenth century regional theater proliferated in China, gathering momentum and yielding a large array of drama types in which originally northern and southern xiqu types mingled.

Five Categories
The five broad categories of China’s regional operas are (1) The Yiyang qiang system, (2) Kunqu, (3) clapper operas (bangziqiang), (4) the Pihuang system, and (5) all others.

Yiyang qiang songs and music arose in Yiyang, Jiangxi Province, probably in the fourteenth century. Beginning in the sixteenth century this opera spread to southern China and even to Beijing, becoming an integral part of many regional xiqu types under the name “Gaoqiang,” including Sichuan Opera (Chuanju). Its main features, according to the drama historian William Dolby (1976, 91), are that “It [uses] drums and cymbals for the rhythm, [has] bangqiang [helping tunes] choral backing in the final lines of the songs, and [is] brisk, vigorous and loud in delivery”. Its music follows the joined-song structure.
Kunqu, one of the oldest and most literary forms of traditional drama, combines music, poetry, dance, and highly stylized hand gestures that correspond to the music and percussion, and draws as well on mime, farce, and acrobatics, elements of ancient Chinese theater. It’s name comes from a type of music characteristic to the form, and dating to the fourteenth century, that originated in the district of Kunshan, in modern Jiangsu Province. The cast members include male characters (sheng), female characters (dan), clown characters (chou), and the strong male character with the painted face (jing). Although performance of Kunqu declined dramatically after reaching its peak in the eighteenth century, it regained popularity after the opening of China, and today some 700 troupes, many veterans of Beijing Opera, perform all over China.

Clapper operas are named for the hard wooden clapper (bangzi) that sets the rhythm. The earliest of the systems to follow the beat-tune structure, clapper operas also have string accompaniment, mainly from the yueqin (moon guitar). Arising in the Shaanxi area of north China in the sixteenth century, they quickly spread over the north and, by the seventeenth century, even to Hunan and Hubei provinces. This type of opera makes strong use of local folk songs.

The Pihuang system, which also follows the beat-tune structure, is actually the combination of two xiqu types: the xipi (literally “western skin” but meaning “song from Shaanxi Province” in the west) and Erhuang, a xiqu type probably developing in Yihu, Jiangxi Province, in the late Ming dynasty. Xipi music is vigorous and bright, whereas Erhuang is more lyrical and darker in texture. Pihuang xiqu types share musical accompaniment by the two-stringed fiddle huqin as well as the ban (clapper), two loosely connected pieces of hardwood, one striking the other to beat out the rhythm. By the eighteenth century xipi and Erhuang flourished together as Pihuang in south China, forming a major part of such important regional xiqu types as Sichuan Opera, Anhui Opera (Huiju), and Guangdong Opera (Yueju)—(this Yueju is not to be confused with Shaoxing Opera, which also goes by the name...
Yueju; even though the sound is identical, the characters for “Yue” are different). Most important, the Beijing Opera belongs to the Pihuang system.

The fifth category covers those regional opera xiqu types that do not belong to any of the systems, among them being many small-scale village folk theaters, most with small casts, and ethnic minority theaters. Other than Yueju, those attracting particular attention include the following:

1 Huangmei Opera (Huangmei xi) is based on local tea-picking songs in Huangmei, Hubei Province, and nearby Anhui. By the nineteenth century it began to perform full stories and in the twentieth was introduced to the city of Anqing, Anhui Province.

2 Nuo ritualistic dramas of minority areas in Guizhou and Hunan Provinces and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region share the use of masks. Diverse in color, shape, and pattern, these make symbolic use of such factors as character, status, age, and gender.

3 Tibetan Opera (ache lhamo) is the only ethnic minority drama in China to develop independently of the Han. Of fifteenth-century origin, it also makes much use of masks. Singing is high-pitched and flows smoothly, and accompaniment is limited to drum and cymbals.

Authorities regarded these popular performances with great suspicion, and both central and local governments adopted many rules against them. Authorities saw such performances as an occasion for sexual misconduct and demanded the separation of the sexes, often forbidding women even to attend at all. Authorities also saw regional operas as an occasion for social disobedience, for rebels to incite the people against legitimate authority. Authorities were particularly suspicious of operas based on the novel Shuihu zhuan (Water Margin), which concerns rebels and tends to characterize them positively. On the other hand, Confucian thinkers tried to use drama to spread their own thinking by emphasizing filial piety and loyalty in characterization.

During the Ming dynasty single-sex acting troupes became all but universal and remained so until the twentieth century. The great majority of troupes were all-male, which meant that cross-dressing of males impersonating females became a major artistic and social feature of Chinese theater. Boys began learning acting skills at a young age; their training was conducted within the acting

Social Setting

A major reason for the proliferation of regional operas was their close association with society. Becoming familiar with these popular dramas was part of everybody’s childhood socialization. Most xiqu types originated in the countryside, many then becoming more complex and moving into the cities.

Occasions for regional operas were many. Three of particular importance were popular festivals, religion, and fairs. These three were often interconnected, since festivals usually had religious connotations and fairs often took place at temples. Of all the festivals, the most important throughout almost all of China was the Spring Festival or Chinese New Year. This was generally the occasion for people to go out and celebrate, with an opera performance being part of the festivities.
The troupe itself, so pedophilia and homosexuality were common. Although folk troupes existed in the villages, many urban-based performers spent much of their time strolling around the countryside, especially during the peasants' idle seasons. As wanderers with socially despised morals, actors not surprisingly held a low status. In addition, they were subject to discriminatory laws and enjoyed no government protection.

**Stages for Regional Operas**

Although records indicate the existence of public indoor theaters in China's capital cities under the Song dynasty (960–1279), they had disappeared by the Ming dynasty. Until the rise of teahouse-theaters in Beijing, public performances of regional operas took place not in theaters but rather on outdoor square or rectangular stages or in other available spaces.

Many temples had a stage near or at the exit, popular regional operas being frequently part of religious ritual. The stage might be erected opposite the statue of the deity to whom the temple was dedicated. The performance was then offered to the deity, even if its content was secular. Dramas could also be performed outside the entrance of the temple.

Temporary stages also were used. They were erected for just a few days during the drama season or the temple fair and then dismantled. Sometimes such temporary stages were erected near each other, with a range of performances taking place simultaneously.

Although the stages were covered, audiences were not. They usually stood around and did not necessarily stay for the whole play. In dramas performed to honor a particular god, the human audience members were theoretically no more than incidental onlookers. Men outnumbered and stood or sat separately from women. Audiences were not required to be silent during a performance.

Tibetan drama performances took place in the monasteries in specially designed tents or in open spaces. If a performance took place in a tent, the actors stood in the center, entering or exiting through a narrow corridor, while the audience could stand or sit around on the floor, as appropriate. High-ranking guests had special seats.

**People's Republic**

The government of the People's Republic of China (founded in 1949) reformed the regional operas in several ways. It took over existing troupes and gave members formal salaries, attempting not only to improve actors' quality of life but also to raise their social status. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recognized regional operas as positive art forms ideologically because they were attended by such large groups. At the same time theater workers reformed the operas' content, eliminating material they regarded as antisocialist and promoting what could be used for propaganda purposes. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), during which CCP leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) had his wife Jiang Qing (1913–1991) carry out a class-obsessed "revolution" in the Beijing Opera, the regional operas mostly disappeared from the stage or simply copied the stereotyped patterns of the model revolutionary operas in which traditional themes were totally excluded. After the reform period began in the late 1970s the regional operas returned like a pent-up flood. Early in 1978 the main architect of the reform policies, CCP leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), explicitly encouraged actors in his native Sichuan Province to restore traditional themes in his beloved Chuanju. Since that time many traditions have revived in the regional operas, both in terms of content and social context. Some good regional opera works have been created, but in most xiqu styles output has tended to dwindle since the high point of the 1980s.

The modern public proscenium stage—darkened during performance and with the audience seated in front of it in rows and tiers, possibly at a significant distance from the performance—was introduced to China in Shanghai in 1908. Although they were not initially intended for performance of regional operas, theaters built since 1949 follow modern patterns, whatever kind of drama takes place within them.

Amateur folk troupes still perform, especially at festival times, but young people are tending to become more interested in modern art forms. The number of state-run troupes throughout the country (excluding the Beijing Opera) was 1,450 in 1998 but only 1,412 in 2006. The number of performances that these troupes gave held fairly steady during the same time, being 195,000 in the countryside and 60,000 in the cities in 2006, but the total
The number of audience members fell from 323 million in 1998 to 275 million in 2006.

Although regional operas survive, especially in the countryside, competition from more popular modern forms of entertainment are exercising a harmful influence on them.

**Colin MACKERRAS**

**Further Reading**


Yue Opera, which originated in Zhejiang Province, is unique among Chinese regional operas. Its actors are primarily female, and its stories and actions center on love and romance. Among China’s regional opera forms, its music is unusually lyrical and sweet.

Yue Opera (Yueju), whose name reflects the ancient designation of the Zhejiang region, is the main regional opera style of Zhejiang Province and Shanghai. It is among the best known and loved of Chinese regional opera styles, second only to Beijing Opera. Two main features differentiate Yueju from other Chinese local styles: its actors are mostly or entirely female, and its stories, costumes, and actions emphasize love and romance to the virtual exclusion of war and fighting.

Music and Style

The first stage performance of a yue opera, which took place in a village of Sheng County, Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, in 1906, was very simple. The music was based on local folk songs, and the costuming and props were rudimentary. The style proved successful enough for a 1910 introduction to the provincial capital Hangzhou, and in 1916 Wang Jinshui led a troupe to Shanghai. Reform followed over the next few years, and instruments like the two-string fiddle erhu and the three-string sanxian were added to the accompaniment. With the advent of women actors in the 1930s, the music became more lyrical and melodious, with smoother vocal lines, to suit the range of the female voice.

In October 1942, the famous actress Yuan Xuefen adopted the slogan “new Yueju,” leading further reforms, some influenced by Western theatre and film, others by Chinese romantic traditions. They included lighting and elaborate décor, colorful makeup, and costumes copying pictures of beauties of ancient times, with soft colors replacing bright ones and soft materials like crepes and georgette. The more feminine texture of yue opera is reflected in its lack of fighting and acrobatic scenes, distinguishing it from other regional styles.

Story Lines

Favored story lines emphasize romance and women, rather than the military dramas so popular in other regional styles. Many new operas were written during the reform period after 1949, including some that were directly political. Perhaps the most famous Yueju is Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai. This new version of Chinese culture’s most famous love story premiered in 1952. The young beauty Zhu Yingtai dresses as a man in order to engage in study. Fellow student Liang Shanbo falls in love with her, but her parents force her to marry somebody else. Liang dies of a broken heart, and the mournful Zhu dies jumping into his tomb. The couple change into butterflies, hence the name “the butterfly lovers” often given the story. The 1952 version emphasizes the cruelty of arranged marriages, but there are many implications in the
story about cross-dressing, sexuality and gender relations. Other performances in the repertoire include *Dream of the Red Chamber*, based on one of China’s most famous classical novels. The opera highlights the love-story between Jia Baoyu and Lin Daiyu. Although Baoyu is destined to marry Xue Baochai, he falls in love with another cousin, Lin Daiyu.

**Actors**

All performers were male in the first Yuefu stage performance in 1906. In 1923, Wang Jinshui began training girls for a women’s company. Within a few years the women’s companies were competing with the men’s companies, displacing them by the mid-1930s.

Men actors tended to appear again in limited numbers beginning in 1952. Traditions have returned, though, and since the 1980s almost all young stars have been female. Li (2003, 191) draws attention to a “bifurcated development in cross-dressing” in contemporary China: the once-dominant playing of female characters by male actors is dying out, while the converse performing of male characters by females is still flourishing, especially in *yue* opera. In this sense *Yueju* holds a special place in the Chinese theatre.

With its unique emphasis on female characters and stories of romance and love, the regional Yueju is holding its audiences very well in the twenty-first century.

**Further Reading**


Before the seventeenth century opium was used in China primarily for medicinal purposes. As the practice of smoking opium prevailed in China from the 1820s onward to the 1870s and the turn of the twentieth century—a time fraught by increasingly contentious issues regarding opium trade—opium’s addictive properties became more apparent. China was faced with a dilemma: whether to benefit from the revenue of opium trade or outlaw its use.

China’s opium trade is said to have been started by Arabian merchants in the seventh century during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). But the research of the Japanese scholar Yano Jin’ichi indicates that what China began to use during the Tang period was an opium-containing medicine, and that Chinese people did not know of or, as some opium historians have said, produce opium itself—the raw substance that’s derived from collecting the milky juice found in the unripe seed capsules of the opium poppy (*Papaver somniferum*), which becomes a brownish sticky gum when exposed to the air—until the sixteenth century.

Since the Tang period and into the Song dynasty (907–1279) a medicine produced by grinding, frying, and boiling opium poppy seeds and their dried cases had been used to treat bone ailments, kidney stones, stomach diseases, and respiratory ailments. Neither poppy seeds nor their dried cases are considered to be “real” opium. Moreover, the medicine made after grinding, frying, and boiling them was ingested, not smoked.

Opium (in its raw form) for medicinal purposes came to China around 1500, either from Thailand and Vietnam in Southeast Asia as tribute (payment of respect to China) or from central Asia by Arab traders. As some Chinese doctors said in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, opium had a curative effect for colds, diarrhea, anal prolapse, weak pulse, infected sores, and dysentery, among other supposed uses.

**Opium Imports Intensify**

From the seventeenth century to the early eighteenth century the Portuguese were the most habitual importers of the opium from India. In 1757 English merchants began to sell Indian opium to China. In 1773 the British East India Company, reaping further the benefits of India’s colonization, exerted influence on the trade, levying a tax on merchants. Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia played important roles in forwarding Indian opium to China’s various coastal harbors other than Canton (Guangzhou), which was the only port the British merchants could enter.

From the evidence available Chinese did not begin to use opium for smoking until 1710, when opium was first smoked by mixing it with tobacco, and after the 1770s pure opium was smoked using a pipe. Opium smoking was at first limited to Fujian and Guangdong, and it did not spread nationwide until around 1820.
After the practice of opium smoking expanded in China during the eighteenth century, opium imports gradually increased. According to the British East India Company’s records, in 1767 imports were more than 1,000 chests (a chest is a little heavier than 1 picul, which is 133.33 pounds), in 1790 more than 4,000 chests, in 1824 more than 10,000 chests, in 1832 more than 20,000 chests, in 1835 more than 30,000 chests, and in 1838 more than 40,000 chests. Because opium imports suddenly increased markedly during the 1830s, and the Chinese government could not thoroughly implement its opium prohibition policy, the First Opium War, which was the first military defeat of China by Western powers in the modern period, broke out in September 1839.

The war did not end until July 1842; China was defeated. Opium imports, considered illegal, flourished nevertheless in plain sight of the Qing court. In the twenty years after the First Opium War opium imports increased from their level of 40,000 piculs prior to the war to 75,000 piculs by 1859, according to Chinese maritime custom data. By that time the Second Opium War (1856–1860) was underway in China, with France, as well as Britain, in the fray. When the war ended, again with China in defeat, opium imports were legalized.

In the thirty-six years from 1858 to 1894, except for six years during which opium imports exceeded 75,000 piculs, imports fluctuated between 55,000 piculs and 75,000 piculs. During the few years when imports exceeded 75,000 piculs, they were at most 83,000 piculs. In the eleven years from 1895 to 1906—except for 1899 and 1903, when imports were 59,000 piculs and 58,000 piculs, respectively—opium imports always remained less than 55,000 piculs. The lowest was 49,000 piculs in 1909, and in 1906 imports were 54,000 piculs. Because of the decrease in foreign opium imports since 1895, Britain’s profits from the opium trade were slim, and in 1907 the Sino-British Opium Prohibition Regulations were signed, which decreased British opium imports 5,100 chests each year until imports were eliminated in 1918.

Opium Production in China

China did not possess knowledge of how to produce opium until around 1500, approximately three thousand years after opium’s first appearance in western Asia. Although there are records of opium production in Yunnan and Gansu in western China during the eighteenth century, no evidence exists that it was much produced or used for smoking. Not until 1820 did records show that the production of opium for smoking gradually began to increase. To this day historians cite Commissioner Lin Zexu’s 1838 warning that opium use would deprive China of soldiers strong enough to resist a hostile army. Nonetheless, in 1833 Lin was the first Chinese official to suggest that the production of native opium be considered to ease
the drain of silver from China—a deficit in the international balance of payment—caused by China’s spending more on opium imports that it brought in by selling silk and tea.

Although China increased opium production in the 1820s, not until late 1870 did surpass foreign opium imports. The production of native opium increased fivefold between the late 1870s and 1906, when total production of native opium was nine times greater than imports. The main opium-producing areas continued to be in peripheral China. Provinces in the southwest, including Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou, produced about 60 percent of the total opium output. Provinces in the northwest, including Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu, produced about 20 percent of the total opium output. The peripheral regions of the littoral provinces (located on a shore, especially of the sea) produced the remaining 20 percent. Before 1869 Yunnan was the most important opium-producing province. Thereafter Sichuan took its place.

In addition to native opium’s geographic and climatic suitability (and the fact that little land and labor were needed in peripheral China to produce it), the high price of native opium, caused in part by the Indian opium monopoly, was sufficient to cover the transportation costs between the inland and the coastal provinces. The import of Indian cotton made southern China rely less on cotton of northern China and southwest China, which resulted in increased opium production in these areas. Some evidence shows that half of all native opium was produced for the long-distance domestic trade and that the value of this opium constituted as much as one-sixth of the value of all of China’s interregional trade.

Opium Distribution

Although it had been long thought that foreign opium had not been sold beyond the Yangzi River before the First Opium War, the scholars H. B. Morse and John K. Fairbank, by “reconstructing” (from Qing palace archives) the pre-1839 distribution route of imported opium, determined that imported opium was distributed all over China. Soldiers, officials, large merchants, and small peddlers brought it inland.

After the Opium Wars China’s main entrepot (an intermediary center of trade and transshipment) for distributing foreign opium shifted from Guangzhou to Shanghai. When native opium swiftly increased in the 1870s, the sphere of distribution for foreign opium was more and more reduced to the coastal area between Jiangsu and Guangdong. Like the market of imported opium before the 1870s, that of native opium after the 1870s was all over China.

Records of the International Opium Commission of 1908 and of opium use of other countries in the late nineteenth century indicate that the 630,000 piculs of opium used by China in 1908 represented 95 percent of the total amount of opium used in the world that year. The per-capita amount of opium used in China was fifteen times that of England, twenty times that of the United States, and fifty times that of India. Southeast Asia, in total, used 20,000 piculs of opium at most. Except for the small island of Singapore, the figures for per-capita opium consumption in most of the countries in this area were lower than that of China. Out of the total population, 1.64 percent of opium users were American and 4.5 percent were from China. Among opium-producing countries, the percentage of domestic users was 25 percent for Persia (modern-day Iran), 8 percent for India, 1 percent for Turkey, and 99 percent for China.

Health Issues vs. Policies

Even though Chinese doctors had warned against opium overdose since the seventeenth century, they did not have much influence on Chinese policymakers. The Chinese view of opium as an addictive drug has actually been greatly affected by new medical views of opium in the West. Prohibitive views spread in Britain, especially after 1874, but Britain officially prohibited opium use only in 1916. The view of opium in other Western countries followed a roughly similar pattern.

In contrast to earlier Chinese discourse about native opium production between 1833 and 1874, which did not pay much attention to opium’s effects on health, the post-1874 Qing discourse by both proponents and opponents of native opium conveyed a deep concern for “national health.” Paradoxically, from 1874 to 1905, when opium was blamed for degrading social morale and when Chinese nationalism was rising, opponents of native opium lost the upper hand. “To seek final prohibition through
commanding the supply” was the Qing government’s rationale. Intellectuals such as Zheng Guanying, Wang Tao, and Sun Yat-sen all favored domestic cultivation. The worsening of the economy and a shortage of state revenues somewhat explain this paradox.

Furthermore, in contrast to Christian physicians who introduced the dangers of opium addiction to China around 1874, China-based Western doctors working for the Chinese maritime customs were slow to reflect this disapproval of opium. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did their view evolve from opium as a curative to opium as a “poison.” The Imperial Maritime Customs publications were another Western media that influenced late Qing thinking.

Opium Prohibition—Ramifications

By 1905, in addition to the victory of non-opium-smoking Japan over Russia and the prevalence of the view of opium as a poison in the Western world, many changes had taken place. Native opium was out-competing foreign opium. Opium imports had ceased to be profitable. Importation of foreign goods other than opium was increasing; foreign businesses gradually found other sources of profit. These conditions spread prohibition attitudes across the country and paved the way for the successful prohibition movement from 1906 to 1916.

However, the opium-abolition movement was relaxed in 1916 as China entered the Republican period (1912–1949). During the entire Republican period tensions over the production, sale, and use of opium were even keener than they had been during the nineteenth century. On the one hand, economic considerations encouraged some permissiveness toward opium growing and trading. On the other hand, concern was increasing that opium use harmed national health. Particularly during the Republican period, opium use was somewhat different from that during Qing times. In many villages in north China opium had been taken by pills or by injection. While opium-suppression bureaus of various political regimes in Republican China continued to function, the fiscal benefits of supplying opium was hard to ignore: The Japanese empire sold opium from Mongolia, Taiwan, Korea, and Osaka to coastal China and Manchukuo during the Sino-Japanese War.

The data for the sources of opium supply during the Republican period were scanty. The highest estimate of annual production was 400,000 piculs—less than the 580,000 piculs of 1906 when the Qing dynasty reached its climax. According to John Lossing Buck’s survey of thirteen areas of fifteen provinces, opium poppy fields were 14 percent of total agricultural land in 1904–1909, 3 percent in 1914–1919, 11 percent in 1924–1929, and 20 percent in 1929–1933. Although the survey did not represent the entire country or the entire period, it reveals more fluctuation in opium production during the Republican period than the steady increase during the late Qing period.
In Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, a policy of gradual abolition was adopted. This policy was adopted by China between 1906 and 1916. From 1896 onward the Japanese colonial government had set up factories to refine opium purchased from India and Persia into opium paste to sell to licensed smokers. The amount of opium used in 1899 was 229,864 kilograms and was gradually reduced to 3,667 kilograms in 1944. The number of licensed smokers was 52,063 in 1919 and 2,778 in 1942. In contrast, on the Chinese mainland, the People’s Republic of China resorted to drastic measures from 1949 to 1952 to eliminate the opium business by condemning it through mass propaganda as counterrevolutionary and subject to severe punishment.

While the use of other illegal substances has increased to some extent in both Taiwan and China in recent years, from the scale of its use and its effects is far less that of opium in the past.

**Man-houng LIN**

Further Reading


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*Canton Harbor*, oil painting by an anonymous Chinese painter, nineteenth century. This scene, painted in 1840, shows a British side-wheeler arriving in Guangzhou (Canton). Prior to the First Opium War (1839–1842), merchants from the West were not permitted to trade outside of the city.
Opium War, First

Di-Yì Cí Yāpiàn Zhànzhēng
第一次鸦片战争

The First Opium War (1839–1842) between Britain and China was triggered by disputes regarding the trade of opium, but contentious Sino-British relations had already been in existence for nearly a century. China’s clear defeat in the war began another century-long era in which China was subject to active foreign aggression.

Chinese attempts to prohibit British importation of opium in the 1830s, and the First Opium War (1839–1842) that resulted from them, were clear defeats for the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). After the war, while opium trade in China continued, China lost Hong Kong to Britain and was then forced to open “treaty ports” to foreign trade and to accept unequal treaties that limited China’s control over its foreign affairs.

Opium imports became a serious concern for the Qing dynasty in the 1820s as the court worried about the effects of smoking opium on officials and soldiers and the supposed drain of silver out of the country. In the 1830s people debated whether these problems were best dealt with by legalizing and regulating opium or by prohibiting it. Prohibition won, and Commissioner Lin Zexu was sent to Guangzhou (Canton) in March 1839 to bring about the end of the trade.

The British had for years been unhappy that the Chinese government forbade them to trade in ports other than Guangzhou—and while in Guangzhou they were forced to trade with a group of monopoly merchants (the Cohong). By forbidding the trade of opium, the Chinese now forced the British to smuggle it or relinquish the enormous profits it brought. (Two earlier British attempts to win the British full access to Chinese markets and European-style diplomatic relations with China, the Macartney mission of 1792–1794 and the Amherst mission of 1816, had also failed.) British merchants were also unhappy at being subjected to Chinese law, which they regarded as barbaric.

When Lin Zexu seized and destroyed the British opium at Guangzhou he demanded that foreign merchants pledge not to import opium again. The British deemed these actions to be justification for war and sent a naval and military force from India; skirmishes ensued throughout 1839. Formal fighting began in June 1840 when a large British expeditionary force was dispatched from Singapore. The British strategy was to seize the island of Zhoushan, near the mouth of the Yangzi (Chang) River, and then sail north to Tianjin, demand payment for the seized opium, and completely renegotiate relations between the two countries. The British easily defeated all the Chinese naval and land forces they faced. The Qing court was eventually forced to agree to the Treaty of Nanjing. The Second Opium War of 1856–1858, also called the “Arrow War” (because an of incident on the ship Arrow involving Chinese marines) resulted in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, which further opened China to foreign penetration. These treaties were the foundation of the system of unequal treaties that would govern China’s
relations with the imperialist powers until World War II. The opium trade continued and grew, and the political and economic dislocations caused by the war and the treaty were key causes of the Taiping Rebellion, which lasted from 1851 to 1864.

Further Reading
The Second Opium War (1856–1860) is less well known outside China than the first, but its impact was no less profound. The First Opium War (1839–1842) marked the beginning of the end for imperial China, but only because of the second conflict were opium imports legalized, foreigner governments granted the privilege of establishing embassies in China, and missionaries permitted to live and work in China’s interior.

Historians have as many names for the clash between the British, French, and Chinese from 1856 to 1860 as they have interpretations of that clash. It is sometimes called the “Anglo-French War” and perceived as yet another military engagement with aggressive imperialist powers. It is also called the “Arrow War,” after the ship whose allegedly illegal boarding by Chinese marines became the catalyst for war. Finally, the clash is most often referred to as the “Second Opium War” because in many ways the conflict was an extension of the tensions that caused the First Opium War (1839–1842).

As with the First Opium War, the opium trade was a crucial component of the tensions surrounding the Second Opium War, but it was by no means the only or even the most important bone of contention between the Chinese and the British. Most British at that time had an unshakable belief in not only the inevitability but also the righteousness of free trade, and Qing dynasty (1644–1912) restrictions on commerce seemed unreasonable and even provocative. The First Opium War demolished the Canton (Guangzhou) system of restrictive trade, but only five Chinese ports were open for foreign commerce. The clandestine opium trade flourished but remained illegal, much of the city of Guangzhou seethed with antiforeign sentiment, and most Chinese still viewed the foreigners as barbarians. The British and the French quickly grew dissatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), as well as what they saw as China’s unwillingness to live up to the promises contained in that treaty. The British were particularly angry that their merchants were still unable to live and work inside the city of Guangzhou, a measure that Chinese officials insisted would be dangerous for the merchants. By 1856 no one was satisfied with the status quo, and tensions were high.

The incident that began the war involved the Arrow, a lorca—a three-masted ship with a European-style hull and rigging characteristic of a Chinese junk—that Chinese authorities suspected of piracy. The Chinese crew was arrested and taken to shore. Initially, outraged British officials claimed that the Arrow was a British vessel and that the Chinese hauled down the Union Jack flying on its mast, but both accusations were false. In fact, the British registration had expired, and the flag was not flying when the ship was boarded. Sir Harry Parkes (1828–1885), British consul to Guangzhou, angrily called for military retaliation. Most scholars now accept that the Arrow incident was simply a British pretext intended to provoke open hostilities and wrest further concessions from a weakened Qing government. The French had their own excuse for joining the conflict—the beheading of
a Catholic missionary working in Guangxi Province in violation of Chinese restrictions on foreign movement. The two incidents were related because Guangdong and Guangxi provinces were administered as a single unit by the same governor-general, Ye Mingchen, a staunch opponent of foreign imperialism who resided in Guangzhou, the provincial capital of Guangdong.

Concessions of War

The British and French attacked Guangzhou in 1857 after some delays related to the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, seizing the city and capturing Ye. They then sailed north to Tianjin, just southeast of the Qing capital of Beijing, which the British threatened to attack. Negotiations resulted in the Treaties of Tianjin (1858), which, among other concessions, allowed foreign ambassadors to reside in Beijing, opened ten new ports for trade, permitted foreign ships to travel the Yangzi (Chang) River (where four of the new treaty ports were located), and allowed foreigners—missionaries included—to travel freely in the Chinese interior. The Chinese were to pay Great Britain and France large indemnities and to cap transit tariffs on foreign goods inside China. In addition, a fixed tariff was to be paid on all imported opium, thus legalizing foreign opium imports. Russia and the United States quickly claimed many of the privileges accorded the British and French in their own treaties. The agreements were to be ratified within a year, when all parties would gather again for a formal signing.

Although none of the concessions was welcome, the Xianfeng emperor (reigned 1850–1861) was said to have been particularly incensed at the notion of ambassadors from these aggressor nations living in Beijing and other foreigners traveling freely about the Qing empire. When it came time for the Chinese to ratify the treaties in 1859, Qing authorities unexpectedly changed their minds, blocked foreign troops and dignitaries intending to sail up the Beihe River toward Beijing, and bombarded them from Dagu Forts at the mouth of the river. Outraged, the British and their French allies—led by James Bruce, the eighth earl of Elgin (1811–1863), on the British side and by Baron Gros on the French—landed a combined army of nearly twenty thousand soldiers and marched on Beijing. Discouraged by the Russian ambassador from burning the Forbidden City, the complex in which the royal family resided, the troops instead looted the Yuan Ming Yuan, the summer palace just outside the city favored by the Qing royal family, and then burned the complex to the ground. Faced with the overwhelming military strength and advanced military technology of the Anglo-French forces, the Qing government backed down, and the Conventions of Beijing

During the 1856 war, Chinese set fire to foreign factories. The British retaliated by burning Chinese houses. Burning of Canton Harbor, oil painting, by an anonymous Chinese artist, nineteenth century.
were finally signed in October 1860, but only after China paid a much larger indemnity, adding Tianjin to the list of ports open to trade, conceding the Kowloon Peninsula across from Hong Kong to the British, and agreeing to a French demand that missionaries be permitted to purchase property inside China.

**Far-Reaching Ramifications**

The conflict had profound political and socioeconomic consequences. The Qing dynasty was forced to allow greater foreign penetration of Chinese territory and to consent to the further erosion of its sovereignty. At the same time the humiliating settlement generated a strong desire for reform among a number of top Chinese officials. The Self-Strengthening Movement, spearheaded by Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) and Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), sought to learn from the West in order to modernize China’s technology and strengthen its military. The treaties signed at the conclusion of the Second Opium War also contributed to the decision on the part of foreign powers to support the Qing dynasty against the Taiping rebels, whose catastrophic rebellion (1850–1864) overlapped the war and had the potential to topple the dynasty and invalidate those treaties. Last but not least, after opium imports were legalized in 1860, the opium trade with India surged dramatically, with imports peaking in the late 1870s and diminishing only because of growing competition from the Chinese poppy crop.

The Second Opium War is less well known outside of China than the first, but its impact was no less profound. Although the First Opium War is often cited as marking the beginning of the end for imperial China, the lesser-known Second Opium War left more visible scars of the destructive power of Western imperialism. The summer palace has never been rebuilt; its ruins remain to educate subsequent generations.

**Joyce A. MADANCY**

**Further Reading**


Initially used by ritual practitioners in prehistoric times as tools of divination, the bones of animals, as well as turtle shells, were inscribed with an ancient form of the language the Han use today. More than two hundred thousand of these “oracle bones,” covered with details of daily living, form the foundation of the world’s earliest written historical record.

A sophisticated system of divination called jiaguwen, or oracle bones, was practiced by royalty in the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE) dynasties. These survive as inscriptions, mainly on animal scapulae and turtle shells, whose function was to predict the future of national affairs, and they were written in an ancient form of the Han language that is used by the majority of Chinese today. The oracle-bone inscriptions of the Shang from Anyang, in Henan Province, were discovered at the end of the nineteenth century, and they form the most complete historical record of that period. Their various writing styles are artistic and are appreciated as calligraphy. About 210,000 pieces of Shang oracle bones have been collected. About 80 percent of about forty-five hundred characters used in the oracle bone inscriptions are recognizable, and many are still in use in modern Chinese. In Anyang, nearly twenty-five thousand inscribed pieces were excavated between 1928 and 1937; they include more than twenty-two thousand turtle shells and some twenty-two hundred bones. The excavation of Anyang has been resumed since 1950 and continues now; the largest excavation of inscriptions totaled more than five thousand pieces.

Some three hundred different inscriptions from the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) have been excavated from several places since 1979: the Zhou’s royal center, Zhouyuan, in Shaanxi province; Xingtai in Hebei province; and Fangshan Liulihe in Beijing. The Zhou inscriptions have smaller-sized characters and different representations than the Shang’s, and their nature has not yet been interpreted with certainty; some believe that these Zhou artifacts should be attributed to the Shang peoples. Nevertheless, the knowledge we have now comes mostly from the Shang oracle bones.

Belief System and Astronomy

The materials selected for use as oracle bones were animal scapular bones and turtle shells. Some of the turtle shells came from as far away as the South China Sea. Ritual practitioners, or wu, would heat the dried bones during a ceremony and ask questions of ancestors or the gods. By examining the cracking patterns and listening to the sound of cracks, the wu were supposedly able to hear the divine answer. These questions, answers, and results, as well as the date and the wu’s name were inscribed on the bones and/or shells. The wu of the Shang dynasty were experts in specialized fields such as the medical science, agriculture, and war. It seems that female wu were in charge of reporting forecasts and other changes. Written
language was only accessible to some elites and the wu; the latter were thought capable of communicating with the gods.

The Shang believed that ancestors could protect them but they could also bring disaster. Royal ancestors were worshiped along with gods. The highest god was Di, who led a group of gods of nature, such as wind, rain, storms, individual mountains and rivers, and planets and stars. Royal ancestors could also influence the gods, so a king could perform a ritual wherein he married one of his dead consorts to a god. The king, also named "King Di," acted as a medium between the divine and the human worlds, and some had even learned the wu’s profession.

From the written records on the oracle bones, much has been learned about the lives of the ancient Shang. The Shang established a mature ritual calendar and had a concept of past and future. Such a calendar is based on the knowledge of the regularity of the sun and moon, which can be reconstructed according to the inscriptions. The inscriptions show the discovery of new stars, comets, the different stages and changes of the sun and the moon, and they also contain the earliest record of an eclipse in history. Big months of 30 days, small months of 29 days, and a year of 353–354 days were recorded. The Shang had also set up a double month and double year to resolve the extra time accumulated, which is unique in the world calendar. The Shang used a decimal system in which 10 days equaled one xun. For each xun one ancestor was worshiped, and 36–37 individual xun were offered reverence, creating a one-year cycle.

### Economy and Technology

Both the Shang and the Zhou were agricultural societies, so the weather was extremely important; the subject of many inscriptions is weather—begging for rain or for the rain to stop. Food, liquor, and blood, along with music and dance, served as offerings to the gods for their favors. Sometimes animal and human sacrifices were necessary. These records show that four-hundred humans were once sacrificed at one time.

The oracle-bone inscriptions of the Shang explain group farming methods and the different instruments used in agriculture along with fertilizers and equipment for storing the harvest. The main produce was grain and millet, and the Shang produced a large amount of liquor; the Zhou, on the other hand, forbade drinking. Some bones record that sweet wine and aromatic liquor were offered in rituals—often together in hundreds of pots.

The Shang used sophisticated techniques for the domestication of animals. Cows, sheep, horses, pigs, and dogs were domesticated. Horses and dogs were also used in battle and for hunting. The oracle-bone inscriptions contain categories of terms that describe certain animals according to type, shape, color, character, and sex.

Bronze ritual vessels are the most important artifacts of the Shang and the Western Zhou people; they were considered to serve as mediums to the supernatural world and symbolized royal power. Techniques for casting bronze were kept secret. The oracle-bone inscriptions record that the Shang made blood sacrifices when casting bronze vessels.

More than two hundred characters used on the bones relate to silk production, weaving, silk cloths, and nets, revealing that the Shang had mastered extensive textile
technologies. Sixteen kinds of medical conditions ranging from pregnancy to urinary diseases, children’s diseases, infectious diseases, and facial and teeth problems, including some diseases that are known today, were inscribed on oracle bones. Techniques and medicines used in surgery were recorded, as well as the activities of specialists who took care of royalty. Some of the medicines and medical instruments described are still used in traditional Chinese medicine.

Government and Social Systems

The oracle bones reveal much about the structure of the government and social system of the ancient Shang dynasty. The Shang had established a sophisticated legal system and government, all under the king’s dominant control. A group of titled, high-ranking elites with many consorts lived in the royal court. Both male and female elites had feudal lands, and both genders participated in ritual practice and war. Commoners and slaves were on the lower rungs of this social ladder.

The government included specialized departments that dealt with matters ranging from hunting to war, from salt to ritual calendars. The Shang had established a postal system, and they used shells as currency. The Shang had a well-equipped and well-trained army of about thirty thousand people during peacetime that included foot soldiers, chariots, and cavalry.

The inscriptions on the oracle bones act as a royal journal; they form a three-thousand-year-old window into the daily lives of the Shang people and their rulers.

WANG Ying

Further Reading

Overseas Chinese

Throughout the past two centuries, Chinese have migrated to different places for different reasons. The terms for these groups have varied as well, and their profile in economic markets has changed from unskilled to highly skilled. Although descendents of older generations of Chinese migrants might have fewer emotional ties to China, they share a common bond of interest in their heritage.

The migration of Chinese from different regions in China to different parts of the world is a phenomenal process in globalization that has demographic, socioeconomic, and political implications both worldwide and in China. Numbering between 30 million (lowest estimate) and 40 million (highest estimate) worldwide, not including Chinese living in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, the overseas Chinese are minorities in some countries, making up as little as 3 or 4 percent of the population, but form significant percentages of the population in others (78 percent of Singapore’s population, for instance, and 28 percent of Malaysia’s). Although the highest concentration of overseas Chinese is in Southeast Asia, the United States has the largest absolute population with 2.5 million, a number expanding due to the continuous flow of Chinese migrants into the country from China and other parts of the world.

Today most overseas Chinese are visibly urban, and many are engaged in the business, professional, and service sectors. There are also many Chinatowns around the world, whether remnants of historical niches of Chinese communities or new creations for attracting tourists.

Distinctive Names

The term *overseas Chinese* loosely refers to all Chinese who reside outside China, including both citizens of China and citizens of other nations. The Chinese term for Chinese migrants who settle outside China is *huaqiao* or “Chinese sojourners” and is generally interchangeable with the English term *overseas Chinese*. When these Chinese and their descendents identify themselves by their local nationality as, for instance, Malaysians or Americans, they prefer to use the more neutral term *huaren*, literally Hua people, which refers to the Chinese ethnically without any implication of nationality. The term *huaren* is today commonly used by Chinese of different regions and nationalities, including those in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, instead of the term *zhongguoren*, which also means Chinese but is derived from the root word *zhongguo*, which refers to the country of China (literally as the Middle Kingdom). In fact even in China, when politicians and other individuals wish to emphasize Chinese worldwide, *huaren* rather than *zhongguoren* may be used, although often they are collectively referred to as *huaqiao/huaren*. In China today, *huaqiao* refers only to citizens of China living abroad, and so it is technically incorrect to refer to Chinese of other nationalities as *huaqiao*.

Such distinctions are not addressed by the English
label *overseas Chinese*. Because of this, many scholars who study them prefer to use the terms *Chinese overseas* or *Chinese of different nationalities* (CDN) to refer to Chinese who are citizens of other countries worldwide. These terms are more comparable to the Chinese term *haiwai huaren*, meaning, simply, the Chinese outside China, and they are commonly used by Chinese scholars in China. Although overseas Chinese are also described as Chinese diaspora, especially by scholars in the West, some Chinese scholars take issue, perhaps with “forced exile” implicated in the term diaspora as it was originally used, since overseas Chinese departures from China have been voluntary. But for simplicity in this discussion in English, the term *overseas Chinese* refers to all Chinese living outside China, without any disrespect to those who wish to stress their new national identities. Regardless of the labels they are given, these populations have their Chinese origins in common, even if their regional backgrounds are diverse.

Since there is no consensus on a label that can cover all Chinese in different parts of the world, it is worth pointing out one aspect of a Chinese term about which Chinese scholars agree: *huaren*, or Hua people, or more specifically *haiwai huaren* excludes Chinese living in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. Scholars and politicians in China refer to these Chinese as *jingwai huaren*, or Chinese in the territories outside mainland China, in contrast to huaqiao and CDN. Also worth noting is that overseas Chinese are often assumed to be Han Chinese, although in the term *overseas zhongguoren*, non-Han Chinese, such as the Uighur in Turkey, who originally migrated from Xinjiang should also be included. There are Koreans, Russians, Mongolians, Huis, and other non-Han *zhongguoren* (Chinese) who live overseas. The Huis, for example, either form a distinct population of Chinese Muslims or merge with the local dominant Muslim population.

**Migration and Distribution**

Southeast Asia, known to the Chinese in the past as the South Seas, had long been visited by Chinese traders and pilgrims. But when Admiral Zheng He made various expeditions to Southeast Asia (and further west) in the first part of the fifteenth century, there were few Chinese in the region; it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that there were significant Chinese settlements in different Southeast Asian ports. These earliest Chinese settlers were traders.

In the nineteenth century, many Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia and the Americas. Most of them were recruited as coolies or indentured laborers. This was the time of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) in China, which had brought about much suffering in South China; many peasants from the region were willing to migrate overseas to secure a better livelihood, while a number of colonial economies welcomed Chinese labor. In the Americas, slave trade had just ended after a civil war, and coolies were needed to replace slaves. In places like Cuba, British Guiana, and Peru, coolies were in fact treated like slaves to work in sugarcane and other agricultural plantations, build railroads, and even dig guano. In North America, Chinese coolies were recruited for railroad construction in the United States during the 1860s and in Canada during the 1880s. The earliest Chinese migrants in Panama were indentured laborers recruited to build the Panama Railroad in the 1850s.

The migration of Chinese in the nineteenth century to North America, as well as to Australia and South Africa, was also linked to the gold rush. For example, Chinese migration to Canada began with the Fraser River gold rush in 1858. The early Chinese immigrants to North America, however, suffered from white racism and opposition from local organized labor. The United States introduced the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 to restrict and discriminate against Chinese immigration. Not until 1965 did the New Immigrant Act abolished quotas of immigrants based on national origins. And the introduction in 1967 of Canada’s universal points system—in which immigration officers assigned points for certain criteria such as education level, the availability of suitable employment, age, and fluency in English or French—helped to prevent racial discrimination against immigrants entering Canada.

Compared to the migration to North America, there were relatively less Chinese who migrated to Europe in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the Allied Forces in World War I recruited more than 100,000 laborers from Shandong, Shanghai, and Zhejiang to serve on the war front in such roles as cooks and trench diggers. In Russia, Chinese laborers were recruited also during World War I to build railways. The more affluent European countries attracted Chinese migrants from their former
colonies. The United Kingdom attracted Chinese from Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, both students and professionals. Many of the migrants from Hong Kong established and worked in Chinese restaurants. Chinese from Indonesia and Suriname were attracted to the Netherlands, where they are still very visible in the twenty-first century. After the defeat of the Americans in Vietnam in 1975, many Chinese from Indochina migrated to France.

The 1920s and 1930s saw another surge in Chinese migration overseas, especially from Fujian and Guangdong, as young men sought to escape kidnapping by bandits or recruitment by soldiers to fight in the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists. Migration from China subsided after World War II, however, as the independent new states in Southeast Asia restricted Chinese immigration. There was a further surge before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949; after which migration became extremely difficult. With the opening of China in 1979, Chinese were again freer to migrate, especially to the richer industrial West. There were also Chinese who “re-migrated” from the poorer south to the richer north, such as from the Caribbean to Canada. The years preceding the British handover of Hong Kong to Communist China saw the migration of many Chinese from Hong Kong to the United States, Canada, Europe (especially the United Kingdom), Australia, and New Zealand.

Today overseas Chinese of similar regional origins in China often settle near each other outside of China (such as the Hokkiens, Hakka, Cantonese, and Teochiu in Southeast Asia, the Taishan Chinese in America, or the Hakka in Calcutta and Jamaica). Although they might assimilate the diverse cultures of their new locales (by learning to speak Tagalog or Malay or Spanish, for instance) many of them, bonded by their national origin, still share a common interest in various aspects of Chinese symbolism and civilization. While most overseas Chinese originated from the southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, today many of the migrants in Europe are from Zhejiang, especially Wenzhou. There has been overland migration from Yunnan to mainland Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand, where there is a significant population of Yunnanese Chinese. There are small numbers of Chinese who migrated from elsewhere in China; for instance, there is a small community of Chinese in Sabah, Malaysia, whose forebears migrated from Hebei and Shandong.

**Overseas Chinese and China**

Chinese migrants have always maintained some ties with qiaoxiang, their native region in China. This included returning to China to visit relatives or to marry. The early migrants were generally men, while women were left behind in China. There was thus a large number of “living widows,” wives who were visited by their husbands once every few years and who were dependent on them for remittances. The unlucky ones never saw their husbands after some years passed, as the men married local women in the lands where they settled. By the end of the nineteenth century, more and more women emigrated from China, resulting in overseas Chinese communities with a more balanced ratio of men to women, especially after World War II. While the women also suffered from patriarchal restriction in the early period of migration, most eventually were able to receive a modern education, and many contributed significantly to running family businesses. But the lack of women in the early period of migration resulted in many men marrying local non-Chinese women, giving rise to some racially mixed populations, such as the Chinese Mestizos in the Philippines and the Creoles in the Caribbean. Although originally racially mixed, the Chinese Peranakan in insular Southeast Asia eventually married intensively among themselves and with Chinese migrants, and they have remained Chinese, albeit with a localized identity, such as the Babas in Malaysia and Singapore.

There always had been transnational networks between overseas Chinese and their relatives in China. With the opening of China since 1979, the advance in transportation and Internet technologies, and the expansion of global capitalism, today’s transnational networks are even more intense and frequent. Overseas Chinese have contributed significantly to investments in China, although the bulk of the investors are usually the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Chinese, because they speak Mandarin or a relevant Chinese language and have contacts through the wider Chinese networks, may be in an advantageous position to establish the guanxi

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(personal relations) so necessary in business ventures. At the same time the overseas Chinese are able to play a part in attracting investment from China to their respective countries.

The migration of Chinese today also takes the form of overseas Chinese re-migrating to China, since the expanding economy and the presence of international investments offer many business and professional opportunities. These returnees, called haigui, are different from the returning overseas Chinese called guiqiao, who were mostly Chinese from Southeast Asia who went back to China to study either before or soon after the establishment of the PRC, as well as those who left Indonesia because of anti-Chinese policies. Many of the latter returnees were sent to overseas Chinese farms (huaqiao nongchang); many of these returnees later migrated to Hong Kong in the 1970s, some even earlier.

Unlike the early migrants, now it is common to find these entrepreneurial Chinese leaving their families outside China while the men (usually) return to work in China or in both China and their newly adopted countries. This so-called astronaut family strategy came to prominence after many Chinese from Hong Kong migrated prior to 1997, when the British relinquished the territory to China, although the men later returned to work or do business in Hong Kong after finding that Hong Kong had remained relatively unchanged and stable. Worth noting are the many new migrants who left China after 1978, both legal and illegal: Among these are the illegal migrants brought by the snakeheads (smugglers) to Europe and North America. Most current migrants, in contrast to migrants of the past, are students and professionals. Many of them continue to identify strongly with both China and their new country, negotiating their identities as both, for instance, Australians and Chinese. So significant in number are they that the Chinese government has attempted to gain their support for nationalistic Chinese causes, especially by

The Chin family, 1955. William and Betty Chin owned and operated a laundry in downtown Baltimore, Maryland, after moving to the United States in the 1940s. Photo by the Chin family.
influencing new migrants’ associations. Indeed, with its emergence as a big power and an economic giant, China is also seeking to have political and cultural influence among overseas Chinese and the local societies. The establishment of Confucian institutes (kongzi xueyuan) worldwide is an example, and so are the roles played by the Chinese embassies and the overseas Chinese organizations in keeping close contact with leaders of Chinese associations inside China. While the descendants of older migrants may not have the same emotional attachment to qiaoxiang or China in general, the curiosity about their ancestors’ homeland and the religious links with the lineages and temples in China continue to preserve their cultural ties with China. After all, China is the land of Chinese civilization, and it is always culturally relevant to the Chinese, whether in China or overseas.

Chee-Beng TAN

Further Reading

The Chin children pose in front of the family car in downtown Baltimore. PHOTO BY THE CHIN FAMILY.

Painting as an art form came into its own in the Han dynasty, and would later join poetry and calligraphy as one of the “three perfections” of the scholar-gentleman (wenren). Styles of post-imperial painting were affected by political turmoil, repression, and ensuing reforms; twenty-first century painters now have the freedom to challenge viewers with controversial subject matter.

Painting—along with poetry and calligraphy—is one of the “three perfections” of the scholar-gentleman (wenren) in Chinese culture. Painting and calligraphy, the latter being the means by which poetry was traditionally recorded, use essentially the same materials—brush, ink, and silk or paper—and depend on line for expression. The brush is of greatest importance in controlling the quality of the line. The thickness, flexibility, and readiness of the brush to absorb ink allow for the variety of strokes that an artist can achieve.

As early as the Neolithic period (8000–5500 BCE) evidence of painting in China can be found in the swirling abstract patterns on Yangshao painted pottery. Bronze décor of the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Zhou (1045–256 BCE) dynasties shows further development of pictorial art. These patterns and images were symbolic and were believed to possess special powers. At this time artists also produced wall paintings. The archaeological remains are fragmentary and few, but early texts confirm that surfaces were covered in painted designs. Painting was found in other media, too: During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) painted silks and lacquers, especially those of tombs from the state of Chu, reflect the development of regional artistic styles.

Achievements of the Han Dynasty

Painting in China came into its own during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), which inherited the tradition of painting murals from its predecessors during the Warring States period and the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). The subjects of Han painting, because of the increasing influence of Confucian thought, included models of proper social and moral behavior. But much of what is known about painting of that time is found only in written records, with only stone reliefs, pictorial clay tiles, tomb murals, painted lacquer, and a few silk paintings still in existence to provide visual evidence. The paintings from the tombs at Mawangdui in Changsha, Hunan Province, are among the most important examples.

Although they are different from paintings on paper or silk, clay and stone tile reliefs give a more complete sense of the use of pictorial space during the Han dynasty. The stamped, incised, or molded tomb decorations indicate interest in the afterlife, Confucian themes, and human activity. These relics, with fragmentary paintings found on tomb walls, show the Han artists’ ability to depict receding space and their interest in observing nature.
Earliest Masters

The earliest known Chinese painting masters lived after the Han dynasty collapsed. The first treatises on painting and calligraphy also date from that time. Xie He’s (c. 500–c. 535) *Six Canons of Painting*, which outlines early painting theory, is the earliest and most influential example. Although little painting exists from this time (largely because it was destroyed during periods of social and political upheaval), the copies and fragments of works tell us of a considerable interest in Confucian subjects. One work, attributed to Gu Kaizhi (c. 344–c. 406), is *Admonitions of the Instructress to the Ladies of the Palace*. Rendered in ink and color on silk, this handscroll uses text and image to outline wifely virtues and rules for proper behavior. Other important pictorial expressions of Confucian values are not paintings at all, and yet indicate the development of certain painting conventions. An engraved stone sarcophagus, illustrating tales of filial piety and dating to the sixth century, details the Confucian theme of having respect for elders and shows as well the beginning of landscape elements in art and an increasing confidence in depicting space. The sarcophagus is now in the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art in Kansas City, Missouri.

Buddhism was introduced to China during the Han dynasty and began to flourish during the North and South dynasties (220–589 CE). The Buddhist cave-temple site of Dunhuang, on the eastern edge of the Gobi Desert, has the greatest collection of wall paintings. Artists began painting at Dunhuang in the fourth century and continued for several hundred years. The paintings there, combining Chinese and central Asian elements, are characterized by a vitality unsurpassed in early Chinese art, and they continue to provide inspiration for artists in the twenty-first century.

Painting at Its Pinnacle

After centuries of disunion China was reunited under the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). The dynasty lasted only thirty-seven years, but it set the stage for the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), China’s most cosmopolitan and glorious period. During the Tang dynasty painting achieved great heights. For example, the first imperial painting academy was established at the court and attracted many notable artists, such as Wu Daozi (flourished 720–760), the master of the monochromatic technique; Yan Lide (d. 656) and his brother, Yan Liben (d. 673); Li Sixun (651–716) and his son Li Zhaodao (c. 675–741), famous for their landscapes in the blue-and-green style; and the horse painter Han Gan (flourished 742–756). Although few paintings that survive can be firmly attributed to these artists, enough examples exist to give a sense of the character of their work. Those of Yan Lide and Yan Liben epitomize early Tang figure painting. The figures were first outlined in black, and then the colors were filled in, using some shading. Wu Daozi developed *baimiao*, or “white line,” a monochromatic technique that focused on calligraphic line. This simple method would influence later landscape artists, and it contrasted sharply with the more complex and strongly colored landscape paintings of Li Sixun and Li Zhaodao. Scholars associate the painter and poet Wang Wei (699–759) with the development of true monochrome landscape painting, where the focus was on nature rather than on narrative.

Song Dynasty Landscapes

The Song dynasty (960–1279) was a period of political decline and yet one of intellectual and artistic achievement. The growing number of patrons and the abundance of leisure time, combined with the rise of neo-Confucianism, contributed to a flourishing intellectual and artistic environment in which landscape painting reached its pinnacle. Song dynasty paintings would inspire artists into the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

The monumental landscape characterizes painting of the Northern Song period (960–1126). In this style artists broke free from Tang influence and created a style that was purely Song. The early masters of the style were Fan Kuan (flourished c. 990–1030) and Li Cheng (919?–967?). Their works exhibit the rationalism and realism characteristic of the period. Artists conveyed the sense of distance and depth with towering mountains surrounded by clouds and mist, detailed foregrounds of rocks, and weathered, aged trees. Under Li Cheng’s student Guo Xi (c. 1020–c. 1090), this style reached a climax. His greatest work, *Early Spring*, is one of the most important works in the history of Chinese painting.

The monumental landscapes were scaled down to small scenic views near the end of the Northern Song
dynasty. These paintings, their subjects often viewed from bird’s-eye perspectives and through veils of mist, were more poetic and softer in feeling, as exemplified in the work of Mi Fu (1051–1107) and his son Mi Youren (1072–1151).

China’s first important painting academy began during the Northern Song dynasty, formed in the twelfth century under the Huizong emperor (1082–1135). At this academy teachers encouraged artists to paint in a more literal style, going beyond mere technical performance to capture the subject, usually flowers and birds. The Huizong emperor himself was a talented calligrapher and painter as well as a collector and connoisseur, and several of his works survive. His talent, however, did not extend to military matters; the invading Jin armies captured him in 1126, and he died in prison. The newly founded Southern Song dynasty (1126–1279), however, continued Huizong’s so-called Academy style in the new capital of Hangzhou.

Artists of the early years of the Southern Song academy featured some who had worked in the north, including landscapists as well as bird-and-flower painters. The landscape painters Ma Yuan (flourished c. 1190–c. 1225) and Xia Gui (c. 1180–1230) created the Ma-Xia style, in which the artist focused on a specific view of the natural world and used empty space by eliminating some detail and highlighting the extremes of distance and foreground.

Chan (the school of thought known in Japan as “Zen”) Buddhist painter-priests were also working at this time. They used more spontaneity with their brush and ink in capturing the essence of subjects, as exemplified in the work of Muqi (c. early thirteenth century–after 1279).

**Scholar-Painters of the Yuan Dynasty**

In the fourteenth century the Mongol conquests of the Southern Song empire devastated the Chinese. Although the Mongols employed some Chinese scholars at their court, most scholars refused to serve these “barbarian” rulers and dedicated themselves instead to painting, poetry, and calligraphy. Because of this dedication, the brief Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) included a great development in the arts and produced some of China’s greatest masters.
Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322) was one artist who was criticized for serving the Mongols. Zhao, a descendant of the Song imperial line, took a job in the Yuan bureaucracy and distinguished himself as a painter. His handscroll, *Autumn Colors on the Qiao and Hua Mountains*, with its varied, interwoven, and textured brush strokes, remains one of the great paintings of this period.

As the Yuan dynasty came to a close artist studios became gathering places for *wenren*. The scholar-gentlemen painted not as a means of livelihood, as did professional painters, but rather for personal expression and enjoyment. The best-known of these literati painters were the “Four Great Masters”: Wu Zhen (1280–1354), Ni Zan (1301–1374), Huang Gongwang (1269–1354), and Wang Meng (1308–1385). They refused to serve the Mongol bureaucracy and stressed an attitude of art for art’s sake, preferring landscapes to other subjects and working with ink on paper. The sharpness and purity of these media highlighted their meticulous, almost calligraphic, brushwork. Their theories of painting would influence later artists.

**Restoration under the Ming Dynasty**

The Mongols were driven out by the mid-fourteenth century, and China was again ruled by the Chinese under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). With this new rule came the desire to return to Chinese traditions and to purge any memory of barbarian rule.

Because artists looked to the past and were influenced by the masters of the Tang and the Song dynasties, painting during the Ming period tended to be conservative. Distinctions between amateur and professional painters continued in the two principal schools. The conservative Zhe school—so named because one of its most prominent members, Dai Jin (1388–1462), came from the southeastern province of Zhejiang—consisted of professional and court painters who looked to Xia Gui and Ma Yuan of the Song dynasty for their inspiration. Zhe painters, in turn, had a strong influence on later artists. The Wu school, named after the Wu district near Suzhou where many scholar-painters lived and pursued art for pleasure, looked to the Four Great Masters of the Yuan dynasty—and the spirited sense of freedom from foreign court service that informed their painting. Wen Zhengming (1470–1559)
and Shen Zhou (1427–1509) were the leading masters of the Wu school.

It is not always easy to distinguish between the professional painters who worked in the styles of the Song dynasty and the amateurs who based their work on the Yuan dynasty artists. Three mid-Ming masters emerged, perhaps influenced to a lesser or greater extent by both schools: Tang Yin (1470–1523), Zhou Chen (d. c. 1536), and Qiu Ying (flourished c. 1522–1552).

The theorist and painter Dong Qichang (1555–1636) provided new impetus in the arts by the late sixteenth century. Dong, in studying the division between northern and southern schools of Chan Buddhism that began during the Tang dynasty (the “northern” and “southern” labels referred to their opposing views, not to their geographic positions), felt that painting similarly could be divided into two schools. The northern school of professional, often decorative painting with a focus on technical expertise, was characterized by the colored landscape style of Li Zhaodao and others who worked in the manner of Song artists Xia Gui and Ma Yuan. The southern school of painting, which favored poetic expression, ink over color, and free brushwork over meticulous detail, was characterized by the works of Wang Wei and other literati painters who followed the Four Great Masters of the Yuan. Dong ultimately favored the southern literati school, and his theory was especially influential when literati painting became the conventional (orthodox) style for artists of the early Qing dynasty.

The orthodox style is represented by the works of the Four Wangs: Wang Shimin (1592–1680), Wang Jian (1598–1677), Wang Hui (1632–1717), and Wang Yuanqi (1642–1715). The most traditional of the four was Wang Shimin, who assimilated Song and Yuan styles. The most original was Wang Yuanqi, who was closer to the individualist painters than the other three.

Some individualist painters, like their Yuan-dynasty predecessors, did not want to serve under foreign rulers and thus retired from official life to write poetry and to paint privately. Zhu Da (also called “Bada Shanren,” 1626–1705) had an abbreviated style, capturing his subjects with a minimum of brush strokes. The monk-painter Kuncan (also called “Shiqi,” 1642–1707) used bold washes, much deeper color, elegant detail, and in later life adopted an almost abstract treatment of landscape. Gong Xian (c. 1619–1689) was one of the most forceful of the individualists. His style features velvety ink and somber landscapes. In contrast, Hongren (1610–1664), the monk-painter from south China, painted spare landscapes composed of refined and simple brush strokes first seen in the work of Ni Zan of the Yuan dynasty.

Painting at the Qing court was influenced by the presence of European artists in the eighteenth century. The Italian Jesuit Giuseppe Castiglione (Lang Shining, 1688–1766) spent years in Beijing and combined Western realism with Chinese conventions. But his paintings, although admired by the Qing rulers, were little appreciated by Chinese literati.

Qing Dynasty and the Classical Tradition

The high point of the classical/traditional form of painting occurred under the Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty (1644–1912). During this time two basic approaches to painting existed: (1) the orthodox literati style, based on studying masters of the Song and Yuan, and encouraged by the writings of Dong Qichang, and (2) the individualist style, favored by many Ming loyalists who cultivated highly original styles, often to express frustration over another foreign rule.

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The Twentieth Century to Today

Chinese art was redefined by the political turmoil of the twentieth century—led by the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912 and followed by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the War of Resistance against Japan (known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945), the founding of the People’s Republic of China (1949), and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Traditional literati painting faced opposition as artists began to look outside China for inspiration. Chen Shuren (1883–1949) and the brothers Gao Jianfu (1879–1951) and Gao Qifeng (1889–1933) were among artists who advocated the reform of traditional painting in the early part of the
twentieth century. They were members of the Lingnan School in Guangzhou (Canton). Gao Jianfu had substantial influence on young Xu Beihong (1895–1953), the best-known artist to blend French academic and Chinese styles. In contrast, Lin Fengmian (1900–1991), another modern master, was influenced by the fauvists and post-Impressionists.

With the founding of the People’s Republic of China art became a tool for the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party and reflected Marxist views on class, as outlined in Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Art and Literature” of 1942. Art, according to Mao, should serve the masses and further the revolutionary cause. His Cultural Revolution created further upheaval as artists were persecuted, and many were sent to the countryside to be “reeeducated” and to learn from the peasants. Art was symbolic of party policy and was rendered on a grand scale for wide distribution, as seen in the two- and three-dimensional portraits of Mao that appeared throughout China.

**Art After Mao**

Mao’s death in 1976 ended the Cultural Revolution. There followed a gradual relaxation of government control in the arts and an openness to Western modernism. China’s young artists embraced this openness. Scar Painting was one of the first movements to emerge, seeking to address the deep societal “wounds” left by the Cultural Revolution. Avant-garde artists in the 1980s used previously banned Western-painting styles to create works that urged social reforms and called on the Chinese to break free from the past. The government attacked such art by launching its Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1982. This campaign resulted in a stronger and more widespread avant-garde movement in 1985 (known as the “’85 Movement”), which produced such artists as Xu Bing (b. 1955), whose work, *Book from the Sky* (1987), was made of four thousand printed characters that, although they closely resembled classical Chinese, were in fact meaningless. Another noted artist was Cai Guo-Qiang (b. 1957), who came to international prominence by detonating gunpowder on paper or canvas. In 1989 the events of Tiananmen Square brought a return to conservatism.

Two new forms of avant-garde art emerged in the early 1990s: Political Pop and Cynical Realism. Political Pop mixes Marxist ideology and capitalism with American Pop art. Cynical Realism addresses serious ideological issues with irony, humor, and cynicism. Political Pop’s commentary about the intersection of consumerism and ideological propaganda is evident in Wang Guangyi’s
poster-style painting, Great Castigation Series: Coca-Cola (1993), in which three Cultural Revolution–era workers are juxtaposed next to a large Coca-Cola logo. Major artists of Cynical Realism include Zeng Fanzhi (b. 1964) and Yue Minjun (b. 1962). Zeng’s Mask Series 1996 No. 6 (1996), depicting eight masked figures dressed as Red Guards, set a record price for Asian contemporary art when it sold at auction in 2008. An example of the Chinese avant-garde and its brush with political controversy is Yue’s Execution (1995). Inspired by the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the painting depicts men pointing mock guns at grinning men standing in their underwear in front of a red wall that resembles the red wall of the Tiananmen Rostrum.

Although Chinese painters continue to be influenced by Western styles, these artists also look to their long artistic tradition to create works that are a synthesis of China’s culture and current international styles.

Catherine PAGANI

Further Reading
Jiang, Joshua. (2007). Burden or legacy: From Chinese cultural revolution to contemporary art. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

An image of a bamboo has already been formed in mind before it is committed to the painting canvas.

胸有成竹
Xióng yǒu chéng zhú
Imperial courts throughout China’s long dynastic history employed professional painters—as well as architects, artisans, ceramists, and gardeners—whose endeavors shaped the aesthetic experience of palace life. Courts were indeed the arbiters of artistic taste through the ages. The status of painters rose dramatically over the years, with the most prolific and renowned working from the Five Dynasties period to the Southern Song.

Professional court-employed artists served the aesthetic needs and desires of imperial dynasties throughout much of China’s history. Artists of the same period would often painted similar subjects using fine, meticulous techniques. Court painters became prominent during the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) and the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), but the roots of palace painting go back to Gu Kaizhi, a court official of the Eastern Jin period (317–420 CE). Gu’s famous painting, *Admonitions of the Court Instructress to Palace Ladies* (handscroll, ink and color on silk), contained strong Confucian moralistic messages about ways in which ladies should conduct themselves.

An detail of an scroll from the Jurchen-Jin dynasty titled *Admonitions of the Instructress to the Palace Ladies* by Gu Kaizhi (c. 344–406). In this scene royal children are groomed by their nannies as their parents look on indulgently. COLLECTION OF THE BRITISH MUSEUM.
During the Tang dynasty both Chinese and foreign artists were attracted to the court. The most celebrated were Yan Liben (600–673) and Wu Daozi (680–959). Yan Liben's *The Imperial Sedan Chair* (handscroll, ink and color on silk, Palace Museum, Beijing) records an important meeting between the Tang emperor Taizong (reigned 712–756) and the Tibetan ambassador in 641. In this painting Taizong is dressed in a scholar-official manner and surrounded by female attendants. He is one and one-half times the size of his subjects, indicating his importance. Similarly, the red-robed Tibetan ambassador is larger than his companions and is placed in a forward position. The emperor looks benign and appears to govern his vast empire by reason and persuasion rather than by force. The Tibetan ambassador is submissive to Taizong in his facial expression and hand gesture. This painting thus advocates the authority and virtue of the Tang emperor.

Tang court painters also developed independent genres in which they depicted female figures, birds and flowers, and horses. The two most famous figure painters were Zhang Xuan and Zhou Fang of the eighth century. A copy of Zhang Xuan's *Court Ladies Preparing Newly Woven Silk* portrays four ladies on the right side of the scroll holding pestles and smashing silk. To their left one lady sews while the other spins the silk. In the third scene one is ironing the silk, and three more are holding the silk straight and tight. The fifth lady is the youngest; she playfully lowers her head under the silk banner. Although these ladies are working together, none is interacting or communicating with any other. This expression of their isolation, together with their exquisite gestures, elegant dress, and calm demeanor, conveys a mood of tranquility and a profound sense of separation and loneliness.

**Cherished Masterpieces**

During the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE), the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), and the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) palace painting developed significantly. Works by such masters as Li Cheng, Fan Kuan, Dong Yuan, Ju Ran, and Guo Xi...
have been cherished ever since. Li Cheng’s *A Solitary Temple amid Clearing Peaks* (hanging scroll, ink on silk, c. 960, Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, Kansas City), for instance, has a Buddhist temple sitting atop a small mountain in the center middle ground. Mist separates the temple from the monumental mountains directly behind it. The balance between the heroic rising mountains and the mist and the water flowing down the mountain recalls the interactive forces of the yin and yang. The centrality, order, and stability of the composition could symbolize the authority and power of the central court. Another politically charged palace painting expresses their isolation and, together with their exquisite gestures, elegant dress, and calm demeanor, conveys a mood of tranquility and a profound sense of separation and loneliness.

*Zhang Xuan’s Court Ladies Preparing Newly Woven Silk.* Although the women are working together, none is interacting or communicating with any other. This scroll painting expresses their isolation and, together with their exquisite gestures, elegant dress, and calm demeanor, conveys a mood of tranquility and a profound sense of separation and loneliness.
painting is *Peace Reigns over the River* (Zhang Zeduan, ink and color on silk, dated to the eleventh or twelfth century, Palace Museum, Beijing). This long handscroll provides a panoramic view of life in the Northern Song capital at Bianliang (modern Kaifeng, Henan Province); most art historians concur that the scene depicts the city on the day of the Spring (Qingming) Festival. Zhang Zeduan painted the city with remarkable realism: Hawkers, camel trains, pedestrians, vehicles, restaurants, city gate, hotels, pawnshops were all depicted with painstaking detail. The most intense moment happens in the middle of the painting, when the crewmen of a boat hastily lower their mast before it almost hits the rainbow-shaped bridge. On the bridge onlookers are caught in this drama. We can imagine that the emperor must have taken enormous pride viewing the prosperous urban life under his own wise rule.

Particularly under the rule of Emperor Huizong (1082–1135) were court painters organized as a systematic and well-ordered group. Huizong reformed and structured the imperial Painting Academy and promoted painting to the same status as calligraphy and poetry. Great masters of figure painting, landscape, and birds and flowers were appointed. During the Southern Song dynasty the works of Ma Yuan and Xia Gui of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries typified the achievements of the Southern Song academy. Both preferred the ax-cut technique to depict the texture of rocks and used off-centered composition. Mist and water define most of the painting space. A lyrical, mystic, and serene mood permeates Ma Yuan’s and Xia Gui’s paintings.

In the Yuan (1279–1368) and Ming dynasties (1368–1644) artists were enthusiastically enlisted to serve the court but were not organized in an independent painting academy. The leading Yuan figure was Wang Zhengpeng, who specialized in drawing architectural settings in fine details. The Ming palace figure paintings were predominately political scenes in which emperors were

**Detail of the painting The Imperial Sedan Chair, handscroll, ink and color on silk by Yan Liben. The painting records an important meeting between the Tang emperor Taizong (r. 712–756) and the Tibetan ambassador in 641. Emperor Taizong is surrounded by female attendants.**
portrayed as benevolent and wise. Virtuous rulers and ministers of the past were also depicted to serve educational purposes. Other masters, such as Bian Jingzhao (active 1426–1435), Lin Liang (active 1488–1505), and Lu Ji (active 1500), depicted birds and flowers. One example is Bian Jingzhao’s *Bamboo and Cranes* (hanging scroll, ink and color on silk, fifteenth century, Palace Museum, Beijing), which depicts two proud cranes underneath bamboo, Chinese traditional symbols of longevity, purity and perseverance.

### Cultural Diversity

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) palace painting flourished during the reigns of emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong. The arrival of Jesuit missionaries and other Europeans from Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Italy, England, and France in the Qing court, including Giuseppe Castiglione (1688–1768), made possible interaction among Chinese and European painters. Chinese painters learned from their Western counterparts in the application of light, shade, scale, perspective, and copperplate etching techniques, while European painters adopted traditional Chinese painting subjects. The most popular palace paintings recorded contemporary events. Many of such paintings are handscrolls that bear bright colors of red and blue against grayish-yellow background.

Isometric perspectives were used to indicate depth and visual recession, and great architectural detail, clearly differentiated official ranks and clothing, and freshly portrayed trees, street, and clouds were included.

**Yu JIANG**

### Further Reading


Flower and bird painting is a traditional Chinese painting genre that focuses on depicting plants and animals. It is much appreciated for the evocation of nature’s changing seasons and the painter’s lyrical emotions. In technique flower and bird painting uses either meticulously detailed and highly refined brushstrokes and colors or spontaneous lines, contours, and compositions for symbolic self-expression.

The earliest extant flower and bird painting, a scene with two crows perched on the branches of a tree, appears as part of the decorative embellishments painted on the exterior walls of an Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 CE) earthenware house (a tomb model, part of Han funerary tradition), an artifact now at the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art in Kansas City, Missouri. The first known painter to specialize in flower and bird paintings, however, was the fourth-century painter Liu Yinzu, according to the Classified Record of Ancient Paintings (Gu hua pin lu) by Xie He, an art critic and painter of the sixth century.

Flowers and Birds through the Dynasties

During the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE) flower and bird painting developed into an independent genre. During this time Huang Quan, Huang Jucai, and Xu Xi established a solid flower and bird painting tradition that profoundly influenced painters of the Song dynasty (960–1279) and later generations. On Huang Quan’s Sketches of Birds and Insects (handscroll, ink and color on silk, Palace Museum, Beijing), birds, turtles, bees, cicadas, locusts, and other small creatures are naturalistically rendered and colored in great detail. The variation of size, color, light and shade, gestures, perspectives, and composition in this picture represents a rhythmic and balanced view of the beauty of nature.

Birds in Autumn by Lin Fengmian (1900–1991). Lin often evokes a feeling of loneliness and isolation in his flower and bird paintings.
During the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) painters made significant advancements over previous traditions of flowers and birds. A leading figure was the court painter Cui Bai (flourished eleventh century). His *Magpies and Hare* (hanging scroll, ink and color on silk, 1061, National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan) captures the surprised reaction of a hare turning its head 180 degrees back toward a pair of tweeting magpies. The round contour of the hare parallels the gently slanting hill. Broad, loose brushstrokes depict the hill, which is counterbalanced by the diagonal, jagged tree. Grasses, branches, and leaves sway in the autumn wind.

Toward the end of the Northern Song dynasty the patronage of Emperor Huizong (1082–1135, reigned 1100–1125) ensured the popularity of flower and bird paintings. Indeed, Huizong himself was an accomplished painter. He emphasized the visual representation of poetic ideas that were rooted in classical beauty and realistic observation. In his *Finches and Bamboo* (handscroll, ink and color on silk, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York) two birds are perching on bamboo branches on a bright spring morning. The bamboo leaves are colored in turquoise green. The contrast between void and solid spaces, black and white ink tones, and the formations of the rocks and the organic growth of the bamboo branches represents the emperor’s refined taste for poetic ideals. It is a vision of a sequestered ruler in a harmonious and quiescent world.

During the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) flower and bird subjects were painted by both conservative court painters and literati scholar amateurs. The court painters followed the Song tradition in the naturalistic portrayal of grass carps, minnows, shrimps, lotus flowers, water birds, and so forth, whereas the literati painters, including Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322), Wu Zhen (1280–1354), and Wang Mian (1287–1359), were particularly in favor of bamboos and plum blossoms because bamboos and plums, together with the pine tree, were considered three friends of the cold, wintry season and stood for perseverance, purity, courage, and regeneration of a virtuous gentleman.

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) monochrome ink paintings developed in the works of Lin Liang (1416–1468), Shen Zhou (1427–1509), Tang Yin (1470–1524), Chen Chun (1483–1544), and Xu Wei (1521–1593). Among them Xu Wei used calligraphic and spontaneous brushstrokes in a highly expressive mode. In his *Grapes* (hanging scroll, ink on paper, Palace Museum, Beijing) a grape bough bears sprays of branches and transparent grapes. Flower and bird paintings remained a major genre...
during the subsequent Qing dynasty (1644–1912). When western Europeans came to the Qing court, Chinese painters learned oil painting techniques and applied perspective, light, shade, and the illusion of three dimensionality to their painting. Zhang Weibang’s *The Glory of the New Year* (hanging scroll, ink and color on silk, Palace Museum, Beijing) is such an example and recalls the still-life painting in the Netherlands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Other accomplished painters included Shen Quan (1682–1763), Ren Bonian (1840–1895), and Zhao Zhiqian (1829–1884). Ren Bonian’s *Pheasants and Dahlia* (hanging scroll, ink and color on paper, Palace Museum, Beijing) separates areas of color from ink. Thin ink wash defines the flower branches, while thick ink depicts the bird plumes. Intense red color is contrasted with the green leaves.

**Post-Imperial Tastes**

A leading artist of the flower and bird genre of the twentieth century was Qi Baishi (1864–1957), whose most common subjects were fish, shrimp, crabs, and frogs. In *Shrimp* (hanging scroll, ink on paper, 1949, China Fine Art Gallery, Beijing), Qi Baishi uses different shades of ink and adds water to the paper surface to express the transparency, liveliness, and playfulness of the water-dwelling creature. Another artist, Yu Feian (1889–1959), painted flower and bird subjects with meticulous detail in a style that follows the Song tradition. In his *Peonies* (hanging scroll, ink and color on paper, China Fine Art Gallery, Beijing) the heroic peonies in intense red and luminous yellow colors are supported by silver gray and turquoise green stalks and leaves.

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, painting often served propagandistic purposes, and most artists were employed by the state prior to 1980. After the end of the repressive Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), artists

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*A scroll painting of a blossoming plum branch by Wang Mian (1287–1359). Bamboos and plum blossoms, together with the pine tree—three friends of the cold wintry season—stand for perseverance, purity, courage, and regeneration of a virtuous gentleman.*
were able to express personal feeling and individuality. For instance, an important painter, Lin Fengmian (1900–1991), evokes a feeling of loneliness and isolation in his landscape and flower and bird paintings.

Chinese painters have used flowers, birds, and other creatures as an important genre since the Five Dynasties period. Throughout its development different techniques and traditions have been established, and flower and bird subjects have been used to represent different moods, personal feelings, or aesthetic tastes of the artists and the state.

Yu JIANG

Further Reading


**Huang Quan’s Sketches of Birds and Insects** (handscroll, ink and color on silk, Palace Museum, Beijing). Birds, turtles, bees, cicadas, locusts, and other small creatures are naturalistically rendered and colored in great detail. The variation of size, color, light and shade, gestures, perspectives, and composition in this picture represents a rhythmic and balanced view of the beauty of nature.
Folk painting in China focuses on subjects drawn from myth, drama, and fiction, as well as regional rituals, customs, and landscape. It includes forms such as woodblock prints commemorating the New Year or illustrating a popular drama or novel, and painted door gods to ward off demons and bad spirits. As a result of Mao’s ideology, it is an art not only by the people but for the people.

Folk painting in China is a traditional genre loosely defined as “art by the people” (mín jìnyìshù). It most often refers to art created by persons with no formal art training and, more specifically, to paintings by and for commoners—in contrast to work done by and for aristocrats and literati elite during dynastic eras. But the twentieth century brought to the genre the influence and the participation of professionally trained artists, as well as a starring role in the political agenda of Mao Zedong, who believed that art existed to serve the people as it championed his revolutionary cause.

Mainstream versus Folk Painting

Mainstream and folk paintings use many of the same pictorial subjects: birds and flowers, various religious deities (including Buddhist, Daoist, and folk belief) or literary and historical narratives. In general subjects such as folklore, festivals, traditional rituals and customs (such as funerals), and drama play a significant role in folk painting. But the scope of folk art, including painting, masks, silk embroidery, toys, kites, and architectural decorations, is less precise than that of mainstream art, and discussing its sources can be quite complex. This is because of the transformation and evolution of many areas that folk art draws on, such as ethnology, religious studies, anthropology, sociology, and other disciplines.

By including two-dimensional pictorial representations within the category of folk painting, the possibilities expand. New Year prints and genre painting occupy a significant portion of this cultural production. The historical period associated with these works focuses mainly on modern and contemporary times, from the seventeenth century to the present. It is important to recognize that such cultural works developed in response to particular audiences. They reflect differences in preferences and taste of subjects, choice of pictorial representations, and techniques according to the fashion admired by (and traditional to) particular regions and provinces.

Provincial Forms

The regions and provinces producing folk prints and paintings that have drawn the attention of scholars are predominantly along the coastal rim from Shandong to Fujian provinces. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the city of
Suzhou turned out a particularly flourishing and prosperous supply of woodblock prints, called Suzhou ben, representative of the south. Because of its convenient location near Shanghai and other vital cities, Suzhou folk artists gradually combined different regional styles in their prints. The “green willow” (yangliuqing) style from Tianjin, a city north of Beijing near the Korean border, is known for its characteristic color palette and elaboration of details. Initially, Tianjin’s yangliuqing prints drew on subjects similar to those focused on in other regions, such as festivals, the New Year, and stories from popular drama.

After the mid-nineteenth century, folk artists from Tianjian developed much more sophisticated prints. Some of these prints are associated with recognized artists, such as Qian Hui’an (1833–1911). Some landscape prints exhibit perspective that suggests an acquaintance with Chinese mainstream landscape painting and, perhaps, Japanese ukiyo-e (“pictures of the floating world”) prints by Katsushiko Hokusai (1760–1839) and Utagawa Hiroshige (1791–1858). By contrast, regions located more inland, such as Shaanxi province, have maintained their provincial and regional forms. This is likely due to their geographical distance from major cities and subsequent limited exposure to outside influences.

Other provinces are noted for prints of a particular style or focus. The work of folk artists from Huxian, near Xi’an, which is called Picture Land today, has maintained a traditional feel and subject matter—harvest and the abundance of life—while rejecting highly charged political implications. Typically these works have represented themes established in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), but they’ve been accomplished with less sophisticated techniques.

New Year and Drama Prints

Because they are popular and in annual demand, New Year woodblock prints (nianhua) are the dominant media within the category of two-dimensional folk art. The primary subjects are portraits or images of Zhong Kui and other door deities. Zhong Kui, a historical figure of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), became a legendary demon queller after the Song dynasty (960–1279). His ugly and grotesque image posted on house gates is believed to have the supernatural power to expel bad spirits and demons. Production of his image for use at the New Year remains popular in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as well as in

Lin Fengmian (1900–1991). Opera Story, Lotus Lantern. Along with Zhang Daqian and Wu Zuoren, two other artists influenced by the New Culture Movement, Lin studied painting in the West. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Chinese communities around the world. Various deities bearing auspicious metaphors and implications—such as the goddess and god of children (a symbol of fertility and wealth), the god of the earth (a symbol of longevity), the god of grains (a symbol of harvest and abundance), the deity of fortune, and the deity of promotion—are also common themes in New Year prints. Other festivals, such as the Dragon Boat Festival, originally commemorating poet Qu Yuan (343–277 BCE) for his loyalty and high principles, are celebrated in this medium. Historical heroes, such as Guan Yu, or Guan Yunchang, (c. third century), who was known for his loyalty and righteousness from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo Yanyi) composed in the fourteenth century, was adapted by folk beliefs and become one of the main deities in Daoism and folk belief practices. Both his single image and narratives of his stories from the novel are portrayed in the prints as well.

The popularity of xiqu (stage performances, the prototype of today’s Chinese operas) during the Mongol Yuan era (1279–1368) and narratives from novels can be measured by the number of their themes found in folk prints. This is particularly observable after the sixteenth century. Of note are subjects and characters taken from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms; the Water Margin, or Outlaws of the Marsh (Shuihu Chuan), composed in the fifteenth century; and the Romance of West Chamber (Xixiang Ji), written by Wang Shifu (c. 1260–1336). The main centers for drama prints are Suzhou, Beijing, and Linfen (Shanxi) because of the popularity of operas in these regions. In the north yangliuqing prints from Tianjin are more predominant. Over the course of time, characters adapted from Chinese operas, not only the early classical novels, are identifiable in these prints.

**Folk Painting since the Influence of Mao**

Folk painting has become more clearly defined since the twentieth century. The championing of folk painting increased under the advocacy of Mao Zedong, who famously celebrated farmers and workers to the detriment of the aristocracy of the imperial past in his historical and revolutionary speech “Yan’an Forum on Art and Literature” in 1942. Subsequently, artists were encouraged to produce paintings taking farmers, workers, and other noncultural elite classes as their subjects. Such works were the mainstay in the newly celebrated genre, folk painting.

The major center for the generation of ideas and production of the art suitable as art for the people was the Lu Xun Academy in Yan’an. Yan’an was the end point of the heroic Long March (16 October 1934 to 19 October 1935). It was during this retreat of the Red Army that Mao Zedong famously led the Eighth Route Army, culminating in a political landmark and turning point for the Communist Party in 1936. A few artists followed Mao, and later more artists joined the party in Yan’an and produced woodcut prints for the wartime effort and other political propaganda. Lu Xun Academy, which established this genre, was particularly influential from the 1930s to the late 1950s and during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961).

Mao’s idea of art for the people did not stop with professionally trained artists. Consistent with his great revolutionary program, he also encouraged untrained artists, such as peasants, to depict their genuine views of the new society. The first works inspired by this effort appeared in Pixian, Jiangsu Province. Some 1,500 farmer artists produced about 183,000 art works in 1958. The media of this large quantity of art works ranged from individual paintings to murals, and subjects focused on farm products, mostly corn and pigs.

Other folk paintings—such as papercuts, New Year pictures, and the serial pictures (lianhuanhua)—either continued to be produced or were revived during this era. Papercut, a craft that goes back to the third century CE or earlier (and which often involves mounting the cut paper onto a window or door), drew on subjects such as flowers, mythical animals, and festival icons.

The serial pictures, which are cartoon strips or pages for children and teenagers, mainly relied on historical novels or drama, such as the Romance of Three Kingdoms and the Water Margin, but expanded from historical novels to contemporary historical events to take up themes such as the Long March and stories of revolutionary heroes after the 1950s. Serial pictures continued to be an important cultural form during the Cultural Revolution. Some of the best serial pictures were produced during the 1970s. The popularity of serial pictures and, later, picture books among the general public, along with demands from the market, surpassed that of other forms of folk painting. Several famous artists, including Chen Shifa (b. 1921), have participated in this production and
enhanced the qualities and styles of serial pictures and picture books.

While some artists produced characters from Chinese literature and romance, others illustrated exotic and foreign works ranging from *The Thousand and One Nights* to *Dante's Inferno* to *The Snow Goose* (Paul Gallico, 1897–1976). Because of their artistic training, artists of serial pictures sometimes incorporated Western themes and techniques, including Russian social realism and symbolism. These innovations brought the genre of serial pictures to its peak, adding depth to the category of folk painting in China in the 1980s.

The conventional subjects of the New Year prints, including door gods, shifted into various directions under Mao Zedong’s guidelines in 1949. New themes—such as the lives of the working classes, an image of the new China, and the overturn and liberation of feudal China—were encouraged. These politically charged themes greatly influenced the range of subjects and techniques and took folk painting into a new era. The results of this new energy were particularly reflected in folk paintings from the 1970s onward. Under Mao’s encouragement folk painting was no longer an exclusive genre for peasants; art professionals (artists and art educators) were encouraged to create folk painting. As a result, folk painting became more decorative, sophisticated, and realistic. The earliest examples of twentieth-century folk painting were created by peasants in Shaanxi province, and production of folk painting spread to other regions.

Since the 1970s, many regions have developed styles that reflect significant local features in their folk painting. For example, farmers from the Shanghai region are known for tranquil water scenes; Shandong folk painting often reflects bright colors under the influence of the local tradition of *yangliuqing* prints; and art from the Xinjiang region is enhanced with Muslim motifs and designs. The diversity to be found across regions and ethnic groups in China has expanded modern folk painting toward an unlimited horizon in terms of themes, styles, and imagination. This tradition is has been well preserved and sustained in the art schools since Mao’s death. It is also visible in the fact that there are no limits on gender, age, or social class of the artists who produce folk painting. The main feature that once distinguished folk painting—the categorization of particular artists producing the work as peasants without artistic training—is no longer relevant, as professional artists with complex Chinese and Western training in techniques and styles make contributions to the genre.

**Contemporary Outlook**

With the end of the Cultural Revolution, many varieties of folk painting in various forms and media continued to be produced since the 1980s. Contemporary folk painting may have suffered somewhat in recent times because of the popularity of TV, movies, and digital products. However, as Chinese economic strength and interest in Chinese tourism increases, the value of folk painting may well increase and will, perhaps, enjoy a revival.

Diana Y. CHOU

**Further Reading**


Landscape painting—depicting mountains, trees, waterfalls, and rivers—developed as a genre during the Tang dynasty. After the end of imperial China, landscape painting continued to develop as artists expressed the new and engaged the old.

Although painting emerged in China prior to the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), landscape as a formal category developed much later, sometime in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), and was fully established as a dominant category in the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126). Prior to the Song dynasty (960–1279) landscapes appeared in various formats, such as on scrolls, on murals, on musical instruments, screens, and the walls of tomb chambers, as well as on the walls of other architectural settings, including those serving decorative and religious purposes.

The theme of landscape painting (or shan shui, mountains and water) literally and pictorially refers to mountains, trees, waterfalls, and rivers. The simple display of outdoor scenery emerged much earlier than the Northern Song era. Some spare trees along with a stylized form of hills were represented in three-dimensional objects and are in evidence on the painted coffins from the Mawangdui tomb (Changsha, Hunan Provincial Museum), dated circa 165 BCE of the early Han era. This suggestion of outdoor scenery is considered the incipient and earliest surviving landscape subject in China. The Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove (Nanjing, Jiangsu Province) suggests a slightly more mature and sophisticated observation of trees in terms of types. A more complexly realized landscape representation is observed in the engraving of a stone sarcophagus dated to the early sixth century (Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, Kansas City, Missouri). This piece is also one of the earliest examples in which the artist incorporated natural elements with figures and animals into the suggestion of a narration.

Artists who either specialized in landscapes or painted subjects in landscapes were first recognized and documented in the Tang dynasty by Zhang Yanyuan in Lidai Minghua ji (Record of Famous Painting of the Previous Dynasties, finished 847 CE) and by Zhu Jingxuan in Tangchao minghua lu (Record of Famous Painting of Tang Dynasty, compiled c. ninth century). The earliest surviving scroll landscape painting is dated to the sixth century. It has the title Spring Outing (handsroll, ink and colors on silk) and is attributed to Zhan Ziqian (Palace Museum, Beijing). It is particularly noted for employing the “level-distance” view.

Three-Distance Perspectives

The descriptions of three-distance perspectives were fully theorized by Guo Xi (c. 1001–c. 1090), one of the three masters of landscape, in his Lofty Ambition of Forests and Streams (Lin Quan Gao Zhi, c. 1080, with Guo Si, son of Guo Xi). Li Sixun (651–716 CE) and Li Zhaoda (dates unknown, flourished c. 730s, son of Li Sixun) were credited and known for their distinct “gold-and-green” or “blue-and-green” landscapes. One of the most famous
and exemplary pieces of this style is Emperor Minghuang’s *Journey into Shu* (hanging scroll, ink and colors on silk, National Palace Museum, Taipei), which is attributed to Li Zhaodao. Although it is considered a Song copy of a Tang work, this painting has many characteristics of Tang painting, which are echoed in the mural paintings at the Mogao caves of Dunhuang, Gansu Province. Another notable Tang landscape painter was Wang Wei (698–759 ce). Although Wang Wei’s paintings no longer survive, his reputation as the painter of such treasures as *Wangchuan Villa* is well documented, assuring his place in history.

Scholars have traditionally considered the Northern Song dynasty as the golden age of Chinese painting. This consideration extended to the painting of landscape, which became a formal category, although the term might have been applied in the Five Dynasties period (907–960 ce) by Jing Hao (flourished 907–923 ce) in his *Bifa ji* (A Note on the Brush). During the late Northern Song era Emperor Huizong (reigned 1101–1125) not only founded the Imperial Painting Academy but also sponsored compilations that documented the imperial art collections, which formulated into two influential records: *Xuanhe shupu* (Record of Calligraphy of the Xuanhe Era) and *Xuanhe huapu* (Record of Painting of the Xuanhe Era, preface dated 1120). The *Xuanhe huapu* is particularly significant for the history of landscape painting. In this compilation landscape painting not only was treated as an independent subject among thirteen categories but also significantly occupied four chapters (juan) out of twenty in total. Forty-one painters and 1,108 paintings were included and collected by the imperial treasure house. The Three Schools/Masters of Landscape—Li Cheng (919–967), Fan Kuan (flourished c. 1023–1031), and Guo Xi (mostly known for his *Early Spring*, dated in 1072)—and their paintings were listed with other important painters in this catalogue.

Because of the differences of geographical spheres, landscapes in the Northern and Southern (1127–1279) Song dynasties changed significantly in composition, arrangement of figures and space, additive inscriptions, and overall atmosphere of painting. The monumental scale of Northern Song landscapes, reflecting the grandeur scenery north of the Huang (Yellow) River, was gradually diminished and replaced by a misty and flat level of water and lake views of the Yangzi (Chang) River delta scenery in south China, and paintings by Ma Yuan (flourished 1189–1224) and Xia Kui (flourished 1195–1224) are exemplary of this era.

The Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) brought a revolutionary era for landscapes, theories, and other subjects. The notion of the Three Schools/Masters of Landscape was established during the Yuan dynasty by Tang Hou, an art collector and connoisseur of the late thirteenth century in Hangzhou. Tang Hou’s confirmation of Li Cheng, especially, set the foundation of the landscape tradition and theory later put forth by Dong Qichang, (1555–1636) whose canon divided northern and southern schools and the gave preference to literati painting. Although the “Returning to the Past” movement in both art and literature, focusing on the Tang and Five Dynasties periods, was advocated and executed by various Yuan painters, new ideas and approaches to landscape painting co-existed among the same painters. Zhao Mengfu’s (1254–1322) *Autumn Colors on the Qiao and Hua Mountains* not only synthesized the archaic elements and ideas of the past, and the movement to return to its style, but also deliberated from the tradition into a new era of Chinese painting—naturalistic-pictorial representation of actual geographic sites—a concept that was inspired by the Mongol court’s interests in science.

**Four Masters of the Yuan**

After the mid-fourteenth century the notion of Four Masters of the Yuan—Huang Gongwong (1269–1354), Wu Zhen (1280–1354), Ni Zan (1306–1374), and Wang Meng (1308–1385)—was formulated and adopted by the landscape painters and theorists of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Dong Qichang and his Songjiang School painters (a regional circle) played an influential role in canonizing landscape tradition, followed by the Four Wangs—Wang Shimin (1592–1680), Wang Yuanqi (1642–1715), Wang Jian (1598–1677), and Wang Hui (1632–1717)—and formed the orthodoxy with their political advantages that remains today.

Landscape painting tradition did not end with imperial China but rather continued to develop as artists devised various methods to express the new and engage with the old. Particularly notable are divergent and
complex themes that have emerged as artists have explored new media, techniques, and ideas after the twentieth century in both China and overseas. Zhang Daqian (1899–1983), Wu Guanzhong (b. 1919), and Zao Wuo-ki (or Zhao Wuji, b. 1921) are a few of many contributors in the new era. Zhang Daqian developed “ink-splash” with a bright “blue-and-green” manner into a semiabstract pictorial representation of landscape with traditional media. Wu Guanzhong maintained stylized but identifiable landscapes with linear and calligraphic lines and Western media. Zao Wuo-ki transformed the emptiness in space of a cosmological (relating to a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe) view of Chinese landscape into abstract and expressive oil painting. Contemporary Chinese landscape is still developing.

Diana Y. CHOU

Further Reading


Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China began in 1951, and relations between the two countries have been cooperative ever since, especially in the areas of defense, technology, and economics. China’s significant investment in Pakistan’s development, including monies for nuclear facilities, the port of Gwadar, and highways, helps China achieve access to natural resources and to extend its global sphere of influence.

The year 2006 marked the fifty-fifth anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan. The bilateral relationship between the two countries has endured as a relatively uninterrupted, trust-bound and “all-weather relationship.” This tactical friendship has survived numerous geo-strategic changes: improved Sino-Indian relations from 1989 onward, the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-September 11 developments, especially Pakistan emerging as a frontline state in the war against terror, as well as the recent Indo-U.S. strategic convergence.

A Short History
Pakistan recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1950 and was the third non-Communist state and the first Muslim state to do so; afterward the two nations established formal diplomatic relations. Bilateral relations were further emphasized at the Bandung Conference in 1955, where talks between the two heads of state played an important role in promoting understanding and developing friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries. In 1961, Pakistan furthered diplomatic relations when it voted for a bill concerning the restoration of China’s legitimate rights in the United Nations.

Deterioration in Sino-Indian relations, which culminated in the 1962 war, provided further opportunities for Sino-Pakistani cooperation, and in 1963 both countries signed an agreement on border relations and the construction of a road linking China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with the northern areas of Pakistan. They signed their first trade agreement in 1963, and, in the years that followed, diplomatic exchanges increased significantly. Their strategic partnership was initially driven by the mutual need to counter the Soviet Union and India, and China supported Pakistan in its two wars against India in 1965 and 1971 with both military and economic assistance. The military alliance led further to the creation of a Joint Committee for Economy, Trade, and Technology in 1982, and in the late 1980s China began discussing the possible sales of M-11 missiles and related technologies to Pakistan.

In 1996, Chinese president Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to Pakistan during which the two countries decided to establish a comprehensive friendship. Relations since then have continued on the same steady path, especially as the United States, after the events of September 11, expressed a new strategic commitment to India. In
2005, China and Pakistan signed a landmark Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, whereby each committed that neither would join an alliance that infringed upon the sovereignty or security of the other, and that neither would conclude similar treaties with a third party.

During the post–Cold War era, China emerged as Pakistan’s most important strategic guarantor vis-a-vis India. China was the source of initial design information for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and assisted with the building of the latter’s nuclear technology complex. On the whole, China has been Pakistan’s most important source of modern conventional weaponry and a vital source of trade and investment. Moreover, given the American preoccupation with proliferation issues, China found in this military relationship with Pakistan to be a useful bargaining tool against Washington while discussing issues important to China like U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, for instance, and the deployment of the theater missile defense (TMD) system in East Asia. China’s close ties with Pakistan allowed the former a greater sphere of influence extending to South Asia, as well as a bridge between the Muslim world and Beijing. Within such a framework, the political scientist Kenneth Lieberthal posits, the driving factor for China was a hedge against India that also gave Pakistan access to civilian and military resources. The relationship, Lieberthal continues, is still of great strategic importance today, where, since the mid-1960s, the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy has been its military relationship with China, and “now that China is trying to build its global sphere of influence—for which it needs Pakistan—it doesn’t mind if Pakistan becomes a regional power in the meantime” (Pan 2006).

Nuclear Cooperation

Pakistan hoped that a civil nuclear deal would fructify between Washington and Islamabad, similar to agreements between the United States and India. Once it became clear that no such deal would be forthcoming from Washington, Pakistan turned to China because the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal suggested both strategic
instability and a security threat. China has been widely acknowledged as the source of Pakistan’s initial nuclear weapon strategy, a major partner in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex, the major source of Pakistan’s short- and medium-range solid fuel missile technology, and the likely partner in the development of Pakistan’s Land Attack Cruise Missile. In 2006, China signed an agreement to cooperate in the peaceful application of nuclear power. Pakistan asserts that, having recorded one of the highest levels of economic growth in Asia during the first few years of the twenty-first century, it will need at least an eight-fold increase in its power requirements by 2013.

After President Zardari’s visit to China in October 2008, China agreed to provide Pakistan with two more nuclear power plants in addition to the Chinese-built nuclear reactor now at Chasma in Punjab and the one in progress. While Pakistan denies any such reports, the Indian press has frequently maintained that China has offered to upgrade Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capacity.

**Defense Cooperation**

Pakistan’s relationship with China has been the anchor of its defense and foreign policy since the 1960s. Defense cooperation is especially important for Pakistan as China serves the purpose of a high-value guarantor against India. China has proven to be a reliable supplier of conventional military equipment for Pakistan, selling F-7 fighters and a version of the T-96 main battle tank. The fighter aircraft JF-17 Thunder, a joint development of China and Pakistan, began production in 2008 at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra. It has been opined that this enhanced military cooperation could herald a shift in the center of gravity from Europe to Asia, with China at the forefront, followed by Pakistan.

In the spring of 2006 Pakistan clinched a $600 million defense deal with China, which included the construction of four F-22P frigates for the Pakistani Navy, the upgrading of the Karachi dockyard, and the transfer of technology for the indigenous production of a modern surface fleet. The first of these frigates was launched in Shanghai in April 2008. Two more frigates will be built in Shanghai and the fourth one at the Karachi dockyard.

**Trade and Energy Cooperation**

Pakistan is not merely expanding its defense cooperation, but is also improving its economic cooperation with China, thus attempting to reposition itself as an important trade route in South Asia. Both countries signed an agreement to promote bilateral trade and cooperation. From 2006 onward, the two countries will implement the first part of the free trade agreement. As tariffs drop to zero, the zone could emerge as a possible commercial hub of the region.

Both countries agreed to step up cooperation in the energy sector, promising to give China access to the gas and oil resources of Central and Western Asia. China supports oil and gas exploration in Pakistan, and promises to help Pakistan in developing its coal, lignite, and renewable energy resources. As the two countries explore joint ventures in the field of energy, there are already major infrastructure projects underway, namely the port at Gwadar, the Karakoram highway, and the coastal highway.

**Gwadar Port and Karakoram Highway**

China is projecting its might across the subcontinent through its strategic presence at the Gwadar Port project, located in Balochistan province on the Arabian Sea at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Construction of the port began in March 2002 after the Chinese agreed to provide $198 million of the $248 million required for the first phase of the project. China has also invested in support infrastructure by financing a highway link from Gwadar to a central Balochistan town, connecting Karachi and Quetta. Just 420 kilometers from the strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 40 percent of the world’s oil supplies flow, the port is strategically located to serve as a key shipping point in the region. Its great strategic value augments Pakistan’s importance in the region while allowing China to diversify and secure its crude oil import routes and simultaneously gain access to the Persian Gulf.

China is also planning to build a 90-kilometer highway link connecting the Chinese side of the Karakoram highway to the Russian-built highway network that already connects all five Central Asian republics. This
regional highway network will directly link Gwadar to Xinjiang and to the landlocked Central Asian republics. The Karakoram highway and the coastal highway will both serve as vital trade routes.

Through the construction of the Gwadar port, Beijing also will gain considerable influence in the region, giving it a strategic entrance to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, while allowing it to closely monitor U.S. naval activity and U.S.-Indian maritime cooperation.

For Pakistan as well, the benefits are profound. Gwadar, designated as a “sensitive defense area,” would inhibit India’s ability to blockade Pakistan, and would permit China to supply Pakistan by land and sea during wartime. The construction of the port and the highway, by making Pakistan a regional trade hub for commercial traffic, would also boost domestic economic development, and would influence the geo-strategic environment of the region. The port will enable the transfer of Central Asia’s vast energy resources to world markets, earning Pakistan significant profits in transit fees, as well as attract considerable investment into Baluchistan. Although construction was beset by violence from Baluch nationals protesting against the federal government and the construction of the Gwadar port, it became fully operational in 2008. Additional phases will include additional terminals and docks.

Sino-Pakistani Relations: Assessments and Conclusions

The emphasis on trade and energy cooperation makes it appear that Pakistan is attempting to create a new strategic framework, outside military cooperation, through economic cooperation. If the expansion of Gwadar port facilities does fructify, Pakistan will be almost guaranteed a further “all weather relationship” with China for many years to come, with the extension of the Karakoram highway serving as a symbol of this calculated friendship. Pakistan could become a trading center for the region and receive substantial amounts of foreign direct investment to facilitate domestic development. For China, Pakistan could emerge as an energy hub as well as a low-end manufacturing center.

The 2005 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation set the foundation for relations between China and Pakistan. Meetings between the two countries since then have reaffirmed the friendship and understanding between them. Demonstrations of this relationship include Pakistan’s support for China’s policies in Tibet; Pakistan, unlike other countries, welcomed the Beijing Olympic torch relay with no protests. The two countries have pledged to collaborate in economic development, especially expansion of free trade agreements, and in technology, such as the procurement by Pakistan of a Paksat-1R telecommunications satellite from a Chinese company. Other areas of collaboration include mineral development, environmental protection, cultural exchange, and scientific and agricultural research.

Urvashi ANEJA

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Further Reading


Things will develop in the opposite direction when they become extreme.

物极必反

Wù jí bì fǎn
China’s Paleolithic era, also known as the foraging era, started about 2 million years ago and ended about 10,000 years ago. The large span of this era can be divided into the Lower, Middle, and Upper periods, each generally correlating with significant change in human evolution. As time went on, human-made tools became more sophisticated and human population also increased.

The Paleolithic, literally the “Old Stone Age” (also known as the foraging era), is a prehistoric era characterized by the use of percussion stone tools by humans. In geological terms this period falls within the Pleistocene period, which began some 3 to 2 million years ago. Archaeological materials suggest that China’s foraging era started some 2 million years ago and ended about 10,000 years ago. It was followed by the Neolithic era, or the New Stone Age.

Most of the foraging-era human fossils and cultural layers were found above ground. It is difficult, however, to determine whether stone objects from some early Pleistocene sites were human made or natural.

Model for Banpo, a Neolithic (or New Stone Age) village dating to about 4,000 BCE. The villagers of Banpo, despite their more advanced stage of civilization, still used many of the tools conceived during the Paleolithic era. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Dated to 2.4 to 2 million years ago, the Renzidong Cave in Anhui Province is the oldest foraging-era site found in China, if the stone objects from this site are indeed human-made tools. The site of the Xihoudu culture in Shanxi dates to about 1.8 million years ago, on a paleomagnetic analysis. Unfortunately, the Xihoudu relics suffered from severe erosion, which blurred possible traces of human processing of the stone objects. Another famous site, Shangnabang, Yuanmou, Yunnan, was initially dated as 1.7 million years old, according to paleomagnetic evidence. A few scholars have recently reexamined the paleomagnetic evidence and identified the age of two human incisors from Yuanmou to be 600,000–500,000 years old. During the lower foraging era, people either settled in certain areas for an extended amount of time or stayed temporarily in one place. A close examination of the animal bones illustrates their hunting and scavenging methods. Stone tools were used to cut animal meat; sometimes the broken animal limbs suggest that marrow was dipped out of these bones. Fire was probably used as well because the Shangnabang and Xihoudu sites yielded ashes, although natural, rather than human, fire could have left the ashes.

China’s lower foraging era can be further divided into at least three cultural zones. Zone 1 includes the Xihoudu and Qiahe cultures in Shanxi and the Lantian culture in Shaanxi. These cultures were distributed mainly throughout southern Shanxi, eastern Shaanxi, and western Henan. Although large, stone tools manufactured in Zone 1 are rather simple. Many of these tools are choppers. In particular a mandible (lower cheek bone) from a pithecanthropoid (a hypothetical species thought to be intermediate between humans and the anthropoid apes) found near the village of Chenjiawo in Lantian, Shaanxi, dates to about 650,000 years ago. In 1964 a human skull was discovered in Gongzhuling of the same county. Paleomagnetic analysis indicates that the Gongzhuling fossil is 1.15 to 1.1 million years old. Both fossils were probably remains of females.

Zone 2 covers northern Hebei, northern Shanxi, and southeastern Liaoning and is marked with cave sites. Many of the stone tools from Zone 2 are small. The main types are scrapers. In Zone 2, Zhoukoudian Locality 1 is the most renowned of all foraging-era sites in China. Its occupants were collectively called Peking Man. Located 48 kilometers southwest of modern-day Beijing, the site was first discovered in 1921. Excavation of the site began in 1927. Before 1941 five nearly complete crania were found at the Zhoukoudian cave site. Unfortunately, these fossils mysteriously disappeared in 1941. Since 1950, a few teeth, a skullcap, a mandible, and several long bones of human fossils have been discovered at Zhoukoudian. Taken together, the fossils from Locality 1 represent a population of more than forty Homo erecti. Clearly, Peking Man had used this site for a long time. More than 30 meters of cultural remains in thirteen different layers had accumulated on the site. Multiple dating methods, including paleomagnetic analysis and the uranium fission technique, place these layers at between 500,000 and 200,000 years old. Peking Man’s main food source was the meat of wild animals, among which 70 percent were deer with heavy horns. All together more than ninety kinds of mammal fossils have been found at the site, including remains of leopard, cave bear, Pachycrocuta sinensis (a kind of giant hyena), elephant, rhinoceros, water buffalo, and ostrich. Many pieces of charcoal, burned bone fragments, and hearths suggest that Peking Man had used fire and cooked meat, although there is no direct evidence to prove that he knew how to make fire. Peking Man made six kinds of stone tools: scrapers, points, chopper hammers, awls, engravers, and balls. Many are multipurpose objects. Zone 3, in southwestern China, is represented by the Guanyindong culture in Guizhou. The predecessors of the Guanyindong culture were probably related to the Yuanmou culture of Yunnan. Stone tools from this cultural zone differ to a great degree from the other zones, and there are quite a few different types. Most stone artifacts were skillfully fabricated.

The Middle Foraging Era

The middle foraging era was between 128,000 and 35,000 years ago. During this time the natural environment changed dramatically. In north China the climate became drier and cooler. As a result the saber-toothed tiger (Smilodon), the giant beaver (Trogontherium), and Pachycrocuta sinensis became extinct, while wild donkeys, horses, deer, Bos primigenius (a kind of cattle), and many other species gradually emerged.
In this period a deposit of wind-blown sand and clay, known as the Malan loess, transformed north China. By comparison changes in the tropical and subtropical natural environment in south China were less significant. Giant panda, oriental Stegodon (an elephant-like creature), the Asiatic elephant (*Elephas maximus*), rhesus monkey, sambar deer, and water buffalo were the typical animal species living there. The middle foraging-era cultures showed varying characteristics. For instance, the Xujiayao culture in Shaanxi and Hebei produced a number of types of small stone tools, most of which were small scrapers. By comparison the Dingcun culture from Shanxi used larger stone tools. The typical Dingcun tools were points with three ridges. The Xujiayao culture might have developed from the Zhoukoudian culture while the Dingcun may have come from the Qiahe culture.

Humans during this time lived in caves or camps above ground near to water. The middle foraging-era cave sites were used mainly for dwelling rather than for slaughtering animals. Many caves have hearths inside. No buildings from this time have been found to be constructed or modeled clearly by humans.

Lifestyles differed according to location. In the tropical and subtropical forest areas, food gathering was probably common. In the temperate zone grasslands, a combination of hunting and food gathering was more viable. Sometimes certain stone tools, including balls, characterize a specific site, suggesting that people were engaged in specialized hunting or food-gathering activities. Small, well-polished tools, such as engravers, were produced at this time. Such tools could be used to process other small-scale and more refined objects, which could be used for ornamental purposes. At this time in Europe and West Asia, graves emerged, but so far no tombs from this era have been found in Asia. The middle foraging era also saw an increase in human population.

### The Upper Foraging Era

The upper foraging era began about 35,000 years ago and ended approximately 10,000 years ago. This period witnessed the peak of the glacial period. Many parts of northwest China changed into frozen zones, deserts, or grasslands, while subtropical forests gave way to temperate-zone forest grassland or semiarid grassland north of the Nanling Mountains in south China. Following the peak of the glacial era, the weather gradually changed and warmed the land. From the end of the Pleistocene period, followed by the Holocene period, weather...
Among the 174 adult graves found at Banpo village, there were two graves that buried multiple bodies. In the upper foraging era humans were already showing an increasingly complex treatment of the deceased, including the placement of artifacts in tomb and a sense of the tomb itself as a resting place. Photo by Paul and Bernice Noll.

Patterns in China generally changed to become what they are today. Bone and horn artifacts became increasingly popular during this time, and humans evolved into *Homo sapiens sapiens*, or modern humans.

Upper foraging-era sites were found not only in northern and southwestern China, where foraging-era cultures were normally discovered, but also across Heilongjiang in the north; Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Taiwan in the east; Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangdong, and Guangxi in the south; and the Tibetan Plateau in the west.

The development of upper foraging-era cultures was highlighted by the making and use of microlithic tools by humans. Other types of tools also emerged, including scrapers, points, engravers, awls, drills, and even arrowheads. Many of these artifacts are composite tools. The advancement of stone technology, the use of many new and efficient tools, and the specialization of tool types reflect a further development in the hunting and foraging lifestyle. The use of microlithic tools suggests a profound understanding of the physical qualities of stone and the ability of modern humans to modify the material into intended shapes. Composite tools also indicate a possible specialization among certain groups of people in stone making. Such specialization requires organization and coordination among the stone workers. At the same time, there appeared highly specialized hunters, including the horse hunters of the Zhiyu culture in Shanxi. Another notable achievement of upper foraging-era cultures was the manufacturing of bone and horn artifacts. Many such items have been excavated from the Upper Cave of Zhoukoudian of Beijing, Haicheng, and Zhejiang. Fish forks, spears, daggers, and shovels made of animal bone and horns were manufactured by applying sawing, cutting, scraping, surface polishing, and drilling methods. Large quantities of ornaments, of a variety of materials, were used, including many kinds of animal bones, animal teeth, stone, shell, and ostrich eggshells.

Another aspect of the upper foraging era was the multiplicity of lifestyles. People hunted wild animals, fished, or gathered plants and adapted to their changing environment. Society at this time was composed of small units. Often the existence of a hearth in a dwelling suggests a possible social unit, perhaps a family, while several units form some sort of clan or tribe. A remarkable development during the upper foraging era was the rapid expansion of the human population. Although the death rate of new babies remained high and the lifespan was seldom more than fifty to sixty years (with that of women less than forty years), in general this period saw more people growing old. Modern humans lived a healthier life than ever before.

In the upper foraging era, humans showed an increasingly complex treatment of the deceased. They not only...
buried their dead in specified locations, thus marking a kind of “resting” place for the deceased, but also placed artifacts in the tombs to accompany them. In the Upper Cave of the Zhoukoudian site, in addition to burial goods, hematite powder (iron oxide, often used a pigment in tomb murals) was also found spread around the bodies. Such treatment of the dead suggests that humans at this time had developed a concept of an afterlife, or another world to live in after one physically died. Primitive religious ideas might have arisen during this period, too.

The Legacy of the Foraging Era

In short, China's foraging era was characterized by regional differences and marked by different developmental phases. Changes in weather and the natural environment made a huge impact on people's lifestyles and migration routes. With the development of tools and the sophistication of the brain, people evolved into modern humans. Improved techniques in the fabrication of stone, bone, horn, and shell implements contributed to a higher quality of life and unprecedented prosperity among cultures. Toward the end of the foraging era, around 10,000 years ago, human beings in China began to cultivate plants, domesticate animals, make ceramic vessels for cooking, and generally settle down, thus ushering in the Neolithic era.

Yu JIANG

Further Reading

With only about 1,000 giant pandas left in the wild, this icon of Chinese nature is as rare as it is popular. The black-and-white animal’s natural habitat has receded to a minuscule mountain region in and near Sichuan, though it has become one of the most popular zoo attractions of modern times.

The panda, or giant panda (Ailuropoda melanoleuca), is a solitary bear-like animal native to the rainy bamboo forests in the isolated mountain uplands of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan between 1,200 and 3,400 meters above sea level. Their diet consists almost entirely of bamboo leaves, stems, and shoots; they occasionally eat other plants and even meat. Their Chinese name is da xiong mao (great bear cat 大熊貓). Pandas have a unique and distinct coloration: they have black fur on their ears, around their eyes and nose, on all of their legs, and across their shoulders; the rest of their bodies are white. Adults are typically 160–180 centimeters in length and 85–110 kilograms in weight. Their scientific classification, as either members of the bear or raccoon family, is still disputed. Pandas do not breed prolifically. They reach adulthood at age eight, and females are receptive to breeding only a few days per year. This, combined with habitat loss, are big factors in their declining numbers in the wild.

Pandas were mentioned in Chinese texts more than two thousand years ago, but they first became known to Western science only in 1869. Although historically pandas have been used as emissaries of good will and diplomacy for centuries, the People’s Republic notably employed “Panda Diplomacy” from the late 1950s to the early 1980s. The most well-known of these gestures was Mao Zedong’s gift of the famous panda pair Hsing Hsing and Ling Ling to U.S. president Richard Nixon after his historic diplomatic visit to China in 1972. The pair received over a million visitors in their first year in the U.S. National Zoo, making them arguably the most popular zoo attraction in history. But since the early 1990s, a series of international agreements have led to the “rental” of pandas to foreign countries for research purposes at a variable fee of around $1 million per year. The proceeds go to panda conservation and repopulation efforts in China.

Today there are an estimated six hundred to one thousand pandas in the wild, and they are highly endangered because of dwindling habitat caused by logging and forest clearance. In 2006 the Sichuan Giant Panda Sanctuaries, an aggregate of seven preserves in southwest Sichuan province, were added to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site list. Pandas, because of their rarity and distinctive appearance, have long been considered a Chinese cultural treasure and symbol.

Michael PRETES
A group of pandas munching on their breakfast of bamboo shoots—a staple of their diet—at the Canton (Guangzhou) Zoo. The panda (*Ailuropoda melanoleuca*), a highly endangered species, is native to the rainy bamboo forests in the isolated mountain uplands of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

**Further Reading**


Paper cutting (jianzhi) is one of many Chinese handicrafts emerging a few thousand years ago. Both the Han Chinese and their ethnic minority compatriots cut paper, though for different purposes. There are different schools of paper cutting today, each having its regional flavor. The themes of paper cuts are diversified, varying from animals and plants to people and scenery.

Paper cutting (jianzhi) belongs to the folk (minjian) tradition of the four-thousand-year-old art of Chinese handicrafts and has been influential in Chinese decoration since its inception. Whereas the other type of handicrafts, special handicrafts (tezhong), largely involve costly materials manufactured with sophisticated workmanship, as in the case of cloisonne enamel and lacquerware, folk handicrafts are mostly made by common people and possess distinct regional and ethnic flavors. Along with paper cutting, embroidery and wax printing (batik)—a method of dyeing a fabric by which the parts of the fabric not intended to be dyed are covered with removable wax—also belong to the folk category.

An excavation of a tomb from the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) in Henan Province revealed ornaments of silver foil with hollowed-out, flowery designs. These were the precursors of paper cuts. Before the mass production of paper in the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 CE) expensive paper of bast and leaf fibers was already in use. A legend tells that Emperor Wu (156–87 BCE) of the Han ordered that a portrait of his deceased concubine be cut out of this type of paper to be used in a ritual to call her spirit back. Indeed,
early foil or paper cuts were mostly used for religious purposes.

Women of the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1279) dynasties used sheng (hollowed-out ornaments of paper, silk, and gold foil) to dress their hair. Designs came in the shape of squares (fangsheng), people (rensheng), and flowers (huasheng). Today, paper cuts are used primarily as house decorations to celebrate the Chinese New Year.

Besides the Han, ethnic minority Chinese, such as the Dai, Daur, Hezhen, Manchu, Mongol, Miao, Tibetan, Tu, Uygur, Xibe, and Yugur, also cut paper, though each group has a distinct style. The patterns of the Dai hint at Buddhism. Xibe and Uygur designs feature only flowers because their Islamic traditions prevent them from worshiping human or animal idols (Yuan 2006). Instead of decoration, they use paper cuts mostly as templates to create patterns on embroidery.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, while some rural Chinese individuals are still fond of cutting paper to decorate their houses, paper cutting has become a profitable industry. Paper-cutting themes are diversified. Paper cuts can depict cultural symbols and characters representing good wishes, historical or legendary figures, flowers or animals, natural or life scenes, traditional or ethnic performances, and even images of the West such as Santa Claus. Styles of paper cutting also vary, falling into two major categories: positive and negative. With positive cutting, the product is usually made of monochrome paper so that the outlines of a design are kept and the lines within the outline must be connected. Negative cutting does the opposite, keeping only blocks of the cutout, which can be painted in multiple colors. Sometimes both techniques are applied to create a more vivid, or even a three-dimensional, effect.

The different schools of paper cutting are named after the locations of their origins. They include xiaogan, characterized by its vivid representations; guangling, recognized by its ink-and-wash effect, created with liquor; ansai, characterized by its bold and simple craftsmanship; Wei County, marked by a technique borrowed from the Yangliuqing New Year Paintings, a
600-year-old folk art of woodcut painting named after its place of origin Yangliuqing, a town on the outskirt of Tianjin, China; fengning, recognized by its Manchurian flavor; yangzhou, characterized by its exquisiteness, comparable to the region's famed embroidery; leqing, marked by its thin-lined patterns, which are often used to decorate lanterns of dragon boats; and guangdong, recognized by its integration of paper with glistening copper foils.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading

Paper can't wrap up a fire.

纸包不住火

Zhǐ bāo bù zhù huǒ
The Chinese inventions of papermaking and printing, though prompted by politics and religion, were the catalysts for major changes in ancient China, impacting culture, politics, and education. Papermaking and printing created separate communications revolutions in the premodern world, one in Asia and the other in Europe, by permitting the rapid and widespread transmission of information and ideas.

Chinese innovations from the third to eleventh centuries CE included the invention of paper and the development of stamps, rubbings, and woodblock printing. The mass production of text and images made possible by these inventions resulted in widespread dissemination of religious texts, the introduction of civil service examinations for government officials, the creation of storybooks for a mass audience, and an increase in public debate.

Invention of Paper

With the rise of the first Chinese empire (the Qin dynasty, 221–206 BCE) came an increase in imperial bureaucracy, and an increasingly urgent need for new writing materials and methods of keeping records. The earliest Chinese records from the sixteenth to eleventh centuries BCE were etched on tortoise shells and animal bones; these cumbersome materials were gradually replaced with wooden tablets and strips of bamboo. The imperial bureaucracy generated hundreds of pounds of records on these new, unrefined materials.

The invention of paper has long been attributed to a court official of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). In 105 CE the eunuch Cai Lun (d. 121) presented the Han emperor with a new writing material, a composite paper perhaps made from plant fibers (such as hemp and bark), textile fibers (such as silk), and perhaps other ingredients as well. The exact formula was lost. But in 1957 Chinese archaeologists dated the earliest known sample of paper found in China to 49 BCE, over 150 years before Cai Lun’s presentation.

Early papermakers macerated old rope ends, rags, and fishing nets in water to free the component vegetable fibers, then sifted the solution through a screen to form a thin sheet of matted fibers. The wet sheets were left to dry on the screen or placed on another drying surface. What distinguishes paper produced this way from the papyrus of ancient Egypt is this process of separating and reforming vegetable fibers into a single sheet; papyrus, by comparison, is simply pithed and flattened to create a writing surface. Once dry, the fibers in paper form chemical bonds and create a strong but light writing surface.

By the fourth century paper was more readily available, and it replaced wood and bamboo strips as the writing material of choice; by the sixth century, Chinese papermakers had learned how to extract vegetable fiber from the bark of the mulberry tree, one of the best sources of paper fiber. Today mulberry bark is still favored by fine
papermakers in China, Korea, and Japan because of its strength and beauty.

Strong paper requires long-length fibers; as a result, much of the subsequent history of papermaking in Asia has depended on the development of techniques that preserved fiber length. To ensure the even distribution of the paper fibers, papermakers learned to add a starch solution to the pulp to suspend the fibers. This important development is thought to have occurred in the seventh century.

Stamps and Rubbings

Having created an inexpensive, light medium on which to write, the Chinese next searched for a way to mass-produce written text and visuals, primarily for religious reasons. In the eighth century, devout Buddhists sought to spread their religion by making thousands of copies of the Buddha’s word and image. One early technique used a stamp with an image carved in relief on its surface; once inked with a combination of black soot and oil, the stamp could be pressed onto a sheet of paper, sparing the patron the cost of reproducing the image by hand. This technique was suitable for relatively small images, but larger, more complex images and texts were much more difficult to reproduce.

Government artisans also frequently made rubbings from stone stele. Although this technique was not as fast as stamping, rubbings could be taken from large surfaces with complex engravings. To make a rubbing, the artisan needed to place a moist sheet of fine paper onto the surface of the text- or image-bearing stone stele or tablet. Once the paper adhered to the surface of the stele, the artisan carefully pressed some of the moist paper into the crevices of the stele or tablet with a pad. Then the artisan would take another pad, this time inked with water and black soot, and press the ink onto the surface paper. The pad would not touch the paper the artisan had pressed into the engraving. When the paper was dry, the artisan would peel the inked sheet off the stone, revealing a copy of the engraving in white on a black background. The rubbing technique is still valued today for its precision and aesthetic quality, and is still used to duplicate images of fine calligraphy for Chinese art collectors.

By the eighth century, all the prerequisites for printing were in place. Artisans knew how to take prints from both relief and engraved images with stamps and rubbings. Stamps could replicate small images quickly, and rubbings could reproduce large, detailed images, albeit slowly. But neither method could satisfy the increasing demand in Chinese society for more books: Buddhists, Daoists, and Confucians all sought to produce more copies of their canonical texts for an increasingly literate public. Some time in the eighth century, an artisan thought of combining the advantages of stamps and rubbings by making woodblock prints.

Woodblock Printing

Xylography, or woodblock printing, is both a simple and sophisticated technique for printing, unrivaled until the advent of mechanical printing presses in the nineteenth century. Three skilled artisans are needed to prepare a page of text for xylographic printing. First, using black ink, a calligrapher writes the text to be printed on a thin sheet of paper. Next, a woodcarver takes the sheet of paper and turns it over, pasting the right side of the sheet onto a foot-long block of fruitwood; once the sheet has dried onto the block, the carver can see the characters
in reverse through the back of the paper. The carver
then carefully cuts into the wood and removes the back-
ground, leaving the calligraphic characters raised in re-
lief. When the remaining paper is rubbed off, the block
is ready for printing. Finally, a printmaker inks the cut
woodblock with an ink pad, carefully inking only the
raised characters, and then lays a thin sheet of paper on
top. The printmaker presses the sheet of paper onto the
characters to take an impression. A skilled printmaker
can make two or three impressions a minute this way.
This technique was used to make the world’s earliest ex-
tant printed book, the Buddhist Diamond Sutra, which
is dated 868 ce.

The printing press was not invented in China be-
cause the xylographic process had no use for it. The
critical technical requirement for Chinese printing is
strong, thin paper, which had been perfected with the
development of strong mulberry papers in the sixth
century. By the twelfth century, Europeans learned to
make paper from the Arabs, who had captured some
Chinese papermakers in a battle near Samarqand (in
Uzbekistan) in 751 bce. European papers, however,
were much thicker than Chinese, especially papers
made from macerated cotton rags. European printmak-
ers needed a great deal more pressure to take a relief
impression with these thick papers and therefore re-
quired massive, heavy presses. Another important dif-
ference between European and Chinese printmaking is
the composition of the printing surface. In Asia, a single
woodblock was the preferred medium because the aes-
thetics and complexity of Chinese characters could be
captured easily by a skilled calligrapher. Some Chinese
printers experimented with movable type—tiny relief
blocks of each character—but the capital investment
required to produce and maintain the thousands of tiny
blocks of type was greater than the cost of a few skilled

“A Chinese bookseller
of the prosperous city
of Hangchow, China,”
30 December 1908.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
calligraphers and woodblock engravers, who could set up shop anywhere and begin producing printed books on demand.

**First Print Culture**

The nature of the communications revolution brought on by the development of inexpensive book production is still debated. In China, wide access to a large number of texts costing less than one-tenth that of books printed a few centuries earlier reinforced the education and imperial examination system as a vehicle for recruiting civil service talent from a much wider portion of the population than had been previously possible. This correlation between printing and the examination system is supported by the fact that those areas in China that produced 84 percent of the successful examination candidates also produced 90 percent of China’s printed books.

While there was a dramatic reduction in the cost of books in China, there was also an explosion of printing for profit. By the eleventh century, xylographic printing was already a mature technology and had created the world’s first print culture in China. New literary genres emerged, such as storybooks, aimed at a popular as well as an elite audience. Popular *shanshu* (morality books) were also aimed at the newly created mass audience. The sheer volume and variety of publications for popular consumption prompted the Chinese government to attempt to censor, prohibit, or monopolize the printing of various materials, especially those works, like the dynastic histories, that could be a source of information to be used by rival governments if exported. But the fact that these prohibitions were repeatedly issued indicates that the government had very little real impact on the commercial trade. Printing technology was well established even among the seminomadic empires to the north, and the Chinese government tried to prohibit the import of books from these rival states as well.

The expansion of critical scholarship due to the easy circulation of the printed word is another important feature of print culture. Not only was the literacy rate increasing the eleventh century, but the social elites who were already literate were reading more books and comparing a greater diversity of ideas. We might expect the Chinese imperial library to have a very large collection, but by the twelfth century the government holdings were rivaled by private libraries sometimes containing more than a million volumes.

Easy access to books allowed writers and scholars to compare ideas and generate new ones with greater facility. When writing new books, Chinese writers could draw upon a wider variety of books and challenge old ideas. In his memoirs, the eleventh-century Song scholar-scientist Shen Guà made over 250 citations of a wide variety of works that were available to him, sometimes using those works to support his conclusions, at other times challenging his sources. When he finished his memoirs in the 1080s, they were printed and sold to his peers and other aspiring members of Song society. This highlights another
important aspect of print culture: Not only could people now read and question older ideas, their own ideas could be easily published and disseminated, adding to the scope and intensity of public debate and discussion. The creation of a larger and more critical reading public outside the auspices of government agencies was an important Chinese development of the eleventh century.

Developments after the Eleventh Century

The invention of woodblock color printing during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) brought printing to a new level. A text called *Painting Manual of the Mustard-Seed Garden* appeared around 1640. This work was intended to provide instruction and inspiration for artists. The introduction of this work in Japan began the development of woodcut technique in that country. In the 1930s, lithography (an image is applied to a plate using a greasy medium that accepts ink) and intaglio (an image is etched onto a plate with ink filling the recessed areas) began to displace the woodcut as the primary printmaking technique in China. Screen printing, where ink is forced through a screen of silk or other fine mesh onto a surface, was developed in the second half of the twentieth century. “Hello to Autumn,” created by Guang Jun in 1980, is credited as China’s first screened print.

The existence of a large and discerning reading public in premodern China has diminished with political changes. The closing of schools and denunciation of teachers and intellectuals that characterized the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) lowered the level of Chinese literacy. Despite a government campaign to eradicate illiteracy since that time, there are indications that the level of illiteracy in China has risen since 2000. Reasons include the increasing number of young workers who leave the classroom for migrant work in the cities. Nevertheless, the Chinese tradition of innovation in papermaking and printing spawned a world heritage of art and communication across three epochs.

Paul FORAGE

Further Reading


Pawnshops
Diànhằng 典当行

Pawnshops in China, in existence since the fifth century, operate as small financial institutions. Their general function is to supply fast cash in exchange for goods held in collateral; interest rates, fees, and terms of repayment vary. Pawnshops were forbidden by law from the mid-1950s through the 1970s, but have revived in China since the late 1980s.

The concept of the pawnshop originated in China as early as 420 CE when Buddhist monasteries, having garnered an abundance of assets through donations and land rents, were able to make loans to those in need of financial aid.

A pawnshop was called zhi ku from the Tang (618–907 CE) through the Song dynasties (960–1279), jie ku or jie dian pu in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), and dian dang or dang pu in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). In the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) pawnshops were divided into types according to their capital and business size: ya, ang, dang.

Ya was a smaller type of pawnshop that offered higher interest rates and required a lower value of the collateral. The period of redemption of a pawned item was between four months and one year. Ya pawnshops required little working capital and usually operated in rural or small-town areas. The pawnshop operator received clothes and jewelry from poor pawners as collateral for lending cash to them. Sometimes the pawnshop operator could repawn these items to large dang pu to generate profit or new capital to receive other collateral.

Ang was a midsized pawnshop that offered midrange interest rates and a longer period of redemption—between one and two years. Ang also could repawn their collateral to large dang pu for profit or currency liquidation.

Dang was the largest type of pawnshop. It offered lower interest rates and a longer redemption period—up to three years. Dang pawnshops could receive gold, jewelry, fine art, antiques, and even the deed to a house or land. Gold was the most welcome item because it could be resold in bulk to a smelter to be sold for scrap gold. These pawnshops had a large capital circulation, usually collected from rich Chinese businessmen, landlords, and high-ranking officials. These pawnshops existed in large cities and areas with promising economic prospects.

In the Ming and Qing dynasties large pawnshops were mostly in Anhui and Shanxi provinces. Therefore, they generated a specialized professional business. In 1685 China had 15,080 registered large pawnshops, and this number increased to 22,781 during the Qian Long period.

The pawner had to pay an interest rate as high as 3–10 percent per month to the pawnshop. Dang piao was a receipt of the collateral goods issued by the pawnshop operator. The receipt indicated the name of the collateral goods, how much they were worth, and the period of redemption. The amount of the pawn loan was much lower than the value of the collateral and carried a high interest.
rate. After a certain period the interest would be higher than the value of the collateral, so some pawners would rather lose than redeem the collateral. Then the pawnshop operator could sell or auction the collateral to the public or to other pawnshops.

Brisk Business

China’s pawnshops were very active in the early twentieth century. Local and central governments issued several pawn laws to regulate the business. The government even set up gong dian and gong dang (public pawnshops) under the supervision of local police departments. Several local pawning laws were passed in Jiangsu in 1927, in Anhui in 1929, in Beijing and Shanghai in 1930, in Zhejiang in 1931, and in Tianjin in 1932. The central government also began nationwide regulation of pawnshops (diandang guanli guizhe) in 1945.

Pawnshops were described as “bloodsuckers” after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 because they took items from poor people at extremely low prices and sold them to the rich at higher prices. Poor people were exploited by rich people, according to the theory of Marxism. Therefore, the pawn business was wiped out after the socialist transformation in 1956.

With China’s economic reform millions of private businesses have reemerged and demanded working capital and loans. Because state-owned banks and big commercial banks could not grant loans to small businesses, the old type of pawnshop was revived as an alternative financial institution. Since the pawnshop revival in Sichuan Chengdu in 1987, several thousand pawnshops have been founded.

Fast Cash

Pawnshops are convenient because a getting a loan from them requires no credit check and no guarantors, although the interest rate is high. The combination of fees and interest rate could range from 3.6 to 4.5 percent per month. A pawner can get cash immediately by pawning items such as jewelry, stocks, home appliances, houses, cars, cameras, and computers. Recent statistics show that about 90 percent of customers of pawnshops are small-business owners and low-income persons. With their simple procedures pawnshops are considered a type of microfinance institution.

The pawnshop revival in China has depended to a large degree on the pawnshop’s business culture over fifteen hundred years. Many Chinese choose pawning as an easy way of financing without having to go through a complex loan procedure in banks or having to lose face by borrowing money from friends. Consequently pawnshops will continue to be a unique alternative financial institution in China.

JI Zhaojin
Further Reading

Crows everywhere are equally black.

天下乌鸦一般黑

Tiānxià wūyā yī bān hēi

Peace Reigns over the River
The twelfth-century painted handscroll known as Qingming shanghe tu (Peace Reigns over the River; previously known as Qingming Festival on the River) is considered to be one of the best depictions of daily life in China.

Painted by Zhang Zeduan, Qingming shanghe tu (Peace Reigns over the River; previously known as Qingming Festival on the River) portrays the activities of a bustling city set along a busy river. This work is said to represent the Song-dynasty (960–1279) capital of Bianliang (modern-day Kaifeng) on the Bian River, a waterway that joined the Grand Canal and was used to ship commercial goods. Done in ink and slight color on silk, this painting measures just over five meters in length and slightly less than 25 centimeters in height. The painted scroll has been famous since the fourteenth century and inspired many forgeries and imitations, but the original disappeared from public for centuries. Its whereabouts were unknown until 1954, when it was returned to the Palace Museum in Beijing after having passed through many hands over the centuries; this painting is accepted as the earliest version known, predating the famous imperially commissioned scroll of 1736 in the National Palace Museum, Taipei.

A handscroll was originally meant for intimate, close-range, and occasional viewing. When not in use it would have been kept tightly rolled around a wooden pin, secured, perhaps, by a silken cord with a jade or
ivory toggle, then wrapped in silk and stored in a wooden case. When unfurled from right to left the handscroll would reveal shoulder-length sections of the painting at a time.

The intricate detail and astonishing realism of *Peace Reigns over the River* accurately depict the architecture, carts, boats, and bridges that would have been associated with a bustling commercial center in the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126). Moving from right to left, this painting takes the viewer on a journey through time and space: from early morning to early afternoon, and from the pastoral outskirts of town to the crowded urban center. The painting is composed of three sections. The first shows quiet farms shrouded by mist. A few figures quietly go

### Detail of *Peace Reigns over the River*. A train of camels passes through the city gate; an ornate tower guards the entrance. Willow trees planted along the river bank to hold the earth are beginning to turn green as the time for the Spring Festival nears.
about their duties among the trees. Activity increases as the scroll moves toward the city. The second section shows in exacting detail the area outside the city wall with its taverns, restaurants, and shops as well as barges moored along the river. Here excitement mounts at the Rainbow Bridge, where a crowd has gathered to watch one barge swing under the bridge. The third and final section is of the city itself, marked by a large gate in the city wall. It is now midday and people enjoy the activities that a large, prosperous city has to offer.

Although the painting is unsigned, the attached colophons (or written notes) attribute the work to Zhang Zeduan (dates unknown), a native of Dongwu (modern-day Zhucheng, in Shandong Province). Biographical details are few. The earliest colophon, datable to 1186 and written by Zhang Zhu, an official curator of the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234), states that Zhang Zeduan also went by the name of Zhang Zhengdao. He studied painting at the capital and excelled in a painting technique known as jiehua, or fine-line drawing, that he used for depicting such objects as boats, carts, markets, bridges, and moats. In Zhang Zhu’s opinion, the work is inspired and ought to be treasured.

It has been generally accepted that the painting depicts the city on the day of the Spring (or Qingming, literally “clear-bright”) Festival.
the city on the day of the Spring or Qingming (literally “clear-bright”) Festival that takes place one hundred days after the winter solstice when the graves of ancestors are swept, giving the painting its earlier and most familiar title, Qingming Festival on the River. Recently, however, scholars suggest that the size of the crowds and the relative lack of women allow another reading of the title. Qingming is also translated as “peaceful and orderly”; thus, with a title of Peace Reigns over the River, Zhang Zeduan has depicted an idealized city in which people from all classes mingle harmoniously at a time of economic and commercial prosperity characteristic of this period.

Catherine PAGANI

Further Reading


A person cannot be judged by his appearance in the same token as the sea cannot be measured with a bucket.

人不可貌相，海水不可斗量

rén bù kě mào xiàng, hǎi shuǐ bù kě dòu liàng
During the Tang dynasty the progressive emperor Xuanzong endowed the Pear Garden in Chang’an (modern Xi’an) in 714 CE as a conservatory for the nascent performing arts. Secular music and dance developed and thrived there, especially Chinese opera; the roots of later classical and modern Chinese dramatic performance can be traced there as well.

In 714 CE Emperor Xuanzong (685–762) established a conservatory for the performing arts in the city of Chang’an (modern Xi’an), which he called Li-yuan, or the “pear garden.” During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), a period both of political stability and rich cultural expression, China encouraged, and sought out, interaction with the outside world. One of the results of this cultural and political milieu was the thorough advancement of the arts.

Although this period is renowned for its poetry, painting, and ceramics, it was also a time of steady progress in musical knowledge and theory. But it was during the reign of Emperor Xuanzong (685–762) that one aspect of Chinese music received his personal support: opera (xiqu). The initial purpose of the Pear Garden was to train actors, singers, and dancers for the personal delectation of the Emperor, but it was not long before the innovations that were developed there began to influence Chinese performing arts as a whole. Before 714, the performing arts were intimately linked with religious rites and rituals. Xuanzong, however, demanded personal entertainment that incorporated modes of performance that were traditionally sacred in origin, namely, singing and dancing. By removing the religious element, the performing arts began to develop along secular lines.

One style of presentation especially favored by the Emperor was choral song, which became further refined as art-song (xiaoling), a form that related tales in a dramatic fashion. Such songs were often concerned with courtly activity as well as the trials and tribulations of lovers beset by hardship and even political intrigue. Given their narrative emphasis of these songs, it was not long before another venue of dramatic recitation was engaged that depended upon music and dance. Consequently, much attention was given to developing secular music at the courtly level, and instruments, such as the lute, the harp, the zither, the flute (both vertical and transverse), the side-drum, the kettle drum, the oboe, the gong, and the clapper were perfected to accompany choral, narrative song. Thus, the Pear Garden tradition successfully combined the various performing arts (music, dance, dialog, and acting) into one art form, that is, opera; the linguistic basis of operas performed at this time was the vernacular that would later be classified as classical Chinese.

It is also important to note that, at this early stage, Chinese opera did not include what has become its traditional cast of characters: the clown, the male and female, and the strong male with the painted face; these innovations were introduced later during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Whether choral song during the Tang period involved humor, elaborate costumes, and acrobatics is still debated among scholars. Also, given the penchant of Emperor Xuanzong, the majority of the students in the Pear Garden was choral song, which became further refined as art-song (xiaoling), a form that related tales in a dramatic fashion. Such songs were often concerned with courtly activity as well as the trials and tribulations of lovers beset by hardship and even political intrigue. Given their narrative emphasis of these songs, it was not long before another venue of dramatic recitation was engaged that depended upon music and dance. Consequently, much attention was given to developing secular music at the courtly level, and instruments, such as the lute, the harp, the zither, the flute (both vertical and transverse), the side-drum, the kettle drum, the oboe, the gong, and the clapper were perfected to accompany choral, narrative song. Thus, the Pear Garden tradition successfully combined the various performing arts (music, dance, dialog, and acting) into one art form, that is, opera; the linguistic basis of operas performed at this time was the vernacular that would later be classified as classical Chinese.
Garden and its subsequent graduates were women who were employed to provide entertainment both at courtly functions and at private performances solely for the Emperor. And given the breadth and extension of China during the Tang Dynasty, it is also assumed by scholars that many of these women were slaves from other countries. The importance and durability of the techniques engendered during the reign of Emperor Xuanzong are such that, to this day, actors are commonly referred to as “children of the Pear Garden.”

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading
Pearl River
Zhū Jiāng 珠江

The Pearl River is one of China’s major river systems, extending through several southern provinces. Historically and today, its delta has been an important region for agricultural production and foreign trade.

The Pearl River (Zhu Jiang, 珠江, known also as the “Yue Jiang 粤江”) is the third-largest river in China and took its name from an islet in the river at Guangzhou (Canton) known as Ocean Pearl Island (Haizhu Zhou 海珠洲 or Haizhu Shi 海珠石). The Pearl River is formed from three main tributaries—the West River (Xi Jiang 西江), North River (Bei Jiang 北江), and East River (Dong Jiang 東江). The largest of these, the West River, originates in Yunnan Province and has a total length of about 2,200 kilometers; the North River originates in Jiangxi Province and flows approximately 460 kilometers; the East River also originates in Jiangxi Province and flows 532 kilometers.

The entire drainage area of the Pearl River basin includes parts of the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Jiangxi. The West River and North River tributaries of the Pearl River converge just west of Guangzhou; the East River joins them on the east side of that city. The Pearl River enters the South China Sea by eight major channels. Some definitions reserve the term “Pearl River” only for that portion of the river formed by the convergence of all three of its major tributaries, which flows into the Pearl River delta through the Hu men 虎门 (often known in Western sources as the Bocca Tigris or Bogue), and call the remainder of the system the “Pearl River basin.” This latter definition prevailed historically, and the use of “Pearl River” as a general name for the system emerged only in the twentieth century.

The Pearl River has played a significant role in Chinese history. After Han Chinese settlers began cultivating the Pearl River delta in the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties the West River formed an important route of further exploration and settlement. The Pearl River system remained an important route of trade and settlement in southern China, connecting important inland markets. The importance of the Pearl River as a route of transportation was increased because the mountainous terrain of southern China impedes land transport. The Pearl River delta has also played a particularly important role in China’s economic history. Its fertility made it one of the most densely cultivated regions in China and the economic hub of Guangdong Province. The Pearl River delta is also associated with foreign trade: The former British colony of Hong Kong and the Portuguese colony of Macao are situated on the fringes of the delta, and from the mid-eighteenth century until the First Opium War the government of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) permitted European trade only at Guangzhou. During this period foreign vessels docked at Huangpu (Whampoa) in the Pearl River. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries residents of the Pearl River delta accounted for a major portion of Chinese emigrants, particularly those going to North America. Today the Pearl River delta is known for its industrial production, which in Shenzhen and elsewhere accounts for a significant portion of China’s exports.

Matthew W. MOSCA
Cityscape by the Pearl River, Guangzhou. The river system has long been an important route of trade and settlement in southern China, connecting important inland markets.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

Further Reading


Peking Man
Bēijīngrén 北京人

Peking Man is a hominid of the species Homo erectus, discovered in the 1920s in Zhoukoudian, not far from Beijing (known then as Peking). Remains of more than 40 individuals have been found dating back c. 670,000–410,000 years ago, and Chinese researchers believe that the species intermittently occupied the area during this time, using stone tools and, in its later stages, controlled the use of fire.

The term Peking Man refers to a hominid—a species of the family Hominidae to which humans and their closest fossil ancestors belong—discovered during excavations that were begun in 1921 in Zhoukoudian, Hebei Province, approximately 50 kilometers southwest of Beijing. The area, declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987, has yielded remains of more than forty individuals dating back to 670,000–410,000 years before the present (an alternative dating puts the remains at 580,000–230,000 years ago), and Chinese researchers believe that Peking Man intermittently occupied the area during this time.

The excavations at Zhoukoudian were initiated by Swedish geologist and archaeologist Johan Gunnar Andersson 安特生 (1874–1960), who while working for the Geological Survey of China had shown a profound interest in surveying fossil deposits in China. He recruited Austrian paleontologist Otto Zdansky 仰丹斯基 (1894–1988) of Uppsala University in Sweden to conduct the excavations. During the first year Zdansky found a humanoid tooth, and a second one in 1923, while working on Zhoukoudian fossils at the laboratory in Uppsala. The discoveries were not made known to Andersson until 1926, who then announced the new finds on 22 October of that year. The Canadian physician and paleoanthropologist Davidson Black 葛利普 (1870–1946) of Peking Union Medical College examined the finds and wrote the first paper on the new species. It was based largely on photographs and a written report by Zdansky and published in the journal Nature on 20 November 1926. After the announcement American paleontologist Amadeus William Grabau 葛利普 (1870–1946) of Peking University coined the popular name “Peking Man,” and Black gave the find its official name, Sinantropus pekinensis, though it later was changed to Homo erectus pekinensis.

Joint excavations by China and Western nations were set up at Zhoukoudian. A third tooth was found in 1927 by Swedish paleontologist Birger Bohlin 步林 (1898–1990), and at the end of 1929, the first skullcap was identified by the Chinese paleontologist Pei Wenzhong 裴文中 (1904–1982). Based on the new finds, Black concluded that Peking Man was similar to Java Man, or Pithecanthropus erectus, a hominid first found in Indonesia in 1891. Both finds were later confirmed to be of the same species, and renamed Homo erectus. Erectus finds have also been made in Africa, and most paleontologists believe today that Homo erectus evolved and spread from Africa to Eurasia. During the Japanese occupation of China and World War II, the remains from the Peking Man discovery—apart from three teeth stored in Uppsala—disappeared in an
attempt to smuggle the remains to safety in the United States. New finds since have been made in Zhoukoudian and in other parts of China to confirm the existence of the species.

Peking Man had a long, low skull that was remarkably thick, with a large brow ridge above the eye sockets. Its brain size varied from 915 to 1,225 cubic centimeters, compared with an average cranial capacity of about 1,350 cubic centimeters in modern humans.

It used stone tools, as evidenced by the large number of chopping tools made of sandstone or quartz, and scrapers made of flakes of various sizes that have been found on the site. In 1931 Black reported the presence of what he believed to be burned animal bones and blackened layers containing quantities of carbon inside the cave deposits. Although no real hearths were found, it was believed that Black’s report indicated that Peking Man was able to control the use of fire. The evidence for this assertion was questioned in the 1980s and 1990s in a report by American archaeologists and anthropologists Lewis Binford and Nancy Stone, and later by a team led by Steve Weiner of the Weizmann Institute of Science in
Israel. The first study did, however, acknowledge episodes of roasting horse heads in the later phases of the occupation, and the latter noted burned animal bones in association with stone tools nearby.

A theory that Peking Man was a cannibal that lived in a cave on the site was put forward first in the late 1920s by Henri Breuil and in the 1930s by Franz Weidenreich, who continued Black’s work after his death in 1934. Weidenreich concluded that many remains found in the cave bore traces of physical wounds and that some of the crania seemed to have been broken, presumably to reach the brain within. Pei Wenzhong early disagreed with this conclusion and suggested instead that these skeletal wounds could have resulted from hyenas dragging their victims to the cave and eating them there. Pei’s view won fresh support in the 1980s and 1990s from research conducted by Binford and Stone, whose examinations of bite and tool marks on animal bones furthermore indicated that Peking Man was a scavenger instead of a hunter and that the cave mostly was occupied by denning animals. However, a cranium discovered in 1966 has recently been shown to have marks from stone tools, indicating that cannibalism in fact did occur. A long-held claim that Peking Man may have been the forefather of the people in Asia has been contradicted by recent DNA research.

Jan ROMGARD

Further Reading
Peking University
Běijīng Dàxué 北京大学

Peking University, China’s oldest university and today one of its best, was crucial to the development of Marxism in China. University professors Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, co-founders of the Chinese Communist Party, and Mao Zedong, eventual leader of the CCP, then working in the university’s library, all attended the school. The name “Peking University” lives on despite the modern usage of Beijing.

Peking University is the oldest and one of the best universities in China. It was founded in 1898 under the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and was originally named Metropolitan University. After Republican China (1912–1949) was established, the university changed its name to Peking University in May 1912; it retained this name after the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and after usage of Beijing became more commonplace among Westerners.

Peking University has a tradition of academic freedom. From 1915 to 1923 it played a prominent role in the May Fourth Movement for intellectual and social change—the movement is most often associated with the demonstrations on 4 May 1919 for which it was named—and it became a center for the Chinese New Culture Movement to adopt a popular speaking language instead of the language of classical literature. The development of Marxism in China was begun at the university by professors Li Dazhao (1889–1927) and Chen Duxiu (1889–1942), and by Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who then worked in the university’s library but would go on to become leader of the Chinese Communist Party.

When Japan invaded China in World War II, Peking University was moved to Kunming in Yunnan Province. When the university moved back to Beijing in 1946, it consisted of six colleges with a total enrollment of three thousand students. By 1952 enrollment had increased to 10,671 students but declined during Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

The Library at Peking (locally known as Beida) University. The future chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was working in the library when he met the party’s founders, former students themselves but professors by that time. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Today Peking University is a comprehensive university offering five fields of study: social sciences, humanities, science, medicine and information, and engineering. With a total enrollment of 36,982 students, it has 16 colleges, 19 departments, 80 undergraduate programs, 177 masters programs, and 155 doctoral programs. It also has 126 research centers and 98 research institutes.

The presidents of Peking University have included well-known scholars, including Yan Fu, the most famous Chinese translator of Western classics to Chinese; educator Cai Yuanpei, philosopher and author Hu Shi, and economist Ma Yinchu.

CHANG Teh-Kuang

Further Reading
Completed in 1598 by Tang Xianzu and widely performed and printed thereafter, *Peony Pavilion* was among the first Chinese plays to explore the philosophical dimensions of passionate love. An instant success, scenes from the play entered the core repertoire of Kun Opera, the oldest continuously performed Chinese operatic form and now a UNESCO Masterpiece of Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity.

Together with the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) *zaju* drama *Story of the Western Wing* (*Xixiang ji*) and the story of the Butterfly Lovers, Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai, *Peony Pavilion* ranks among the famous romantic comedies in the corpus of traditional Chinese song-drama. Also known as *The Return of the Soul* (*Huanhun ji*), *Peony Pavilion* was written by Tang Xianzu (1550–1616), the most innovative dramatist of his era. Rather than letting musical and prosodic considerations constrain his compositions, Tang treated song lyrics not so much as mere libretti but as a poetic medium in its own right. Inspired by the aesthetic of Yuan *zaju* drama, which combined poetic and colloquial elements, Tang conceived of a fresh and often complex poetic language while juxtaposing scenes of great emotional delicacy and depth with episodes of hilarity and military valor.

Completed in 1598, staged in 1599, and widely published in the 1600s, the fifty-five-scene play follows the story of Du Liniang as she experiences sexual awakening with a young scholar in a dream (scene 10), draws a self-portrait and composes a poem on a silk scroll to
commemorate her beauty (scene 14), dies of lovesickness (scene 20), is sent back to the world by the Judge of Hell (scene 23), has her portrait recovered by the scholar Liu Mengmei (scene 24) and meets up as a ghost with Liu, the real incarnation of her dream lover (scenes 28–32), cajoles him into resurrecting her corpse (scene 36), and eventually convinces both her stern father and the emperor to accept her marriage to her dream lover (scene 55).

As Tang Xianzu announced in his famous preface to the play, the song-drama aimed to explore the mysterious power of authentic passion (qing) to transcend the conventional limitations of the natural world on the one hand, and to be accommodated and integrated within to improve upon the social contract on the other hand. In endowing a female heroine with the capacity to imagine a deeply sexual and yet profoundly pure love, Tang drew on established notions of women as the emotional gender (duoqing) but newly invested such a disposition with socially regenerative powers. An instant success in private and commercial performance venues, Peony Pavilion struck a chord with both popular and elite audiences. Gentry women in particular deeply identified with the romantic and literary aspirations of the heroine. Such sentiments culminated in the Joint Commentary to Peony Pavilion by the Three Wives of Wu Washan (1694).

Select scenes from the play quickly became fixtures in the operatic repertoire, particularly in the melodious string- and wind-based Kun opera (Kunqu), the oldest continuously performed operatic genre in China and since 2001 a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Masterpiece of Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity. Since the late 1990s several major theatrical productions with renowned directors (Peter Sellars, Vienna, 1998; Chen Shizheng, New York, 1999; Guo Xiaonan, Shanghai, 2000; Bai Xianyong, Suzhou, 2004) have rekindled interest in Kun opera in China and abroad with new versions of Peony Pavilion. Filmic and novelistic adaptations of Peony Pavilion in Chinese and other languages underscore the renewed appeal of genuine passion in an age of mediated experiences.

Patricia SIEBER

Further Reading
People’s Courts
Rénmín fǎyuàn 人民法院

The current Chinese legal system is based on the 1982 constitution, which established a hierarchy of people’s courts to handle both civil and criminal cases. People’s courts are units of the government charged with advancing the interests of the state (i.e., maintaining the social and economic order), are subject to the direction of CCP officials, and do not involve an adversarial prosecutor/defender relationship, as is common in the West.

The Chinese legal system has undergone several substantial changes since it was established by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China of 1954. The legal system under this constitution was based largely on early Soviet legal practices and included Western concepts such as freedom of religion, speech, and correspondence, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, unless those arrests were authorized by people’s procuratorates. In the Chinese system, procuratorates serve as both prosecuting attorney and public defender. By 1957 the emphasis on legal rights had come to be perceived as a threat to central authority, and arrest powers were granted to police forces. Judicial power was undermined by local officials who assumed the functions formerly assigned to the procuratorates.

The breakdown of constitutional legal authority contributed in part to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which ended with the promulgation of the new constitution of 1975. Procuratorates were not included as part of the legal authority under this constitution, and their functions were assigned to the police. This increased party authority but undermined the rights of citizens. Legal reforms continued with the 1978 constitution and again with the 1982 constitution, in which the legal organs of the 1954 constitution were brought back.

The current Chinese legal system dates from the 1982 constitution and is quite different from Western systems, in both criminal and civil cases. But China’s court systems, and its legal procedures as a whole, have been undergoing substantial change as China shifts from the hard-line socialist authoritarian regime it was in 1982 to a more market-based one that must address pragmatic matters and international observation.

Section 7 of the 1982 Chinese constitution directs the structure of the people’s courts and the people’s procuratorates. Unlike some Western judicial systems, courts are not independent. According to the Chinese constitution, the Supreme People’s Court answers to the National People’s Congress and oversees the operations of lower courts. These include military courts, special people’s courts, and local people’s courts. The separation of powers that exists in modern Western governments does not exist, and courts are subject to the direction of party officials. But the increasing openness of Chinese political activities serves to balance the decisions of the people’s courts.

Also within the judicial structure are the people’s procuratorates and the public security bureaus. Under
the 1982 constitution, all court proceedings are to be open to the public, except in cases of state secrets, private family matters, and children.

Article 135 under this Section 7 of this constitution directs: “The people’s courts, people’s procuratorates and public security organs shall, in handling criminal cases, divide their functions, each taking responsibility for its own work, and they shall coordinate their efforts and check each other to ensure correct and effective enforcement of law.” This points out that Chinese courts cannot exercise judicial review over legislative matters, and in this regard are not as powerful as many of their Western counterparts. The Chinese constitution does guarantee the right to appeal decisions of the lower courts, but only one appeal is permitted. The Chinese practice of encouraging people charged with crimes to confess (with the expectation of reduced sentences) leads to an extremely high rate of convictions and undermines the effectiveness of appeals.

The lowest level of the people’s court functions at the district and county level. Approximately 3,100 of these basic courts 基层人民法院, which operate at the county, city, and municipal level, have been established. The next level is the higher court, or intermediate court 中级人民法院. Thirty of these function in the major municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Tianjin; in the autonomous regions of Guangxi, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Neimengu, Xizang (Tibet); and in the provinces. Separate judicial systems exist for the Hong Kong and Macao special autonomous regions. The highest level of people’s court is the Supreme People’s Court 最高人民法院.

Within the Chinese system, Western concepts such as the Anglo-American adversarial relationship between prosecution and defense are not used. Because Chinese courts are units of the government, socialist theory dictates that they should advance the interests of the state, including maintaining the “social and economic order,” which is often at odds with the interests of the accused. Another aspect of people’s courts that differs from Western systems is that judges in these courts can recommend mediation between the parties; the same judge acts as mediator.

Defense lawyers in the Chinese system do not become involved with their clients until after an indictment has been issued, further limiting their usefulness. Another barrier to defense is the “presumption of guilt” on which the Chinese system operates. Additionally, freeing a defendant on a legal technicality is seen as a threat to the security of society. Lawyers must have their licenses to practice law renewed by local officials, so challenging political authority puts lawyers at risk.

Nevertheless, the complexity of China’s legal system
has led to a need for trained legal professionals, particularly as China’s economic system has opened up to more foreign exchange. In the late 1980s, the numbers of professional lawyers did not meet the demand for their services. But since the late 1990s, the number of lawyers and law offices has increased. Since 1990, the number of cases in Chinese courts has doubled, and a new focus on social justice, rather than social and economic order, has developed. Since the late 1990s, people’s courts have had to deal with a more litigious population, and the number of civil cases, particularly those dealing with exploitation of migrant workers, has greatly increased.

Thomas P. DOLAN

Further Reading


People’s Daily
Rénmín ribào 人民日报

People’s Daily is the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, and is the most influential and authoritative newspaper in China to represent the voice of the Chinese central government. With a combined domestic and international circulation of over 3 million, it is ranked among the top ten largest newspapers in the world by UNESCO.

Beginning publication in 1948 in Pingshan, Hebei Province, as the newspaper of a regional branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People’s Daily is the official newspaper of the CCP’s Central Committee. In March 1949 the People’s Daily moved from its Hebei location to Beijing as the People’s Liberation Army entered the city in preparation for the founding of the People’s Republic of China; it was named the official party paper in August 1949.

The People’s Daily is the most influential and authoritative newspaper in China, representing the voice of the Chinese Communist Party and the central government. It has a combined domestic and international circulation of over 3 million. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), it ranks among the world’s ten largest newspapers in circulation. The People’s Daily has thirty-six correspondent branches in China and thirty-two foreign correspondent bureaus.

The People’s Daily carries the latest news about policies, resolutions, and viewpoints of the Chinese Communist Party and the central government. It also offers comprehensive coverage of major domestic and international news.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) the People’s Daily was one of the few sources of information from which either Chinese or foreigners could learn what the Chinese government was doing. During that period an editorial in the People’s Daily was considered a powerful statement of government policy. The People’s Daily is still the chief information source of the Chinese Communist Party, but editorials in the People’s Daily are only regarded as fairly authoritative statements of government policies. Although all editorials, commentaries, and other opinions published in the People’s Daily must be government approved, they differ sharply in the amount of official authoritativeness they contain.

The People’s Daily has three editions: Mainland Edition for readers in mainland China; Hong Kong Edition for Hong Kong readers; and Overseas Edition for readers outside the first two areas. Unlike the other two editions, the Mainland Edition does not announce that it is specifically geared for mainland readers. The Hong Kong Edition has much more content, whereas the Mainland Edition content is restricted from including party-sensitive subjects.

Since the mid-1990s the People’s Daily has faced a decline of government subsidies and has been challenged as well by increased competition from international news sources, smaller Chinese newspapers, tabloids, and online
news outlets. As part of its effort to modernize, in 1997 it began an online edition at its website (www.people.com.cn) and has expanded its content in language editions of simplified Chinese, traditional Chinese, English, Japanese, French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic. The web content, such as that appearing in the Strong Nation Forum in the Chinese edition, has been more candid than that of the paper’s printed editions.

Published under the People’s Daily are several other publications, such as East China News, South China News, Market Daily, International Financial Daily, Jiangnan Times, Global Times, Securities Times, Health Times, Satire and Humor, and monthly magazines, including The Earth, News Front, Listed Companies, Times Trend, and People Forum.

Further Reading

People’s Liberation Army
Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiēfàngjūn
中国人民解放军

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the ground, air, naval, and strategic forces of the Communist Chinese military. The PLA has been instrumental in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) success in carrying out the revolution and in governing the country. Since the 1980s Chinese leaders have embarked on a series of reforms to professionalize and modernize the PLA.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is one of the largest military forces in the world. In fact, its army, with more than 3 million members, is the largest in the world. It also has a fairly large navy and air force. Its nuclear forces, although small compared with those of the United States and Russia, are the fourth largest. However, many of the PLA’s weapons and equipment are antiquated and limited in their capacity to project military force beyond China’s borders.

The origins of the PLA date back to 1 August 1927, when the Chinese Communists established the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army to fight a guerrilla war against the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) forces, led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975). During the Maoist period (1949–1976) the PLA was transformed from a loosely organized guerrilla army into a professional fighting force closely resembling the Soviet model, although some tension existed between those who wanted further professionalization and those who wanted the PLA to remain a revolutionary organization.

The former group included Marshal Peng Dehuai, the PRC’s first Defense Minister who was relieved of his post by Mao in 1959 after he criticized Mao for launching the Great Leap Forward. The latter group included Mao and Lin Biao, the Defense Minister who replaced Peng and was an important supporter of Mao during the Cultural Revolution until 1971, when Lin was declared dead after a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia. The official story is that Lin was fleeing to the Soviet Union after his plot to kill Mao had been uncovered.

Historically the PLA has been heavily involved in governance of the country, although it has always remained subordinate to rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Top CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), historically have had extensive experience in, and connections with, the Red Army. The PLA is one of the three pillars of power in the Chinese Communist political system, alongside the CCP and the Chinese government. The PLA enjoys equal rank with the State Council, the highest governmental body, and answers only to the Military Affairs Commission of the CCP. In other words, the Chinese Communist Party, not the government, commands the PLA. In fact, CCP control over the PLA has been so important that the only official position held by Deng Xiaoping, China’s preeminent leader during the 1980s, was that of chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. Another indication of the PLA’s involvement in domestic affairs is that until recently it ran a vast industrial and commercial empire that...
numbered over 10,000 enterprises with profits estimated at around S$5–10 billion a year. The growth of these enterprises was accompanied by high levels of corruption.

When Deng Xiaoping became China’s top leader in 1978, he began a series of reforms to professionalize and modernize the PLA in order to disentangle it from domestic affairs and redirect its mission toward external security from other countries. That reform continues into the twenty-first century, with one milestone being reached shortly after Deng’s death in 1997 when the PLA was ordered to transfer most of its commercial and industrial holdings to civilian control. Under the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao administrations, China has made major investments in upgrading its military force. The defense budget has risen consistently and significantly since 1989, a trend that has caused concern among China’s neighbors. China has purchased major weapons systems from Russia and Israel, and made substantial progress in developing its own military hardware. In 2007, China unveiled its new J-10 fighter bomber and is expected to introduce its own nuclear attack submarines in the near future.

Shawn SHIEH

Further Reading

Western opinion of China has oscillated between the positive and negative for nearly three hundred years. In the current era the media is an important force in China’s perception and reception.

China has made considerable efforts on the foreign policy front to offset Western perceptions of a “China threat,” instead stressing China’s “peaceful rise” (a phrase that quickly was replaced by “peaceful development”). But despite gains on the political front, the general cultural image of China remains clouded in the West.

China is becoming increasingly difficult to define ideologically because it is in a constant process of change. It is searching for national and international identities and for a fresh model of development. Its rate of socio-cultural and economic transformations is almost dizzying. In terms of Western perspectives of China, one can have either an essentialist view—which assumes that an authentic and clear set of definitively Chinese characteristics exists—or a nonessentialist view, which questions the concept of a “fixed” or “true” Chinese identity or essential “Chinese” qualities.

The Chinese government spent billions of dollars on new facilities for the 2008 Olympic games in Beijing. The Olympics were a great opportunity for the Chinese government and people to present a positive image to the rest of the world. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN
Eleven “Ages” of Attitudes toward China

The scholar Harold Isaacs described six “ages” of attitudes toward China in the 1950s; in 1990 Steven Mosher added three more ages:

- Age of Respect (eighteenth century)
- Age of Contempt (1840–1905)
- Age of Benevolence (1905–1937)
- Age of Admiration (1937–1944)
- Age of Disenchantment (1944–1949)
- Age of Hostility (from 1949; Mosher saw this age as lasting until 1972)
- Second Age of Admiration (1972–1977)
- Second Age of Disenchantment (1977–1980)

To these nine append the following two:

- Age of Uncertainty (from 1997)

Each age has some distinguishing essentialist features:

- Confucian wisdom in the first
- Oriental despotism in the second
- A resilient civilization in the third
- The heroic Chinese in the fourth
- The ungrateful wretches in the fifth
- The evil Communists in the sixth
- Peaceful communitarian society in the seventh
- Excessive revolution in the eighth
- A modernizing nation in the ninth
- An unrepentant Communist state in the tenth

The eleventh age, the current “Age of Uncertainty,” is marked by concerns about human rights but more substantially by a sudden increase in coverage of China’s economic development as well as its increasingly important role in global issues.

For example, in mid-March 2008 the riots in Tibet triggered severe criticism of China’s record on human rights. American soldiers in China during World War II found Chinese girls who were educated in the United States to be good sports companions. Here Sergeant Ivan O. Stanbury of Pomona, California, waits with three young ladies for a turn on the tennis court. This photograph, circa 1942, conveys the Western view of China that Harold Isaacs calls the “Age of Admiration” (1937–1944). PHOTO BY TOM CHRISETSENSEN
rights by the media in the West. This criticism, reaching its apex in the Olympic torch relay in London, Paris, and Los Angeles in early April, galvanized so much public attention that it even threatened to derail the Beijing Olympics. But only a few weeks later the media responded positively to the Chinese government’s quick rescue attempts after the devastating earthquake in Sichuan. Later the early critical voice of the media was largely lost when the media joined the celebration of the success of the Beijing Olympics in August. The ravaging financial crisis in late 2008, however, brought China back to the other focus: China’s increasingly vital role in the world economy. The current uncertainty in the media’s portrayal of China may reflect uncertain changes within China and the challenges that these changes pose to formulating stable, long-term relations between China and the West. The theme of human rights versus the economy will continue to play out in the foreseeable future.

A prominent feature of the ages of attitudes toward China is that chronological pairs of them often represent two polarized positions. The image of China during the

An 1987 lithograph by J. Keppler, for Puck magazine, dating from the “Age of Contempt” (1840–1905, as named by the scholar Harold Isaacs). During the economic depression of the 1870s, white workers began to blame Chinese competition for the high rate of unemployment. As anti-Chinese sentiment grew, the American media depicted Chinese immigrants as opium addicts and rat-eaters, crowded together on bunk beds to save money. In this particular illustration a racist portrayal of Chinese immigrants is juxtaposed with that of an idyllic American family, implying that the Chinese laborers’ “standard of living” allowed them to settle for less wages than their American counterparts. Library of Congress.
1980s, for example, was dominated by hardworking people and harmonious families with the aspirations of an old civilization to modernize, whereas during the 1990s that image was replaced by an image of child abuse, prison labor, the death penalty, Taiwan, and Tibet. Perhaps it is not surprising that the 1980s brought the flowering in Great Britain of television documentaries about Chinese history and culture as the West tried to rediscover China after decades of isolation. At least eight such documentary series were produced during the 1980s, including Yellow River, The Heart of the Dragon, and Silk Road. However, during the 1990s this cultural China yielded, in the Western mind, to a largely political China.

The romantic-cynic pairing is another duality in Western perception of China. The West has had a love-hate relationship with China for as long as the West has studied China. That duality is reflected in U.S. policy toward China.

**Similar or Dissimilar?**

Because the West has a fondness for such dualities, it tends to see China through an either/or lens: China is perceived either as deviant and therefore negative or as like the West and therefore positive. During the oscillating ages presented earlier, with the exception of the Age of Respect (eighteenth century), positive ages were marked by qualities that the West sees itself as possessing and negative ages by what the West defines as “other.”

Therefore, on the whole, China’s receptiveness to Western influence has resulted in positive perspectives in the West, whereas China’s resistance to Western influence has resulted in negative perspectives. The one exception was the Age of Respect, when Europe used its idealized view of China as a means to criticize its own culture. The French philosophers of the eighteenth century grossly exaggerated the grandeur of China in order to address domestic problems. For example, the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, disillusioned by the immorality of his own society, argued that China should send missionaries to teach natural theology to Europeans. But by the mid-nineteenth century the decline of China’s power with the advent of Western encroachment meant that such lofty perspectives could not be sustained. The technological progress that resulted from the Industrial Revolution and the opinion (common then in the West) that the non-Western world had no history to speak of meant that Westerners perceived China as backward.

**Media Role in Image Building**

We can easily see a parallel between image oscillation and changes in relations between China and the West. As the image shifts, so do relations. The reverse also is true: as relations shift, so do media perceptions. Indeed, the underlying force behind so many “back and forth” images concerning China is the change in the underpinnings of the relationship between China and the West.

The scholar Tsan-kuo Chang, writing on the influence of the media on U.S. policy toward China from 1950 through 1984, concluded that the media functioned more as a surrogate for foreign policymakers than as an independent voice. In reporting on China the U.S. media serve as an unofficial instrument for foreign policymakers to establish the rules of the game. During the 1980s the media reinforced the policymakers’ view of China as a counterbalancing force against the threat of the Soviet Union. When that threat disappeared during the 1990s after the Soviet Union collapsed, China seemed suddenly much more threatening. Policymakers and the media were now aware of China as the world’s most populous country, a country with rising economic power and an alien ideology. Since the 1990s the challenge seems to be to engage China productively and to balance economic and political interests.

**The Future**

China’s polity, despite having embraced economic (capitalist) globalization, remains unchanged for the most part. But it has reached a crucial crossroad: It has abandoned the Maoist development model but is not walking down a totally Western road to modernity, which is what some in the West, as well as in China, would prefer. The Chinese society and state continue to evolve, steered by a multiplicity of dynamics but mostly by a catch-up mind-
set and a renewed appreciation of their own traditional values and history.

The Chinese adage “groping for stones to cross the river” can be applied not only to China’s economy, which has already taken off, but also to China’s sociocultural and political institutions, which are seeking a sustainable development model. This fact is reflected in the Chinese Communist Party’s adoption of a scientific approach to development at its seventeenth National Congress in 2007. The Communist-versus-capitalist perspective linked to the Cold War is obsolete. Indeed, today the Chinese state resembles, if anything, more its predecessors in China’s long history of bureaucratic control and state intervention than anything described by orthodox Marxism. The groping-oriented approach initiated by Chinese Communist Party general secretary Deng Xiaoping to some extent shows that the Chinese political elite has made a complete reversal in its ideological struggle for China’s future: from embracing Soviet-style Communism early in the twentieth century to embracing capitalism in the twenty-first century. Both Dengist pragmatism and Maoist dogmatism are part of a search for a Chinese road to modernity in a journey that is far from being over in the first years of the new millennium.

Today China defies simplistic characterization, although some people in the West may still feel that China can be interpreted within existing Western frames. Mark Leonard, executive director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in What Does China Think? that although dozens of books about China’s rise have been written, most authors treat China as a political, economic, or military unit instead of as a generator of ideas that could influence the Western world.

If news reporting mediates reality rather than mirrors reality, how are the news media mediating the reality of China? How does China become news? How is newsworthiness determined? More important, how should China be presented to the general public? These questions are important because the media contribute greatly to the public perceptions and knowledge of China. The media often define what we say and think about China. The scholar Richard Hoggart concludes that news editors’ sense of what is news has been culturally conditioned and that such a sense structures reality. If his conclusion is true, news reporting involves an interaction between our internalized versions of the spirit of our time, influenced by cultural conditioning, and our external world.

Qing CAO

Further Reading
Perspectives on the United States—Chinese

Zhōngguó rén kàn Měiguó 中国人看美国

After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, relations between China and the United States were nonexistent until 1972. Since then, dealings have been complex and frequently changing; Chinese viewpoints of the United States often have been fueled by suspicion and distrust.

China, a cradle of human civilization and the birthplace of the dominant East Asian culture, is a large country with a rich, long history. Although China had trade and diplomatic relations with the United States in the nineteenth century, the focus here is on relations between the two nations since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, and on Chinese perspectives on the United States from that date forward, with emphasis on the contemporary period after 1989. PRC-U.S. relations since the 1990s have become progressively more complex and have proceeded on two tracks, one of comprehensive engagement and one of strategic competition. The PRC-U.S. relationship will probably be the most important bilateral relationship in the world during the twenty-first century.

History of Relations with the United States

The history of relations between the PRC and the United States can be divided into four periods. In 1949, the Communists won the civil war against the Nationalists (Guomindang or GMD) and took control of mainland China; the Nationalists fled to Taiwan. During the first period (1949–1972), U.S. relations with the mainland regime, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were vituperative, estranged, and largely frozen.

The second period (1972–1989) began with the visit to China of U.S. president Richard Nixon (served 1969–1974) to meet with Mao Zedong, the chairman of the CCP. This led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries for the first time, with the two sides sharing a common strategic concern over the threat posed by the Soviet Union. PRC-U.S. relations were further normalized in 1978 when the two countries reached an accommodation on the question of Taiwan’s status. (In 1949 the Nationalists had insisted that, although located on Taiwan, they represented the legitimate government of all China, a claim the United States initially supported; the PRC for its part regarded—and continues to regard—Taiwan as a constituent part of China that should one day return to mainland control.) As part of that accommodation, the administration of U.S. president Jimmy Carter (served 1977–1981) terminated official relations with the government on Taiwan. In 1978 the PRC, led by Deng Xiaoping, initiated economic reforms, and PRC-U.S. relations flourished in terms of trade, tourism, and cultural exchanges.

The third period (1989–2001) began with the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 and ended with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. In June 1989 the Chinese government suppressed mass protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, as well as elsewhere in China, sparking the most severe crisis in
PRC-U.S. relations since the 1972 rapprochement. Relations remained troubled throughout the 1990s. But the administration of U.S. president Bill Clinton (served 1993–2001) viewed the PRC as a strategic partner and actively sought comprehensive engagement with it. His successor, George W. Bush (served 2001–2009), reversed that view, calling China instead a strategic competitor. Yet PRC-U.S. relations during the fourth period (from the September 11 attacks to 2007) improved significantly as President Bush sought Chinese help and support for the global war on terrorism and in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.

**Perspectives on the United States**

China views itself as a victim of nineteenth-century Western imperialism and power politics. For Beijing, the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was another example of Western power politics, by which Beijing means a type of foreign policy distinguished by a pursuit of national interests and power with no regard for moral principles. Beijing views the West in general and the United States in particular from this perspective, and it has colored the PRC’s perception of the United States in almost every context. To Beijing, U.S. pressure on China to democratize, grant more access to Chinese markets, lower its trade deficit, and limit its arms sales, not to mention U.S. support for Taiwan and effort to maintain dominance in Asia, are all examples of U.S. hegemony (that is, U.S. desire to dominate). The unilateralism of the foreign policy of George W. Bush in the post–September 11 era further bolstered this view. Both hegemony and power politics involve the excessive use of military force in solving foreign policy problems, while hegemony involves the unilateralist use of it.

Policy analysts in the United States have a “China threat” thesis, which claims that the PRC’s economic growth, population size, increasing military capabilities, and political influence threaten U.S. national security. It assumes that the Chinese and U.S. political systems and ideologies are irreconcilable, and consequently predicts that there eventually will be a confrontation between the two countries. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the thesis says more about U.S. aggressiveness than about China; Beijing
does not see China as being similar to the United States or other Western powers. To counter what it believes to be an unfair characterization of China, Beijing has come up with its own “Peaceful Rise” (heping jueqi) thesis. According to this, China does not threaten the United States because China does not have superpower military strength, China does not have a tradition of territorial expansion, and China does not have a single soldier overseas. Heping jueqi essentially maintains that China does not support or share the Western tradition of power politics and hegemony and therefore could not pose a threat to the United States.

**MAJOR EVENTS INFLUENCING PRC PERSPECTIVES**

In its opinion, Beijing’s view of the United States as a hegemonic world power has been reinforced by a series of events and issues in the post–Cold War era (since 1989).

**Iraq War (1991)**

First, Beijing was astonished by the advanced technological wizardry of U.S. weaponry and by the rapid defeat of Iraq’s armed forces in the 1991 Iraq War. It jolted China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into initiating

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A daguerreotype of white and Chinese miners hoping to strike it rich during the California Gold Rush at Auburn Ravine in 1852, when thousands of first-wave Chinese immigrants arrived to seek their fortune in Gum Shan, or “Gold Mountain.” CALIFORNIA STATE LIBRARY (DAGUERREOTYPE COLLECTION #912).
an aggressive program to modernize its military hard-
ware (equipment) and software (technology, doctrines).
NATO operations against Serbia in 1999 and yet again in 2003, when war in Iraq resumed, further shocked China.

**Taiwan Strait Crisis (1996)**

In 1996 Washington dispatched two aircraft carrier groups near China after China lobbed missiles across the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to influence the presidential election. James Sasser, the U.S. ambassador to China, warned President Clinton that running a carrier group through the strait might trigger a Chinese military response. The carrier groups moved away, China quieted down, and the relatively conciliatory Lee Teng-hui was reelected in Taiwan. The episode, however, started Beijing thinking about ways and means to deter similar interventions by the U.S. military in the future.

**Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (1999)**

During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, U.S. jetfighters “mistakenly” bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Washington apologized and paid a sum of $2.2 million for the loss of Chinese lives and damage to the embassy building. However, even today Beijing has not accepted the official U.S. explanation that it was an accident. From China's perspective, the bombing was planned by certain right-wing elements in the Pentagon to humiliate the Chinese and to sabotage President Clinton’s attempt to engage China.

**Cox Report (1999)**

In May 1999 the U.S. House of Representatives’ Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military and Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, led by Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), reported, among other things, that China used an elaborate system of espionage and exchanges to modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities, and that it stole U.S. data on thermonuclear warheads, missiles, and space technology. China’s State Council saw in the report a U.S. attempt to instigate anti-Chinese sentiments, to contain China, and to undermine PRC-U.S. relations.


Experts abroad and at home discredited the Cox report, arguing that many of its statements were factually wrong, overly politicized, or simply lacked understanding of the true nature of some of the issues (specifically regarding nuclear science and missile technology). Nevertheless, the report paved the way for Congress’s creation of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission (later Economic and Security Review Commission) in October 2000. The USCC’s mandate is to investigate, monitor, and report on how PRC-U.S. economic relations might affect U.S. national security. The question of the PRC’s strategic intentions toward the United States is foremost for the USCC. Its annual reports provide data that allegedly attest to the “China threat.” The reports claim that the PRC leadership perceives Washington as a formidable adversary and an overbearing bully, but also as a declining power with exploitable military vulnerabilities. Beijing, however, sees the reports as further attempts by U.S. right-wing groups to demonize China.

**EP-3 Spy Plane Landing on Hainan Island (1 April 2001)**

On 1 April 2001 a U.S. navy surveillance plane, the EP-3, collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet, causing the latter to crash into the South China Sea and forcing the former to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island in southern China, where its twenty-four crew members were detained until 3 July 2001. The two sides disagreed on who was responsible for the crash and whether the U.S. plane had ventured into Chinese airspace. The crisis was defused and the crew released only after Washington said that it was “very sorry” for the death of the Chinese pilot and for landing on Hainan without permission. However, the incident served to reinforce Beijing’s perception that continued U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance of China, a hegemonic practice, reflected Washington’s determination to contain China.

**The September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks and the Iraq War of 2003**

Prior to the terrorist attacks, the administration of President George W. Bush saw China as a potential peer competitor; after the attacks, the “China threat”
was temporarily overshadowed by the global terrorist threat. China’s president Jiang Zemin met with Bush (for the first time since the EP-3 collision) and offered help in the war against terrorism. By September 2003 the U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, said that bilateral relations were at a thirty-year high, an assertion he repeated a year later (in November 2004) while acknowledging China’s help with the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear capability. However, at the beginning of the second term of George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld continued to see China as a strategic competitor. Accordingly, Beijing and Washington continued to prepare for military confrontation over Taiwan and closely monitor each other’s long-term military capabilities and strategic intentions.

From Beijing’s perspective, then, bilateral cooperation on the war on terrorism and on North Korea is merely tactical. Writing in the People’s Daily, the former foreign minister Qian Qichen argued that Washington has gradually brought its post–September 11 strategy into alignment with neoconservative thought. First, Bush identified the “axis of evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union address, which prepared the way for bringing regime change to other countries. Next, the president’s September 2002 National Security Strategy Report shifted U.S. strategy to one of preemption. Finally, in March 2003, Washington defied its allies, the international community, and domestic public opinion, and launched the war against Iraq. The doctrines of regime change, preemption, and unilateralism deeply troubled Beijing, since that meant that the United States could intervene anytime in Tibet, in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, or in Taiwan.

**The Global War on Terrorism**

Beijing believes that the United States is pursuing a kind of new imperialism under the guise of a global war against terrorism. It sees the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as Washington’s attempts to use military power to push through its neconservative agenda and establish a U.S.-dominated world order. Beijing sees this agenda as a direct threat because the neoconservatives argue that China will inevitably challenge U.S. dominance in Asia and that the United States must not surrender its position there to China. From Beijing’s perspective, the neoconservative vision of the “New American Century” is merely the latest version of hegemony and power politics.

**Perception of U.S. Military Encirclement (2004)**

In August 2004 President Bush announced that the largest strategic redeployment of U.S. forces globally since the end of World War II would take place. While it remained uncertain how exactly the U.S. forces would be restructured, they were clearly reduced in Europe and moved toward Central Asia, Southeast Asia (Thailand, Philippines), and the West Pacific (Australia). In Central Asia, U.S. troops and warplanes were based or had flyover rights in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. In South Asia, Washington has developed closer military ties with India. From Beijing’s perspective, the United States’ maneuvers in these regions were, and still remain, attempts to encircle China.

**Major Issues Influencing PRC Perspectives**

In addition to the events discussed above, certain long-term issues affect how Beijing and the Chinese people regard the United States.

**Human Rights**

Beijing sees U.S. confrontation on issues such as human rights, Internet dissent, Falun Gong, and Muslim Uygurs as intervention in domestic Chinese affairs and as attempts to destabilize the Chinese government. It also considers the United States’ human rights rhetoric to be hypocritical. Finally, it sees the United States as a morally degenerate nation, and as such, the United States is not in a position to judge China’s or other nations’ human rights records; the implication is that the United States should put its own house in order first. In response to the U.S. Department of State’s annual report on human rights conditions in China, China’s State Council publishes an annual report of its own—entitled Human Rights Record of the United States—“to make known to the world the human rights violations” of the United States. When Bush remarked in April 2003 that the Chinese people will eventually want their liberty “pure and whole,” China’s Xinhua news agency countered that China will pursue its own path to democracy. It slammed the United States.
for assuming the right to be the world’s judge while having serious human rights problems at home, including prisoner abuse, discrimination against women, police brutality, and the exploitation of illegal immigrants. In Beijing’s view, the United States is equally hypocritical in its foreign policy—for example, in its imposition of arms embargoes on others for alleged weapons proliferation while ranking first in the world in terms of arms sale. In the wake of September 11, Beijing notes worsening U.S. violation of human rights in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Taiwan
After September 11, President Bush appeared to shift course on the issue of Taiwan in favor of the PRC, which, however, regards this shift unsentimentally. Bush pledged in March 2001 that he would do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan, and offered the island the biggest weapons package in a decade. But in December 2003, during a visit by PRC premier Wen Jiabao, Bush abandoned the long-standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity over Taiwan by making a statement opposing Taiwan’s efforts to change the status quo. In October 2004 Colin Powell remarked that Taiwan was not independent, and in a separate interview with the CNN news network, he referred to “an eventual outcome, a reunification that all parties are seeking” (Kahn 2004). This was the first time a U.S. official ever spoke so unequivocally about PRC-Taiwan reunification as an eventual goal. But given the larger strategic competition between China and the United States, Beijing could view this shift in U.S. position only as inspired by the same realpolitik that had led to the 1972 rapprochement. This time the dictates of the war on terror rather than those of the Cold War provided the context for Washington’s policy decisions.

Trade Deficit, Currency Problem, and Arms Embargo
Beijing reasons that because of U.S. vested interests in trade with China, Beijing need not give in to Washington’s pressures on a number of issues. In 2003 the U.S. trade deficit with China reached approximately $124 billion (by 2008 it had risen to $266.3 billion). U.S. industry and labor groups complained that this was the result of China’s currency—the yuan—being undervalued. Beijing has permitted U.S. exports to China to rise faster than its imports from China, but it does not float the yuan. Such a move could cause liquidity problems, leading to a banking crisis that would hurt many U.S. companies with Chinese subsidiaries. For this reason President Bush turned down petitions to force a rise in the value of the yuan. Beijing is also confident that once the European arms embargo, imposed on it after the Tiananmen episode in 1989, is lifted, U.S. arms manufacturers will pressure Washington to follow suit.

Popular Perspectives on the United States
Surveys indicate that the ordinary Chinese citizen is ambivalent about the United States: A duality of resentment and admiration characterizes popular Chinese perspectives on the United States. Many Chinese admire U.S. economic dynamism, international status, and scientific achievements, but many also believe that the United States deliberately bombed their embassy in Belgrade in

Mao Zedong and U.S. Ambassador Pat Hurley. The two were not fond of each other (to put it diplomatically). In a less than statesman-like moment Mao called Hurley “that turtle egg”; Hurley reciprocated by calling Mao “moose dung.” NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
1999 and that it was the U.S. spy plane's recklessness that caused the crash of the Chinese plane in 2001. Further, a recent poll reported that 90 percent of the Chinese public believes that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planted the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus in China in 2003.

In a 1995 poll of 1,050 urban residents, the United States was rated the “most impressive country,” and yet polls conducted among Chinese youth in 1994 and 1995 reported that the United States was also ranked first among the most disliked foreign countries. Some Chinese gloated at the humbling of the United States on September 11. Anti-American sentiments were particularly pronounced regarding the U.S. handling of the Iraq War. Half the respondents to a 2003 poll answered a resounding “no” when asked whether the United Nations should help the United States rebuild Iraq; 60 percent saw the quagmire in Iraq as one of the United States’ own making; and 76 percent said they admired France and Germany for standing up to the United States.

It is not always easy to differentiate popular and official Chinese perspectives on the United States. Government-regulated media is often used to forge public opinion, but public sentiments are not entirely the result of official manipulation. A freer press in recent years has led Chinese tabloids to market jingoistic stories. A 1996 anti-American book entitled *China Can Say No* was a sensational success; a number of similar works in this genre since have similarly fueled anti-American sentiments. Official and popular views tend to converge on the Taiwan question. When a (false) story circulated that the United States was planning a massive show of naval power off Taiwan, it spawned a firestorm in Internet blogs, where anti-American sentiments run high.

Any changes in Chinese perspectives on the United States will be determined by several factors that could influence them in either direction: first, if President Barack Obama favors treating China principally as a strategic partner rather than a strategic competitor; second, if neoconservative thinking in the United States does not continue to dominate U.S. foreign policy; third, if both the North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan issue are peacefully resolved without American military intervention; and fourth, if the U.S.-led global war on terror diminishes the “terrorist threat,” which could return the “China threat” to the center stage of U.S.-China international politics.

**Anthony A. LOH**

**Further Reading**


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China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Piaohao were native draft banks which originated in Shanxi Province. The managing style of the piaohao had great influence in modern Chinese banking. This type of bank served local merchants and businesses all over China, as well as Russia and Japan.

The piaohao were draft banks created by merchants in Shanxi Province during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties, Shanxi merchants were involved in both domestic and foreign trade ranging from the northeast provinces to Mongolia, Xinjiang, and even Russia and Korea. They made fortunes by distributing salt and iron from their own area to the whole nation and also traded rice, tea, and silk from southern to northern and western parts of China. By that time China had adopted a bimetallic currency system, mainly a silver standard; each trade required the transfer of a large quantity of silver. Although the Shanxi merchants often hired armed men (biaojun) to guard these transfers, robberies still occurred.

The piaohao were created to solve this money transfer problem by Lei Lutai (1770–1849), a Shanxi dye merchant in Tianjin. He used Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) “fly money” (paper draft) methods to invent a money transfer system called huipiao, which was similar to a bank check. Lei established China’s first piaohao, Rishengchang Piaohao, at Shanxi Pingyao in 1823.

Along with the development of Shanxi merchant trade with other provinces, several piaohao opened branches outside Shanxi and established a transregional business network. For example, Rishengchang opened its branches in Shandong, Henan, Liaoning, and Jiangsu provinces only a few years after it was established. In the 1840s Rishengchang expanded its operations to Japan, Singapore, and Russia. Over the next half century more than fifty other piaohao were established throughout the Qing dynasty. Twenty of them had their headquarters in Pingyao, which became a famous financial center in the modern history of Chinese banking.

Piaohao had multiple banking functions, such as remitting trade bills and even taking government transit tax deposits during special periods. Piaohao could provide merchants and long-distance travelers with a huipiao, a check that they could exchange for cash at specified branches after they reached their destination. The check reduced the risk of robberies by eliminating the need to carry large amounts of silver.

Piaohao also received savings deposits and granted loans. All large Shanxi piaohao had branches in Beijing and other major trading cities. They cultivated close personal relations with Qing officials and took private deposits. Piaohao made profits by taking advantage of the time elapsed between issuing huipiao and having to pay the actual remittance; they could loan the money to others and charge interest. Since the quality of silver was different in each location, piaohao also could profit by remitting a lesser silver quality when the huipiao was presented.

Piaohao developed some practices of modern corporate governance by dividing ownership and management functions. Rishengchang hired a general manager.
to oversee all business, hired customer relations experts to deal with daily business operations, and established an incentive system by offering stocks and dividends to employees. The incentives increased with the duration of employment, making employees loyal to the piaohao.

In internal management piaohao had a strict personnel system to hire and train new staff members. Each new employee had to have at least two reputable reference persons with a certain amount of money deposited in the bank to act as financial guarantors. Piaohao required all employees to study Confucianism to establish high moral standards of trustworthiness, truthfulness, and loyalty and self-discipline to avoid the temptation of gambling and prostitutes. Thus, efficient internal management reduced operational risks and moral hazards.

Piaohao was the major type of draft bank during the late Qing dynasty, primarily because there was no central bank until the establishment of the Hubu Bank in 1904. Some piaohao served as semiofficial treasury agencies during the Taiping Rebellion period. The managers of these piaohao developed close relationships with Qing officials, for whom they transferred funds for the Bureau of Revenue and served as fiscal agents by collecting local tax revenues and transacting these revenues, such as lijin, the transit tax on goods traveling from provinces to the capital. Thirty-two piaohao banks with more than four hundred branches had paid-in capital of 30 million tael (a unit of value based on the weight of silver) in 1893. This amount, plus the deposits and notes of the native banks, totaled 200 million tael.

Since piaohao held some government deposits without paying interest, they had larger financial resources than some qianzhuang or native commercial banks in various cities. Piaohao lent money to those qianzhuang. The Yangzi (Chang) River usually served as a natural dividing line that indicated that piaohao dominated the financial market in northern China, and qianzhuang dominated the financial market in southern China. Since Shanxi piaohao did not have their trading business base in Shanghai, they could lend money to Shanghai local qianzhuang and make a profit by receiving interest.

Piaohao declined with the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912. Due to the overthrow of Qing dynasty, and large quantity of loans made to Qing officials that were never repaid, many piaohao were driven into bankruptcy. The remaining piaohao declined and finally disappeared after private banks were nationalized in 1952. But with China’s financial reform and promotion of microfinance in rural and less-developed urban areas in recent years, some small private cooperative banks have revived. Piaohao are also reviving in Shanxi Province and other places.

JI Zhaojin
Further Reading

A man's greed is like a snake that wants to swallow an elephant.
人心不足蛇吞象
Rén xīn bù zú shé tūn xiàng

Ping-Pong Diplomacy
In 1971, Ping-Pong—the “ping heard round the world”—helped to create the first person-to-person, and then diplomatic, ties between two Cold War enemies: China and the United States.

Ping-Pong, also called “table tennis,” came to international prominence in 1971 because of Cold War diplomatic maneuvering. China, the world’s most populous nation, had been cut off from diplomatic relations with most of the rest of the world for over two decades when, seemingly out of the blue, the U.S. table tennis team, visiting Nagoya, Japan, in April 1971 for the World Table Tennis Championship, was invited to visit the People’s Republic of China—a nation that no American citizen had been allowed to enter for twenty-two years. The visit took place three months later, in July.

From the perspective of the Chinese authorities, namely Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 made it seem that the USSR was a more potent threat to China than the United States. They decided that improved relations with the United States would increase China’s international security as well as its stature. Meanwhile, President Richard M. Nixon believed that ties with the People’s Republic would counterbalance the Soviet Union, improve Nixon’s own political standing at home, and improve the United States’ position in the Vietnam War.

In 1970 the Chinese offered to arrange a meeting between high-level officials of both governments, which led
eventually to national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger’s visit to Beijing in July 1971. But that same month, during the U.S. table tennis team’s visit—an event that may have been spontaneous and personal, as is usually claimed, or may have been encouraged by diplomatic efforts, as some suggest—the young American and Chinese table tennis players, many of them teenagers, changed the way ordinary people in their countries thought about so-called Red or Communist China and the decadent, imperialistic United States. *Time* magazine dubbed the event the “ping heard round the world.”

By all accounts the trip was deemed a success, although not without its worries. One player was worried about being amongst atheists, while a player of Korean descent decided against going. The team was treated royally, sometimes being offered five meals a day. By all accounts the trip was deemed a success, although not without its worries. One player was worried about being amongst atheists, while a player of Korean descent decided against going. The team was treated royally, sometimes being offered five meals a day, and was besieged by news bureaus wanting first-hand information. This “people-to-people” exchange, which was extolled by the press and by both governments, provided President Nixon with a backdrop for the major diplomatic shift that was in progress. During the team’s visit, the United States announced the end of a twenty-year trade embargo against the People’s Republic. Nixon himself went to Beijing from 20 to 27 February 1972, the first visit by an American president to China.

**China Visits the United States**

The Americans reciprocated by inviting their Chinese opponents to visit the United States, which they did in April of 1972. In this case, a nongovernmental organization, the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCU-SCR), stepped in to organize what became a huge media event, broadcast by every news outlet and publicized in magazines as diverse as *Life* and *Seventeen*. The two teams traveled on one charter plane to play in matches across the country; another plane was needed for reporters and camera people. The tour inspired both enthusiasm and protests. Upon their arrival in Detroit, the Chinese team was bemused at the sight of a welcoming crowd of people waving Mao’s “Little Red Book,” an embarrassment...
because by that time the Chinese Cultural Revolution was over and the book and its ideas had fallen out of favor in China. The Chinese players completely dominated the matches, but the U.S. players managed to win surprise victories when the tour landed in their hometowns.

Throughout the 1980s, there were many athletic exchanges that introduced Chinese athletes to huge U.S. audiences across the country, all in the spirit of “friendship before competition.” The table tennis matches of the 1970s helped to change, or begin to change, the negative images Americans and Chinese had of each other. Sports would continue to play a role in diplomatic relations with other countries after the International Olympic Committee (IOC) reinstated China. The Nagoya Resolution of 1979 that led to China’s re-admittance stipulated that China would use its name, flag, and anthem, while Taiwan’s team was required to use the name “Chinese Taipei.”

**Table Tennis at the 2008 Olympics**

Table tennis only became an Olympic sport in 1988, but it was a centerpiece at the 2008 Beijing Games because of its importance in China—and perhaps because of the role it has played in building bridges for China in the early
Ping-Pong Oddity

H. Roy Evans, president of the International Table Tennis Federation, reflects on the American sport that brought China and the United States together in the 1970s.

I never thought that I would be happy to see the words “Ping Pong,” and in a newspaper of all places—in fact, in many newspapers. These words are hated by all who struggled hard in the early days to persuade a general public, derisive because of the ping pong table in the basement, that table tennis is a first class sport, involving art and great physical stamina.

Yet in May, 1972 newspapers all over the World carried banner headlines—“Ping Pong Diplomacy”—and I was glad. It was scarcely to be expected that journalists anywhere would not leap to use an onomatopoeia which not only gave them a neat lead, but, by the very fact of their Chinese appearance, were a “must” in introducing a story which rocked the world!

The fact that British and Canadian teams were invited to tour China after the Nagoya World Championships was news enough, for all physical contact with the Chinese had terminated in 1965, and little if anything was known of their activities throughout the Cultural Revolution.

But when the Americans were invited, that really got the wires buzzing, and the implications were tremendous. Perhaps “tremendous” isn’t an exciting enough word to use to describe the impact in the United States. Probably there, for longer than anywhere, our game had suffered the indignity imposed by the name by which it was known. And the fact that such a game had been the means of establishing a detente between World Powers politically so far apart was almost unbelievable!

Little wonder then that, as President of the International Table Tennis Federation, I was so proud that our game had been used as a vehicle of approach that I instantly forgave all those who used those hated words.


Further Reading


The ping heard round the world. (1971, April 26). Time, 97, 17.

One of only a handful of towns and cities in China surrounded by their original walls, Pingyao, in Shanxi Province, was accorded UNESCO World Heritage Status in 1997. Significant restoration work has been accomplished to provide visitors with a sense of urban life in times past, including the role of the fabled piaohao, exchange facilities that served as nascent banks for merchant traders.
aspired to a courtly lifestyle, Pingyao over the subsequent century and a half nonetheless receded into a backwater status before resurging to prominence in 1997 when it was declared a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site.

Some 6 million visitors now see Pingyao annually, bringing with them not only resources to reinvigorate the city’s infrastructure but also myriad unintended negative consequences of tourism that lead many to ask how it is possible to protect a fragile cultural landscape.

Said to have been laid out in the shape of an auspicious turtle, Pingyao’s perimeter is marked with 10-meter-high walls that run 6,200 meters in circumference and is secured additionally with a 4-meter-wide, 4-meter-deep moat. Six gates—two each on the east and west sides and one each on the north and south sides—provided guarded access into the town. Mounted atop them are multitiered wooden structures. Faced with bricks on the outside and along the top but with its tamped-earth core visible from inside, the wall is an imposing crenellated structure that is 9–12 meters wide at the base but tapers upward to between 3 and 6 meters. Distinctive features of the wall are the three thousand crenels, which are indented openings that give the wall the look of a saw blade, and seventy-one embattlements, each about 50 meters apart, that project from the wall.

Shanxi Province always has had a reputation as a difficult place to make a living because of limited arable land and a dry, harsh climate. On the other hand, the location of the province midway between the imperial capitals of Beijing and Xi’an brought with it relatively easy access to the outside world by way of its north-to-south flowing rivers and old-style trunk post roads that crisscrossed the

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**Photograph of the walls of Pingyao, Shanxi Province, taken during Photofest 2003.**
The city was built during the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries by merchants and bankers who aspired to a courtly lifestyle. **PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.**
region. Shanxi merchants during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries dominated various commodity markets in towns along the border with Russia as well as in large cities along the coast. With increasing wealth from buying and selling salt, iron, cotton, silk, dyestuff, and tea, a need arose for the long-distance transport of silver cash. Pingyao merchants, especially because of their sense of business and loyalty to kinsmen, introduced paper notes called huipiao that could be redeemed for cash at piaohao (exchange shops). Piaohao were nascent banks, forerunners of a modern finance system, that made possible long-distance remittances.

In Pingyao piaohao were associated with merchant shops, which usually were housed in extravagant courtyard residential structures. Among the largest was Rishengchang, once merely a dyestuff store, which at its peak had forty branches throughout China, each staffed by loyal people from Pingyao. It is said that by the middle of the nineteenth century, of the fifty-one traditional banks in China, forty-three were owned by Shanxi natives, with those from Pingyao operating twenty-two—all of them benefiting from a close relationship with the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) imperial court, which also had a need to transfer funds around the country. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, as Western-style banks began to be established in China’s major cities, they siphoned off resources from the traditional piaohao, and by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, Shanxi merchants and “traditional bankers” lost their primacy. Many once-prosperous businessmen retreated to their great manors in Pingyao to live out their days quietly. This stagnation led to the preservation of Pingyao’s network of narrow streets and lanes, along with some thirty-eight hundred Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and Qing dynasty structures, about five hundred of which remained in reasonable repair.

Ronald G. KNAPP

Further Reading
Pipa

The *pipa*, a form of lute with four strings, became an important solo and ensemble instrument in China over a period of two thousand years. It is used in a great variety of traditional genres as well as modern compositions.

The *pipa* is a four-stringed, pear-shaped, plucked lute that developed in China over a period of two thousand years. The instrument was originally based on Central and South Asian prototypes brought to China via the Silk Roads. The *pipa* spread to other East Asian nations such as Japan, where the characters are pronounced as “biwa.” The name for the instrument was originally a generic term applied to a variety of plucked lutes, but eventually came to be applied exclusively to the pear-shaped version.

The modern Chinese instrument has a hollow back basin made from a single piece of hardwood tapering into a carved tip that bears its tuning pegs; its front surface has a flat piece of porous wood. Slightly more than a meter in length (about 42 inches), it has four fret ledges (*xiang*) carved into the body as it approaches the tip, and an additional twenty-three bamboo frets (*pin*) glued to the porous soundboard. The Chinese characters (Hanzi) in the instrument’s name (*pi* and *pa*) are phonetic approximations of ancient terms indicating the alternate strumming up and down with a plectrum.
Pipa

The pipa is a four-stringed, pear-shaped, plucked lute that developed in China over a period of two thousand years. The instrument was modeled on Central and South Asian prototypes brought to China via the Silk Roads.

Photo by Anna Myers.

(pick); this was the original right-hand technique, preserved in Japan and in some regional Chinese ensemble genres. Modern right-hand technique is very complex and uses a variety of individually named strokes made by all five fingers, achieving contrasts in timbre and volume. Beginning during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and possibly earlier, players who used these right-hand techniques held the instrument vertically.

Initially, the instrument was associated with foreign travelers, including Buddhist evangelists who used it to accompany their songs, and virtuoso musicians who came to the Chinese court during the Tang dynasty (618–908 CE). Eventually, the instrument became popular in native Han musical genres, including regional ensemble music, narrative song accompaniment, and solo performances.

In the nineteenth century, printed collections of pipa scores were published using woodblock technology, and solo technique continued to expand. In the early twentieth century, new compositions were created by Liu Tianhua and other composers. After 1948, Lin Shicheng brought the virtuoso Shanghai traditions to Beijing, and several generations of professional soloists were trained in the nation’s conservatories, including Liu Dehai, who premiered the pipa concerto “Little Sisters of the Grassland” in 1973. Since the modern pipa, with more frets that were added in the 1950s, was now capable of playing chromatic melody and harmony, composers such as Tan Dun began to create more modern pieces for the instrument. Min Xiaofen, a pipaist living in the United States, has begun to utilize the pipa in jazz improvisation. Min and other players continue to maintain the traditional repertoire parallel to more recent musical styles.

John E. MYERS

Further Reading


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Poetry
Shīgē 诗歌

Poetry has been the most celebrated and vibrant form of writing in China for more than three thousand years. Although China’s poets wrote in relatively stable, classical forms, they explored a vast range of situations, feelings, and concerns. More recently Chinese poets have experimented with vernacular language and Western poetic techniques.

For more than three thousand years, poetry has been the vehicle for the highest levels of literary art in China. To memorize large numbers of poems was necessary if one were to be considered learned. Even today students commit to memory selected works of major historical poets for recitation. Consequently, the past still exerts its influence on writers of the twenty-first century, despite its associations with old China’s political elite.

The Roots of Chinese Poetry

China’s earliest poetry was compiled into the Shijing 詩經 (most often called The Book of Songs in English) around 600 BCE, which some would argue was written by Confucius (551–479 BCE). The collection has regularly been considered a source of proper moral conduct as well as of inspiration for later writers. Its imagery is rich, and its range of subjects broad, from the founding myths of the royal house, through the banquets of the nobility, to the daily cares and joys of the common people. Some of these short poems seem very much like folk songs. Their immediacy has moved readers through the ages. A second major collection appeared about six hundred years later. Called Chuci 楚辭 (Songs of the South), it preserved poetry generally associated with the lands south of the Yangzi (Chang 長) River. Older sections of the text are associated with the court minister Qu Yuan 屈原 (fourth–third centuries BCE); exiled due to the slander of jealous rivals, he wrote of his loyalty and longing for recognition in the form of a lengthy allegory. Other poets represented in the collection take Qu Yuan’s life as their subject, but some of the more interesting poems clearly refer to religious rituals of the period, using rhythms quite different from those of the northern tradition.

Traditional Forms

Inspired, most likely, by the long compositions in the Chuci, poets of China’s first great dynasty, the Han (206 BCE–220 CE), wrote lengthy fu 賦 (rhyme prose or rhapsodies) that incorporated lush descriptions of objects, buildings, landscapes, human activities such as hunting, and even emotional states in alternating prose and rhymed verse. The greatest of these writers was Sima Xiangru 司馬相如 (179–118 BCE), who recounted the pleasures of his king. Other Han writers, such as Yang Xiong 楊雄 (33 BCE–18 CE), insisted that fu should serve to criticize excesses, not encourage them.
Fu were meant to be read aloud. Their varying cadences, alliteration, and complex rhyming schemes were designed to delight the ear. Virtually all other Chinese poetry was lyrical, often intended literally to be sung. By the end of the Han dynasty, writers drew on the subjects of folk songs, love, separation, and death to begin a new tradition of occasional verse that continues to this day. Most of these poems, called generally shi 詩 (lyrical verse), have lines of all the same length. The most common form is the five-syllable line, which in monosyllabic Chinese originally meant five-word lines. Shi poems were often written in couples, with the second lines of all the couplets rhyming with one another. Most are relatively short. During the Tang period (618–907 CE), strictly regulated verse forms developed. These forms, called jinti shi 近體詩 (modern-style verse), prescribed even the tonal patterns of syllables in each line. These “modern” forms were generally either four or eight lines and written alongside the freer, earlier gushi 古詩 (ancient-style) forms. Both forms continued to be written through the Qing (1644–1912) period.

A new form, the ci 歌, or song lyric, developed among Tang-period entertainers in response to popular music imported from Central Asia. Instead of all lines having the same length, these new poems were written to fit the varying lines of Central Asian melodies. (Later, when the music had been forgotten, poets—even those of the twentieth century, such as Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong, an accomplished poet as well—would fill in the patterns of line length, tonal sequence, and rhyme scheme remembered from early poems that had been written to fit these named, then lost, melodies.) From the late Tang onward, poets generally composed ci that fit those original patterns. But efforts were made to update the melodies used for writing new song lyrics, called qu 曲, when arias for the theater became the primary venue for sung verse during Mongol rule in the Yuan (1279–1368) and subsequent dynasties. Some poets viewed the ci as inadequate for serious composition, but for others the full range of poetic topics was written into both shi and ci. Poetry in the ci form reached its first peak of development during the Song period (960–1279) and its second during the seventeenth century in the hands of Ming poets, such as Chen Zilong 陳子龍 (1608–1647), and Qing poets, including the Manchu writer Nalan Xingde 納蘭性德 (1655–1685).

**Major Poets**

China’s great poets are legion, but those of the Tang dynasty are generally considered the best. The great triad of Du Fu 杜甫 (712–770), Li Bai 李白 (or Li Bo, 701–762), and Wang Wei 王維 (701–761) are considered to embody the teachings of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, respectively. Other poets brought a personal voice to their poems, such as the reclusive Tao Qian 陶潜 (Tao Yuanming 陶淵明 365–427) and the failed statesman Su Shi 蘇軾 (Su Dongpo 蘇東坡, 1037–1101). Many were exceptionally capable craftsmen, but China’s literary history is crowded by people who dashed off poems to commemorate special occasions (banquets, birthdays, leave taking).

Although most of the best-known poets were men, China produced a striking number of distinguished women poets. Perhaps the most famous is Li Qingzhao 李清照 (1083–c.1149?) who, widowed early when her “Quatrain on Heavenly Mountain,” a poem by the Song emperor Gaozong (1107–1187). Throughout history many Chinese leaders were accomplished poets, including Mao Zedong.

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husband (and constant literary companion) died, left a legacy of haunting poems of love and loss. The Ming and Qing periods produced literary societies of women whose many members seldom, if ever, met but who maintained long correspondences in verse as the vehicle to convey their deepest feelings.

Themes

A large percentage of Chinese poetry has been devoted to love, given the system of arranged marriages that persisted for so many centuries. But poems in China have conveyed the most profound as well as the most light-hearted of emotions, have captured the daily lives and aspirations of many, and have narrated significant (and insignificant) events over more than two millennia. The poems of Song-period poets Su Shi (1037–1101) and Mei Yaochen 梅堯臣 (1002–1060) exemplify this range of experience. Religious thoughts have motivated many poets, but because there is no fundamental division between religious and secular lives, the material world is present even in religious poetry, especially in poems by Wang Wei and Shen Zhou 沈周 (1427–1509). Li Bai is well known for his wine poems (“Bring the Wine,” Jiang jin jiu 將進酒). Du Fu wrote many poems that describe people’s suffering in times of war and famine (“The Old Man With No Family to Take Leave Of,” Shihao li 石壕吏).

Modern Poetry

During the high tide of their “literary revolution” of the 1920s, China’s poets experimented widely with European images, rhythms, and literary trends. The strongest influence initially was that of romanticism, as seen in the work of Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892–1978). During the 1930s younger poets were more attracted by imagism and
symbolism. Although war with Japan (1937–1945), fought also in the context of World War II in Asia) and subsequent civil strife brought attention to China’s rich body of traditional folk songs as the vehicle for new, patriotic content, postwar poets produced a remarkable body of modernist verse. This tradition was later continued on Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s. In the People’s Republic, leftist political movements enforced the production of verse simple enough to be appreciated by unlettered farmers and workers, but this provoked a strenuous reaction after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Within a few years menglong (misty) poets appeared. In contrast to their predecessors, who produced public poetry, these younger poets developed very personal styles and levels of significance. China’s poets began to experiment freely with a variety of styles, influenced by both twentieth-century trends abroad and their own literary heritage; such experiments continue as poets of a new generation come of age in the twenty-first century.

Many readers have felt that these engagements with other literatures were less than successful, in some cases reflecting the cadences of other languages more than of Chinese, especially because twentieth-century poets often wrote free verse in colloquial language. This was a dramatic shift from the indigenous poetic tradition in which verse was carefully structured in a few conventional forms. Similarly, the diction of classical verse was rich and seldom utilized true spoken language.

Poetry has been not only the greatest of Chinese art forms but also one of the clearest mirrors for reflecting the experience of the Chinese people over an enormous span of time. Enormous numbers of poem survive, more than fifty thousand from the Tang period alone, along with hundreds of thousands of poems from later periods.

Robert E. HEGEL

Further Reading

Throughout China’s long history people have enjoyed little in the way of political participation. Although formal involvement has increased somewhat since China’s opening and the beginning of reform in 1979, the Chinese continue to use alternative measures—ranging from tax evasion to underground trade unions—to make their voices heard. The rise of the Internet in China has been especially useful in encouraging public debate.

China’s traditional political culture allowed the majority of the population only a small role in local and national politics. Confucianism established an individual’s duties to the ruler, the state, and the family, but not an individual’s rights. Independent political groups and parallel power structures were always suppressed. One exception was with the concept of the “Mandate of Heaven,” which gave the emperor his divine right to rule. The people were permitted to depose an incompetent ruler if the state were in political, economic, and social decline.

At times throughout history, Chinese villages and communities enjoyed a relatively large degree of autonomy. Clans, kinship groups, secret societies, temple organizations, and guilds organized around common political and social goals. Also, opposition to the state occurred informally through connections, corruption, negotiation, and strategy. But overall, political participation has nearly always been reserved for a chosen elite.

Politics Emerge

A legal system with laws and courts developed during the Republican China era (1912–1949). During this time political parties, professional associations, literary and artistic circles, and mass media emerged. In the early 1930s, attempts were made to conduct general elections for the offices of heads of villages or communities. But the consolidation of state power between 1912 and 1949 limited the development of a civil society and universal political participation.

Communist Control

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initially allowed various degrees of political participation in areas under its control. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949), however, the party controlled virtually all political and public life. Occasional reforms to allow general participation were short-lived; for example, Mao Zedong’s Hundred Flowers campaign, a brief period of open criticism of the government, lasted only several weeks in 1957. As dissatisfaction with the party spread, critics were arrested, branded as Rightists, and punished. From then on such movements were subject to stronger political and ideological control.

Mao’s “mass line”—the political, strategic, and
organizational framework of the CCP—included a model of leadership wherein leaders were to learn from the people. In theory it involved open meetings between the peasants and workers and party officials, with the aim of adapting party policies to the current situation. In practice, however, party officials listened to the people’s complaints and opinions and then interpreted them according to the party’s goals. It sought the people’s support, not their participation.

The CCP launched various campaigns to mobilize the masses to help the party reach its economic or political aims. Diverse opinions or new forms of organizations were tolerated only if they supported the goals of the party political elite. Mass mobilization was closely supervised by the political elite. The methods for participation endorsed by the party—criticism of officials, self-criticism, posted newssheets, ideological study groups—became ritualized and more a means of social control than of promoting political participation.

ERA OF REFORM

Various reforms since 1979 have opened up people’s possibilities for increased social and political involvement. New groups have joined existing groups that were not represented in the party—private entrepreneurs, professional associations, migrant workers, ethnic minorities, and religious organizations—and together they have sought economic, social, and political participation and the creation of channels to express and pursue their interests. This is true for both formal and informal structures.

Formal participation takes place both within and outside the party in mass organizations (unions, the Communist Youth League, Women’s Federation, People’s Militia); in the so-called Political Consultative Conferences (political advisory boards consisting of delegates from a wide range of political parties, organizations and individuals); and in many new associations, clubs, and nongovernmental organizations. The needs and actions of these diverse groups influence political decision making at the national level. The increasing separation between the public and private sectors and the state’s decreasing influence on many aspects of society have allowed these groups to strengthen their autonomy and create a social counterweight to state actions.

This leads to more direct political participation, as evidenced in new laws enacted in the early 1980s governing general elections at the county, township, and village levels. Although these elections have generally been limited in certain ways, they may generate a type of grassroots democracy, particularly at the village level. By the end of the 1990s, elections were being conducted in urban neighborhood communities (shequ) as well.

Informal Political Participation

Although the party exerts a powerful influence on formal political participation, a study of informal patterns shows that participation and decision making exist at all levels of society. Where there are few opportunities for formal participation, informal, or unofficial, participation by groups or individuals helps to advance particular interests.

On an informal level, the practice of guanxi, which literally means “social relationships,” is used to influence decisions or push interests. Guanxi functions through business relationships, friendships, patronage, nepotism, and bribery. It is a permissible and common way to make a deal, reach a compromise, and negotiate, as long as the practice does not disrupt the political framework of the CCP.

Informal political participation also includes illegal acts, such as organizing unauthorized demonstrations or strikes (this has especially become prevalent since the rise of the Internet and cellular phones), refusing to pay taxes, and forming illicit interest groups like underground trade unions, secret societies, underground churches, and hometown associations. Again, all of these activities have mushroomed with increased Internet usage.

Also on an informal level, a kind of regionalism has developed based on local resources and interests. In areas with strong local markets, local economic interests take priority over state interests. Communities underreport profits in order to pay fewer taxes and use the money for local development. They ban products to or from other provinces (a practice know as protectionism) to bolster their own markets. This localism also includes communities’ negotiating how much income tax to pass on to the central government or how to implement national policies, sometimes even ignoring certain state policies.
To better implement its policies and garner support, the CCP has been trying to include more people and groups in discussions and consultations. Special interest groups, which have been gaining political leverage at the unofficial level, have helped stimulate this attempt to widen political participation. The discourse, however, is limited because all parties involved must accept the policies and leadership of the CCP. Nevertheless, groups that in the past had no means of expressing their needs, desires, and interests now have the opportunity to do so.

Collective Action by Social Groups

For many years China’s peasants have practiced highly effective forms of protest. Protests originally deployed the “weapons of the weak,” a term used by the sociologist James Scott to describe forms of resistance by some of the downtrodden members of a society. These weapons included such actions as supplying falsified harvest figures; underreporting the amount of arable land and income; yielding the lowest quality products to the state; ignoring state directives; evading taxes; neglecting, stealing, or destroying state property; and organizing unofficial special interest groups. This kind of everyday resistance is a type of political participation by the disenfranchised. It can, in the long term, lead to political change because of its high social and economic costs.

An example of collective action leading to political change took place in the late 1970s. Because of decline and poverty, peasants in certain areas decided to divide collectively held land among themselves and return to family-run farming. The economic success of this unofficial form of participation led to the CCP’s approving it as “agricultural reform” and subsequently implementing new policy across the country. Collective action, or unofficial participation, provided a solution for economic difficulties and was, therefore, approved by the party.

The social scientist Yu Jianrong suggested that political participation of peasants changed from spontaneous “routine resistance” before the 1990s, to “lawful rebellion” (citing state policies or laws to oppose political arbitrariness at the local level) until 1998, and to “actively using the law to fight” since then. According to Yu, using the law to fight is characterized by a struggle for political rights and the enforcement of existing laws and regulations. It is directed toward local officials, not the political system. Peasants establish transvillage communication networks, demonstrate, and conduct sit-ins to enact change. Their actions are “permitted by law” but “prohibited by politics.” In the future this might change from securing rights by law to political participation by law. The peasantry could become a strong force for general participation.

Although direct participation in Chinese power structures still depends on membership in the CCP, political power and political influence do not stem only from party membership. More than ever before, China’s people have the opportunity to express their interests, to act, and to participate in the political life of the nation.

Rise of the Internet

The Internet is another field of participation that in recent years has spawned new forms of public activity. It has had an effect on the emergence of a new form of public space, the development of “virtual” social organizations, and of widespread protest activities that would have been virtually unthinkable before. Furthermore, by encouraging public debate and the articulation of problems it functions as a tool for social transparency.

In 2008 the number of Internet users in China reached more than 250 million. Yet this figure does not say much about how the Internet is used. A Chinese study found that 46.2 percent of those surveyed used the Internet for information, while nearly a third (32.2 percent) used it mainly for entertainment. Certainly Internet access provides an alternative source of information on domestic and international developments, yet it remains to be seen whether or not the Internet will function as a tool for political change.

Undoubtedly in recent years the number of Internet portals with news and up-to-date information, as well as the number of virtual communities, has significantly increased. In particular, the better-educated and younger people in urban areas participate more in public debates in the public space of the Internet, thus redefining the interrelationship between the state and society. The anonymity of the Internet has spawned a newly critical public. Active users who pick up information on social injustice, on the hush-up of local disasters, criminal activities, and
corruption, and spread the news and put it up for public discussion are called wang luo gong min—“netizens” (a portmanteau of Internet and citizen).

A prominent example was the case of a worker who, after a flagrant misjudgment, was executed in Shaanxi province in 2002. This provoked a public debate on the death penalty and legal procedures in China. Not only jurists and Communist Party–sponsored newspapers but also thousands of citizens via the Internet participated in the debate. The discussions were rather heated and many participants expressed fury and outrage. Although the party leadership finally put an end to the discussion, it did request that the legal authorities decrease the number of people scheduled to be sentenced to death. The Supreme People’s Court was ordered to reexamine each death sentence. The death penalty, however, is not yet abolished; in fact, China leads the world in numbers of annual executions (although it is the fourteenth in terms of per capita executions). But this case reveals that people increasingly use the Internet to disseminate information and to vent grievances. Moreover, the Internet contributes to making public opinion and trends more transparent.

Another noticeable case that gained Internet attention was that of Sun Zhigang, a rural college graduate who was seized by the police in Guangzhou because he did not have a temporary residence card in his possession and could not prove his identity. He was detained and put into custody. Three days later, when his friends tried to locate him, they were told that he died of a heart attack; when his parents asked for an explanation the police provided no details. With financial help from Sun’s classmates the family was able to have an autopsy performed, and it was determined that Sun had been beaten...
to death. A journalism student from Beijing posted this news on a cyber-forum, and immediately after that online discussions arose, growing more and more intense, on the general behavior of the police, the amount of freedom given to the press, and the necessity of reforming the legal system. Jurists demanded a revision of the laws regarding the treatment of rural working migrants in China’s cities and wrote to the national parliament (the National People’s Congress) to either negate or revise the existing regulations. They also demanded that the congress investigate the incident and punish the those responsible. An open trial resulted in thirteen arrests and convictions of policemen, prison guards, and detainees. Eventually twenty-three additional policeman and government officials were disciplined for their involvement in or lack of response to Sun’s death.

Such Internet movements are a form of collective action new to China: a more or less spontaneous concurrence of individual or group action that represents common interests and has an impact upon policies. These “e-social movements” include online petitioning, either against such things as software regulation and the censorship of Internet publications, or in support of such causes as the Tiananmen Mothers—an initiative of mothers whose children were killed during the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident—and the Living Buddha Zhaxi, who was detained due to alleged terrorist activities. Furthermore, since the mid-1990s autonomous virtual NGOs (non-governmental organizations) have increasingly used the Internet to organize online congresses and alternative groups. Numerous websites and virtual NGOs have arisen over the issue of environment protection, exposing environmental problems and disasters and thus inducing public debate.

Of course the party-state attempts to monitor Internet activities. It blocks discussions it considers to be too sensitive or too critical. As a further deterrent, from time to time people are arrested and sentenced to long imprisonments. Yet those measures essentially do nothing to dull the spirit of the Internet users or their debates.

Thomas HEBERER

Further Reading

POLO, Marco

Mǎkěbōluó 马可波罗

1254–1324  Venetian traveler

Marco Polo, a Venetian who was one of the earliest Europeans to travel all the way to China on the Silk Roads, left behind what is probably the best-known travelogue in history, The Travels of Marco Polo. He did not write it himself, however, but rather dictated it to a fellow prisoner of war who may have embellished what he heard.

Marco Polo (1254–1324) grew up as a member of a great trading house in Venice, a leading Italian city-state. Taking advantage of the ease of communication afforded by the Mongol empire, his family began trading in the East, and after an initial period of activity, reaching as far as Mongol China, young Marco himself became involved. He remained in China for seventeen years (1275–1292) and seems to have held some unnamed official post but, in any case, moved in elite circles, thus his knowledge of the inner workings of the Mongol East. He also seems to have traveled extensively, apparently on official business, thus the accounts in his well-known travel journal of such relatively remote areas as Mongol Yunnan, the first in European geographical literature. He heard of, but did not visit, Japan, but his notice of the Japanese islands was also the first for Europe.

Polo’s most responsible mission came in 1292 when, returning to Italy by sea—the land route by then cut off due to Mongol warfare—he was asked to deliver a Mongol princess to Ilkhanate Iran, then the principal ally of Mongol China. This he did successfully, acquiring substantial information about insular Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, finally returning to Italy in 1295, where he heard of the death of Khubilai Khan, Polo’s major patron.
in China. Soon thereafter Polo fought for Venice in a war against neighboring Genoa and became a prisoner of war. To pass the time, he dictated a memoir of his travels in Old French, then the international commercial language to a writer of romances.

Several versions of the text exist, differing substantially in detail, including some in languages other than Old French. In any case Polo’s memoirs were an immediate sensation, and in the centuries since few books have been more translated or had a greater impact on the European psyche. Columbus, for example, is said to have taken a copy of Polo along with him when searching for the fabled East as described by the Venetian.

But recently doubts have been cast upon Polo’s veracity. In fact, there is much in *The Travels of Marco Polo* that is truly fantastic and even legendary but also a great deal that we know to be absolutely accurate from other sources. Criticism has also in part been based on a misunderstanding of the character of Mongol China, its use of a variety of languages alongside Chinese, for example, and a misappraisal of what Polo would actually have seen.

**Paul D. BUell**

Further Reading

Porcelain was first made in China about 850 CE. The essential ingredient is kaolin, a white clay that when fired at an extremely high temperature acquires a glassy surface. Porcelain wares were first exported to Europe during the twelfth century. By 1700 trade in Chinese porcelain was immense, with Ming dynasty wares, characterized by cobalt-blue-painted motifs, highly prized.

Porcelain is ceramic material made with kaolin, which is a fine, white clay. Porcelain wares were first made in China about 850 CE during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). An Islamic traveler who had visited China in 851 saw clay vessels that resembled glass. Evidence indicates that fine, white stoneware (pottery made from high-firing clay other than kaolin) was made in China as early as 1400 BCE, and potters appear to have been familiar with kaolin during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). But the forerunner of modern-day porcelain was not made until the Tang dynasty. Tang dynasty porcelain is known as “hard-paste” or “true porcelain” and was made by mixing kaolin, which is formed by the decay of feldspar, a chief constituent of granite, with petuntse, which is a form of feldspar occurring only in China.

Kaolin is the essential ingredient in porcelain. Found throughout the world, kaolin is known for its white firing characteristics (that is, the finished product appears white rather than gray or brown or rust colored) and high fusion temperature (the high heat required to turn the ingredients into porcelain). Chemically kaolin is made up of kaolinite, quartz, feldspar, muscovite, and anastase. Kaolin and petuntse are fused by firing in a kiln at 980° C, then dipped in glaze and refired at about 1,300° C. Petuntse binds the clay particles and gives porcelain its translucency. The high firing temperatures vitrify the ceramic body, giving it its glassy characteristics.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279) some of the
most beautiful Chinese porcelain wares were made, including eggshell porcelain, which was thinner and more translucent than earlier porcelain. Ding ware, made in northeastern China, has a molded design that is emphasized by its typical ivory-colored glaze. Two other types of porcelain were produced slightly later during the Song dynasty: Longchuan and Jingbai wares. Longchuan wares had near-white ceramic bodies under a bluish-green translucent glaze (celadon) that was reminiscent of green jade, a favorite stone of the Chinese. Longchuan ware showed to great advantage the incised or molded decoration of the time. Jingbai ware, produced in Jiangxi Province (which eventually became the center of Chinese porcelain manufacture), was delicately formed and distinguished by a pale blue glaze with decorations of incised flowers and foliage.

Porcelain was not widely produced in China until the Yuan dynasty (1297–1368), when the Chinese began to use a kaolin-based compound to make a material that when fired at high temperatures turned both white and translucent.

**Spread to Europe**

Porcelain came to be called “china” because it originated in China; china was first taken to Europe during the twelfth century. Portuguese traders began importing china in the sixteenth century. The Portuguese introduced the term *porcelain* sometime between then and the beginning of porcelain manufacture in Europe in the late eighteenth century. The terms *china* and *porcelain* are used interchangeably today, although some people use the term *china* to refer to figurines and items for use with meals and use the term *porcelain* to refer to a wider range of products. Thus, a tea set is made from either china or porcelain, but a toilet seat is made from porcelain.

The Chinese formula for making porcelain long remained a secret. During the medieval period Europeans, who had an insatiable appetite for the beauty of kaolin clay, experimented with various materials, hoping to discover the Chinese formula, but it was not discovered until the early eighteenth century. Meanwhile, beginning in

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**Porcelain vessels fired with a red glaze. Porcelain came to be called “china” because it originated in China; the terms are often used interchangeably today. PHOTO BY BERKSHIRE PUBLISHING.**
the sixteenth century China exported porcelain wares in increasing amounts, particularly its blue and white ware (porcelain decorated with cobalt-blue designs under a clear glaze). The British and Dutch East India companies were the main exporters. By 1700 the trade in porcelain was vast. Porcelain ware of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was particularly prized.

Ming and Qing Ware

Potters of the Ming dynasty concentrated more on painted designs and less on the forms of the wares. They had great success with the blue and white wares. Wares with a yellow ground were made when the art of fusing enamels or colored glass onto the surface of the glaze was perfected during the reign (1505–1521) of the Zhengde emperor (1491–1521).

Jingdezhen (in Jiangxi Province), the center of porcelain production, reached its zenith during the reign of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) emperor Kangxi (1654–1722, reigned 1661–1722). Jingdezhen produced wares for use by the court as well as large amounts of porcelain for the European market. Porcelain wares of great beauty were produced to commemorate the birthdays of emperors. Particularly popular during the reign of Emperor Kangxi was famille verte, which are wares in which shades of green predominate. Then a black enamel background was used, giving rise to the term famille noire and later the famille rose, which included a range of rose pink enamels. Such wares were in vogue during the reign (1726–1795) of the Qianlong emperor (1711–1795), grandson of Emperor Kangxi. Most of the enamel painting was done in Guangzhou (Canton), which was the main trading port.

Further Reading


OOI Giok Ling
Potala Palace, in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, has been the home of Tibet’s Dalai Lamas since 1642. The palace has two thousand rooms. UNESCO has declared the palace a World Heritage Site.

A huge structure that dominates the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, Potala Palace has been the home of Tibet’s Dalai Lamas (the spiritual heads of Tibetan Buddhism) since 1642, when the unfinished building was consecrated. It was built by the fifth Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lozang Gyamtsho (1617–1682), to represent the cosmic mountain abode of the bodhisattva (deity) of compassion, Chenrezi, who is believed to dwell on Potala Mountain in south India and to be embodied in the Dalai Lamas. The Red Hill, 130 meters above Lhasa and already sacred to Chenrezi, was chosen as the site. The Potala was also built as a fortress, thus expressing its dual religious and political function.

So important was this palace that the death of the Dalai Lama was kept secret for twelve years so that the palace could be finished without political interference. The fifth Dalai Lama and his successors are interred in sepulchers in the palace.

The Potala consists of a huge central keep (secure inner fortress) painted maroon, the religious color, surrounded by the ancillary buildings of a white-painted palace.
representing the secular. This creates an effect of wings, so that the whole edifice, with its golden roofs, seems to soar. The palace has two thousand rooms, numerous temples and shrines, and the private rooms of the Dalai Lamas, now open to tourists. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has declared Potala a World Heritage Site. China claims to have spent $6.7 million between 1989 and 1994 on renovations of the palace.

Michael KOWALEWSKI

Further Reading
The Potsdam Conference, held in 1945 in a suburb outside Berlin, was the occasion for the World War II Allies to focus on ending the war and to plan for the future. Leaders discussed possible strategies for an invasion of Japan, the reconstruction of Europe, and German reparations for the war. They also discussed the founding of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which included China.

Held at Cecilienhof Palace outside Berlin, the Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945) was the final of several meetings of Allied leaders during World War II. Present at Potsdam were the “Big Three” heads of state: U.S. president Harry Truman (1884–1972), Soviet premier Joseph Stalin (1879–1953), and British prime ministers Winston Churchill (1874–1965) and Clement Attlee (1883–1967). (Churchill played a major role at Potsdam but was replaced by Attlee at the end of July after the Labor Party’s victory in the British general elections.) Potsdam was the first conference held since Germany’s surrender on 8 May 1945, but World War II continued in Asia. U.S. victories at Iwo Jima and Okinawa in June had positioned the Allies for a planned invasion of Japan. Divergent national interests and competition, however, made consensus difficult. Many analysts point to the Potsdam Conference as a harbinger of the Cold War.

On 1 August Allied leaders agreed to the twenty-one-part “Protocol of the Proceedings.” Foremost were the procedures for the reconstruction of Europe, particularly Germany. The Allies divided Germany into four zones for the purposes of disarmament and demilitarization, called for the destruction of Nazism, and proposed trials for major war criminals. The controversy over German reparations was settled by giving the Soviets access to resources both inside and outside their zone, while the United States and England renounced claims to German assets in Soviet-controlled areas. National borders throughout Europe, with the notable exception of western Poland, were established in order to facilitate the resettlement of populations. The Allies also created the Council of Foreign Ministers, comprised of representatives of the five World War II allies—China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and the USSR—which would meet no later than 1 September 1945 to discuss many unresolved issues, such as peace treaties for Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland; the disposition of colonies of former Axis states; and the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.

The conclusion of the war with Japan was the subject of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July. At the earlier Yalta Conference (February 1945), U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) had negotiated Moscow’s declaration of war on Japan and a joint invasion scheduled for August. Truman, who sought to limit postwar Soviet involvement in Asia, was bolstered by the news on 17 July of a successful test of the atomic bomb at the Trinity Site.
in New Mexico. Nevertheless, given the uncertainty of the new weapon, Truman forged ahead with the plans conceived by Roosevelt for an Allied attack. The final section of the Potsdam protocol demanded Japan’s surrender: “We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.”

June GRASSO

Further Reading

Poyang, Lake
Póyang Hú 鄱阳湖

Jiangxi Province’s Lake Poyang, aside from being China’s largest freshwater lake and a sanctuary for migratory birds and endangered species, is the metaphorically rich setting for legends retold throughout China’s long history. In the twenty-first century it retains its scenic splendor, but the lake and its wildlife inhabitants are threatened by environmental change.

In 1363 the largest naval battle in China’s history took place in Lake Poyang between a Mongol general of the Yuan dynasty and the soon-to-be first emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).
like a large shoe floating in the blue water. Thus the hill is also known as “Shoe Hill.” Another well-known spot in the lake is Nanshan Hill, near Duchang County, famous because a Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) legend tells of a farmer living on the hill who turned down Emperor Wudi’s offer of the fame and rank associated with a government position. Named “Farmer Rock,” it is said to rise from water like a humble old man, and is the main attraction of Nanshan Hill.

In 1363, during the late Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), the largest naval battle in Chinese history took place as General Chen Youliang (1320–1363) fought Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398), the first emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), in the Battle of Lake Poyang. As legend recounts, Chen’s wife often watched the skirmishes from what is now called Lake-View Pavilion, frustrated that neither side seemed to dominate. She suggested a strategy to her husband, which he initially rejected but eventually used to win the ultimate battle. On his way home General Chen decided to play a trick on her, knowing she would be awaiting his return, and he laid down his commander-in-chief banner as he approached the shore. Seeing the banner flung down, his wife thought that her husband had lost the battle—had been killed because he had failed to take her advice. Distraught, she jumped into the lake and died.

In modern times environmental issues affect the Lake of Poyang. Sand dredging, an important local source of revenue, has become a mainstay of regional economic development. High-density dredging projects have been the principal cause of death of the local wildlife population. In 2007 Chinese scientists warned that the Chinese finless porpoise, known locally as “river pig,” might follow the baiji, the Yangzi River dolphin, into extinction. Scientists warn that only about 1,400 porpoises survive, with between 700 and 900 in the Yangzi River and 500 in Lake Poyang and Dongting Lake. Since 2002 the Chinese government has enforced a fishing ban on a 333,000-hectare area of the lake from 20 March to 20 June—the breeding season.

The Editors

Further Reading

Operating under the auspices of the China Youth Development Foundation, a non-government, non-profit organization, Project Hope is considered by many to be the largest charitable project in modern China. Project Hope’s ultimate goal is to provide affordable education to impoverished children in China from primary school through college and to help them help themselves.

Project Hope is by far the most influential charity project in China. It was initiated, executed, and managed by the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF), a non-government, nonprofit organization under Communist Youth League (CYL) Central Committee of China. Its goal is to assist dropout and at-risk children aged six to fourteen in poverty-stricken, rural areas of China in completing their primary school education with financial aid. At present, Project Hope has expanded its goals to help migrant youngsters in the cities and high school graduates who have been admitted to colleges but cannot afford tuition. CYDF has also increased its services to include enhancing educational facilities and teaching quality, establishing Stars of Hope Scholarships in high schools and universities. To qualify for the scholarship, a student has to (1) have excellent academic achievement, (2) actively participate in community activities, and (3) be in need of financial aid to finish school (different places have different standards, CYDF is also carrying out distance-education initiatives (virtual education, that is, providing education through internet or a closed-circuit TV system), training rural teachers, and reinforcing the nine-year compulsory education law as well as other related subprojects.

Since its launch on 30 October 1989, Project Hope has attracted support from home and abroad, both in financial aid and volunteer work. China’s top leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Jiang Zemin, have endorsed the project at different times to show their support. By 2006, the CYDF had raised over RMB¥ 35 billion (about $473 million) in total. The project provides its subsidization mainly through the following avenues:

- establishing long-term grant-in-aid programs;
- constructing and refurbishing schools;
- providing teaching aids, instruction materials and textbooks; and
- providing scholarships.

Within eighteen years, Project Hope has supported more than 2.9 million school children, built some 13,000 Hope Primary Schools (regular elementary schools) donated about 13,000 sets of Hope House of Books, trained about 35,000 primary school teachers in rural regions, and assisted more than 1,000 AIDS-affected children to continue finishing their education. Around 80 percent of the Hope Primary Schools and students aided by the project lived in China’s less developed middle and western regions (CYDF 2007).
Chronology

1989: The Communist Youth League Central Committee established the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) with donations from the public to respond to the severe dropout situation in poverty-stricken areas.

1990: The first Hope Primary School opened in Jinzhai County, Anhui Province.

1991: Taiwan artist Ling Feng established the “Overseas Love and Care Fund for Project Hope” (海外爱心基金). Ling initiated and hosted “100 Charity Concerts” to raise the funds for this foundation for seven years. The actual amount of funds raised is not clear, but all the proceeds were donated to Project Hope. His efforts motivated many other artists and famous people, as well as the general public, to contribute to the project in their own ways.

1992: The 1990s Development Program for Chinese Children promulgated by the State Council formally listed Project Hope as one of the main measures for ensuring the survival, protection and development of children. CYDF launched its first “Project Hope—Million Love and Care Action.” This was a public promotion action of fund raising for the project.

1993: CYDF sponsored the second “Project Hope—Million Love and Care Action.” The first Hope School funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) opened in Humaying Village, Humaying Town, Fengning Manchu Autonomous County, Hebei Province.

1994: The Government Work Report presented at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress stipulated that Project Hope should continue with the support of the Chinese society. The Project Hope National Supervisory Committee was founded. CYDF also established the six-level network—national, provincial, prefecture, county, town and school—for the project.

1995: “Project Hope Management Year.” CYDF partnered with publishers to compile a five-hundred-volume series entitled “Hope House of Books” that consists of seven subject areas: famous literary works, history, culture and arts, science and technology, ecology, dictionaries and reference books, and daily life skills. In July, the project started the construction of the first Hope Middle School in Wangcun Town, Yongshun County, Hunan Province.

1996: The China Administration of Posts and Telecommunications issued two million Project Hope phone cards. The funds raised from these cards went to the construction of fifteen Hope Primary Schools and the distribution of three hundred sets of the Hope House of Books.

1997: Project Hope received a registered service trademark from the Trade Mark Bureau of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and became the first registered Chinese public charity organization with legally protected intellectual property rights.

1998: CYDF initiated a comprehensive audit of financial assistance to more than 1.8 million children.

2001: The project accomplished its initial goal of assisting dropout children in the poverty-stricken areas (Gu 2006). The new framework uses the Project Hope Distance Education Plan as its core, accompanied with election of Stars of Hope (students who have met those qualifications to receive scholarship) and their follow-up, teacher training, and construction of Hope School components, namely financial need. Most CYDF staff participated in the field research on the future direction of the project.

2002: The project expanded its financial aid to students at middle and high schools and colleges (Gu 2006). Meanwhile, a trust crisis broke out regarding CYDF’s investment and appropriate use of the donations for the project. In September, the first five graduates from the Stars of Hope Scholarship went to Canada for advance study.

2003/2004: CYDF launched the Project Hope Financial Aid Plan for Migrant Children, which offered assistance to more than twenty thousand migrant children, with each receiving an average of RMB¥600 (about $70) (Gu, 2006). Educating migrant workers’ children in the cities had been a serious problem. These children were either rejected by public schools or were charged extra fees; since their parents belong to a low-income population and cannot afford the high costs, they had to attend substandard, less-equipped schools run by individuals or philanthropic organizations. CYDF also held the first Red Dragonfly National Hope Primary School Sports Game: Representing thirty-seven delegations...
from thirty-one provinces and areas, 904 students participated in the game.

2005: CYDF partnered with China Central Television (CCTV) and launched “I Want to Go to College” fundraising drive. According to a 25 October 2005 report posted on a popular Chinese website (www.sina.com.cn), the drive identified five thousand college students who qualified for its financial aid, with each receiving RMB¥4,000, or about $500.

2006: Partnered with more than one hundred news media organizations and provincial youth development foundations, CYDF initiated “Dream-Coming-True Action” to help financially needy college students. This action raised RMB¥152 million, which assisted 38,892 students to realize their dreams of going to college (CYDF 2007).

Looking Ahead

In its next six-year plan (2007–2012), CYDF will keep the core values of Project Hope and continue serving children whose families have financial difficulties in poverty-stricken regions. As the foundation increases fundraising, it will also expand the cultural development of Hope Primary Schools, create Project Hope volunteer services, and better help farmers’ children acquire academic and development abilities.

Project Hope has been widely acknowledged as China’s most influential public charity campaign in the twentieth century and has received numerous awards, including the 2004 China Eliminating Poverty Award 中 国消除贫困奖 and the 2005 China Philanthropy Award 中华慈善奖 (CYDF 2007). It promotes its activities to the international community and has established relationships with similar organizations in countries such as Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, Spain, and United States.

Jean W. YAN

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Jean W. YAN

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Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 1667.

Property Law
Wùyè fà 物业法

China is experiencing one of the greatest real estate booms in history despite a prohibition on private ownership of land, a stated adherence to Marxist principles, and the absence of a national property law until 2007. Although China’s formal legal system still has some catching up to do, its informal legal practices illustrate how real estate professionals have been able to thrive during the past two decades.

China has enjoyed a tremendous real estate boom in recent years, though operating under a different system of laws and customs than those familiar to Westerners. The Property Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China, China’s first modern property law, became effective on 1 October 2007, but there remains considerable confusion regarding its implementation.

While it is not possible to own Chinese land, an investor can acquire a land-use right. Like investors in Western nations, Chinese investors must consider the type of ownership entity they wish to use and also must address site selection.

Rule-of-law principles continue to grow in importance, but China’s strong cultural tradition of reliance on personal relationships (guanxi) remains a key factor in many business interactions. There also are significant gaps between what China’s few written laws state and how they are enforced in practice. When examining Chinese doctrine, the question is not only what the law says, but also how it actually operates.

Land-Use Rights

In 1988 China amended its constitution to allow the right to transfer the use of land. That right was further strengthened by a 2004 amendment requiring the government to pay compensation when it expropriates land. Nowhere, however, do these amendments allow private ownership of land. Instead, these constitutional provisions, along with laws that were enacted to implement them, clarify that the government may grant land-use rights for a specific term. This compromise created opportunities for sustainable economic growth and the flourishing of a private real estate market without formally abandoning Marxist principles.

The government may transfer land-use rights to residential property for a term of up to seventy years. For commercial property the maximum term is forty years. Industrial and other types of land-use rights may not be granted for terms greater than fifty years.

Land-use rights are limited by statute. Article 25 of the Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate, for example, states that the land-use right may be reclaimed without compensation if the initial holder has not developed the land within two years, a rule that is frequently ignored. Rights holders may pay an additional fee to extend the term beyond two years, may initiate minimal construction before the two-year period expires as a means of formally meeting the statutory requirement, or may
seek extensions of this two-year term, which seem to be readily available.

The initial and subsequent nongovernment holders of land-use rights may further transfer them, with certain limits. For instance, the initial holder of a residential land-use right may not resell the right to a second holder until the initial right holder has completed at least 25 percent of the proposed construction. This rule apparently is ignored with great regularity, often because of confusion about exactly how much construction has been completed. The holder of the land-use right also must own the building constructed on that land. In addition, in parts of China, buyers have been unable to use borrowed funds to acquire a land-use right.

Despite apparent similarities, the Chinese granted land-use right differs significantly from the ground lease familiar in the West. Chinese land can be owned only by the government, so the granting of a land-use right, by definition, severs ownership of the land from ownership of the building constructed on that land, just as the Western ground lease does. In China, however, the holder of the land-use right also must own the building constructed on that land, which forces the developer to incur the capital expense of acquiring the land-use right in its entirety at the beginning of the construction process. The ground lease, by contrast, permits the developer to avoid all or most up-front land acquisition costs. The Chinese land-use right, in short, is not a financing device.

Sales of Land-Use Rights

The process by which the government sells a land-use right, like so many other procedures in Chinese law, derives from a combination of formal written rules and informal practice. Shanghai’s procedure serves as a useful illustration of these granting practices. The government initiates the sale process by deciding on the requirements and specifications for a tract. It asks the Department of Land Administration to place a value on the property, and this administration sets a minimum price for the land-use right. The government publicizes these requirements and specifications and makes the relevant documents available to prospective bidders, which then submit sealed bids. Each bid from a developer is solely a price bid, as the government already has established all of the specifications in advance.

Shanghai’s government is not required to select the highest bidder, a fact that leaves it open to charges of favoritism or corruption. Concerns about favoritism are widespread. The government’s response is that it is concerned with a bidder’s reputation, experience, skill, financial strength, and general capacity to complete the project, and not just with the amount of its bid. The government argues that there is greater public benefit if the project is actually completed, even if the government receives less money in the short run. Nonetheless, bidders who have good personal relationships with highly placed officials are widely perceived as enjoying an edge, and these perceptions are further enhanced by a belief that the specifications themselves sometimes seem to have been drafted with particular bidders in mind.

Shanghai’s method of auctioning land-use rights has improved dramatically in recent years. Before 2002, the municipality would negotiate privately with several reputable developers and then choose one, a process that still is followed in some of the less commercialized provinces. Whatever their flaws, Shanghai’s current procedures generally are recognized as among the most impartial in China.

Land-Use Planning

The Chinese land-use right system serves as a rudimentary zoning arrangement. When the government transfers land-use rights, it executes a formal document with the acquirer. In this document, the government limits the uses to which the land may be put.

The price for a land-use right is a function of the total buildable area that can be constructed on the land. If that number changes as the project moves forward, the price is adjusted accordingly. This fact illustrates the tension that local governments face between regulating land uses and maximizing revenues: A bigger building that may be undesirable for planning reasons will generate greater revenue.

Municipal planning bodies may devise land-use plans restricting certain types of developments in specified areas. These bodies are also aware of the tremendous revenue-raising possibilities from the sale of desirable land to developers who may wish to improve it in a manner that conflicts with those land-use plans. Pressure is mounting
both domestically and internationally for China to place greater emphasis on protecting the environment, and Shanghai officials regularly note the increasing amount of green space that is available to residents of that city. But if land that is slated for a downtown park proves to be considerably more valuable than anticipated to its government owner, there may be huge financial incentives to convey the right to use that land to a developer.

The Chinese real estate boom has made land-use rights extremely valuable in many urban areas. Governments in these regions often treat land-use rights as assets to be sold whenever the need for cash arises, and many provincial and municipal governments employ the sale of land-use rights as an indispensable means of keeping themselves solvent. But if they transfer too many land-use rights too quickly, they will impair the government’s long-term financial viability. The national government recognizes important reasons to slow the real estate market down, and because it is less dependent on revenues from the sale of land-use rights, it suffers less than the provinces and municipalities if it accomplishes this goal.

Business Entities Owning Land-Use Rights

Most real estate projects in Shanghai are owned by domestic limited liability companies formed in accordance with China’s Company Law. If a new limited liability company wants to develop real estate, the first thing it must do is obtain land-use rights. This company often is partly owned by a private developer/manager and partly by a unit of government, a fact reflecting the reality that a government entity controls the use of the land the developer needs. The government provides the land-use right to the company as its contribution to that company. The local government’s control of the land ensures that it can retain an interest in the company that will develop the land. The government’s partial ownership of the project allows it to control and profit from the development, with the other partner providing the professional know-how and much of the cash.

The government also may benefit by acting as a subdivider. It is quite simple for the government to profit in this role when it controls the right to use desirable land and holds the power to determine how that land can be used. In some less densely populated areas, a municipal government will establish a first-level developer company in which it holds a large ownership stake and then convey land-use rights to this company. This company subdivides the land, breaking a larger parcel into smaller ones and installing necessary infrastructure. It then transfers the land-use rights to the smaller lots to the real estate developers that actually will build on them.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), like governmental units, may own land-use rights, or they may obtain these rights from local governments at little or no cost. These SOEs then contribute the land-use rights to a development entity that they jointly own with a local developer or, occasionally, a foreign partner. SOEs often are highly inefficient manufacturing operations that have difficulty competing against private businesses in the modern Chinese economy. They historically have been a key part of the “iron rice bowl” social service network, typically offering their workers a guaranteed job, housing, schools, and health care. Any time an SOE fails, the government must step in and provide these benefits, or else the SOE’s former employees will suffer the type of reduction in comfort and security that can lead to more generalized social unrest. The government obviously has a strong political interest in seeing that these SOEs survive, and SOEs that successfully diversify into real estate enhance their long-term prospects.

Just as SOEs have sought to profit from real estate investments, private companies that are not primarily engaged in the real estate business have been seeking to diversify their portfolios, and real estate has proved to be one of the most successful investments in recent years. The government has become so concerned about competition from these private companies that it has started limiting their ability to invest in real estate, even taking steps to encourage them to sell their real estate assets to state-owned real estate holding companies.

Guanxi and Real Estate Development

Although the government clearly profits from participating in real estate transactions, government units that wish to invest in development may not have the expertise to do so. Professionals who possess this skill and are willing to
share the gains with the government—or with certain officials within the government—are more likely to obtain the land-use rights they need. Even when there is no outright corruption, those professionals who master the nuances of a fluid, fast-changing legal system—and maintain amicable relationships with the government workers whose approval they need—hold a huge edge over their less well-connected competitors. Personal relationships, or guanxi, matter enormously in a nation in which laws are evolving rapidly and being applied inconsistently.

A local government sometimes will convey a land-use right to a company in which it holds an ownership stake for less than the fair market value of the land. The development company then can resell a portion of the land-use right at a higher per-square-meter price (reflecting the true market value) and recover all or most of its total cash investment before construction even begins. The restriction on reselling land-use rights for land that has not been developed does not appear to impede transactions of this type. The result of this two-step transaction is that the company obtains the right to develop its remaining land at little or no cost. In many of these cases, the private co-owner of the company is someone with close personal connections to the government, such as a former government official. Concerns about this type of corruption, or at least the appearance of corruption, are beginning to lead to change. For example, public auctions of land-use rights are becoming more common.

Some of the more established investors have even sought to cement their advantage by lobbying for legal changes that would reduce the very type of corruption from which they appear to have benefited themselves. Having built a huge lead under the original rules, they now seek to level the playing field. For example, the government may limit the bidding for desirable land-use rights to those developers who have demonstrated in their previous work that they have the skills to complete larger transactions, a group that often consists of the same first-generation developers who were able to acquire land-use rights under the more opaque procedures that were in place just a few years ago.

The importance of guanxi and experience helps to explain why so many developers in China are Chinese. The little foreign investment that there is in Chinese real estate mostly comes from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. Well-known Western corporations have also begun to enter China’s real estate market, recently acquiring trophy properties in desirable areas such as the Lujiazui Trade and Finance Zone in Shanghai’s Pudong New Area.

## Site Selection

When a Chinese real estate developer is deciding where to build, its choice is influenced by both the profit motive and government inducement or compulsion. Developers seek to acquire land-use rights and build structures in locations that will be profitable. At the same time, the government uses its power, including its ownership of the underlying land, as a means of channeling development where it wishes. If the government is seeking to intensify development in a thinly populated area, it benefits as well from the fact that it is advantageous for private developers to build on land from which they will not have to remove current occupants and structures, a controversial and expensive undertaking.

## Public Input

Chinese government entities do engage in land-use planning and zoning. Land-use plans in China are developed in a top-down manner, with little or no citizen input. Some government entities do invite public comment, but citizens’ suggestions are followed only rarely. Citizen input may have more effect on changes to existing land-use plans than on the initial enactment of those plans.

But it appears that the land-use planning process is becoming more transparent if not more citizen based. Practices in Shanghai again serve as an example of the multiple levels of planning. Step one is known as open planning, in which Shanghai’s municipal government comes up with a proposal that must be approved by both the Shanghai National People’s Congress and the State Council. Following completion of this first step, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (or, for less significant projects, the Shanghai Urban Planning Administration, an administrative arm of the municipal government) next specifies requirements for individual blocks of land. Subsequent rezonings, while occasionally available, are difficult to obtain. In step three, technical specifications are proposed.
for individual buildings. Steps four and five consist of bidding on the transfer of land-use rights and the execution of a contract with the successful bidder. These steps are not completely alien to the American real estate practitioner, but the Chinese process allows virtually no opportunity for input from outside the government, even by those considering bidding.

In the earliest days of the real estate boom in Shanghai, investors considering acquiring land-use rights could become involved in the planning process sooner. During the 1990s the government would ask developers to locate a development site and propose a project for it. This method is rarely used today. Instead, the government either makes its planning decisions in the manner described earlier and invites proposals from developers who must comply with these detailed specifications, or it invites proposals for specific blocks that it has designated but not yet planned in great detail so that the developer can participate in the later stages of the planning process. This newer approach allows the government to retain greater control over land-use policy and may reduce opportunities for improper behavior by government officials and bidders.

Government Control

The question of whether to slow China’s real estate surge offers a prime example of a conflict between the central government in Beijing and the government of a province or municipality. Lower-level government entities enjoy huge benefits when they grant land-use rights. They retain 70 percent of the proceeds from sales of land-use rights, while Beijing receives only 30 percent. China has no system of periodically taxing property according to its value, so municipalities must fund a significant portion of their ongoing capital and operations budgets by selling land-use rights.

Experts in China argue that China’s vast stock of government- and collective-owned land ensures that the Chinese economy will not collapse any time soon, as some Western experts have nervously predicted. The government can simply keep transferring land-use rights on the ever-expanding urban fringe at hefty prices that reflect the land’s increasing value for urban residential or commercial use. These experts argue that as long as the government has land-use rights that it can sell, it will never run out of cash.

Meanwhile, the central government, which receives less than one-third of the sales proceeds, fears that an overheated real estate market fueled by this sort of local government behavior may lead to social turbulence. Fear of upheaval may be the most important reason why the central government has tried in recent years to slow the real estate market. Developers and many private citizens, however, wish to see hot markets persist at least long enough for their next investment to pay off. Lower levels of government, which have their own economic incentives for wanting to see good times continue to roll, use their enormous control over local markets to encourage further growth.

An Exciting Market

China has accomplished much despite a prohibition on private ownership of land, a stated adherence to Marxist principles, and the absence of a national property law until 2007. Although China’s formal legal system still has some catching up to do, its informal legal practices illustrate how real estate professionals have been able to thrive during the past two decades. Overall, China is gambling that its central planners will be able to control the pace of growth in the real estate market and that its legal system eventually will attain the same level of maturity that its markets seem to be reaching.

China’s leaders have made significant progress, especially considering how recently they began this task and how stagnant the Chinese economic and legal systems were when they embarked on this project. For the interested real estate practitioner, it is difficult to imagine a more exciting market than China’s in the early twenty-first century.

Gregory M. STEIN

Further Readings

Rapid development has transformed China’s skyline. Skyscrapers and modern buildings occupy space once used for farming.
PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
Traditional sayings are an important means of passing on cultural wisdom. In China an especially rich accumulation of such sayings has been passed on for well over two thousand years. Today, despite political disruptions and an intrusive modernity, traditional sayings still play an active role, passed on largely by grandparents who often care for their grandchildren while both parents work.

All cultures have accumulated bodies of traditional sayings that constitute a common folk wisdom. China in particular has actively preserved an extraordinary number of sayings that many people use to make sense of what happens to them. From a cultural perspective, these sayings transmit fundamental cultural orientations and values. Although familiar sayings may sometimes be taught in school, their primary transmission is oral, reinforced by rhetorical devices that help make phrases memorable, especially to children. For the most part, learning them takes place informally within families and communities. The origins of Chinese proverbs are often ancient, indicating that all the intervening generations have found them useful.

It is difficult to estimate how many sayings have been acquired by people growing up in China (or for that matter in the West). Learning hundreds, perhaps thousands, of sayings was a common preparation for living under premodern circumstances. The sayings provided a pool of ready explanations and/or consolations for myriad events. Taken as a whole, proverbs did not necessarily have a single-minded philosophical orientation, but instead they preserved multiple or even contradictory ways of looking at things. One then chose an appropriate one according to the circumstances.

For example, the English proverb, “A stitch in time saves nine,” encourages people to solve problems when they are still small. A Chinese equivalent, “Xiao shi tou zhen, da shi tou jin” 小时偷针大时偷金, means “If a child can get away with stealing a needle, when he grows up he will steal gold.” This saying calls for the discipline of children when they are young. A more specific application of similar advice in English proverbs might be “As the twig is bent, so the tree shall grow.”

With an opposite implication, however, the proverb, “Look before you leap,” enjoins caution in the face
of risks. The Chinese equivalent, "San si er xing" 三思而行, means "Think thrice before you take any action." On one level, these proverbs seem contradictory—one urging immediate action, the other cautioning against it. Yet both recommendations circulate freely in the collective cultural wisdom. Their contradictions do not really matter because individual circumstances determine which seems more appropriate.

In fact, the function of this "wisdom" may lie less in the advice offered than in the availability of a communal, ready-made response for every circumstance. Drawing on the pool of proverbial sayings reaffirms allegiance to and participation in the community. This communal wisdom may provide glue for social continuity, as it does in today's China—or it may dissipate and gradually disappear, as seems to be happening in the West.

**Origins in China**

The origins of proverbs, clearly oral in form, have been recorded in China from the very earliest written texts that date from the first millennium BCE such as the Zuo Commentaries (Zuo Zhuan 左传) and the works of Kongzi (Confucius) or Mengzi (Mencius). Perhaps the best known collection of proverbs in use today is named *The Extended Virtuous Words* (Zeng guan xian wen 增广贤文), which was first compiled around 1600 during the Ming Dynasty.

Episodes in the lives of famous historical figures are frequently alluded to in Chinese sayings. Their message is often expressed in four-character set phrases known as *chengyu* 成语. Here is an example from a letter written in 93 BCE by China's first great historian, Sima Qian (145–86 BCE): “The loss of one hair from nine oxen” or *Jiu niu yi mao* 九牛一毛. To an outsider, this saying remains cryptic. It is not even a sentence that makes sense as a moral caution. To someone who grew up in China, however, this saying evokes Sima Qian's explanation for his refusal to commit suicide on the order of the emperor Han Wudi. Instead, he preferred castration so that he could live on to complete his pioneering history of China. His death, says Sima Qian, would have been no more significant than "the loss of one hair from nine oxen." But living on despite his humiliation would allow him to complete a great work whose importance would outlive the influence of the Emperor who had maltreated him.

An additional source of proverbial sayings is traditional Chinese poetry; this often culminates in a last line or two
that sum up a whole sequence of feelings in a few words. Example: “To extend one’s view to cover a full thousand miles, climb just one more story of the tower.” (Yu qiong qian li mu, geng shang yi ceng lou. 欲穷千里目更上一层楼.) These two lines are quoted from the poem “Climbing Stork Tower” (Deng guan que lou 登鹳雀楼) by Wang Zhizhuan (688–742 CE). Because the aim of much traditional Chinese literature has been the teaching of one lesson or other, a short and memorable way of encapsulating the moral in the last line invites later quotation. Thus many features of the Chinese cultural tradition are reinforced through the habit of speaking in short, proverbial sayings.

Not all proverbs and common sayings can be traced back to ancient times. Mao Zedong’s so-called Little Red Book (1966) prolonged the tradition as did stories propagated during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). During Mao’s time these permeated China’s social landscape. Used as inspirational phrases by which to live, these mottos were produced and disseminated as part of a campaign to spread Mao’s revolutionary message: for example, “Revolutionists are guiltless, and rebellions are justifiable.” (“Ge ming wu zui, zao fan you li” 革命无罪造反有理.) Another example is ”Revolution is by no means inviting guests to a banquet.” (“Ge ming bu shi qing ke chi fan.” 革命不是请客吃饭). Today’s young people often say they have never even heard of these sayings.

Despite the disruptions of the Revolutionary period and an encroaching modernity, the survival of traditional proverbs in China seems assured under present conditions. Two-thirds of China’s people still live in rural areas in fairly traditional circumstances. In cities, both parents are likely to work and to leave their child largely in the care of grandparents, who thus have many opportunities to pass on traditional wisdom. In addition, teachers may often incorporate venerable Chinese sayings into classroom instruction, though such sayings may be greeted with a certain amount of ambivalence by the more sophisticated students of today. Nonetheless, in Chinese culture and history, proverbs have provided a rich reservoir of handy mind-tools that allow people to categorize their experience and live with the consequences. They affirm that one can always find ways of coping with misfortune; everything has always happened before. Today these widely known rhetorical patterns also help to preserve and pass on a distinctively Chinese world view: Everything changes and everything that happens is connected. Thus the survival of proverbial sayings constitutes a powerful linkage between the present Chinese generation and all those that came before.

John G. BLAIR and Jerusha H. McCORMACK

Further Reading

You think you lost your horse? Who knows, he may bring a whole herd back to you someday.
塞翁失马
Sài wēng shī mǎ
The publishing industry in China is growing, as can be seen by an increase in the number of new book titles, bookstores, consumer magazines, and a consolidation of imprints. The science, technology, and medical publishing sectors are making the transition to digital or online publishing, and there are now three major online retail booksellers in China.

As the country noted for its long literary history and credited for the invention of printing and paper, China would be expected to boast a thriving publishing industry, especially since it is home to the world’s largest population. Indeed, both book publishing and magazine publishing have been expanding in recent years as China’s thirst for knowledge and know-how grows. Concurrently the world’s interest in China increases as new translation rights and co-publishing agreements are reached, and attendance at the Beijing World Book Fair grows both in the number of publishers and countries represented.

Book Publishing

There are 527 officially designated book publishing companies (excluding imprints) in China governed by the General Administration for Press and Publications (GAPP), although a relatively small number of these are responsible for generating the majority of titles on the ever-growing list of new publications. Of these publishing houses 220 are in Beijing, 40 are in Shanghai, and the balance of 267 are in other parts of the country.

The number of new titles released in China each year continues to grow: 150,800 were published in 2004, about 172,000 in 2005, 222,000 in 2006, and 248,000 in 2007. According to the OpenBook Information Service’s statistics, the growth rate for national retail book sales grew an average of 9.2 percent over the same four-year time frame. Most of the books published in China are in the low-cost paperback format, whereas in other parts of the world, publishers produce multiple editions including hardcover, book club, quality paperback, mass paperback, and special editions.

The government controls and continues to administer the structure of the industry that has been identified as moving forward on “two wheels” (i.e., sparing no effort to develop), including the establishment of rules governing for-profit and not-for-profit publishers. Similar to a consolidation of publishers via mergers and acquisitions in the Western world, since 2004 the GAPP has been organizing small publishers into more productive clusters in China. The largest, China Publishing Group, was established in April 2003 and includes the following enterprises: Commercial Press, DSX Joint Publishing Company, Zhonghua Book Company, China National Publishing Industry Trading Corp., China National Publications Import and Export Corp., and the Xinhua Bookstore Company. It is a vertically and horizontally integrated conglomerate of publishing and distribution, information services, technologies, and import and export services.
The top fifteen publishers have been able to retain their dominance during this transition as they have focused on their specialized subject areas and have added new segments for growth. For example, the People’s Literature Publishing House and the Changjiang Literature and Arts Press are the leaders in trade and literature books. The Jieli Publishing House and Zhejiang Juvenile and Children’s Publishing House are the two leaders in children’s books. In March 2007, the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics reported that, by the end of 2006, children and teenagers up to the age of fourteen represented 20.3 percent of the total population, or 263 million young readers.

China International Publishing Group, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, New World Press, and the Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press are identified as the leaders in foreign-language learning textbooks, dictionaries, and reference books. Chemical Industry Press, Machine Press, and Science Press are three leaders in the scientific and technical professional cluster of publishers.

The single largest publisher in China is the Higher Education Press (HEP), founded in 1954. It specializes in media on all aspects of higher, vocational, and adult education, including textbooks, teacher training manuals, supplemental materials, multimedia software, and online digital information resources. The target audience for this publisher comprises more than 2,000 universities and 25 million students enrolled in universities. HEP is recognized as one of the top forty-five publishing houses in the world. The total market segment of all education publishing, an arena including university presses, represents an estimated 84 percent of all book-publishing sales in China.

University presses play an important role in China both to promote scholarship and disseminate research findings of their host universities and to publish a large share of the higher education textbooks. About a hundred of the 527 publishing houses are university presses, of which the top ten will each generate sales of over 150 million yuan (about $22 million) per year. The university presses are not regarded as not-for-profit institutions because a certain percentage of their profits are expected to be remitted to their universities each year. Some of the leading imprints are Tsinghua University Press, Peking University Press, Beijing Normal University Press, Zhejiang University Press, and Shanghai Jiaotong University Press.

Transitions to Privatization

The government has promoted the concept of shareholding reforms to have publishing companies publicly listed (although a foreign company cannot own a majority share of any one such publisher). Along with the trend toward a form of public ownership comes the related “marketization” or privatizing of publishing programs that will be increasingly responsive to the changing market. For example, in 2004 the Hunan Publishing Group was transformed to a major state-owned business under the new title of the Hunan Publishing Investment Holding Group, with twenty-five branch business units, including book, newspaper, magazine, video, digital online publishing, and other industry-related units. In December 2007 Liaoning Publishing and Media Group was one of the first to be listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and a long-awaited new door opened for multinational publishers to invest in the dramatically growing Chinese book market. In July 2008 the Anhui Publishing Group was approved for listing on the Shanghai stock market, followed by the China Publishing Group, which registered in Hong Kong in August 2008. A survey conducted by the Chinese Research Institute of Publishing Science indicated that there are at least thirty private companies in the book business with assets over 100 million yuan (about $15 million) engaged in publishing and distribution in China.

Translation Rights

The purchase of translation rights, or what the Chinese publishers refer to as “imported” titles, plays a major role in the type and content of books published each year. The Kaijuan Book Market Research Institute, based in Beijing, reported that Chinese publishers purchased translation rights for an average of 12,000 titles each year between 2002 and 2007. In contrast, Chinese publishers sold translation rights for only 2,571 titles in 2007. Literature, children’s books, social sciences, and language learning represented 85 percent of the purchased translation rights in 2008, according to the Kaijuan Institute.

Early in 2008 the GAPP launched a new program to fund the costs of translations from Chinese into other
languages to facilitate the process of selling rights to publishers around the world. The amounts range from 17,000 to 60,000 yuan (about $2,500 to $9,000) per title. The first agreements for such supported translations rights were signed during the Frankfurt Book Fair.

**Cultural Content Providers**

Another unique factor in the publishing industry is the existence of an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 private creative studios, or packagers, as outsourced publishers, identified in China as content providers and cultural companies. These companies cannot publish because they cannot obtain the official ISBNs and, therefore, must work in partnership or under contract with official state-owned publishers. These private companies produce an estimated 30,000 new titles, or 15 percent of China’s total new book programs, because the state-owned companies have not been able to keep up with the demand of the rapidly changing and growing market.

**Book Sales and Distribution**

The Xinhua wholesale and retail bookstores form a government-owned and administrated book sales and distribution system on a national scale that has provided the channels for publishers to sell books throughout the country. In 2000 the state-owned Xinhua bookstore system represented 96 percent of the industry’s unit sales and 85 percent in terms of revenue value. Since 2003 there have been a rapidly growing number of privately owned bookstores. In May 2003 the government decreed that retail bookstores could be designated as outright joint ventures with foreign companies or owned by foreign companies. The government allowed the same designations for wholesale businesses in December 2004. A survey at the end of 2007 reported an estimated 119,900 bookstores, including the 11,879 state-owned Xinhua bookstores and more than 108,000 private bookstores.

The current focus is to develop the Chinese version of Western superstores. OpenBook Information Services reported at the end of 2006 that there were sixty-one superstores with a size of 5,000 to 9,500 square meters (about 54,000 to 102,000 square feet) and another thirty-one superstores larger than 10,000 square meters (about 108,000 square feet). BookCity, one such superstore in Shanghai, has an average of over 9,200 visitors each day. The next phase of development will be the establishment of chain bookstores within a province or on a national scale, as well as in the ten larger cities along the coast.

By 2008, there were 253 million Internet users in China, which helped lead to the development of online bookstores. Despite the lack of plastic credit cards across the country to facilitate direct retail sales, three major online bookstores are now functioning very effectively: www.bookuu.com, www.dangdang.com, and www.joyo.com. Amazon.com entered the market in 2004 investing $75 million to acquire the www.joyo.com online bookstore. (Amazon.cn)

The Beijing International Book Fair (BIBF) is ranked as the largest in Asia and as one of the four most important annual events in the world to promote the sale of books and rights. The first BIBF was officially approved by the State Council and organized by the China National Publications Import and Export Corporation in 1990. Since entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the Chinese government has strengthened its support of the BIBF’s role in going global. In 2007 fifty-eight countries were represented; 1,463 publishers exhibited more than 150,000 books, with the sale of an estimated 12,064 translation contracts.

**Magazine and Journal Publishing**

The magazine industry started from a comparatively much smaller base, with only 257 periodicals published in 1949 printing 20 million copies, according the China Periodical Association. Currently there are more than 9,400 titles published with an estimated annual distribution of 2.75 billion copies. The three prime centers for magazine publishing are Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong. The industry is divided into seven major market categories. The consumer segment includes 547 titles; the literature and art segment, 540 titles; the children’s segment, 160 titles; and illustrated magazines, 64 titles. Only a quarter of these are published by publishers that have national distribution. The balance of the titles is released by regional publishers. Circulation numbers are still small in comparison to other countries. Consumer magazines, for example, have an average print run of just over 1 million

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copies; children’s magazines have average print runs of only 170,000 copies.

According to Xin Guanwei, vice president of the Chinese Institute of Publishing Science, magazines in China are published as commercial publications sold in newsstands or via subscriptions and noncommercial magazines distributed within organizations or specific industry sectors. Subscriptions with related order fulfillment are carried out for all magazines by the government post office in China. The post office controls all aspects of the subscription system, including lists maintenance, renewals, and related promotion campaigns. Only a few of the best-selling magazines can be purchased at a newsstand, which is in China a distribution channel still under development. The Business Publication Audit Company based in the United States has authorized Global China Media Consulting Company in Beijing to be its agent in China and measure distribution and sales levels for individual magazines to establish certified circulation numbers to be used for advertising sales.

Hachette Filipacchi Média—the world’s largest magazine publisher, based in France—reached an agreement in 1988 with Shanghai Translation House and published the Chinese edition of Elle, which started a whole period of cooperation in the publishing of fashion and consumer magazines. In 1993 China’s Trends Publications launched its first fashion magazine, Trends, after which Hearst then moved rapidly into the market with International Data Group, and developed the Trends Publications joint venture to establish translations of Cosmopolitan and Esquire in 1998. In 2004 Reader’s Digest reached an agreement with the Shanghai Press and Publishing Administration, a branch of the central General Administration for Press and Publications in Beijing, to develop a Chinese edition of the magazine. National Geographic followed with a partnership agreement with the Trends group to publish Traveler, and Condé Nast signed an agreement with China Pictorial Press to publish a Chinese edition of Vogue. Currently the four fashion giants—Trends, Elle, Vogue, and Rayli dominate the consumer magazine segment as the market leaders.

The number of Chinese scholars who read and write scientific, technical, and medical journals has increased fivefold since 1996. The Intersection of Technology, Content and Academia Institute reported that China had a twentyfold increase in publications of articles in scientific journals from 1981 to 2003. The sector of natural sciences, technology, and research journals is the largest of the seven categories with more than 4,600 titles.

Copyright Protection

In recent years the Chinese government has made major efforts to strengthen and enforce copyright laws for protecting print and digital content for copyright. From the revised Copyright Law in 2001 to the new Regulation on the Protection of the Right of Communication of Information on Network established in 2006, the judicial protection system of copyright law has been revised, strengthened, and actually applied. The rapid growth of
the Internet and the public’s taking more notice of rights violations have led to an increase in the number of Internet infringement cases judged by the courts of the Peoples Republic of China.

Moving Forward

Information and related education are essential for a huge country to make the transition from an agrarian developing population and move forward on a national scale into the next century. In addition to a well-organized public education system, there is a growing development of continuing and professional adult education. An increasing number of the 1.2 billion population will read information for education, self-improvement and entertainment—in print and online. The size of the country and rapid acceptance of the Internet will provide a wide range of opportunities for both print and digital or online publishing.

Robert E. BAENSCH

Further Reading


Drinking with a bosom friend, a thousand shots are too few; Talking with a disagreeable person, half a sentence is too many.

酒逢知己千杯少，
话不投机半句多

jiǔ féng zhī jì qiān bēi shǎo, huà bù tóu jì bàn jù duō
Pudong New District

Even by the standards of rapidly developing China, Pudong New District, a designed economic zone to the east of Shanghai, is far beyond average. The district has shattered development goals, as well as expectations in education, social welfare, and the environment.

China’s port city of Shanghai is known as the “pearl of the East.” More than a pearl, Shanghai has been a magnet, attracting global attention for some time. As one of the cities in China with the most significant level of development, Shanghai is becoming an international city, and Pudong New District reflects this change.

As an area for experimental policies to promote harmonious development, Pudong sets an example for other areas in China in terms of government support, infrastructure construction, and function.

Location

Pudong New District is located east of Shanghai and the Yangzi (Chang) River delta. It lies between Nanhui and Minhang Districts in the south and Luwan, Huangpu, Hongkou, Yangpu, and Baoshan Districts in the west. The district covers 570 square kilometers and contains twelve subdistricts and eleven towns.

The area has a long history. Pudong New District was

Pudong Jinmao Dasha, Shanghai. The Jinmao Tower, built in 1998, boasts 88 floors (eight being an auspicious Chinese number—hence the starting time of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony at eight minutes and eight seconds past eight p.m. on 8 August 2008). PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
called “Zhousha” in 535 CE and didn’t belong to Shanghai until 1292 in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). From that time to 1984 the administrative region of Pudong (Zhousha) was changed many times. In 1990 the central government and the State Council of China decided to develop this area, and the area was given the name “Pudong.” In 1993 the Pudong New District Management Committee was formed, and the name “Zhousha” officially became history.

**National Strategy**

On 18 April 1990 the central government and the State Council of China decided to develop Pudong New District in Shanghai, with follow-up implementation from Shanghai’s municipal government and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. In 2005 the State Council approved Pudong New District as an experimental site for comprehensive reform. The district was to be a “tripod” area: an area for applying new opening and reforming strategies, an area for innovation, and an area for a modern service industry, promising a new era in its development.

After seventeen years of planning, the construction of Pudong New District went well. The district has been commonly referred to as the “window of China’s opening and reform policies” and an “epitome of the modernization process in Shanghai.”

In terms of economic development Pudong New District has been solid and sustainable. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the district increased from 6 billion yuan in 1990 (the beginning of the development policy) to 210 billion yuan in 2005, with an average growth of 15 percent per year. Advanced manufacturing and modern service industries have been leading, with total production volume of the former exceeding 420 billion yuan in 2005. This accounts for 25 percent of the city’s total, of
which tertiary industry (banking, finance, insurance and tourism) accounted for 49 percent. In the same year the consumption of Pudong New District exceeded 40 billion yuan, and foreign trade volume reached $90 billion, with an export volume of $37.2 billion.

In addition, by 2006, more than thirteen thousand foreign enterprises from more than one hundred countries had invested in Pudong New District, with a contract value of more than $30 billion. More than ninety-three hundred domestic enterprises have invested in Pudong New District, with a contract value of more than 60 billion yuan. Pudong New District accounts for one-fourth of the GDP, one-half of the foreign trade volume, and one-third of the foreign direct investment in Shanghai and clearly has been a powerful engine for economic development in the city.

**Multifunction Center**

After more than a decade’s development Pudong New District is a multifunction center for Shanghai. Different kinds of development zones in the district enhance the city’s functions. For example, the Lujiazui Finance Zone contains 360 financial institutes from China and abroad, including a branch of People’s Bank of China. Securities, futures, and properties can be efficiently exchanged in the zone, and financial resources are allocated according to free market rules. More than 60 percent of foreign bank assets and 80 percent of security turnover are found in the Lujiazui Finance Zone, and the property exchange scale is one of the top ones in China.

The Waigaoqiao Bonded Zone promotes international trade and logistics for bonded goods, which strengthen the function of transportation and the communication of seaports and airports. The economic volume, sales income, and tax revenue of the Waigaoqiao Bonded Zone accounts for one-half of those from fifteen bonded zones in China, and the container throughput accounts for two-thirds of Shanghai’s total (12 million standardized containers per year), making it one of the most important ports and logistics centers in the Yangzi River delta or even all of China.

The Jinqiao Export Processing Zone excels in advanced manufacturing and research and development (161 research institutes from China and abroad are located there), with more than $11 billion in investment and at least ninety major projects (each has on average more than a $10 million investment). In 2005 the industrial production value reached 129 billion yuan, and sales income in the zone reached 150 billion yuan. Furthermore, the progress in microelectronics, biotechnology, and information technology in the Jinqiao Export Processing Zone has promoted technological innovation and industry upgrades.

**More Than Economic Development**

The strategy of developing Pudong New District does not focus only on development. Development can bring economic benefit, but sustainable growth will also bring
social benefits and promote a harmonious nation, which is a long-term goal of the Chinese government.

The ecological environment of Pudong New District has also been emphasized. Large gardens, ecological parks, and forests have been built on the edge of the district, and statistics show the result: By 2006, green space in the district increased by 3,000 hectares compared with the area covered in 1990, with 35 percent of Pudong New District being green space.

Water pollution and air pollution have also received attention. The policy of “develop first and protect later” was eliminated, and a policy of “prevent first” is taking the lead. Since the end of 2005 all rivers and streams have been properly monitored, sewage treatment plants have covered the whole water system (8.5 percent of Pudong New District is covered by water), and all industrial sewage has reached required standards. In an area with busy traffic, automobile emissions have been limited so that during 85 percent of days in 2005 the air reached grade II of the air quality system, with 90 percent being the next goal of Pudong New District.

As a busy area with a large population, Pudong New District works hard at noise control and rubbish collection. Since 2005 noise in Pudong has been held to 60 decibels during the day and 50 decibels at night. Measures have been taken to promote rubbish categorization and collection as well, and 80 percent of residents’ rubbish has been categorized and recycled.

Although Pudong New District is a busy area with high-speed economic development, it contains a national nature conservation area of 420.2 square kilometers of wetlands that migratory birds visit every year. It is the best-preserved space in the country.

**Urbanization and the Working Environment**

Urbanization is a sign of city progress and in China a sign of what is called a “harmonious society.” The integration of suburbs and urban areas is among the top five of Pudong’s development strategies in terms of city planning, management, system insurance, education, and medical care.

A positive employment and business environment is vital for people’s sense of security and enterprise stability in any area, and Pudong New District is no exception.

The government encourages industries, such as contemporary services and other labor-intensive industries, to create adequate employment opportunities, and private and community enterprises are also supported. An effective market-oriented mechanism is promoted for job hunters in which employment information is widely disseminated, and government macroadjustment is applied when needed. In addition, some facilitating policies, such as those that provide small loans and employment training workshops, are offered to encourage unemployed residents to start their own businesses, and an unemployment security system has been set up to provide an anxiety-free environment.
Future Directions

In spite of its success, Pudong New District has more to achieve, and the next stage of development is being planned. One goal of the district is building a top science and technology zone with solid innovation ability by international standards. Enterprise-centered innovation will be encouraged to promote and take advantage of the enthusiasm of entrepreneurs, and research and development centers will be built by Chinese and foreigners to improve competitiveness and attract enterprises to the district.

An innovative mechanism is only the core, and it needs a comprehensive service system as its coordinating periphery. Public information platforms will be built for better communication and understanding between enterprises and government, and a human resource reservoir is needed as a backup for high-speed development of science and technology (in 2005 more than fifty thousand employees worked in the Zhangjiang Science and Technology Park; more than fifteen thousand of them had more than one college degree). Investment and finance-related facilities, as a kind of policy guidance (including government financial support and finance mortgage), will be put in place to encourage new businesses to start or to coach investment decisions of existing investment companies and listed corporations. Public laboratories, hubs, technology evaluation centers, and other institutes are also required to make Pudong New District versatile and multifunctional.

New industries with high added value and great space for future development are expected to be the leading industries in Pudong New District. The most advanced

Pudong, Shanghai. The Shanghai International Exposition will come to Pudong in 2010. Under construction are a conference venue and a convention theme park that will host 20 million people and twelve hundred conferences annually.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
assembly line for complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) chip production has been imported to Pudong, which was already a national leader in the field (as of 2005 there were ten CMOS chip assembly lines with more than 150 related enterprises). Pudong Software Park, with an annual income of 20 billion yuan, is also prominent: More than fifty thousand employees work there. Also booming is biomedication, which in 2005 had an output of 15 billion yuan from more than two hundred enterprises. Other industries, such as automobiles and new materials, have already started and are expected to develop in coming years.

Pudong's international airport and seaport offer the necessary transportation to build Pudong as a logistics center. Existing logistics, especially third-party logistics resources, can help to build a network of national or multinational shippers, shipping agents, purchase centers, and delivery centers, which can bring further commercial prosperity to the district. An efficient municipal traffic network will be improved based on existing river routes, roads, railways and subways.

Conferences and tourism can be the side products of the Shanghai International Exposition in 2010. Under construction are a conference venue and a convention theme park that can host 20 million people during a year and twelve hundred conferences annually. This development will make Pudong a conference and commercial tourism center.

With natural advantages, public expectations, and support from the government and other sources, Pudong New District has become a shiny pearl in the east of China.

ZHOU Guanqi

Further Reading


Qi is an important concept in the Chinese philosophy that defines an animated force that can influence the human body.

The concept of qi is as important to understanding Chinese philosophy as the concept of pneuma (air, breath, spirit) is to understanding ancient Greek and Hebrew philosophy. The earliest pictographs of the Chinese character for qi represent rising steam or vapor. However, quite early in Chinese tradition qi gained psycho-physiological significance when the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) described "blood and qi" as the vigor of the stages of a man’s life (Ames and Rosemont 1998, 198). Like the Greek pneuma, qi here is the “energetic fluid which vitalizes the body, in particular as the breath” (Graham 1989, 101).

By the early Warring States period (475–221 BCE) qi was further understood to be an animating force in the atmosphere that could influence the human body. A physician’s prognosis recorded in the Zuo Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals cites the six qi of heaven—shade and sunshine, wind and rain, darkness and light—which “produce the six diseases when they are in excess” (Legge 1861, 580). By the end of this period, when philosophical schools began to flourish, qi had become the primordial constituent of all phenomena. The cosmogony (a theory of the origin of the universe) that begins chapter 3 of the Huainanzi is illustrative:

The Dao arose in the nebulous emptiness;
The nebulous emptiness generated space and time;
Space and time generated qi.
Here qi is “the universal fluid, active as Yang and passive as Yin, out of which all things condense and into which they dissolve” (Graham 1989, 101). The original sense of qi was not lost but was now subsumed by the term jing (essence), as in the following passage from the Guanzi: “Where there is essence, life springs forth…. It is the wellspring of qi” (Rickett 1998, 51).

Along with the six qi of heaven, the Zuo Commentary identifies five xing or “movements” as belonging to Earth. These are the “five elements” or phases of qi, developed by Zou Yan (350–270 BC?), a late Warring States thinker. Zou perfected a theory of transmutation whereby the elements progress through cycles of mutual change. For example, wood produces fire (by combustion), which produces earth (as ash), which produces metal (as ores), which produces water (as condensate), which produces wood (as nourishment). Furthermore, these five categories were paradigmatic, correlating with other sets of fives (tastes, colors, grains, etc.). Mutual interaction among categories was conveyed by qi through the means of “mutual resonance,” a theory that probably also originated with Zou Yan. For example, because “the essence of the qi of water became the moon” (Major 1993, 62), water and moon share the same qi, which explains why the moon has an effect on ocean tides.

The term qi has entered the English lexicon mainly because of the popularity in the West of acupuncture and feng shui (the Chinese art of site orientation based on the belief that the house or tomb can be situated physically to take advantage of the flow of energy within the environment). The “flow” of qi in the human body is influenced by the pierce of the needle. The same flow in the terrain is supposedly influenced by the excavation of the tomb or foundation. The term qi (in its older spelling, ch’i) should not be confused with ji (in its older spelling, chi), which means “pole, utmost point” as in taiji (the Supreme Ultimate, a primarily Daoist philosophical concept) or taijiquan, a form of martial arts.

Stephen L. FIELD

Further Reading
Qi Baishi 齐白石

1864–1957  Modern painter

Qi Baishi 齐白石 is possibly the best known Chinese painter of the modern era. His paintings, often sparse depictions of birds, plants and insects, reflect a strong connection with Chinese tradition, as well as Qi’s uniquely expressive and unrestrained brush style. In describing his philosophy of art he once wrote: “The sublime is found between likeness and unlikeness.”

Qi Baishi (1864–1957) is perhaps the best known and loved Chinese painter of the modern era. His life spanned the last half century of dynastic rule, and reached into the first years of the People’s Republic. These were some of the most trying times in the history of the Chinese people, yet Qi was able to rise above the cultural and political cataclysm to create a fresh, unique style of painting, still rooted in the venerable traditions of Chinese art.

Born into a peasant family in Xiangtan, Hunan Province, Qi Baishi received little formal education. After apprenticing as a carpenter, he began to teach himself painting by studying the Mustard Seed Garden Painting Manual (published in 1679). Later he studied portraiture and calligraphy with local artists and began to make a living as a painter. As his skill and reputation rose, he studied painting and poetry with some of the most important literary and artistic figures of the day. In his late forties, during the years from 1902 to 1908, Qi traveled extensively, not only acquainting himself with China’s most famous scenery, but also meeting fellow artists and encountering other styles of painting. While in Shanghai

Painting of fish and crabs by Qi Baishi.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
he became aware of the Shanghai School of literati painting, and especially the work of Wu Changshi (1844–1927), which made a strong impression on him. He also accepted an invitation from friends to travel to Xi’an to study the historical stone inscriptions at Beilin. This experience was to be critical in the development of Qi’s unique style of seal carving. (The use of seals, or stamped calligraphs, on Chinese artworks dates back to the Zhou dynasty [1045–256 BCE]. A treasured work will include not only the seals of its maker but of those of its collectors through the centuries.)

In 1917, to escape unrest in Hunan, Qi Baishi traveled to Beijing and was introduced to a number of artists and scholars, including Chen Shiceng (1867–1923). Chen was to be perhaps the most influential figure in Qi’s development as a painter. Qi settled permanently in Beijing in 1919. He lived by selling his paintings and seals. By 1927 Qi Baishi was well enough established that he was given an appointment at the Beijing Art Academy, a position that he held until the Japanese invasion of Beijing in 1937. In response to the invasion, Qi withdrew to a life of seclusion. It was not until after the Japanese surrender in 1945 that Qi came out of retirement and resumed teaching.

After the establishment of the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1949, Qi Baishi was appointed Distinguished Professor of the Central Art Institute and chairman of the Chinese Art Association. In 1956 he received international recognition by being awarded the International Peace Prize by the World Peace Council.

Throughout his life Qi Baishi developed a large number of styles in his painting. His early training in the realistic gongbi style provided him with a strong foundation in the fine brush technique necessary for portrait painting. Later, his study of the individualistic styles of Xu Wei (1521–1593) and Bada Shanren (1625–1705), and his acquaintance with the work of Wang Changshi, led him to a more modern, expressive style. His association with Chen Shiceng eventually allowed Qi to escape the shadow of tradition and forge his own unique style. That style, often described as da xieyi, or “painting ideas in large,” was a progression from traditional calligraphic use of brush strokes to a liberated application of heavier strokes that sought to capture the spirit of the subject matter without being restrained by excessive attention to figural detail. Qi’s most famous description of his own approach to painting is the phrase, “The sublime is found between likeness and unlikeness.” That ideal

Painting of grapevines by Qi Baishi.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
A Letter to Qi Baishi

It is customary in Chinese usage to address correspondence to friends by their personal names, rather than their family names, as a sign of intimacy. The salutation Xiansheng (Mr.), however, is retained. Here, Baishi is Qi’s personal name; this translation of a letter from Mao Zedong shows the familiar Chinese usage in correspondence.

Mr. Baishi:

I thank you heartily for the gift of your scroll painting Pu tian tong qing (Joyous Celebration of All in Heaven), which I have received. I would like to express my gratitude to all your co-creators: Messrs. Xu Shixue, Yu Feian, Wang Shensheng, Hu Peiheng, Pu Yizai, Pu Xuezai, and Guan Songfang.

Mao Zedong
October 5, 1952


is most fully exhibited in the simple paintings of birds, insects, plants, and everyday objects that he favored in his late years. Those late works also exhibit a nostalgia for the uncontrived styles of Chinese folk art.

Terence RUSSELL

Further Reading

The role of the qianzhuang, a traditional Chinese banking institution, evolved to a position of dominance until it finally succumbed to the power of foreign and state-owned banks in China during the twentieth century.

A native Chinese bank, qianzhuang 钱庄 prevailed in both the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. Originally, such banks functioned as “money shops” to deal with China’s bimetallic currency system and to exchange precious metals of copper coins, silver ingots, silver dollars, and gold with different degrees of weight and purity. Later, qianzhuang developed commercial banking functions, including accepting deposits, granting loans, and engaging in the settlement of international trade.

Qianzhuang were originally family-based or established through partnerships among family members and friends. With roots in a long standing agrarian economic society and a Confucian cultural background, qianzhuang emphasized the ethics of family values; a qianzhuang owner or a manager (in the corporate partnership) acted like a father overseeing all internal business and devising strategies to deal with external affairs. The owner or manager could efficiently operate the institution with a relatively small amount of capital by utilizing friendship and connections. Thus, building good “friendship networks” were critically important in carrying out business, primarily because borrowing and lending was based on personal trust and fidelity.

Qianzhuang were often divided into five different types, according to their capital and areas of operation (in Shanghai, for example): huihua zhuang (commercial bank); yuanzi zhuang (secondary commercial bank, meaning its capital and business size was smaller than huihua zhuang); hengzi zhuang (credit union); lizi zhuang (exchange house); and zhenzi zhuang (grocery shop with money exchange). Huihua zhuang possessed more capital and operated with a wider business trading circle. They had the authority to issue bank promissory notes (zhuang piao) by taking deposits and granting loans to merchants. These huihua zhuang were members of local native banker guilds, a self-regulated native banking institution, which determined the interest rate and exchange rate each day before foreign banks and modern national banks in China assumed that role.

The capital of a qianzhuang included zhengben (basic capital) and fuben (supplementary capital). Zhengben referred to the capital originally paid by the founder and partners of a qianzhuang; fuben referred to the capital later added to the original capital. Normally, the shareholders received a 7 to 8 percent interest rate annually on the deposit. According to a 1926 survey among 112 qianzhuang in Shanghai, the basic capital of a single native bank ranged from 20,000 to 360,000 silver tael (refers to weight measurement in old China; a silver tael weighed 37.8 grams [about 1.22 oz]).

Qianzhuang were usually organized into three levels: a managerial level with an associate manager or an assistant manager; a senior staff level that included accountant, money-market staff, street-runner (paojie), clearing clerks, banking clerks, and customer service staff; and a
supporting staff level that included cashier, assistant accountant, assistant clerks, apprentices, silver deliverer, and secretaries. Promotions and pay scales were generally determined on the lunar New Year. All employees, including apprentices, received cash bonus in a small red bag.

In China’s large cities, local banker guilds set up business rules and cleared interbank promissory notes. The Shanghai Native Banker Guildhall was built in a Ming-style garden connected to the city temple of Shanghai. This guild played a leading role in Shanghai financial markets from the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century by determining the daily interest rate (yin-zhe) and the exchange rate (yangli).

The financial role of the qianzhuang evolved from money shops into more self-sufficient and effective financial institutions in the late Ming dynasty. At this point, qianzhuang assumed the role of receiving deposits, granting loans, discounting bills, issuing bank notes, buying and selling gold and silver, and exchanging bimetallic money and foreign currency. These efficient financial tasks linked qianzhuang with foreign banks and modern-style Chinese banks throughout the entire modern financial history in China.

The qianzhuang performed all the functions of modern commercial banks prior to the entrance of foreign banks into China. When China opened to foreign trade in 1842, however, qianzhuang began to lose their predominant banking position. Faced with the challenge of strong foreign capital inflow, qianzhuang adjusted their business strategies. Instead of changing their traditional banking patterns and business behaviors, they mediated international trade settlements between local merchants and foreign trade companies. After many large, modern Chinese banks were established in the early twentieth century, qianzhuang still played important roles as independent microfinancial institutions to small private enterprises.

In the 1930s, the Chinese Nationalist government launched currency reforms. In 1933, it changed the monetary policy, abolishing silver tael and adopting the silver dollar instead, which substantially eliminated the basic money exchange function of qianzhuang. After the 1934 American Silver Purchase Act was issued, the world silver price rose dramatically. All foreign banks in China had shipped their silver reserve to the London and New York markets for profit, plus China lost mess silver (silver-plated cutlery belonging to the military) in the Northern area where silver was smuggled by the Japanese fleet. The Chinese government had no choice but to eliminate the silver standard as the monetary base. In 1935, China issued the Currency Reform Decree that forbade all private banks from issuing promissory notes, limiting the inter-regional business of qianzhuang and making them more localized. In 1937 after the Japanese army occupied all Northern China, the Chinese government used wartime banking controls to monopolize most Chinese banks, and qianzhuang lost most of their autonomy.

Partially due to its conservative business manner and limited financial resources and partially due to the government policy, qianzhuang eventually lost their banking position with the rise of state-owned banks. At the end of 1952, a Soviet-style socialist planned economic system replaced China’s traditional banking and financial markets. All qianzhuang were reorganized into a few joint state- and private-ownership groups; eventually they were nationalized. The name qianzhuang disappeared for several decades, but with the Chinese economic and financial reform in late 1970s, many “underground qianzhuang” reemerged all over China. But without the Chinese government’s permission, these qianzhuang are illegal financial
institutions and can be closed. But these underground qianzhuang are still doing business in some gray areas, such as rural areas in the Wenzhou of Zhejiang provinces that the state banks ignore. The matter of justifying the historical qianzhuang functions and legalizing them as a modern financial institution could be on China’s financial reform agenda. In the twenty-first century the Chinese government allows qianzhuang revivals in certain areas as private cooperative banks to promote economic development.

**Ji Zhaojin**

**Further Reading**


Only when all contribute their firewood can they build up a strong fire.

众人拾柴火焰高

Zhòng rén shí chái huǒ yàn gāo.
Qin Dynasty

Qín Cháo 秦朝

221–206 BCE

Although the Qin dynasty lasted for a scant fifteen years and was repressive, it was China’s first imperial dynasty and developed a centralized administration and a model of government that subsequent emperors followed for centuries.

Although it lasted only fifteen years, the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) was China’s first imperial dynasty. It developed a centralized administration and a model of government that later emperors followed until the emperor of the final dynasty, the Qing (1644–1912), abdicated in 1912. In fact, the name of China was probably derived from the word Qin (pronounced “chin”). The Qin rulers achieved their successes, however, by harsh, totalitarian acts that hastened their dynasty’s fall.

Rise of the Dynasty

After the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE) fell, the state of Qin emerged as one of many small states that formed in the absence of a strong ruling house. The people of the Qin state, living in present-day Shaanxi Province among various nomadic tribes in the far west of early China, had long been fierce warriors. Rich deposits of iron ore found in their region aided their weapons industry. The Qin began their rise to prominence during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), when Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE), a politician and scholar, took reforms that had been initiated by other states to their logical conclusion. His reforms concentrated on rural dwellers, who previously had played no part in the workings of the state and who were now to be granted land in return for performing agricultural labor and military service and for paying taxes. Under Shang Yang this reform was extended to all adult males in Qin, a development that required replacing the feudal aristocracy with a central government to administer a large population. Positions in this new bureaucracy were granted on the basis of merit rather than inheritance, as earlier. Fajia (legalism), a philosophy that stressed that rulers should have absolute power and should govern with the help of a strict legal code that favored no single class, pervaded Shang Yang’s concept of government.

The rise of the Qin state culminated in the years after 260 BCE, by which time only seven large states were left in the struggle for supremacy. A man who would be known posthumously as “King Zhuangxiang” (an early Chinese custom gave rulers posthumous names by which they would henceforth be known) ruled Qin. Lü Buwei was the chancellor or prime minister. He compiled guidance from classical texts for a system that was aligned to the cosmos and that would serve to govern a proposed imperial state. The thirteen-year-old Zheng (c. 259–210 BCE) came to the throne in 245 BCE; seven years later he instigated a palace coup to depose the regent who had ruled in his name. Between 230 and 221 BCE the Qin—who had once been regarded as too barbaric to pose a serious threat because they had absorbed various central Asian invaders into their state—annihilated their rivals. By 221 BCE Zheng had unified all the states that had emerged from the feudal rule of the once-mighty Western Zhou dynasty. Zheng,
having survived various assassination attempts, most notoriously one by the folk hero Jing Ke, proclaimed himself “Shi Huangdi” (first [literally, commencing] august emperor). He moved to the new capital of Xianyang in a region of the North China Plain associated with former dynastic capitals and took control of his territories.

**Fall of the Dynasty**

A morbid occurrence attended the end of Shi Huangdi’s reign. He died in 210 BCE in eastern China, but his death was not announced for two months more, during which time the imperial entourage traveled back to the capital at Xianyang. Senior minister Li Si, who had been a companion to the emperor on his journey, had decided to withhold news of the emperor’s death until members of the government could regroup, lest the news cause uprisings because of Shi Huangdi’s widespread unpopularity. Thus, the glittering cortege, the dead emperor in tow, trundled through the countryside while his subjects remained unaware of his demise.

Li Si was again at the center of intrigue concerning the question of succession. Shi Huangdi’s first son, Fusu, for a time had been exiled by the emperor at Li Si’s urging. Fearing for his life if Fusu come take the throne, Li Si and the chief eunuch, Zhao Gao, convinced Fusu that his father had ordered him to commit suicide. Thus disposing of Fusu, Li Si and Zhao Gao installed the emperor’s eighteenth son on the throne. Revolts broke out almost immediately among imperial laborers. The second emperor was essentially a puppet. Zhao Gao made all decisions. Two rebel armies were advancing on the capital by 207 BCE. Zhao, facing blame as the main architect of the disaster, tricked the second emperor into committing suicide. The throne then passed to a boy who was formally entitled “child-emperor.” In an intrigue of his own, during the coronation ceremony the boy assassinated Zhao. But...
within a couple of months the child-emperor was forced to surrender to the invading Han king Liu Bang and was not spared. With its child-emperor dead and its capital destroyed, the Qin dynasty ended in 206 BCE, just fifteen years after it had begun.

**Changes Made by Shi Huangdi**

After Shi Huangdi was in power as the first emperor he made sweeping changes to consolidate and support Qin authority. Some elements of Confucianism, such as the importance of ancestor worship and filial duty, were still emphasized; however, in organizational matters Shi Huangdi observed the philosophical tenets of legalism as modeled by Shang Yang. The empire was divided into thirty-six commanderies. Authority was carefully distributed to prevent too much power in any one man’s hands. Each commandery thus was ruled by a civilian governor who was assisted by a military governor. An inspector reported to the central government on the activities of both governors. The emperor enforced a strict penal code and relocated Zhou aristocratic families to the capital of Xianyang, where they could be monitored in mansions built for that purpose.

Shi Huangdi extended the military reforms of Shang Yang to the entire empire. His rule brought a number of technical innovations in warfare. For example, the imperial army was supplied with crossbows and lamellar armor (rows of overlapping leather plates sewn together). Swords were improved and distributed in large numbers. A nationwide system of canals and roads was established to enable troops to move quickly to quell revolts and to facilitate trade. Currency and weights and measures were standardized. The newly uniform width of axles allowed carts and carriages to travel the ruts dug to accommodate them on the freshly built highways. For both administrative and commercial reasons Shi Huangdi also supervised unification of the writing system, which had developed multiple regional variants during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). These variants were regularized in a new script called *xiao zhuan ti* (small seal script), which was to be used for official documents throughout the empire.

The armies of the Qin dynasty expanded the empire’s borders by invading lands to the south. To the north they repulsed attacks by nomads from central Asia such as the Xiongnu but were unable to defeat them. As a result, huge numbers of peasants were drafted to build a long wall to defend the northern frontier. Over time most of the Qin wall, built of mud, crumbled, but it remained an inspiration for later dynasties, which initiated their own construction and reconstruction projects. The Great Wall of China is south of Shi Huangdi’s wall and was completed by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

**Cultural Developments**

The Qin apparently staged competitive martial displays known during the Warring States period as *jueli*, which combined the word *jue* (literally, horn/horning, suggesting an aggressive attacking quality) and the word *li* (strength). These ritual displays fell under the category of *wu*, which is normally translated as “martiality” but had a cosmic dimension lacking in the English word. *Wu* connoted the nature of the cosmos during the months of decay and death in autumn and winter as opposed to the life-giving months of spring and summer. The staging of acts of ritual violence during the winter was thought to bring the social order into accord with the cosmos itself. *Jueli* were great occasions of state and included chariot handling, archery, a team sport of kickball, as well as wrestling and strength competitions that pitted man against man, man against animal, and animal against animal. These displays were as much entertainments as they were religious rites. The Qin changed the term to *juedi* (horning-resisting), perhaps implying the to-and-fro of combat, and arguably made the dimension of entertainment more explicit. At the imperial retreat of Ganquan the second emperor was said to have enjoyed *juedi* and *youpai* (performers or entertainers such as musicians, jesters, singers, dancers, and acrobats). Such entertainments may not have originated on the North China Plain. The first emperor certainly enjoyed songs, music, and dance that were familiar to him from the former homeland in the far west with its nomadic contacts. A recently discovered bell that had been left behind by looters on the grounds of Shi Huangdi’s mausoleum was marked with the words *Qin yuefu*. The word *yue* refers to song-dance forms, and *fu* means “institute.” As documented for the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) office of the same name, this institute would have had as its purpose the
enrichment of court music and dance by incorporating forms from cultures, including nomadic ones, outside the borders of the empire.

**Quest for Immortality**

Shi Huangdi, seeking to deny death, sent thousands of youths in search of Peng Lai, the mythical islands of immortality, which were said to lie in the East China Sea. Some scholars believe that this search resulted in the settling of an area of Japan by the youths, who not surprisingly (because they faced execution if they failed on their mission) never returned to their homeland. The Qin founder claimed as an ancestor the mythical founder of the ancient Chinese people, Huangdi (yellow emperor; Huang here refers to a different Chinese character than the one in the first emperor’s name meaning “August”). This Huangdi reputedly never died but instead rose to tian (heaven) in a chariot pulled by dragons. Shi Huangdi employed alchemists to find the secret to immortality and took long journeys to sacred mountains, where he practiced sacrificial rituals for the same purpose. At Mount Tai he conducted the mysterious sacrifices known as feng and shan, also in the hope of cheating death. Ironically, Shi Huangdi was said to have died after ingesting mercury-based concoctions that, alchemists declared, held the key to eternal life (alchemists continued to peddle the claim for centuries, evidence to the contrary).

Shi Huangdi was buried just east of the modern-day city of Xian. Judging from the part of the imperial tomb complex excavated so far, it is apparent that the complex was planned as the final resting place of a man whose life would be continuing on some grand scale. The dimensions are impressive: The complex is 515 meters north to south and 485 meters east to west. The mausoleum itself, enclosed by a thick outer wall with a tower at each corner, is divided into an east vault and a west vault, of which the former has been largely uncovered. Here have been found royal chariots and horses sculpted in bronze and in 1974, most famously, an army of seven thousand life-sized terra cotta figures representing the imperial guard, cavalry, infantry, and chariot drivers. Each figure was sculpted wearing the uniform and carrying the weapons appropriate to his branch of service; remarkably, each face was individually molded. The figures were lined up in processional formation, as if setting out on a military campaign; the army presumably was to act as Shi Huangdi’s escort and protector. In the west vault as many figures again are believed to remain hidden.

Archaeological excavations of the future will be able to test the accuracy of the description of the mausoleum provided by China’s first great historian, Sima Qian. Sima, writing during the Han dynasty, observed that the massive and elaborate tomb was under construction from 245 to 210 BCE, that is, from when Zheng became king at age thirteen until the year of his death. Many laborers literally were worked to death building the tomb, and all surviving laborers were buried with the emperor. Sima described a huge central chamber with a ceiling studded with pearls and other precious stones to represent the sun, moon, and stars; snaking across the floor (the Earth), mercury “replicas” of the Yangzi (Chang) and Huang (Yellow) rivers flowed into a miniature ocean also made of mercury, the metal said to have such great regenerative powers. Lighting was provided by burning whale oil, the longest-burning fuel at the time. Within this and other chambers of the compound, which represented palaces, temples, and offices, armed crossbows were set, primed to fire on any intruders from this world.

**Reign of Shi Huangdi**

As mentioned, the reign of the second emperor brought breakdown and disorder rather than much that could be called “constructive.” Most of the achievements of the Qin dynasty occurred during the rule of the first emperor in just eleven years but came at the cost of harsh and repressive laws established to regulate his subjects in large, disciplined bodies. Overworked peasants not only served as agricultural laborers but also doubled as soldiers and as builders of the lavish architectural projects undertaken by the ruler. Prison sentences and maiming punishments commonly were meted out to dissenters or to those unfortunate enough to gain the emperor’s disapproval. Shi Huangdi reportedly executed officials who were late to their assigned tasks, even if their lateness was the result of weather conditions that made travel impossible. Shi Huangdi also made enemies among aristocrats who in the new meritocracy no longer were entitled to inherited court office. In 213 BCE, eight years into his reign, his
growing fear of the power of intellectual debate resulted in an order for the execution of hundreds of Confucian scholars and the burning of all books except those on the subjects of medicine, forestry, divination, and agriculture. A single copy of each of the condemned books was held in the imperial library—which itself was burned by the invading Han forces in 206 BCE. Fortunately for subsequent records of Chinese history, the brevity of the Qin dynasty meant that after its fall scholars lived on and were able largely to reconstruct the classical texts, which they had memorized.

As one might expect, Shi Huangdi lived in fear of attempts on his life and took great precautions to thwart assassins. He employed doubles of himself as decoys. An extensive network of tunnels connected his palaces, and he was said to have moved throughout this network, sleeping in different locations each evening. Death was the punishment for anyone who revealed Shi Huangdi’s whereabouts.

In their compilation The Crimes of Qin Han scholars condemned legalism and the ruler who had embodied its tenet stating that the law should be obeyed through fear rather than through respect. The consensus Confucian view was summarized in an essay entitled “The Faults of Qin,” written by the statesman-scholar Jia Yi. In this influential essay Jia ascribes the collapse of the Qin dynasty to the widespread discontent caused by Shi Huangdi’s harshness in pursuit of his grand ambitions. Nonetheless, although the Han replaced legalism with other ideological systems (Confucianism, Daoism, and a variety of state cults), the Han largely maintained and built on the military, economic, and political structures it inherited from the Qin. In fact, the traditional image of Shi Huangdi as a tyrannical monster recently has been giving way, in China and elsewhere, to a more nuanced assessment that from several perspectives seeks to set his ruthlessness of method against his lasting accomplishments as “China’s first unifier.”

Dallas L. McCURLEY

Further Reading
The Qing dynasty, founded in 1644 by the Manchus, was the final imperial dynasty to rule China. The last emperor abdicated in 1912 following the dynasty’s overthrow by the Republican revolution of 1911. Over a period of 268 years, the Qing built the largest consolidated empire in China’s history and oversaw great changes in governmental administration, economic growth, regional integration, and intellectual achievement.

The Manchus, the founders of China’s last imperial dynasty, the Qing (1644–1912), were descendants of the Jurchen people of north China, who ruled the region as the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234). Behind the leadership of Nurhachi (1559–1626), the various Jurchen tribes organized into large feudal and military units called banners. In 1616 Nurhachi established a dynasty that he called the Hou (Later) Jin, using the Chinese political concept of tianming (Mandate of Heaven) as his right to rule. Hongtaiji (or Abahai, 1592–1643), Nurhachi’s successor, continued to copy Chinese customs and changed the name of his people from Jurchen to Manchu in 1635 and the dynastic name from Hou Jin to Qing in 1636.

Manchu emperor Shunzhi (1638–1661, reigned 1644–1661), who was guided by his uncle, the imperial regent Dorgon (1612–1650), entered Beijing in 1644 and crushed the rebellion that had recently overthrown the reigning Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The Qing conquerors also crushed the Southern Ming resistance and recruited the Han Chinese elite into the new Manchu government. Although the Manchu tried to repress antiforeign feelings among the conquered Han Chinese, they based their empire on...
the Chinese model. This plan for governing included Confucianism as the official state doctrine; administrative offices, such as the grand secretariat and six ministries; and a system of taxation. The new Qing government was ruled jointly by Manchu and Chinese. Equal numbers of Manchu and Chinese held office and worked side by side.

The next three Qing emperors—Kangxi (1654–1722, reigned 1662–1722), Yongzheng (1678–1735, reigned 1723–1735), and Qianlong (1711–1799, reigned 1735–1795)—guided the dynasty to the heights of its power and prosperity and built the largest empire in the world. Following its conquest of greater China, the Qing seized Taiwan in 1683, Outer Mongolia in the 1690s, Tibet in 1720, and Xinjiang in 1759. Beyond China proper, the Qing exacted tribute from Burma (present-day Myanmar), Annam (in present-day Vietnam), and Korea. As governors of their country, these three emperors strove to be model Confucian rulers.

During the eighteenth century, imperial authority became more concentrated through governing bodies like the Grand Council, which was established in 1729. An active bureaucracy enabled the emperor to manage all important government matters efficiently. The minority regions were brought under the control of the central government. Emperor Qianlong continued the policy of limited foreign contact. In 1760 he established the so-called Canton system, which restricted foreign trade to Pearl River delta ports in the area around Guangzhou (Canton).

**Nineteenth-Century Changes**

Events of the nineteenth century brought tremendous change to the Qing and to the whole system of imperial government in China.

In the 1840s foreign imperialist powers were granted political, economic, and legal privileges in certain Chinese
coastal cities, known as treaty ports. During the 1850s the Qing faced large-scale popular uprisings across the empire, including the Nian rebellion (1853–1868) in the east, the Muslim rebellion (1855–1873) in Yunnan, and the Taiping rebellion (1851–1864). These and other smaller rebellions led to a shift in power from the Manchu central government to members of the powerful provincial Chinese elite, who often led their own regional armies against the peasant rebels.

To revive the dynasty, Qing leaders established a number of programs to modernize the country. The yangwu yundong (self-strengthening movement) was implemented during the reigns of Tongzhi (1856–1875, reigned 1862–1874) and Guangxu (1871–1908, reigned 1875–1908), who were both directed by Tongzhi’s mother, Cixi (1835–1898), from behind a silk screen at court. The principle of zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong (Chinese learning as the essence and Western learning as a practical tool) was further applied to modern industrial development. Led by Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), the program included building arsenals, machine factories, schools, railways, shipyards, telegraph lines, a postal service, and a modern army, navy, and press.

Although the self-strengthening movement helped to somewhat modernize the nation, it could not make the Qing powerful enough to fight off foreign imperialist interests. China lost Vietnam to France in the Sino-French war of 1884–1885. China surrendered Macao to Portugal in 1887. And China was forced by its defeat to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 to recognize Korean independence and to concede Taiwan to Japan. Other foreign powers began to compete for concessions (areas of land that were leased in perpetuity by foreign governments) in China.

Fearing the splitting apart of the country, Chinese from various social strata launched new social movements. In 1898 a group of intellectuals persuaded Emperor Guangxu to call for reform. Known as the Hundred Days of Reform, the movement called for sweeping changes in education, political administration, industry and commerce, and foreign relations. The reform movement, however, failed mainly because it was opposed by the powerful and conservative Empress Dowager Cixi.

Twentieth-Century Changes

During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Qing court enacted even more radical reforms in an effort to save the dynasty. In 1905 the civil-service examination system was abolished. Thousands of Chinese students went to study abroad. The government was restructured. And legal institutions were modified along modern precepts.

Meanwhile, foreign interventions in north China triggered a violent backlash known as the Boxer Rebellion (1900). In the late 1890s, a secret society called the Boxers United in Righteousness focused its frustration and anger on Christian converts and foreign interests—such as churches, railways, and mines—which the Boxers blamed for much of the misery in people’s lives. In 1900, with the support of the Qing court, the Boxers attacked foreign government offices in Beijing. Although popular with and bolstered by the people, the siege was broken by a military alliance of eight countries. The foreign powers forced the Qing to pay huge compensation and to accept the establishment of foreign military posts in Beijing. China at this time hung on to its sovereignty by a thin thread.
The Qing’s failure to deal with foreign aggression stimulated Han Chinese nationalism. The political tract *Geming jun* (The Revolutionary Army), written by anti-Manchu radical Zou Rong in 1903, called on the Chinese to overturn Manchu rule and seize their own destiny. The nationalists, led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), considered the father of modern China, sought revolution to solve China’s problems. Guided by his Three Principles of the People—nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood—Sun mobilized various groups, such as secret-society members and overseas students. In 1905 he combined his organization with other Chinese radical groups and founded the *Tongmeng hui* (Revolutionary Alliance), which directed the revolution.

In 1908 the Qing government issued the *Xianfa dagang* (Outline of Constitution), which introduced constitutional monarchy to China and defined the rights and responsibilities of the people. In 1909 the government opened provincial assemblies and in 1910, a consultative national assembly. But these desperate reform efforts failed to satisfy the revolutionaries. The Republic of China was founded following the 1911 Revolution. The dynastic era in China officially closed when the last Qing emperor, Xuantong (1906–1967, reigned 1909–1912), abdicated on 12 February 1912.

**Socioeconomic Changes**

The Qing empire contributed to significant changes in Chinese society, in particular an intensive cultural integration of different peoples. The peoples of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and other regions were incorporated into the Chinese nation but enjoyed considerable political and cultural autonomy. Even so, the Qing sought to preserve their ethnic character.

Ethnic Manchu were granted preferential political, legal, and social treatment and were encouraged to retain their native arts, including archery and horsemanship. Military units made up entirely of Manchu, the banners, were stationed across the empire. Manchuria was maintained as a homeland base from which Han Chinese were excluded. Manchu women were forbidden to engage in the Chinese practice of foot binding. Han Chinese males were forced to shave the front of their heads and to wear a long braid in the back in the Manchu style, which expressed political loyalty. Marriage between Manchu and Chinese was prohibited.

At the same, to build a Confucian empire, the Manchu rulers created a policy of sinicization, adopting Chinese values, institutions, cultural practices, and social customs. The Qing court encouraged the ruling elite, including the Han Chinese, to receive a Manchu-style education and to master the Manchurian language.

The economy thrived under the Qing. By the late eighteenth century, agricultural production had increased because of an increase in arable land, the cultivation of new crops from the Americas, and the use of improved seeds, fertilizers, and farming techniques.

Qing tax policy facilitated agricultural and economic development. In 1713 Emperor Kangxi permanently fixed the number of taxpayers, exempting the increased population from taxation. Emperor Yongzhen instituted reforms in which taxes were based on land and collected in silver, which greatly benefited poor peasant farmers. The textile, porcelain, paper, sugar, mining, and metalworking industries flourished. Efficient transportation networks...
and an effective banking system helped spur domestic trade and develop a thriving market across the empire and beyond. China traded with Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America. Foreign trade grew rapidly in China’s favor, and the country prospered. By the early nineteenth century, China’s prosperity reflected the most dynamic economy in the preindustrial world.

Foreign encroachment following the First Opium War (1839–1842) changed Qing economic and social structures, especially in the coastal areas. Enormous war indemnities drained the treasury. Foreigners held the important posts in the customs service. Foreign factories, railways, and banks dominated industry and commerce. Independent foreign communities built from the concessions in the treaty ports sprang up within Chinese society. Yet because of—or in some cases, in spite of—the introduction of foreign values and technology, the late Qing launched China’s modern enterprises, whether they were operated by the government or private Chinese entrepreneurs. Arms manufacturing, shipping, textiles, communications, mining, machinery manufacturing, and banking succeeded and transformed business patterns and the social fabric along the coast. The more traditional interior sections of the country remained mostly unchanged.

Along with changes in the economic structure came changes in the social order. Modern cities developed. Shanghai grew into the largest city in China and an important economic center of East Asia. In the treaty ports, the Chinese commercial class—entrepreneurs or compradores (merchants working for foreign firms)—adopted Western modes of life and ideas. Western-style education, in both China and abroad, trained a new class of people who challenged the supremacy of the old educated elite. Laborers who migrated overseas built economic and social connections in their adopted countries that stretched back to the mother country. A new military establishment, trained in Western methods and better equipped than the old imperial army, began to play an important role in Qing politics. “New women,” epitomized by the revolutionary Qiu Jin (1875–1907), appeared. They unbound their feet, joined sisterhoods, obtained educations, and took part in public life. By 1909 some thirteen thousand girls were attending schools in China and several hundred more were studying abroad. These new social elements, along with a growing discontent among the peasants from the countryside, overwhelmed the old order and helped topple the Qing regime.

### Cultural and Intellectual Changes

The Qing era marked a time of cultural flowering and intellectual searching. In the early years of the dynasty, the Manchu endeavored to reconstruct a world order based on neo-Confucianism. To control the intellectuals and the spread of knowledge, the state sponsored literary projects, including the *Gujin tushu jicheng* (Synthesis of Books and Illustrations Past and Present, 1726–1728) and the *Siku quanshu* (Complete Library of the Four Treasuries, 1772–1782).

Despite the government’s repressive policy, the intellectuals continued to produce great ideas and literary works. Many scholars devoted themselves to a literary work called the evidential research movement. This monumental work contributed immensely to critical studies of Chinese history, philosophy, and linguistics. Philosophers such as Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), and Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) searched for new meanings of life. Finely crafted works such as *Liaozhai zhiyi* (Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio) by Pu Songling (1640–1715), *Rulin waishi* (The Scholars) by Wu Jingzi (1701–1754), and *Honglou meng* (Dream of the Red Chamber) by Cao Xueqin (d. 1763) exposed social problems.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Catholic and Protestant missionaries brought Western science, technology, medicine, education—and religion—to China. At times the Chinese forcibly opposed the missionaries and their ideas. For example, in 1704 Emperor Kangxi expelled a number of missionaries who were intolerant of Chinese culture. The Tianjin Massacre of 1870 and the Boxer Rebellion were demonstrations against Christian missions in China. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, some 750 Catholic and 1,300 Protestant missionaries were serving in China. They converted about 200,000 Chinese to Christianity.

Foreign aggression after the Opium War impelled the Qing court to examine Western ideas for enriching the country and strengthening the military. Wei Yuan (1794–1856), in his famous *Haiguo tuzhi* (Illustrated Treatise on
Overseas Countries), advocated using the foreigners’ own methods to depose them. The Qing Self-Strengthening Movement adapted Western values and applied modern science and technology. Yan Fu (1854–1921), who studied naval sciences in England, translated the works of Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and Adam Smith. The movement toward modern nationalism, furthered by Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary followers, became yet another force that helped destroy the old imperial order.

The Qing dynasty commands a significant position in the history of China. During its long reign, the dynasty dealt with many difficulties and disasters from within and outside of China. Yet the Qing left a distinctive legacy of territorial, political, demographic, economic, and intellectual influence that continues to affect present-day China.

JIANG Yonglin

Further Reading


The trees want to remain quiet, but the wind will not stop.

树 欲 静 而 风 不 止

Shù yù jìng’ér fēng bù zhǐ.
The Grand Council (Junjichu) was the high privy council that assisted the emperors of the mid- and late-Qing dynasty. Although its predecessor committees were organized almost midway through the dynasty during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng (1723–1735), the Grand Council was formally established only in 1738, near the beginning of the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1736–1795).

The archives revealed Emperor Yongzheng less interested in establishing a powerful inner-court organization such as the Grand Council and more interested in retaining power for himself. It is true that he depended on inner-court confidantes such as his younger brother, Prince Yi (Yi Qinwang), and two trusted Chinese officials, Zhang Tingyu and Jiang Tingxi. Beyond this inner circle Yongzheng added several informal, specialized offices to track and advise on particular problems such as financial corruption (Audit Bureau, Huikaofu), military finance (Junxufang), and military strategy (Junjifang). The advantage of these small working groups was that they could be summoned into existence and disbanded as necessary, leaving the emperor firmly in control. In fact, Emperor Yongzheng was content to maintain his father’s (Emperor Kangxi, reigned 1661–1722) policy of a divided inner court.

Arrangements swiftly changed at the beginning of Qianlong’s reign, when the Interim Council (Zongli shiwu wang dachen), the advisory committee for the imperial transition that was traditional at the outset of Manchu reigns, took over and ran the government for the new young emperor. Some of the same people who had served at high levels in Yongzheng’s inner court were now firmly in charge of the entire government, free of a strong imperial presence to challenge their actions. In spite of the traditional Confucian behest to respect a deceased emperor’s arrangements for three years, the Qianlong Interim Council instituted changes with unseemly haste. Most significant was the disbandment of the old informal committees and the Interim Council’s assumption of their responsibilities. Moreover, the Council itself was
enlarged. Most momentous of all was the fact that at the end of the mourning period the Interim Council was not disbanded but simply given a name-change that revived the name of one of the former inner-court committees, the Military Strategy Office. Today this is translated not in accordance with its original meaning of military strategy but with a term describing its involvement with the myriad details of governing, “Council of State” or, more commonly, “Grand Council.” The all-powerful Interim Council had thus transformed itself into a permanent high privy council, advising the emperor and managing the government.

Expansion followed. Part of this was necessity: a growing population required increased government activity. Other factors propelling Grand Council expansion in the eighteenth century included a traditional Chinese battle for supremacy between the outer and inner courts and certain singular governing arrangements of informality, secrecy, and concurrent posts. Informality meant that the new council’s powers were not limited by regulations in the administrative code; indeed, the Council did not appear in the code until 1818. Secrecy meant that it could perform and expand beyond the glare of publicity. Concurrent posts meant that an outer-court grand secretary with outer-court responsibilities (particularly of the Six Boards) took these with him when appointed to the inner-court Grand Council, while the same official’s outer-court links supplied an empire-wide network of informants. Ministerial ambition may well have played a role, although this is difficult to discern in the available sources. Another factor was that Emperor Qianlong, possibly on the advice of his key confidantes, often turned his attention to cultural matters, leaving other perhaps more crucial details to his grand councilors. By the final third of the reign, the emperor’s in-box was piled high, possibly with the intention of overwhelming him, with chapters
of campaign histories and draft biographies for the State History (Guoshi), all presumably to receive the required imperial scrutiny. Finally, the Council’s management of communications, even generally supervising outer-court documents, provided access to information and methods of withholding it from others.

In the Jiaqing reign (1796–1820), a reform of the Grand Council took place. This limited the Council’s power and prestige in small ways but made no serious inroads on its basic responsibilities of advising the emperor and managing the government. Even the Administrative Code of 1818 merely ratified the existing situation without constraining the Council. In spite of the Code’s specifics, it was possible, for instance, for the Council’s clerical staff to be increased during the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864).

Nineteenth-century research has shown less interest in the Council than in the Zongli Yamen, a new organization created in 1861 to deal with foreign relations. Moreover, in spite of the Yamen’s rise, for two decades Grand Councilors retained a strong influence in the membership of that body. The Council was also essential to running the government during the era of baby emperors, going through the formalities of responding to memorials and drafting edicts in the emperor’s name but in reality directing much policy on its own.

In May 1911, the throne’s end-of-dynasty attempt to rectify a dangerous drift toward regionalization finally brought an end to the Council. Yet an examination of archival materials from the few final post-Council months of the dynasty show that records continued to be kept in exactly the same form as the defunct Council’s, so possibly the supposed abolition was carried out in name alone. In fact, the Council had served China well. In the eighteenth century it was a key element in the Qing rise to power and greatness. And in the dynasty’s waning years of internal rebellions and foreign aggression, it held the country together for a considerable period of time before the final collapse.

Beatrice S. BARTLETT

Further Reading


Qinghai Province

Qīnghǎi  青海

5.52 million est. 2007 pop. 720,000 square km

One of the largest official provinces in China (about twice the size of Germany), Qinghai is home to the world’s highest plateau, China’s largest inland lake, and the famous monastery Taer. Despite its harsh climate, the province is inhabited by a broad population including Tibetans, Chinese Muslims, and Kazakh and Mongol minorities.

A remote province in western China, Qinghai (Blue Sea) has a population that includes Han Chinese and Tibetans, as well as Mongol, Kazakh, Hui, Salar, and Tu minorities. The capital Xining (Western Peace) has an estimated population of 2.15 million, as of 2007. Qinghai is the fourth-largest official province in China, having six autonomous prefectures, thirty counties, and seven autonomous counties spread across 720,000 square kilometers (about twice the size of Germany, or half the size of the state of Alaska). Known as China's West, Qinghai hosts the Yushu Horse Festival, which includes horse racing, dance competitions, and commercial trading.

Bordering Sichuan Province (southeast), Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region (southwest), Xinjiang Uygur A. R. (northwest), and Gansu Province (northeast), Qinghai encompasses part of the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau averaging more than 4,000 meters (13,123 feet) above sea level, the world’s largest and highest plateau. From Qinghai arise three of Asia’s major rivers, the Yangzi (Chang), Huang (Yellow), and Mekong. Qinghai Lake (Koko Nor, in Mongolian) is China’s largest inland lake. More than 105 kilometers (65 miles) long, the turquoise lake is 3,205 meters (10,515 feet) above sea level. Its brackish waters host Niao Dao (Bird Island) sanctuary, where thousands of waterfowl congregate, including the rare black-necked crane. The Tsaidam (Mongolian for salt marsh) Basin of central Qinghai has an area of 240,926 square kilometers (93,022 square miles). Part salt marsh, part desert, and rich in minerals, coal, and oil, the area is of increasing interest for the exploitation of natural resources. Native fauna include wild yak, Przewalski’s horse, blue sheep, wolf, and a wide variety of birds. The saltwater-drinking camel, newly discovered in 2001, also inhabits part of Qinghai.

Qinghai’s harsh climate has an average winter temperature of −15° C (5° F) and an annual rainfall of 25 to 51 centimeters (10 to 20 inches). The east produces spring wheat, highland barley, peas, potatoes, and rapeseed (canola). The vast grasslands of the west are suitable for herding yaks, horses, sheep, and goats. Other products from the area include wool, animal skins, oil, natural gas, common salt, and minerals. Per capita income is small. China’s main nuclear facility and waste site are in Haiyan, by Qinghai Lake. Qinghai is known as “China’s Siberia” because of the large number of prisoners sent there from the rest of the nation to work in the prison factories.

Once part of Tibet (Amdo), Qinghai came under Mongol rule during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), becoming part of Gansu Province. About 20 kilometers (12 miles) southwest of Xining at Huangcheng is the famous Taer monastery, home of the reformer of Tibetan Buddhism Tsong-kha-pa (fifteenth century). After 1724, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) continued to rule Qinghai, then called Koko Nor. In 1928 Qinghai became an official province.
of China. It contains autonomous districts for Tibetans, Chinese Muslims, and Kazakh and Mongol minorities. Xining is known for its Great Mosque and for the North Mountain Temple.

Noelle O’CONNOR

Further Reading
Qinghua University
Qīnghuá Dàxué 清华大学

Founded in 1911 and located in Beijing, Qinghua University is one of China’s most respected universities. Although it has a varied and comprehensive course of studies, it is especially well-known for its sciences and engineering departments.

Qinghua University, originally named Qinghua Xuetang and also called Tsinghua University, was established on 19 April 1911 as the preparatory school for students who wanted to study in the United States. It is located in the northwestern suburbs of Beijing, in the Haidian district; the campus was one of the former Royal Gardens and is called Qinghua Yuan. In 1912 it was renamed Qinghua School. In 1925, it established a university section, and was renamed National Qinghua University of The Republic of China in 1928; it consisted of four colleges and sixteen departments. At the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War (known in China as the War of Resistance against Japan), Qinghua University moved first to Changsha (Hunan Province), and finally to Kunming (Yunnan Province), temporarily merging with Peking University and Nankai...
University as National Southwestern Associate University during the period of World War II.

In 1946 Qinghua University moved back to its original location in Beijing. It then consisted of five colleges and twenty departments. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Qinghua University was reorganized to become a polytechnic institute of engineering in a nationwide restructuring of universities and colleges, which was undertaken in 1952. After 1978–1979, when China opened up to the West, Qinghua University restructured as a comprehensive research university.

During Republican China (1912–1949), Mei Yiqi served the longest as president of the university, from 1931 to 1948. In 1955, the Republic of China set up another Qinghua University in Taiwan, with Mei Yiqi as president until his death in 1962.

Today, Qinghua University has 14 colleges and 56 departments; 123 doctoral programs and 159 master’s programs are available. Fields of study include science, engineering, the humanities, law, medicine, history, philosophy, economics, management, education and the arts. Qinghua University employs 7,777 faculty and staff members. There are 32,152 full-time students. Over 13,000 are undergraduate, over 13,000 are MA students, and about 5,000 are doctoral students. There are more than 1,700 students from over 46 countries, and about 9,000 students are enrolled under the “distance education” program, in which the students do not need to be physically present in the classroom.

The tradition of Qinghua University is to balance a liberal arts and science education, with emphasis on engineering, thus, Qinghua University often has been considered as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) of China.

One special feature of Qinghua University is that some of its graduates have become political leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including Jiang
Qinghua University students train as cadet warriors. For two weeks at the beginning of their education, they live like soldiers. Seen here, Qinghua students participate in athletic exercises. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

Zemin, former general secretary of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and former chairman of the PRC; Rongji Zhu, former premier of the PRC; and Hu Jintao, general secretary and chairman of the PRC.

Further Reading

Teh-Kuang CHANG
Qingke
Qǐngkè 请客

The proper treatment of guests has been an important duty and source of cultural pride for the Chinese for many centuries. A special term, qingke (guest hospitality), was, and continues to be, used to define this social phenomenon. Qingke refers both to a straightforward goal to maintain guanxi (interpersonal relationships) and, more generally, to social occasions that involve entertaining friends and guests.

In Chinese culture positive feelings of fellowship and individual and group identity are associated with the hospitality offered to guests. Since the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), daike (the proper treatment of guests) has been an important Confucian value. The Chinese refer to their country as liyizhibang (the kingdom of etiquette) and use words such as reqing (warm) and haoke (hospitality) to describe themselves. The opening passage of the Analects reflects the Confucian attitude toward entertaining friends and guests: "Is it not delightful to have friends come from afar?"

Hospitality remains central to the flow of everyday social life in present-day China, and the treatment of guests has become a highly developed and ritualized art form. On the down side, there is intense social pressure to uphold this cultural standard. During the 1980s and 1990s, as large sums of state, corporate, and personal funds were spent on lavish banquets and elaborate entertainments, qingke had come to also be associated with excess, waste, and corruption.

Invitations
Qingke can denote an invitation or a polite gesture of goodwill. Qingke can express an acceptance of the responsibilities of a host ("I will make you feel at home") or the desire to maintain harmonious social relations ("Let’s get together sometime"). Contextual cues—such as stating specific times and locations, and repeating offers—enable listeners to distinguish a sincere invitation from a simple courtesy. As a genuine invitation, qingke is a display of friendliness, openness, and a desire to deepen the bonds of the relationship. Qingke is also a way to confer face (respect) to the receiver of the invitation.

Entertainment of Guests
Qingke is associated with numerous events, occasions, and outings: holidays, festivals, weddings, birthdays, promotions, tea dates (or coffee dates), sharing a meal, seeing someone off or welcoming someone back from a journey, and, most important, maintaining guanxi. The type of qingke activity is prompted by the closeness among participants, with distinctions observed between in-groups and out-groups. In-group occasions tend to be private, relaxed, and focused on the exchange of feelings. They generally celebrate something good that has happened to the host. Typically, there is no strict adherence to ritual etiquette in
these occasions involving close friends. Out-group occasions are more formal and take place in restaurants, hotels, teahouses, and other public places. These occasions, frequently motivated by personal gain, involve large amounts of resources and are governed by adherence to traditional codes of proper etiquette.

**Tradition of Proper Etiquette**

During the Zhou dynasty, discourses on ritual, protocol, and etiquette governed the way people were to act. Works such as the *Liji* (*Book of Rites*), the *Yili* (*Book of Rituals and Etiquette*), and the *Zhouli* (*Zhou Rituals*) were taken quite seriously because without an understanding of ritual and etiquette, one could not become a functional member of society. Each member of society had a specific role with social responsibilities and expectations for behavior. Culturally defined customs of etiquette have created a complex web of social roles, defined the responsibilities associated with those roles, and shaped public behavior in China. In Zhou China, for example, *binke* (guests) were defined as one of the seven most important relationships but a category distinct from the category of friends.

As China becomes more integrated into the international community and social relationships become more complex acknowledging hierarchy, knowing one’s place in society, reciprocating, exchanging *ganqing* (feelings), and maintaining social harmony are behaviors still valued and maintained through the Chinese system of etiquette. These behaviors constitute a large part of the set of skills that socially competent Chinese draw on to manage interpersonal relationships. They are an integral part of hospitality. Most Zhou rituals have been simplified or have evolved over time, and much of the formal language associated with those rituals is no longer used. Nevertheless, guests (out-group members) and friends (in-group members) continue to have distinct roles in contemporary Chinese society, roles that have radically different responsibilities associated with them.

Guests are referred to as *guibin* (literally, esteemed guests), *jiabin* (distinguished guests), *guike* (esteemed visitors), and, more generically, as *binke* (guests), *laibin* (visitors), or *keren* (visitors). Social distance is maintained when interacting with guests and relaxed when meeting with friends. Guests receive special treatment and significant status. They are treated with courtesy marked by honorific titles and polite speech. Politeness mechanisms, such as the use of phrases such as *please* and *thank you*, are directed toward guests. In addition to these readily observable distinctions, guests are afforded more turns to speak, offered the right of way at doorways and elevators,

An example of *qingke*; a family treats some friends to dinner at a restaurant. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
and praised with compliments. In general, guests hear what the host thinks they want to hear. Because guests are to be taken care of, hosts feel a sense of burden associated with their role, but most of these behaviors are dispensed with when interacting with friends.

**Regional Variations**

Because of its vast size and enormous population, contemporary China is characterized by tremendous cultural and regional diversity. Traditional protocol in the entertainment of guests is adhered to in developed urban centers, such as Beijing and Shanghai, much differently than it is in conservative rural areas, such as Shandong and much of inland China. Moreover, China’s numerous ethnic and cultural subgroups often maintain distinct social practices. Although notions of hospitality differ across region and subculture, most Chinese share an intense pride in their complex systems of etiquette and hospitality.

What can differ from location to location in China includes, of course, what regional specialties are served—the choice of staple foods, for example (wheat, millet and sorghum-based noodles and dumplings in the north and rice or rice-based foods in the south)—as well as a number of other details: the order in which dishes are served (soup last in the north and soup first in the south), the amount of food served (copious amounts in the north and small exquisitely prepared portions in the south), where guests and hosts sit (host facing the door in some regions, back to the door in others), the size and shape of the table (square, rectangular, or round), the number of ceremonial toasts (usually an auspicious number such as three or six), host and guest responsibilities, and what certain behaviors signify. For instance, in Shandong, if glasses are tapped when toasting, it is an indication that whatever beverage is being consumed should be completely consumed to display sincerity; in other areas tapping glasses may simply be a kind of salutation that does not require draining the contents of one’s glass. In northern China, eating events are characteristically raucous gatherings in which all guests are expected to contribute to the mood, while elegance and refinement are valued by southern Chinese. Surface level appearances, saving face, and ceremonial actions take on greater significance in these northern-style events, while thriftiness and style are key in southern events. In large urban areas in the south that have been exposed to more international contact, such as Shanghai, hosts tend to allow guests to order what they wish to eat or drink and tend not to put...
as much pressure on guests to consume large amounts of food or drink. In northern China, however, it is still the host’s responsibility to take care of all guests’ needs, which includes ensuring that they are provided with the best foods and sufficient amounts of food and drink. Thus, northern hosts often order for their guests, place food on their plates, fill their glasses, and spend significant energy urging guests to consume more food and drink.

Private and Public Contexts

The level of intimacy of the people involved in a social gathering determines how a particular qingke occasion unfolds. Invitations to visit private homes, for instance, signify the trust and closeness of a relationship that has either existed for a long time or has just taken on a new significance. Hosts spend tremendous amounts of time and energy cleaning, cooking, and preparing food and spirits before the arrival of their guests. Despite the initial efforts made to prepare for the event, these qingke occasions are relatively relaxed because they occur in the private setting of the home, involve small numbers of intimate friends and family, and are normally focused on strengthening existing bonds.

In the public arena, qingke occasions range from the least formal level, perhaps with an invitation to attend a movie or concert with a friend, or to gossip over a cup of tea and catch up on the latest news, to the most formal level, as with an invitation to a banquet. Informal qingke occasions are viewed as opportunities for friends to deepen ganqing through chatting, eating, drinking, or doing something interesting together. Formal banquets, on the other hand, are large-scale cultural performances involving vast quantities of food and drink and serve as means of interacting socially and maintaining guanxi. Banquets are a microcosm of Chinese society and are conducted with an emphasis on conforming to the proper norms of etiquette, with themes of modesty, sincerity, and mutual respect framing behavior.

Pattern of Occasions

In-group, out-group, private, and public qingke occasions are all social occasions that frequently involve eating and drinking and all tend to proceed according to a similar four-step pattern:

1. Yingke (welcoming guests)
2. Jingcha (offering guests tea, alcohol, or cigarettes)
3. Yanqing (treating guests to a meal)
4. Songke (seeing guests off)

In traditional China, important guests were ceremoniously welcomed by setting off firecrackers. Protocol dictated specified distances at which to meet guests, depending on their social rank. Phrases such as jiefeng xichen (“receive from the wind and wash off the dust”), still used colloquially to describe the welcoming of guests, reflect these traditional practices. These rituals have been replaced by the hosts’ meeting of guests at doors of restaurants or at train stations, airports, or harbors.

After greeting guests, the primary host, usually a man, begins the occasion with hanxuan (small talk) that may take place on a couch in a sitting room or anteroom. While one host, usually the lady of the house, prepares the meal, a second host offers tea, cigarettes, fruit, and candy. Although what is offered to guests during this period has changed—with candy, melon seeds, and bottled water replacing tea and cigarettes in some contemporary urban settings—most qingke occasions still begin this way.

The offering of tea is typically followed by a meal. Even if a guest visits at a time outside of normal meal times, the good host is expected to liuke (ask a guest to stay for a meal). When not arranged in advance, an offer to remain for a meal places a burden on a guest to decide whether the host actually has the time to continue the interaction or is simply being polite. Because of the cultural importance of food and eating, meals are most often the focal activity of qingke occasions.

When the meal is completed, hosts escort guests to a more comfortable setting to relax, chat, smoke, eat fruit, or sing karaoke. Qingke occasions end with the hosts’ seeing off of guests while urging them to stay longer and to visit again. Hosts are expected to escort their guests to their transportation and to wait until they are out of sight. For positive beginnings and endings that leave guests with good first and last impressions, particular emphasis is placed on welcoming and seeing guests off.
Hosting

During formal qingke occasions, hosts are divided into primary hosts, assistant hosts, and escorts. Guests are hierarchically differentiated as main and secondary guests. Participants must conduct the ritual behaviors and fulfill the responsibilities associated with their roles. Recognizing the hierarchy of an occasion and displaying mutual respect are keys for all participants. The standard rule that underlies all hospitality events in China is ke sui zhu bian (guests follow the host’s wishes). Hosts have assumed the responsibility to take care of guests during a particular occasion, which means that while during zuozhu (serving as host), one has the responsibility to arrange everything and to provide for needs of all guests without their having to ask for things.

Hosting involves a significant responsibility and provides an opportunity for enormous influence. Prestige, honor, and social status are associated with good hosting skills. Hosts are responsible for arranging a suitable location, sufficient food and spirits, interesting and amicable guests, transportation, seating assignments, and entertainment. Hosts are also responsible for maintaining the hierarchy of the occasion, creating a festive atmosphere, leading the conversation, maintaining harmony, facilitating the exchange of feelings, and ensuring a pleasant experience for every guest. While accomplishing all of this, hosts are expected to project humility, which is usually expressed through self-deprecating remarks about the inadequacies of hosting abilities, the location, or the amount and quality of the food and drink provided.

Hosts bear all costs, arrange everything, and accompany guests at all times, a practice many Western visitors to China find stifling but most Chinese guests expect. Hosts arrive early, welcome guests, lead toasts, order dishes, issue self-deprecating remarks, serve food, pour drinks, and control every aspect of the occasion. Hosts frequently offer hospitality with particular gusto because the assumption is that guests will politely decline, even if they plan to accept.

Guesting

The practice of zuoke (serving as guest) also carries responsibilities. Guests are expected to shower hosts with repeated compliments on the quality of the site; the interesting group of guests; the host’s hosting skills; the host’s thoughtfulness and attention to detail in preparation; and the amount, taste, and quality of the food and drink provided. Guests are further expected to remain humble, to avoid eating or drinking to excess, to avoid imposing upon the host or infringing upon the host’s time in the spotlight, and to give the host every opportunity to make a good impression (save face) while participating in the occasion.
These expectations frequently impose upon guests the burden of doing things that they may not wish to do in order to avoid damaging their host’s face (reputation). In formal situations Chinese guests work hard to convey the notion that they are enjoying themselves, thanks to the host’s efforts, even when they are not. Guests also frequently decline initial offers of food and drink and frequently apologize to hosts for burdening them.

Qingke occasions are participatory occasions. Neither guests nor hosts drink or eat alone. Participants toast and drink with each other; everyone eats together; and everyone participates through eating, drinking, toasting, complimenting, storytelling, telling tasteful jokes, playful verbal jousting, singing, and dancing. Failure on the part of any guest to actively participate in at least one of these activities is a direct insult and signals to all participants that the host has failed in his or her hosting responsibilities.

Western participants in qingke events need to adapt to certain protocols for eating and drinking as a group, and those differ from acceptable customs while eating as individuals. Dishes are served family-style, and it is also impolite to eat or drink if other participants present haven’t started yet or have finished with the meal. Chinese events tend to be highly structured; guests only eat when the host indicates, either with words or gestures, that it is time to eat. The controlled nature of such events, combined with a host’s incessant urging to eat and drink to one’s fill, leads to impressions among Western participants that the focal activity of qingke events is drinking and, in particular, getting guests drunk. In fact, the urging is not meant to be coercive—it is rather the host’s attempt to fulfill the responsibility associated with qingke, and drinking is merely one mode of interaction involved. The primary goal of the host is to create a mirthful atmosphere that facilitates the exchange of feelings among participants.

In addition to these confusing points, Western participants typically have difficulty in determining who pays the bill because guests and hosts frequently have heated arguments over the check. But face plays a critical role in qingke events. And details such as “who pays the bill” are nearly always determined prior to the event: Hosts pay, or they delegate the task to their assistant hosts so as not to have to leave their guests alone. Guests should offer to pay but should not steal the host’s limelight. That is, guests follow the host’s lead in all situations; failing to allow a host the face gained through paying can cause more damage to a relationship than such apparent generosity would bring. Hospitality demands reciprocity, but reciprocity at a subsequent event is the best rule to follow.

### Centrality of Qingke

Qingke occasions hold special significance in a culture where strict norms of etiquette dictate public interaction, human relationships are emphasized, and a balanced social ledger is the ideal. Entertaining guests is a crucial element of participating in social, political, and economic life in China. Qingke is the means for maintaining the flow of social capital, exchanging feelings, opening a relationship, repairing relationships, and paying back favors. Qingke is a method for affirming existing friendships, expressing gratitude, displaying status, conferring respect, and learning more about a person to determine whether further investment in feelings is warranted. And qingke is a way of accessing the group, managing social relationships, balancing social harmony, and celebrating special occasions.

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**Further Reading**


Qingming Festival
Qīngmíngjié 清明节

Officially reinstated as an official holiday in 2007, the Qingming (clear and bright) Festival is a day of both sorrow and joy. While paying tribute to the dead, people go outdoors to enjoy the spring. Because of the festival’s legendary origin, it is customary to eat hanshi (cold food) on that day.

The Qingming (clear and bright) Festival falls on the first day of the fifth solar term, one of twenty-four terms, or points, marked on the traditional lunisolar calendar shared by the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese. The qingming term starts around 5 April and, like the other terms, lasts fifteen days. It is the real beginning of spring, when vegetation turns green and flowers burst into bloom.

For the Chinese, the Qingming Festival is a day of both sorrow and joy. On this day, all Chinese people mourn and remember their dead relatives. The Chinese either bury or cremate their dead. After cremation, they either leave the urns in public cemeteries or bury them. With the economic boom experienced in the 1990s and 2000s and its subsequent increased degree of social relaxation, the practice of burying the body has resurfaced, and Western-style

In the handscroll Peace Reigns over the River, by Zhang Zeduan and believed by art historians to depict the celebration of the Qing-Ming Festival in modern-day Kaifeng, street hawkers offer food, drink, and fans to passersby.
tombs have become fashionable among the wealthier Chinese vying to display their filial piety as well as their fortunes. Despite changes in the ways of laying the dead to rest, the custom of visiting the dead year after year persists. Sweeping the grave, tomb, or urn and offering up sacrifices constitute a large part of this ritual. Hence the day is sometimes known in the West as the Tomb-sweeping Festival. The rites also include setting off firecrackers and burning incense and joss money (paper money in offering to ancestors). Because this practice can cause wildfires, the government encourages the offering of flowers instead. So many people driving to their relatives’ grave sites on the

A scene from a copy after Zhang Zeduan’s scroll Peace Reigns over the River shows a residential courtyard. In one room three scholars debate as they relish a quiet moment away from the Qing-Ming Festival celebration.

Tightrope walking was one of the many entertainments depicted in this copy of the eleventh/twelfth-century scroll Peace Reigns over the River. An appreciative crowd attending the Qing-Ming Festival celebration looks on.
same day always cause traffic jams, so some choose to go a day before or after *qingming*, thus unwittingly stretching the length of the festival. Monuments of those who died in conflicts of modern history are always visited by schools and youth organizations as part of patriotic education.

*Taqing* (treading on the greenery) is one of the more joyous traditions of the Qingming Festival. Activities include outings and recreation, including ball kicking, kite flying, and swing playing. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, people increasingly choose to picnic while viewing flowers in gardens and parks.

The origin of the Qingming Festival is dubious. Most people, however, attribute it to a king named Chong’er and his subject Jie Zitui. Before he was king of the Jin state in the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE), Chong’er (697–628 BCE) fled from the persecution of his murderous stepmother queen. The hardships he endured during his exile alienated all his followers, except Jie Zitui, who even fed the starved king with flesh cut from his leg. After ascending to the throne, Chong’er forgot Jie Zitui. By the time he remembered and sent for him, Jie Zitui had already gone in hiding to Mount Mian with his mother. Chong’er set fire to the mountain in the hope of driving out Jie Zitui; but Jie Zitui preferred to be burned to death. The regretful king then set aside the day in Jie Zitui’s memory and decreed that no fire be allowed on that day, resulting in a festival called *hanshi* (cold food). Later, *hanshi* and *qingming* were combined to create the Qingming Festival.

Around 713–742 ce, the Qingming Festival became an official public holiday. The festival was dismissed as a day of superstition after 1949. In December 2007, the Chinese government, in answer to a popular appeal for respecting tradition, reinstated it as a public official day. Koreans, Vietnamese, and some Japanese also remember their dead on the same day, as do people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world.

**Further Reading**


The Qinling Range is located in north-central China between the Huang (Yellow) River and the Yangzi (Chang) River. It is one of the last remaining places in China where pandas may be seen in the wild.

The Qinling Range, with an area of 55,000 square kilometers, covers about 20 percent of Shaanxi Province in north-central China. It is a part of the Kunlun mountain range, which spans about 1,500 kilometers. The highest mountain in the Qinling Range is Taibai, at 3,763 meters.

The climate on the south side of the Qinling Range is warm and humid year around, and the north side of the range is dry and cold in the winter. The Qinling Range is also a watershed between the Wei River, a branch of the Huang (Yellow) River, and the Han River, which flows into the Yangzi (Chang) River. The Qinling Range has been called a “God-given gift to the Earth.”

The Qinling Range is famous for its pandas, which are at the top of the International Union for Conservation of Nature Endangered Species List, with fewer than one thousand left in the world. The Qinling Range is one of the few places in China where pandas may be seen in the wild.

Economic development, however, has threatened much of the wildlife in the Qinling Range. The extraction of copper, manganese, lead, zinc, gold, and silver (much of it for China’s information technology industry, as well as for its space program) has increased in the northern and western parts of the range. In order to develop Xi’an, the provincial
capital, construction began in 1998 on the 18-kilometer-long Qinling Tunnel on the Xi’an-Ankang Railway; the project, completed a year ahead of schedule, received the first-place award at the State Science and Technology Award Conference in Beijing in 2003. This was the second tunnel to be built in the Qinling Range: During the 1950s the Chinese built the Raoji-Chengdu Railway using the first 2-kilometer-long Qinling Tunnel. Environmentalists do not know the future consequences to wildlife, including pandas, of these economic developments.

Unryu SUGANUMA

Further Reading

Dream different dreams on the same bed.

同床异梦

Tong chuáng yì mèng
QIU Jin
Qiū Jǐn 秋瑾
1875–1907 Revolutionary and women’s rights advocate

Qiu Jin founded a women’s magazine, advocated equal rights for women, and worked against the government of the Qing dynasty until she was arrested and executed.

Qiu Jin, (Ch’iu Chin) meaning “Autumn Jade,” was born into a well-to-do family in Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province. She received a good education, but when she was twenty-one she was forced into a marriage arranged by her parents. Qiu Jin had two children before she left her family in 1904 and went to Japan, where she studied and was influenced by Western ideas. She unbound her feet while there, as well: an extremely painful act of rebellion. Returning to Zhejiang in 1906, she founded Zhongguo Nubao (Chinese Women’s Journal) magazine in Shanghai. In articles for the magazine, she condemned such practices as arranged marriages and foot-binding and urged equal rights and modern education for women. In her outward appearance, and with her participation in activities such as martial arts and horseback riding, she was often at odds with her community. She joined the revolutionary organization of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and supported anti-Manchu (Qing) movements. With a male cousin, Xu Xilin, she coordinated several secret societies and planned a rebellion. In July 1907 both Xu and Qiu Jin were arrested and executed before the plans could be carried out. Qiu Jin remained silent about her activities under torture, and after her death became a martyr and a heroine in the fight against the government of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Although she was originally buried ignominiously, she was re-interred after the fall of the Qing dynasty and given an honorable burial.

Bent NIELSEN

Historical photograph of revolutionary and feminist Qiu Jin.

1857
A Song: Promoting Women’s Rights

A poem by women’s rights activist and revolutionary Qiu Jin, written around the time of her founding of the Chinese Women’s Journal in 1906.

Our generation yearns to be free;
To all who struggle: one more cup of the Wine of Freedom!
Male and female equality was by Heaven endowed,
So why should women lag behind?
Let’s struggle to pull ourselves up,

To wash away the filth and shame of former days.
United we can work together,
And restore this land with out soft white hands.
Most humiliating is the old custom,
Of treating women no better than cows and horses.


Further Reading


Compiled in 1705–06, the Quan Tangshi is the most complete collection of poetry of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE). It contains the works of more than two thousand writers.

Emperor Kangxi (reigned 1661–1722) of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) ordered the compilation of the Quan Tangshi. Peng Dingqiu was appointed editor-in-chief, and Cao Yin (1658–1712) was in charge of organizing and publishing the project, which began in the spring of 1705 and was completed in the autumn of 1706. The relative completeness of the Quan Tangshi was the result of its incorporation of the efforts of a long lineage of previous collectors. Its basic framework was drawn from a compilation by Ji Zhenyi (b. 1630) under the same title; this, in turn, was based on a collection by Qian Qianyi (1582–1664), who himself had drawn heavily from Wu Guan’s (c. 1571) Tangshi ji (Records of Tang Poetry), itself an expanded version of Ji Yougong’s (flourished 1121–1161)
Tangshi jishi (Events of Tang Poetry). Furthermore, the Quan Tangshi absorbed all 1,033 fascicles of poems in Hu Zhenheng’s (1569–1644/45) Tangyin tongqian (Comprehensive Booktags of Tang Sounds).

The works collected in the Quan Tangshi are divided according to a fourfold periodization of Tang poetry into early, high, mid, and late periods, a schema first suggested by Yan Yu (c. 1230) in his Canglang shihua (Canglang Remarks on Poetry), which, although problematic, has long been followed in anthologies and in scholarship on the subject. Writers are arranged according to year of birth or, if that is unknown, the year in which they passed the jinshi (scholar) examination. Short biographical sketches appear at the head of each writer’s collected poems.

The Quan Tangshi has been criticized for certain shortcomings. For example, it is far from complete. Tang poems discovered in the Dunhuang caves in modern Gansu Province at the turn of the twentieth century were, of course, unknown to its editors; certain poems and fragments quoted in other sources were overlooked as well. Another recurrent problem arises from the abundance of incorrect or overlapping attributions, and other works are out of sequence. Finally, no source references are given.

In the pursuit of a truly complete collection of Tang poetry, studies on commentary, supplements, collation, and other critical issues concerning the Quan Tangshi have been published. These works will eventually contribute to the updated version of the Quan Tangshi now being compiled.

Timothy Wai Keung CHAN

Further Reading


Quemoy and Matsu

Jinmén-Mǎzŭ 金门马祖

92,000 est. 2008 pop.

Quemoy and Matsu are part of a group of fifteen islands located off the coast of Fujian Province. In the 1950s the two islands, which belong to Taiwan, became the focus of political crises between China, which controls the other thirteen islands, and Taiwan.

The islands of Quemoy and Matsu are part of a group of fifteen islands located in the Min River estuary about 12 kilometers off the coast of Fujian Province in China. The two islands, which were occupied by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) forces during the Nationalist evacuation of the mainland in 1949, belong to Taiwan. The larger island is Quemoy.
(also known as “Kinmen,” “Chin-men,” or “Jinmen”), which covers an area of 132 square kilometers, whereas the smaller island of Matsu (also known as “Ma-tsu” or “Mazu”) covers only 12 square kilometers.

The heavily fortified islands became the focus of political crises between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which controls the remaining thirteen islands in the group, and Taiwan, 210 kilometers to the east.

Historically the islands have served as refuges for people fleeing wars on the mainland or as shelter for pirates. The pirate Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga) fought the Manchus and the Dutch from his stronghold on Quemoy. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 the U.S. Seventh Fleet was placed in the Taiwan Straits to prevent the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Communists from attacking each other. Having just been elected U.S. president, Dwight D. Eisenhower withdrew the fleet in February 1953, and in August 1954 the Nationalist government in Taiwan moved fifty-eight thousand soldiers to Quemoy and fifteen thousand to Matsu. In September the two islands came under heavy bombardment from mainland forces, and the fighting spread to other islands in the East China Sea. In the early months of 1955 the fighting further escalated and involved coastal ports on the mainland. In the United States nuclear strikes against the PRC were considered, but this action was opposed by leading European members of NATO. In April 1955 the PRC offered to negotiate a cease-fire, and the bombardment of the islands stopped on 1 May 1955.

In 1958 the crisis flared again, and the islands were shelled once more. This time the United States extended its mutual security pact with Taiwan to include Quemoy and Matsu and once again deployed the Seventh Fleet to the area. Observers have proposed that large numbers of native Taiwanese soldiers were sent to the two islands in order to prevent them from staging an armed rebellion in Taiwan. The island of Quemoy has now been opened to tourism. Agriculture is the main occupation on Quemoy.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading
During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) Red Guard organizations, made up of hundreds of thousands of students, were devoted to a personal glorification of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong and a campaign against foreign or traditional culture.

Red Guard organizations were an important factor in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), particularly from 1966 to 1968. They were created from junior and senior high school students and college students who made it their cause to become the personal guards of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and China’s socialist revolution. The Red Guards were founded on 29 May 1966 at Quinhua University Middle School in Beijing as a reaction to criticism of Mao in the play Hai Rui (Dismissed from Office) by the historian Wu Han. They used demonstrations and slogans to express their disapproval of their schools and faculty.

Mao, using the Red Guards as a powerful tool in his political struggle with his rivals in the Communist Party and the government, gave his blessing to the Red Guards by sending them a personal letter in which he praised their campaigns and by witnessing the participation of almost 10 million Red Guards in six huge rallies in Beijing late in 1966.

The Red Guards, encouraged by Mao, quickly spread to other schools and colleges in Beijing and then to the rest of the country. Red Guard activities centered on a personal glorification of Mao and on an assertive campaign against foreign or traditional culture. Such activities were focused by Mao’s campaign to eliminate the “Four Olds”: old thought, old culture, old customs, and old practices. His campaign began in late 1966, and the activities were in large part those of the Red Guards. Mao’s attack on the “Four Olds” was a personal campaign, and the Red Guards implemented physical measures based on his philosophies. These measures included attacking foreign fashions and hairstyles, renaming streets, and attempting to redirect street traffic after determining that the color red should signify “go.”
measures turned violent as Red Guards began torturing and killing people who were deemed to have “bad class backgrounds,” destroying stores that sold luxury goods, burning theater and opera props, smashing Confucian tombstones, and ransacking cultural treasures such as Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) archaeological sites, the Ming portion of the Great Wall, and religious sites such as mosques and Buddhist monasteries. Only direct intervention by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party kept the Red Guards from storming Beijing’s Imperial City.

The Red Guards by 1967 had splintered into factions whose members violently contested one another’s loyalty and commitment while continuing to arrest, torture, and harass those Chinese whom they regarded as threats to the revolution, including scholars, translators, and

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This poster from the Cultural Revolution shows Red Guards and members of the People’s Liberation Army sporting red bands on their arms and holding copies of Mao’s “Little Red Book.” The Red Guards’ initial patriotic glorification of Chairman Mao and the Communist Party turned quickly into violence. These student groups mobilized by Mao in the late 1960s targeted “reactionaries”—including a number of artists, intellectuals, scientists, and teachers—as well as symbols of both bourgeois and traditional Chinese culture. The Red Guards were responsible for the torture and death of many victims they thought as “feudal” thinkers, as well as for the looting of shops that sold luxury goods, the burning of theater and opera props, and the smashing of Confucian tombstones and other ancient artifacts. COLLECTION STEFAN LANDSBERGER.
military officials. Red Guards confiscated gold, jewelry, and valuable real estate and destroyed art collections and priceless records. Alarmed by the horde of Red Guards, in March 1967 the government took the first step in curbing their activities by ordering them to cease national networking and travel. In 1968 the army was dispatched into schools and colleges to restore order and to control the Red Guards.

In the end the Red Guards, although deeply committed to Mao and the revolution, created nothing new, but they terrorized China for more than two years in the name of tearing down the old. The Red Guard organizations, which mobilized hundreds of thousands of students, were too dangerous to be allowed to continue. They had to be stopped by official force and ceased to be an important element of the Cultural Revolution.

Margaret SANKEY

Further Reading
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, and a brief power struggle, China commenced an era of economic liberalization and social reform that is still going strong at the beginning of the twenty-first century. During this process, China has opened up to the outside world, become a global economic power, and profoundly linked itself to the world’s economy. But it has also created massive, ongoing political, environmental, and economic challenges.

The most recent period of China’s development dates back to two years after the death of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong and the change in leadership to Deng Xiaoping, which occurred over the period 1978–1979.

Each attempt by Mao to identify a successor had met with disastrous results. Liu Shaoqi, who for almost the first two decades of the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the number two man in the party, had been purged from the CCP in 1968, was beaten and tortured, and died without being given adequate medical care in 1969 during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Lin Biao, who had replaced Liu, fared little better. After falling out of favor in 1970 and reportedly being involved in an attempted coup, Lin decided to flee to the USSR in 1971; en route his plane crashed in Mongolia, and he died as a result. The youthful Wang Hongwen, who had been groomed from 1972 onward, had proved a poor and highly inexperienced administrator. Deng Xiaoping, who had been rehabilitated in 1974 as vice premier, was politically unacceptable to the radicals grouped around Mao who later labeled the “Gang of Four.” This situation led to Deng’s second fall from power in 1976. Mao’s final choice had been the former party secretary of Hunan Province, Hua Guofeng, a man whose only merit, so many claimed, was that he vaguely resembled Mao. Mao’s final words of affirmation for Hua in late 1976 before his death were “With you in charge, I am at rest.”

Although Hua had been able to move quickly with other senior moderate leaders such as Yang Shangkun and Peng Zhen to arrest the Gang of Four members a mere nine weeks after Mao’s death and had secured the main leadership positions in the party, including party chairman, general secretary, and chair of the Central Military Commission, respect for him within the party and the country generally was not high, and he was soon seen as an interim leader. Perhaps his most fateful move was to stick resolutely by the acts of Mao Zedong, with the famous statement that “Whatever Mao Zedong said is right, and whatever Mao Zedong did is correct.” Hua was condemned mockingly as a “whateverist” throughout 1977 and into 1978, and all eyes were on the immensely experienced Deng Xiaoping, who was to make his final comeback, being instrumental in instigating and then implementing the reforms that were to start in 1978 and that in many ways continue today in 2009. These reforms have, in essence, pushed China toward being the world’s third-largest economy, its second-largest exporter, its largest destination for foreign direct investment, the largest user...
of all energy sources apart from oil, and the holder of the largest foreign currency reserves. This was an economy that was effectively enclosed and isolated in 1971, with hardly any foreign reserves, poor infrastructure, and human capital deeply degraded by the wholesale closure of universities during the early period of the Cultural Revolution.

The reform period, however, did have links to China’s past and was not wholly unprecedented. Mao himself had admitted that he was economically illiterate and for most of the 1950s at least had left economic management to people around Deng, party secretary at the time, and the main economists such as Chen Yun. Although they had never repudiated heavy state control and had effectively returned large parts of the economy to central planning control by 1956, they had seen the value in encouraging enterprise in limited areas. After the Great Leap of Forward of 1958–1961, the worst period in the PRC’s economic history since 1949, ensuing famines in 1963–64 had caused the deaths of up to 30 million people; Deng had reintroduced limited reforms, allowing farmers to sell surpluses on a highly managed free market and sanctioning small landholdings. These reforms continued throughout the Cultural Revolution, although by then the aspiration was to create communes nationally and to effectively set up autarky (national economic self-sufficiency and independence) with central planning in control of all areas of the economy.

Back from the Brink

By 1978 China was economically on its knees, its infrastructure highly limited, and 80 percent of its population engaged in backbreaking agricultural work. It exported very little and manufactured hardly anything, and its central bank reserves were empty. It also had the even graver problem of a population that had few skills and that had been exhausted by almost three decades of political campaigns. Many of the youngest of the population had received no education because of the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution. China’s self-enforced isolation had been partially corrected by the opening to the United States in 1972 after the visit of U.S. president Richard Nixon. But there remained real tensions with the USSR and a realization that China was not only economically weak but also militarily backward, its army working with out-of-date equipment. This fact was proved in the embarrassing defeat in the invasion of Vietnam in 1979, when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was effectively shooting at its own troops when the Vietnamese simply disappeared.

Discussions throughout 1978 culminated in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress in December 1978, a meeting that, with its earnest intentions to bring about political, economic, social and cultural reforms, was genuinely to change the course of Chinese history. (The Fourth Plenum, in September 1979, went hand-in-hand to further those efforts with a formal statement that acknowledged the Cultural Revolution—and, implicitly, Mao Zedong—as the worst setback to the socialist cause since 1949. The meeting was indeed a setback for Hua Guofeng, whose days in a position of influence were numbered.) Chen Yun was one of the key movers in China’s economic reform, arguing forcefully during the 1978 meeting that marketization should be reintroduced into selected areas of the economy. A decision was also made to allow foreign investment, although tightly controlled, and to encourage what were called the “Four Modernizations”—science, industry, agriculture, and defense. Foreign investment was therefore angled at gaining access to intellectual property that China lacked. Chinese were gradually sent abroad to study in initially the United States and then Europe to gain skills to bring back to China (this policy was to have mixed results—from the first wave of students sent abroad in 1980 to the present day, 720,000 have gone, but only 130,000 have returned to China). Deals were signed, mostly with Japanese companies, to supply advanced technology. The Chinese started importing again. But economic problems in the early 1980s meant that many of these deals were either cancelled or only partially honored, creating tensions, particularly with Japan. China simply overstepped itself with ambition in the early period of the reform process.

People had hopes in 1978 and at moments throughout the 1980s that China’s economic reforms would lead to political reform. And yet, although China’s economy has reformed dramatically in the last three decades, democratization—what dissident and political activist Wei Jingsheng argued was the Fifth Modernization—was not likely to happen, or not at least for many years. Deng’s government, in which Deng himself occupied the
somewhat nebulous but extremely powerful position that came to be known outside China as “paramount leader” (he was never to occupy any formal position except chair of the Central Military Commission until 1989), made clear from early on that political reform would have to wait.

China faced enormous challenges in the early part of the reform process. It had been an enclosed economy for much of the last two decades—since the withdrawal of Soviet aid and personnel in the late 1950s. In 1971 only Hong Kong had been a substantial trading partner. Ports such as Shanghai and Xiamen were barely active. The greatest problem, however, was that China had had no rule of law under Mao, with decisions basically emanating from him. The “rule of man” rather than “rule of law” tradition was seen as a fundamental problem. China had no contract law, bankruptcy law, or investment law. Beginning in 1978 it had to create, literally from scratch, a legal infrastructure, a task not helped by the lack of qualified lawyers. Much of China’s legal system was to be borrowed from Japan and is still being refined. The first joint venture law, passed in 1979–1980, allowed foreign investment in China as long as it was in partnership with a Chinese organization. In the same year Coca-Cola became one of the first importers into the PRC, allowed to sell its drinks in hotels and stores authorized to accommodate foreigners.

**HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM**

The most radical and far-reaching reform, however, was not one dealing with foreign investment but rather the move to create the sort of system that Deng and Liu had attempted first of all in 1963 and 1964: a household responsibility system in which farmers were allowed to sell grain and other crop surpluses back to the government for a small profit. This reform freed up the entrepreneurial energies of the Chinese people and from its real inception in 1984 was to have startling results, not the least of which was to make China self-sufficient in food by the mid-1980s and to dramatically improve efficiency in the agriculture sector, leading to the creation of town and village enterprises (TVEs). Even Deng was to be surprised at the success of the TVEs, which today are the employers of over half of all Chinese people and one of the real engines of China’s economic growth.

Chen Yun had argued famously that partially embracing the market economy did not need to lead to anything like freefall toward a capitalist system. Many people were puzzled because what had been considered anathema only a few years before was now promoted as acceptable, but the formula Chen used was that free enterprise was like “a bird in a cage,” allowed latitude in certain areas but surrounded by the parameters supplied by Marxist-Leninist Mao Zedong Thought. This formula was to evolve into the idea of “market socialism,” something that would have been regarded, in the Maoist period, as wholly unacceptable but that, from the 1980s onward, became the central creed of the reforming PRC. Mao’s position had been effectively dealt with by Deng in the Resolution on Party History issued in 1981, which had recognized Mao as a great revolutionary but had accorded him a correctness ratio of 70 to 30 and had roundly condemned his role in the Cultural Revolution. With Mao now parked out of the way, the party was able to justify its use of a raft of new ideas. Deng soon gained the reputation of being highly pragmatic, using the famous saying that “it doesn’t matter if a cat is white or black as long as it catches mice.” He was to proclaim that “it is glorious to grow rich” and allowed the government to tolerate the appearance of economic inequality in the PRC, with the first generation of entrepreneurs starting to emerge.

**SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES**

This element of control is best illustrated by special economic zones (SEZs), which were established from 1982 onward. China’s memory of foreign companies had not been a happy one. A century before, toward the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), British companies had controlled something like 70 percent of China’s energy sector and many of its key strategic industries. Such economic activity had contributed little, if anything, to Chinese firms, which had remained stuck in the handicraft, low-technology area. The devastation of the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 (called in China the War of Resistance against Japan, and fought in the context of World War II) had blown much of this away, with the vast majority of foreign companies simply leaving China after 1949. Beginning in 1980 Deng’s government, under Party Secretary Hu Yaobang, who with Zhao Ziyang, had
introduced some of these reforms while running Sichuan Province in the late 1970s, decided to allow joint ventures, in which foreigners could have a 50 percent Chinese partner and could be based only in SEZs. The first five of these SEZs were placed in strategic positions where they could take advantage of key trading partners. Zhuhai was just across the border to the then-Portuguese colony of Macau (returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1999). Xiamen faced Taiwan. Guangdong, of course, had been one of the main trading ports a century before. The whole of Hainan Island was proclaimed an SEZ. The most important, however, and the one that was effectively constructed from scratch, was Shenzhen, just across the border from the British colony of Hong Kong. Shenzhen was simply a fishing village with a primitive entry and exit port until 1983. Originally planned to accommodate 300,000 people, it grew quickly to several million and had the most rapid economic growth, chalking up figures of 40 percent or more for much of the 1980s.

Showcase SEZ
Shenzhen existed to encourage Hong Kong businesspeople to look at investing in their home province (many originally hailed from Guangdong Province). Indeed, it proved a masterful stroke. Hong Kong investment, whatever its role and function, was to make up the bulk of the first wave of foreign money and know-how coming into China. Taiwanese investment, although also significant, came in any volume only later. Japanese, U.S., and European investment, although important, was also later in coming. China’s reforms really started with the initial wave of Hong Kong money. In 2007, unsurprisingly, 90 percent of Hong Kong’s external investment still went to mainland China.

The SEZs allowed for preferential tax treatment and supplied support and security for foreigners coming into the market. But initially they were allowed to exist only to manufacture goods for immediate re-export—a rule changed only in 1996 when goods manufactured in Shenzhen were allowed on the domestic market. Although SEZs were a great success, Deng Xiaoping admitted later in his life that perhaps his greatest mistake had been not to include Shanghai in the first wave of SEZs until 1990. The SEZs served their purpose well, however, and China was to post growth rates nationally of up to 10 percent throughout the first decade of the reform process.
In the Market for Change

Market socialism was to change the face of China dramatically, allowing for the appearance of what might be called a private, or nonstate, sector, with many Chinese going into small businesses, and much more freedom of movement from countryside to the city and from work units into private work. But from 1980 onward social and political side effects of this change became evident, among them the erosion of the secure “iron rice bowl system,” the appearance of increasing inequality, and the first signs of the impact of China’s economic development on its fragile natural environment. Deng had bluntly stated in the early stages of the reform and opening-up period that “flies would get in through the windows” from time to time. Campaigns against “spiritual pollution” were waged, particularly in 1982 and again in 1986. However, the mid-1980s came to be remembered as a particularly liberal period, with Chinese experimenting with ideas and exposed for the first time to an array of Western concepts and techniques. Economic slowdown, corruption, and inflation were to appear toward the end of the decade, contributing to the tragic events in the summer of 1989, which brutally made obvious that although the PRC under Deng was in the market for economic change, political change and the introduction of multiparty elections were a long way off.

China’s reforms since 1978–1979 have delivered the country that exists now—a place fast approaching economic superpower status in perception if not in fact. But the issues that the whole process was meant to address remain surprisingly resistant. Foreign investment was meant to be a means to bring in foreign technology and to address China’s critical human capital problems. Almost three decades after the reforms started, however, China still had massive issues in this area. In fact, 88 percent of China’s high-tech exports in 2006 were produced by foreign companies. In becoming an open economy China has also allowed foreign companies to exploit its supply of cheap labor but to contribute little to the strengthening of indigenous companies. China’s economic model had remained surprisingly stable. Manufacturing remains the basic activity, although it has moved far beyond the confines of the SEZs. Instead, cheap labor lies at the heart of what China does. The aspiration to become a knowledge economy still lies some way off, with over 60 percent of investment in China being in manufacturing, most of it in low-tech goods. This model has also had devastating effects on China’s environment.

On the positive side, however, the Chinese government, in pursuing this path, has certainly lifted more people from poverty into well-being than any other government in the history of civilization. The government has unleashed the entrepreneurial energies of the Chinese people and moved light-years away from Maoist enclosure. The challenge of moving to a new level of development, one that is sustainable and that addresses China’s considerable problems, is something China is still struggling with. Realistically, however, it is hard to see what other choices Chinese leaders could have made in 1978–1979 when they looked at the options for the future. Some people have argued that so momentous has been the impact of their decision that the twenty-first century could be argued to have started on that day in December 1978, when the plenum decided to go in the direction it did.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading

Throughout the history of China, folk religion maintained its fundamental importance to the people, even after the development of Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The beliefs, rituals, and morality of these latter streams of institutionalized religious belief intermingled and coexisted with folk religion to create an eclectic spiritual culture that characterizes Chinese culture to this day.

Since their beginnings more than 2,000 years ago, the major organized religions of China (Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucian-based state religion) were never powerful or popular enough to displace completely the communal religion of the people. Instead, they have had to remain satisfied with sharing the spiritual loyalties of the people with community- and family-based religious observances. But these textual religions have been successful in infusing communal religion with some of their doctrines and traditions. For example, the Buddhist vision of Hell and the afterlife became the commonly accepted vision among all Chinese, Confucian morality penetrated deeply into the everyday morality of the common people, and the Daoist pantheon was largely fused with the pantheon of communal religion. This was one of the ways that Daoist priests were able to establish themselves as the elite religious authorities for both the common people and the state, but the masses of the Chinese people, most of whom lived in small rural villages, always remained faithful to their local gods. Only under the most dire circumstances, when famine, military unrest, or natural disaster destroyed their villages and livelihoods, did they voluntarily throw their support behind charismatic religious leaders from a variety of religious persuasions. Such leaders often promised to lead the people out of their misery and into some divine utopia, but often the final destination was dystopian rebellion.

Because Chinese culture has been spread over a vast geographic area, it developed many regional variations. It is therefore extremely difficult to give a definitive description of the general characteristics of the national communal religion, or even say for certain if such a religion existed. Despite regional differences, however, Chinese culture was remarkably integrated, and that makes it possible to identify some universal qualities. Also, because the major religious traditions worked hard to infiltrate the religion of the people, they inevitably left their marks and these factors serve to provide some consistency of belief from one region to another.

**Characteristics of Popular Religion**

To the common people of premodern China, as for those in most premodern societies, the natural world was inhabited by a great number of unseen forces and beings. The objective of popular religion always was to enlist the assistance of the more benevolent of those forces to protect the social and economic interests of the local community. On the other side of the spiritual spectrum, a variety of
methods were used to defend against malevolent forces. Certain divinities were identified as being primarily responsible for maintaining order in the unseen world, just as certain authority figures were charged with ensuring the smooth functioning of the material world. One of the most striking features of the Chinese conception of divinity is the manner in which the gods were thought to operate through a centralized bureaucratic government, undeniably patterned after a vulgar vision of the imperial government in traditional China. Gods were endowed with titles and often were responsible for well-defined administrative tasks. They were also surrounded and waited upon by legion subalterns and personal attendants. The means of communicating with the gods also, fairly naturally, replicated the manner of dealing with officials of the mundane imperial government: Requests were made via formally worded memorials and necessarily passed through the hands of lower-level functionaries. Sacrifices and temple celebrations were compared with official banquets at which local people entertained visiting government representatives with lavish offerings of food and wine.

Another curious but significant aspect of the relationship between humans and the divine in China was the fact that the gods were assumed to be subject to human authority in some respects, or at least that they existed in a relationship of mutual obligation with humans. Priests of various affiliations, as well as government officials, could issue orders to the officials of the unseen world. Depending on the level of their bureaucratic rank, mundane officials could even promote or demote those holding positions in the divine bureaucracy. Punishment for spirits who had not fulfilled their correct roles was also sometimes necessary. The official titles carried by certain prominent gods were often bestowed by the imperial government in recognition of the gods’ service to humans.

In any village or city of medieval China it would have been possible to find many temples, large and small, that housed gods who were believed to possess powers specific or general. They might protect against natural disaster, cure illnesses, assist women in childbirth, or save sailors at sea. Sometimes there were legends to explain how a god had acquired his or her powers, sometimes there were not. The temples of these gods were maintained by the surrounding community, and for the most part there was no full-time priest in residence. When the occasion called for it, such as the celebration of the god’s birthday, or the arrival of an important juncture in the cosmic cycle, certain members of the community would preside over ceremonies. For the more important rituals, such as the annual Pudu 普渡 (Ulambana) rite wherein the disenfranchised and unattended spirits in Hell, commonly referred to as “hungry ghosts” (eguí 饿鬼) were invited to enjoy a feast donated by the community, Daoist priests with specialized knowledge of ritual procedures would be invited; in other cases, the local magistrate would stand in as the master of ceremonies. This latter phenomenon is significant because, at least since the time of the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the state, which considered itself the only legitimate intermediary between the world of humans and Heaven, had maintained a religious presence in the local communities by giving their local representatives the responsibility of conducting rituals of various sorts, especially those directed toward controlling the forces of nature. Memorials addressed to the responsible
Religion, Folk

divine officials begging for rain, seeking to end pestilence, or in one famous instance, asking that crocodiles refrain from consuming local village folk, were commonly composed and delivered by government officials who may have also offered gifts of cooked food and wine, or simply fragrant incense smoke as inducement.

One of the most characteristic tendencies of Chinese folk religion was the deification of real historical personalities. This usually occurred on a local level, but sometimes the popularity of such a figure might spread to other areas, or even become a national phenomenon. Very often those deified were cultural heroes, people who had distinguished themselves by their moral strength or military prowess. Perhaps the most famous example of this is that of the god Lord Guan (Guangong 關公), whose fearsome bearded image can often be found presiding over Chinese restaurants and retail stores. Lord Guan was in life a famous and popular general from the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo 三國) period (220–265 CE) who captured the popular imagination with his valiant defense of a failing imperial court. The process of deification in China was very much like the canonization of saints by the Catholic Church. The major difference was that in China, no central authority had control over who should and should not be deified. In theory, the imperial government held that authority, and it constantly tried to enshrine those whom it felt embodied values it wished to promote. Lord Guan, for example, was given several titles over the centuries, including a title indicating his divinity bestowed upon him by the Song Dynasty emperor in 1120 CE. In the vast majority of cases, however, it was the people themselves that determined the survival and popularity of a given cult, and if the people did not feel that the god was effective in helping them, his or her temple fell into disuse and disrepair in a relatively short time.

The God of the Locale

One of the most widely dispersed and oldest divinities in China is the God of the Locale (Tudi gong 土地公), precursors of whom can be found mentioned in the predynastic classics dating from as early as 1000 BCE. Virtually every village and urban neighborhood in traditional China recognized their own version of this deity. He was the protector not only of the people of the community, but also of their livelihoods. Most people saw him as a police chief of the local underworld, and it was through his power to keep the often unruly spirits of the deceased in check that he was able to provide security on earth. While this divinity can be approached by individuals seeking assistance with a personal matter, especially a matter concerning deceased family members, the God of the Locale often was worshipped by the community as a whole. Worship was carried out in times of crisis, but also on special days, such as the god’s birthday. On these latter occasions lavish offerings of food and drink, as well as music and dance, were made, and a generally festive
atmosphere prevailed. Such celebrations were a natural opportunity for the members of the community to mix informally with each other, lifting the spirits of all those involved.

The City God

Another god found in many urban Chinese communities is the City God (Chenghuang 城隍). City God temples are still found in virtually all Chinese cities whose founding predates the end of the dynastic period in 1912. Frequently a city will have several gods distributed among its different wards. Cults of the City God are not as old as those of the God of the Locale; they begin to appear more widely in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and Song dynasty (960–1279) as the result of increased urbanization during those periods. City Gods have a somewhat different role to play in the community than Gods of the Locale. They are usually recognized as the direct superior of the God of the Locale, and while the God of the Locale is most often seen as a local personality with no official position, the City God represents the higher authority of the heavenly bureaucracy. They too, have an important responsibility to protect the area under their control from disaster and to bolster its prosperity, but their influence is usually felt to be more far-reaching than that of the God of the Locale. Also, because they are considered to be appointed to their positions by higher powers, those same powers, or sometimes the local representative of the mundane imperial government, could relieve them of their posts and replace them if they did not carry out their duties properly. City Gods are generally accommodated in impressive urban temples that can serve as community centers as well as religious institutions, very much in the same way that the plazas in front of European cathedrals served as meeting places for the citizens of the city.

Family-Based Religion

The family has probably been a center of Chinese ritual activity since Neolithic times. But the nature of family religion changed significantly over time as values and concepts originating in the Confucian and Buddhist traditions seeped slowly down through the social ladder from the elite to the common people. Due to its missionary efforts among the common folk, Buddhism had probably changed the basic worldview of the peasant masses by the beginning of the Tang period. But we can quite safely posit that up until the Song period Confucian ethics were primarily the exclusive preserve of the educated elite. With the explosion of printing and publishing, as well as due to expanded social mobility and the popularity of certain forms of entertainment such as professional storytelling and theatre, by the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) Confucianism had finally brought its normative, or universal, values to the common people of all regions of China, providing them with standard rituals and standard ethics. This was particularly so in the case of the cult of the ancestors. Although ancestor worship appears in the earliest records of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) emperors, formal and ideological aspects of such things as funerals, weddings, and posthumous rites steadily became more imbued with Confucian values over time. This process accelerated with the acceptance of neo-Confucianism among the educated class of the Song dynasty and the Ming dynasty. Yet even today there remains considerable regional diversity in such rites.

Traditionally the Chinese believed that human destiny was not determined by effort alone: it was necessary to enlist the help of superhuman agencies to protect the interests and bring prosperity of the living. The closest, most obvious place to look for such assistance was among one’s ancestors. Ancestors were very much considered part of the family. They had moved on to a different level of existence and had special needs, but they were dealt with as if their interest in family affairs remained as strong as when they were alive.

Rituals for the ancestors were aimed at making their afterlife as comfortable as possible. Some ceremonies were also intended to assist passage through otherworldly purgatories in which the past conduct of the ancestors was judged by divine authorities. Not surprisingly, since it was Buddhism that brought the very concept of Hell and reincarnation to China in the first place, it was usually through Buddhist rituals that the ancestors awaiting delivery from Hell could be provided assistance in their progress. It was also popularly believed that only if the ancestors were well provided for materially
and free from the clutches of hellish officials, that they could give their protection and assistance to living members of the family. This meant that altars to honor the ancestors were maintained in every household, and tablets with the names of the ancestors were placed there, along with offerings of food and drink. On special occasions, such as Chinese New Year or the Grave-sweeping Festival (Qingming Festival), more elaborate rites were enacted before those altars, at the graveside, or at a temple. On such occasions, more lavish offerings were also provided, and joss (paper) money was burned in the belief that it would be transformed by the flames and conveyed to those in the afterlife. Anyone who visits an area where traditional Chinese religion is still practiced will see small metal containers filled with ashes on the sidewalks in front of people’s houses and businesses. These are for the sole purpose of burning money for the ancestors of the family.

The ancestors were not the only spiritual presence in the Chinese household. Gods and spirits were believed to inhabit strategic locations inside and out. No doubt the most important of these was the God of the Stove (Zaoshen 灶神). His dominion over the cooking hearth and food-preparation area of the home guaranteed his prestige. The God of the Stove was responsible for watching over the activities of the family, and for reporting those activities to the gods in the heavens. This yearly ascent to make his report was believed to take place shortly before the New Year, and the family would prepare a feast for him to ensure that he would make only favorable comments about them.

Many houses would also have an altar to the God of the Foundation (Diji zhu 地基主) placed close to the ground. This deity was charged with protecting the family against low-lying evil spirits that resided near the ground. In the Chinese worldview there is general association between things issuing from the low-lying earth, and noxious, yin (as opposed to yang) vapors. Ghosts and legions of hostile demons also had an affinity for the cold earth. The role of the God of the Foundation was especially important to the preservation of spiritual and physical health in the household. Door gods (menshen 門神), whose images were painted on or beside entranceways, also protected against the entry of unwelcomed spirits and ghosts. Statues of the God of Wealth (Caishen 財神), the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy (Guanyin 觀音), and other popular divinities swelled the ranks of the Chinese pantheon during the late imperial age (Ming and Qing dynasties, 1368–1912). The help and protection of these gods was considered critical to the preservation and prosperity of the family.

Shamanism in Chinese Religion

Shamanism is a form of religion that focuses on direct contact with the world of spirits. It is the main religious and cultural tradition in many preliterate cultures. The classical description of shamanic religion was constructed by Russian anthropologists working in southern Siberia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since that time, shamanic practices have also been identified and studied among North and South American native peoples, among the Bushmen and other tribes in Southern Africa, and among Australian aboriginal tribes, to name just a few examples. The shaman is a person,
either male or female, who has can communicate with the spirits. Communication is often affected when the soul of the shaman temporarily is released from its physical body and travels to the spirits’ world, where he or she (since in many cultures the shaman is usually a woman) can speak directly with the spirits and request their assistance in human affairs. Shamans also can cause their souls to vacate their bodies, allowing the spirits to make use of their voices, and sometimes hands and feet, to address humans directly. One of the most important roles of the shaman was to cure illness. Both spiritual and medical means are employed to this end. Often it was necessary to exorcise evil influences, and the shaman was an expert at this task as well.

Although purely shamanic religion has not been practiced in China since prehistoric times, shamanic elements have remained an important part of religious practice. The kings of the Xia 夏 (2100–1766 BCE) and Shang 商 (1766–1045 BCE) dynasties relied on the services of priests who were capable of contacting the spirits to plan their every move. Among the common people, mediums, traditionally known as wu 巫 (female) or xi 玄 (male), could enter a trance and allow spirits to speak through their mouths or write with their hands; they have been a basic part of village religion since at least the Zhou period (1045–256 BCE), and continue to be so today. Many temples still employ mediums who hold regular sessions during which popular divinities enter their bodies and provide assistance to people in need. Generally, people attending these sessions are concerned about medical issues, either their own or those of family members, but questions about business and domestic affairs are also common. This type of activity usually occurs in the local temples and without the sanction of government or organized religion. The spirits who descend to provide advice are...
seldom highly placed in the popular pantheon, but they do have a strong following among people at the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder.

**Ledgers of Merit and Demerit**

Although the role of popular Chinese religion is not primarily to provide moral and ethical guidance, moral behavior is often seen as a prerequisite to the achievement of spiritual goals. As societies become more sophisticated, they require more satisfying explanations about the existence of evil. People want to believe that there are forces that provide compensation to those who have been wronged, and punishment for those who have wronged. In Chinese religion, it is believed that there are gods whose primary function is to keep track of the deeds of humans; at death, the deceased individual is brought before a tribunal of spirit-officials for judgment. Since the Chinese adopted the Buddhist concept of rebirth beginning in the period of political division following the Han dynasty when Buddhism first gained currency in China, it is often a case of determining not only which punishments or rewards should be given, but also how long these will be in force before rebirth occurs. Living descendants can modify the sentence by undertaking certain ritual activities, such as reciting Buddhist scriptures and employing Buddhist priests to intercede on behalf of the departed souls.

Beginning in roughly the third century CE in China, another variation on this theme of morality and retribution developed: the practice of maintaining one’s own personal record of good and evil deeds. The fourth-century Daoist text *Baopu zi*, by Ge Hong (c. 280–343) details that it was necessary to do a specific number of good deeds to proceed with the quest of immortality. Evil deeds were marked off against the total number of good deeds at a high ratio, and divine authorities ultimately verified the correctness and validity of these records. This belief continued to gain popularity until the late Song dynasty; scriptures that give detailed information on which sorts of deeds count for how many points, and how many points are required to achieve a given reward have been found dating from that time have been found among the texts recovered from the Dunhuang oasis in Gansu Province.

By the Ming dynasty, the practice of recording one’s own merits and demerits had become even more widespread and formalized. Registers for keeping track of merit and demerit points were being published both commercially and by religious establishments. Belief in the validity of the practice had also spread from Daoism and popular religion to Buddhism and Confucianism. Well-known Confucian officials and Buddhist priests were actively keeping their own records and writing about the subject. By the late Ming, moral principles from the major religions had become thoroughly mixed and universalized. This mixing and unifying of moral values is symptomatic of the strong forces of integration at work in the realms of religion and philosophy in late imperial China. Such integration, or syncretism, remains one of the most important aspects of Chinese popular religion today.

**Further Reading**


Religious Practice, Contemporary
Dàngdài zōngjiào huóđòng 当代宗教活动

Contemporary China is a country of diverse but strictly regulated religions. People continue to practice the traditional Chinese religions—Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism—along with Islam and Christianity, but under control of the state.

Most world religions are or have been at one time practiced in China. Several—Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism—either originated in China or underwent history-altering transformations there. The Chinese Communist Party, in keeping with the tenets of Marxism, is atheist and requires its members to reject religious belief. At the same time, however, Chinese law officially supports religious freedom for its populace at large, though only in sanctioned channels, which can cause conflicts. The government’s appointing of Roman Catholic bishops without seeking approval of the Vatican has led to tension and, in the past, even to excommunications. Similarly, in 1995 the Dalai Lama and Chinese authorities chose rival reincarnations of the tenth Panchen Lama, the second-highest figure in Tibetan Buddhism.

Religious Demographics

China’s basic religious heritage comprises the san jiao (three traditions, 三教)—Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. According to official Chinese reports, there are more than 100 million religious believers in China, and most profess faith in one of these three traditions. As of 2007 China had about 13,000 Buddhist temples and 200,000 Buddhist monks and nuns, and more than 1,500 Daoist temples and more than 25,000 Daoist priests and nuns.

Islam and Christianity were introduced into China in the seventh century. As of 2007 there were some 18 million Chinese Muslims and 30,000 mosques. Christianity is catching up, with 4 million Roman Catholic adherents worshipping at more than 4,600 churches and 10 million Protestants worshipping at more than 12,000 churches.

The Chinese government has paid special attention to ethnic religious beliefs. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Regional Autonomy, promulgated in 1984, grants the right to freedom of religious belief to all Chinese. Since the reform movement initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978–1979 to modernize China, Tibetan Buddhism and Islam have been practiced all the more vigorously in Tibet and Xinjiang, respectively. The Chinese government reports that since 1980, it has invested about ¥200 million (about $29 million) for the maintenance and reconstruction of religious sites in Tibet, including Potala Palace—the residence of the Dalai Lama—and the Jokhang Temple and Tashilhunpo and Samye monasteries. Because these sites are also tourist attractions, the investment also yields economic benefits to the Chinese state: over 1,700 places of worship and religious activity in Tibet, housing 46,000 resident monks and nuns. It is difficult, however, to evaluate precisely the level of religious freedom in Tibet, for, as a 2002 report...
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Chinese Religions and the Chinese Communist Party

The ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the creation of a Communist social system. To fulfill that goal, and in accordance with China’s constitution, the party takes Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as its guide. Atheism is a central tenet of Marxism. Marxism holds that God is a mere fabrication, invented by people to soothe the misery of this world, a fabrication exploited by the ruling classes to oppress the working class. From the Marxist perspective, the abolition of religion and the abolition of the capitalist system go hand in hand. The party requires its members to profess Marxist atheism and to educate the masses in the Marxist perspective on religion.

After the party came to power in 1949, the Chinese government began to monitor and regulate all religions, cutting Chinese religious organizations off from foreign countries. In 1950 the first Chinese Christian conference drafted the Christian Manifesto: The Direction of Endeavor for Chinese Christianity in the Construction of New China, which launched the Three-Self Movement. The movement was based on the Three Self-Principles—self-administration, self-support, and self-propagation—originally introduced by Christian missionaries in the mid-1800s. These principles stressed that Chinese Christians must organize their churches themselves, not let Chinese people clamoring to touch the stone lion at the 1,700-year-old Guangxiaosi Buddhist temple. There are reportedly more than 100 million religious believers in modern China, and most profess faith in one of these three traditions—Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. As of 2007 China had about 13,000 Buddhist temples and 200,000 Buddhist monks and nuns. PHOTO BY ROBERT EATON.
them be organized by foreigners, and that Chinese Christians must support the new socialist China. Many believers felt that the Three-Self Movement was evidence of the government’s plotting actively against all religions. During the ten years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), all religions were denounced, all religious believers were persecuted, all religious meeting places were closed, all religious activities were prohibited, and property belonging to religious institutions was confiscated.

After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government tried to restore freedom of religious belief and reopened sites for religious activities. Reports on religious activities, including the celebration of religious festivals, have been published regularly in the official press. In the 1990s China began to join international religious groups and to participate in international religious activities, such as the World Council of Churches, the Fifth World Conference on Religion and Peace, and World Catholic Youth Day. The associations of Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam have also developed international exchanges. Roman Catholicism has developed slower than Protestantism and other faiths have because of the Vatican’s recognition of Taiwan and the Chinese government’s consecration of bishops without Vatican approval. In 2007 Pope Benedict XVI demanded that all Chinese bishops declare allegiance to the Vatican, but he also approved the four government ordinations made in 2007, which Chinese government authorities took as a sign of improving relations.

### Nature of Religious Freedom and Practice in China

Under the Chinese constitution in all its incarnations, the Chinese people have the right to religious freedom. Every version of the constitution protects freedom of speech, assembly, association, procession and demonstration, and religion. The Constitution of 1975 even stated that citizens have the freedom to practice a religion and the freedom to not practice a religion and to promote atheism. Still, only five religions are constitutionally protected: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestant Christianity, and Catholic Christianity.

In South China attached houses are built of cement and have tiled roofs, and at the New Year they all display traditional decorations. Paintings and calligraphy honor the Kitchen God and other auspicious guardians who will keep the evil spirits away from the door. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Normal and Abnormal Religious Activity

To control Chinese religions, the Chinese government makes distinctions between what it designates normal and abnormal religious activities. According to the Chinese government, abnormal religious activities are usually conducted by “a small number of people, actuated by some abnormal purposes, who conduct religious activities in an excessively frequent and long manner.” To prohibit abnormal religious activities, the Fifth National People’s Congress adopted a law in 1979 that banned people from organizing secret societies and sects to practice “feudal superstitious beliefs” to carry out counterrevolutionary activities. Later the term counterrevolutionary was deleted from the statute, but the party has applied this term in practice—for example, in making distinctions between the activities of Falun Gong (a system of mind-body cultivation involving meditation and exercise, which has been treated as a religion) and so-called normal religious activities, and considering Falun Gong counterrevolutionary.

CCP’s Religious Hierarchy

Party organs and a state hierarchy manage religions in China. The party/state controls Chinese religion first through promulgation of official Chinese ideology, Marxism-Maoism-Dengism. All schools, colleges, and universities educate students in Marxism, communism, and atheism. Second, the state controls religion through religious policy, which is made by the party and put into practice by the associations of different religions, for example, the Buddhist Association of China, the China Daoist Association, the China Islamic Association, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of Protestant Churches of China, the China Christian Council, and the China Catholic Patriotic Association. These associations act as liaisons between religious institution and the government. The Religious Affairs Bureau, a government agency, mediates between religious organizations and the party. The United Front Office represents the party in making religious policy. The Public Security Bureau ensures that all religious groups and believers implement party policy. If religious believers

Central Beijing churches are carefully controlled and mostly locked tight when not in use for worship. After the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the government began to monitor and regulate all religions. Based on the Three Self-Principles (self-administration, self-support, and self-propagation) that were originally introduced by Christian missionaries in the mid-1800s, the CCP’s Three-Self Movement established three criteria for Chinese Christians: (1) They must organize their churches themselves, (2) must not let their churches be supported by foreigners, and (3) must support the new socialist China. Photo by Robert Eaton.
or organizations violate party policies, the Public Security Bureau punishes them according to the criminal law.

Religious Policies

On 31 March 1982, the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued an important statement of religious policy: Document 19. Document 19 summed up the historical experience of the party on religious matters; promoted a moderate religious policy; and called for restoration and administration of churches, temples, and other religious sites. At the same time, the document also declared that religion must not interfere with politics, education, or marriage and family life, and reaffirmed that the government prohibited criminal and counterrevolutionary activities committed under the cover of religion.

Regulations Governing Venues for Religious Activities—Decree No. 145—and Regulations Governing the Religious Activities of Foreign Nationals within China, issued by Premier Li Peng in January 1994, were subsequent important regulations for religious organizations and believers. Registration is the key to the Chinese government’s control of religion. According to Decree 145, registration is required for the establishment of a venue for religious activities. Registration requires three things: patriotic association, a fixed meeting place, and activities confined to a specific geographic area. The regulation reaffirms that venues for religious activities shall not be controlled by persons or organizations outside China. Land, mountains, forests, and buildings cannot

Falun Gong (also known as Falun Dafa) is a movement founded by Li Hongzhi in 1992. A system of mind and body cultivation partially derived from qigong (气功, traditional Chinese breathing patterns, which are practiced with physical postures and movements). Since its ban in China, it has become a familiar name in Western media. Falun Gong grew quickly in the 1990s, perhaps because, according to the Economist, “Falun Gong [claimed] that it could heal without the need for medicine” when China’s “cash-strapped state-run hospitals usually sell medicines to patients at inflated prices in order to boost their revenues.”

Falun Gong’s practitioners say their goal is to develop the principles of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance and that they are a peaceful group, following a philosophy that leads to spiritual awareness and improved health. The Chinese government accuses them of “spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting disturbances and generally jeopardizing social stability.” The exact number of Falun Gong practitioners is not known, but the Chinese government estimates that the movement has as many as 70 million followers. In 1999, alarmed by Falun Gong’s organizational prowess (it organized a massive demonstration outside the Longnanhai government compound) and its challenge to the official ideology, the Chinese government declared it a “heretical organization” and launched a full-scale campaign against Li and his followers. The campaign included arrest and re-education of Falun Gong’s followers. Since that initial crackdown, the Chinese government has continued to arrest Falun Gong members and to suppress the spread of Falun Gong propaganda. In July 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives expressed disapproval of Chinese policy by passing a resolution calling on China to stop persecuting Falun Gong practitioners.

While the organization has attracted sympathy from Western activists, many view it as a cult. Around the world, followers of Falun Gong stage protests against the Chinese government and publish a newspaper filled with articles attacking the Chinese government.

The Editors
be used for religious purposes without the government’s permission. Donations from persons and organizations outside China cannot be accepted. And the publication of religious articles and artwork is forbidden. If violation of this regulation threatens public security, the public security organs are empowered to mete out penalties in accordance with the relevant sections of China’s Public Security Administration Penal Code. If the violation constitutes a criminal act, the judiciary is to undertake an investigation to determine criminal responsibility.

The Regulations Governing the Religious Activities of Foreign Nationals within China stipulate that foreign nationals may participate in religious activities in religious venues in China, including monasteries, temples, mosques, and churches, which are recognized by the Religious Affairs Bureaus of the People’s Government at or above the county level. They may invite Chinese clerics to conduct such religious rituals as baptisms, weddings, funerals, and prayer meetings. However, they are not permitted to establish religious organizations, liaison offices, or venues for religious activities or run religious schools or institutes within China. They are not allowed to seek to convert members of the Chinese public or to appoint clergy or undertake other evangelistic activities. When foreign nationals enter China, they may carry printed materials, audio and visual materials, and other religious items for their own use, but if greater quantities are brought in, the materials will be dealt with according to the relevant Chinese customs regulations.

**The Outlook for the Future**

In recent years, the Chinese government has begun instituting more liberal policies for Chinese religions, but the government retains authoritarian control. Traditional Chinese religions, and especially imported religions such as Christianity and Islam, continue to experience difficulty. Nevertheless, even in the face of difficulties, religion continues to flourish. The number of Chinese Christians, for example, is expected to continue to grow by 7 percent annually, a sign that religions and religious feeling remain robust even when restricted.

**Jinghao ZHOU**

**Further reading**


The global exchange of religious belief was part of China's imperial history. The populace practiced China's three main religions—Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism—along with traditional folk beliefs and imported faiths such as Christianity and Islam.

During China's imperial era, the religions that had the most influence on Chinese culture and intellectual thought were Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Of these, the first two were homegrown; Buddhism came to China from India by way of Central Asia.

Confucianism

Of China's three traditional religions, Confucianism is considered the basis. Confucius (551–479 BCE) was one of China's first great teachers and philosophers, and his teachings were studied by centuries of Chinese scholars. Confucius taught the principles of benevolence, loyalty, righteousness, propriety, and knowledge. He also espoused the five relationships: between ruler and subject, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger brother, and between friend and friend. Confucianism went through two phases in imperial China. The first stretched from Confucius's lifetime to the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and is known as traditional Confucianism. In the Song dynasty (960–1279), Confucianism entered its second phase known as neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism assimilated Buddhist cosmology and made Confucian ethics and political theory more metaphysical. The most significant neo-Confucian scholars—such as Wang Yang-ming, Zhu Xi, Cheng Hao, and Cheng Yi—introduced important new interpretations of Confucian theory.

Confucianism has served both secular and religious functions throughout history. Some scholars refuse to call Confucianism a religion because Confucius did not perform miracles or discuss death and the existence of gods and because Confucianism does not have religious texts, systematic rituals, and formal organizations. The Analects (a collection of Confucius's teachings), however, records Confucius's prayers, fasting, and regular attendance of worship services. Confucius discusses god using the term shàng dì (天, heavenly god, or ancestors) and heaven using the term tian (天). Confucius as a sage was worshipped by the majority of Chinese people in imperial China. Confucian temples were established everywhere, using identical designs. In a Confucian temple, religious rituals were held twice a year, in midspring and midautumn, to worship the ancestors of Confucius. These ritual services were convened by state officials and Confucian scholars, not by priests.

Daoism

Daoism comprises many disparate components, including witchcraft, yin–yang theory, ideas regarding ghosts, the theory of Chinese medicine, and the religious ideas
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of Laozi, sometimes known as Lao Tzu (c. sixth century BCE according to some scholars, while others date him to the forth or third centuries BCE). Daoists synthesized these sources and formed a unique religious system, which is reflected in the Daoist canon, comprising about 1,120 volumes. Daoism is a salvation religion that guides its believers beyond this transitory life to a happy eternity. Daoism associates human weakness and sickness with sin and tries to heal such ills with the confession of sin, forgiveness, and prayer and penance. Early on Daoism was associated with Chinese peasant rebellions, but in the third century CE it shifted its emphasis from the present world and its concerns to the transcendental values of nihilism, the belief in nothing. Daoist priests live in temples and can marry and have children.

Buddhism

Buddhism began its journey in China in the first century BCE, arriving via the Silk Roads from India. At first Buddhism was treated as a foreign religion, but it gradually became integrated into the Chinese way of life after its concepts were made understandable with Daoist terminology. As Buddhist scriptures and teachings were translated into Chinese, Buddhism opened the way of Buddhahood to Chinese believers. By the fourth century, Buddhism had penetrated into the highest social and economic circles. Wealthy Buddhists founded temples, supplied the monks with necessities, and paid for the translation of Buddhist texts. Buddhist scholars became advisers to the imperial court. Although Buddhism faced resistance from supporters of Confucianism, it continued to develop and spread rapidly among the populace. Buddhism in China reached maturity during the Tang dynasty and reached its peak at the beginning of the Song dynasty, after which it began to decline. The four most important factors contributing to this decline were the moral corruption of high-level clergy, the institution of civil service examinations that forced Chinese scholars to seek office through a study of the Confucian classics, diminishing support of Buddhism from India, and the introduction of Western culture.

Christianity and Islam

Beginning in the seventh century, Western religions found a footing in China. The Persian Bishop Alopen (d. c. 451 CE), of the Nestorian Christian Church, was the first Christian missionary to China, beginning the Nestorian mission in 635 in Chang’an (present-day Xi’an), the capital city of the Tang. Emperor Taizong (reigned 627–649) honored Alopen after his death with a monument, erected in 781 outside the city. Although there was considerable collaboration between Buddhists and Nestorians, the Nestorians had little impact on Chinese society.

The second wave of the Christian mission was the Franciscan mission, a Roman Catholic missionary movement of short duration. Giovanni da Montecorvino (1247–1328), the first Catholic missionary and a zealous monk, arrived in China from Italy in 1292 during the Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), which had
adopted a tolerant religious policy. Catholic missionaries were allowed to build churches and to baptize Chinese believers. But the Catholic mission did not have much influence until Jesuit missionaries came to China in 1583 during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

At the beginning of the Ming dynasty, foreigners were permitted to establish churches only in Macao, but the Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) finally opened the way for a Christian mission in the rest of China. Ricci, who was originally from Italy but ordained in Goa, India, developed the Christian mission in new ways, learning Chinese culture and tradition and using the Chinese concepts of tiān and shàng dì to explain Christian principles.

As a result, the Christian missionary movement in the sixteenth century was relatively successful.

Protestant Christian missionaries did not make much progress in China until China was defeated in the First Opium War (1840–1842), which resulted in five treaty ports being opened to Western countries and their citizens. Soon thereafter, large numbers of Christian missionaries made their way to China, but Christianity continued to be regarded as a foreign religion, only just tolerated by the Chinese government.

Although Christian missionaries worked in China for centuries, the Chinese response was always minimal, and the church never constituted more than 1 percent of the national population. Theologically, the central Christian doctrines—creation, sin, and incarnation—contradicted traditional Chinese culture. Politically, the contacts between China and Christians from the West before the nineteenth century were mutually beneficial, but then the interaction became more unbalanced, with the West in an exploitative position. Some Western missionaries disparaged Chinese culture and went so far as to assume that destroying traditional Chinese culture was the first task of the Christian mission in China.

In the seventh century Islam came to China from Southeast Asia. Unlike Christian missionaries, the Muslims came to China as immigrants or traders, setting up their families in China and continuing to practice their Muslim faith. Muslims in China gradually assimilated into Chinese culture and society and became isolated from the rest of the Islamic world. The development of Islam in China was a slow process, and Muslims did not build their own religious temples until the Song dynasty. There was a large Muslim infiltration in the Yuan dynasty, especially in the western provinces of Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. The Muslim population continued to increase throughout the Ming and the Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. It is estimated that there were about 15 million Chinese Muslims in 1912.

**Characteristics of Chinese Religion**

The English word *religion* had no equivalent term in Chinese until the Chinese created the word zòng jiào (宗教) in the late nineteenth century. Zòng refers to clan, tribe,
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and ancestor; jiao refers to teaching. When the Chinese people put the words zong and jiao together to mean "religion," they were reinforcing the Chinese understanding of the role of ancestral religion. The basic content of the ancestral religion in imperial China was to worship ancestors as well as the land, clouds, sun, moon, mountain, river, and spirits. The ancestral religion recognized four types of gods: heavenly gods, earthly gods, human spirits, and material gods. Correspondingly, there are four types of worship: heaven worship, land worship, ancestor worship, and grain worship. The Chinese people believed that their ancestors were still alive in heaven after their death and had the power to bring harm or good fortune to their descendants. Sacrifices to honor them were a basic part of religious ritual from the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). The I Ching (Yijing) is a classic text from that time that codified ancestral religion for the first time. Some important concepts, such as the Mandate of Heaven (the notion that heaven bestowed authority to rule upon the emperor) and the Son of Heaven (the emperor), were employed to justify social order and religious rituals. In imperial China there was no meaningful distinction between divine power and political power.

The Influence of the Ancestral Religion

Traditional ancestral religion had a profound impact on Chinese society. It deeply influenced all religions in China. Traditional Chinese ancestral religion had more adherents than any other religious faith in China and was an important unifying force within China. In imperial China almost every city had a temple to the city god, every village had a temple to the village god, and every Chinese home had a religious shrine for ancestor worship. For most people, both noble and common, ancestor worship came first, and belief in other religions came second. Traditional ancestral religion actually dominated other religions even though it did not have a formal religious structure. Other religions were not permitted to contradict the ancestral religion in ideas, moral code, belief, or rites.

Ancestral religion affected daily life. Everyday religious rites, prayers, festivals, and ceremonies arose from it. Ethically, it maintained human moral behavior and social order through ancestor worship; economically, it maintained order through grain worship, land worship, and nature worship, and it sanctified the process of agricultural production and the natural environment.
Ancestral religion affected Chinese culture. Confucianism, the mainstream of Chinese culture, had a profound influence on Chinese society because the central principles of Confucianism preserved traditional Chinese familial values. Filial piety is not merely an ethical value but a religious principle.

Ancestral religion also affected Chinese politics. The development of ancestor worship in China went hand in hand with the evolution of the dynastic political system. Important sacrificial rites were national events and were presided over by the emperor, thereby indicating that the emperor’s power was received from heaven.

The Influence of the Government

In imperial China the central government controlled religions—not only Daoism and Buddhism but, later, also Islam and Christianity—from the national level to local levels through ideology and force. Beginning in the Zhou dynasty, all local religious officials were appointed by the central government, and that degree of control continued in subsequent dynasties. During the Han dynasty, Dong Zhongshu, a Confucian scholar and chief minister, suggested that the dynasty espouse only Confucianism and abolish all other religions. But after the Han dynasty, adherents of Daoism and Buddhism gradually gained ground and even participated in politics. During the Tang dynasty, the government laid equal stress on all three religions. After Islam and Christianity came into China, the central government extended its reach to regulating foreign religions. The state of affairs in contemporary China, with the government exercising considerable oversight and control of religion, can be seen as the continuation of a pattern that was established in the imperial period.

Jinghao ZHOU

Further Reading


Sun Yat-sen’s revolution, beginning with an uprising in October 1911 and officially bringing down the Qing dynasty when its emperor abdicated in February 1912, ended more than two thousand years of imperial rule and established Asia’s first republic. But many historians question Sun’s leadership abilities and the conclusiveness of his revolution.

By the end of the nineteenth century nearly every political and intellectual leader in China saw the need for change. Some leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), felt that revolution rather than mere reform was needed. Consequently Sun called for the formation of a new republic based on his “Three Principles of the People”: nationalism, democracy, and socialism (often translated as “people’s livelihood”).

Sun and his fellow revolutionaries (organized as the Tongmeng Hui or Revolutionary Alliance) traveled throughout the country during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to promote their republican form of government. Sun’s actions led to his political exile, but his followers infiltrated the military and spread Sun’s revolutionary ideals. On 9 October 1911 an accidental explosion rocked the revolutionaries’ secret headquarters in Hankou. Police raided the building, discovering a stash of weapons and membership rolls. Knowing that the rolls had revealed their identity, those soldiers who were loyal to Sun quickly mutinied. By the afternoon of 10 October they had captured the entire city. Over the next several weeks province after province declared its independence from the national government in Beijing. Sun, who had been in the United States at the time of the explosion, returned to China and on 29 December 1911 was elected provisional president of Republican China. The Qing court was helpless as events spiraled out of its control. As a result, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) emperor unceremoniously abdicated the throne in February 1912, ending more than two millennia of imperial rule.

Nevertheless, the early years of the republic were fraught with confusion and civil war, leading many historians to question the leadership abilities of Sun and the conclusiveness of his revolution. Although the leaders of 1911 failed immediately to create a stable and lasting government system, they did topple the imperial system and establish Asia’s first republic. For this reason 10 October—the tenth day of the tenth month—was celebrated as National Day (Double Tenth) in China until 1949 and continues to be celebrated on Taiwan today. With the perspective of a century the events of 1911 still appear quite revolutionary.

David L. Kenley

Further Reading

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China’s turbulent twentieth century was marked by a series of violent revolutions from 1911 to 1949 and then the “revolution within the revolution” that occurred during Mao’s last years. They changed every aspect of Chinese life and society, but perhaps not so completely as it seemed at the time. It is unwise to completely ignore the potential legacy of past revolutions for inspiring future social movements.

Evolution is a twentieth-century phenomenon in China, although the three-thousand-year-old empire had a long history of peasant rebellions and dynastic overthrow. During much of the second half of the twentieth century, the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 was seen as the decisive revolution, or perhaps the completion of earlier incomplete or “failed” revolutions. With the cooling-off of the Communist revolution in recent decades, that metanarrative is open to question, and the earlier revolutions of 1911–1912 and 1927 acquire more prominence in the long process of transforming an ancient agrarian-bureaucratic empire into a modern nation-state and industrialized society.

Even the word revolution was new in China in the late nineteenth century. Along with many Western ideas about modernity, it came to China from Japan as a neologism formed by taking the ancient Confucian term for a heavenly mandate to rule and putting the word remove before it. Thus, geming literally means “to remove the mandate” (political legitimacy), but by the early twentieth century Chinese radicals already understood the word in the sense of the French or American revolutions—the establishment of a new political order. Closely associated with ideas of popular sovereignty and progress, the word was manifestly foreign and new, in fact, a response to the military and political humiliations that China had suffered at the hands of industrialized Western powers since the middle of the nineteenth century.

1911–1912: Republican Revolution

The first revolution came rather unexpectedly, although for more than a decade there had been revolutionary agitation and small-scale uprisings, especially in the south. Most of these were led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and drew support from overseas Chinese business communities and the new generation of young intellectuals studying what was known as “Western learning.” Sun’s call to overthrow the “alien” Qing dynasty (1644–1912; the imperial family during the Qing dynasty was ethnically Manchu, not Han Chinese) strongly appealed to the ethnic nationalism that the young intellectuals had learned largely from the West.

The revolution broke out, almost accidentally from a botched military coup in the city of Wuhan in eastern central China on the Yangzi (Chang) River. Lack of effective
leadership in Beijing (the emperor was only a child) combined with widespread frustration over the Qing court’s inability to strengthen and modernize China, caused imperial authority to collapse rapidly throughout southern and central China. Sun Yat-sen became president of a short-lived provisional government, but the revolution was soon hijacked by China’s most powerful military man, Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), a different kind of modernizer. Yuan used his military muscle to squeeze out Sun Yat-sen and his party’s elected representatives in the new National Assembly.

The revolution thus ended in apparent failure, with no democracy, no progressive political program, and China torn apart by civil wars after Yuan Shikai’s demise. Nevertheless, the rather premature revolution of 1911–1912 officially ended—with the Qing emperor’s abdication in February 1912—2,100 years of imperial bureaucratic government, replacing the hereditary emperor with a (supposedly) elected president, the Mandate of Heaven with the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and the old type of Confucian scholar-official with “modern men,” whether they were trained in modern military academies or Western-style universities.

1927: Nationalist Revolution

Such modern men—and, with the growth of coeducation in the new schools, some women, too—carried the revolution to its next stage. The revolution of the 1920s was nominally led by Sun Yat-sen and his revived Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), but it mobilized much broader and more radical social forces than the revolution begun in 1911.

The radicalism grew from several sources. First, there was the disappointment with the results of Sun’s revolution as the country fell into political chaos and remained under the domination of the foreign imperialist powers. Second, there was more rapid growth of the modern sector of the economy, with factories and new social classes—Chinese capitalists and a nascent industrial working class—appearing in the coastal cities. Finally, of most direct import, there was the cultural iconoclasm of the New Culture movement, which blamed traditional culture and social habits (Confucianism was a prime target) for China’s backwardness. The new universities, notably those in Beijing, were at the center of this intellectual revolution, which emphasized “enlightenment” and a broader concept of revolution.

However, two external events were crucial in politicizing this cultural radicalism. One was the deep disappointment with the decision of the Western democracies to allow Japan to retain control over China’s Shandong Province, which the Japanese had taken from Germany during World War I. To Chinese nationalists, this decision was a gross violation of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination. The second was the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, which offered an alternative, anti-imperialist vision of national salvation to the pro-democratic capitalist path that had originally attracted Sun Yat-sen. When recruiters from the Comintern, Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin’s association of national Communist parties, came to China in the early 1920s, they found eager converts to Marxism and social revolution. They also used financial, military, and political aid to persuade Sun Yat-sen to reorganize his Nationalist Party and launch a renewed revolution against imperialism and warlordism. The newly formed Chinese Communist Party also followed Moscow’s guidance by accepting a subordinate position in a revolutionary united front with the Nationalists.

In an ironic way the events of 1927 confirmed the Comintern’s thesis. After Sun Yat-sen’s premature death from cancer in 1925, tensions grew between the radicals and moderates in the revolutionary movement. In 1926 Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), commander of the new Nationalist Party army based in Guangzhou (Canton), launched the Northern Expedition (1926–1927) against the warlord armies. After successfully liberating the Yangzi River valley, including the modern metropolis of Shanghai, he broke with his radical allies, massacred the Communists, and brought the Nationalist Party under
his control and formed a new government with its capital in Nanjing.

This marked an abrupt turn away from the radical agenda of the 1920s. Chiang abandoned most of the revolutionary social and economic policies, including Sun Yat-sen’s plans for redistribution of land, in favor of militarily imposed political unification and nation building. Chiang and the Nationalist government achieved some success with this course during the Nanjing decade (1927–1937), before a Japanese invasion brought the government and the nation new challenges.

1949: Communist Revolution

The Chinese Communist Party had been urban based in the 1920s, organizing industrial workers along conventional Marxist lines. After its defeat in 1927, it moved into the countryside, where Mao Zedong (1893–1976) emerged as the most successful leader of peasant-based revolution. After relocating from south central to northwestern China in the famous Long March of 1935–1936, a reorganized party under Mao’s leadership was positioned to take advantage of the withdrawal of Nationalist government authority from northern China to organize the peasantry in broad areas there to resist the invading Japanese.

During the eight years of war, while the Nationalists’ morale and power waned, the Communists grew in military power and popular support in the countryside of northern China. Combining anti-Japanese nationalism with social and economic improvements for the peasant majority, the Chinese Communist Party, now free of Russian influence, was much more ready for renewed conflict with the Nationalist government after Japan’s surrender in 1945. The party’s experience during these years—the “Yan’an spirit” of self reliance, political will power overcoming material difficulties, and faith in the rural masses’ innate revolutionary consciousness—was instrumental in gaining popular support and overcoming Nationalist military superiority in the seizure of national power by 1949. It also left a legacy of populist activism and guerrilla war mentality that was not always well suited to solving problems of economic development on a national scale.

The victory of the Communists in 1949 was in part the result of the Nationalist government’s collapse from rampant corruption, administrative inefficiency, poor military strategy, and unsolved economic problems such as runaway inflation. But it was also due to the Communists’ success in tapping into the main currents of modern nationalist aspirations for a strong, prosperous, and united country as well as the older socioeconomic grievances of the peasantry. That mixture was a potent revolutionary formula that seemed to have potential application throughout much of the Third World.

1966–1976: Cultural Revolution

In the first two decades of the People’s Republic, the Communist Party oscillated between following the Soviet model of a centralized, bureaucratic planned economy and more populist, rural-based strategies for building a modern, industrialized economy and an egalitarian, socialist society. The Great Leap Forward of 1958, with its rural communes, backyard steel furnaces, and frantic mobilization of the masses, was the most dramatic experiment in the Yan’an-inspired unorthodox developmental strategy that Mao favored. A disastrous economic failure, it was followed in 1966 by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao, appalled by the loss of revolutionary fervor in the Soviet Union and its new society of entrenched bureaucratic privilege, thought to prevent the same from happening in China by mobilizing frustrated students, low- and mid-level party members, and some elements of the military in a “revolution within the revolution.” This would not only remove those high-ranking leaders who were “taking the capitalist road,” but also revitalize the entire revolution.

With the help of the politically ambitious commander of the People’s Liberation Army, Lin Biao (1908–1971), Mao purged almost all the top party and government leaders, inspired vast numbers of fanatically loyal revolutionary youth (the various bands of Red Guards), and put the country in turmoil for two years. He drew back, however, from completely dismantling the party apparatus that held China together, and the last eight years of
his life were characterized by a complicated and somewhat paralyzing covert struggle between the acolytes of the Cultural Revolution’s radical socialism and more cautious, economically oriented party bureaucrats.

1978 to the Present: Postrevolutionary China

With Mao’s death in 1976 everything changed, but not right away. After a brief interlude under Mao’s chosen heir, Hua Guofeng (b. 1936), Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) emerged by 1978 as Mao’s real successor. Also a veteran revolutionary from the Long March and Yan’an era, Deng abandoned Mao’s revolutionary rhetoric, above all the idea of class struggle and continuing revolution, and proceeded to systematically dismantle all of Mao’s social and economic policies. Technological expertise replaced mass mobilization as the key to rapid economic modernization, and this meant both educational reform (no more politics before knowledge) and opening the country to advanced scientific technology from the West. Furthermore, economic incentives replaced socialist ideology as the motivator for economic growth. The communes were broken up into family farms. Private enterprise, at first on a small scale, but then on a large scale, was revived, foreign capitalist investment encouraged, and China embarked on the kind of export-driven industrialization that Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea had pioneered so successfully. As market economics gradually eroded the position of state-owned economic enterprises and consumerism spread throughout society, China became an integral part of the new globalized capitalist economic system. As market economics gradually eroded the position of state-owned economic enterprises and consumerism spread throughout society, China became an integral part of the new globalized capitalist economic system.

Did all this mean that the revolution was over, or in Deng Xiaoping’s formulation, was China just entering a new phase in building “socialism with Chinese characteristics”? The official ideology remained socialist, and Communism remained the ultimate goal. However, for the present capitalism was being allowed to develop its full productive potential, and successful capitalists were being recruited into the Chinese Communist Party. But the party retained its absolute monopoly on political power, Deng himself sanctioning the ruthless suppression of the most serious challenge in the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989. Whether that makes the government still a revolutionary regime or just another one-party dictatorship is a moot point.

Communist Revolution in World Perspective

All great revolutions reverberate far beyond national borders, and the Communist revolution was no exception. For a time, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, China appeared to have inherited the mantle of Marxist world revolutionary leadership from an increasingly ossified Soviet Union. This was especially evident in Third World peasant societies, where the Chinese Communists vigorously promoted their experience with peasant-based revolution as a way to break free from capitalist imperialism and achieve rapid modernization. Lin Biao’s short essay “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!” (1965), succinctly expressed this ambition.

But Maoism and the Chinese model have had little real impact on political evolution in the Third World. The Naxallites in Bengal failed in attempts to import Maoist-style revolution into India. The most successful practitioners of “people’s war,” the Vietnamese Communists, depended on the Soviet Union for most of their military hardware, and in any event harbored a deep historic distrust of Chinese. The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia came the closest to being followers, but their ruthlessness exceeded anything in the Chinese experience, and their failure was more absolute. In Africa, Marxist movements leaned towards the Soviet Union. To be sure, there were some echoes of Maoism in Peru’s Shining Path in the 1980s, and more recently rural insurgents in Nepal have proclaimed themselves Maoists, at least until they abandoned guerrilla warfare for a share of political power. But on a global scale, it now seems that the Chinese model was much more specific to China’s particular historical experience than relevant to peasant societies elsewhere.

There is also the overriding reality that since 1949 the percentage of peasants in the world’s total population has continued to drop, until it is now well under 50 percent.
With the poor and downtrodden of the twenty-first century more likely to live in urban shanty towns than on the land, how relevant is a rural-based revolutionary strategy? Similarly, the model of radical egalitarianism that appealed to young Western radicals during the 1960s and 1970s has been almost completely discredited by the revolvements of Cultural Revolution atrocities and post-Mao China’s cozy relations with the international capitalist order.

Has the Communist revolution then left any global legacy? Perhaps, in the post-2008 crisis of global capitalism, the Maoist slogan, “Where there is oppression there will be resistance” may acquire a new relevancy. Ironically, it is in China itself where the government leaders most fear an economic slowdown will trigger social unrest, especially in the underprivileged rural population. The revolutionary twentieth century is well past but it is not so clear whether its legacy is completely dead.

**Ralph C. CROIZIER**

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**Mao Zedong on Policy**

*This inner-Party directive was written by Mao Zedong in December 1940 on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.*

**ANTI-ESPIONAGE POLICY**

Our policy towards prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Among the prisoners, those who were coerced into joining the reactionary forces but who are more or less inclined towards the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. We should not insult them, take away their personal effects or try to exact recant taxation from them, but without exception should treat them sincerely and kindly. This should be our policy, however reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the camp of reaction.


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**Further Reading**


A missionary respected for his expert knowledge of China and the West, Matteo Ricci was the first Jesuit to live in Beijing. His deep understanding and tolerance for Chinese beliefs aided his missionary work and allowed for a greater acceptance of Catholicism among his converts.

Matteo Ricci (Li Madou) was the first Jesuit to reside in Beijing. Among his converts were noted Chinese scholars such as Xu Guangqi. Using Allessandro Valignano’s (1539–1606) accommodation method, which demanded missionaries to show respect of local cultures, Ricci paved the way for generations of Jesuit scholar-missionaries, with their technical expertise in mathematics and astronomy, to serve the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and Qing dynasty (1644–1912) governments. To this day Ricci’s name stands for a cross-cultural dialogue based on mutual understanding and respect in both China and the West.

Born in Mazzerata, Italy, in 1552, Ricci joined the Jesuit order in 1571. At the Collegio Romano he received an education in theology, the sciences, and the humanities representative of the broad interests of the Renaissance period. Among his teachers and subsequent friends was the mathematician Christopher Clavius, designer of the Gregorian calendar. Clavius’s course in mathematics included its practical application in astronomy and timekeeping, geography and surveying, optics and music—skills that greatly enhanced Ricci’s reputation in China.

After years as a missionary apprentice in Portuguese-controlled Goa, Ricci was selected by Valignano to join Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607) in the conversion of China through the accommodation method. Ricci first entered China in 1583. He was allowed to reside in Beijing in 1601, where he died. Ricci’s tomb can still be found in Beijing today (12 Maweigou Road, Fuchengmen district).

Ricci reached Beijing as an expert in both Chinese and Western knowledge (xixue). In dress and lifestyle, in all but his celibate state, Ricci had followed the model of a Chinese scholar and gentleman since 1594. He had also memorized the Confucian canon and had demonstrated a deep understanding of Chinese literary style and argument in his publications Tianzhushiyi (The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) and Jiayoulu (Treatise on Friendship, 1596). He had created the first world map (mappomondo in Italian, kunyu wanguo quantu in Chinese) with China at its center, which had been widely copied and distributed. He had also translated the Greek geometer Euclid into Chinese and introduced his teacher Clavius as the Renaissance Euclid. He impressed his friends with inventions such as the astrolabe (an instrument used to observe and calculate the position of celestial bodies before the invention of the sextant). A gift of two clocks that struck on the hour, a painting that used the technique of perspective (unused by Chinese artists at the time), and a musical instrument called a spinet gained him access to the emperor and the palace. Through his openness, wisdom, and integrity Ricci won the trust of educated Chinese at a time when the weakened state of the Ming government, paired with foreign military encroachment, strengthened
xenophobic tendencies. Most of his friends and converts among the literati had ties to the tonglin group striving for government reforms.

Ricci’s contributions to Catholic missions in China are manifold. Limiting his association with Portuguese and Spanish colonial settlements while in China allowed him to present his missionary work in the light of cultural exchange rather than as part of colonial conquest. Ricci presented Catholicism and Western learning, particularly mathematics and astronomy, as an organic whole capable of supplanting Chinese accomplishments in philosophy and science. He was also committed to the basic tenet of the accommodation method: that missionary work needed to understand and respect Chinese culture. Careful interpretation of Chinese texts allowed him to claim an early Chinese monotheism. He thus presented Catholic
Christianity as both a continuation and a restoration of Chinese traditional thought and offered a way to integrate Chinese Confucian learning into Catholicism. He was, however, highly critical of contemporary neo-Confucian thought and Chinese Buddhism. Ricci believed in gradual change. Examination of the ritual practices surrounding the commemoration of personal ancestors and of China’s philosopher Confucius convinced Ricci that converts could participate in such ritual practices with slight modifications. Wherever he stayed he won converts from all social classes, starting Catholic congregations in cities such as Zhaoqing, Nanchang, and Nanjing.

Ricci’s claims of an early Chinese monotheism and his tolerance toward Chinese ancestral rites have been disputed to this day and fueled the Rites Controversy. While Ricci and many Jesuits considered the ancestral rites to be civic, representatives of the mendicant orders, Benedictines, and Franciscans saw them as religious and therefore incompatible with Catholic practices. But Ricci’s integrative approach led to the baptism of several important scholar-officials whose patronage allowed Ricci, Chinese Christians from all social classes, and future Catholic missionariness—even those from mendicant orders highly critical of Jesuit missionary techniques—to evangelize and weather the storms of repeated persecutions in relative safety.

Lydia GERBER

Further Reading

RICHARD, Timothy

Li tímótài 李提摩太

1845–1919 Welsh missionary, educator, and reformist

Timothy Richard was a Welsh Baptist missionary who laid the groundwork for the rise of the Chinese Republic through his articles in the newspaper, Wan Guo Gong Bao, in which he detailed methods that would lead to economic, legal, and cultural reform.

Still considered one of the most influential foreigners in China, Reverend Timothy Richard was a missionary, educator, writer, publisher, and reformist. Indeed, his efforts established a viable education system in which Western sciences and the humanities were stressed within the borders of China; and his writings awoke the newer generation to the potentials of a life unbounded by tradition. This new spirit of reform and change enabled the eventual establishment of the Republic of China, with its break from an age-old imperial system of government.

Born in the small village of Ffaldybrennin in South Wales, Richard was not content to follow in the footsteps of his family and take up farming. Working at various jobs, he earned enough money to get an education and to become a teacher. But this did not satisfy him, and he realized that his true calling lay in mission work. At the age of twenty he entered the Haverfordwest Theological College and became a Baptist minister. While there, he decided to become a missionary in China.

In 1870, sponsored by the Baptist Missionary Society, Richard arrived in the coastal town of Yantai, Shandong Province, where he spent five years with other missionaries. He soon came to criticize their methods of preaching in public places and advocated instead the emphasis of education along with the tenets of the Christian faith, for he believed that missionary work needed to go hand-in-hand with education and reform. Before long, he adopted Chinese dress and moved further inland, where he handed out Christian and educational literature that he himself had written and provided whatever medical care he could. This too didn’t yield enough results for Richard; he realized that his efforts were best directed at the men in power—the scholar-officials—the very backbone of imperial China.

When the great famine of 1876 hit northern China (in which some 13 million people died), Richard immersed himself in relief efforts. But all that he did was vitiated by the scholar-officials, who cared more about personal agendas than aiding their own people. Thus Richard realized that China’s greatest need was for Western-style education, as well as Western philosophical principles, which could be used to end human suffering. As a result, he began to advocate sweeping changes at the governmental and institutional levels, by way of his articles in the newspaper Wan Guo Gong Bao, or The Review of the Times, which was published, by another missionary, Young John Alen, from 1868 to 1904, and wherein topics such as the establishment of a just government, the necessity of universal education, and the elimination of feudal practices were discussed. Such a message found an eager audience among the younger generation, which began to follow his views.
Richard’s opinions were not met with universal approval. His fellow missionaries thought his approach untrustworthy. This led to conflict, but Richard held firm to his belief that what China most needed was Western-style education and Western ideas, such as humanism. In 1891 the Baptist Missionary Society appointed him to the Society of the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese, which in a few years time became the Christian Literature Society. It was during these latter years that he was able to do the kind of work he had always sought to do in China—spread Western-style education to as broad a segment of the population as possible; he hoped that such an educational program would eventually lead to reform. And perhaps as a result of his efforts, the years that followed brought the Chinese national reform movement of 1897, the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1900), and, finally, the Republican Revolution of 1911; all three forever changed China.

Richard only returned to England in 1915 when his health began to fail him, and he settled in London, where he died in 1919.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading

Photo of Timothy Richard at the age of 40. Richard believed that missionary work went hand-in-hand with education and reform. After several years in the company of other Christian missionaries, he moved further inland, where he handed out Christian and educational literature that he himself had written. He provided whatever medical care he could for the people he served. When the great famine of 1876 hit northern China (in which some 13 million people died), Richard immersed himself in relief efforts. 

The 1988 television documentary River Elegy criticized Chinese culture and major national symbols, while indirectly attacking Chairman Mao's legacy. Both the film and the book version drew an immense audience and generated significant controversy within and without mainland China.

River Elegy (Heshang)

Heshang is the title of a television documentary in six parts, which was broadcast twice by Chinese Central Television, in June and August of 1988; is also the title of a book based on the series. The character he 河 of the title refers to the Huang (Yellow) River, long regarded as the cradle of Chinese civilization; the character shang 殇 means "to die young" as well as "elegy or threnody." The title, rendered in English as River Elegy, implies a lament for the death of Heshang culture, or Chinese culture. Although aired only twice, Heshang was viewed by hundreds of millions of people in China, while the text was excerpted in newspapers and published in several different editions, with an estimated million copies printed. Because of its controversial attitude toward Chinese tradition and Western culture, Heshang created a shock wave among Chinese intellectuals inside and outside mainland China and gave rise to heated debates. It was praised by Zhao Ziyang, then general secretary of the Communist party, but vigorously opposed by hardliners such as the vice president Wang Zhen.

Historical Context

Heshang represented a collaboration between several young intellectuals led by Su Xiaokang (b. 1949), a veteran writer of the literature of reportage. As intellectuals, they expressed a strong sense of mission and social concern. In the decade from 1978 to 1988, Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “reforming the economy and opening up to the outside” 不改革开放 had gradually given intellectuals greater freedom to express themselves. The increasingly liberal climate gave rise to New Wave Films and New Era Literature. From 1985 to 1987, in particular, intellectuals focused on the themes of cultural reflection 文化反思 and the search for roots 寻根热. They were acutely conscious of China’s past greatness and modern weakness, and sought to find the roots of backwardness in its traditional culture. But by 1988, difficulties in economic reform, including inflation, had generated public uneasiness. It was under these circumstances that Heshang was conceived and produced. Its creators proclaimed that its purpose was to “arouse the whole nation to self-questioning” and to motivate people to ponder China’s old culture and destiny.

While Heshang’s narration often adopts a scholarly tone, the miniseries is better viewed as a work of art, combining literary and cinematic techniques to push the envelope of permissible discourse at the time. Those whom it offended certainly considered it a political commentary, and in the aftermath of the crackdown of 4 June 1989 at Tiananmen Square, it was officially blamed for provoking the student protests.
CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL ICONS

In searching for the sources of China’s weakness, *Heshang*’s creators took an iconoclastic approach, questioning major icons of Chinese national identity such as the Great Wall, the Huang River, and the dragon. The writers’ primary strategy was to place China’s conservative and inward-looking civilization in opposition to the dynamic and expansionist world of Western civilization.

In the twentieth century, as China defended itself from Japan, the Great Wall became a major symbol of China’s nationalism. The national anthem says, “Let’s make our flesh and blood into a new Great Wall,” while the People’s Liberation Army is called a “Great Wall of steel.” *Heshang* points out, however, that throughout China’s history, the Great Wall never stopped “barbarian” invasions, and its maintenance cost untold lives and treasure. The real effect of the wall was to isolate China from the outside and to assist the ruler in consolidating centralized power. *Heshang* condemns the wall as “a gigantic and tragic gravestone,” representing an isolationist psychology and a defensive civilization, unable to take risks or make progress.

While the Huang River basin is revered as the birthplace of Chinese civilization, *Heshang* notes that the river’s heavy load of sediment rapidly raises the river bed, leading to frequent floods. Flood prevention requires an enormous network of dikes and ditches as well as a system of forced peasant labor to keep the dikes in repair. The need for collective labor tied peasants to the soil, creating a mentality of subservience to authority and resistance to change. The river’s heavy load of sediment is compared to the oppressive weight of the Confucian bureaucratic tradition, which in turn led to the periodic rebellions and insurrections that have devastated the Chinese landscape no less thoroughly than the river’s floods.

Chinese culture regards dragons as benevolent guardian deities, as river spirits that shower the thirsty earth with needed rain, just as China’s emperors, in theory, bestow blessings on a grateful people. Emperors were considered incarnate dragons, and a popular song in the 1980s called the Chinese “descendants of the dragon.” *Heshang*’s creators remind their audience that the spirit of the Huang River used to require human sacrifice and that reverence for the charismatic dragon created a tradition of totalitarian rule. An unspoken comparison, made possible by matching scenes with newsreel footage of the

The 1988, six-part television documentary *River Elegy*, hugely popular and controversial, was blatantly critical of traditional Chinese culture (and implicitly of Chairman Mao). The plot centered on the Yangzi River as an analogy of China’s decline from a great civilization to an isolated country teetering on the brink of obsolescence. Here men gather earth to rebuild dykes along the Yangzi River in Sichuan Province. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Cultural Revolution, suggests that Chairman Mao inherited the role of dragon and dictator.

Yet another Chinese icon is the city of Yan’an in northern Shaanxi province, where Chairman Mao led Communist forces after the Long March. While official history regards Yan’an as Mao’s revolutionary base during the anti-Japanese war, the makers of Heshang show footage of a modern Yan’an that is still poor and backward.

**A THEORY OF CIVILIZATIONS**

*Heshang* boldly proposes that world civilizations can be categorized as either yellow or blue. Yellowness suggests the birthplace of Chinese civilization in the region of loess, or yellowish brown soil, while blueness suggests the open ocean, which Western countries daringly crossed to found empires and to create modern industrial civilization. China is a yellow civilization in that it is agricultural, inward looking, and defensive; Europe and America are blue in that they are industrial, outward looking, and aggressive. Politically, yellow civilizations are despotic and have an ethical creed that forbids opposing views; blue civilizations are marked by the liberation of productive, industrial forces, which in turn require democracy, science, and diversity of opinion as prerequisites. Intellectuals should lead the way in helping China transition to a new blue culture because the only way for China to survive in this competitive world is to bring about modernization and Westernization, according to *Heshang*. The twenty years since the broadcast of *Heshang* have indeed witnessed China’s transformation into a “bluer” civilization, though economic reform has been much more actively promoted than political reform. China is now a major world economic power, one in which the state has given up monopoly control of the economy in favor of markets, created an urban middle class, and pulled large numbers of peasants out of poverty, while also somewhat loosening restrictions on dissent and expanding the freedom of individuals.

**INTERPRETATION**

*Heshang*’s critics accused the authors of the television series of being in favor of “total Westernization,” while its supporters saw the creators as the embodiment of China’s social conscience and the inheritors of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. The TV series and the debate it aroused have been studied by historians of Chinese popular culture as the reflection of an identity crisis in contemporary Chinese society.

**Pin P. WAN and Richard W. BODMAN**

**Further Reading**


Romance of Three Kingdoms is one of the four classic fictions and the first chaptered novel of ancient China. Based on the efforts of historians, storytellers, and dramatists, it gives a vivid account of the saga of the rise and fall of the kingdoms of Wei 魏, Shu 蜀, and Wu 吴 between 169 and 280 CE. Its influence on the Chinese psyche and culture is profound and far-reaching.

Sanguo yanyi (Romance of Three Kingdoms), short for Sanguozhi tongsu yanyi (Popularized Romance of the Record of Three Kingdoms), is one of the “Four Classic Novels” of ancient China and the first chaptered novel in its history. Although Luo Guanzhong is credited for writing it between the Yuan (1279–1368) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties, the novel was also indebted to the efforts that historians, storytellers, and dramatists had made in the previous five centuries. Sanguo zhi (Record of Three Kingdoms) by Chen Shou (233–297 CE) was the first historical record of the Three Kingdoms (220–265 CE). Shishuo xinyu (New Stories of the Past) by Pei Songzhi (372–451 CE) added more tales and legends about them. By the tenth century biased or fabricated tales about the protagonists proliferated, as in the popular Sanguo stories, which made Liu Bei the legitimate descendant of Han royalty. During the Yuan dynasty, more than forty zaju dramas depicted additional famous characters and scenarios that would eventually appear in Romance of Three Kingdoms, and later scripts for storytelling suggested a rough outline of the ultimate novel.

Romance of Three Kingdoms is a saga of the rise and fall of the kingdoms of Wei, Shu, and Wu between 169 and 280 CE. The first thirty-three chapters recount the contention for supremacy among multiple strongmen, resulting in the rise of Liu Bei of Shu, Cao Cao of Wei, and Sun Quan of Wu. Chapters 34–50 depict the decisive Battle of Chibi (Red Cliffs) leading to the sharing of power among the Three Kingdoms. Chapters 51–115 are devoted to Liu Bei and, after his death, his chancellor Zhuge Liang and his military exploits. Chapters 116–120 tell of the Sima family usurping the throne of Wei and establishing the state of Jin after conquering Shu and Wu.

The twenty-four-volume Sanguozhi tongsu yanyi, block-printed in 1522, is the closest text to the lost original. Different editions with varied volumes, chapters, and versions appeared later. The 120-volume Romance of Three Kingdoms, edited by Mao Lun and Mao Zonggang between 1654 and 1722, proves to be the most popular among readers. The framework is largely true to history although the details are products of imaginative re-creation.

Romance of Three Kingdoms represents the highest attainment in the romance genre of Chinese literary history. It manages to weave a century’s schemes and wars into an orderly, relevant, and interrelated whole. It depicts one battle after another with a well-measured flowing rhythm, analyzing the strategies used in them in great detail. Characters such as Liu Bei, Cao Cao, Zhuge
Liang, Guan Yu, and Zhang Fei are so vividly portrayed that they are deeply rooted in the Chinese spirit. Some have become deities worshiped by the millions. The code of conduct promoted in the novel still guides today’s behavior in many aspects. Zhuge Liang, who is known “to spare no effort in the performance of one’s duty,” served as a role model for China’s premierses Zhou Enlai and Wen Jiabao. A part of the Chinese lexicon is also owed to the novel.

*Romance of Three Kingdoms* continues to inspire tremendous artistic and literary creativity. The novel has been rendered in various contemporary media, including television series, movies, and arcade and computer games. An eighty-four-episode television serial aired in China in 1991, for instance, while a forty-seven-episode cartoon serial ran on TV Tokyo simultaneously. The game series *Dynasty Warriors*, which is based on characters in the novel, is available for most video game consoles.

Haiwang YUAN

**Further Reading**


Ruan Lingyu was a famous actress of the silent screen during the “golden age of Chinese cinema.” She appeared in twenty-nine films before committing suicide at age twenty-four.

One of the most famous actresses of the silent screen, Ruan Lingyu was wildly popular in China during her lifetime, and posthumously became well-known throughout the rest of the world. She appeared in twenty-nine films in Shanghai during the 1920s and 1930s, the “golden age of Chinese cinema.” Historian Frederick Wakeman Jr. has written about how films and their stars affected audiences during that period: “It is difficult to exaggerate the centrality of cinema to Shanghai’s mass culture. Movie actors and actresses were national celebrities and popular idols” (Wakeman 1995, 11). Ruan Lingyu was a goddess among deities in these entertainment circles after her rise to stardom from humble origins.

After her working-class father’s death when Ruan Lingyu was six years old, her mother worked as a maid-servant in a wealthy Shanghai household to support her family. At sixteen Ruan Lingyu started to earn her own income as an actress for Ming Xing Film Company. Her first film with the studio was released in 1927, after which she made four more films with that studio. Then she made six films with Da Zhonghua-Baihe Film Company before she changed studios again in order to headline films for Luo Mingyou and his Lianhua Film Company. Ruan Lingyu starred in her most impressive and influential films at Lianhua, including Spring Dream in the Old Capital (Gudu Chunmeng, directed by Sun Yu, 1930), Three Modern Women (Sāngē Mode Ng N✉xīng, directed by Bu Wancang, 1933), Small Toys (Xiaoy Wanyi, directed by Sun Yu, 1933), and The Goddess (Shennu, directed by Wu Yonggang, 1934).

Ruan Lingyu’s films ranged from costume dramas to contemporary melodramas, and many of her films dealt with political issues of the day. For example, in New Woman (Xin nùxing, directed by Cai Chusheng, 1934) massive navy destroyers filmed in the harbor at Shanghai bring an immediate association with the theme of anti-imperialism. But Ruan Lingyu’s emotional performances are often thought to stand out the most. In New Woman Ruan’s character pleads, “I want to live!” as doctors try to revive her after a suicide attempt. In Small Toys Ruan plays a village woman named Ye who loses her home to warlords in the early 1920s and her daughter (played by Li Lili) to the Japanese during the 28 January 1931 Incident. At the end of the film, with no living immediate family members, the long-suffering and partially insane Ye addresses the camera/audience directly, screaming: “Resist!” And in The Goddess, in which Ruan is a single mother who turns to prostitution in order to raise her son, each scene emotes an intense pathos from an actress at the height of her prowess.

On a night in 1935 Ruan Lingyu attended a party with her employers and colleagues from Lianhua Film Company. During this gathering, immortalized in Hong Kong
director Stanley Kwan’s postmodern biopic Centre Stage (1992), staring Maggie Cheung as Ruan Lingyu, the actress had more on her mind than the evening’s festivities. After enduring financial struggle, a love life publicized by the intruding eye of the tabloid press, and—where speculation regarding motive has yet to cease—a career spent portraying forlorn characters, the twenty-four-year-old actress committed suicide.

James WICKS

Further Reading

Ruan Lingyu (1910–1935) performed in twenty-nine films in Shanghai during the “golden age of Chinese cinema.” She was one of the most famous actresses in the history of the silent screen, but the news of her suicide at age twenty-four brought to the spotlight enduring financial struggles and a love life publicized by the intruding eye of the tabloid press.
Plagued by unstable markets, incompetent government, and local welfare, China’s Rural Reconstruction Movement developed in the 1920s and 1930s as a collation of projects committed to non-revolutionary reform of village life. Although they did not succeed in their immediate purpose of saving the Chinese countryside, they helped to shape the perception that rural China was in crisis.

The Rural Reconstruction Movement 乡村建设运动 (xiāngcūn jiànshè yùndòng) of the 1920s and 1930s was a loose coalition of several hundred independent projects, government experimental districts, missionary projects, and schools. The best known projects were at Ding Xian, Hebei Province, under the leadership of Y. C. James Yen (Yan Yangchu), and at Zoup ing, Shandong Province, under the leadership of Liang Shuming. These diverse groups shared a commitment to reforming village life by nonrevolutionary means but to be independent of the Nationalist government. They did not succeed in their immediate purpose, but they shaped the perception that rural China was in crisis and that any government of China should be judged by its ability to deal with that crisis.

The rural economy in imperial times was considered the responsibility of the emperor and his officials; the weakening of central governance in the early twentieth century left the countryside on its own. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the village economy in coastal commercial China actually improved, but the 1920s and early 1930s brought unstable world markets, incompetent government support, local warfare, disruption of access to markets, deterioration of the land, drought, and little access to credit. In addition, the gap between urban intellectuals and the countryside widened. The imperial Confucian cultural world had not been divided into “city” and “country,” per se, but with the opening of China to the world and the new prestige of foreign schooling, many educated youth lost touch with the village. New Culture intellectuals of the 1910s held rural values to be responsible for China’s weakness. Li Dazhao, for instance, wrote in 1919: “The blackness of the Chinese village has reached its nadir, and the common people are all blind to their situation, not knowing how to protect themselves or band together for mutual aid . . . From morn ’til eve they work in the fields like horses and oxen” (“Youth and the Village,” Chen Bao 1919). In 1923 radical Nationalist and Communist activists organized the Peasant Training Institute in Guangdong. These activists, including future Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong, saw China’s rural problem as “feudalism” and destruction of the landlord class as the answer.

Emergence of Rural Reconstruction

In response to the rural challenge and the radical revolutionary program, a number of intellectuals of liberal and conservative persuasions in the New Culture generation...
made their own “discovery” of the countryside. They saw the problem not as class exploitation but rather as social disorganization and lack of support. The answer was neither to return to the past nor to import Western scientific techniques, which were expensive and not fitted to China, but rather to go to the countryside and create a basis for China’s own modernity.

In 1923 Y. C. James Yen and Tao Xingzhi founded the National Association of Mass Education Movements (MEM) to organize and coordinate urban literacy campaigns but quickly decided to start programs in the countryside where the vast majority of the Chinese people lived. Tao founded a teachers’ training school in Xiaozhuang, a village outside Nanking (now called Nanjing), which combined training and activism, but it was closed down, probably for political reasons, in 1927. In 1926 the MEM started a pilot program of “People’s Schools” (minjian xuexiao) in Ding County, Hebei Province. These schools, unlike expensive government schools, met at times convenient for the students, in rent-free places such as temples or homes, and used local volunteer teachers. They were cheap, indigenous, and effective. However, one graduate complained, “Dr. Yen, my stomach is just as empty as my illiterate neighbor’s” (Hayford 1990, pp. 53–59). Yen responded by recruiting a team of experts, many of them with foreign graduate degrees, to live in the villages and make a “laboratory county” to develop scientific techniques that suited poor, agrarian China.

The Ding Xian Experiment, as Yen called it, produced the integrated Fourfold Reconstruction Program to attack the “four weaknesses” of village life—poverty, disease, ignorance, and misgovernment. The U.S. journalist Edgar Snow visited in 1933 and proclaimed that “rural China is being remade.” The program coordinated culture, economics, health, and political divisions. The People’s Schools remained the entry point. Graduates became “little teachers” to spread literacy and create an organizational network. Demonstration farmers tested new techniques, seed, and breeds of pigs, which led to economic buying cooperatives and eventually to cooperative marketing of cotton. Village health workers, trained to form the base of a public health pyramid, kept records, spread public health knowledge, gave vaccinations and other simple medical care, but referred harder tasks to trained nurses in the market towns or to the hospital in the county seat. The MEM also developed a village theater and local publications. In 1932, after the global depression devastated the rural economy, the national government created an institute run by Yen and his colleagues to take control of the county government, collect taxes, and plan for political reform.

A woman separates wheat from chaff in the Lanzhou, Gansu Province. Over 60 per cent of China’s population still lives in rural areas. Because the media so often focuses on “China’s economic miracle” and its booming urban population, many Westerners are unaware that China’s vast hinterland is in a dangerous state of crisis. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Zouping (Shandong)

In 1926 Liang Shuming, a Confucian scholar who drew from the past but did not want to return to it, was frightened and inspired by the radical peasant movement in Guangdong. Partly borrowing from the Ding Xian Experiment, partly drawing on the precedent of the shuyuan (the traditional Confucian academy), he obtained the political backing of the Shandong provincial government to set up a rural reconstruction program in Zouping. Confucian moral education and group organization were emphasized over technical development, leading some to distinguish “scientific Ding Xian” from “philosophical Zouping.”

By the early 1930s the experiments in Ding Xian and Zouping caught the imagination of the public and the eye of the Nanking government. Almost every provincial government sponsored rural training programs and experimental districts, and colleges sponsored local projects. Liang Shuming and Y. C. James Yen organized the Rural Reconstruction Movement, which held national meetings in 1934 and 1935. The Rockefeller Foundation sponsored the North China Council on Rural Reconstruction to coordinate university, government, and private groups. On the eve of the War of Resistance against Japan the national media reflected a new rural consciousness; the village was the foundation of the nation, China’s path to a unique modernity, and the basis for national defense.

After 1937

The war destroyed the local rural reconstruction projects, and national priorities shifted to military control and political competition. The wartime Rural Reconstruction Party did not achieve major influence. In 1948 Y. C. James Yen obtained funding from the U.S. Congress for the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). The JCRR carried out land reform and development projects on the mainland, but only after moving to Taiwan in 1949 did it achieve major results. In the late 1980s and 1990s the New Rural Reconstruction Movement, based in Beijing, explicitly modeled itself on the earlier one.

Charles W. HAYFORD

Further Reading

Russia-China Relations

É luó sī he Zhōng guó de wàijiāo guān xì

俄罗斯和中国的外交关系

China and Russia have a long history of political and ideological differences. Territorial disputes, especially concerning the Far Eastern frontier, also have strained relations. China’s economic growth and Russia’s economic decline have shifted the balance of power between the two countries.

Differences deeply embedded in a long history of conflict and territorial disputes complicated China-Russian relations long before Communist regimes came to power in either China or Russia. Political and ideological differences exacerbated this relationship during the Soviet era. Russian Cossacks pushed into Siberia in the seventeenth century as hunters and trappers. In the later 1600s these settlers moved into the Amur River basin to establish agricultural settlements. This expansion of czarist Russia into regions claimed by China’s Qing dynasty (1644–1912) eventually resulted in confrontation along the Far Eastern frontier. The two powers concluded the Treaty of Nerchinsk in August 1689, delimiting the Far Eastern sector of the China-Russia boundary in an effort to avoid further conflict. The 1727 Treaty of Burinsk delimited the middle sector (roughly the current Mongolian-Russian boundary).

During China’s decline in the nineteenth century, Russia continued to advance into the Far East. Concluded in 1858, the Treaty of Aigun redrew the boundary between the two countries along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, but left territory east of the rivers in “joint possession” for future negotiations to settle. Two years later Russia prevailed on China to negotiate the Treaty of Peking (Beijing). This treaty granted the territory between the Amur and Ussuri rivers and the Sea of Japan to Russia.

Russia also advanced into Central Asia, where China claimed control over the area that is today China’s autonomous region of Xinjiang. The 1864 Chuguchak Protocol and the 1881 Treaty of Saint Petersburg (Treaty of Ili) defined generally the boundary between Russian Central Asia and Chinese Central Asia. Following the 1881 treaty, many boundary commissions worked to demarcate precisely the China-Russia boundary in Central Asia. This work was completed, except for one sector in the Pamir Mountains that was delineated by the 1884 Protocol on the Sino-Russian Boundary in Kashgaria (modern Chinese Turkestan, in Xinjiang) but was never demarcated. Russian troops occupied the area in the early 1890s, and the Qing court protested by sending Russia a note stating that it retained its claim to the region even if it did not maintain a garrison there.

Following the Japanese defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Russia prevailed on a weakened China to grant it the right to build a railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok, with a southern spur running southwest through Manchuria to the Chinese port city of Lushun (Port Arthur), which eventually became Russia’s principal naval base in East Asia. Just days before the fall of the Qing dynasty, Russia compelled China to sign the 1911 Qiqihar Treaty, which ceded to Russia several hundred square kilometers near the eastern trijunction of Russia, Mongolia, and China.

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legacy of Russian encroachment into regions that the Chinese consider their territory continued to plague China-Russia/Soviet relations until the final decade of the twentieth century.

The Sino-Soviet Alliance of the 1950s

Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. For the next decade, China followed the Soviet development model, adopting a centrally planned economy with state-owned factories emphasizing heavy industry. Thousands of Russian advisers went to China to train Chinese technicians, and Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union to study. With time, however, China’s growing resentment of Soviet domination, ideological differences between the two countries, and boundary disputes left over from the past sowed the seeds of conflict that led to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, and eventually a border war in 1969.

Territorial Issues in China-Soviet Relations

Following the 1917 October Revolution, the new Soviet government issued the Karakhan Manifestos of 1919 and 1920, which renounced all the treaties concluded by the
czarist government with China. However, new boundary treaties were not a high priority in subsequent negotiations, which dealt with the issues of Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway controlled by Russia.

Mao Zedong raised territorial issues in early 1950, while he was in Moscow negotiating the Sino-Soviet alliance. The two nations discussed the status of the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) during this first Sino-Soviet summit. Mao stated his desire for the eventual reunion of Mongolia with China and raised the boundary issues as well. The Soviet Union was apprehensive about China’s ambitions in Mongolia and Stalin insisted on a Chinese declaration acknowledging the MPR’s independence. Several times during the next ten years China raised the boundary question with the Soviet Union and in 1960, with the open split in the Sino-Soviet alliance, the boundary dispute became a major source of tension.

As ideological and political tensions escalated between the Soviet Union and China, the Soviets grew concerned that the boundary question had become so salient an issue in Sino-Soviet relations. In May 1963 the Soviet Union proposed holding boundary consultations. At the talks, which began in February 1964, Mao blocked progress toward an agreement when he raised historical issues. He contended that during the czarist period, China had ceded more territory to Russia than to any other imperialist country and that czarist Russia had expanded its borders at the expense of China. Mao stated that the list of “lost” Chinese territory was long and the Chinese had not yet “presented their bill” for it. Russia accused China of betraying socialist internationalism, fostering a Maoist personality cult, and adopting radical Maoism. China accused Russia of Soviet imperialism and abandoning Marxism. After this polemical exchange, the two powers made no progress on boundary questions.

During China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the boundary dispute flared up again. In March 1969 a military confrontation at Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River proved that the boundary dispute could easily spark a larger military conflict. In the wake of the March clashes, tensions also rose along the border in Xinjiang, and during the summer of 1969 several other military incidents occurred. Moscow became increasingly alarmed and even contemplated a preemptive strike against China’s nuclear facilities. Both China and the Soviet Union understood the real possibility of escalation and agreed to renew boundary negotiations.

Boundary Settlement

During the 1970s and early 1980s the two countries made no progress toward a boundary settlement. But with the

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Shanghai Exhibition Hall (formerly the Palace of Sino-Soviet Friendship). In 1992 President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and President Jiang Zemin of China both began promoting a strategic partnership between China and Russia. This new focus on China-Russia cooperation resulted in several high-level meetings and agreements. The two leaders formally announced the strategic partnership during a summit meeting held in April 1996 in Shanghai. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, Chinese-Soviet relations began to improve. A significant breakthrough came when Gorbachev, speaking in July 1986 in Vladivostok, showed a clear willingness to improve China-Soviet relations and publicly stated that Russia was willing to adopt the international standard and draw its eastern boundary with China by using the main channel of the Amur and Ussuri rivers rather than China’s shoreline, as it had previously insisted. This significant leadership change, and Russia’s new position on a boundary settlement, resulted in renewed negotiations.

Coupled with Gorbachev’s Vladivostok initiative was the Soviet Union’s growing willingness to withdraw its military from Afghanistan, which it had invaded in 1979, end its support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, and dramatically reduce its troop strength along the Chinese-Russia border and in Mongolia. Progress in satisfying these three Chinese preconditions for normalization of relations resulted in the first Sino-Soviet summit in twenty years in May 1989, when Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping met in Beijing, formally ending the thirty-year-old Sino-Soviet split.

Mutual interest in improving bilateral relations as both Russia and China pursued economic and political reform led to a quick resolution of the boundary dispute. At the outset of new negotiations, both sides agreed to use the old treaties as the basis for determining the border and to delimit the boundary according to internationally accepted principles of international law. In June 1990 China and the Soviet Union agreed to sign a treaty covering areas on which they had reached a compromise. They signed the boundary treaty when Chinese president Jiang Zemin traveled to Moscow in May 1991. The newly established Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation ratified the accord on 3 February 1992, and the Standing Committee of the Chinese National Peoples Congress ratified it on 25 February. Russia and China concluded a treaty delimiting the short fifty-three-kilometer boundary to the west of Mongolia in September 1994. In April 1999 demarcation of the entire Chinese-Russian boundary was finally completed with the exception of a few islands along the eastern border and a remote mountainous area in Central Asia; the detailed maps and comprehensive documentation weighed more than thirty kilograms.

The areas that remained unsettled were a never-before-demarcated region in the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia and the islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Moscow was willing to accept the watershed principle in establishing the boundary in the Pamirs; that is, it was willing to draw the boundary along the highest peaks of the mountains. Nevertheless the issues remained complex, and both sides agreed to postpone a final settlement until after negotiations were completed for the eastern sector of the boundary. However, with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990, China was faced with negotiating boundary settlements with the newly independent Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. China negotiated boundary settlements with the three Central Asian states relinquishing approximately seventy percent of the territory Beijing claimed historically belonged to China. Ownership of the controversial islands was eventually resolved and a supplementary boundary treaty was signed in November 2004.

Post–Cold War Relations

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, China-Russia relations entered a new phase. This sudden and fundamental shift in the global balance of power made it imperative for China and Russia to develop closer relations. In the mid-1990s, Chinese and Russian leaders formed a Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” to counterbalance American unilateralism in world affairs. These closer military and strategic relations between China and Russia are due in part to both countries’ intensely nationalistic response to American power in the post–Cold War world. China and Russia, both undergoing a difficult transition from Communism to a market economy, have bruised national identities that make them natural allies against America’s global cultural, economic, and military influence.

In 1992 President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and President Jiang Zemin of China both began promoting a strategic partnership between China and Russia. This new focus on China-Russia cooperation resulted in several high-level meetings and agreements. The two leaders formally announced the strategic partnership during a summit meeting held in April 1996 in Shanghai. The two countries now have a thriving military relationship, with Russia’s cash-strapped military industries supplying China’s
The present China-Russia strategic partnership is unlike the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s. China and Russia do not have a formal military alliance. Nevertheless they cooperate closely to improve military-to-military relations and to develop confidence-building measures. Closer relations have reduced tensions along the border, as well as over nuclear weapons, and made both countries more secure in the face of the threat they perceive from the United States.

Economic relations have improved more slowly than the military relationship. Trade over the past several years has grown reaching $48.16 billion in 2007, a 44.3 percent year-on-year increase, and they have a goal of increasing bilateral trade to between $60 billion and $80 billion by 2010. A robust border trade has developed over the past decade, and several border towns have become “open cities” to facilitate this dynamic local trade. The slow development of economic and trade relations was due largely to the problems Russia was experiencing with the transition from a centrally planned command economy to a market economy.

The greatest potential for cooperation is in the developing energy sector. China’s rapid economic development during the past several decades has increased its demand for imported oil and gas. Estimates are that China will import 1.3 million barrels of oil a day by 2010. In October
2008 China and Russia reached agreement to construct a pipeline connecting Russia’s oilfields to China. The Russian Far East has vast undeveloped oil and gas fields. However, Russians living in the Russian Far East are reluctant to develop closer relations with China because of their apprehension about the socioeconomic consequences of a stronger Chinese presence in the region. This apprehension is rooted in the deep historical differences and the history of conflict along the long mutual boundary. The demographic imbalance in the Far Eastern regions of Russia and northeastern China is also a point of concern. The Russian Far East has a population of roughly 8 million, while northeastern China has a population of approximately 100 million; the Russians fear Chinese immigration will cause them to become a minority in their own country. Regional leaders in the Russian Far East have been more skeptical than leaders in Moscow about developing closer economic relations with China. They would rather develop closer relations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

**Future Concerns**

Although in the post–Cold War world China and Russia share common strategic concerns and some complementary economic interests, they will not easily overcome the deeply rooted historical and geopolitical legacy of conflict. Many inherent tensions are simply due to the fact that China and Russia share a long border. More fundamental causes of friction are the result of China’s dynamic economic growth and Russia’s economic decline, resulting in a shift in the balance of power between the two countries over the long term. Russian anxiety, especially in the Russian Far East, over what is perceived as a demographic time bomb just across the border in northeastern China will stymie closer economic cooperation and integration for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, if China and Russia effectively manage the inherent tensions in their bilateral relations, closer military and economic cooperation is possible. One factor that will determine the closeness of Russia-China relations is the relationship between the United States and China and between the United States and Russia. Certainly for economic reasons, both countries would value a better relationship with the United States more than a closer relationship with each other. But concern over American “hegemony” or unilateralism could cause a closer China-Russia strategic relationship that may form the cornerstone of an anti-American coalition seeking to undermine U.S. influence in important regions of the world, including the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

**Further Reading**

Sanxingdui

Sanxingdui 三星堆

The Sanxingdui site is one of the most important bronze-age sites in the Chengdu Plain of Sichuan Province. Archaeological discoveries at the site, for which the Sanxingdui culture is named, include remnants of city walls and two sacrificial pits. The pits have yielded thousands of bronze and jade objects, which have provided evidence for reconstructing bronze culture in the Chengdu Plain.

Sanxingdui, the most important archeological site and center of the Sanxingdui culture (c. 2800 – c. 1000 BCE), is located 40 kilometers north of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province. The site covers an area of about 12 square kilometers and includes more than thirty locations. It was known to the public as early as 1929, when a local farmer dug up more than four hundred objects made of jade and hard stone and sold them on the antique market.

The Museum of the China Western University (Museum of the Sichuan University today) conducted a brief excavation of the site in the 1930s. Archaeological surveys and small-scale excavations were carried out from the 1950s to the 1970s. Large-scale excavations from 1980 to 1994 revealed remnants of city walls covering an area of 2.6 square kilometers. The walls were constructed by the pounded-earth technique in the first half of the second millennium BCE, contemporary with or even earlier than the early Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) city at Zhengzhou in the Central Plain. The walls at Sanxingdui meander in three directions except in the north, where the Yazi River runs through, and were protected by trenches. The trenches were connected to the Mamu and Yazi rivers, creating a solid defense for the city. In addition, archaeologists have found a pottery kiln and over fifty building foundations inside the city and a group of twenty-eight graves outside the city.

The most exciting discoveries at Sanxingdui are two large sacrificial pits 300 to 400 meters north of the southern city wall. The pits, accidentally discovered by local brick factory workers in 1986, have since yielded thousands of bronze and jade objects. These objects, with distinct and astonishing styles, have drawn great attention around the world to this mysterious ancient culture. They are the primary material evidence used in reconstructing the Sanxingdui bronze culture in the Chengdu Plain.

Pit 1 is 4.5 to 4.64 meters by 3.3 to 3.98 meters at the top and 4.01 by 2.8 meters at the bottom. It is dated to a period contemporary with late Yinxu Phases I and II of the Shang dynasty. Objects excavated from the pit include 420 artifacts made of bronze, gold, jade, and hard stone, pottery, and amber; fragments of 10 bone objects, 13 ivory tusks, and 62 seashells. About 3 cubic meters of burned bones were also found in the pit. Pit 2 is 5.3 by 2.2 to 2.3 meters at the top, 5 by 2 meters at the bottom, and 1.4 to 1.68 meters in depth. It is dated to the period from late Yinxu Phase II to Yinxu Phase IV. It yielded 1,300 objects laid in three layers, including 735 bronzes, 486 pieces of jade, 61 pieces of gold, 15 stone objects, 3 pieces of turquoise, 67 elephant tusks, 4 fragments of ivory objects,
120 ivory beads, 2 tiger teeth, and 4,600 seashells. Many of the objects were burned and destroyed before being dumped into the pits, suggesting the practice of rituals at the site.

**Mask Mystery**

The most fabulous findings from the pits are two large bronze standing figures; forty-four bronze heads, some of which are covered with gold foil; and twenty-three anthropomorphic masks and nine animal masks executed in sculptural form. These artistic representations have no parallel among the bronze productions at the Shang center at Anyang. One of the two standing figures from the pit was reconstructed. It is thought to represent a wu shaman, a shaman king, or a shaman leader. Interpretations of the bronze heads and anthropomorphic masks are even more diverse. They are identified as ancestors, wu shamans, gods, and other deities. All the bronze heads lack torsos, implying they may have been dressed or attached to other objects originally. The animal masks might represent the ancestors of the later Shu people. In addition to these impressive figurative representations, six large bronze trees, bronze architecture elements, and numerous small bronze pendants in various shapes such as birds and flowers further indicate a complex system of ritual ceremony with a spectacular display of social wealth.

The majority of the bronzes and jades from both pits exhibit distinct local styles. A small number of bronze vessels, including fourteen zun and six lei wine containers similar to the Shang style, have been found, suggesting that cultural interactions took place between the Sanxingdui and the Shang. Nevertheless, Sanxingdui culture clearly had its own cultural and ritual traditions that were distinct from those of the Shang.

The material remains from the two sacrificial pits suggest that the Sanxingdui culture must have possessed sophisticated jade-making and bronze-casting technology. A centralized, complex political organization must have existed to support the workshops and organize large-scale productions. Religion and ritual practices seem to have played a significant role in the society. At its peak the Sanxingdui culture had expanded beyond its homeland on the Chengdu Plain to surrounding areas such as southern Shaanxi Province, the upper Han River valley, and western Hubei, where objects of typical Sanxingdui styles have been discovered.
Beginning and End Debated

The predecessor of the Sanxingdui culture is still a matter of debate. Some scholars trace the culture’s roots to local Baodun culture during the Neolithic period (8000–5500 BCE), while others argue that it developed from the culture that migrated into the Chengdu Plain. The fate of the Sanxingdui culture is as puzzling as its origin. It is not clear whether the Sanxingdui culture suddenly collapsed, moved out of the area, or transformed into a society of different social and political organization. Discoveries of more than five thousand gold items, objects made of jade and hard stones and bronzes, and ivory tusks and pottery at the Jinsha site in the western suburb of Chengdu since 2001 could provide clues to this puzzle.

Yan SUN

Further Reading


It is easy to dodge a spear that comes in front of you but hard to avoid an arrow shot from behind.

明枪易躲，暗箭难防

Míng qiāng yì duǒ，àn jiàn nán fáng
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, is a virus which caused a pandemic when it struck eastern Asia in 2002 and 2003, with large rates of infection recorded in the cities of Hong Kong and Guangzhou, the island of Taiwan, and other southeast Asian areas. The initial outbreak’s media coverage was not accurately reported to international authorities, the exposure of which prompted reform in international disease monitoring.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, is caused by the SARS coronavirus, also known as SARS-CoV, which infects and replicates within the bloodstream. Symptoms of the virus include respiratory difficulties, fever, throat and mouth inflammation, occasionally myalgia (muscle pain), and lethargy. Most fatalities associated with the SARS outbreak were due to pneumonia and were largely confined to the very young and the elderly. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated the final mortality rate at 9.6 percent.

Diagnosis in the early days of the outbreak was usually either the common cold or influenza, but increasing numbers of patients with similar symptoms and a history of contact with one another helped distinguish SARS as a new disease. The first WHO report identifying SARS by name was in March 2003, four months after the first case. The source of SARS was originally thought to have been from masked palm civets, which are common in south and Southeast Asia, after SARS was found in the blood of civets found for sale in a Guangzhou market. As a consequence, thousands of civets were killed to prevent new outbreaks of the disease. In 2008, genetic studies at the State University of Ohio traced SARS back to several species of bats living in the area, but the connection between the bats and humans is not known.

Outbreak and Containment

The first case of SARS has been tracked back to the city of Guangzhou (Canton), in southern China, to a rural farm worker who became ill in November 2002. The disease began to spread in rural areas either from person-to-person contact, or from the original source. This outbreak was reported by the Chinese government as an outbreak of influenza to the WHO in the early days of February 2003. On 21 February, an unnamed doctor, who had been treating patients in the countryside, visited Hong Kong, where he transmitted the virus to other guests at his hotel; once his own symptoms manifested and he was hospitalized, the hospital staff were infected as well. It is estimated that between 70 percent and 85 percent of all SARS cases can be traced back to this one doctor. Outbreaks in Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan, and Vietnam were reported in March, and the first non-Asian case of the disease emerged in Canada. The forty-five days from the middle of March to the end of April were the most active times of the epidemic in the south of China, as schools, public buildings, and residential areas were all shut down. By the end of April, the virus had been
identified, and the quarantine was lifted in Vietnam. The United States withdrew its diplomatic staff from Guangzhou and Hong Kong facilities, but they quickly returned, when the WHO lifted its warning level due to a lack of new infections in April.

SARS didn’t arrive in northern China until early April 2003, which is remembered as a particularly disruptive time in Beijing. International media sources focused on images of Beijing’s efforts to control the outbreak, as the Peking University campus was shut down and residential area were sealed off. Many public areas, including subways and restaurants, were uncharacteristically empty.

Containment of the outbreak was accomplished primarily through public space restrictions and awareness...
campaigns. During the event, large public announcements warned against risk and encouraged sanitary behavior. Quarantines were enforced in large parts of several cities, and hospitals were given increased support from central authorities. By the end of April 2004, these measures were effective, and the rate of new cases of the disease reported fell.

Aftermath

SARS was the first international epidemic of the twenty-first century. It tested the international community’s ability to share information and to develop solutions for disease control in a time when ease of travel can quickly result in the spread of disease far from its initial occurrence. In the first months of the outbreak, the central Chinese government restricted information about the epidemic. Once the emergence of the disease became public knowledge, the central authorities increased media coverage, until by March and April, coverage of the outbreak was front-page news almost every day. Major international media attention to the outbreak was not given until a Westerner, James Earl Salisbury, died in the first week of April, having been sick for a month. There was a relatively intensive personnel shakeup as well, with the replacement of the mayor of Beijing and reorganization of the Ministry of Health.

After coverage of the spread of SARS began to spread to international media outlets, rapid international quarantine efforts began, and systems to prevent the spread of the virus were implemented. These were primarily through travel restrictions, warnings, sanitary efforts, and screenings at major travel hubs for persons with greater than average body temperatures. These screening stations are still in place today. Overall, the WHO reported 8,096 cases of SARS and 774 deaths.

The socioeconomic impact of SARS is debated. In all of the major cities affected, conferences and events were cancelled. In the United States and other western countries, business in Chinese restaurants declined during and in the months after SARS. The impact was still felt several years after, despite the fact that all major Chinatowns in North America did not report any cases of SARS. In Toronto, the hardest hit non-Asian city, a WHO travel warning led to a major decline in tourism, which recovered after celebrity concerts and other efforts by the Canadian government. After the two-to-three month period in 2003 when the SARS epidemic was at its height, the only cases have been at virology institutes in isolated contamination incidents in April and May 2004.

The Editors

Further Reading


Less well-known than his contemporary Marco Polo, Rabban Sauma was a Christian Uygur monk who traveled in the opposite direction as Polo, from China to western Europe. In France he presented to the king a proposal by the Mongol governor of Baghdad to form a Mongol-Christian alliance to recover Jerusalem from the Muslims. The alliance never materialized.

Rabban Sauma, a Christian Uygur monk, and his young colleague Rabban Markos traveled from Beijing to western Europe in the mid-thirteenth century. Christian missionaries from the Nestorian, or Syrian, branch of the Church had reached China in the seventh century and had created a small but learned Christian community during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). When the Mongols under Chinggis (sometimes spelled Genghis) Khan conquered China in the thirteenth century, they found the Nestorians to be useful ambassadors, counselors, doctors, and merchants. Mongol leader Khubilai Khan (grandson of Chinggis Khan) embraced all religions equally, but he found it helpful to set Christian and Muslim advisors against the predominant Confucians and Buddhists in China. When Rabban Sauma and Rabban Markos proposed a journey to Europe, Khubilai Khan gave them a travel permit guaranteeing safe passage through his vast empire.

Crossing central Eurasia was a dangerous mission, but Sauma and Markos took shelter in a Nestorian community in Khorasan (in Persia), then passed through Azerbaijan and reached Baghdad, the seat of the patriarch of the Nestorian Church. They toured famous churches and monasteries as they moved on to Jerusalem. Because they knew the Chinese, Mongol, and Persian languages, they had excellent qualifications not only for religious service but also for diplomatic service. In 1280 the patriarch appointed Markos head of the Nestorian Church of China. The Mongol governor, or ilkhan, of Baghdad had grander plans for Sauma. The governor’s greatest enemies were the Muslims who held Jerusalem, Egypt, and Syria, and he knew that the western European crusader kings likewise considered the Muslims enemies and shared his goals of conquering them. In 1287 he sent Rabban Sauma to contact King Louis IX of France (who, however, had died in 1270) and ask the king to consider a Mongol-Christian alliance to recover Jerusalem. The governor gave Rabban Sauma official orders, money, animals, and travel passes and sent him with gifts for the king of the Franks, the king of the Greeks, and the pope. Rabban passed through the Byzantine empire to Constantinople (modern Istanbul), met the king of Byzantium, and toured the great churches of the city. He went on to Rome, where he passed on his letters to the pope and the king of the Franks. He astounded the cardinals of Rome with the news that Christian communities had spread all across eastern Eurasia as far as China and told them that many Mongols had been baptized Christians. After touring Italy’s famous churches, Rabban Sauma moved on to Paris, where he
met the French king Philippe IV, and, according to his account, he then met the king of England, Edward I, in Bordeaux.

Ultimately the grand alliance of the Mongols and Christians against Islam never formed because the Christian powers distrusted each other too much, and the Mongols had other wars to fight. Rabban Sauma’s mission presented a surprising opportunity that could have changed the course of history. Christians in western Europe had heard mythical tales of a Christian kingdom of Prester John far off in Asia: Now they had actually met a Christian from China. Everyone has heard of Rabban Sauma’s famous contemporary Marco Polo, who claimed to have crossed Eurasia from west to east. Fewer people know of Rabban Sauma, but his story is more plausible than Marco’s. Sauma traveled with official documents from the Mongol khan on a diplomatic and religious mission; a learned man, he impressed the nobles and religious elites of every country he visited. Compared with Rabban Sauma, Marco Polo seems little more than a jailed, bankrupt merchant and tall-tale teller. Rabban Sauma’s adventures show how the Mongol conquests had united the entire continent of Eurasia and made it possible for learned men to cross great distances and still find themselves in a common religious community.

Peter C. PERDUE

Further Reading

The lotus root may be severed, but its fibered threads are still connected.

藕断丝连

Ou duan si lian
Johann Adam Schall von Bell was a German Jesuit missionary, mathematician, and astronomer. He modernized the Chinese calendar during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties and contributed to the introduction of Western contemporary science to China. After the Qing takeover in 1644, Schall became head of the imperial astronomical bureau, which remained in the hands of Jesuits until 1776.

Johann Adam Schall von Bell (Tang Ruowang) was born into an aristocratic family in Cologne, Germany in 1592. He joined the Jesuit order in 1611 and finished his education at the Collegio Romano in Rome. He reached Macao in 1619 and spent more than a decade working for the Jesuits in Beijing and Xi’an. In 1630 Schall was asked to assist in the reform of the Chinese imperial calendar, a project initiated by the Christian official Xu Guangqi (1562–1633). In collaboration with Giacomo Rho (1592–1638) and a staff of Chinese astronomers, Schall completed the project and published extensively on mathematics and astronomy. He also made converts to Christianity at the imperial court.

Having supported the Ming dynasty’s failed efforts to stay in power through battle plans and the casting of cannons, in 1644 Schall nonetheless moved his allegiance to the new Qing dynasty. He soon became head of the imperial astronomical bureau, which remained in the hands of Jesuits until 1776.

“P. Adam Schaliger a German Mandarin of ye first order.” An engraving of Johann Adam Schall von Bell, an eminent seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary to China, for a book by Johannes Nieuhof (1618–1672).
astronomical bureau—the first European to hold high office in China—and subsequently prepared the annual calendar for the Qing empire based on Western mathematics. Schall’s position and proven expertise provided some protection for all Jesuits in China during this period of transition.

Schall’s experience at the court in Beijing included great achievements and great setbacks. Schall became a teacher of Western science and a friend to the Shunzhi emperor (reigned 1644–1661). In 1650 Schall received permission to establish the first Catholic church in Beijing. In 1658 he was promoted to mandarin of the first and highest rank. However, the emperor’s sudden death left Schall vulnerable to intrigue. In 1664 he was accused by the anti-Christian activist Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) of having caused the emperor’s death by choosing an inappropriate day and site for the funeral of his infant son. Schall was thrown into prison, and most of his fellow missionaries were asked to leave Beijing for Guangzhou (Canton). On 15 April 1665, Schall, who had lost his voice in a stroke, was sentenced to death. However, a major earthquake the next day convinced the judge of Schall’s innocence. Schall returned to the Jesuit residence, where he died the next year.

Regardless of his success at the Qing court, Schall’s work faced heavy scrutiny among Jesuits and the Catholic authorities in Rome. He was accused of holding an office contrary to the rules of the Jesuit order and of supporting idolatrous practices by editing the imperial calendar. Both claims were judged insubstantial under the specific circumstances. In 1668 the Kangxi emperor (1662–1722) had Schall’s rank fully reinstated and ordered a state funeral for him at the Jesuit cemetery at Shala.

Lydia GERBER

Further Reading

Four kinds of organizing principles formed the basis of traditional science in China: Heaven and Man, yin–yang duality, the wu xing or Five Phases, and qi. They were combined to build a complex theoretical structure for the relationships and patterns that Chinese doctors and scientists found in nature.

Just as it did elsewhere in the premodern world, scientific thought in China emerged with early attempts to think about the natural world abstractly and systematically. One of the earliest attempts to organize the phenomenological and natural world was the ancient divination text known today as the Book of Changes (I Ching). Although today writers find antecedents for many modern scientific ideas in this text, to early Chinese science and many other areas of Chinese philosophy, the Book of Changes was a way to organize and classify natural phenomena—the first step in any scientific tradition.

Because many of the terms used in this system of classification came from ancient mystical traditions of shamanism and divination (the practice that seeks to foresee future events or discover hidden knowledge, usually by the interpretation of omens or by the aid of supernatural powers), assigning them strict definitions is particularly challenging for Western students of Chinese life and science. The terms yin and yang, wu xing, and qi have been the subject of much debate in the vain quest for precise Western equivalents. But the fact that these terms are still used in schools of traditional medicine in China testifies to their usefulness in Chinese science.

Organizing Principles

From these beginnings emerged four kinds of organizing principles to form the basis of all premodern Chinese scientific thought: Heaven and Man, yin–yang duality, the wu xing or Five Phases, and qi.

The relationship between Heaven and Man is central in Chinese scientific thought and is expressed in several ways. In astrology and astronomy not only is man part of the natural world, but also heaven reflects and responds to the human world below. The fenshu (field allocation theory maps) of the second century BCE divided the heavens into political regions in the human world and then into specific agencies within the imperial government. Specific constellations corresponded to specific government ministries, and the unpredicted appearance of an object in a ministry’s constellation was interpreted as an ominous sign.

Chinese medicine interprets the relationship between nature and man in terms of both microcosm and macrocosm. The human body can be interpreted as both a natural world in miniature and as an integral part of a larger natural world. As a result, ailments are diagnosed as either dysfunctional imbalances within the microcosm of the human body or as imbalances between the human body and the external world.
Light and Dark, Male and Female

Yin and yang were terms used in early Chinese thought to express the basic duality of all phenomena. The earliest examples can be found in the Book of Changes, and some scholars claim that conscious expression of the notion of polar dualities can be seen in the art of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). The terms yin and yang are used to express the observation that many things have a dual nature: both light and dark, hot and cold, male and female. The Chinese characters for yin and yang literally describe the dark and light sides of a hill. In medicine the terms are used most frequently as adjectives, qualifying things based on their observed qualities, such as yin qi or yang qi.

Metal, Wood, Water, Fire, and Earth

Chinese science uses the Five Phases (wu xing) to further describe and classify phenomena, especially processes. An emphasis on process and interaction is a distinguishing characteristic of Chinese science and medicine. Whereas much of early Western medicine stressed the mechanical relationships of organs and other body parts, Chinese medicine looked at how the many characteristics of the body and nature interact and sought ways to describe and classify these interactions. The Five Phases, often confused with the Aristotelian “elements,” are the metal phase, wood phase, water phase, fire phase, and earth phase. The word xing means “to do or act, action, activity.” The Five Phases or activities of qi are often used to explain cyclical transformations found in medicine and elsewhere.

The Five Phases and Qi

Qi is the most important term in Chinese science and one of the most difficult to translate. Today most scholars choose not to translate the term, but some of the better Western equivalents for the term qi include “vital energy or substance” or “matter-energy.” The science scholar Nathan Sivin explains that qi is simultaneously “what makes things happen in stuff” and “stuff in which things happen” (Sivin, 1977). Qi can either take form and become visible and substantial or can be an agent that activates processes and influences their development. As a result, the concept

Historical illustration of Chinese metal casting. The Five Phases (wu xing)—metal, wood, fire, water, and earth—can be used to describe and classify relationships and processes at work in the realm of science.
of qi is central to Chinese medicine. Qi circulates through the body as a kind of vital energy, but, unlike blood, it has no substance. Qi instead activates and influences how blood and the organs function. Often qi is beneficial, but sometimes qi, especially from an outside source, can upset the balance within the body to create an ailment. The responsibility of the Chinese doctor is to diagnose this imbalance and take corrective measures.

The Five Phases describe five aspects of qi and their cyclical relationship. The wood phase does not describe the texture of qi but rather qi that is growing and developing a certain potential. When qi moves on to the next phase, fire, it realizes this potential and becomes active. The fundamental sequence of the Five Phases is sometimes called the “cycle of mutual production.” The sequence of the cycle is based on early empirical observations, but in practice its use is much more theoretical. When wood is burned it produces fire; fire produces ash (earth); ores from the earth become metal; water condenses on cold metal; and wood can grow with water. The logic behind this sequence is more mnemonic than practical. What was important to the Chinese doctor or scientist was the relationship between the different aspects of qi.

All of these basic concepts—Heaven and Man, yin and yang, the Five Phases, and qi—can be combined to build a complex theoretical structure for the relationships and patterns that Chinese doctors and scientists found in nature. Even though Chinese and Western thinkers confronted the same physical universe—human bodies in China differ only superficially from bodies elsewhere in the world—Chinese science and medicine developed a unique theoretical structure for understanding the phenomena in the universe, a system of understanding that Chinese scientists refined for almost two thousand years.

Paul FORAGE

Further Reading


Self-Strengthening Movement
Yāngwù Yùndòng 洋务运动

The Self-Strengthening Movement, which began in 1861, was an effort by the Qing dynasty to restore power so China could resist Western encroachments, especially after the Second Opium War, which resulted in the burning and looting of the Summer Palace in Beijing by British and French forces.

The goal of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895) was to employ Western technology while retaining traditional Chinese values to meet the threat of Western imperialism. The Chinese assumed they could adopt Western technology, but not the values and philosophies that produced such technology. With their superior wisdom and intelligence, the Chinese believed, they would first learn from the West, then equal it, and eventually surpass it.

With such a mindset the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government and various provincial officials began a series of self-strengthening projects. The most urgent goal of these projects was to develop military industries by building arsenals and shipbuilding dockyards to bolster the navy. The projects centered on military modernization initially and subsequently on economic self-strengthening. Thus China built Jiangnan Arsenal, Shanghai Arsenal (supervised by Zeng Guo Fan), Fuzhou Dockyard (supervised by Zuo Zong Tang), Nanjing Arsenal and Tientsin Arsenal (supervised by Li Hong Zhang), and Tianjin Machine Factory. China also sent students to the United States and constructed the Beiyang Fleet, one of the four modernized navies in the late Qing dynasty. The navies were sponsored by Li Hong Zhang, viceroy of Zhili, and became the dominant navy in East Asia before the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The Beiyang Fleet was said to be the best in Asia during the late 1880s.

Prince Gong, a member of the ruling clan of the Qing dynasty and one of the chief proponents of liberal reform that aimed to strengthen the empire against Western encroachment.
The Self-Strengthening Movement also created the Zongli yamen (foreign affairs office). Prince Gong (1833–1898), aided by a new generation of leaders, was made head of the Zongli yamen. In contrast, the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908) was staunchly antiforeign but was resigned to accommodating Prince Gong because he was influential in the Qing court. But as her political influence grew, she became a formidable opponent of reform.

The time period of the Self-Strengthening Movement roughly approximates that of the Meiji Restoration of the Meiji period (1868–1912) in Japan but with differences. For example, Japanese leaders were more willing to part with the past and to alter the structure of government and society because of the strong desire to resist imperialist encroachments. By contrast, Chinese leaders were unwilling to change dramatically the system of government or the social hierarchy, and as a consequence struggled at the margins. China’s defeat by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War exposed the weaknesses of the nearly four-decades-long Self-Strengthening Movement.

Charles DOBBS

Further Reading

Drinking with a bosom friend,
a thousand shots are too few;
Talking with a disagreeable person,
half a sentence is too many.

酒逢知己千杯少，
话不投机半句多

jiǔ féng zhī jǐ qiān bēi shǎo，
huà bù tòu jǐ bàn jù duō
Shaanxi Province

Shānxì Shěng 陕西省

33.93 million est. 2007 pop. 205,000 square kilometers

Shaanxi Province (not to be confused with neighboring Shanxi Province, which has a comparable population) is a mostly mountainous northwestern province about twice the size of Iceland. The capitals of the Qin, Han, and Tang dynasties were located near the capital city of Xi’an. In 1935 the Chinese Communist Party established its headquarters in Yan’an on the northern plateau. Important agricultural products are millet, wheat, rice, and tubers.

The northwestern Chinese province of Shaanxi (Shensi, Shanxi) borders on Gansu Province and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region on the west; Shanxi, Henan, and Hubei provinces, following the course of the Huang (Yellow) River, on the east; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on the north; and Sichuan Province on the south.

Covering 205,000 square kilometers, Shaanxi is geographically divided into a large northern and a much smaller southern part by the Qinling mountain range. The northern region is a high, eroded loess (unstratified loamy deposit believed to be chiefly deposited by the wind) plateau about 1,000 meters above sea level. This is a fertile but dry steppe, with a temperate climate and an annual precipitation of 300–500 millimeters. South of the Qinling range the climate is subtropical, with annual rainfall of 750–1,000 millimeters. All of Shaanxi has a continental climate, with monsoon rain from July to September. The capital is Xi’an (estimated 2007 population 7.64 million), which is situated in the valley between the Wei River and the Qinling range. Shaanxi is divided into eight regions and ninety-three counties.

The Wei River valley was inhabited by settled peasants before 5000 BCE, and it was the homeland of the Zhou people, who overthrew the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) and founded the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). The capitals of the Qin (221–206 BCE), Han (206 BCE–220 CE), Tang (618–907), and some minor dynasties were located in the vicinity of modern Xi’an. After the Tang dynasty fell the capitals of succeeding dynasties were founded in eastern China, and Shaanxi lost its importance as a political center and declined to become one of the most destitute areas in China.

Rebellions, civil war, and famine wreaked havoc in the province well into the twentieth century. In 1935, after the Long March, the Chinese Communist Party established its headquarters in Yan’an on the northern plateau, from where it fought Japanese occupying forces from 1937 to 1945 in the War of Resistance against Japan (known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War).

The majority of the population lives in the valleys of the Wei and Han rivers, and the most important agricultural products are wheat, millet, rice, and tubers, but rapeseed, tobacco, and soybeans also account for a considerable part of the agricultural economy. Sheep breeding is important on the northern plateau, and south of the Qinling range corn, beans, fruits (especially apples), tea, and medical herbs are grown. Industry, which is concentrated along the Wei River, has a relative high output of light industrial...
products such as sewing machines, cloth, television sets, and watches, but heavy industry is also significant.

**Bent NIELSEN**

**Further Reading**


Puppetry began as a performing art in ancient China. Its high point was the Qing period (1644–1912). Although puppetry survives in the twenty-first century, it has declined in recent decades. Several different forms exist, including rod puppets, marionettes, and shadow plays. Some features differ according to region, but the stories tend to be the same across China.

Shadow plays are among the large array of ancient performance arts using artificial figures in Chinese puppetry. Despite earlier prototypes, the first confirmed reference to manipulated puppets in theater performance is to the debauched Emperor Gao Wei (reigned 565–576 CE) of the short-lived Northern Qi dynasty (550–577 CE), who is said to have loved puppet performances; according to the marionette specialist Robin Ruizendaal, Gao was himself ridiculed in later puppet performances as “Baldy Guo.” The Tang emperor Xuanzong (reigned 712–756 CE) included puppetry in his Imperial Academy of Music (established 714 CE), and puppet shows were popular in the marketplaces and even with officials under the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE).

Puppet shows reached a height of popularity in the urbanized and sophisticated culture of the Song dynasty (960–1126), with some puppeteers achieving considerable fame. Writings about the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) capital Kaifeng and about Hangzhou, the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) capital, attest to various kinds of puppets. These included water puppets (shui kuilei), which have died out in China but remain popular in Vietnam, rod puppets (zhangtou kuilei 枝头傀儡), manipulated from below, marionettes or string puppets (xuansi kuilei), and shadow puppets but not yet glove puppets.

The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) represents the acme of China’s puppet theater. Rod puppets were spread virtually all over the country, while glove puppets flourished in Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Hunan, and Fujian Provinces and marionettes in Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Hunan, and Fujian provinces, the latter being home to several particularly ancient and famous forms of puppetry and theater.

**Shadow Puppetry Origins and Development**

The earliest definite references to shadow plays date from the Northern Song dynasty, just before the earliest authenticated human-acted dramas. In the capital cities of the Song dynasty at least thirty-three troupes existed, and many Song shadow play performers were female, probably the earliest female puppeteers in history. Shadow puppetry was found in the entertainment quarters, public spaces, private houses, temples, and even the imperial court.

Although the Song dynasty was a great age of shadow theater, the highpoint was the Qing dynasty. By that
time a substantial range of shadow puppet traditions had emerged, perhaps the most important being those of Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces. According to the theater scholar Chen Fan Pen Li, Shaanxi shadow puppetry “spans the widest area of influence and features the largest number of minor traditions” (2004, 5). By the Qing dynasty all puppeteers were male.

Shadow plays (yingxi 影戏) combine “design, carving, and painting with music, song, dialogue, and manipulation of the shadow figures” (Chen 2004, 1). The shadows that distinguish this form of theater from other puppetry result from “pierced, painted, and jointed leather puppets, cast onto lamplit screens” (Liu 1988, 4), these translucent parchment screens being usually made from the hides of domestic animals such as oxen, donkeys, and goats. In the earliest shadow plays some puppets were made of paper or cardboard, and nowadays some are made of celluloid.

**Shared Features**

Chinese puppet shows are generally like regional operas in that the role types are the same, and song and instrumentation are of vital importance, within regional variations. The plots of the plays derive mainly from the oral tradition of the storyteller; the authorship of almost all puppet plays before 1949 is anonymous. During the centuries a great commonality has developed in the stories of the various puppetry forms and the regional operas. Chen stresses the role that women warriors played in the plots of the shadow plays.

**Social Context**

Puppetry in all its forms is intrinsic to Chinese society. Although some among the educated classes, and even emperors, have loved puppetry, it has mostly been a popular rather than an elite art. Puppet performances are a natural part of festivals, including those marking deities’ birthdays. Spring performances ask the gods for good harvests, while those in autumn give them thanks. Because puppeteers are much cheaper to hire than whole troupes of human actors—sometimes just one or two people can manipulate the puppets and sing the various roles—puppeteers have often been invited to private houses for weddings, birthdays, or other family occasions. Puppetry is part of the secular entertainment of the cities, but its role in religious ritual should also be recognized. Writing of one form of puppetry, Chen says: “popular religion informs the traditional shadow theatre and has been a major underpinning of this performing since the Yuan dynasty [1279–1368]” (Chen 2007, 15). Ruizendaal (2006, 2) describes the marionette theater of Quanzhou (now Fujian Province) as “still an intrinsic part” of regional religious culture.

**Modern Change and Survival**

Although change followed the fall of the Qing dynasty, puppetry did not experience the same radical transformation as did human-acted theater. Because of puppetry’s religious connections, the antireligious movements of the twentieth century negatively affected it. On the
other hand, intellectuals introduced various reforms in Shanghai, including: the use of modern spoken plays for puppetry; other Western-influenced phenomena such as using scenography (the art of perspective representation, especially as applied to the design and painting of stage scenery); and having scripts written by individual playwrights.

Under the People’s Republic of China (1949) the government professionalized the folk puppet arts. It took over and controlled most of the puppet troupes, founding others at public expense. In 1955 the Ministry of Culture set up the China National Puppet Arts Company (Zhongguo muou yishu jutuan). In the 1950s a modern puppetry developed, using animal fables and revolutionary stories as well as revised traditional plays. The government organized the first puppet festival in Beijing in 1955, and puppet performances took place in theaters, restaurants, or teahouses more often than before. Trainees included girls as well as boys.

The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) suppressed all traditional themes. Surviving puppetry followed the party-sanctioned themes of the model operas. The traditional puppet forms largely revived in the 1980s. But the troupes tended to dwindle in number in the 1990s. The state has given less money to puppetry in a commercialized age when organizations are mostly expected to keep themselves alive by making profits. Theaters and restaurants remain the preferred venues for urban performances. Rural outdoor puppet shows are still common, however, and folk puppeteers still perform at festivals or occasions such as banquets and weddings. Although in decline, puppetry is not dying out.

Colin MACKERRAS

Further Reading

Shandong Province

Shēndōng Shěng  山东省

Shandong Province is located on the country’s northern coast, across the Yellow Sea from the Koreas, and is home to China’s second-largest provincial population (after Guangdong Province on the south coast). Shandong is home to a large portion of the Huang (Yellow) River and once was home to many Neolithic cultures and ancient philosophers such as Confucius. It is now known for its production of wheat, cotton, and sorghum.

Shandong is a large, densely populated northern coastal province on the Shandong Peninsula, which separates the Bohai Gulf from the Yellow Sea. Shandong Province, bordered on the southwest by Henan Province, on the south by Anhui and Jiangsu provinces, and on the northwest by Hebei Province, is about the size of Mexico in both land area and population. It covers 153,000 square kilometers, and its population density of 579.5 persons per square kilometer ranks it second only to neighboring Henan Province in Chinese provincial population density. Emigrants from the crowded province became a major source of the present population of China’s northeast (Manchuria) during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

China’s Grand Canal historically traversed the province, carrying grain and other trade to Beijing from the lower Yangzi (Chang) River valley, but today this commercial route is of little importance. Today the Huang (Yellow) River is Shandong’s dominant geographic feature, crossing the North China Plain to empty into the Bohai Gulf near the Shengli (Victory) oilfield. Before 1950 flooding by the Huang River caused great suffering, but flood-control projects and water diversions have decreased the river’s flow, and the river has posed no threat in the past half-century.

During the Neolithic period (8000–5500 BCE) Shandong was home to several cultures that made up parts of ancient Chinese culture. During the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), modern Shandong encompassed several important states, including the powerful state of Qi and the lesser state of Lu, closely associated with the Zhou ruling house and its traditions. The ancient philosophers Confucius (551–479 BCE) and Mencius (371–289 BCE) lived in what is now southern Shandong.

In the central mountains Mount Tai has been a major northern China religious site since prehistoric times. The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) began in Shandong as attacks on Chinese Christians and foreign missionaries, but in 1900 the uprising shifted its center north to the Beijing-Tianjin area. German imperialism built the port of Qingdao and Shandong’s first railroad after 1898; in 1915 during World War I Japan took over German interests and remained the dominant foreign presence there until 1945.

Agriculturally, Shandong produces sorghum, wheat, and cotton. Its largest cities and richest land are located from Jinan, the provincial capital, eastward through Weifang to Qingdao. Shandong Peninsula has good ports at Yantai, Qingdao, and Weihai. These ports have grown quickly since 1978, when Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) began China’s reform era.

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South Korean interests invested heavily in Shandong in the decade before the 1997 Asian economic crisis.

David D. BUCK

Further Reading


The Shang inherited the ancestor cult and the use of bronze for ritual purposes from advanced precursors. Much of the information on them comes from inscriptions written on oracle bones used in divining. Later dynasties perpetuated the Shang legacy through continuing practices of ancestor worship, elaborate burial ritual, the calendar, divination, writing, and the layout of the capital’s administrative and ritual center.

Despite mythical accounts of an early Neolithic dynasty known as the Xia (2100–1766 BCE), the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) is the first dynasty clearly identifiable as such from the archeological evidence. At Erlitou in present-day Henan Province, however, remains were found in 1959 of what was arguably China’s first full state formation, and has indeed been identified by some scholars with Xia. Certainly the Erlitou culture (c. 2100–1500 BCE) passed to the Shang a number of material innovations and cultural motifs. Among these was the form of a capital city and ritual center. Covering some three square kilometers, Erlitou was an urban complex bigger than any of the multiple city-states which had preceded it. At the center was a “palace-temple” compound where, among other religio-political ceremonies, feasts were apparently held in honor of the ancestors. The same compound also housed workshops, whose output included bronze drinking vessels for use at these feasts. The aim of the ancestral cult was to take the relationship of authority that had once bound subjects to their king and make it operative across the divide between life and death. The ancestors’ spirit-power was therefore presumed to be very great. At the same time, however, they were taken to be dependent on their descendants for the performance of rituals to keep their memory alive and provide them with the nourishment they continued to need in the afterlife. This ensured a reciprocity between ancestors and descendants which was continued by the Shang in a much more elaborate ritual structure.

The significance of the ritual bronzes introduced in the Erlitou ceremonies was also great, extending through the Shang dynasty and beyond. Most pre-Shang ritual vessels were ceramic. The bronzes, however, were harder and more enduring, and spoke, moreover, of a highly exclusive, even magical production process, redolent of power at every level—not least because Erlitou, occupying the Yiluo alluvial valley with the Huang (Yellow) River just north of it, and generally surrounded by mountains, was well-situated for agricultural yield and natural defenses but entirely lacked the copper, tin, and lead needed for bronze. The need to acquire the materials for its all-important ritual productions in the form of tribute from neighboring polities drove Erlitou’s military and diplomatic expansion. The Shang, which took from Erlitou both the ancestor cult and the use of ritual bronzes—Shang tombs display a greater quantity of bronze than any other world culture—also relied on forced tribute for their basic ritual materials.
Early Shang

From c. 1800 to 1500 BCE, Erlitou underwent a protracted decline; over the next century or so, performance of religio-political authority reached new heights in Zhengzhou, 100 kilometers east of Erlitou and apparently the site of an early Shang capital. According to the founder of Chinese historiography, the Han-dynasty historian Sima Qian (c. 145–86 BCE), there were several Shang capitals; movement from one to the other may have been occasioned by religious obligations, military disadvantage, or food imperatives. It seems that the center of the dynasty’s power was secured above all in the person of the king, whose political authority in turn was reaffirmed in the state worship of the royal ancestral line, rather than through persistent dwelling by the people in a specific geographical locale.

The dynasty resided in Zhengzhou during what is sometimes called the Erligang period, named after a section of the present-day city. Like Erlitou, Zhengzhou enfeoffed (invested with a fief or fee) neighboring polities to acquire the raw materials for a thoroughgoing commitment to ritual performance. This Shang capital, building on the Erlitou model, had two city walls, an inner and an outer; the former enclosed a palace-temple area, the latter three cemetery sites, two bronze foundries, a bronze casting area, and a bone workshop. The inner wall, in other words, bound together the political elite and the craft specialists on whose skill their ritual authority was dependent, and the outer served above all to exclude the city’s other inhabitants. Both human and animal sacrifices were staged for dwellers in the inner area; the human victims may have been common inhabitants of Zhengzhou or prisoners taken in warfare, perhaps for the express purpose of ritual killing.

In the bronze foundries and casting area, craft specialists used key technical innovations to increase and standardize the number of bronze vessel types, as well as to add visual designs. The principal motif found on the Zhengzhou bronzes, and indeed on all subsequent Shang ritual vessels, was later given the name taotie, although the Shang name for it is unknown. At Zhengzhou it began as scarcely more than a pair of eyes in a narrow band of linear ornamentation; through the decades the latter increased in area, the patterns becoming denser and busier. The taotie seems to have figured in some pervasive kind of metamorphic magic.

On all the vessels used to prepare food and drink for offering to the ancestors, for example, officiants and audience would have been aware of taotie eyes watching: the eyes of some kind of tutelary spirit, perhaps, or an opener-up of links between the performers on earth and the absent-present dead of the spirit world. These eyes stood out amidst the dynamic whorls which unfurled around them; the whorls themselves, suggestive of endless metamorphosis and later known as “cloud and thunder patterns,” may have constituted a visual aid to the participants’ imagining of the transformational action under way, in which humans and spirits engaged with each other.

Early Shang power extended as far as the city of Panlongcheng, 450 kilometers south of Zhengzhou, and conceivably to other sites further yet from the middle Huang River valley; at any rate, bronzes using Zhengzhou techniques and often in the Zhengzhou style spread over a rather large area, although this could indicate a sharing of techniques by a number of linked “nodal” sites rather than implying dominance by a Shang center. Zhengzhou itself fell into decline toward the end of the fifteenth century BCE, perhaps as a result of conflict among members of the royal house. Knowledge of developments during the years from circa 1400 to 1200 BCE remains sketchy. At the next and final Shang capital, however, a wealth of prototextual materials abruptly appears, opening up the historical record.

Writing

Extant written records left by the Shang cover the reigns of the last nine kings (Wu Ding, c. 1200 BCE, through Di Xin, c. 1045 BCE), usually known as the Late Shang period. The writing, which has every appearance of a script with some history of development (although the details of that history are still unknown), exists as brief inscriptions on bronze ritual vessels and also as myriad oracle-bone inscriptions, recording an extensive divinatory practice that by the dynasty’s end was the exclusive preserve of the king. The oracle bones, consisting of cattle scapulas and turtle shell plastrons, were “asked” questions concerning ritual matters, the conduct of military campaigns, royal hunts and other excursions from the capital, all aspects of agricultural production, the king’s health, any potentially ominous royal dreams, tributes from surrounding polities,
and many other things. The divinatory method was to apply a hot poker to hollows carved into the bones, causing roughly T-shaped cracks to appear on the opposite side. The king interpreted these according to the degree of angle between perpendicular and cross-bar, and uttered a prognosis based on the divination’s verdict. Following this, the day of the divination, the name of the diviner, the questions asked by the diviner, and the king’s final verdict were inscribed on the bone or plastron, which was stored away with its fellows as records of state.

Late Shang Capital and Sphere of Influence

The Late Shang capital of Anyang was settled along a bend in the Huan River some 180 kilometers north of Zhengzhou; by the dynasty’s end, Anyang covered an area of more than 20 square kilometers. The royal cemetery of Xibeigang was on the eastern side of the Huan; to the southeast, on the river’s other side, the district of Xiaotun included an elite residential area, a palace-temple complex, two altars, a hall of ritual vessels, the great bronze foundry where these vessels were cast, and multiple quasi-subterranean (pit-house) servants’ quarters. The city was located in the area known as Zhong Shang (Central Shang). Outside this state heartland lay “the lands” (tu), inhabited mainly by enfeoffed allies; beyond these were the fang, whose inhabitants tended to be hostile. As concepts, moreover, tu and fang comprised not only the geographical regions and the people who inhabited them, but also the spirit powers believed to inhere in the regions. The tu powers were considered by the Shang broadly benevolent; they presided over regions where...
much of the grain destined for Anyang was grown, and were regularly offered harvest tribute. The fang powers were liable to send baleful, drought-bringing winds into Central Shang, and had to be pacified with Shang sacrificial rites as well as harvest offerings. These rites may have required the king’s journeying to the region(s) in question, as did the frequent military and diplomatic ventures in which the Shang kings engaged.

Within the often ad hoc nature of the dynasty’s alliances and enmities, the dynasty contrived to take in sufficient tributes to meet their ritual requirements, whether in the form of human victims for sacrifice or bones and plastrons for the all-important divination ceremonies; Xiaotun, the administrative center of Anyang, also received a share of the grain production of various labor units, which figured in rituals devoted to commemorating and perpetuating agricultural fertility. State rites were scheduled in accord with a formidably complicated calendar, which resulted from combining two sequential sets of terms (later called zhi, “[Earthly] branches,” and gan, “[Heavenly] stems”) according to a formula that produced sixty gan-zhi pairings. Each of these pairings designated a day in a cycle made up of six ten-day weeks; in turn, six of these sixty-day cycles produced the greater cycle of a 360-day Shang ritual year. The magnitude of the task of having everything in place—musical instruments (notably bronze bells), trained performers, objects for burning, sacrificial victims—to accord with this intricate temporal scheme meant turning, again, to writing; evidence shows that the Shang kept records of the constantly changing stock of ritual materials. It is also known that their protobureaucratic system included variously titled officials, although it is not certain that the titles related to specific responsibilities. It would seem clear, however, that the Late Shang was driven to an increasing degree of managerial efficiency in order to cope with the many and many-leveled demands of staging a variety of ritual performances on a daily basis, as well as managing a range of practical activities that included settling new sites, building ever greater bronze foundries, and keeping track of the incoming tributes as more and more of the land fell under the sway of organized agriculture.

At the height of their power, Shang influence extended over a remarkable range. Over five hundred sites that were culturally, although not necessarily politically, Shang have been found in Henan, Hebei, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Anhui, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan, Inner Mongolia, and Liaoning; together these make up an area covering much of present-day China.

Legacy

The fall of the Shang at the hands of one of their enfeoffed polities, the Zhou, did not cut short their influence on subsequent mainstream Chinese developments. The Zhou (1045–256 BCE) and successive dynasties perpetuated the legacy of the Shang (which was, to a degree, the legacy of Erlitou) through continuing practices of ancestor worship, a patrimonial system of inheriting political status, elaborate burial ritual, the calendar based on Earthly branches and Heavenly stems, divination as a means of state advisement, writing, and a layout of the capital’s administrative and ritual center, found even today in such structures as Beijing’s Forbidden City.

Dallas L. McCURLEY

Further Reading:

China’s most populous city first rose to world prominence in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, it has been at the forefront of China’s economic and international development.

The city of Shanghai is the largest in China; of China’s four province-level municipalities (the other three are Beijing, Tianjin, and Chongqing), only Chongqing outranks Shanghai, due to its larger rural population. Shanghai is the eighth-most-populous city in the world.

As an administrative district, Shanghai is the equivalent of a province. It covers an area of 6,341 square kilometers (for comparison, Tokyo is 2,187 square kilometers and the London metropolitan area is 2,263 square kilometers.) It is located in the center of eastern China on the coast, at the mouth of China’s largest river, the Yangzi (Chang), which enters the East China Sea.

Shanghai is divided into eighteen districts and one county—Chongming Island. The city center of Shanghai is on the west bank of the Huangpu River. The inner nine districts are in the east-bank area, as is the new district of Pudong, which belonged to Chuangsha County until 1992. The outer eight are further away from the urban center.
History

There is evidence of human settlement in Shanghai from as early as 6,000 years ago. Historically, Shanghai was a fishing town, though from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) onward, it also was an important region for cotton manufacture and for shipping. Its ascendancy on the world stage began when the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, which ended the First Opium War with Great Britain, designated Shanghai one of five seaports to be opened for foreign trade. The British, Americans, and French all leased land in Shanghai for their international settlements. These areas were autonomous zones that were outside the jurisdiction of Chinese law.

In 1927, Shanghai was officially established as a city of the Republic of China; it became a municipality with the status of a province in May 1930. In the lead-up to World War II, Japan invaded China; it occupied Shanghai from 1939 to 1945. In 1943, Great Britain and the United States (joined later by France) signed a treaty with the Republic
of China to renounce their leased territory in Shanghai, which they returned to China at the end of the World War II. The five years from 1945 to 1949 were the only period during which Shanghai was purely under the control of the Republic of China; in 1949 that control shifted to the new People’s Republic of China.

Shanghai has special significance in China’s political development and international relations during the twentieth century. Shanghai was the place where the Chinese Communist Party was founded and where it held its First National Congress in 1921. On February 28, 1972, Shanghai was the place where the “Shanghai Communiqué” between the People’s Republic of China and the United States was signed—the outcome of President Richard Nixon’s visit to China (the first visit of an American president) and the start of normalization of relations between the United States and China.

**Economic Growth**

Shanghai was able to become a center of international trade and finance as a consequence of the national policy of reform and openness laid down by Deng Xiaoping, who led China after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976.

When China adopted market socialism, Pudong (East Shanghai) was declared a “special economic zone.” Economic development was encouraged in this region, which flourished. This led to Shanghai’s expanding its development of the new area of eastern Shanghai while at the same time renovating the old area of western Shanghai, divided by the Huangpu River. Six bridges across the river were built to connect the two zones, along with two tunnels under the river and a new international airport in Pudong to supplement Shanghai’s Hongqiao International Airport. In 2005, Shanghai was ranked the world’s...
busiest port in terms of cargo throughput. Shanghai’s port is also the largest in the world, and Donghai Bridge, which links Shanghai to the Yangshan Islands, is the longest cross-sea bridge in the world, with a total length of 32.5 kilometers.

Special Features

The Pudong district in eastern Shanghai has developed into a modern international trade center and is home to one of the tallest towers in Asia, the landmark Oriental Pearl Tower, as well as the Jin Mao tower, which is the tallest skyscraper in China.

The city center is in western Shanghai. One can find old, historical buildings, including the old headquarters of foreign trading houses, in the part of Shanghai known as the Bund, along the bank of the Huangpu River. Shanghai’s most modern architecture, including the Shanghai Museum and Shanghai Grand Theatre, are found in the People’s Square.

Shanghai has more universities than any other city in China, being home to sixteen national universities, one military medical university, eleven public universities below the national level, and six private universities. The most famous, Fudan University, is a comprehensive research university. Its late president, Xie Xide, established China’s first center for America studies at Fudan University, and under Xie’s tenure, presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton both gave speeches at the university when they visited China.

Shanghai is not only a leading city in the economic, educational, and international arenas, it also is a cradle of national leadership. The positions of secretary and mayor of Shanghai became stepping stones to national power in the People’s Republic of China. Jiang Zemin was party secretary of Shanghai before he became the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and eventually chairman of the People’s Republic of China. Zhu Rongji was mayor of Shanghai before becoming prime minister. Xi Jinping, party secretary for Shanghai, was elected in 2007 by the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the National People’s Congress to be vice chairman of the People’s Republic of China and possible successor of Hu Jintao when his term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the People’s Republic of China ends.

Looking Forward

Shanghai is at the forefront not only in economic development, but also sustainability initiatives. With nearly half the nation’s rural population expected to move into urban areas by 2030, sustainable cities are a high priority, and one notable initiative was planned for Dongtan, near Shanghai, although the project has run into considerable difficulties, including the 2006 arrest of its main Politburo sponsor, Chen Liangyu. The future of the project is uncertain.

Shanghai’s hosting of the 2010 World Fair (Expo 2010), with the theme “Better City, Better Life,” has prompted the city to develop four new subway lines and to implement improvements and extensions on four others. Organizers have announced that the expo will center on innovation and interaction, with participants focusing on the urban theme. China hopes to attract two hundred nations and 70 million visitors to Expo 2010.

Teh-Kuang CHANG

Further Reading


The Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 is the agreement between the United States and China that led to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Because they had unresolved issues, each government stated its positions in order to facilitate cooperation. The Communiqué resulted in the establishment of scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges as well as trade ties between the U.S. and China.

The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai Communiqué) announced on 27 February 1972 at Shanghai’s Jinjiang Hotel began the process of normalizing relations between the two nations after twenty-two years of nonrecognition. It was the culmination of a weeklong visit to China by U.S. President Richard M. Nixon (1913–1994) and his wife, during which they toured Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou. On February 21 Nixon, the first U.S. president to travel to China, met with Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976) at a much-celebrated occasion marking the renewal of ties between the two nations and the opening of weeklong discussions. The principal negotiators for the United States were Nixon National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (b. 1923) and Secretary of State William P. Rogers (1913–2001) and for China, Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei (1910–2000), and Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua (1913–1983). The communiqué asserted:

Richard Nixon, President of the United States, in 1972. Nixon thought his diplomatic efforts with China to be one of the high points of his presidency. National Archives.

The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to
have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972)

The first steps leading to the communiqué took place in October 1971 when Kissinger met with Premier Zhou in Beijing at a time when both governments agreed on the need to settle decades-old conflicts and to use new strategies to solve international problems. The Chinese sought to break out of the diplomatic isolation resulting from their role combating United Nations forces in the Korean War (1950–1953), the Nixon administration hoped that China could assist in ending the Vietnam War, and Beijing and Washington both shared a threat from the USSR. (Despite both being Communist nations, the USSR and China diverged on ideological and boundary matters and officially parted ways in 1960.) Nevertheless, negotiations were difficult since the two nations’ foreign policy interests often conflicted. Both sides made concessions while acknowledging the “essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies” (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972).

The communiqué announced that “both governments wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict” and “neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or groups of countries to establish such hegemony” (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972). The latter statement alluded to tensions with the Soviet Union at the time. China and the United States also proposed opening bilateral trade and maintaining contact with the goal of facilitating “new prospects for the relations between the two countries” (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972). On the other hand, viewpoints on several topics proved to be irreconcilable. Zhou Enlai is credited with suggesting an unusual format for the communiqué by which each nation stated its positions on contentious issues rather than trying to reach a compromise. Both governments put aside significant ideological differences in order to reestablish ties.

**Major Obstacle**

The major obstacle to restoring diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in 1972 was U.S. recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan since 1949 and the close military and economic ties between Washington and Taiwan’s Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMD). Chinese leaders would not accept the United States having close ties with both China and Taiwan. Sections 11 and 12 of the communiqué summarize the two governments’ positions. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:
...The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China...; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972)

The U.S. side declared:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China... The United States government... reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972)

The Nixon administration made its boldest moves by not allowing Taiwan’s status to stand in the way of developing a new relationship with Beijing. Nixon ran the risk of alienating his conservative supporters who backed the Chinese Nationalists. Nevertheless, in the Shanghai Communiqué the United States announced its “ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan” (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972) and its adherence to a “one-China” policy that is the basis for U.S. relations with China today.

Discussions also focused on the general political situation in Asia. Other difficult issues on which there was little agreement included the ongoing conflict in Southeast Asia, plans for the reunification of North and South Korea, Japan’s close ties to the United States, and the self-determination of Kashmir, a disputed area in northern India. Each side introduced its policies with general statements, highlighting the two nations’ incompatible outlooks for the future. The Chinese side stated:

Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has
become the irresistible trend of history… (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972)

The Chinese side stated that it firmly supported the struggles of all oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation.

The U.S. side stated:

Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world. (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972)

Normalization Delayed

The signing of the Shanghai Communiqué improved Sino-U.S. relations, allowed cultural and educational exchanges, and opened trade, but it did not immediately lead to normalized relations. In the United States other problems, such as the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and finally Nixon’s resignation, took precedence. Full diplomatic relations between China and the United States were established in January 1979 when President Jimmy Carter (b. 1924) and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) reaffirmed the principles outlined in the Shanghai Communiqué in a second joint communiqué.

June GRASSO

Further Reading


Originally a fictional locale, Shangri-La is now a Chinese township (originally named Zhongdian) in Yunnan Province—although India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Tibet have also claimed to be the inspiration behind British writer James Hilton’s vision of Utopia. The surrounding area, now a UNESCO World Natural Heritage Site, has experienced both recognition for its beauty and controversy over development.

The word “Shangri-La” originated from the Tibetan language, meaning a “bright moon in one’s heart.” The Chinese have renamed a township (originally named Zhongdian) in Yunnan Province “Shangri-La,” based on experts’ identification of it as the place that inspired the British writer James Hilton’s portrayal of a fictional Shangri-La as an earthly paradise in his 1933 novel *Lost Horizon*. Based on the novel, the term Shangri-La has also come to represent, in general, the perfection sought by humans in the form of love, happiness, and other Utopian ideals. In the book, the secluded valley locale known as Shangri-La is gently governed from a monastery and is enclosed by mountains. India, Pakistan, and Tibet have also claimed sites as Hilton’s inspiration. In 1992, Nepal also began to use the name of Shangri-La to attract tens of thousands of foreign visitors.

In 2003, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) listed the area surrounding the newly renamed Shangri-La as a World Natural Heritage Site—the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Area—reportedly taking only twenty minutes to make the decision to include the area for protection. The area covers eight clusters of land adding up to about seventeen thousand square kilometers (approximately the size of Connecticut) and including the upper reaches of the Yangzi (Chang), Mekong, and Salween rivers, which run parallel to one another, north to south. They course through gorges that become at times three thousand meters deep and are surrounded by 6,000 meter peaks. The site, in a temperate region, is considered extraordinary in regard to its biodiversity.

Near the World Natural Heritage Site, controversy has brewed over the issue of building dams in the rivers to produce hydropower and to divert water to Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan. In 2004, after much public outcry, Premier Wen Jiabao halted a plan for such a dam and called for an environmental study. Many people then considered that the damming project was dead. However, in 2008 officials in Yunnan continued to support damming in order to bring economic development to the region.

**Further Readings**

Shangri-La: Where Fact and Fiction Meet

Visions of utopia exist everywhere, and sometimes influence the real world. One of these is Shangri-La, the fictional Buddhist monastery in the Himalayas that is now the name of a recently renamed township in Yunnan Province. The area surrounding the new “Shangri-La” has been recognized by UNESCO as the “Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Area.” The following passage comes from British writer James Hilton’s 1933 novel, describing the main character’s first view of the Himalayas from the air.

Then he turned to the window and gazed out. The surrounding sky had cleared completely, and in the light of the afternoon there came to him a vision which, for the instant, snatched the remaining breath out of his lungs. Far away, at the very limit of distance, lay range upon range of snow-peaks, festooned with glaciers, and floating, in appearance, upon vast levels of cloud. They compassed the whole arc of the circle, merging towards the west in a horizon that was fierce, almost garish in coloring, like an impressionist backdrop done by some half-mad genius. And meanwhile, the plane, on that stupendous stage, was droning over an abyss in face of a sheer white wall that seemed part of the sky itself until the sun caught it. Then, like a dozen piled-up Jungfraus seen from Mürren, it flamed into superb and dazzling incandescence.


gorges-probe/news-and-opinion/china-dam-casts-long-shadow-over-idyllic-valley

China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Located in northern China, Shanxi Province (not to be confused with neighboring Shaanxi Province, which has a comparable population) is known mainly for its coal industry, as it contains one third of the country’s coal deposits. Shanxi also contains significant amounts of other natural resources including iron and copper. Though two major Chinese dynasties were established from Shanxi, the area went through times of poverty and Japanese occupation.

The northern China province of Shanxi borders on Shaanxi Province on the west, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on the north, Hebei Province on the east, and Henan Province on the south. Shanxi covers an area of 156,300 square kilometers (roughly the size of the state of Georgia) of highly eroded plateau at an altitude of about 1,000 meters above sea level. On the western, northern, and eastern fringe, mountains rise from 500 to 2,000 meters above the plateau. The Huang (Yellow) River constitutes parts of the border to Hebei and Henan. Sheltered from winds from the ocean by the eastern mountains, Shanxi has a typical continental climate, with cold winters and dry summers, and an annual precipitation of 400 to 650 millimeters, which makes irrigation necessary. The capital of Taiyuan (estimated 2007 population 3.46 million) is situated in the center of Shanxi, which is divided into six regions and one hundred counties.

Shanxi was inhabited by farmers as early as 5000 BCE, and during the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE), the state of Jin was established in the area. After the unification of China in 221 BCE by the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) Shanxi often came into play as a crucial part in the Chinese empire’s defense against nomad invasions. Both the Northern Wei (386–534 CE) and the Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties were established from Shanxi, but when succeeding dynasties set up their capitals in eastern China, the area declined into a poverty-stricken region ruled by warlords or nomad chiefs. Shanxi was occupied by Japanese forces from 1937 to 1945.

The province is sparsely populated in the northwestern mountainous parts where sheep, cattle, and other livestock are raised. In the agricultural areas, relatively little wheat and rice is grown, the major products being millet, soybeans, and potatoes. Other main crops are cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, fruit, and vegetables. Shanxi has the largest known deposits of coal in China, accounting for one third of the country’s total. The coal is of high quality and the coalfields cover an area of over 57,000 square kilometers and are easily mined near the surface. Other natural resources in significant amounts include iron ores, copper, and gypsum. The industry is concentrated around Taiyuan and Datong in the north. The coal industry is, of course, by far the most important, but important industrial products also include locomotives, automobiles, and tractors. The light industry produces consumer goods such as watches, television sets, and washing and sewing machines. Shanxi
is home of the famous Yungang caves from the Northern Wei dynasty, containing fifty-three grottoes with about 51,000 statues of various Buddhist deities.

Bent Nielsen

Further Reading


Shen Congwen wrote poetry, novels, essays, short stories, and novellas. After the Chinese Communist Party took control of the government in 1949, Shen was branded a conservative, and his books were banned.

Born in Fenghuang Chen (Phoenix Town), a scenic village populated by the Miao minority in Hunan Province, Shen Congwen briefly attended primary school and then went to a military training camp to carry on the family tradition of soldiering. Shen began writing after witnessing the horrors of military campaigns. At age twenty he went to Beijing, became co-editor of the journal *Modern Critic*, and gradually gained recognition for his literary talents. Shen wrote in many genres, including poetry, novels, and essays, but was best known for short stories and novellas, including “Three Men and a Girl,” “The Lovers,” and “Gazing at Rainbows.”

Like his contemporaries, Shen was influenced by Western writers such as Guy de Maupassant, Anton Chekhov, and James Joyce. Later he moved to Shanghai, where he continued to write. Shen’s main sources of inspiration were the Chinese countryside, military life, and the Miao minority ethnic group of Hunan. In 1949 Shen’s productive streak ended after the Communists took power. The Chinese Communist Party labeled Shen a conservative and banned his books. For several decades Shen ceased to write fiction and instead studied porcelain making and the history of Chinese costume, a subject about which he published a renowned study. In the 1980s, as an old man, Shen began to write again, and enjoyed a resurgence in popularity, until his death.

Elizabeth VANDERVEN

Further Reading


Shenyang

Widely known as the birthplace of the Manchu Qing dynasty and an industrial stronghold throughout the socialist era, Shenyang is the capital of Liaoning Province and an economic and cultural hub that conjoins China proper with the three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang that together make up Manchuria.

One of China's largest cities, with an estimated population of 7.2 million and a total administrative area of 12,980 square kilometers, Shenyang is the capital of Liaoning Province and the political, economic, cultural, and transportation hub of northeast China. Situated at 122°25′–123°48′E and 41°11′–43°2′N, Shenyang is centrally located in the hinterland north of Liaodong Peninsula. Its four distinct seasons are typical of northern temperate continental climates.

Archeological discoveries at Xinle Relics date the earliest settlement in Shenyang to 7200 BCE, during China's Paleolithic period. Burial sites from the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) and Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) have also been discovered since the 1960s. Shenyang, then known by the name of Shenzhou, became a major jurisdiction under the Liao (907–1125 CE) and Jurchen Jin (1125–1234) dynasties. Recognizing the locale's geostrategic location as a military garrison, Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang (1368–1399) ordered the initial deliberate city planning in Shenyang. Its ensuing economic prominence as a regional trading and handcraft industry center during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) led to Manchu Qing dynasty founder Nurhachi (努尔哈赤, 1559–1626) choice of the town as the power base for his Jurchen regime, the Late Jin 后金, and his construction there of the Imperial Palace in 1625 (today a big tourist draw, nearly rivaling Beijing's Forbidden City in its magnificence). Nine years later, in 1634, Nurhachi's son and successor Huang Taiji (皇太极, 1627–1643) renamed the Jin dynasty the Qing (1644–1912) and Shenyang was redubbed Mukden (奉天, or Shengjing 盛京). The city has since been most widely known as the birthplace of the Manchu Qing dynasty.

The founding of the Mukden Machine Bureau in 1895 marked the beginning of modern industrialization.
in Shenyang. The year 1898 saw the first Russian-built rail station in the city, incorporating the city into the South Manchurian railway system. Following Japanese occupation in 1931 and the founding of the Japanese-controlled puppet state of Manchukuo (1932–1945), northeast China fell prey to the Japanese colonial projects of military occupation, economic encroachment, and mass migration. Shenyang, with its proximity to the iron- and coal-mining complexes in Anshan and Fushun, quickly became the heavy industrial base and so-called industrial capital of imperialist Manchukuo. Tiexi Industrial District, China’s oldest and largest comprehensive industrial base, took shape under this period of Japanese occupation. As World War II reached its destructive climax, the Japanese destroyed most of the productive capacity in the city; the Soviet Red Army then acquired as booty many of the remaining machines, equipment, and supplies. Subsequent social turmoil further disabled the industrial capacity of Shenyang.

The city’s industrial infrastructure was revived during the first Five-Year Plan period (1953–1957), and it remained an industrial stronghold throughout the Maoist socialist era. Shenyang’s comprehensive manufacturing industries include nonferrous metals, chemicals, automobiles, aviation, machine tools, defense, building materials, electronics, textiles, food processing, pharmaceuticals, and light industrial products. As China transitions from a planned economy to a market economy in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and with a significant number of formerly state-owned enterprises gone bankrupt or privatized, the city has been diversifying its industrial base, a project that has benefited tremendously from the government’s “Revitalize Northeast China” campaign since 2003.

MA Hongnan

Further Reading

Void of a long-term plan will bring you trouble soon.

人无远虑，必有近忧

Rén wú yuǎn lǜ, bì yǒu jìn yōu
The Shenyang Imperial Palace, located in the capital city of Liaoning Province, was the imperial residence of the Later-Jin kingdom (1616–1644) prior to their founding of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Serving as an administrative center for the Manchus, the royal complex’s architecture represents not only the material culture and artistic aspects of its time, but the political necessity as well.

The Shenyang Imperial Palace, or Mukden Palace, was constructed in 1625 when Shenyang (modern capital of Liaoning Province, in northeast China) became the site of the capital city for the Later-Jin kingdom (1616–1644), a Jurchen outpost in Manchuria that rose to power toward the end of the Han Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The palatial complex served as the administrative headquarters and royal residence until the Manchurians breached the Great Wall in 1644 to rule China as the Qing Empire. The architectural complex is particularly noted for its unique synthesis of ethnic Manchu and Chinese attributes. It also provides invaluable data for understanding its owners’ native past and their assimilation into Chinese mainstream culture.

The palace complex covers 60,000 square meters and comprises three groups of architectural structures in parallel north-south axial lines. Completed by 1626, the eastern sector exemplifies the incipient phase of Manchu official architecture and is reminiscent of a military encampment. The Grand Hall of Administration, as the palace’s principle building, was a stage for the Great Khan (as the Manchu emperor was called) to hold court, to inspect his army, and to perform grand rites.

Detail of a carved column at Shenyang Palace, former capital of China during the Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty.
This octagonal, south-facing, double-eaved pavilion on an elevated base incorporates hybrid decorative schemes originating from Tibetan, Mongolian, Manchurian, and Chinese cultures. On its front are ten smaller square pavilions in two equal rows extending outward to embrace an elongated quasi-trapezoidal courtyard. These buildings were offices for the chiefs that were leading military divisions called “Banners,” or administrative precincts in the Manchu government. They allude to the collapsible tent barracks previously used at court assemblies to house Banner chiefs, who were regularly summoned to collaborate with the Great Khan for policymaking. In conjunction with a carriage house behind the Grand Hall, the layout of these buildings visually explains the unique Banner administrative system, which was deeply rooted in a nomadic tribalism.

The main body of the palatial complex is the newer middle section, which consists of rows of mid-eighteenth century additions flanking structures built during 1627–1634. Across a large courtyard from the main entrance in the south is the administration building called the Hall of State Affairs. Beyond is the central courtyard in front of the Phoenix pavilion, a conspicuous, multi-story, hip-roofed structure whose façade doubles as the entrance to the northern courtyard still further behind. The northern sector is the venue of a ritual totem and the Pure Tranquility Hall, in which altars dedicated to ancestors and facilities for shamanistic rites are set next to the emperor’s and empress’s chambers. The entire complex of living quarters, consisting of the Pure Tranquility Hall, the Phoenix pavilion, and four lesser residence halls nearby, is planted on top of a terrace (3.8 m high) that is physically divided from the administrative offices to the south. The use of a high platform to elevate architectural structures from the ground level, in particular, is a distinct Manchurian trait reminiscent of the mountain dwellings of older days. These resident halls also are remarkable showcases of rich regional features of Manchu architectural forms. Among the unique features are variegated roof-ridge ornaments and eave trims, carved frontal animal masks on pillar tops, wooden dragon sculptures as beams under the eaves, along with heated platforms inside.

To the west is the site of a two-story book repository and an operatic performing center. Added to the complex in late eighteenth century, they were constructed to comply with official codes used nationwide. Comparable to typical Ming/Qing official architectures aesthetically and structurally, they appear distinctive yet blend well with older constructions within the palatial compound. Although the royal complex of Shenyang is a fraction of the size of the more famous Forbidden City in Beijing that succeeded it as the seat of Manchu power, its distinct character, rich history, and multifaceted architecture contribute to its status as a unique and irreplaceable element of the complex tapestry of Chinese imperial life.

TzeHuey CHIOU-PENG

Further Reading
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

Shēnzhèn Tèqu 深圳特区

8.62 million est. 2007 pop.

Created as an economic experiment in 1979, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was originally intended as a means to promote growth and export for China. This zone quickly became one of China’s most important centers of export, technology, and economic reform.

Shenzhen is a city in the south of China’s Guangdong Province, on China’s south coast. It borders Hong Kong and the Pearl River, with an area of 2,020 square kilometers (slightly less than the size of Rhode Island), 327.5 square kilometers of which have been designated as a special economic zone (SEZ) since 1979. Shenzhen was only one of four SEZs established to carry out experiments with greater economic freedom. But the transformation of the former rural community into a major export center is the showcase of economic reforms in post-Mao China and has attracted worldwide attention, especially from other developing countries.

Historical Background and Foundation of Shenzhen SEZ

Since the 1960s, so-called export processing zones (EPZs) have been established in various parts of the world with the goal of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and promoting industrialization. While Latin America’s experience with EPZs has been mixed, East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have made their EPZs centers of export-driven growth.

Until the end of the Maoist era in 1976, the People’s Republic of China followed a strategy of development that was diametrically opposed to that of EPZs. The open-treaty ports of the nineteenth century, which had to accept free trade as a result of unequal treaties with the Western powers and Japan, were symbols of national decay. Therefore, Communist China followed a policy of self-sufficiency and isolation. However, China’s Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and its Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) resulted in economic and political catastrophe.

After the death of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and the arrest of the Gang of Four, his hard-line supporters, new leadership under Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) changed China’s economic-development strategy. In July 1979, Guangdong and Fujian provinces were granted the right to carry out economic experiments, and four SEZs were set up: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou of Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of Fujian Province. Later, in 1988, the island of Hainan (formerly a part of Guangdong Province) became the fifth SEZ, as well as its own province. All of these were coastal regions, rich in labor, and located close to the successful market economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The economic opening of these regions was intended to promote growth and exports, but the possibility of growing economic ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan was also seen as facilitating eventual reunification.
Development of Shenzhen SEZ

The newly established town of Shenzhen had originally been a county called Baoan, whose residents earned their living mainly from fishing. When Shenzhen city was established in 1979, it had 314,000 inhabitants. In 2000, it was a town of around 4 million inhabitants; by 2007 the population had doubled.

The development of Shenzhen SEZ can be divided into four phases. The first phase, lasting from 1979 to 1984, saw the establishment of some legal preconditions for the existence of a special economic regime in the SEZ, but only slow changes in economic activity. In 1984, Deng Xiaoping set up an economic framework for the SEZs as “windows to technology, management, knowledge, and foreign policies,” opening a second phase in the institution of preconditions for growth. The inflow of foreign capital, mainly from Hong Kong, slowly accelerated from the mid-1980s, but production processes, contrary to expectations, were mostly characterized by low-technology intensity and were based on the comparative advantage of Shenzhen’s low labor costs. Twice, in 1985 and after the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the SEZs were criticized by conservative Communist Party leaders.

In the early 1990s, the third phase of development began. During this takeoff period, foreign companies from all over the world rushed in, and by 1997, fifty-one of the world’s top five hundred enterprises had taken root in Shenzhen. The export volume of Shenzhen increased to around one-seventh of China’s total ($26 billion in 1998). Deng’s much-publicized trip to Shenzhen in 1992 (as part of his “Southern Tour”) helped gain the trust of domestic and foreign investors. The technology intensity of production also increased, and in 1998 more than 35 percent of Shenzhen’s production was in the high- and new-technology sectors.

The fourth phase of development began with the challenge of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and China’s preparation for entry in the World Trade Organization (WTO). While competition in the domestic market is tougher due to market entry of new competitors and more domestic competition, the WTO accession in 2001 has opened the world market even wider for Chinese exports.

Characteristics and Economic Effects of SEZs

When the EPZs were first established in various parts of the world, they were delineated as areas to provide procedural and operational ease for producers and to offer tax holidays, tax reductions, and duty-free import of capital goods and raw materials for export manufacture. This policy was designed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), generate employment, earn foreign exchange, and eventually link the less-developed hinterland and facilitate technology transfer and transfer of modern-management practice. Infrastructure in the EPZs was limited to industrial estate development.

The Chinese SEZs, by contrast, additionally focused on the provision of supportive infrastructure such as housing, airports, roads, ports, telecommunications, electricity, and transportation. Also, the reform activities expanded to include agriculture, commerce, development of the financial sector, including the opening of a stock exchange, tourism and the service sector, and increasingly since the mid-1990s, privatization of state-owned enterprises and housing. This expansion enabled
Shenzhen SEZ to escape from the fate of many EPZs, which attracted only labor-intensive, low-technology production processes with few possibilities for economic development of the hinterland. Since a general liberalization of the Chinese economy was not possible because of political considerations, the SEZs served as a model for the reform of the rest of the economy in a politically closely controlled area. This indirect effect of the SEZs as models for the economy is as important as the direct effect of the attraction of FDI and the transfer of technology and modern management practices.

**Future of Shenzhen SEZ**

Shenzhen SEZ not only became one of the centers of export, technology, and economic reform in China, but it gradually was able to cope with such early problems as growing inequality, the fate of migrant workers, and environmental degradation.

As China moves through the early years of the twenty-first century, however, the economic position of Shenzhen SEZ must be redirected. Labor costs are increasing, and firms are migrating to cheaper locations. The mushrooming of SEZs and the introduction of open ports and special zones for technological development as well as general economic reforms in China make competition for FDI harder. In the future, the upgrading of production and infrastructure, especially in areas such as education, will be crucial for Shenzhen SEZ.

Bernhard SELIGER

**Further Reading**


Shenzhou Space Project
Shènzhōu Jīhuà 神舟计划

China began work on its Shenzhou Space project in 1992. Since 1999, the project has successfully launched seven spacecraft, three of which were manned (starting with the Shenzhou-5 in 2003), and one of which (in 2008) included a space walk. The space program is a source of national pride, a demonstration that China has the technology to keep pace with other developed countries.

China began planning for manned space flight in the late 1970s. Because of shifting political and economic priorities, though, no serious work was begun until 1992, with the creation of Project 921. In 1994 the project name was changed to the Shenzhou Space project. The project reportedly was named by then President Jiang Zemin (in office 1993–2003). Shenzhou 神舟 means “divine craft.” To date, there have been seven Shenzhou missions. The first manned mission was Shenzhou-5 in 2003. The project has become a tremendous source of pride for China, as it became the third country capable of independently rocketing humans into earth orbit.

After mastering ballistic reentry techniques in its space program, China began the Shuguang-1 (meaning “Dawn”) project in the late 1970s to launch Chinese astronauts into space. However, the project was postponed for two decades because of political and financial reasons, although during the 1980s Chinese experts debated whether to use a modest ballistic capsule design or a highly advanced two-stage reusable space shuttle.

On 21 September 1992, Project 921 was begun, with some help from Russia, to develop a spacecraft with the capacity for human flight by 2000. In 1994 the spacecraft was formally named Shenzhou.

The early Shenzhou spacecraft were similar to the Russian Soyuz spacecraft but larger and with all-new construction. The spacecraft had three modules: the orbital module at the front, the reentry capsule in the middle, and the service module at the base. Unlike the Soyuz, the orbital module was equipped with its own propulsion, solar power, and control systems, allowing autonomous flight. Since the late 1990s, Shenzhou spacecraft have been launched on Long March-2F (LM-2F) booster rockets from Jiuquan, Gansu Province, in northwest China.

The first launch of a Shenzhou spacecraft was on 21 November 1999. It orbited the Earth fourteen times before it landed under parachute in Inner Mongolia twenty-one hours after liftoff. The Shenzhou-2 spacecraft was launched on 9 January 2001. It completed 408 orbits over a seven-day flight. Shenzhou-3, launched on 26 March 2002, carried human physical monitoring sensors and dummy astronauts. The last unmanned flight, Shenzhou-4, was launched on 30 December 2002. It also carried a test dummy and performed several scientific experiments.

The first piloted spacecraft was Shenzhou-5, launched on 15 October 2003. Yang Liwei was China’s first astronaut, or taikonaut (taikong means “space” or “cosmos” in Chinese) or yuhangyuan (Chinese for “space navigators”). Yang orbited the Earth for twenty-one hours and became a national hero. The second manned flight, Shenzhou-6,
was launched 12 October 2005, carrying two taikonauts, Nie Haisheng and Fei Junlong. By most accounts this flight is considered the event that proved China was capable of carrying out its own space program. Finally, on 25 September 2008, Shenzhou-7 was launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, carrying a crew of three. The three-day mission featured a successful space walk. China joined the United States and Russia as the only countries to have completed a space walk.

Thousands of Chinese engineers and technicians from more than three hundred organizations have contributed to the research, design, assembly, test, launch, and recovery of Shenzhou spacecraft. By the end of 2003, when the first flight carrying a person was accomplished, China reportedly had spent $2.3 billion on the project, of which $1 billion was spent on the building of infrastructure. Despite the cost, the space program is a tremendous source of pride for millions of Chinese. When Shenzhou-6 was launched on 12 October 2005, President Hu Jintao watched it live at the Beijing Aerospace Control Center and had a brief conversation with the two astronauts, telling them “the motherland and people are proud of you” (People’s Daily, 2005).

Hailing the successful five-day space flight, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated China’s policy of peaceful use of space. Many people view the project as a way for China to demonstrate its world power status, and countries around the world have had quick and generally positive responses. The U.S. State Department congratulated China on the successful launch, and the Russian Federal Space Agency welcomed another power to the “space club” and looked forward to further cooperation in all areas.

Inspired by its success, China has ambitions for future space exploration. Although no official projects have yet been begun, China hopes to put a space station in orbit by 2010, to land an unmanned probe on the moon by 2011, and to land a taikonaut on the moon by 2017.

Wenxian ZHANG

Further Reading
The *Shijing*, roughly translated as “classic songs,” are a collection of folk songs, hymns, and narratives that date back to at least the fourth or fifth century BCE and are considered the foundation of literary and cultural tradition in China. Scholarship on the *Shijing* involves studying the songs as guides to character enhancement, records of political history, and reinterpretations of the language.

The *Shijing* (also translated as "Classic of Songs," "Book of Songs," "Canon of Odes," or "Classic of Poetry") stands at the fountainhead of the Chinese literary and cultural tradition. In the earliest stratum of the Confucian canon the *Shijing* is referred to simply as the *Shi* (Songs); not until the second century BCE do texts begin to call it a *jing* (classic). Recorded in the historian Sima Qian’s (c. 145–86 BCE) *Records of the Grand Historian* is a much-debated legend that the *Shijing* was drawn from a large body of Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE) songs and was refined and edited by Confucius (551–479 BCE) into a fixed canon of 305 songs. Modern research substantiates at least two aspects of this account: First, the *Shijing* had indeed evolved into its final form by the fifth or fourth century BCE; second, many songs in the anthology are genuine artifacts of Western Zhou performances regularly held as part of state ritual apparatus.

By the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) the original music, dance, and other elements of the songs' performance had been lost and were no longer centerpiece of state rites. This loss of ritual context around the *Shijing*, however, did not end transmission of the songs. During the politically chaotic fifth and fourth centuries BCE the *Shijing* was widely chanted, quoted, and alluded to during diplomatic exchanges. It was also firmly established among the elite classes as a source of didactic, morally suasive power and was considered privileged access to the morally enlightened times of antiquity. Transmission of the *Shijing* as a didactic social and literary force was to continue throughout imperial times.

**Mao Songs**

The only complete version of the *Shijing* still extant is the *Mao Shi* (Mao Songs), containing 305 songs together with a strain of commentary dating to Han dynasty times (206 BCE–220 CE). This version was named after its senior compiler, Mao Heng, a scholar in the employ of Prince Xian of Hejian (d. c. 130 BCE). The discrepancies we observe between the *Mao Shi* and fragments of other *Shijing* versions datable to the Han dynasty or earlier seem to stem from scribal variations of one single orally stable prototext. These discrepancies among written versions of the *Shijing* were the impetus for the polemics of the “Three Schools,” namely, Qi, Lu, and Han. These state-sanctioned traditions of *Shijing* scholarship produced different strains of commentary, which are now lost except for fragments scattered in quotations in other early texts. The *Mao Shi* assumed orthodoxy sometime after
the Confucian scholar Zheng Xuan (127–200 CE) wrote his commentary to this edition.

The Mao Shi is divided into four sections, with narrative content as the organizing principle. The largest section is called the “Airs of the States” (Guo feng). It contains mainly gentrified folk songs from fifteen feudal states. The second section is the “Minor Elegantia” (Xiao ya), with content similar to the “Airs” but with more emphasis on articulated political grievance. The third section, called the “Greater Elegantia” (Da ya), contains songs of grandiose texture, many of which are now understood to be third-person scripts of ritual performances. The last section is called the “Hymns” (Song). It contains solemn lyrics to collectively performed liturgy from the states of Lu, Zhou, and Shang. Scholars have construed some of the hymns of Zhou intertextually, with transmitted texts and bronze inscriptions of the Western Zhou dynasty, to reconstruct the kingdom’s important multimedia ritual performance that commemorated the conquest of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE).

The language and literary devices of the Shijing deeply influenced Chinese poetics throughout the ages. The “Airs” in particular were cited by later poets as a literary ideal of elegant simplicity and directness. Furthermore, the Mao Shi carried on an earlier tradition that associated one of three literary devices with each song. These are the fu, bi, and xing, terms originally understood as something akin to “narrative,” “analogical,” and “evocative stimulus.” These terms evolved during the next millennia and played a central role in Chinese poetics.

Scholarship and Interpretation

From the Warring States period through Republican China (1912–1949) there were roughly four distinct phases of Shijing scholarship and interpretation. The earliest, dating from the fourth and third centuries BCE, is focused on studying the Shijing for character enhancement and career advancement. In the Analects, for example, competency with the Shijing is typically promoted as a means to improving an individual’s ceremonial conduct and rhetorical capabilities. The prevalence of this perspective in the fourth century BCE is supported by a cache of bamboo strips dated from this period that were recently recovered by the Shanghai Museum from tomb thieves. One of these texts is retrospectively entitled the Kongzi Shi lun (Confucius Discusses the Songs). No consensus exists on many paleographic (relating to writings of former times) and other basic questions regarding this important monument in Shijing history.

The second phase of Shijing scholarship focuses on the role of the songs as records of political history. Fully mature in the Han dynasty, this kind of scholarship produced synoptic (affording a general view of a whole) prefaxes and glosses recorded, for instance, in the Mao Shi. Han scholars read the Shijing by reconstructing for each song a geopolitical context. This contextualization allowed scholars to find in the Shijing politically oriented praise or blame allegories.

The third phase is represented by the Shijing zheng yi, a centerpiece of the monumental Zheng yi (Correct Significance) project of the seventh century. Chief editor Kong Yingda (574–648) followed the Mao Shi text, including the Mao-Zheng commentaries, and appended important glosses by Lu Deming (556–627). Kong and his editorial committee added extensive new commentaries that laboriously expand on, rather than question, the interpretations reflected by the Mao-Zheng commentaries. This new hermeneutic is one of synthesizing a definitive orthodox reading of the Shijing.

The most recent phase of scholarship is marked by a renewed attention to the language of the Shijing as it may be understood by painstaking philological research rather than by the normative interpretations of the Han dynasty and later periods. Qing dynasty (1644–1912) scholars such as Ruan Yuan (1764–1849), Chen Huan (1786–1863), and Ma Ruichen (d. 1853) are the most representative.

Today the Shijing continues to intrigue scholars, particularly as new intertextual methods are applied to understand the ritual context surrounding the songs. Archaeological findings also continue to invigorate the field of Shijing studies, which remains as lively as it ever was.

Tyler C. PIKE

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Chen Huan. (1986). Shi Maoshi zhuan shu [Explanation of the Mao commentaries to the Songs]. Taipei, Taiwan: Xuesheng shuju. (Original work published 1847)
Translation from the Shijing

The songs of the Shijing have been translated into English by a number of prominent scholars since the eighteenth century. The translation of this song is by James Legge (1814–1897).

黍离  SHU LI

彼黍离离，彼稷之苗
行邅靡靡，中心搖搖
知我者，謂我心憂，不知我者，謂我何求
悠悠蒼天，此何人哉

彼黍離离，彼稷之穗
行邅靡靡，中心如醉
知我者，謂我心憂，不知我者，謂我何求
悠悠蒼天，此何人哉

彼黍離離，彼稷之实
行邅靡靡，中心如噎
知我者，謂我心憂，不知我者，謂我何求
悠悠蒼天，此何人哉

There was the millet with its drooping heads;
There was the sacrificial millet into blade.
Slowly I moved about,
In my heart all-agitated.
Those who knew me,
Said I was sad at heart.

Those who did not know me,
Said I was seeking for something.
O distant and azure Heaven!
By what man was this [brought about]?

There was the millet with its drooping heads;
There was the sacrificial millet in the ear.
Slowly I moved about,
My heart intoxicated, as it were, [with grief].
Those who knew me,
Said I was sad at heart.
Those who did not know me,
Said I was seeking for something.
O thou distant and azure Heaven!
By what man was this [brought about]?

There was the millet with its drooping heads;
There was the sacrificial millet in grain.
Slowly I moved about,
As if there were a stoppage at my heart.
Those who knew me,
Said I was sad at heart.
Those who did not know me,
Said I was seeking for something.
O thou distant and azure Heaven!
By what man was this [brought about]?


The old neighborhoods of Shanghai are characterized by the dense juxtaposition of narrow multi-storied residential buildings called shikumen. These iconic dwellings are packed tightly in neighborhoods that are often separated from each other by gates.

Whereas in Beijing siheyuan are the quintessential courtyard dwellings, and hutong are the associated lane-neighborhood communities, in Shanghai the distinctive multistoried residences and neighborhoods are called shikumen and lilong (also longtang), respectively. Beijing’s traditional urban fabric emerged over more than half a millennium, from the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) onward, whereas Shanghai’s emerged only during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, it is not surprising that shikumen housing reveals a blend of Chinese and Western elements that reflect the city’s emergence as China’s most important entrepôt.

Built first to accommodate Chinese who were moving in large numbers from other places into the foreign concession areas in the nineteenth century, shikumen and lilong subsequently proliferated throughout the metropolitan area to meet the needs of those with different incomes even to the 1940s. Variations in structure and ornamentation, which are still observable today, reflect changing styles and varying real estate markets. Domestic urban architecture with a European flavor is found in other Chinese coastal and riverine cities, but shikumen and lilong represent a uniquely hybrid house type and community.

Shikumen, small townhouses located off of narrow alleys, are the traditional building style of Shanghai. Photo by Tom Christensen.
typically includes a central main room and two secondary rooms, used usually as bedrooms, which open toward a small courtyard or skywell that admits light and exhausts heat. A staircase reaching to the second story is usually located at the back of the central room. In the rear, sometimes adjacent to a narrow skywell, are a kitchen and storage rooms. In some areas of Shanghai these rear rooms open onto a narrow service lane. Unlike in Beijing hutong, where one encounters horizontality created by the gray walls—with only decorated gates breaking the line—multistoried shikumen draw the eye upward to catch glimpses of variegated gables as well as tall, ornamented gates.

The entryway to individual shikumen is usually through a prominent stone gate with framing pillars as well as lintels and pediments above. The affinities with Western classic orders and carved or molded adornment in European styles are often striking. Frequently one encounters bold numbers above the doorway that indicate the year of construction, clearly a Western convention, while carved Chinese characters declare a name, which reveal its Chineseness.

Lilong neighborhoods are arranged in a hierarchy involving streets, lanes, sublanes, and individual shikumen that provides a layering of public space, semipublic space, semiprivate space, and private space. In the past gates and lanes served to modulate activities and define relationships. Neighborhood shops in lilong generally face outward along a series of broader streets. Set into the row of shops is typically a gate leading into the residential lanes and sublanes. It is especially in the lanes and sublanes that neighbors gather to socialize on hot evenings and during the day. Since many of the interior sublanes terminate as dead ends, their spaces are used by nearby residents as places to safely store bicycles and other belongings.

In recent years lilong neighborhoods with countless cramped shikumen, some beyond salvaging but many others still inhabitable, have been demolished to make way for contemporary high-rise residential and commercial buildings as well as improvements in transport infrastructure. In the wake of the extensive razing of old neighborhoods, more voices have belatedly been raised concerning conservation of the architectural fabric of Shanghai. Seen by some as a success and by others as a failure in conservation is Xintiandi, a high-profile development to adapt a neighborhood of shikumen as a shopping, dining, and entertainment area. Occupying a small fraction of a once-vibrant urban community now razed and uprooted, Xintiandi is in many ways a mere shell gutted and reconstructed to serve only commercial rather than mixed residential-commercial purposes.

Ronald G. KNAPP

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Sichuan Province ▸
Sichuan Province, renowned worldwide for its cuisine, is one of China’s agricultural heartlands, thanks in part to the 2,300-year-old irrigation system still in use. The province, one of China’s most populous, played a key role in the early years of Deng Xiaoping’s reform program to decentralize the economy. The 12 May 2008 earthquake killed more than seventy thousand people in Sichuan.

Sichuan (Szechwan) Province is located on the upper reaches of the Yangzi (Chang) River. With a land area of 485,000 square kilometers (slightly smaller than Spain) and an estimated population of 81.27 million, it is one of China’s most populous provinces. It borders Qinghai, Gansu, and Shaanxi provinces to the north; Hubei and Hunan provinces to the east; Guizhou and Yunnan provinces to the south; and Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region (TAR) to the west. For centuries it has played a key role in China’s economy and in relations with Tibet and other western regions. Sichuan also plays an important role in China’s plans to develop the interior of the country.

Archaeological evidence at Sanxingdui just north of the provincial capital of Chengdu (with an estimated 2007 population of 11.12 million) suggests that Sichuan was inhabited as early as the eleventh century BCE by a technologically advanced people whose culture was distinct from that of the north China heartland. By 311 BCE the kingdoms of Ba (in eastern Sichuan) and Shu (in western Sichuan) had fully developed. In that year the armies of the Qin state from northern China incorporated the territories of Ba and Shu into the Qin empire, although the names of the two kingdoms are still used to refer to the Chongqing area (part of Sichuan until a 1997 administrative reorganization) and the Chengdu area, respectively.

Governors of Qin established a regional capital at Chengdu, and Qin engineers built the Dujiangyan waterworks on the Min River west of the city, making the Chengdu Plain a productive agricultural center. However, Sichuan’s geography—surrounded by mountain ranges and the Yangzi (Chang) River gorges—kept it relatively isolated from the rest of China. The Qin constructed a highway from their capital near the Huang (Yellow) River southwest into Sichuan, carving ledges into the steep mountain slopes. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) Buddhism flourished, and many monasteries were established in Sichuan. The Great Buddha at Leshan, the world’s largest stone statue of Buddha, was carved into a cliff along the Min River south of Chengdu. During the last thousand years Sichuan has been a center of the horse and tea trade with Tibet. Sichuan also supplies rice, silk, sugar, and medicinal products to eastern China. Salt wells drilled as deep as 1,460 meters produce brine, which is boiled down using local deposits of natural gas.

Resettlement and Reassignment

The word Sichuan (four rivers) was applied to the area during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). At the end of the
Ming dynasty (1368–1644) the Sichuan population was devastated by a rebellion. The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) promoted resettlement of the area by emigrants from eastern China. Many settlers from Hunan and Hubei brought their spicy culinary culture which, combined with influences from other parts of China and local innovation, produced the world-famous Sichuan cuisine. After the Qing dynasty fell in 1912 Sichuan remained isolated from national politics until 1937, when it became the base of anti-Japanese resistance. In 1939 the Chinese Nationalist Party government created a new province, Xikang, out of parts of western Sichuan and eastern Tibet. In 1955 the People’s Republic of China government dismantled Xikang and reassigned its territory to Sichuan, with the result that the population of western Sichuan today includes many Tibetans and other national minority groups. Although they only represent about 5 percent of Sichuan’s population, the Tibetans (Zang), Qiang, Yi, Moso, and other
minority peoples are spread widely over the vast moun-
tainous regions of western Sichuan.

Deng Xiaoping, who became China’s leader after the
death of Mao Zedong in 1976, was a native of Guang’an
in eastern Sichuan. The province played a key role in
the early years of Deng’s reform program to decentralize the
economy. Deng’s close ally Zhao Ziyang, as provincial
Chinese Communist Party secretary in Sichuan during
the late 1970s, launched what came to be called the “house-
hold responsibility system,” dismantling communes and
giving farmers more freedom to manage their fields and
to market their surplus crops as they chose. Policies first
adopted in Sichuan Province soon spread across the coun-
try, leading to dramatic increases in agricultural output.

Sichuan Province is home to the Xichang satellite-
launching center and many scientific research institutes.
Large government investments in transportation and
energy networks have been made to promote the eco-
nomic development of Sichuan. The new dam in the
Yangzi River’s Three Gorges area, for example, is being
built to provide electricity for much of western China.
It is hoped that the dam will meet 10 percent of China’s
energy needs, but the environmental and societal costs
are great; an estimated 1.3 million people have been dis-
placed by the dam’s construction. The dam is projected
to be completed in 2009.

Sichuan Province and Chongqing (a province-level
municipal area with a population of over 28 million) are
the focal regions of the central government’s “Develop
the West” campaign. The campaign, begun in 2000, is
designed both to tap the resources of western China and
to reduce the cultural and economic disparities between
interior and coastal China. Many of eastern China’s mi-
grant laborers are Sichuan natives. By developing infra-
structure and luring foreign capital to Sichuan and other
western provinces, the government hopes to stem the flow
of migrants, thus alleviating social problems caused by
the division of families and political problems caused by
disadvantaged migrant communities in the coastal cities.
Provincial and local governments have promoted tourism
around many cultural and scenic sites, including the hot
springs at Jiuzhaigou in the northwest and the National
Nature Reserve at Wolong, home of the largest popula-
tion of giant pandas in captivity. China’s largest private
museum, the Jianchuan Museum Cluster, opened west
of Chengdu in 2005. The museum has the world’s most
extensive collection of artifacts from the War of Resis-
tance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as
the Second Sino-Japanese War) as well as from the Cul-

2008 Earthquake

On 12 May 2008 an earthquake measuring 7.9 on the
Richter scale and centered at Wenchuan in the Himala-
yan foothills west of Chengdu destroyed many Sichuan
communities and killed more than seventy thousand
people. Although aid from the government and private
donors quickly reached the stricken areas, the earthquake
may have long-term effects on Sichuan’s economy. Many
cultural sites, including the temple next to the ancient
Duijiangyan waterworks, were damaged. The collapse of
many school buildings, even as nearby government offices

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and residential complexes withstood the earthquake, has laid Sichuan officials open to charges of corruption. Many parents lost children in school buildings that may not have been constructed to comply with building codes. It is uncertain whether the earthquake will stimulate reform in Chinese administration and construction practices. The Chinese government’s three-year redevelopment plan is estimated to cost $150 billion and will include the complete relocation of Beichuan, one of the hardest hit Sichuan towns. In October 2008, the World Bank announced that loans amounting to $510 million would be allocated to Sichuan to support earthquake recovery efforts.

Kristin STAPLETON

Further Reading


Silk

Silk production in China has evolved for thousands of years but remains tied to the life cycle of the silkworm and its sole diet of mulberry leaves. Silk was such an important product during ancient times that the major trade route between East Asia, West Asia, and Europe was called the “Silk Roads.” Its status as a luxury item remains the same today, and China continues to be the world’s largest silk producer.

Although the exact origins of sericulture (the production of raw silk from silkworms) are not known, experts agree that it began in China about 2500 BCE. Chinese mythology supports this date. In one popular myth the empress of a legendary emperor is credited with intensifying mulberry tree cultivation, breeding and raising silkworms, and inventing the loom in 2640 BCE. This myth also is important because it acknowledges the major role that women played in silk production and processing.

Production of silk was a vital part of the rural economy, and through the centuries many technical advances speeded up the production of silk thread. However, weaving remained difficult and time consuming until the invention of mechanized looms in the twentieth century. Although silk was produced mostly in rural areas, it was usually woven in urban centers for the imperial court or for well-to-do city dwellers, and people often paid raw silk cloth as taxes to the central government.

In about 140 BCE, during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) silk production spread from China to India and to Japan a few centuries later. It spread to Europe in about 550 CE (during China’s Southern and Northern Dynasties period, 220–589 CE) when the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I asked two Persian monks to smuggle silkworms from China. In fact, silk was such an important product during ancient times that the major trade route between East Asia, West Asia, and Europe was called the “Silk Roads.” The Chinese traded silk for gold, silver, and wool.

China at the beginning of the twenty-first century remains the world’s major producer of silk, accounting for about 80 percent of the world’s silk. However, the development of synthetic fibers such as rayon (beginning in 1910) and nylon (beginning in the late 1930s) has decreased the demand for silk clothing. As it was in ancient
times, silk continues to be a luxury item but is no longer a major export for China.

**Silkworm Life Cycle**

The life cycle of the silkworm (*Bombyx mori*) largely determines silk production. Silkworm caterpillars hatch from eggs and need large amounts of mulberry leaves for food. Their growth period lasts from thirty-four to thirty-five days and is interrupted by several periods of dormancy. At the end of this period of growth, the caterpillars spin cocoons of a single strand of silk thread that can be from 600 to 900 meters long.

The adult moths, under natural conditions and uncontrolled by humans, would then emerge from the cocoons and reproduce. However, for silk production the emergence of the moth from the cocoon would be a disaster: The emerging moth breaks the silk strand and renders it virtually useless for cloth production. Thus, most moths are killed while still in the cocoon, although a few are allowed to reach maturity for breeding purposes.

**Mulberry Tree Cultivation**

Most phases of the life cycle of the silkworm are controlled by careful regulation of mulberry leaves (the
A woman inspects the completed cocoons. PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL.

silkworm’s sole food) and temperature. In early times mulberry trees were planted in orchards, and new varieties were developed. The most crucial development had occurred by the twelfth century, with perfection of a method of grafting a leafy variety of tree onto the trunk of a hardier variety. Agricultural treatises of the twelfth century describe the method and suggest that silk producers everywhere adopt it. Use of such grafts permitted two crops of leaves a year in the central region of China and three in the southern regions.

**Controlling the Process**

Providing the silkworms with leaves was always of great importance, and in the fifth century a method was invented to regulate the hatching time of silkworm eggs to coincide with maximum leaf production. The eggs were bathed in cold water to lower their temperature and to delay hatching, often for as long as twenty-one days. The addition of periods of warming and cooling during the thirteenth century improved the method and had the extra advantage that eggs that contained malformed or weak worms could not survive the changes in temperature. After the eggs hatched growers found it best to have the worms grow as quickly as possible, and thus various techniques for warming the growing sheds were devised. During the sixth century fires of burning manure were generally used, although such fires sometimes produced unwelcome smoke. By the twelfth century small portable stoves had been invented. They warmed the sheds without producing smoke and could be removed if necessary. Large-scale silkworm operations often had large fire pits in the growing sheds. Such fires would be lit five to seven days before the eggs hatched and were left to warm the sheds during the growth phase of the worms. With these methods the growth phase of the silkworms could be reduced to just twenty-nine to thirty days.

**Reeling the Thread**

Reeling the silk fibers of the cocoons into thread was preferable while the moths were still alive in the cocoons because doing so produced a higher quality of silk, but this technique was impracticable because it was so labor intensive. Because most silk thread was produced by small rural operations that lacked large workforces, the moths were killed before they could damage their cocoons. Three methods commonly used to kill the moths were leaving the cocoons out in the sun, salting them, and steaming them in ovens. By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when mass production began, steaming became the most common method.

Reeling the thread involves unraveling the cocoons and twisting several fibers together to form a thread and then winding the thread onto a reel. This process can be done by hand, but by the late eleventh century a treadle-operated reeling frame had been devised. It allowed one person to reel large amounts of yarn relatively quickly. The design of the frame took into account the qualities of silk. The cocoons were placed into a basin of heated
water because water loosened the fiber in the cocoons. The heat caused the fibers to move and twist of their own accord. The motion of the water caused the threads to be more rounded. However, despite this technical advance, silk reeling required constant labor after it was begun and was difficult and time consuming.

**Weaving Technology**

Weaving lent itself less readily to improvements. The reeled yarn had to be made into the warp (a series of yarns extended lengthwise in a loom and crossed by the weft) and weft (a filling thread or yarn in weaving) by a spindle wheel. Preparation could take days. Two people were needed to operate the loom to weave just plain silk, and if elaborate designs were to be added, the production of even small quantities of cloth could take weeks. Early silk-weaving operations were run by weaving families who worked from their own homes, and many of the practices were passed down for hundreds and hundreds of years with little change. Technological innovation in silk production reached its zenith during the Song dynasty (960–1279), but not until the founding of the first modern silk-weaving factory in 1905 in Hangzhou was the silk industry further transformed.

The silk cloth, after it was woven, could be left raw, or it could be “finished” by being boiled in a solution of ash, steeped in soap overnight, and rinsed to render it softer. Many peasants produced silk to pay taxes and thus left the cloth raw.

**Silk in Society**

Much production of silk took place in rural areas, but complicated designs were usually woven in urban workshops or imperial factories that produced elaborate luxury goods for aristocrats, the imperial court, or wealthy city dwellers. Silk was a luxury, and it was jealously guarded by the imperial court, which often stockpiled bolts of silk instead of precious metals. During the Song dynasty, when foreign invasion threatened the imperial government, silk was an important diplomatic tool, with millions of bolts of cloth paid in tribute during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Rulers also used silk to reward outstanding acts, to pay government officials, and to give relief to victims of disasters.

Use of silk in everyday dress was strictly regulated by sumptuary (relating to personal expenditures and especially extravagance and luxury) law. Laws were also enacted against the use of gold thread, garments of certain colors, “foreign” styles of dress, and embellished silk. Certain patterns were reserved for the imperial court. Although penalties such as caning and jail sentences were meted out, these laws seem to have been largely ignored by people who were wealthy enough to afford luxury items. Enemies of the Chinese were also aware of the prestige attached to clothing because they often asked for certain grades of silk cloth with decorations reserved for the imperial family as tribute.

**Further Reading**


Silver, originally used solely as ornamentation, was the most important currency of late imperial China, although it came mainly from abroad. A global silver shortage in the early nineteenth century almost overturned the Qing dynasty, which was temporarily rescued by an increased supply of silver due to the sale of silk and tea abroad. It was not until 1935 that the Chinese government controlled the monetary system by putting China onto the paper currency system.

Silver has been important in Chinese history, particularly for its use as money during the late imperial period. Before the fifteenth century, when silver became more important as money, people used silver mostly for ornamentation.

China’s main form of money during the imperial period was copper coins, which had been cast by the state since the late Warring States period (475–221 BCE). Around 1800 China’s copper coins were worth only about one hundredth the value of silver, with silver’s value relative to that of gold being between 1:14.5 and 1:15.1. The long-standing use of copper coins in Chinese history indicates that China engaged in small-scale commercial exchanges. On the other hand, China’s vast territory and diverse products in various regions necessitated money for large-scale exchanges. Gold or bronze of higher quality was used for storage of greater wealth and for exchange of larger scale from the Warring States period to the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). During the Han dynasty silver and deerskin also were used for storage of wealth. During the chaotic Southern and Northern Dynasties period (220–589 CE, known as China’s Dark Age), and Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) a barter economy based on woven products dominated because of the lack of trust entailed by the invasion of the northern intruders; the weak central government of Eastern Han, the Cao-Wei and the Jin Dynasty allowed many Non-Chinese tribes (referred to as the Sixteen Kingdoms of the Five Barbarians) to intrude on Chinese territory in the northwest. During wartime, production and exchange could not be engaged normally, because the money lent might not be returned. From the Song dynasty (960–1279) to the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644) convertible paper notes were mainly used for large-scale exchange. From the middle Ming dynasty until 1935 silver replaced paper notes for large-scale exchange. Silver was weighed and not coined by the state before 1910.

China began using silver cast into ingots during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Qing dynasty (1644–1912) evidence shows that the government stipulated in what shape silver could be cast. Bank shops, which are different from banks in that they are privately owned and do not accept non-security loans, cast silver into ingots. The name of the bank shop or of the craftsman who cast the ingot, rather than the likeness of a king or queen, was cast on the ingot. Because Chinese people referred to silver coins from abroad as “Buddha head” to denote a king’s likeness or “Two pillars” to refer to the “II” in the words “Charles II” or “Philip II” on a coin, we can see that Chinese people had a vague concept that silver coins symbolized...
sovereignty. Not until Republican China (1912–1949), though, were silver coins cast by the state and bore the likeness of national leaders, as Western coins do.

Foreign Dependence

Furthermore, silver during late imperial China came mostly from abroad through merchants. Other than in Yunnan Province, China had few silver mines. From 1550 to 1700 silver used in China came mainly from Japan and partly from Latin America. About 1700, when Japan’s silver mines were depleted and Japan began keeping the remaining silver for its own use, Latin America provided more silver for China than did Japan. After 1775 almost all silver for China came from Latin America. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Spanish and Portuguese governments established companies to operate silver mines in Latin America and to bring back silver, mainly under the state’s custody. The Japanese shoguns

A young girl dressed in traditional Miao (Hmong) clothing and silver jewelry. She is wearing a horned-style headdress. The Miao are famous for the craftsmanship of their silver ornaments. Photo by Wang Ying.
(military governors ruling Japan until the revolution of 1867–1868) opened the silver mines in Japan and controlled silver themselves. China acquired silver through merchants’ private international trade, and the government taxed a small part of it.

Paradoxically, from the fifteenth century onward the Chinese government designated silver as the means to pay taxes, and silver was much used for long-distance trade or large-scale transactions, particularly after the late eighteenth century. The supply of silver was crucial to China’s economy. Both the bottleneck period caused by the dominance of Japan silver over Latin American silver for China’s supply in the mid-eighteenth century and the decrease of the Latin American silver supply in the early nineteenth century threatened the Chinese economy. The early nineteenth century crisis almost caused the overthrow of the Qing Empire as its revenues were decreasing because the copper coins earners could not earn enough to pay taxes, or commodities from afar were charged in the more and more expensive silver. Social conflicts between the people and the government, between tenants and landlords, between craftsmen and merchants all partly contributed to the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the largest rebellion in China’s history. The Qing dynasty could not pay its soldiers and officials for three years after this civil war broke out. The backflow of silver from international sales of China’s silk and tea between 1850 and 1887 was crucial to easing this Qing dynasty crisis.

Transition to Paper

Because this silver backflow took place when more opium was being imported from India by China, the fluctuation of the global silver supply was more important than opium importation for the early nineteenth-century silver outflow. This situation triggered the First Opium War (1839–1842) between Britain and China. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries paper notes issued by foreign banks in China or by China’s own banks shared more silver for China’s money supply. Against this background the silver outflow, due to the American Silver Purchasing Act of 1934, did not damage the Chinese economy as seriously as the one during the early nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the outflow of the 1930s hastened China’s transition from the merchant-controlled silver economy to the state-controlled inconvertible paper notes system in 1935.

Man-houng LIN

Further Reading

Sima Xiangru was the greatest writer of *fu* (rhapsody) in Chinese literary history. His *fu* became a model for emulation but also a target of criticism. His critics included Confucians who feared that the “healthy” content in his literature is overshadowed by excessively ornate depiction of scenes and objects.

Sima Xiangru (byname Zhangqing) was the greatest writer of *fu* (rhapsody), a poetic genre that thrived during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). A native of Shu (modern Sichuan Province), he took a junior post during Emperor Jing’s reign (157–141 BCE). But because the emperor did not like *fu*, Sima left the post and became a member of the salon of King Xiao of Liang (d. 144 BCE). This salon played a pivotal role in the *fu* genre’s development, sustaining many famous *fu* writers such as Zou Yang (mid-second century BCE) and Mei Cheng (d. 140 BCE). Under the patronage of King Xiao, Sima composed the famous “Fu on Sir Vacuous.” Upon the king’s death Sima returned to Shu.

Sima was fond of swordsmanship. He was also famous for his romance with Zhuo Wenjun, whom he met on his homeward journey to Shu. When passing by Linqiong, he won the heart of the new widow Zhuo with his literary talents and seductive zither music. But Zhuo’s father refused the marriage; the lovers thus eloped to Sima’s hometown, Chengdu. Poverty pressed them to return to Linqiong, where they ran a wine shop. Zhuo’s father finally accepted their marriage and subsidized their livelihood. Adaptations of this story appeared in many works of literature in later ages.

Han emperor Wu (reigned 141–87 BCE) was an admirer and patron of Sima. Enraptured by Sima’s “Fu on Sir Vacuous,” the young emperor resolved to track down the author, who subsequently composed the “Fu on the Imperial Park.” This work earned him the post of gentleman.
He was later commissioned to a diplomatic posting in southwest China but lost favor after being charged with bribery. Soon thereafter Sima died of diabetes.

Sima brought the *fu* genre to a historical zenith. The word *grandiose* best defines his style. This style is achieved by the extensive use of descriptive phrases, hyperbole, and panoramic perspectives. Himself a lexicographer, Sima strove to find the most fitting word in the juxtaposition of spectra of colors, fauna, flora, buildings, plants, as well as in objective and emotional depictions of various objects. Carrying on the dialogue structure characteristic of the genre, Sima’s *fu* typically begins with a debate between two interlocutors, one of whom finally wins the debate. Sima also wrote in the Sao style of *fu*, which more closely adheres in form to the “Lisao” (Encountering Sorrows) by Qu Yuan (early third century BCE). Some of Sima’s famous Sao-style pieces are his *fu* on the abdicated empress Chen, one on the Great Man, and a lament for the second Qin emperor (reigned 210–207 BCE).

Sima’s *fu* became a model for emulation but also a target of criticism. His critics included Confucians who feared that the “healthy” content in his literature is overshadowed by excessively ornate depiction of scenes and objects.

**Further Reading**


Sino-American Commercial Treaty

Zhong-Mei Jingji Tiayue 中美经济条约

The Sino-American Commercial Treaty of 1946 was a controversial agreement aimed at providing the Nationalists with much needed wartime aid during their Civil War with the Communists. The Chinese Communists condemned the treaty as imperialist while segments of the American population criticized the commercial rights granted Chinese in the United States.

The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (Sino-American Commercial Treaty of 1946), signed in Nanjing on 4 November 1946, was a comprehensive commercial treaty between the United States and China, the first such treaty concluded by either nation after World War II. Chief U.S. negotiators were U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart (1876–1962) and U.S. Consul-General at Tianjin Robert Lacy Smyth. Chief Chinese negotiators were Wang Shih-ch'ieh, foreign minister, and Wang Hua-chang, director of the Treaty Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The purposes of the treaty included updating the January 1943 commercial treaty by which the United States had relinquished extraterritorial rights enjoyed in China since 1844 and developing a new framework for commercial ties between the two allies following the conclusion of the war. According to the U.S. Department of State announcement, the ten thousand-word treaty “is somewhat broader in scope than existing United States commercial treaties with respect to the rights for corporations, and includes... commercial articles similar in principle to the general provisions of recent trade agreements...” (Fox, 1947, p. 138). While the treaty may have been intended as a routine protocol, it was signed at a time when China was in the midst of a civil war between the Nationalist (Guomindang) government of General Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) and the Chinese Communists headed by Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The treaty was to serve as a mechanism for inducing an influx of U.S. capital for China's wartime recovery and economic development but ultimately proved ineffective. Although China's Legislative Yuan ratified the treaty on 11 November 1946, one week after the signing, the final ratifications were not exchanged in Nanjing until 30 November 1948. The treaty was put into force too late to affect positively the Nationalist war against the Communists. On the contrary, its provisions created a storm of controversy both in China and the United States.

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong used the treaty to bolster his campaign against the Nationalists, accusing his enemies of being the puppets of U.S. imperialism. Having declared 4 November 1946 “National Humiliation Day,” Communist leaders at Yanan ordered Chinese flags flown at half staff for three days after the treaty's signing. Mao vehemently denounced the original terms of the treaty, referring to it as “a commercial treaty of enslavement” in his October 1947 Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (October 10th Manifesto). He proclaimed, “[T]o maintain his dictatorship and carry on civil war, Chiang Kai-shek has not hesitated to sell out our country's sovereign rights to foreign imperialism.”
Communist radio broadcasts announced: “The harshness and scope of the treaty far surpass the Twenty-One Demands that Yuan Shikai signed with the Japanese. The country will be subjugated and the nation exterminated if this treaty is carried out” (Orlean, 1948, 354). The Chinese Communists’ sentiments were echoed by the Soviets, who accused the United States of attempting to wrest control of China’s economy and return the country to a semicolonial state.

The inflammatory rhetoric was targeted at several articles in the treaty that encouraged U.S. investment in Chinese industry. China would benefit from capital, modern technology, and other resources, and, in a restatement of portions of the 1943 wartime commercial treaty, U.S. interests could eventually take control of much of China’s commercial development. While the provisions incurred the wrath of Chiang Kai-shek’s enemies, they were consistent with Nationalist appeals for U.S. aid at the time.

The treaty also ran into difficulty in the United States. After U.S. president Harry Truman (1884–1972) submitted the original version to the Senate for ratification, nearly two years passed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed debate and put forward revisions. On 2 June 1948 the Senate consented to ratification “with a reservation and understandings.” The final ratification by the United States took place on 8 November 1948.

Among the problematic issues was language in the treaty that guaranteed equality, mutuality, and reciprocity for citizens of both countries, a significant change over earlier commercial treaties with China by which the United States and other foreign nations benefited from extraterritorial rights. As a result, provisions for “alien land ownership” became a concern for those states that regulated land ownership by foreigners or, as in the cases of Nevada and Oregon, specifically prohibited the ownership of property by Chinese. Debate in the Senate reflected the history of poor relations between Chinese and white U.S. citizens, particularly in the western states, that had resulted in a series of “exclusion laws” passed by the U.S. Congress in the late nineteenth century. Not until December 1943 did Congress pass the Act to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts, an act that paved the way for naturalization and property ownership in the United States by Chinese. The 1946 commercial treaty would override discriminatory provisions still in effect. Several states, including Nevada and Oregon, revised outdated state laws soon after the signing of the Sino-American Commercial Treaty of 1946.

The final version of the treaty was proclaimed by President Truman on 12 January 1949, just months before the Chinese Communists’ victory and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October. In 1951 the treaty was modified with acknowledgments by the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan that certain provisions were no longer applicable because of the Communist victory over the Nationalists. In March 1965 the U.S. Department of State notified Taiwan that portions of the treaty “were considered suspended with respect to areas of China not under control of the National Government of the Republic of China” (U.S. Department of State, 2008).

June GRASSO

Further Reading


Sino-Japanese War, First ▶
The First Sino-Japanese War was a turning point in the modern history of East Asia: The victory of a smaller but more modernized Japan shocked the much larger, traditional Chinese empire. The war propelled Japan into the ranks of power and plunged China into political upheaval that continued into the twentieth century.

The First Sino-Japanese War was fought between August 1894 and April 1895. (The Second Sino-Japanese war, known to the Chinese as the War of Resistance against Japan, took place from 1937–1945; after 1939 the conflict joined with the worldwide struggle known as World War II.) It was started by Japan, which sought to take over China’s position of hegemony in Korea. Japan’s aggression was not motivated principally by China, but instead by fear of the West. Since the 1870s, Japan, unlike China and Korea, had adopted full-scale Western-style modernization, and this left them militarily exposed in an era of accelerating Western colonialism. Japan’s particular fear was that Russia would expand through northeast China and, by seizing Korea, could be in a position to destroy Japan. Historically, China had been the protector of Korea, and following a Japanese-backed attempted coup d’état in Seoul in 1884, Beijing had stationed troops in the peninsula to maintain order. An internal uprising in 1893–94 gave Japan an excuse to send its own troops to Korea. These were ostensibly to assist in restoring order but in reality they were meant to provoke conflict with China and create a pretext for war.

A series of prints by artist Hashimoto Chikanobu (1838–1912) showing Japanese troops surprising Chinese soldiers at Weihaiwei, and the death of a Chinese officer who had led his troops into battle during a snowstorm in 1895.
Battles on the mainland were concentrated initially in the north of Korea, but by late 1894 they reached across the border into China’s northeastern region of Manchuria; in January 1895, Japan opened a second front by attacking China’s Shandong Province. The war expanded further in March 1895 as Japanese forces invaded the Pescadores and Taiwan in search of a colonial base to their south. The single major naval battle occurred in the Huang (Yellow) Sea in September 1894. The decisive engagement of the land war arguably was in November 1894 at Lushun, known to the West as Port Arthur. This was China’s strongest naval base, however, it fell to the Japanese in one day. Despite this, or because of it, Japanese soldiers then engaged in a massacre of Chinese civilians in the town; this is proven by Japanese eyewitness accounts that speak of the heaped corpses of men, women, and children.

The longest period of fighting was in Taiwan. There the Japanese claimed to have pacified the island by November 1895, but in fact, guerrilla resistance continued well into 1896. The Japanese army responded by razing villages and, according to some observers, killing as many as 17,000 Taiwanese (mainly Chinese immigrants from the eastern provinces) in this part of the war.

During the war, the Chinese army mobilized about one million men, and the Japanese about 240,000. But

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Itoh Sukeyuki, admiral of the Japanese naval forces.
China was never able to utilize this numerical advantage. Beijing neither wanted nor was prepared for war, and the Chinese sought to negotiate peace at the earliest opportunity. In addition, well over half the Chinese soldiers were untrained conscripts. The Chinese military also suffered from incompetent generals, a lack of any kind of uniformity in equipment or weapons, and shortages of ammunition. Furthermore, the men received no medical support, which greatly increased the risk of dying from illness or injury and naturally reduced their appetite for combat. For these reasons, Japan won every battle on land and sea with very few losses of life, although the Chinese resistance was sometimes fiercer than later historians have suggested.

A wider problem for China in this (and in its earlier wars in the nineteenth century) was disunity. At the official level, the South China fleet refused to fight Japan, just as the northern fleet had refused to assist the south in the war against France in the mid-1880s. This means
that it is actually misleading to speak of a war between China and Japan; Japan fought as a nation, China fought as regions. At the popular level, China had none of Japan’s modern technologies for organizing mass support; a politically engaged Chinese-owned press emerged only after (and as a consequence of) the war, while a system of national schooling for mass literacy was still decades away. Instead, the relative localization and brevity of the war on the mainland benefited Japan, and Japanese forces there encountered little or no public opposition. Indeed, Chinese businessmen and farmers in Manchuria profited by supplying the Japanese army.

At the peace conference in Shimonoseki, Japanese demands included a massive indemnity for its war expenses, China’s acknowledgement of the formal independence of Korea, and the cession to Japan both of Taiwan and the Liaodong peninsula in southern Manchuria. But in what is known as the Triple Intervention, the governments of Russia, France, and Germany combined to pressure Japan into relinquishing any territorial claim in Manchuria. In return for this concession, China was forced to increase the indemnity, bringing the total to $21 million, said to be about one-third of the government’s total revenue.

Among the long-term consequences of the war, four stand out. First, the independence of Taiwan from mainland control began with Japan’s colonization in 1895. In the twenty-first century, this remains a final lost territory and reminder of perhaps the greatest period of national weakness in Chinese history. Second, Japan had always been a marginal and despised presence in Asia: Its defeat of China was an unparalleled shock to the educated Chinese elite. This persuaded intellectuals to advocate radical social, political, and military reforms (some of these being attempted in the 1898 One Hundred Days’ Reform); it also encouraged the nascent revolutionary movement ultimately to be organized under Sun Yat-sen.

Third, in November 1897, the German navy seized part of Shandong Province as a belated reward for its part in the Triple Intervention. Other powers quickly followed with their own demands for territorial and economic concessions. This scramble to exploit China’s postwar weakness led many observers to predict the imminent collapse of China as an entity; the humiliation and assault on China’s territorial integrity also served as a major catalyst to the reform and revolutionary movements. Fourth, within weeks of Germany’s action, the Japanese government began repairing Sino-Japanese relations by approaching China’s most powerful provincial leaders with an offer to educate Chinese military students in Japan. The first of these students arrived in Tokyo in 1898; they would exert an important Japanese influence on the modern Chinese army, which was to last at least until the 1920s. These military students, however, were also soon followed by many civilian compatriots, and by 1904, Tokyo had become the center of the Chinese student revolutionary movement which helped bring about the collapse of the monarchical system in 1911–1912. Thereafter, and up to the present, Chinese nationalism largely refused to tolerate further insult at the hands of any foreign power.

Stewart LONE

Further Reading
The Sino-Swedish Expedition conducted scientific surveys of China's northwestern provinces from 1927 to 1935. The expedition research program covered many disciplines, including cartography, geography, geology, hydrology, and archaeology, as it made a topographical survey for future roads and railway construction in the region.

The Sino-Swedish expedition (SSE), which lasted from 1927 to 1935, was a major scientific joint undertaking of Republican China (1912–1949) and Sweden. It surveyed most of Gansu Province, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, as well as areas in Tibet and Qinghai, Yunnan, and Hebei provinces. The two leaders were the geographer Sven Hedin (斯文·赫定, 1865–1952) and the archaeologist Xu Bingchang (徐炳昶, 1888–1976).

Their scientific and technical staff was truly international, with sixteen Chinese, fifteen Swedes, twelve Germans, two Danes, one Estonian, and one Russian. Geography, geology, geodesy, hydrology, paleontology, palaeobotany, botany, zoology, meteorology, archaeology, and ethnology were among the disciplines involved. The participants called the expedition a "travelling university" because it was so interdisciplinary. It was the first scientific collaboration between China and Europe of its kind and scale. According to the agreement on the joint research program, paleontological, palaeobotanical, and archaeological items found in the field would be examined in Europe before their return to China, a promise that was fulfilled in the 1950s.

On 20 May 1927 the expedition left Baotou in Inner Mongolia with a caravan of 289 camels to survey China's northwestern provinces, locate possible landing sites, and establish weather stations. One of the initial goals was to establish a network of airfields that would link Shanghai to Berlin via Kabul. Air connections were later made, but the project sponsor, the German airline Lufthansa, soon withdrew its support when the local authorities forbade flying by foreigners. The expeditions other scientific undertakings continued with additional support from the Swedish government and Vincent Bendix, a Swedish-U.S. industrialist from Chicago. During this second phase from late 1928 to 1933, the area covered by interdisciplinary fieldwork expanded greatly. In 1933 Sven Hedin proposed to the Nationalist (Guomindang) government in Nanjing the building of motor roads to Xinjiang to help restore in the then-province the rule of the central administration—which eventually happened in 1950. The government agreed to fund the third phase of the expedition. After preparations in Beijing, Sven Hedin, with a team of four Swedish and three Chinese academics and technicians, left the city by car in October 1933, entered Xinjiang in February 1934, and returned to give their report to Nanjing twelve months later. Apart from the topographical survey for future motor roads and railways, they did extensive research in the geography, geology, hydrology, and archaeology of the region.

The work on the collected scientific data began in 1937 and still continues. The results have been published in fifty-six volumes in the series Reports from the Scientific Expedition to the Northwestern Provinces of China, under the Leadership of Dr. Sven Hedin—The Sino-Swedish Expedition.
Expedition. The archaeological and geographical survey of the Edsina 额济纳 area resulted in the discovery by the Swedish archaeologist Folke Bergman (贝格曼, 1902–1946) of more than ten thousand wooden strips, mostly in Chinese, dating between 102 BCE and 95 CE. One of the Chinese archaeologists, Huang Wenbi (黄文弼, 1893–1966), published books on the archaeological work done in the Lop Nor 罗布泊 area and the ancient city of Gaochang 高昌. The expedition has had a significant influence on the development of science in China because the students who joined the expedition later occupied high positions in the Chinese scientific community. Researchers today are, among other things, interested in the meteorological and climatic data that the expedition collected in the desert because the data provide information on desertification and climate change.

Jan ROMGARD

Further Reading


Sino-Tibetan Languages

Hàn-Zàng yǔxì de yǔyán 汉藏语系的语言

Sino-Tibetan languages, by some measurements, are the largest language family in the world, and are divided into two groups. The Sinitic group includes variants of Chinese; the Tibeto-Burman group includes several hundred languages and language groups.

In terms of the number of people who speak one of its components as their first language, Sino-Tibetan is the largest language family in the world. Sino-Tibetan includes Chinese and its variants, Tibetan, most of the indigenous languages of the Himalayan region, and some of the more important languages of Southeast Asia.

The Sino-Tibetan family is divided into two groups. Whereas the sole constituents of Sinitic are the variants of Chinese (which are mostly—but mistakenly—referred to as the “dialects” of Chinese), the Tibeto-Burman branch totals several hundred often little-known languages and language groups, the proper linguistic classification of which is still largely unfinished.

The Bodic (bod, Tibetan for Tibet) languages are subdivided into Bodish and East Himalayan. The former include Tibetan proper and its variants, Kanauri in northern India and Newari and the Tamangic languages in Nepal (Tamang, Gurung, and Thakali). East Himalayan is formed by, among others, the Kiranti (or Rai) languages, the Kham-Magar group, and Bahing (Vayu). These are spoken in central and eastern Nepal. Baric is a conventional term used for the Kamarupan languages (named after the medieval state of Kamarupa in northeastern India), which are made up of a large number of lesser language groups, which are subdivided into the Abor-Miri-Dafi, Kuki-Chin-Naga, and Mikir-Meithei groups.

Burmic includes the Lolo-Burmese group, the most important language of which is literary Burmese, the national language of Myanmar (Burma); Burmic also includes sizable groups of languages in Thailand, such as Lisu and Lahu.

Karenic, sometimes regarded as a higher-level subgroup of Sino-Tibetan, taxonomically (in terms of its scientific classification) coordinates with Tibeto-Burman rather than being one of its branches and consists of the Karen languages Pwo and Sgaw, spoken in Myanmar and Thailand.

Kachinic (for example, Jinghpo, or Kachin proper, in northern Myanmar) is sometimes classified as a subbranch of Baric, but some scholars group it with Burmic or treat it as a separate Tibeto-Burman branch.

Qiangic, a small language family in south China, recently has been added to Tibeto-Burman; scholars sometimes view it as a separate branch of the family, sometimes included in Burmic. Some linguists establish a distinct Rung branch, composed of Qiangic, Gyarong and Pumi of southwestern China, and the Nung languages of northern Myanmar. The extinct language of the Tangut (the language of the Xi Xia empire, which flourished in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries), written in a unique and complicated script, is mostly viewed as Tibeto-Burman.

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Scholars still debate its place in the family, but most opt for its inclusion in either the Rung subgroup or Lolo-Burmese.

The Bai (or Minjia) language of northern Yunnan Province in China may constitute a separate Tibeto-Burman group. This classification of Sino-Tibetan or Tibeto-Burman, as well as any other, can be viewed as only preliminary, and many details of it are still debated.

Another division of the Tibeto-Burman language—into indospheric and sinospheric languages—is based on cultural rather than linguistic criteria. Indospheric languages (the most typical of which are the Bodic and Baric languages) are spoken in the cultural realm of greater India, whereas sinospheric languages are spoken in the cultural realm of China. The millennia-long influences of these two dominant cultural areas are reflected in many loanwords (words taken from another language and at least partly naturalized) from Chinese and Indo-Aryan languages, respectively, found in the languages as well as in some real linguistic traits. Indospheric languages thus generally display more complicated morphological (relating to word formation) systems than languages of the sinosphere (with the Kiranti languages in eastern Nepal being morphologically the most elaborate of the Sino-Tibetan languages), whereas the latter, which are generally poorer in morphological devices, tend to use monosyllabic lexemes (units of vocabulary in a language), display intricate tone systems, and so forth. However, this division is far from being unequivocal, and it does not imply that direct influence of the eponymous languages is solely responsible for these differences.

Writing Systems

Some Sino-Tibetan languages are among those with the longest continuous written record in history.

Tibetans writing began in the seventh century CE; the script was an offshoot of the Indian family of scripts and continues to be used today. Newari, the language of the original inhabitants of the Katmandu valley, has been written in Devanagari script since the seventeenth century (with at least one manuscript dated as early as the fourteenth century). Lepcha, the state language of Sikkim, has a script of its own that has been in use since the eighteenth century, although it is little used today. Burmese has been written since the twelfth century in a script that is likewise an offshoot of an Indic predecessor.

A different kind of script, which some scholars have called possibly the most complicated writing system humanity has ever used, is the Tangut script, which rendered the language of the Xi Xia empire. Although progress was made in Tangut philology (the study of the meaning and use of words) and linguistics during the last decades of the twentieth century, it is not fully deciphered.

The Naxi (or Moso) language of Yunnan Province in China is known for an interesting kind of writing system that mainly consists of iconic, but nonetheless conventionalized, pictographs.

Questions Remain

Although the genetic relationship of the Sino-Tibetan languages is no longer in doubt, details of the relationship have not been worked out. Understandably, one of the reasons for this uncertainty is the great number of languages in the Tibeto-Burman branch, only a small number of which have been adequately described. Moreover, an alarming number of these languages are endangered, rendering the collection of reliable data for them the most important task of Sino-Tibetan linguistics. On the Sinitic side the last decades of the twentieth century brought much progress in our understanding of the phonological (relating to speech sounds) prehistory of Chinese, although scholars still debate too many details to be able to speak of a consensus on the sound-shape of early Chinese.

Besides subclassification, the most debated topics of Sino-Tibetan linguistics include such questions as whether the complicated verbal concord (agreement) system of, for example, the Kiranti languages is to be taken as original for Tibeto-Burman or the more isolating typology (the fact that words show only a minimal amount of morphological elements) of the Southeast Asian members of the family—and if a more isolating and tonal parent language has to be reconstructed, how many distinctive tones should be reconstructed for the parent language, and so on.
Characteristics

The Sino-Tibetan family shows perhaps more internal typological (categorized) diversity than any other established group of related languages. Most languages show systematic tonal contrasts, some do not. The basic word order in most Tibeto-Burman languages is subject-object-verb, but Karenic and Sinitic languages have subject-verb-object syntax (and prepositions as opposed to the postpositions common in the rest of the family). The morphological techniques used range from mostly isolating (in Southeast Asia and Sinitic), to agglutinative (relating to compound words), to high levels of polysynthesis (in Kiranti).

Stefan GEORG

Further Reading

Sixteen Kingdoms

Shíliù Guó 十六国

The Sixteen Kingdoms was a violent era during the third and early fourth centuries CE when five tribes alternated with each other in establishing brief kingdoms in northern China. (See table 1.) Historians list the kingdoms as the sixteen nations of the five “barbarian” tribes. The time is often referred to as “Wuhu Shíliù Guó” (Period of Five Barbarian Tribes and Sixteen Nations). The five tribes were the Xianbei, Di, Hun, Jiehu, and Qiang, originating from Tibetan, Tangut, Mongol, Proto-Turkic, and Tungus tribes. Eventually the Xianbei tribe reunified northern China in 440.

The entire Huang (Yellow) River valley during this period became a battlefield for tribal kingdoms and some remnant military chieftains. As the nations fought among

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location in Present-day China (Province)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheng Han</td>
<td>301–347</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>Di</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han (Anterior Zhao)</td>
<td>304–329</td>
<td>Shanxi and Shaanxi</td>
<td>Hun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anterior Liang</td>
<td>317–326</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Han</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior Zhao</td>
<td>319–331</td>
<td>Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shaanxi</td>
<td>Jiehu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anterior Qin</td>
<td>351–394</td>
<td>Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, and Shaanxi</td>
<td>Di</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anterior Yan</td>
<td>377–379</td>
<td>Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior Yan</td>
<td>384–409</td>
<td>Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior Qin</td>
<td>384–417</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Qiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Qin</td>
<td>385–431</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior Liang</td>
<td>386–403</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Di</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Liang</td>
<td>397–414</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Liang</td>
<td>397–439</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Hun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Yan</td>
<td>398–410</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Liang</td>
<td>400–421</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Han</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xia</td>
<td>407–431</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Han</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Yan</td>
<td>409–436</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Han</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
themselves, blood flowed freely. Although the period is often considered China’s “Dark Age” because of the chaos and foreign occupation of its territories, the period was also a time of great change as China was transformed by the Indian religion of Buddhism.

Unryu SUGANUMA

Further Reading

The work of Edgar Parks Snow helped promote normalization of the U.S.-China relationship. As a journalist, Snow is known as the first and last foreign journalist to interview Chinese leader Mao Zedong. As an author, Snow is recognized for his book *Red Star over China*, which gave insight into the Chinese Communist Party and Red Army leaders.

Edgar Snow was an American journalist who authored eleven books and worked as a highly successful foreign correspondent during World War II. His most famous publication, *Red Star over China* (1937), provided the West with its first glimpse of the revolutionary Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its Red Army leaders. Many Chinese were inspired to join the Communists after reading the Chinese-language edition. Snow was the first (and the last) foreign journalist to privately interview Mao Zedong. He helped promote understanding between America and China and the normalization of U.S.-China relations.

The Early Days

Edgar Snow was born 19 July 1905. He grew up in Kansas City, Missouri, graduating from West Port High School and attending Junior College of Kansas City. He transferred to the University of Missouri in Columbia but left after one year; he moved to New York City and began a career in advertising. He also studied journalism briefly at Columbia University. After making eight hundred dollars from a modest stock investment, Snow decided to see the world. In 1928 he arrived in Shanghai and met his destiny: China, which became his home for the next twelve years. His travels took him throughout Asia, including the Philippines (where he lived for two years), Indochina, Burma, and India. He also lived just less than two years in Russia.

In Shanghai, Snow took a job at the *China Weekly Review*. Given an assignment to write about tourist attractions of towns and cities along the Chinese railways, Snow was able to travel outside the foreign concessions of Shanghai and to see things other Westerners could not see. He was appalled by China’s poverty: Westerners received special privileges, as did Chinese city dwellers, but the vast majority of rural Chinese were trapped in dire poverty with little hope of escape.

In 1929, at the beginning of China’s great famine of 1929–1931, Snow visited the ravaged northwestern countryside. On the way he met Rewi Alley, an expatriate from New Zealand who spent his life working for the Chinese government and was to become Snow’s lifelong friend. In Saratsi, located in Inner Mongolia south of the Gobi Desert, Snow witnessed mass starvation and other horrors he would never forget. These experiences helped formulate his sociopolitical perspective. He remained sympathetic to the Communist Party’s emphasis on agrarian poverty in promoting a successful revolution. Unlike Russia’s Communist revolution, which emphasized class struggle based in the cities, with the proletariat (working class) overthrowing the bourgeoisie (wealthy upper class), over
eighty per cent of China’s people lived in the countryside. Agrarian reform in China was the method employed by the CCP to gain control and unite the country.

First Marriage and Life in Beijing

Snow married Helen “Peg” Foster (who wrote under the name Nym Wales), a private secretary to the American consul general in Shanghai, on Christmas Day, 1932. They moved to Beijing the following year and spent five years there. Snow took the helm of Consolidated Press for all of China and he also taught part-time at Yenching University, which connected him with liberals and the resurgent student nationalism. He learned basic Chinese and compiled *Living China: Modern Chinese Short Stories* (1936), a translated collection of short stories written by Chinese authors.

Red Star over China

In 1936, after the conclusion of the Communists’ Long March, Snow visited the territory held by the Communists, including the caves of Yan’an and the town of Bao’an in northwestern China. He was the first Western journalist to interview various Red Army leaders, including Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) and Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who was rumored to have died while escaping Nationalist Guomin dang (GMD) forces during the 9,600 kilometer (6,000 mile) Long March. At the time, the Chinese Communists were believed to be merely bandits, a ragtag, unorganized group. Snow, however, found dedicated revolutionaries, organized and confident they would prevail.

Snow spent many weeks with the Red Army and countless hours recording the first and only authorized biography of Mao Zedong, published in *Red Star over China*. The book is considered of prime historical significance because it was translated into Chinese and helped educate the entire nation about the CCP movement. It is still regarded a classic by scholars for many reasons, including the extensive and exclusive biographical interviews with Mao Zedong. According to Snow’s account, after thousands of years of imperial rule and servitude in China, Mao saw peasant-led revolution as the only path that would unite the people and be capable of expelling foreign imperialists—both Japanese and Western. Snow also brought back Mao’s proposal to the GMD: an end to civil war and a joint united front to resist the Japanese.

Snow found Mao to be an accomplished scholar of classical Chinese, educated in both history and philosophy, and a genius in both military and political strategy. The two men developed a mutual trust and respect, and a lasting friendship. It was the story of a lifetime, and Snow captured it in both words and photographs; this included his iconic photo of Mao wearing Snow’s red-star cap.

Chinese Industrial Cooperative Organization (Gung Ho)

In 1938, Snow, his wife Helen, and Rewi Alley founded the Chinese Industrial Cooperative Organization (known as Indusco, or in Chinese as gung ho). The Work-Together movement was sponsored by Soong Qing-ling (political leader and wife of Sun Yat-sen) and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr (British ambassador in China). Snow had been moved by the devastation of Shanghai homes and businesses by the occupying Japanese military and wanted to help rebuild cooperatives to offer education and work opportunities to the destitute Chinese. They also enlisted Soong Qing-ling’s brother-in-law, Finance Minister H. H. Kung. Lack of support from the Nationalist GMD government limited the venture’s success, however.

World War II and the 1940s

Snow returned to the United States in 1941. The same year, he published *The Battle for Asia*. For ten years he had claimed that World War II actually began with Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, and in his book he claimed that the destruction of Japan’s Pacific fleet was imperative. (This was written before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941.) In 1942, Snow became associate editor at *The Saturday Evening Post*. As a distinguished war correspondent, he worked in India, Russia, Africa, and Europe. Three extended tours in the Soviet Union
yielded two books on the USSR. His Far East reportage included Indochina, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. He wrote for many other publications, as well, including the Chicago Tribune, New York Herald Tribune, London Daily Herald, and Foreign Affairs.

During the 1940s Snow made two brief return visits to China, but in 1945 he was denied a visa by Chiang Kai-shek due to his ongoing criticism of the Nationalist government’s unwillingness to engage the Japanese and Chiang’s seeming inability to unite the country. When the GMD fell to the Communists in 1949, Generalissimo Chiang moved its government to Taiwan. The U.S. government banned all travel to the new People’s Republic of China (PRC). Snow would not return to China until 1960.

The Cold War Years and McCarthyism

Edgar Snow’s career as a journalist tailed off during the 1950s. He had supported China’s peasant-led Communist movement and often criticized the U.S.-backed Nationalist Party, now located in Taiwan. In 1949, Snow and his first wife divorced. He married the actress Lois Wheeler. Both their careers suffered greatly from the repression and innuendo of McCarthyism and the Cold War. They had two children and lived a quiet life in a semirural setting near the Hudson River, not far from New York City; Snow taught and did some lecturing. The family moved to Switzerland in 1959. Snow published two books during the 1950s, including Journey to the Beginning, which helped pave the way for his 1960 return to China. This and later visits would play a role in breaking isolationist policy between the United States and China.

Return to China (1960 and 1964)

Travel between America and China was off-limits due to the political mood (and State Department policy) throughout the decade following World War II. In 1960, Snow finally obtained a visa and flew to Beijing on 28 June for a five-month visit. He was reunited with friends Rewi Alley, George Hatem, and Huang Hua (one of his translators in 1936 and the future first Chinese ambassador to Canada). He visited fourteen of China’s twenty-two provinces, nineteen major cities, and numerous communes.

Snow spent several days with Zhou Enlai and had an extended dinner visit with Chairman Mao Zedong at his home adjacent to the Forbidden City. Mao claimed success for the Great Leap Forward (1958–1959) program, but his claim has been sharply disputed in other accounts. Mao did concede that China was still extremely poor and would remain so in the foreseeable future. The struggle to survive brought hardship, yet this “challenge” was capable of strengthening the people. Mao refused to talk about Sino-Soviet relations. He would, however, discuss Taiwan: Taiwan remained a domestic issue, and the United States needed to withdraw its troops from the region before talks with China could begin.

Although his travel in China was carefully choreographed, Snow felt he came away with a better understanding of modern China’s people. He saw vast improvements compared to his arrival in 1928. Snow was impressed, although skeptical of some government claims. He felt inspired to write a book that stood in sharp contrast to the usual Cold War portrayals of the PRC.

The Other Side of the River: Red China Today (1962) was acknowledged as a sign of Snow’s continuing goodwill towards China. On 9 January 1965, Mao and Snow met for dinner and four hours of conversation. This represented the most direct U.S.-China link during the entire Johnson administration (1963–1969). Mao spoke about a number of subjects. On U.S.-China relations, Mao felt deep regret that the forces of history had divided the two nations, but he also felt these forces would inevitably bring them together. War could come only if the United States invaded China; that would not be tolerated. Also, Mao declared no Chinese troops were stationed anywhere in Asia, including Vietnam. He sincerely hoped Sino-U.S. relations would improve.

Final Trip to China (1970)

On his last trip, Snow again had an extended private meeting with Mao; he had questions to ask. What about Mao's
personality cult? Although Mao was not very happy with it, he felt that after three thousand years of emperor worship in China, old habits were hard to break. But he did not want to be remembered as a glorious, all-powerful leader. He had begun as a primary school teacher in Changsha in Hunan Province, which was how he wanted to be remembered: as a teacher.

Regarding the Soviet Union, there was indeed ongoing tension. According to Mao, the Soviets considered China inferior, and advised them to move away from being so dogmatic. In turn, the Chinese saw the Russians as revisionists who were turning their backs from pure Marxism. Contentious criticism of both Mao and Edgar Snow from Russian scholars continues to this day.

Concerning the Cultural Revolution, Mao admitted it was a case of unintentional consequences. Mao condemned the mistreatment of captives—party members removed from power and subjected to reeducation. This created bad blood and made it difficult to rebuild and change the Party. In the years to follow, many books and articles detailed the horror unleashed by Mao’s movement to remove Party-chosen successor Liu Shao-ch’i and prevent other Party members from taking the capitalist road. Snow would not read them. He did, however, tell the story from Mao’s perspective, along with details from his final look at China, and presented it in his last book, titled The Long Revolution (1972).

Perhaps most importantly, Mao told Snow he was open to a visit from President Richard Nixon, whether as an official or simply a tourist. The continuing war in Vietnam—the Chinese felt America was prepared to withdraw—and the ongoing problem of Taiwan should not preclude opening a dialog between the nations. Unfortunately, Snow would not live to see the historic moment.

**Farewell, Friend of China**

Edgar Snow conducted many extensive interviews with key Asian leaders during his lifetime, ranging from Mao Zedong to Mahatma Gandhi. Snow always sought the truth but along the way learned that the truth depends on one’s point of view. He believed in America’s democratic ideals and hoped they might be implemented in China. However, he increasingly saw the U.S.—backed GMD as incapable of warding off Japanese imperialism and unifying the Chinese people under a common government able to address the abject poverty in China.

Edgar Snow died of pancreatic cancer on 15 February 1972 at age sixty-seven, three days before President Nixon’s historic visit to China; he was to have accompanied Nixon as a member of the President’s party. On 16 February 1972, Mao Zedong sent Lois Snow his personal condolences and heartfelt sympathy at Edgar Snow’s untimely death. He called him a true friend of the Chinese people who worked tirelessly throughout his life to promote mutual understanding and friendship between the people of China and United States. The Chinese people would remember him.

Zhou Enlai also wrote a warm eulogy, noting that Snow’s writings were widely appreciated in China. Zhou had often said Snow was not a journalist but rather a historian. He lamented the passing of a true friend of China’s.

Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Qing-ling) also offered her condolences in a personal message. She wanted Mrs. Snow to know that her husband’s unyielding support for China’s struggle against native fascism and the Japanese invasion and occupation would never be forgotten. Edgar Snow’s memory would remain forever alive and vibrant in the hearts of the Chinese people.

**Cecilia Siu-Wah POON and Craig RICHARDS**

**Further Reading**


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Red Star over China

In the journalist Edgar Snow’s book *Red Star over China*, first published in 1937, he wrote:

As early as Chingkangshan [a base held by the Red Army in the winter of 1927] the Red Army had imposed three simple rules of discipline on its fighters, and these were: prompt obedience to orders; no confiscation whatsoever from the poor peasantry; and the prompt delivery directly to the government, for its immediate disposal, of all goods confiscated from the landlords. After the 1928 conference, emphatic efforts to enlist the support of the peasantry were made and eight rules were added to the three listed above. These were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Replace all doors when you leave a house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Return and roll up the straw matting on which you sleep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Be courteous and polite to people and help them when you can.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Return all borrowed articles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Replace all damaged articles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Be honest in all your transactions with the peasants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pay for all articles purchased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Be sanitary, and especially establish latrines at a safe distance from people’s houses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Official social organizations in China are subject to the supervision of the state, but they may exhibit considerable independence as long as they do not present a challenge to the state. In addition, many non-governmental organizations monitor the environment, the treatment of ethnic minorities, and the protection of cultural relics. Even illegal trade unions have been formed in recent years.

In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), associations of people with similar interests can be broken down into four basic types: state controlled (such as the so-called mass organizations), state supervised (such as professional and entrepreneurs’ associations or hobby-based organizations), informal (organizations of fellow townspeople and clan members), and illegal (secret societies, underground groups, opposition groups, and criminal organizations). While the state-controlled organizations have existed for almost the entire history of the PRC, the other three types have begun to reemerge only in the course of the reform process. The reasons for this reemergence have been the development of new social classes and an increasing division of labor and specialization in the process of economic reform.

Emerging Special Interest Groups
Since the 1980s, new groups with special interests have been forming professional organizations and interest associations. Along with formal groups, there are now informal ones, and to the traditional organizations have been added modern ones (women’s and environmental groups, for example). This development started in rural areas, where it was encouraged by the return to family-based economic structures and the withdrawal of the state from the running of villages. Often traditional organizations (such as clans, religious and temple organizations, or secret societies) reemerged. Farmers began to form traditional unofficial organizations and interest groups, most often regional groupings, and gangs of beggars emerged.

Illegal trade unions of migrant workers have developed, organizing strikes and demonstrations. In addition, business associations, hobby associations, and sport clubs have developed in urban areas. Although the non-state organizations are, to an extent, based on traditional structures, their emergence demonstrates a growing need on the part of the population for independent organizations.

According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which is responsible for the registration of associations, at the end of 2005, some 320,000 non-state organizations from the county level upward had been registered, including federations, non-government organizations (NGOs), and government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). These figures do not include associations at the township and village level, as they are not required to register. However, the term association is imprecise in China, as it encompasses organizations founded by the party/state as well as those set up by citizens. Organizations set up by citizens must register and adhere to the Regulations.
Concerning Registration and Administration of Social Organizations.

According to official Chinese data in 2005, more than 2,000 NGOs existed, all emerging since 1990. They are involved with environmental protection, endangered animal species, fringe groups, AIDS sufferers, ethnic minorities, protection of cultural relics, consumer issues, or nature and landscape preservation. Some NGOs are involved in the extension and enhancement of grassroots elections, participation in urban neighborhood communities, or the improvement of the labor conditions of rural migrant workers.

Although most associations are concerned with sports, health, recreation, professional, cultural, scientific-technical, and other activities, in recent years social organizations and foundations have emerged that are active in a broad range of more politically sensitive fields. Most notable is the environmental domain, where an increasing number of student groups have come forward to watch and monitor events. They originate in mainly larger cities and areas affected by evident ecological crises. According to reports in 2006, such groups existed at 176 universities in twenty-six provinces.

Beyond official associations are informal organizations like underground NGOs or informal networks. Some are traditional clans, hometown associations, secret societies, or beggar’s guilds. Hometown associations are active in China’s larger cities. They gather people from the same township, county, or province and act as interest organizations. They partly control entire markets, live
together in common living quarters, and provide mutual support. They function as self-protecting organizations of worker migrants and sometimes even as prototrade union organizations.

Religion is a contested field. The officially recognized religious communities are strictly controlled by the state. More traditional ones, such as temple associations and the sects and underground churches that have spread in recent years, may function as social pockets of resistance. But they are not tolerated by the party/state and, therefore, unable to affect the development of civil society.

Chinese associations and NGOs clearly differ from their counterparts in Western societies. To begin with, as long as such associations do not pursue political or politically sensitive objectives, the party/state takes a benevolent attitude since they address issues at the local level that the central state is unable to solve. Associations generally have a rather ambiguous character in China. On the one hand, they are subject to the supervision and control of the party/state. On the other, they may exhibit certain elements of independence as long as they do not challenge the party/state. In a society like China’s, interconnectedness between social associations and the party/state are helpful, as they contribute to problem solving through informal channels and by informal bargaining. The Chinese “bargaining society,” in which interests of social groups are bargain in an indirect way, requires such interconnectedness to enforce interests more easily.

Social Associations as Mediators

The role of social associations as mediators between state and society is nothing new in China. Traditional organizations were based on shared occupations, intellectual fellowship, family ties, or common regional origin. Particularly in rural areas, secret societies or farmers’ interest groups were important. Most secret organizations promised their members a heavenly state of happiness and tried to establish an egalitarian society built on the principles of morality and higher justice.

The guilds, for example, which had existed for centuries, were mostly structured like families and stood for particular interests, but they never had an impact on China’s political history. They adapted themselves to the requirements of the government bureaucracy, which controlled towns and markets, and sought to negotiate and petition their way rather than seek confrontation. They offered their members material advantages, supporting them in times of need, and represented their interests in dealings with the authorities. Through a strict code of rules, the guilds obliged their members to fulfill their duties to the state, especially since the guilds were held responsible by the authorities for their members’ behavior. The guilds financed themselves primarily through self-imposed goods taxes. Every guild was headed by a paid state official who could negotiate with senior officials and was officially recognized as a representative of the organization. This structure, which was easily adaptable to the supervision and control structures of the Communist Party, is in some ways similar to the structure now used by private social organizations in the PRC.

Rise and Fall

Toward the end of the Qing era (1912), numerous modern groups formed in towns. These included professional organizations, groups of intellectuals, chambers of commerce, trade unions, and students’, farmers’, and women’s groups. The weakness of the state in the late Qing era and at the beginning of the republic made these organizations increasingly independent. The chambers of commerce were thus able to work actively toward the creation of parliaments and the drafting of a constitution. Students’, workers’, and professional interest groups played an important part in the May Fourth Movement (1915–1923).

As the central government again took control and became more stabilized after 1927, the ruling Guomindang Party enforced a policy that limited the groups’ powers. In 1941 a law was passed that tied associations directly to state institutions and put them under state control. With the foundation of the PRC, most organizations were disbanded or changed into party-controlled or party-supervised institutions.

Legalization of Associations

The foundation of academic, professional, social, arts-, sports-, or hobby-based associations has been legal since the end of the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of associations...
and organizations, covering a wide range of social interests, have been created across the country. The 1989 provisional decree offering Directions for the Registration and Administration of Social Associations subjected this rapidly growing trend to stronger state regulation, a move that is similar to the policy previously set by the Guomindang. A revised version of this law was passed in 1998. The rules require an official body (authority, state or party institution, or public enterprise) to make a formal application on behalf of the association and to act as the formal sponsor of the association. Because sponsorship includes a supervisory function—the heads of the sponsoring institution can be held responsible for misconduct by the association—insti tutions are often prepared to take on this responsibility only in return for material or in-kind advantages or because of personal connections.

**Association-State Link**

It would be wrong to assume that the connection with state or party institutions means that clubs and associations function as merely quasi-state organizations and represent only the interests of party and state. Social pressure that developed following the extension of a free market, political liberalization, and growing autonomy in society made the authorization of associations acceptable to the party and the state. The connection with sponsoring institutions has resulted, however, in multiple links between associations and the state. Usually associations attempt to articulate and implement their interests through their sponsors. This can be achieved through the common practice of *guanxi* (creating and using connections) or by having well-known and respected officials as honorary members or “consultants” to help the association gain political protection and recognition. In authoritarian societies there is hardly any other way to assert one’s interests. The close connections with state or party institutions also show that independent organizations are not yet possible. In present-day China, it is not the pressure group but the *guanxi* group that solves problems and conflicts and does so by means of patronage. A continuation of this trend is the need to seek help from a powerful sponsoring institution because the connection with an authority or public institution functions as protection and enhances the association’s status.

In a society in which independent parallel structures are not permitted, interest representation and participation in negotiations between the state and interest groups would be impossible without organizations being interlinked in this way. In China a social association’s interests are not so much asserted as indirectly negotiated, and they require such interconnections. On the one hand, only in this way can social groups attain a certain degree of participation in negotiations. On the other hand, associations can influence politics through their sponsor institution. Such semiautonomous organizations can be seen as the forerunners of autonomous economic and political associations. They are two-sided in character because they have elements of both state dominance and autonomy.

**A Future for Social Associations**

As economic reforms and social change have moved forward, special interest groups have sprung up. The party/state is attempting, however, to bind the newly developing interest groups into existing formal structures. On the one hand, increasing economic liberalization has meant that the state is no longer able to control all social activities, but on the other hand, it does not see the necessity for this as long as the newly developing interest groups do not evolve into parallel political structures.

Unlike in democratic societies, in authoritarian societies the state is the only body with decision-making power. Although such a structure might allow various associations and interest groups to have a voice in discussion processes, state supervision prevents the emergence of parallel organizations acting independently of the state. The continuing reduction of the role of the state in economic matters and further changes in Chinese society will probably mean that social associations will have an increasingly important role in the social and political processes of change.

*Thomas HEBERER*

**Further Reading**


Religious Activities as Social Associations

In China as in all parts of the world, the village community has been the primary source of social and economic interaction. An excerpt from the scholar Chang Liu’s 2007 book Peasants and Revolution in Rural China describes how religion works in the village context:

Religious activities were another major category of the village’s social activities. Many organizations were set up in the village for this purpose ... Of these religious organizations, it was the village-wide ascriptive religious association that organized the village as a whole. It was ascriptive because all members of the village were automatically included in the association. Before the twentieth century, this association was usually the only village-wide organization found in North China villages.

Organizing village-wide religious activities—such as collective prayers, maintenance of village temples, temple fairs and opera performances, and so forth—was of course the main function of the village-wide religious association. But it was never limited solely to this aspect. Since it was the only village-wide organization, it also served as an ad hoc body to handle secular public affairs of the village. Because of this, it actually took on the role of the village’s governing organ. Village public affairs involved the villagers’ common interests. These affairs might be generated by matters within or without the village community. Regardless of the source, they had one thing in common: they aroused public concern and necessitated collected choices and responses. Managing these public affairs was therefore a typical political process, carried out within the arena of the village and handled by the villagers themselves.

Harmony as a philosophical objective has been part of Chinese thought for more than 2,000 years. It has remained important in Chinese culture, whether applied to human relationships, religion, nature, or politics, both ancient and contemporary.

The concept of *harmony* has been an integral part of Chinese philosophical thinking for two and a half millennia. Expressed sometimes in the language of social relationships and at other times in the grander ideal of order in nature, it has been at the heart of various forms of Confucianism that have appeared, disappeared, and then reappeared since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). In classical Confucianism, harmony was seen as most fully expressed in Confucius’s (551–479 BCE) concept of the five principle relationships: ruler and subject, father and son, older and younger brother, friends, and husband and wife. Social order was based on individuals clearly knowing their positions, and understanding their obligations to those above, and below them. This concept has been criticized not only for placing women in subservient positions, but also as the justification for highly conservative political and social policies, and as rationale for centralized forms of power. Since 2000, Confucius’s thinking has become fashionable in mainland China, and his statement (or the statement imputed to him)—that there should be “harmony without uniformity” guided by the moral principles of a righteous and clear-thinking person reasserted and reintroduced with approval by the government—among influential mainland intellectuals.

There are more esoteric forms of thought promoting harmony in classical Chinese philosophy. Mencius (372–289 BCE), the great near-contemporary of Confucius, spoke at length on the Mandate of Heaven (*Tianming*) and the responsibilities of rulers to those ruled, and vice versa. Daoism, dating back over two millennia, is one of the most famous, more esoteric expressions of the need for harmony. This has served as a more spiritual form in contrast to the highly practical moral philosophy contained in Confucianism. Daoism exercised influence over some of the rulers of China during the long dynastic period until the end of the Qing in 1912. Even so, its otherworldly nature meant it has not been associated with good governance. Promotion of harmonious relations has also been encapsulated in the need to seek balance—between the feminine and the masculine, light and cold, dark and light—that was most famously articulated in the West by the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) when he adopted the yin–yang theory in his philosophical and psychological theories. In his work, both Western and Chinese forms of seeking harmony were used by individuals as they sought to come to terms with the archetypes in the collective unconscious. Jung prescribed the use of philosophies of contemplative practice for patients seeking to overcome mental or psychic problems. His thinking would have a big impact on later practitioners of psychotherapy.

Harmony has therefore managed to encompass the abstract religious practices of some belief systems, like Daoism, but it has also been important in practical
governance. Fear of the dissolution of stable political entities in Chinese history has left a deep historic stain. Dislike of chaos (luan), taken as the opposite of stability and harmony, was the excuse used by the Chinese leadership in 1989 when they ended the student demonstrations that year. It was also the worst criticism made of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which, after 1978, was judged to be a willful encouragement of turbulence and disruption. Since that time, there has been an increasing emphasis placed on stability, the need for a well ordered society, and peacefulness.

This objective lies behind the concept of a “harmonious society” promoted (since 2003) by the Chinese government under President Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Prior to this (1989–2002), President Jiang Zemin promoted a system in which inequality ran rife; there were increasing disparities between the coastal regions of China and the massive inward regions, and corruption had come back stronger than ever, after being slapped down in 1989 because it was viewed as responsible for the Tiananmen Square uprising on 4 June that year. The liberalization of the economy had released many of the controls that had been in place until then, meaning that many of the restraints on greed, personal gain, and exploitation were, in effect, lifted. In 1984, according to the Gini coefficient, an internationally recognized measure of social inequality recognized by the United Nations, China was one of the world’s most equal societies. By 2004 it had become one of the most unequal.

Wen and Hu wished to show that the ruling Communist Party understood this problem and wanted to continue to look after the interests of the weak and the
underprivileged. They improved educational provision in the rural areas, lifted many of the taxes placed on farmers that had been a major cause of contention, and undertook high-profile sackings of party officials who were viewed as corrupt. The most prominent of these was the Party Secretary of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, whose involvement in the embezzlement of social security money for use in property investment lead to his arrest in 2006, and subsequent conviction and eighteen-year prison sentence.

Talking of a harmonious society was more an aspiration than an actuality. One of the greatest challenges facing China after decades of Communist rule was the very inharmonious relationship between humans and nature. Mao had personified this in his almost aggressive attitude to the natural world, as something that needed to be tamed. Modern China’s abuse of its own natural environment and its flora and fauna has been exhaustively catalogued. Of all the challenges facing modern China, the battle to clean up its own environment has become the most urgent—meaning that in many places sustainability has become a more resonant keyword in political discourse than harmony.

Harmony is also found in China’s international presentation of its own aspirations. In 1954 Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed that the foundations of the newly established People’s Republic of China’s international policy were based on “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”; one of these principles included respect for the integrity of other sovereign nations and noninterference in their domestic affairs. More recently, China has talked of being
a country that, despite its burgeoning economic power, should not be seen as a threat to the rest of the world. Party ideologue Zheng Bijian expressed this in his concept of “the peaceful rise of China” (Zhongguo heping jueqi). Even so, China’s protestations of pure intent and desire for harmonious international relations were viewed with some skepticism by other countries, many of which (the United States in particular) pointed to the double-digit increases in Chinese military expenditure over the last decade.

For the Communist Party inside China, talk of harmony stands in stark contrast to the imprecations of one of its key founders, Mao Zedong, who during his most radical period at the height of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, demanded that there be “great disharmony under heaven” and ordered that young activists create disharmony. His embrace of dialectics in Marxism was seen as fundamentally contrary to the general desire in traditional Chinese philosophy to seek balance. More recent attempts to use so-called practices cultivating inner harmony by sects like Falun Gong (where controlled breathing is used to create calmness and self-awareness) have been quickly outlawed because of the perceived social disruption they cause.

China has a traumatic history of disharmony: The Muslim, Nien, and Taiping rebellions in the nineteenth century caused more than 50 million deaths, and there were the devastating Second Sino-Japanese War (called by Chinese the War of Resistance against Japan) and civil war in the twentieth century. It is no wonder that the current Chinese government, and many Chinese intellectuals, promote the need for balance, and for internal and external harmony. Perhaps it is awareness by Chinese leaders of the extraordinary complexity of forces within their country, and the need to keep these under control. As such, harmony might have had at times exotic routes, but in contemporary China it is a good expression of the county’s pragmatic nature, and its desire for self control.

Kerry BROWN

Further Reading
Social Networking, Online
Zài xiàn shèhuì wǎngluò 在线社会网络

While being careful not to cross certain lines, China’s fast-growing online population of 298 million people (as of 2009), led by China’s “Generation Y” born in the 1980s, is experiencing the liberation of virtual community.

As China becomes increasingly networked, both terrestrially and by mobile technologies, online social networking is transforming many people’s lives with online news, entertainment, education, and shopping. It is also affecting the political landscape as more technically advanced policymakers turn to blogs and bulletin board systems for information about what people are saying and thinking.

Generation Y
Generation Y of China (balinghou), those who were born in the 1980s, grew up in the 1990s as single children without the traditional extended family network, owing to China’s one-child policy. Members of this group are the most enthusiastic users of online social networking. For these young Chinese, a personal and career path is no longer clearly laid out. There are more choices, more opportunities, and more uncertainty. The combination of three main factors makes them ideal users for online social networking: they tend to be highly computer literate, they tend to be the only child in the household, and they tend to be highly mobile. Online networking is the primary way for this generation to get in touch and stay in touch with friends, classmates, relatives, and co-workers. They use blogs, forums, and bulletin board systems (BBS), Web 2.0 social-networking sites, instant messaging, and microblogging, often through mobile devices.

Online Communities
China’s online youth are finding friendship and solace, as well as information and entertainment, in cyberspace. They are searching for others who can relate to their experiences and who may share their mind-set. Online social networking is also becoming functional and a way to adjust to real-world relationships. Online dating sites, such as lotus.com and love21cn.com (or Jiayuan.com), are increasingly chosen for meeting potential marriage partners. Web portals, such as MSN, Skype, and QQ (which boasts more than 220 million users), are accessed by many merchants as customer-service and marketing tools to reach out to real-world customers. Job seekers use online tools, which include searching and social networking, and young, mobile professionals use social-networking sites to find new friends before moving to another city.

For many Chinese, online communities offer an alternative to traditional sources of information, an alternative that is often viewed as more trustworthy than corporate or government sources and more relevant than received wisdom handed down from elders with assurances that it is true because they say so.

Social and entertainment infrastructures in China are more limited than they are in the West. The Internet,
however, provides easy access to entertainment. Its interactive nature seems to fit particularly well with Chinese culture.

Educational opportunities are still uneven in China, with most major universities and information centers still clustered in and around Beijing and Shanghai, but the Internet allows students anywhere to make use of online databases and other global information sources. Online initiatives are seen as crucial to solving the East–West educational divide.

Internet users in China already outnumber those in the United States. According to China Internet Network Information Center, the state network information center, as of June 2008, there were 253 million Internet users in China, a 19 percent penetration. (The United States, by contrast, had 220 million active Internet users in June 2008, about 73 percent of the population; the number of Internet users in China reached 298 million in January 2009). According to the International Telecommunication Union—the organization that sets and monitors communication standards—as of December 2007 there were 66 million broadband Internet connections in China. Chinese Internet users spend nearly 2 billion hours online each week; people in the United States, 129 million hours.

It is difficult to be precise about the figures because of the cell phone factor: Cell phones are ubiquitous in China, and an unknown number of Chinese cell phone users are using their phones to access websites, chat programs, and even to download and listen to music. As mobile technology expands, so do accessibility and the numbers of users.

China is also home to a number of “Net stars,” personalities who are famous online, such as Mu Zimei and Fu Rong Jie (Sister Fu Rong). The world’s top blogger is Chinese actress Xu Jinglei, who is now better known for her blogging than for her acting. She shot to the top of Technorati’s list of bloggers as soon as Technorati was prodded into internationalizing. Unlike in the West, Internet stars in China tend to become genuine stars who enjoy fame both online and offline.

Social Media

The online interfaces that make possible this brave new world are known collectively as “social media.” Blogs are an example of a social medium in which an individual addresses and receives feedback from a large audience—from
the one to the many. BBS, relationship management media (sites such as MySpace or Cyworld), massively multiplayer role-playing games (MMORPGs), file-sharing systems, and wikis are examples of social media in which many people interact with many other people—from the many to the many. Cyworld is an interesting example. Originating in South Korea, it currently has some 17 million users. It combines the features of MySpace, Flickr, and virtual worlds; its many users upload approximately 6.2 million photos daily. (Flickr, by contrast, uploads approximately 500,000 photos daily.) Finally, and of particular interest to businesses, there are corporate feedback forums that let people respond to their experiences with the company’s products—from the many to the one.

BBSs were among the earliest online community tools and are, for now at least, the most important social medium in China, with an estimated 53 million people in China making use of them. They are easy to use and allow for anonymous communication, which, in a restrictive society such as China’s, gives people a feeling of liberation. The Chinese enjoy the social, community-oriented (as opposed to individualistic) nature of BBSs. In general, Chinese people are not so eager to stand out. Blogs are extremely popular, too, but unlike in the United States, they tend to be personal, generally written just for friends and family.

BBSs are a vital center of information exchange for Chinese young people, who, like their peers in the West, find the comments of their contemporaries online more personal, immediate, and relevant than an old-fashioned viewpoint from a traditional source of authority. A typical post might recount a problem—sometimes word-by-word—and tens to hundreds of follow-up posts will help analyze the problem. Other typical posts are questions. Almost any question receives enthusiastic follow-up posts in which people offer analyses, experiences, and tips.

Postings are anonymous, but people seem to cherish the help they obtain and routinely come back to help answer questions themselves. The authors of the most helpful BBS postings are honored by their fellow posters and often given honorary positions in the BBS world. Participants adhere to a sophisticated code of online etiquettes and use a specific jargon. People who follow these rules tend to get more responses and are respected more. For example, people reading the postings on BBSs are encouraged to make a response entry, even if it’s an innocuous “Hi, I like your post.” This kind of behavior is considered polite and helps to build up a participant’s reputation.

Another interesting phenomenon is the race to be the first to respond to a post. Being the first to respond demonstrates respect; therefore, it has special importance. The first-response slot is given a special name: the “sofa.” People routinely compete to “grab the sofa” 抢沙发, that is, to try to be the first reader to respond. Different areas of a large BBS will have its own forum administrator (ban zhu 班主, page owner), who enforces rules and remove the postings that do not follow the rules. Forum administrators are site enthusiasts who have built a reputation for being reliable and trustworthy in enforcing the rules.

**Mob Mentality**

In the United States, Internet hunting is actual hunting: A webcam shows the landscape at an actual location, and a hunter at a computer sends a message to fire, triggering a remote-controlled gun. In China, however, Internet hunting is something completely different: It is the tracking down, by the online community at large, of someone who has committed some act or engaged in some behavior that outrages the community.

The best-known case involved a wronged husband, his wife, and the student with whom the wife had an affair. The husband posted a 5,000-word letter about his wife’s affair with the student, whom she had met through the popular game World of Warcraft (a game so popular in China that its characters appear in television ads). The online community identified the student and tracked him to his parents’ home, making vehement attacks online and putting him at risk of personal injury in the real world. This kind of behavior, a form of communal morality enforcement, is still a potent aspect of Chinese communal culture.

The Chinese government and established organizations are increasingly responsive to the opinions of the vocal online community. Tsinghua University, one of China’s leading higher education institutions, was alerted to a professor who had lied on his résumé by an Internet campaign started by Fang Zhouzi, a famous blogger who is known for identifying and publicizing the rampant
academic cheating among elite Chinese university professors. The professor was fired as a result. Similarly, an Internet campaign launched by environmentalists put pressure on the film director Chen Kaige and eventually caught the attention of the central government. The environmentalists were outraged over the damage that the film crew for Chen’s *The Promise* (2005) had done to the area surrounding Bigu Lake in Yunnan Province—a location so strikingly like Shangri-la, the mountain paradise of James Hilton’s *Lost Horizon*, that in 2002 it adopted that name. Eventually Qiu Baoxin, the vice minister of China’s Department of Development, publicly criticized the production team. Officials in the county of Shangri-la were fired, and the production team was fined.

**Government Monitoring**

The government responds to Internet social media in three important ways: by regulating it, investing in it, and monitoring online activity. This monitoring is done in various ways. One is keyword analysis. Posts that mention Falun Gong or Tibet, for example, might trigger investigation. In the face of government scrutiny, the online public in China protects the freedom of their online interactions by engaging in voluntary self-censorship. Perhaps for that reason, online media has not been used for political activity in China in the way it has in the United States.

**Commercial Monitoring**

Online activity is also monitored by marketers, and it seems that more businesses are allocating more funds to marketing online. One of the leaders in this area is CIC Data, a China-based Internet word-of-mouth and competitive intelligence research company. Sam Flemming, CIC Data’s director in Shanghai, blogs about social media. He thinks social media has greater reach and greater impact in China than it does in the United States because it has more impact on offline life than is true in the United States. He points to the case of the two university students who became an Internet sensation by lip-syncing to the songs of the Back Street Boys. Pepsi picked them up for its Pepsi Creative Challenge campaign and its MyDaDa campaign, and now they are television celebrities, called the Back Dorm Boys 后舍男生.

The most popular interactive sites, according to a 2008 study by CIC Data in Shanghai, are forums where consumers discuss automobiles and sports. Sites for parenting and childcare information are also popular, followed by discussion forums related to cosmetics and consumer electronics. The more personal and explicit sites, such as Senei.com.cn, are latecomers to the crowded Web as are Facebook clones such as Kaixinwang, Zhanzuo, and Xiaonei. The name Xiaomei is a pun, meaning something along the lines of “lustbook.”

**Worldwide Community**

While online life is similar in most countries, online life in China is somewhat unique because it is growing out of a culture with a deeply rooted tradition of social exchange based on feelings, respect, and reciprocity. But at a time when that culture’s economy is rapidly modernizing and globalizing, it seems possible that Chinese innovations in the realm of social media will come to the West and that China is certain to benefit from its connection to the rest of the world.

Jonathan Qiang LI and Karen CHRISTENSEN

**Further Reading**


Social Stratification
Shèhùi jiēcèng fènhuà 社会阶层分化

After the Communist Party came to power in 1949 it attempted to narrow the gaps in income and wealth between men and women and between urban and rural residents. As a result, the standard of living for most Chinese was raised. Some gains were only temporary, however, and the socialist system has introduced new inequalities.

In 1949, when the socialist government of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) came to power, one of its main goals was to reduce the glaring inequalities of income and wealth. To this end the government appropriated most private property, abolished labor markets, expanded public education, and instituted wage controls. By the early 1960s inequalities of income and wealth in rural and urban areas were sharply reduced, and living standards for most Chinese were vastly improved. Ironically, however, socialism introduced new inequalities—both among people who did and did not have network ties to government officials and Communist Party members and among people who did and did not work in state-owned firms.

Furthermore, one of the most serious inequalities in pre-1949 China—the disparity in income and living conditions between urban and rural areas—was never eradicated under Mao. Just two years after his death in 1976, many of the policies designed to abolish economic inequalities were incrementally removed in an effort to marketize the Chinese economy. Post-Mao market socialism would reverse many of the equalizing trends of the Maoist era.

Haves and Have-Nots

In the decades before 1949 China was continuously buffeted by war, acts of imperialism, and domestic turmoil. By the time Mao’s government came to power, China had become a society in which a small proportion of well-to-do people lived alongside countless impoverished people. In rural areas, where about 80 percent of the population lived, 70 percent of farmers were landless and worked for subsistence wages for a small number of landowners. In cities unemployment was high, and begging and prostitution were rampant. Thus the government faced the immediate problem of raising living standards for a mostly destitute population.

Urban Economic Inequalities

The government sought to reduce economic inequalities in urban areas by appropriating wealth and abolishing labor markets. Privately owned housing was seized and subdivided into much smaller living spaces. Families could rent these apartments but never purchase them, thus eliminating a key means through which inequalities of wealth can be perpetuated from generation to generation.

By 1958 virtually all privately owned urban businesses had been appropriated and socialized as well. Furthermore, in an effort to ensure full employment, market competition for jobs in these businesses was eliminated. People leaving school were assigned to jobs bureaucratically. The masses of urban unemployed were
either assigned to jobs in factories or businesses or were sent to rural areas to work in agriculture. After they were matched to a job, employees could not quit voluntarily. But employees could not be fired either and thus essentially had a guarantee of lifelong employment.

Urban inequalities were reduced still more by salary compression in firms. Differences between the salaries paid for high-skill, high-prestige occupations such as doctors and other professionals and low-prestige jobs such as unskilled factory worker were much smaller than is typical in capitalist economies. Efforts were also made to increase the social prestige attached to manual labor and to downplay the social importance of white-collar work.

As a result of these economic policies, income inequalities during the Maoist era plummeted. For example, the richest 10 percent of the urban population took in only 21 percent of total urban income, a figure about ten percentage points lower than the average for other developing countries at that time. Living standards for the average urban resident improved substantially.

Furthermore, the determinants of socioeconomic status were different from those in capitalist economies. In capitalist economies socioeconomic position is largely dictated by income and therefore by one’s educational level. The highest-paying jobs require a long period of education, and a big difference in pay exists between jobs that do and do not require extensive education. Mao’s government expanded public education a great deal. But salary compression in urban firms meant that the payoff in income for a lengthy education was not great.

Instead, nonmonetary employment benefits became a much more important source of stratification in urban areas, and these benefits were determined not by what a person did on the job but rather by the type of work organization in which he or she did that job. Although nearly all urban work organizations were government owned, they were not all administered by the same government offices. About three-fourths of urban residents were employed in state-owned work organizations, which were controlled by the central government. The rest worked in collectively owned organizations that were controlled and operated at the municipal level. State-owned firms could not provide such benefits and could pay employees a salary only about three-fourths of what they would have received in state-owned firms. Because housing, health insurance, and pension plans could not be acquired through markets or other government channels, job placement in a state-owned firm became the goal among urban Chinese.

Important inequalities also developed among people who did and did not have personal ties to government officials and Communist Party members. In the absence of markets government officials and party members had monopoly control over the allocation of economic rewards. Persons with ties to government officials or party members could use those ties to maximize career opportunities or nonwage work benefits.

Rural Economic Inequalities

The socialists also attempted to reduce rural economic inequalities by confiscating resources from the wealthy. In rural China these resources consisted primarily of agricultural land. Many well-to-do landlords were killed in retribution for their exploitation of tenant farmers. Starting in 1951 confiscated land was redistributed equally to all rural households for members to farm privately. But in 1953 the government began taking back this land, designating it as community property. Families were required to work larger plots of land collectively, in groups of twenty to forty households, and the harvest was split between government and the collective. People were paid for their work in points, which were periodically traded in for money and grain. Although average household incomes in rural areas remained low, this collective system of farming did raise living standards for poor families and produced communities with much less economic stratification than before.

Gender Inequalities

One subjugated social group especially targeted by rural and urban economic policies was women. Prior to 1949 Chinese women had little social status or political and economic power. Their low social position was underpinned by a family structure that was patriarchal and
patrilineal. Male heads of household had near-absolute power in the household and held legal right to all family property. Women—especially new brides joining the family—were powerless, marginal family members who were often treated as servants. Fathers and brothers could provide no protection from abusive treatment by in-laws because a woman lost most ties to her natal family after marriage.

One key way by which Mao’s government tried to counter this family structure was by pulling women into the paid labor force. In urban areas women were incorporated into a growing industrial sector, and in rural areas women were put to work in agriculture. The idea was that women would be able to wield more power within their families if they had an independent income.

Such efforts to reduce gender inequalities were somewhat successful. It became routine in both rural and urban areas for women to work, and as a result of their being employed their status in the family improved. But a great deal of gender segregation in the workforce existed and continues to exist, with women usually assigned to lower-paying jobs and given lowest priority for nonmonetary benefits such as housing. Especially in rural areas Chinese families remained strongly patriarchal because the government never challenged the tradition of patrilineal marriage.

Urban-Rural Gap Remains

Although Maoist economic policies reduced inequalities within urban and rural communities, a substantial gap remained in income and living standards between urban and rural areas. As in all developing countries, urban residents in China before 1949 enjoyed much higher living standards than rural residents because of better access to education and well-paying jobs. After both rural and urban economies were socialized, this gap began to shrink. In 1957, for example, urban residents took in three times the income of rural residents. By 1978 urban incomes were 2.36 times greater than rural incomes. Thus the rural-urban gap was smaller, but still substantial, under Mao. Urban residents continued to have much better access to schools, medical care, and pensions. Generous government investment in urban industries and low state-set prices for agricultural goods kept the rural-urban gap from completely closing. Migration laws that prevented rural residents from moving to urban areas also kept urban incomes high by limiting the supply of labor for urban industries.

Post-Mao Policies

Just two years after Mao’s death in 1976, the new Communist Party leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), began to implement economic policies designed to marketize China’s economy. In urban areas private businesses were legalized, and foreign investment was encouraged. A private sector grew quickly, so that by 1999, according to government estimates, nearly 35 million urban residents were employed in privately owned firms. In July 2001 it became legal for private business owners to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a further indication of the growing acceptance of private enterprise. Likewise, reforms were instituted in publicly owned firms, requiring them to operate more like private firms. Managers were given greater autonomy in setting wages for workers and also came under greater pressure to show a profit. Post-Mao economic policies also sought incrementally to institute labor markets in urban areas in both public and private firms. By the late 1990s residents of large cities were no longer assigned to jobs by the government and, after they were employed, could quit or be laid off from their jobs.

However, post-Mao economic reforms have reintroduced substantial economic inequalities in urban communities, in part because some residents now earn high salaries in foreign-invested firms. An equally important contributing factor is the growing unemployment problem. Pressure on public firms to be more profitable after Mao’s death gave managers incentives to cut labor costs. Layoffs are becoming more and more common as a result, especially among middle-aged women. Some employers lay off employees to solve overstaffing. Others wish to replace their urban employees with cheaper recruits from rural areas who have been allowed to migrate to urban areas and work in urban firms since 1983. By 1988 about 2 percent of the urban population was unemployed, a figure that is large compared with the Maoist era and increasing every year. Urban unemployment is publicly acknowledged as a serious and growing social problem.
Post-Mao market reforms in rural areas have also been extensive. Beginning in the late 1970s collective farming groups were disbanded, and rural families were again assigned land for use at their discretion. Rural families also became free to allocate household labor to nonagricultural work. Rural families now routinely have one or more members working in industrial jobs, which bring much better pay than does agriculture. Encouragement of private enterprise in rural areas has resulted in a mushrooming of industrial work opportunities in rural villages and towns.

Because of these burgeoning industrial job opportunities for rural residents and because household agricultural production gives rural families greater profit incentives than does collective agriculture, rural residents have become much more affluent, on average, than they were during the Maoist era. At the same time economic inequalities within communities have increased as some rural residents benefit more than others from these new opportunities.

That post-Mao economic reforms have increased inequalities in both rural and urban communities is not controversial. But scholars do disagree about whether upward economic mobility is still most advantageously pursued through personal ties to political actors. Some sociologists have argued that as a socialist economy marketsizes, political actors such as Communist Party members or government officials lose their monopoly control over economic resources. Opportunities for upward economic mobility open up among people who are not political actors or who lack ties to political actors, and the relative economic advantage of people with political capital declines. People with education or work experience start to see greater returns for those attributes. Thus,
for example, in a private, profit-driven business, someone with a college education but no political ties will be a more attractive job candidate than will someone who has political ties but no college education.

Others sociologists have argued that political actors still maintain privileged access to economic resources or are able to convert their political power into market resources easily. For example, a Communist Party member who wishes to become an entrepreneur can cut through the red tape required to establish a private business much faster than can someone who is not a party member.

**Losses and Gains**

Contemporary China is a fascinating case study for social stratification. Since a socialist government was established in 1949, China has undergone an enormous amount of purposive social change in a short time. Maoist efforts to change the stratification system demonstrate that economic policies can be an effective tool in reducing economic inequalities. In two decades or so China went from a country with a large impoverished population in both rural and urban areas to a country in which most citizens enjoyed a decent standard of living and in which the distribution of economic rewards was much more equal. After the post-Mao government began to dismantle these economic policies, however, many of the equalizing trends of the Maoist era began to reverse.

Mao’s China also demonstrated that although reductions in inequalities can be made, it is difficult to eradicate those inequalities altogether. The concerted efforts to eliminate gender inequalities were only somewhat successful, and the rural-urban income gap never completely closed. Socialism also introduced new sources of stratification: among people who did and did not have personal ties to political actors and among people assigned to different types of work units.

Rebecca MATTHEWS

**Further Reading**


A sense of the social values of propriety, justice, honesty, and honor is a perennial and universal concern, and given China’s historical sweep and contemporary complexity, the country is clearly no exception. Indeed, consideration of such values has occupied many of China’s most prominent thinkers throughout its long history.

In some societies, propriety, justice, honesty, and honor must be extracted from behavior. In others well-developed textual canons exist. China has both explicit intellectual considerations of these values and the actual behavior of both ordinary people and leaders. Further, these values have figured prominently in many of China’s collective, imperial, and national projects. That is, they operate in two dual arenas: intellectual/behavioral and individual/collective.

All societies profess a variety of moral ideals, and all struggle to contain breaches of these ideals. In some cases evidence of the sense of ideal behavior can be found in the responses to perceived breaches. They are connected to the ways each society views human beings.

Propriety
A sense of propriety is a sense of acting properly, fittingly, in accordance with social expectations and decorum.

China has a long, passionate, and subtle history of consideration of propriety. Early in China’s historic civilizations, lì (rites) emerged as a preeminent concern. Cultural precursors saw their role as involved in shaping the workings of the universe and affecting the outcome of both human and natural events. What emerged from this principle was the idea of model emulation, in which certain idealized figures provided exemplars of behavior.

The Chinese philosopher Confucius (Kongzi, 551–479 BCE) and other Ruist (Confucian) philosophers wrote (spoke) at length of the proper rituals. The lì include guidelines for how people are to act with regard to other people and to the rituals handed down from the past. Confucius, in the Analects, wrote “I follow the Zhou” (Analects 3.14); this has been taken to indicate that in a situation of alternative rituals, he pursued those established by the Duke of Zhou.

The late Warring States period (475–221 BCE) text, the Zhou Li (Rites of Zhou), codified some rituals. A Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) text, the Li ji (Book of Rites), specified ways of acting, recipes, manners, and a miscellany of detailed instructions regarding propriety. From the Warring States period on, debates in China centered on whether it is preferable to follow the example of a charismatic authority, such as Confucius, or the law.

Propriety includes relations among the sexes, sexual behavior, and many other aspects of social interaction. All these were governed by public orders as well as private guidelines. During imperial China laws governing behavior and extolling virtue were read aloud in villages. Those who maintained exemplary behavior—such as
widows who remained unmarried for decades—were honored through gateways and pillars pointing out their impressive accomplishments. The Kangxi emperor’s “Sacred Edict” of 1670, promulgating sixteen principles of moral behavior, was read in villages. One principle explicitly called for “propriety.” The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government attempted to combine the legal and moral or charismatic aspects of leadership.

When Westerners first encountered Chinese, they found them to be governed by specific and detailed guidelines about behavior (notably different from their own) and often remarked on the Chinese focus on propriety (ritual, politeness, social status).

From the founding of the People’s Republic of China (1949) until the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) questions of propriety, whether individual or collective, were the subject of prominent public activity: Don’t use titles; don’t pay attention to status differences; treat people as equal; don’t be polite; be blunt; don’t be deferential; sacrifice yourself for the greater good, like the model worker, Lei Feng; tell the truth at all times; be selfless; be self-deprecating; don’t flatter others; don’t give honor to others.

Essentially a war on propriety was waged. The campaign to criticize Confucius (pi-Lin pi-Kong) was intended in part to criticize the traditional focus on manners; the Cultural Revolution clearly targeted proper roles, mores, niceties, and everything that had been part of earlier prescriptions for behavior.

Since the end of the rule of Chinese Communist Party

A propaganda poster from the “Learn from Lei Feng” campaign, titled; “Uncle Lei Feng tells Revolutionary stories” (1965). The image of Lei Feng has served as the model worker/martyr/saint of the Communist party for over 40 years.

COLLECTION STEFAN LANDSBERGER.
leader Mao Zedong, a reversion to norms of polite behavior has taken place in private, with attention paid to relative status, relationships, and decorum.

During the 1980s and 1990s campaigns such as that for “socialist spiritual civilization” (shehui zhuyi wenming jingshen) focused on behaving properly, as was evident in campaigns against spitting and unruly public behavior. In the 1990s people emphasized suzhi (quality). Sometimes sexual morality has been the focus, with pornography the target. Sometimes the focus has been on limao (politeness).

A national campaign to advance a “socialist harmonious society” was launched in spring 2005 by Hu Jintao, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, advocating a society in which human relations are honest, just, fair, and harmonious. In 2006 he proposed “Eight Do’s and Eight Don’ts” (honors and disgraces) of proper behavior.

In the years leading up to the 2008 Olympics, struggles about propriety were renewed. Some focused on boasting, corruption, inequality, spitting, and waiting in line. Taxi drivers, as hosts, were trained to speak correct English as an example of proper behavior. It is safe to predict that debate over propriety will remain part of Chinese public discourse in coming years.

**Justice**

Justice has to do with what is just, fair (gongping), and right (zheng). In some places some of these terms conflict with one another; what is right may not universally be impartial. People’s sense of justice guides the way they regard merit, reward, and punishment. Justice may be sought through law and the workings of the state, through the operations of a moral universe, or through individuals’ and groups’ interactions with one another. It can be substantive in individual relations or formal in law.

For millennia relationships have been regarded as inherently unequal and bring with them expectations about power, responsibility, and justice. We can see traces of China’s earliest sense of justice in its detailed codification of laws and punishments.

Not all punishments or convictions were regarded as just, but people often held the idea that in the divine realm, the truth of people’s innocence would be known because the universe operates according to principles of justice, reciprocity, and exchange.

The Chinese philosopher Mencius wrote of how natural it is to harbor different feelings for relatives and strangers. It would be proper and correct to treat individuals as nonequivalent. The law codified this social value.

In the three entities called “gods, ghosts, and ancestors” the idea of exchange—which involves just turn-taking—rules interactions. Exchange, as the anthropologist Marcel Mauss described, governs these interactions. Human beings provide for the spiritual needs of ancestors. People burn incense and bow to gods. Gods and ancestors, in turn, make sure devotees pass examinations, get well, get promotions, and so forth. The term for filiality, xiao, comes from “feeding the dead.” Misfortune is often explained by healers as stemming from people’s failure to reciprocate. Ghosts are especially threatening because they do not recognize the obligations that govern other relationships. Further, the universe operates according to impersonal powers, such as operations of the underworld. The Buddhist idea of a karmic balance, held by most Chinese in imperial times, reinforces the idea of just rewards for righteous actions—eventually.

In terms of the legal system, in imperial times people turned to the courts and the legal system only when personal intervention and what would now be called “mediation” failed to yield acceptable results. The state attempted to counter the prevailing sense that it is right to favor one’s relatives and associates through its system of assigning magistrates to districts away from home and of rotating their posts every three years.

The twentieth-century revolutions revolved in part around the notion of economic justice. It was seen as unjust that a small proportion of the society owned most of the resources. The redistribution of land and other goods in the 1950s reflected a changed notion of what a just society would look like.

From the 1950s to the late 1970s the law was suspended on the grounds that it was bourgeois. Mediation was encouraged in the case of disputes. The legal system was restored in the 1980s and especially the 1990s. The penal and carceral sense of justice in recent years has been tempered by an emerging civil code, with the shift from “rule by law” to “rule of law.” Many people look hopefully at the legal system as a way of combating widespread corruption and favoritism. The legal assumption has been
that a criminal is guilty unless proven innocent. The vast majority of all trials end in conviction.

Films such as Zhang Yimou’s *The Story of Qiu Ju* (1992) reflect citizens’ sense that securing justice from local officials is difficult and that somewhere in the center a dispenser of justice exists.

Many of the most fraught events in twentieth- and twenty-first-century China are connected with the sense of justice: human rights (both societal and individual rights), environmental justice, and economic justice.

## Honesty

A sense of honesty must be part of the morality of every human society, along with the recognition that human beings are skilled at manipulating truth. Chinese society is no different; it places a premium on honesty while recognizing that honesty may not always be possible or even desirable in every context.

One commonly told story of an honest person is that of Qu Yuan (332–296 BCE). He was a loyal official of the state of Chu, one of the Warring States (475–221 BCE), who criticized his ruler, King Huai. Despite being exiled, Qu Yuan persisted in stating his views. He eventually committed suicide in the Miluo River out of despair. To honor his memory, the Dragon Boat Festival is held every year. People throw triangular, rice- and meat-filled bamboo leaves to feed the spirit of Qu Yuan. His poems include “Li Sao” (Lament) and “Tian Wen” (Questions Addressed to Heaven), collected in the *Chuci*. His name is synonymous with that of any spurned advisor; the danger of stating the truth is always warned against.

Confucius similarly roamed from state to state offering his version of the truth about how to act. His teaching was not always desired; many rulers were reluctant to listen to someone who did not tell them flattering and pleasant things. But Confucius had the integrity to persist in his message, rarely being honored for it.

The *Sunzi Bingfa* (*Sunzi’s Art of War*), one of many war manuals, advocated the use of deception in order to bring about a greater good, which was the avoidance of physical warfare. When one cleverly manipulates appearances and anticipates one’s enemies’ responses to one’s own actions, the good can triumph. In this sense, views of truthfulness are shaded by pragmatic concerns.

In contemporary China many ordinary citizens wholeheartedly desire honesty. They often feel, however, that the government manipulates the truth in order to preserve its power and to manipulate people into acting a certain way. Censorship and the blocking of information (the Internet especially, but in prior decades the blocking of books and other media) are seen as necessary for preserving public morality, for preserving the honor of the nation, and for preventing undesirable information from circulating. The fact that citizens and the government are involved in a continuous struggle to gain or restrict information suggests an individual hunger for honesty alongside a political fear of it.

In ordinary day-to-day life many individuals feel that they cannot be completely honest, especially in financial or political affairs. People fear corruption or manipulation of information, and to protect themselves individuals may not be entirely forthright.

Honesty has to do with saying what is true. The whole truth is rarely urged by any society. So the question revolves around constraints on the full truth.

## Honor

Honor (*guang*) is related to face (reputation), which is in turn related to politeness. Honor requires keeping one’s reputation intact in others’ eyes, a guiding value in China for millennia. A metaphor of light and shining, of visibility, of being seen, is connected with honor. Its opposite is being shamed and losing face. Honor can be gained by individuals or by collectivities, from the family to the nation-state.

Greetings provide an opportunity to bolster someone’s honor: “Jiu yang” (“I have long heard of your illustrious reputation”). Banquets permit public display of honor among peers and comrades as people are toasted with honorific expressions (“Wo jing ni,” “I honor you”). The roles played give a framework for honor. Relationships (*guanxi*) similarly have the potential for increasing or threatening someone’s honor.

During late imperial times China lost its sense of national honor and was shamed through the experience of semicolonialism as Western powers carved up China’s territory among themselves in the form of treaty ports and extraterritoriality. This period is recalled as China’s
“century of humiliation.” China suffered as the “sick man of Asia” because of its opium addiction and loss of currency to Western powers.

In gaining World Trade Organization (WTO) status in 2001 and in hosting the 2008 Olympics, China sees itself as gaining honor in the eyes of the world as it regains its rightful place as a nation of superlatives. China has attempted to build the tallest buildings, the longest bridges, and the highest railway line (in Tibet). Each of these accomplishments adds honor to China; people believe that the twenty-first century surely will tell the tale of China’s recognition as worthy of admiration.

China’s revolutions—political, cultural, social, and economic—have revolved in part around the sense of propriety, justice, honesty, and honor. In the early twenty-first century resolution has not yet been achieved. But much debate has occurred in private and public, in explicit examination of principles, and in implicit concern about the proper moral directions to take.

Susan D. BLUM

Further Reading


“Building a socialist spiritual civilization” is an official goal of the ruling Chinese Communist Party that was first proclaimed in 1986. The commitment to establish such an objective officially was triggered by deep concerns that as China advanced economically, it would regress spiritually.

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted economic reform and opening policies in the late 1970s, many party members began to worry that if China pursued only the goals of economic development, society might advance in material terms but regress morally and ethically. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) had already done irrevocable harm to the Chinese moral universe. Within this context, unbridled pursuit of economic development under reform and opening could lead to a society whose citizens were materially wealthy but selfish, grasping, and base. They could become psychologically alienated: mistrustful of others and unable to cooperate for the public good or for their own good. Eventually material advancement itself might grind to a halt.

Concern mounted as Western television programs, films, and popular music flooded into China starting in the early 1980s. For many, this kind of popular culture was not seen as seriously challenging to the Chinese way of life. But older comrades, in particular, feared that in the spiritual vacuum prevailing after the Cultural Revolution, even seemingly innocuous concepts and cultural products from abroad could do great harm. They decided to launch a “campaign against spiritual pollution” in 1983 but had to cut it short after only a few months when it started slowing economic growth. Clearly, in any contest between material and spiritual civilization, the CCP would favor the material. But it did formally adopt “building a socialist spiritual civilization” as a fundamental goal for all of society to pursue at a high-level Party meeting in September 1986.

Has the CCP achieved this goal or even made substantial progress toward it? Most would say no. The problem is twofold.

First, the Party has still not articulated a clear and distinct image of what a socialist spiritual civilization would look like. What should people think and do to build one? How should they change their behavior? Usually the answers given were that people should “have lofty ideals,” “proceed from a scientific spirit,” “love genuinely beautiful things,” and other vague banalities. They should also strive to do the opposite of anything currently defined as bad. For example, if corruption is defined as bad, they should not be corrupt; if spitting on the sidewalk is defined as bad, they should not spit. Beyond such homilies little in the way of concrete guidance was offered, nor practical policies introduced. The only significant exception would be the massive campaign to make Beijing more “civilized” in the months leading up to the August 2008 Summer Olympics.

A second problem is that the incentive structures necessary to build material civilization frequently reward behaviors opposite to those believed necessary to build spiritual civilization. Too many “lofty ideals” and too
Building Socialist Spiritual Civilization

In December 1980 Li Chang, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, sent a letter to a member of the party Central Committee discussing the concept of socialist spiritual civilizations, in the hope of combating what the academy called “Western bourgeois material civilization.”

Since the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, inspired by the idea of “improving and strengthening the Party leadership,” I have felt all along that, after the ten disastrous years of the “Cultural Revolution,” there still exists within the Party the pernicious influence of the ultra-left line of the Gang of Four, remnants of the factional ideology of feudalism, selfish individualism of the bourgeoisie, anarchism of the petty bourgeoisie, and colonial ideas that worship things foreign. Under these influences, ideological demands inside and outside the Party have grown somewhat slack…. I feel that, along with the general goal of realizing the Four Modernizations, we should also consider putting forward a goal of “building socialist spiritual civilization.” The phrase itself first appeared in Vice Chairmen Ye’s 1979 speech at the meeting in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

I consider that the socialist spiritual civilization includes a concrete aspect (such as well-developed education and thriving science, literature and art) as well as an ideological aspect (such as social ethics, traditions, and customs) . . . It was wrong of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four to emphasize the primacy of the spiritual role. However, we should not overlook the fact that spirit can play a definite role.


Further Reading
Society of Jesus

Yēsūhui 耶稣会

More commonly known as Jesuits, the Society of Jesus sent many missionaries to China between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition to Christianity they introduced Western science, technology, and art to China, and returned to Europe with Chinese philosophies and aesthetics, which in turn influenced Western thought.

The Society of Jesus, a Catholic order whose missionaries worked in China between 1582 and 1773, was critically important to the global exchange of knowledge and ideas during this time. As renowned scientists and artists, Jesuit missionaries introduced contemporary Western science and technology to China during the late Ming (1368–1644) and early Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. As cartographers, they provided both China and the West with an image of their place in the world. As missionaries, they reintroduced China to Christianity and sparked a fascination with Confucianism in Europe that fueled Enlightenment thought and led to Chinese studies as a field of interest.

The Society of Jesus was founded by Ignatius of Loyola in 1540 to help revitalize the Catholic Church after the crises and loss of influence brought about by the Protestant Reformation in Europe. The society’s dual focus on quality education and overseas missions produced scores of outstanding scholar-missionaries.

Jesuit Mission Methods

Two Jesuits who were not themselves missionaries in China (although one of them spent time in Macao, on China’s coast) created a unique framework for the mission that fully acknowledged and sometimes incorporated China’s own cultural achievements. Francis Xavier (1506–1552), the first Jesuit missionary to Japan, called for outstanding scientists to serve as missionaries to the civilized countries of Japan and China. He suggested converting China “from the top down,” beginning with the emperor, and using China’s intellectual leadership in Asia to further the mission within the entire region. Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606), who spent time in Japan and in the Portuguese-controlled territories of Goa in India and Macao on China’s coast in his official capacity as Visitor to the East, refined Xavier’s model. His accommodation method demanded that missionaries respect and adjust to native cultures. Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), the foremost Jesuit missionary to China, further developed the Jesuit mission approach. He integrated what he considered an authentic Confucianism with Catholic beliefs. Ricci promoted a very careful introduction of Christian dogmas and expected only a gradual transformation of his converts. The Jesuits also received permission from the Vatican to train Chinese priests using Chinese in place of Latin and celebrating the mass in Chinese.

Within the first decades of their presence in China, Jesuits established residences and congregations in cities throughout the empire, among them Nanjing, Nanxiang,
Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Xi’an, Kaifeng and Jinan, often using a small network of Chinese scholar supporters, among them Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), to help them gain entry into local society. The limited number of foreign missionaries serving in China fostered independence among Chinese congregations and Chinese clergy, evident in the founding of societies focusing on mutual support, welfare, and charity.

The almost continuous presence of Jesuit scientists at the Ming and Qing imperial courts from 1630 to 1773 is generally considered the most remarkable achievement of Jesuit mission work. It provided some imperial protection, starting with baiban letters of approval and culminating in the Kangxi Emperor’s edict of toleration (1692). The Jesuit mission, however, was repeatedly threatened, and Jesuits often had to leave their residences and live in obscurity. The first period of anti-Jesuit agitation occurred in Nanjing from 1616 to 1621 under the vice president of the Board of Rites (one of the six government ministries, responsible for ritual, the calendar, and the administration of the Civil Service Examination), Shen Que (1592). Two scholar-officials who were among the first generation of converts, Li Zhizao (1565–1630) and Yang Tingyun (1557–1627), offered housing to several missionaries in Hangzhou. Other missionaries were asked to leave China. Another crisis occurred in 1664 when the anti-Christian activist Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) accused Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666), a German Jesuit, of causing the Shunzhi Emperor’s death. At this time, most missionaries in Beijing had to leave for Canton (Guangzhou). In both cases, the Jesuits soon regained their previous strength and positions.
The Rites Controversy

Ricci’s accommodation to Chinese culture sparked almost a century of controversy both within and beyond the Jesuit order. The most critical issue was the evaluation of ancestral rites and the rites celebrated in ceremonies at the Confucius temple as either civic or sacred ritual. Ricci, and most other Jesuits, considered them essentially civic in nature and therefore compatible with Christianity if slightly modified. Some Jesuits, including Ricci’s successor Langobardi and all missionaries from the mendicant orders (Franciscans and Dominicans) who were present in China since 1634, considered them sacred and expected converts to stop participating in these rituals. The Vatican, asked to clarify the issue, ruled against the Jesuit approach in 1645. This ruling was reversed in 1656. As the controversy continued, the Jesuits eventually asked the Kangxi Emperor (reigned 1662–1722) for clarification. In a handwritten note dated 30 November 1700, the emperor sided with the Jesuit view. This, however, did not prevent Pope Clement XI (reigned 1700–1721) from ultimately deciding against the Jesuits in 1715. The Kangxi Emperor, who heard of this decision in 1720, responded by asking all missionaries who followed the Pope’s decision to leave China. His successor, the Yongzheng Emperor (reigned 1722–1736) subsequently evicted all missionaries except for those who worked as foreign experts at the court, thus effectively ending Catholic missionary activity in 1724. Jesuits continued their mission at the court until the Jesuit order was temporarily suppressed in 1773.

Jesuit Contributions in China and Europe

Jesuits like Matteo Ricci, Johannes Schreck (1576–1630), Johann Adam Schall von Bell, Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1699), and Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730) provided a direct link between the intellectual elites of China and Europe through their personal connections with eminent Europeans such as Kepler, Clavius, Galileo, and Leibniz and with Chinese academics and administrators throughout the empire. The results of this exchange benefited both China and Europe. To China, Jesuits brought Western mathematics, including a revision of the imperial calendar; Western-style painting and architecture; and great advances in astronomy, horology (the study of time measurement), and cartography. In Europe, Chinese aesthetics influenced landscaping and interior design, and among technical advances were the waterproofing of vessels, silk making, and porcelain production. More importantly, Jesuit missionary work and publications allowed both sides to consider alternatives to the status quo. They offered a Catholic-Christian world view to China, and they lead to the critical revision of feudal church and state institutions in contemporary Europe that sparked Enlightenment thought.

Lydia GERBER

Further Reading

Sociology
Shèhuìxué 社会学

The discipline of sociology emerged in China in the early twentieth century, but was officially banned from classroom instruction and scholarly research shortly after 1949. In the post-Mao era the Chinese government recognized sociology for its role in China’s modernization and globalization, and it has re-emerged as a respected field of study over the past thirty years.

Sociology is known in Chinese as “the study of society” (she huì xue 社会学). Being introduced into China from the West around the end of the nineteenth century, sociology’s broad implications for building a better society inspired pioneer social-thinkers of modern China. Under Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) regime that began in 1949, however, sociology was considered a stream of knowledge for the bourgeoisie and was banned from classroom instruction and scholarly research for nearly thirty years. In the post-Mao era, the rebirth of sociology was part of the nation’s new reform-and-openness policy to modernize China. For the most recent thirty years, Chinese sociologists have laid the foundation of the discipline in their country, upgraded their teaching and research to international standards, and made sociology a social science discipline of growing scholarly significance and national impact.

Birth and Early Development

Sociology emerged as a new subject of social science in France and England, through the contributions of Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), in the mid-1800s, a century that witnessed rapid industrialization, great social changes, and the flowering of social thoughts throughout the European continent. Meanwhile, China was an agricultural society under a corrupted Qing dynasty (1644–1912); it lost wars to Britain, France, Japan, and an eight-country joint-military force within a sixty-year span on Chinese waters and lands and was forced to open its port cities along the Pacific coast to international trade under unequal treaties. A sense of urgency elevated Chinese intellectuals who, for the first time in a 2,000-year Confucian tradition of great self-respect and self-preservation, voiced out loud a fresh message that China must learn from the West. Introducing sociology into China was a result of the learning-from-the-West movement.

Yan Fu (1854–1921), while sent to study in England’s Navy Academy from 1877 to 1879, became much more interested in social-political thoughts than naval ones. Returning home, he began translating some of the great Western books of the time, including Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, into Chinese. Yan’s sociology favorite was The Study of Sociology by Herbert Spencer; after two chapters appeared in the State News Letter (Guo wen bao 国文报) in 1898, the whole book’s translation was published, with the Chinese title "The Study of Sociology".
of群学肄言 (Qun xue yi yan), by the Shanghai Civilization Publishing House in 1903. This translated work, combined with Yan’s own interpretations of Spencer’s social Darwinism, marked the birth of sociology in China.

While Chinese translations of other works by American, European, and Japanese sociologists followed Yan’s pioneering effort, sociological teaching and research grew quickly in the first half of the twentieth century. The first sociology course was taught in 1908 at St. John’s University in Shanghai; the first department of sociology was set up in 1921 at Xiamen University; and in 1934 China had forty-one universities that offered sociology courses, seventeen departments of sociology, and nearly 500 registered sociology students. This period witnessed a good number of foreign sociologists arriving to teach in China and a much greater number of Chinese students going abroad to learn sociology. Built on an expanding sociology faculty and students, the All-China Sociological Association was funded in 1930, and continued to function as a public forum even during the period of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War, fought in the context of World War II). Meanwhile, theoretical and empirical research flourished. In the spirit of “making sociology Chinese,” scholars and students were oriented toward offering ingenious explanations of social problems, as exemplified in Fei Xiaotong’s (1910–2005) series of original research of peasant life, the family, and social structure. By 1949, sociology had been a lively and rigorous degree program in more than twenty leading universities, and teaching and research activities had contributed greatly to the spread of sociological knowledge throughout China.

Banishment and Political Tortures

Sociology met an unprecedented challenge under the new People’s Republic of China in 1949. Influenced by Vladimir Lenin’s characterization of Auguste Comte’s sociology as bourgeois, Mao Zedong’s new government terminated all sociology programs during the 1952–1953 educational reform, and sociological teaching and research were banned officially. At the time, these brutal actions against sociology followed the model of the former Soviet Union, which abolished the discipline. To Chinese leadership, Karl Marx’s historical materialism should and must take the place of sociology as the only theoretical guidance for building a new society, and, secondarily, there was no need for a discipline that dealt primarily with social problems that would never occur in a socialist China. As a consequence, sociologists were brainwashed and reallocated to the teaching or research of other subjects under the guidance of orthodox Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism.

The termination of sociology was extremely unpopular among Chinese sociologists, whose resistance was, after all, confined only to their minds. Their hope to legitimize and resume the discipline to normalcy was sparked (yet limited to a matter of months between 1956 and 1957, as it turned out), by Mao’s April 1956 speech of “letting one hundred flowers blossom and one hundred schools of thought contend.” The implication of this speech was to permit any form of culture, art, and thought to exist in their own rights, including the possibility of reviving sociology. Such an implication was taken seriously by leading Chinese sociologists, who cheerfully voiced their wishes of making sociology a legitimate and useful social science discipline for a socialist China. But these voices were mixed with other voices that demanded political democracy, a signal Mao considered a rightist attack on the Communist rule. When Mao reacted politically, the atmosphere turned around 180 degrees, and sociologists, joined by 300,000 other so-called rightists, became targets of the political torture of intellectuals during the anti-rightist movement of 1957 and 1958. Subsequently, many sociologists were removed from academic or leadership positions and sent to labor camps; during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, many were physically attacked by the Red Guards. Fei Xiaotong, China’s most influential and respectable sociologist, for instance, lost his personal freedom, was forced to clean toilets, and contemplated suicide.

Rebirth and Rebuilding

The death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 was followed, after more than a year’s power struggles within top leadership, by a series of new directives made to
rectify the ultraleft forces within the Communist Party that were also responsible for the banishment of sociology. Deng Xiaoping and his new leadership began to re-recognize sociology, along with other social sciences, for the role it could play in education during the country’s modernization under a reform-and-openness policy. The re-establishment of the Chinese Sociological Association in March 1979 marked the rebirth of sociology in China.

The association assembled a good score of living Chinese sociologists, who elected a board of fifty distinguished members and Fei their first president, to lead a collective effort of rebuilding Chinese sociology. Having survived political torture and personal persecution since 1957, Fei, at the age of sixty-nine, still had the scholarly spirit to seek truth through science and was determined to devote his life to the revival and reconstruction of Chinese sociology. In the short term, Fei’s urgent task was to train a new generation of sociologists; with twenty-seven years of inactivity, China did not have sociologists to resume classroom instruction or scholarly research of professional quality. Fei and his colleagues invited established professors from America and elsewhere to teach short-term training programs in China during the 1980s. Two of these programs were of historical significance and had lasting impacts on sociological reconstruction.

The first of these was a two-year summer program in Beijing in 1980 and 1981. Students included nearly 100 middle-aged social scientists from China’s major universities and research academies. This program trained the first post-Mao cohort of sociology lecturers, who subsequently helped set up sociology departments and sociology institutes throughout the country. The instructors of this program were invited from the University of Pittsburgh, where C. K. Yang (1911–1999), Fei’s college classmate and lifetime friend, was a professor of sociology. Yang also mobilized, through his former students, a handful of sociologists of Chinese origin from the Chinese University of Hong Kong to join the teaching faculty in the Beijing summer program. Lecture notes from this program were considered valuable and were quickly circulated among colleagues.

The second was a year-long program, set up at Nankai University in 1981, and offered to a group of forty-three college seniors selected from China’s leading universities. Among other instructors, Peter Blau and Nan Lin, both then on the faculty of the State University of New York at Albany, were invited to teach the summer section of the program. With their first-class instruction in theory and methodology, Blau and Lin together laid a solid sociological foundation within this group, the first cohort of post-Mao sociology students. A significant number of career sociologists emerged from this program, many of whom eventually assumed department-chair positions in sociology programs within the country. Others went abroad for doctoral studies and are currently active in research and teaching around the globe.

**Chinese Sociology Today**

After a nearly thirty-year rebuilding effort, Chinese sociology now has gained new stature. As of 2008, seventy-four universities are authorized by the Ministry of Education, an organ of China’s central government, to offer bachelor’s degrees in sociology, and eighty-seven offer master’s degrees in sociology. Under tight scrutiny, PhD programs are so far limited to only eleven top institutions whose faculty quality and academic caliber meet a higher standard; in a sequential order of receiving state approval, these are: Peking, Renmin, Nankai, Nanjing, Zhongshan, and Shanghai universities; the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Tsinghua, Wuhan, Jilin, Huazhong Normal, and Fudan universities. Graduates from these and other sociology programs have taken a wide range of job positions, but most career sociologists work in universities or research academies.

The central government allocates significant funding to programs of academic excellence and national recognition. The “211 Project” identifies 100 national top academic programs, which included the sociology programs of Peking and Renmin universities. The “985 Project” identifies the best universities nationally to which funds are allocated to finance programs of national and international standing; all sociology departments with PhD programs are viable competitors for funds allocated through this directive. Finally, a competitive social science funding scheme has been established to sponsor social science research on an annual basis.

Living in an era of reform, Chinese sociologists have focused on empirical studies of emerging social problems.
One research direction of national impact is about China’s path to modernization. Fei led a group of sociologists in studying developmental patterns, and their research findings have had a direct impact on the directives behind the growth of China’s township-village and private enterprises and the population migration from rural to urban areas. A more contested area of research is about the changing system of social stratification; based on a national survey, Lu Xueyi and his colleagues observed a ten-stratum hierarchy in today’s China, which is significantly different from the image of a working-class led hierarchy under Mao’s regime. The research of state-society relations has been developed largely in the area of rural sociology; Sun Liping pioneered a “practical sociology” approach by looking into village communities in which state laws and power are limited by local social structures. Finally, a new area of national attention is economic sociology; creative scholarship in this area has focused on issues of trust, social capital, and social networks in China’s transition economy.

Influenced by a Confucian tradition, older generations of Chinese sociologists have always had the vision of using sociological knowledge to help construct a better society. This is exemplified in Fei’s work on townships and migration. Following this tradition, the reform-era generation has stressed the notion of “problem consciousness” in teaching and research, which has generated a significant number of problem-solving and policy-evaluation studies. Chinese sociologists have made policy and legislative contributions to birth control, social security system, rural taxation reforms, unemployment problems, community building, environmental protection, and sustainable development. The role of critical sociology is, however, significantly underdeveloped, as China’s public space has effectively been under the control of a Communist party-state. Only recently has public sociology had a role in creating environmental movements.

**Sociology Publications**

China has two sociology journals, *Journal of Sociological Research* (Shehuixue Yanjiu 社会学研究, since 1986) and *Society* (Shehui 社会, since 1982), and eight first-rate social science journals (consult Zhou and Pei [1997] and Bian and Zhang [2008] for names of these journals), which make the top-ten outlets for nearly 200 article-length publications on sociological topics each year. A review of these publications suggests that sociological research quality, measured by authors’ using theoretical frameworks, methodological justifications, and extended references, significantly increased around 1995. Since then, a trend toward adopting peer review and tightening scholarly standards in the screening of submissions has been observed. This trend was consistent with a central directive that scholarly research must meet international standards. Chinese researchers who received rigorous training, domestic or overseas, and gained research experiences in collaboration with international scholars have been the driving force behind improvements in scholarly publications.

Another significant improvement is in public-data archiving. Bucking the tradition of not sharing data, sociologists from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Renmin University of China collaborated to start the Chinese General Social Survey in 2003. Its datasets, along with related documents, have since been disseminated internationally through the Internet (www.chinagss.org). This development has earned China membership in the East Asian and International Social Survey programs. Another project of similar nature is the Chinese version of American Family Income Dynamics project, a collaboration of the University of Michigan and Peking University. Still in preparation in 2009, this project has a panel design to establish a public data archive to satisfy domestic and international users.

International exchanges have been instrumental to the rebuilding of Chinese sociology from the very start, but more still needs to be done. Wider and deeper scholarly dialogues with the world are expected to be mutually beneficial. On the one hand, there is a growing interest in China, and more and more foreign sociologists from around the world want to do research in the country. Chinese sociologists, on the other hand, still have much to learn from their foreign counterparts about how to enhance and institutionalize sociology as a discipline of theoretical and methodological rigor in their homeland. While they share sociological terminologies, methodological principles, and theoretical goals, the Chinese and their foreign colleagues have worked rather separately in areas of common interest, such as economic sociology, social networks, social stratification, and institutional change. Together they can
develop joint research projects through which to achieve new sociological explanations of issues and problems in a world of increasing globalization.

Yanjie BIAN

Further Reading


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Soil Erosion
Shuǐtǔ liúshí 水土流失

Practices such as deforestation for farming, overgrazing, and poor construction techniques have resulted in a rate of soil erosion in China that is among the worst in the world. Climate factors, such as wind and increasing temperatures that increase the rate of glacial shrinkage, also adversely affect soil erosion. Government efforts to control soil erosion have focused on rehabilitation of small river valleys.

Soil erosion occurs when soil is detached and moved by water, wind, or tillage. Scientists estimate that 15 percent of the Earth’s ice-free land surface suffers from soil erosion. Although the area eroded by tillage is not known, of that 15 percent, erosion by water is responsible for about 56 percent, and erosion by wind is responsible for about 28 percent. China, with 3.66 million square kilometers (37 percent) of its land surface eroded to some degree, has one of the worst cases of soil erosion in the world. Soil erosion has been identified as the primary environmental problem in the country. It causes desertification, silts up rivers, lakes, and reservoirs, and aggravates droughts and sandstorms.

Causes
China has every type of soil erosion in the world, including water erosion, wind erosion or desertification, freeze-thaw erosion, landslide, mud rock flow, and hill avalanche. The two prevalent types are water and wind erosion, which occur in all the provinces and autonomous regions in China’s mainland. The most severe soil erosion in China occurs in the Loess Plateau on the middle and upper reaches of the Huang (Yellow) River, where 490,000 square kilometers out of a total area of 640,000 square kilometers are subject to erosion. The soil loss from the Loess Plateau is more than 2.1 billion tons annually.

A vulnerable ecosystem and unfavorable climate changes have been identified as two of the causes of China’s soil erosion. As the least-industrialized region with the lowest population density in China at barely two persons per square kilometer, the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, the “roof of the world” at an average elevation of 4,500 meters above sea level, experienced a sudden rise of temperature beginning in the 1970s. As of February 2007, the average winter temperature had gone up by 1.4°C from the historical average of minus 4.4°C, while the winter temperature in the regional capital Lhasa rose by 6°C. Along with records showing the temperature rise are records showing shrinkage of glaciers at an annual average rate of 131.4 square kilometers over the past three decades. Some scientists predict that the glacial areas on the plateau, which equal five times the area of France, will dwindle by nearly one-third by 2050. Elsewhere, a research station of the Chinese Academy of Sciences at Xilingol League in Inner Mongolia documented that in the twenty-four years up to the year 2000, 12 centimeters of topsoil were lost to wind erosion.

But human activity is believed to be the main culprit in soil erosion. Historical records indicate that most of the eroded areas once were covered with lush woods but were
denuded through the centuries because of wars and mis-
calculated development, such as deforestation for farming, 
discriminate logging, overgrazing, mining, and road con-
struction without consideration of water and soil conserva-
tion. An investigation of the Three Gorges Reservoir area 
indicates that farming on mountain slopes accounts for 60 
percent of the total soil erosion in the area. Most eroded 
areas are caught in a vicious cycle in which soil erosion has 
destroyed the land’s natural productivity, but because of 
the pressures to sustain an ever-growing population, poor 
land use practices are continued, resulting in further dam-
age to the ecosystem. No wonder the areas that are subject 
to severe soil erosion are commonly poverty-stricken.

Rehabilitation

China began its efforts to control soil erosion in the 1950s 
when the State Council established under it the Water 
and Soil Conservation Committee. Now the Ministry of 
Water Resources is responsible for steering the work of 
water and soil conservation and coordinating comprehen-
sive utilization of water resources. Under the Law on Wa-
ter and Soil Conversation and other water-related laws, 
programs have been planned to carry out water and soil 
conservation and eco-environmental improvement in key 
areas, including the middle reaches of the Huang River, 
the upper reaches of the Yangzi (Chang) River, sandstorm 
areas, and grassland areas.

Although government officials openly admit that the 
trend of worsening soil erosion has not been fundamen-
tally checked, control efforts have never stopped, with 
some local achievements witnessed, especially in the 
rehabilitation of small watersheds or river valleys. Such 
rehabilitation efforts feature integrated planning, which 
takes into account the land and resources capacity with 
regard to population size, and the pursuit of a sustainable 
mode of development that is appropriate to local reality 
while allowing the ecosystem to restore its function ef-
fectively. The comprehensive rehabilitation of small river 
valleys, which normally takes five years to accomplish, 
emphasizes the equal importance of economic, ecologi-
cal, and social benefits. It has been regarded as the best 
way to control soil erosion in China.

In Qinghai Province a sapling of dragon spruce takes 
four years to grow barely 5 centimeters tall, assuming that 
the sapling survives hostile conditions such as a frost-free 
period of only seventy days a year, extreme aridity, strong 
wind, and severe cold in winter plus an altitude of well 
over 2,000 meters above sea level. Nevertheless, the vil-
lagers of Xiaogaoling in Huangyuan County have built, 
in the fifty-one years since 1958, a green shelter on the 
mountains surrounding the village of 450 households. The 
400,000 trees covering 513 terraced fields have in-
creased the village’s forest coverage from 0 to 40 percent, 
checked soil erosion, and increased land productivity, 
with grain yields raising from 1,125 kilograms per hect-
are to 5,250–6,000 kilograms per hectare (2001). This 
conservation work has also enabled the village to better 
withstand natural disasters.

Throughout Qinghai, which occupies one-eighth of 
China’s land area, the extension rate of deserts has slowed 
from 13,000 hectares annually in the late 1990s to 2,000 
hectares in 2007, thanks to conservation efforts such as 
Xiaogaoling’s. Nationwide, according to the Ministry of 
Water Resources, forty thousand small river valleys have 
been rehabilitated from soil erosion, bringing a total of 
900,000 square kilometers of soil erosion under control.

Xiong LEI

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Song Dynasty

The Song dynasty (960–1279) defined a new and enduring phase of China’s premodern civilization, including southward economic shift, flourishing of urban culture, revival of the classical heritage over medieval Buddhism, and a new class of civil administrators who served the enhanced imperial autocracy.

The Song dynasty’s duration of 320 years ranks second only to the Han dynasty’s four centuries (206 BCE–220 CE) during the two millennia of China’s imperial age (221 BCE–1912 CE). Like the Han, the Song dynastic court was reestablished in a distant locale after its earlier capital had been occupied by enemies. But unlike the Han, which regained control over all of China proper, the Song lost the ancient northern heartland to nomadic invaders for the second half of its dynastic era. So historians refer to the Northern (960–1126) and Southern (1127–1279) phases of the whole Song dynastic period.

Even the Northern Song never succeeded in fully reconstituting the entire territory of China proper, much less in projecting power beyond the Great Wall, as the Han and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties had done. Two powerful non-Chinese nations, formerly allied with China’s great medieval Tang dynasty, had survived its fall and established their own independent states, occupying territories that straddled the borders of China proper. To the northwest was the Xia state (1032–1227, also known as Xi Xia), established by a nation with Tibetan ethnic affiliations. To the northeast lay the Liao state (916–1125), founded by a seminomadic tribal federation, the Qidan, from which come the Russian name for China (Khitai) and the medieval European name (Cathay). Song was forced to secure peace with Liao and Xia by paying annual tribute while submitting to unprecedented terms of diplomatic equality. In the far south, Vietnam’s national independence from China commenced in the early tenth century, and the Song dynasty’s attempted suppression failed to reassert the dominance that the Han and Tang dynasties previously held over northern Vietnam.

How then, being so weak, did the Song dynasty manage to survive for so long, and why is it worthy of our regard today? Patriotic and nationalist Chinese since Song times have often expressed regret, or even humiliation, at the Northern Song’s unprecedented acknowledgment of equal diplomatic status with its predatory neighbors and at the Southern Song’s extended failure to recover north China. Even so, uncomfortable reservations about the Song’s diminished geostategic posture, compared to the expansive glory of the preceding Tang dynasty, are strongly offset by characteristic Chinese pride in the Song’s outstanding economic and cultural achievements, for which it is often regarded as the acme of Chinese civilization.

Considered in global context, the Song period shows marked features of modern societies: a fundamentally rational, non-mystical worldview; transformation of society by growth of technology, commerce, and population; and development of strong state institutions with increasing influence in society.
The creative reformulation of Chinese culture, which came to fruition in Song times, made the preceding age of the Tang dynasty seem almost unrecognizably alien to historically aware people of the Song. The Song times generated mature intellectual, social, and political models that remained definitive in China until the twentieth century. If the Song was weak in its own East Asian region, its world-leading scientific and commercial strengths were nevertheless greatly admired in faraway lands to the south and west. Three world-changing inventions—printing, gunpowder, and the maritime compass—first exerted powerfully transforming effects in Song China before these technologies were transmitted as far west as Europe.

**Transformation of China**

The Song period marks a distinctive phase in two major trends that had gradually transformed China during the preceding millennium since the Han dynasty. The first trend was a strenuous effort to gain direct access to the cultural and material riches of the ancient Persian and Indian civilizations by state-sponsored expansion from the Huang (Yellow) River valley westward into Central Asia. The second was the conquest, colonization, and integration of the Yangzi (Chang) River valley and points south by successive regimes based in the Huang valley, leading also to fruitful contacts with Indian civilization through Southeast Asia.

A turning point in the unfolding of these two trends occurred in the mid-Tang period, in the decade of the 750s, and may be suggestively summarized by three events. First, in 751 an Arab army, aided by Turkish forces formerly allied with the Tang dynasty, defeated a multinational Tang army at Talas River in modern Kyrgyzstan, in the context of keen strategic competition for control of the profitable trans-Eurasian trade route. Second, in 752, in the wake of that defeat, a Tang general of Iranian cultural origin instigated a massive civil war in north China that destroyed the Tang state’s central power. The dynasty survived in name for another 150 years while the weakening of its control over land tenure and markets greatly stimulated economic growth in the semiautonomous southern provinces. Third, in 758 Baghdad was founded in Mesopotamia as the capital of the new Abbasid dynasty. At that time non-Chinese infidel powers in Central Asia restricted direct overland access to north China. Thus trade between Islamic centers and the Far East increasingly flowed by the southern maritime route from Baghdad through Basra and the Persian Gulf to distant ports in India, Southeast Asia, and the southern coast of China.

In the late ninth century, when the Chinese rebel Huang Chao 黄巢 sacked Guangzhou 广州 (Canton), many thousands of resident Islamic traders were massacred. The violence of that event is but one dimension of a multifaceted yet pervasive nativist reaction against the early Tang period’s cosmopolitan openness through which China had gained and given much in cultural exchange and commercial intercourse with other ancient civilizations. Buddhism, which had thoroughly pervaded Chinese culture during the previous five hundred years, came under attack for being of foreign origin and thus allegedly at odds with characteristic Chinese commitments to family and the sociopolitical hierarchy. The revival of Confucian ideas in Song times was associated with heightened sensitivity to distinctions between Chinese and foreign.

In the early tenth century, five brief regimes successively ruled ancient China’s political heartland in the Huang River valley, most of them based at Kaifeng 开封. Contesting for the imperial legacy after the Tang’s fall, the increasingly intense wars of this transitional era exhausted the hereditary clans, whose military power had dominated medieval society for nearly a millennium, opening the way to a new governing elite of civil administrators and to unprecedented elevation of the emperor above his chief counselors.

Kaifeng’s emergence as an imperial capital signifies fundamental economic change. At the start of the imperial era, prosperity in the capital cities of the Qin 秦 (221–206 BCE) and former Han dynasties had depended on irrigation and transport by canals built in the secure zone at the juncture of the Huang and Wei 满 rivers. But by Tang times reliable local food supply was inadequate for that northwestern capital area’s enlarged population, which became dependent on rice shipped by the Grand Canal from the remote southeastern Yangzi River delta, a naturally well-watered “land of fish and rice,” as the colloquial saying puts it. The Grand Canal greatly promoted links between these two major river valleys during the
long Tang dynasty, as China’s economic and demographic center shifted southward. Kaifeng’s advantageous location, near the juncture of the Huang River and the Grand Canal, guaranteed the security of regular food supply to the court there.

Kaifeng was a new kind of capital city, with a thriving urban life based on commerce. Before the mid-Tang period, China’s few large cities had principally served administrative functions, largely related to taxation and conscription of the large peasant population and to regional military control. Private commerce was relatively undeveloped, and state monopolies controlled production of strategic commodities essential to maintaining a balanced peasant economy, such as salt and iron tools, as well as luxuries like silks, some of which were exported overland to western Asia at great profit. Accordingly, in early imperial capitals, such as Chang’an 长安, for example, residents typically lived in closed courtyards, and night curfews were enforced.

But from the late Tang through the Northern Song, over three and a half centuries, the number of urban prefectures with populations of more than 100,000 doubled, from twenty-six to fifty-two. Dramatic growth of domestic trade, stimulated by use of the world’s first paper money, significantly reduced interregional differences within China proper. Economic and cultural integration was further supported by the rapid spread of book publishing. When Kaifeng became the Song capital, it was already a well-developed commercial city, and its flourishing economic and social life continued unabated. The brilliance, elegance, and raw human energy of scenes in and near the Northern Song capital are vividly portrayed with realistic
and colorful detail in a famous horizontal handscroll more than 5 meters long, known as *Peace Reigns over the River* (*Qingming shanghe tu* 清明上河图).

**Northern Song**

In 960, facing a threat from the Khitan, an educated professional military officer named Zhao Kuangyin 赵匡胤 usurped the reigning child emperor in a bloodless coup and founded the Song dynasty, a name that commemorates a classical feudal state of that region. Facing imminent invasion by the Khitan, Zhao judged that the urgent need for competent leadership outweighed the normative demands of loyalty to an immature sovereign. This instance of a classic ethical conundrum in dynastic politics has been generally, if not universally, approved by historians, a verdict that accords with the generally elevated character of the Zhao family’s ruling style through eighteen reigns.

Concerned with forestalling any further coup against himself, the Song founder immediately persuaded his own commanders to accept lavish retirement under his close surveillance, thus centralizing military power, which remained a characteristic feature of Song rule. This opened the way to a century and a half of internal peace in China proper and to one of its most glorious phases of cultural and economic growth.

Powerful non-Chinese states, formerly allied with the Tang dynasty, faced the newly established Song state on its northern frontier. Northern Song never controlled the far northwestern Gansu 甘肃 corridor, which had been crucial for access to Central Asia during the Han and early Tang. Rather, the early Song’s chief external concern was with the northeastern threat emanating from the environs of modern Beijing 北京, where the Liao dynasty had established its southern capital (then called Yan 燕), the first instance of that city’s later continuing role as the capital of successive regimes with Chinese-style imperial pretensions. In response to this major geostrategic shift, the Song founder followed recent precedents that placed the administrative center at Kaifeng, in the eastern part of modern Henan 河南 Province. This move marked a decisive break with dynastic traditions of the previous millennium.

During the whole Song period, China’s population is estimated to have doubled, from some 50 million to more than 100 million, amounting to around one quarter of the presumed global total. Agriculture became increasingly commercialized as its growing productivity was driven by the spread of innovative technologies. Many landlords left their country estates to take up residence in towns and cities. The consequent changes in elite lifestyle contributed to a new, commercially oriented urban culture with a decidedly more open, mobile, and competitive society. A new and lasting style of painting emerged among cultivated literati, which featured exquisitely articulated views of man in balanced harmony with impressive natural settings. Household amenities such as venetian blinds and playing cards, among many others, were well known in Song China before being transmitted to the West.

Membership in the new type of social elite, which formed in the Northern Song and persisted until the twentieth century, could be gained only through success

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**Architectural manual from the Song Dynasty, demonstrating a classic innovation of this time period: a system of cantilevered joints that distributes weight evenly on a support.**

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in the highly competitive civil examinations. This institution’s dominant social role over a millennium exerted a Darwinian effect favoring demographic propagation of aptitudes for book learning, which have remained a major asset for China’s modernization.

Underlying this remarkable quantitative growth and qualitative change were the long internal peace, gained by centralizing control over military forces, and the qualitative enhancement of bureaucratic administration, particularly through expanded use of civil examinations for recruiting officials. Song emperors were distinctively humane in applying their autocratic powers, habitually respecting their civil officials. New tensions, between the anticommercial bias of revived classical Confucian ethics and the unprecedented contemporary realities of a thriving national economy, were played out in court politics of the Song period, establishing negative precedents that have exerted effects into recent times. But the overall system of regional and local administration was rationalized to an unprecedented degree, enhancing efficiency of population registration, tax collection and transport, and disaster relief, thus facilitating widespread improvements in the popular livelihood. The rise of schools throughout the some fifteen hundred counties greatly promoted education and stimulated social mobility, which brought extraordinary creative vitality to eleventh-century Song China.

The Song dynasty’s chief defects were two. The first was a relatively weak military position toward powerful and predatory nomads in the north because of excessive military centralization intended as a guard against civil war; thus the unheroic policy of utilizing China’s wealth to buy peace was arguably a rational and humane choice intended to avoid the devastation of war and maintain political stability. The second defect was a tendency to administrative paralysis caused by intense factional disputes among bureaucrats, arising from the Confucian stress on principled search for truth by individuals and a heightened emphasis on personal loyalty to the ruler, which allowed no place for a loyal opposition.

Song China’s burgeoning emporia attracted resident merchants from distant points in the Islamic trade networks which then spanned Eurasia. A Jewish community, which Chinese did not distinguish clearly from Muslims, is known to have existed by the eleventh century in Kaifeng, where it remained well established for eight centuries until being dispersed during civil disturbances in the nineteenth century. Thus, although in recent years some Chinese citizens have affirmed personal Jewish ancestry, Jews have not been officially recognized as one of the fifty-six ethnic communities or five religions of contemporary China. On the other hand, Quanzhou, a port city on the southeast coast, during the Southern Song hosted a large population of Islamic traders whose descendants remain today a conspicuous and distinctive presence in that area.

Iron production in Song China reached levels unmatched anywhere until the nineteenth century. Chinese utilized coal, a fuel unknown to Europeans like Marco Polo, who wondered at the black rock that burned when he visited China in the generation following the Song dynasty’s fall. Song period advances in the application of agricultural technology, such as a pedal-driven waterwheel for irrigation, in combination with the sophisticated use of multiple cropping, dramatically increased agricultural output, especially in the long Yangzi River valley from Nanjing to Sichuan and further south. Intense use of water transport in the many canals, rivers, and lakes of south China underlay development of marine technology employed in building the contemporary world’s largest and best designed ocean-going vessels. Such ships, constructed with sternpost rudders and watertight compartments, and carrying several hundred men, often sailed to ports of the western Indian Ocean.

Heavy expenses for northern military defense burdened the treasury by the middle of the eleventh century, provoking efforts at institutional reform and rationalization implicitly aimed to “enrich the state in order to strengthen the military,” as the classical maxim puts it. Reformers, such as Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1085), were also sincerely motivated by Confucian principles of benefiting the people. They were opposed by conservatives, such as Sima Guang 司马光 (1019–1086), who were equally devoted to different understandings of the shared Confucian teachings and of the common good. The creative optimism of early Northern Song scholar-officials, such as Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052) and Ouyang Xiu 欧阳修 (1007–1072), who sought innovative and practical solutions to contemporary problems in accord
with Confucian values, yielded to a political stalemate in which preemptive accusations of moral deviation stymied policymaking at the court. The failure of eleventh-century reforms left lasting effects on imperial government in later dynasties. Wealth gained from commerce was typically invested in farmland, which brought social prestige according to Confucian standards, while stunting the possibilities of independent capitalist development.

In the early twelfth century, a new power rose in northern Manchuria, the Jin 金 dynasty of the Jurchen 汴珍 nation (Jurchen Jin dynasty, 1125–1234), with whom the Song court made an alliance against their common enemy the Liao state. But in 1126 the Jin armies, after occupying Liao, continued southward and seized the Song capital at Kaifeng, carrying off the two last two Song emperors to Manchuria, along with thousands of their clan members. None of them ever returned to China.

SOUTHERN SONG

Following this shocking disaster, a younger brother of the last Northern Song emperor reestablished the Song court in a temporary capital south of the Yangzi River at Hangzhou 杭州 in modern Zhejiang 浙江 Province, where it persisted for another century and a half until it was destroyed by the Mongol 蒙古 invasion in 1279. Even after losing all territories north of the Huai 淮 River basin, the Southern Song continued to grow economically and to thrive culturally, whereas the north lagged under alien rule. Southern export trade was expanded from one port,
Guangzhou (Canton), during the Northern Song to several other ports along the coast: Hangzhou, Quanzhou, and Ningbo, for example. State revenues from maritime trade outgrew income from agriculture, indicating a pragmatic attitude toward the anticommercial ethos of neo-Confucian moral teachings that were concurrently being energetically promoted.

Chinese demographic presence in Southeast Asia can be traced to early communities of resident sojourners in this period. Rapidly ripening rice, allowing two crops to be harvested per year, was introduced to China from Southeast Asia, as was cotton. Chinese craftwares, such as the widely desired porcelains that we call china, and preserved foods were traded for luxury goods such as rare minerals or exotic fauna and flora. As wealthier Chinese consumed more meat, pepper from Java and Sumatra became a necessary import to China, as to Europe. Remains of Song period export products have been found as far away as Arabia and East Africa. A Chinese maritime record of the early thirteenth century indicates knowledge of western locales such as Baghdad, Cairo, and even Sicily.

In the Southern Song period, the Jiangnan region (southeast of the Yangzi River) for the first time became economically and culturally dominant in China, foreshadowing the rise of Nanjing as the founding capital of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and later of the unified Republic of China from 1927 to 1949.

The Southern Song philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200) has been called the single most influential person in the last millennium of Chinese history. Zhu creatively integrated pre-imperial Confucian teachings with Buddhist and Daoist perspectives, which had enlarged Chinese thought and enjoyed popular favor in the medieval period. Through Zhu’s reformulation neo-Confucian thought transcended elite circles and became effectively competitive with Buddhism and Daoism for influence in society.

Zhu Xi’s system, which was orthodox in China until the twentieth century, offered its followers a comforting sense of living in organic harmony with moral principles that were both universal and historically Chinese. Zhu’s thought was rational, as opposed to mystic, but its emphasis on ethical learning diminished later Chinese thinkers’ interest in natural science, which had advanced impressively during the Northern Song, as in the thought of Shen Guan 沈括 (1031–1095). Thus personal commitment to core humanistic disciplines of the Confucian way, such as normative family relations and the prestige of classical and historical models, pervaded Chinese society at all levels during the last millennium.

Southern Song government was often dominated by powerful chief ministers who monopolized power by concurrently holding two or more offices originally meant to be separately staffed. Arbitrary governance paralyzed policymaking and administration, and demoralized officials, intensifying factional disputes.

**End of an Age**

World history was changed forever in the middle of the thirteenth century with the rise of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan’s militantly aggressive Mongol empire, which destroyed the Jurchen Jin dynasty in north China in 1234 before invading Russia, Poland, and Hungary in 1240 and 1241. Western Europe was saved only because the advancing Mongol horde returned to Mongolia on the death of their “Great Khan.” In the Middle East, they destroyed the secret Isma’ili Order of the Assassins and conquered Persia, sacking Baghdad in 1258 and taking Damascus and the Levant in 1260 before a planned attack on Egypt was blunted.

Still, Southern Song valiantly resisted until finally overcome in 1279 by the Mongols’ Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) under Khubilai Khan, during whose reign (1260–1294) Marco Polo was in China. The Mongols’ typically violent and suspicious ruling style, and their imposition of overbearing and exploitative top-down controls on local administration, introduced a shocking new despotism to Chinese government, with lasting reverberations through the centuries to modern times. Many Chinese scholars who had matured in the late Southern Song withheld their support of the new Yuan dynasty and so gained the honored name of principled loyalists to the glorious memory of the fallen Song, China’s most civilized and enlightened age.

By Song times China had fully integrated the influences of the Indian Buddhist worldview and emerged with a renewed and strengthened Chinese identity. That historical experience prefigures China’s struggle in the twentieth century to balance the universal claims of
Marxism and Western science with pride in its own native traditions, and suggests possibilities for China’s role in the world of the present century.

Thomas BARTLETT

Further Reading


Song Lyrics (Ci)

Words set to music, or song lyrics, were a major poetic form in China between the seventh and thirteenth centuries. Words held sway over melodies. Often the music served as a sort of template to which the poet fit the words. Song lyrics covered the whole range of the poet’s experience and were often quite personal.

The song lyric (ci) is one of the major poetic genres in China that had a close connection with musical performance throughout its development. One of the earliest terms used to identify the genre was words set to music (quzi ci). This term points to the song lyric’s origins in the new music from central Asia that began entering China during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and soon became all the rage at the cosmopolitan Tang court and in urban culture. Lyrics were set to this so-called banquet music (yanyue). The earliest extant song lyrics are folk compositions preserved in manuscripts discovered in the Buddhist caves of Dunhuang in Gansu Province. The later history of the song lyric genre, however, is largely a product of literati authors and their interaction with popular culture.

The first literati experiments occurred during the ninth century during the late Tang dynasty; the form evolved in the hands of different literati authors into a major form of written poetic literature from the tenth to the thirteenth century during the Song dynasty (960–1279) and gradually declined after the conquest of China by the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

Two other phrases used to refer to the song lyric highlight formal features and the problem of the genre’s status. A second phrase used to designate the song lyric was long and short lines (changduan ju). This phrase points out a defining formal feature of song lyrics: its frequent use of uneven line lengths and strictly determined rhyme and tone schemes. Although the song lyric frequently had lines of varying length, it was far from free verse. Song lyrics were identified by their tune titles, which referred to a common tune matrix to which different poets would fill in the words (tanci). These tune patterns determined the number of characters per line, the placement of rhymes, and the tonal pattern. Uneven lines of song lyrics accommodated a large number of colloquial elements and empty, or function, words (xuci) and tended to employ more continuous syntax than shi poetry did.

The long and short lines must have reflected the structure of the new music. They were also thought to be more suitable for narrating the twists and turns of subtle emotional states with which the genre was often preoccupied. Finally, song lyrics were also often referred to by a third phrase, the remains of shi or the unspent energy of shi (shiyu). In generic terms song lyrics were often defined against the established genre of shi poetry as the “other” of shi. Shi was the serious poetic genre long thought to be the proper vehicle for conveying one’s intent, to reveal the poet’s character and even to demonstrate one’s fitness for public office in the civil service. By contrast, early song lyrics were associated with women and the entertainment quarters, where courtesans sang the popular new music. The writer of ci could borrow the voices of the singing girl and her allied personae. Song lyrics also allowed
more room for a poet to describe his or her private life, separate and independent from the more public aspects of identity that were the proper domain of shi. This feminine connection would play an important role in setting the ci’s thematic range and would make problematic its legitimacy as a genre for serious literary pursuit during its early development. At the same time, the predominance of the female voice also led to a complex poetics of voice, impersonation, and performance.

Five Dynasties Writers: Courts of Shu and the Southern Tang

The earliest substantial corpus of song lyrics by literati authors comes from the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE). During this time of political division the song lyric was largely a tale of two southern kingdoms, with a prominent collection known as Collection among the Flowers (Huajian ji) compiled in the court of the southwestern kingdom of Shu and important works written by the rulers of the southeastern kingdom of Southern Tang. This collection came largely to define the generic identity of the song lyric as delicate and subtle in tone, linked with the boudoir setting and closely associated with the female poetic voice. The collection contains some song lyrics in which male writers wrote objective descriptions of female figures, epitomized by the song lyrics of Wen Tingyun (812–866) and others in which writers borrowed the female voice in a kind of literary ventriloquism. At the same time in the Southern Tang court, the second and last ruler, Li Yu (961–975), crafted concise song lyrics that harnessed the power of immense natural images to convey the intensity of his sorrow when his kingdom was conquered by the Song dynasty. Although Song literati criticized this failed ruler in official statements, his song lyric’s departure from the boudoir setting, use of a male autobiographical voice, and introduction of vast natural imagery as correlates to feelings associated with the state and country created a precedent for later writers of similar disposition. Literati song lyrics of this period were composed predominantly in the shorter xiaoling form, which bore a closer resemblance in structure and length to shorter forms of shi poetry with which literati writers were well acquainted.

Northern Song Writers

After the Song dynasty unification of the empire in 960, song lyrics began to be composed by members of the newly risen scholar-official class. Some prominent figures, such as Yan Shu (991–1055) and Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072), continued to write banquet songs almost exclusively in the xiaoling form. The main dynamic behind changes in the song lyric was the interaction between popular and literati elite cultures and the effort to employ popular styles, adapt them, or to create a refined style. The form at the heart of this cultural intersection was the manci, a longer form of the song lyric formerly eschewed by literati writers because of its technical challenges and association with popular culture. The appeal of the manci lay in its capacity for more expansive and continuous narration of thoughts and feelings.

Three important writers exemplify these trends in the manci. Liu Yong (c. 987–1055) was the first literati writer to take up the manci form. His manci revolved around two overlapping themes: romances with singing girls in the city and the sorrows of the official traveler on the road. His use of colloquial diction and direct treatment of the theme of love, although incredibly popular in urban entertainment quarters, drew much criticism from contemporary literati. The great renaissance man, Su Shi (1037–1101), is credited with elevating the form by using song lyrics as shi poetry, that is, by using the song lyric to address a broad range of topics associated with the poet’s public persona and incorporating diction and allusions from shi poetry. The short prefaces that he appended to more than 43 percent of his song lyrics also firmly grounded the reading of his manci about his personal sense of displacement in official travel and political exile.

Zhou Bangyan (1056–1121), director of the Music Bureau at the court of Emperor Huizong (reigned 1100–1126), also incorporated diction and allusions from shi poetry into his manci but achieved a different effect. The heavy use of citation and allusion in his song lyrics created an ambiguous and unstable focus in which the poet
becomes a disembodied presence. In his manci we see the shift of the organizing core of his song lyrics away from the persona of the poet and toward the creation of a highly refined mood often centered on an object.

Southern Song Writers

After the collapse of the Northern Song dynasty and the relocation of the capital to Hangzhou in 1127, the song lyric developed along two distinct, although often overlapping, directions following the innovations of Su Shi and Zhou Bangyan. Each of these innovators’ styles was shaped by two different groups, the first by a group of activist scholar-official writers and the second by a new class of professional musicians. During the early Southern Song dynasty a group of scholar-official writers confronting the collapse of the central government and mass migration to the south began to consciously write song lyrics in the manner of Su Shi. Su Shi’s precedent, which had transformed the song lyric into a vehicle for confronting the sense of displacement in travel through a strong, personal voice, responded exactly to the needs of writers, such as Ye Mengde (1077–1159), who were forced to flee south while defending the reestablished state. In the next generation, Xin Qiji (1140–1207) exemplified the trend toward expressing a personal voice and mourning the tragedy of the communal past among scholar-official writers. During the second half of the Southern Song dynasty, however, the mainstream of song lyric writing was defined by an emphasis on musical craft, as seen in the manci of Jiang Kui (1155–1221) and Wu Wenying (1200–1260). These works were written by a class of professional musician-poets whose members were unable or uninterested in obtaining scholar official status and instead relied on the patronage relationships, often within the political elite of the flourishing commercial center and capital of Hangzhou. The opulence and refinement of the material culture of Hangzhou are reflected in their song lyrics on objects, which focused on small and delicate objects, often located within one of the famed gardens of Hangzhou, that evoked a stream of memories and associations.

Although the song lyric declined during the Yuan dynasty, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) experienced renewed interest in the song lyric by a number of maverick writers, such as the female revolutionary Qiu Jin (1877–1907) and the world traveler Lu Bicheng (1883–1943), who drew on the full range of styles and voices developed during the heyday of the genre from the ninth to the thirteenth century.

Benjamin RIDGWAY

Further Reading

Soong Mei-ling, whose life spanned three centuries, was one of the most influential women in twentieth-century China, becoming an indispensable advisor to her husband, Chiang Kai-shek, on foreign affairs. Serving as a de facto liaison between Chiang’s wartime government and the United States during World War II, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, as she was known, was the first Chinese person ever to address both houses of the U.S. Congress.

Soong Mei-ling was born into a wealthy Cantonese family in Shanghai in 1898. Her father, businessman Charlie Soong (Song Jiashu, 1866–1918), made his fortune publishing and selling Chinese-language bibles. He insisted all his children be educated in America, so Soong Mei-ling left for America in 1907 to attend a private school. She graduated from Wellesley College in Massachusetts in 1917. Her fluency in English and profound understanding of American society and politics would enable her to play an essential role in China-U.S. relations after her marriage to rising political star Chiang Kai-shek in 1927.

In China, Soong held numerous political posts. From 1929–1932, she served as a member of the Legislative Yuan. From 1938–39, she was Secretary-General of the Chinese Aeronautical Affairs Commission. In this capacity, she recruited retired U.S. airman Claire Lee Chennault to head the so-called Flying Tigers air force, made up largely of volunteer pilots from the U.S., to help China fight Japan’s air forces. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 caused the U.S. to enter World War II, Chennault was officially appointed as a General by President Roosevelt.

During World War II, Soong served as Chiang’s interpreter and confidante as America sent many military advisors to his war-time capital in Chungking (Chongqing). While Chiang knew little about the West, Soong felt that the Republic of China’s fate would depend on good relations with America. In 1942–1943, Soong toured the U.S. extensively to drum up support and funding for the Nationalist government’s war effort as an ally against the Japanese. She formally addressed both houses of Congress, becoming the first Chinese and only the second woman ever to do so.

At the same time, with the help of her long-time friend, Henry Luce, founder of Time magazine, she organized the now infamous China Lobby as the Nationalist’s support base in the U.S. Time magazine published many glowing reports of Soong and her husband. (They had appeared jointly on the January 1938 cover of Time as “Man and Wife of the Year.”)

However, by the late 1940s, reports of gross corruption under Chiang sullied their reputations in America. Members of Soong’s family, including her brother T. V. Soong, and her brother-in-law, H. H. Kung, were both members of Chiang’s government and were reportedly embezzling great sums of money that America had sent for the war effort. When Soong Mei-ling embarked on another trip to the U.S. in November 1948, she was not invited to speak before Congress. And President Truman
pointedly refused to allow her to stay at Blair House, as she had under Roosevelt.

After the Communists won the Civil War in 1949, Soong fled with her husband to Taiwan. After his death in 1975, she moved to New York, where she lived until her death in 2003 at the age of 105. She was buried at Ferncliff Cemetery in Hartsdale, New York, where her oldest sister, Ai-ling was also interred. (Her middle sister, Qing-ling, was the widow of Sun Yat-sen and had been buried in China.)

Soong’s will stated her intention to be re-buried, along with husband, on the Chinese mainland once the political differences between the People’s Republic and the Republic of China on Taiwan were resolved.

**Winberg CHAI**

**Further Reading**

A member of a wealthy Shanghai Christian family prominent in the Chinese Nationalist Party, Soong Ziwen served in major financial and diplomatic posts under the two pre-1949 leaders of the Nationalist Party. The two men, President Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, each married sisters of Soong Ziwen. Soong and his family were key figures in U.S.-Chinese relations before 1949.

Soong Ziwen was the eldest son of Charlie Soong (Song Jiashu, 1866–1918), a Chinese Christian minister who rose from obscurity to head a wealthy Shanghai family. Like his father, Soong Ziwen was educated in the United States, and his career was closely tied to support for the leader of the Nationalist Movement, Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan, 1866–1925). Equally important were the marriages of his three elder sisters. The eldest, Soong Ai-ling (1889/1890–1973), married Kong Xiangxi (usually called “H. H. Kung,” 1881–1967), a financier who also served in the top echelon of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) administrations. His second-elder sister, Soong Qing-ling (1893–1981), married Sun Yat-sen in 1915, and his third-elder sister, Soong Mei-ling (1898–2003), married the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) in 1927.

After graduating from Harvard in 1915 Soong Ziwen worked in international banking in New York before returning to China as a financial manager. In 1923 his brother-in-law Sun Yat-sen called him to Guangzhou.
(Canton) to reform the Nationalist movement’s finances. Soong Ziwen remained after Sun’s death in 1925, and when his other brother-in-law Chiang Kai-shek established a Nationalist government in Nanjing in 1928, Soong became minister of finance.

Soong Ziwen and his third brother-in-law, Kong Xiangxi, emerged as decisive figures in Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts to centralize economic and financial power in the 1930s. Their efforts threatened the interests of many Chinese and foreign capitalists who resented their statist, dirigist (relating to economic planning and control by the state) policies. Chiang Kai-shek, however, needed their skills to provide a stable currency, taxes, and loans on which to expand Nationalist power.

In 1928 Soong Ziwen’s career became dependent on his close ties to his sister Soong Mei-ling and her husband, Chiang Kai-shek. In the 1930s Soong achieved the first successes in the recovery of Chinese sovereign rights from the nineteenth-century unequal treaties. Soong Ziwen also established a number of state-owned modern factories that were intended to produce revenue for the Nationalist government and improve its defense capacity. These factories became key elements in the Nationalist government’s program of state-controlled capitalism and were condemned later as “bureaucratic capitalism.”

After the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, referred to as the Second Sino-Japanese War outside of China) broke out Chiang Kai-shek called on Soong Ziwen’s connections with the United States to help secure U.S. loans and support. He and his sister Soong Mei-ling played critical roles in this effort. From 1942 to 1945 Soong held the post of foreign minister. Accusations circulated widely, both in China and the United States, that members of the Soong family, including Soong Ziwen, enriched themselves personally from U.S. aid.

At the end of World War II Soong Ziwen became head of the Executive Yuan, which managed civil government. He also continued performing important diplomatic tasks. Chinese critics, including many Chinese Nationalist leaders, disliked Soong Ziwen for his close identification with U.S. interests.

When the Nationalist government fell in 1949 and fled to Taiwan, Soong was serving as governor of Guangdong Province. Subsequently he moved with his wife and three daughters to an estate on Long Island in New York but continued to serve as an advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. He died after suffering a stroke in 1971.

David D. BUCK

Further Reading

Photograph of Soong Ziwen, a prominent Harvard-trained financier who was devoted to modernizing China’s fiscal system.
China has profoundly affected the states of Southeast Asia throughout history, losing its dominance only during a period of Western colonialism in the region. Chinese influence in Southeast Asia is again on the rise and is evident in the spheres of economics, religion, and political ideologies.

The opening decade of the twenty-first century saw China reestablishing itself as Asia’s dominant power and redefining China–Southeast Asian relations. In effect, the Southeast Asian states have been returning to an earlier phase in their history, when they had accepted a subordinate role in their relationships with China. Only between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, when Western imperialism held sway in the region, did China lose its dominance vis-à-vis the Southeast Asian countries.

Chinese Migration in Southeast Asia

Chinese influence in the eleven countries of Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) is relatively proportional to the number of Chinese in each country. Vietnam, for example, was historically the Southeast Asian state most influenced by China because of the steady stream of Chinese migration into northern Vietnam. This influx of Chinese soldiers, officials, and peasants into Vietnam came about through geographical and political conditions. Geographically connected to southern China, Vietnam was an attractive alternative for Chinese fleeing from local bullies, civil wars, dead-end bureaucratic positions, and limited land. Chinese immigration to Vietnam was rather seamless during the first millennium of the common era with Vietnam actually China’s southernmost province between 111 BCE and 939 CE. While this political reality was based on military subjugation, the very fact that it lasted for a millennium is significant. No other Southeast Asian country experienced such profound Chinese influence on its history and society for such a length of time.

Chinese migration to other areas of Southeast Asia involved establishing enclaves only on the coasts of those countries. During the first centuries of the common era, merchants from China’s southern and eastern provinces used small boats, known as junks, to venture into Southeast Asian waters, facilitating trade. This trade dramatically increased during periods when the Silk Roads were impassable due to civil wars along the overland route, which connected China with Western empires. Over time, Chinese traders set up communities in Southeast Asia at established ports. In places such as the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos, Chinese settlements took root where the land met the sea. In short, the Chinese migration into the islands of Southeast Asia was limited to the periphery of the states and did not reach into the interior. The geographical margins of these Chinese communities matched the social isolation the early migrant Chinese sought. Overseas Chinese did not always integrate into
the native population because the Chinese believed in the superiority of Chinese culture and society.

Western industrialization and the concomitant imperialism (Western powers colonized every part of Southeast Asia except Thailand) changed the nature of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. The Chinese actually became more important in Southeast Asian financial systems as Chinese merchants were the personnel that Western colonial powers used to plug Southeast Asia into the world’s economy. In places such as the Malay Peninsula in the mid-nineteenth century, the British established tin mines, which produced the vast majority of the world’s tin. Anglo officials in Malay preferred to employ Chinese laborers rather than the indigenous population, for the former were less likely to create strife and had no ties to local Malay chieftains or the ubiquitous mosques. The importation of Chinese labor was on such a scale that in 2008—a century and a half after the mass arrival of Chinese laborers—26 percent of Malaysia was ethnically Chinese; in neighboring Singapore 76 percent of the island’s residents was Chinese.

While Chinese people constitute only a minor portion of the Philippines’ population, they possess disproportionate economic control, which can be traced to their partnership with the colonial Spanish officials of the region. The Philippines proved to be a losing economic proposition for Spain, which ruled the archipelago from 1571 to 1898. But the Spanish did use the city of Manila as an area for exchanging international goods. Chinese porcelain, finished silk textiles, and other material from southern China were sent to Manila. The Manila-based Chinese merchants partnered with Chinese in southeast China to make this trade possible. From Manila, Chinese wares were placed on a galleon and shipped across the Pacific to Acapulco, Mexico, in exchange for Peruvian silver, which was sent back to Manila and China.

**China’s Philosophical Influence in Southeast Asia**

More powerful and profound than economic influences has been China’s ideological impact on Southeast Asia.
Varied in time and nature, Chinese philosophies have affected the cultures of its southern neighbors.

The geographical and political connections between Vietnam and China also affected the Vietnamese worldview. Assimilating Vietnam into the Chinese bureaucracy meant the imposition of China’s political paradigm on its southern province. Embedded in this system was an implicit moral value system. In other Southeast Asian states these values were spread through intermarriage and the establishment of Chinese schools.

Some of the Confucian ideas that were transmitted to Southeast Asian states include a high regard for education, an emphasis on affable relations, and filial piety. In Vietnam as in China, there emerged an elite educated class that ran the political system. Mastery of the Confucian classics was the means to a more secure, economically viable existence in Vietnam. The Confucian notion of the superiority of learned men was integrated into Vietnamese culture, and a good number of Vietnam’s most influential twentieth-century figures—such as Ngo Dinh Diem, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ho Chi Minh—spent much of their early careers acquiring an education.

In more recent times the thoughts, policies, and writings of Mao Zedong have spawned revolutions in Southeast Asian states. One example of a group that Mao influenced was the Khmer Rouge. This somewhat marginalized Communist group in Cambodia borrowed many of its ideas and practices from Mao’s formulations. During the 1970s, when the popular Cambodian king, Norodom Sihanouk, was ousted by pro-American elements in his army, China facilitated an uneasy alliance between the ousted monarch and the Khmer Rouge. Led by Saloth Sar, also known as Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge capitalized on this China-negotiated alliance and staged a civil war that allowed the Khmer Rouge to run the country from April 1975 to December 1978. The leaders of the Khmer Rouge envisioned an agrarian-based utopia that valued ideological correctness more than education in the humanities and sciences. Their policies resulted in the systematic elimination of people based on their high educational attainment, ethnicity, and ties to the old regime. It is estimated that 2 million out of Cambodia’s population of 6 million died during the Khmer Rouge rule. The Cambodian Communists’ policies and atrocities were not unprecedented. Taking their cue from Mao’s Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), the Khmer Rouge leaders tried to emulate Mao’s vision for a society where people’s lives, energies, and productivity would all be for the state. And, just as in China, vast numbers of Cambodians lost their lives for this ideology.

As in Cambodia, post–World War II Communist movements in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines borrowed heavily from Mao’s teachings, continuing a more than two-thousand-year-long pattern of Chinese philosophers affecting the worldview of Southeast Asian peoples.

Current and Future Relations

“The Chinese people have stood up.” Mao’s memorable words at the 1 October 1949 founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were more prophetic than real. In fact, it was only after Mao’s death in 1976 that China’s rise shifted the balance of power in the region and in the world. The country’s recent, rapid economic growth is unparalleled in human history. For example, since 1979 China’s economy has doubled every eight years. In that same time period the U.S. economy had doubled once.

It is apparently not in China’s destiny to cross oceans and colonize other countries. Identifying their country around 1000 BCE as the Middle Kingdom, surrounded they then thought only by barbarians, the Chinese to this day have not sought overseas colonies because they see themselves as the source of culture: “Let nations come to us and discover our greatness” is the historic Chinese attitude. Some observers question whether this hands-off policy will remain, given China’s economic and military growth. All signs point to the continuation of the peaceful relationship between Southeast Asia and China, though there does seem to be a shift in China’s hegemonic role in Southeast Asia. China’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its claim on potentially oil-rich regions around Southeast Asia point to new developments between China and Southeast Asian states.

Two recent examples of increased tension between China and Southeast Asian nations are the disputes over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea and the establishment of a Chinese base on Mischief Reef, situated 250 kilometers off the southern Philippine island of Palawan. In these cases Southeast Asian countries claim
that China is moving into territory that does not belong to it. China contends that it is not interested in colonizing these islands, but it does seek to explore potential oil reserves in the area. Various ASEAN diplomats remark that when they seek to negotiate with China on these matters, the Chinese are more likely to cite past dynasties and old maps than they are to talk about present realities.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from Southeast Asia, particularly from its two large bases in the Philippines (Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base), there has been a superpower vacuum in the region. While China has not yet stepped into a hegemonic role in Southeast Asia, there is an opportunity for it to do so. Its future in the region will depend on how it maintains relations with each country rather than with the entire region as a whole because ASEAN is too ideologically and ethnically disparate to provide a united front against any type of Chinese dominance in the region. Furthermore, the 20 million overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are treated differently from country to country. For example, Chinese have adjusted quite well in Thailand and the Philippines, but they have not experienced the same amiable integration in Vietnam, Malaysia, or Indonesia. During 1978 and 1979 the mistreatment of Chinese in Vietnam was considered so intense that the Chinese government sent ships to Vietnam to evacuate its overseas constituents.

Compared with Vietnam, hostility between Malays and overseas Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia is relatively recent. During the nineteenth century thousands of Chinese emigrated to Malaya to the point that in 1931 Chinese made up 41 percent of the Malay Peninsula’s population. The Chinese eventually dominated the economy of Malaysia. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, bloody riots against the Chinese on the Malay Peninsula have caused tension between China and Malaysia. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Chinese community in Malaysia still has an inordinate amount of influence on the Malaysian economy.

In neighboring Indonesia the Malay population holds some animosity toward their Chinese neighbors because of their economic wealth in the archipelago. The Indonesian Chinese were also accused of supplying 1960s Communist revolutionaries with weapons, bringing the country to the brink of civil war and leading to President Sukarno’s eventual downfall.

Given the historic precedent of Chinese dominance in Southeast Asian relations and China’s recent rise to superpower status, it appears natural that China will view itself as a guardian over its southern neighbors. But given the diverse historic and current relationships that each Southeast Asian country has with China, it is unlikely that there will be one universal policy that governs Sino-Southeast Asian relations. Rather, the nature of these relations will be predicated on China’s economic/military interests in a particular region and the strength of the bonds between a particular Southeast Asian country and China.

Shelton WOODS

Further Reading

Southeast Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 ▶
The Southeast Asian Financial Crisis that began in Thailand and quickly spread to neighboring countries was an example of the cyclical nature of capitalism. This crisis caused massive political and economic fluctuations and competitive currency devaluations. Within this context China showed itself to be an economically stabilizing influence and a regional leader, the benefits of which it is continuing to enjoy today.

The Southeast Asian Financial Storm, or Asian Financial Crisis as it is more commonly known, was the result of a decade of rapid economic growth in Asia (the Asian economic miracle) where fundamental economic realities became skewed, leading to a period of adjustment following the boom. In this respect it was simply another part of the boom-and-bust cycle of capitalism. The usual starting point is the run on the Thai baht that began in July 1997.

Boom-and-Bust Cycles of Capitalism

It was this boom-and-bust cycle that the economic planners tried to stop at the end of the Second World War. The Bretton Woods agreement is the most famous, where the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were created. The purpose of the IMF was to make emergency loans to economies that found themselves in dire straits. The IMF would restore public confidence through loans and prevent an economy from sliding further into recession. At the same time, it would provide financial advice to get an economy back on track. It has played an important role in the world economy since its creation (though it is not without its critics).

A final initiative of the Bretton Woods agreement was the stabilization of currency exchange. The prewar gold standard system did not survive the Great Depression and Second World War II. The U.S. idea after the war was to peg gold to the U.S. dollar and then, in turn, link all Western currencies to the U.S. dollar ("as good as gold"). This had the effect of stabilizing both international trade and currency exchange. Under this system it was impossible to have a run on a country's currency by speculators. Unfortunately, this system did not last. The U.S. government overspent on both the Vietnam War and President Johnson's Great Society initiative. The result was a massive oversupply of U.S. dollars on the world market to pay for both. When European bankers, in particular, became alarmed about this dollar glut, they began to pressure the United States to pay them in gold at the level agreed upon in 1945. The United States was unable to do this, and President Nixon removed the dollar from the gold standard in 1971, leading to a sharp depreciation in the dollar and the subsequent loss of billions to European banks. The creation of the euro, incidentally, is in large measure a result of this event, so the Europeans do not have to depend on the U.S. dollar as a world currency.
Since this time, the world has moved to a system of floating exchange rates, and hence a high level of instability in the global financial system. For example, how can exporters plan ahead when they do not know how much their products are going to cost in the long term in different markets? What prevents speculators from creating a run on a particular currency to make short-term profits?

**Underlying Causes of the Crisis**

In Asia the financial crisis had both long-term and short-term beginnings. Through the 1970s until the mid-1980s, Japan had been running a huge surplus with the world in general and the United States in particular. In 1985 the Japanese agreed to increase the value of the yen. However, the yen rose far faster than anyone expected, from about 230 yen to the U.S. dollar in 1985 to eventually 80 yen to the U.S. dollar ten years later. The Japanese government, therefore, became worried about endaka, or high yen recession, where their exported products would cost too much on world markets. One result was that they kept interest rates low (eventually 2.5 percent and today just over 0 percent), and banks were encouraged to lend on easy terms to compensate. Japanese companies also massively invested offshore, especially in Southeast Asia, to make products with lower labor costs and, therefore, be less expensive in global markets.

With low interest rates and easy lending by banks, the Japanese massively overinvested in both the Japanese stock market and real estate, creating an artificially large economy (a “bubble”). After Japan’s financial meltdown beginning in 1991 (the end of the “bubble economy”) Japanese companies continued to invest in Southeast Asia, this time to produce low-cost products for the Japanese market as well, and remain competitive there.

Unfortunately, not all of this investment was used wisely in Southeast Asia. Japanese money was typically channeled through local banks, and their lending criteria were not always rigorous. It was also often put into real estate, and this created inflated real estate prices in the region. Other countries followed the Japanese lead and money poured into the region. The result was a number of economic bubbles created by the inflow of foreign investment.

**Short Term Causes of the Crisis**

In terms of short-term causes of the crisis, in 1997 it became clear to some currency speculators that local currencies were overvalued, and they attacked them. The idea was to short sell the currencies (to make a contract buying the currency in the future at a low price and then selling that currency to drive it down). The first attack occurred in Thailand in that year. The result was a panic. Everyone holding reserves of Thai baht sold them, which drove down the price. Then speculators began looking around the region and attacked other currencies. At the same time, panicked investors withdrew their funds, and this added to the fall in local economies. Some $80 billion to $100 billion of investment was withdrawn from the region.

**Impacts of the Crisis**

The result was economic chaos in a number of countries in Asia. Eventually Thailand and Indonesia accepted rescue packages from the IMF (as well as South Korea in Northeast Asia). Massive currency devaluation took place. The worst affected (exacerbated by political turmoil in the country) was the Indonesia rupiah, which dropped from about 2,500 rupiah to the U.S. dollar in mid-1997 to about 18,000 by the time the slide stopped. The Malaysian government took the unprecedented step of introducing currency controls (not allowing its currency, the ringgit, to be freely traded) and the currency’s exchange rate is still managed today though its value is linked to a basket of major currencies. Real estate values plummeted, banks collapsed, unemployment soared, and political turmoil resulted (the authoritarian government of Indonesia, in place for more than thirty years, fell after a period of bloody rioting).

There were a few bright spots. China refused to devalue its currency, to compete with the lower currencies of Southeast Asia, and supported the Hong Kong dollar. It came out of the crisis with substantial political collateral, and became something akin to the savior of Southeast Asia. China’s response showed leadership, where the government put regional above domestic interests. It could...
have devalued its currency and ameliorated the impact of the crisis on China's economy but chose instead to support neighboring countries. By doing so China gained substantial political capital in the region that is continuing to pay dividends today. Singapore, where bank lending was more rigorous, also survived with only a minor recession. The very poor countries of Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma)—were not overly affected because their economies were already at such low levels. But those economies that had grown substantially because of foreign investment—Thailand and Indonesia in particular—suffered enormously.

The real pain lasted for about two years before there were early signs of recovery, though Thailand and Indonesia had yet to recover fully more than a decade later. The idea of Asia's "miracle economies" had been shown to be no miracle at all.

The crisis is best placed within the context of the boom-and-bust cycles of capitalism. The Great Depression is the best known of these, followed by the recession in the early 1970s in the United States caused by the dollar default and the dramatic rise in the cost of oil by OPEC. This was followed by the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s where Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, in particular, defaulted on their international loans and had to be rescued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Then, after the Asian Financial Crisis, came the collapse of the American hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, in 1998, and Russia's loan default and the collapse of the ruble. Finally, in 2008 there was the mortgage crisis in the United States that dragged the U.S. economy into a recession, followed by a banking crisis that spread to financial systems and has affected economies worldwide into 2009.

In this respect the Southeast Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2008 global crisis are similar. When public sentiment for buying goods and investment is strong, business does very well, but this broad-based economic excitement tends to make both borrowers and lenders less prudent. People borrow too much and banks lend on overly easy terms. Prices become inflated, and when the downturn begins, the herd mentality means that everyone rushes to shed their investments (typically either in real estate or the stock market) at the same time. Prices plummet and a recession threatens. The major difference between the crisis of 1997 and the one beginning in 2008 is that the latter downturn, having started in the world's largest economy and consumer market, necessarily has global repercussions.

Curtis ANDRESSEN

Further Reading
Southern and Northern Dynasties

Nán-Běi Cháo 南北朝
220–589 CE (years debated by scholars)

The Southern and Northern dynasties (220–589 CE, although scholars debate the exact dates) were periods of civil unrest and warfare, but they also brought the spread of non-indigenous Mahayana Buddhism and native Daoism, the emergence of Chinese Buddhism, and advancement in the arts and sciences.

The highly complex period of the Southern and Northern dynasties has engendered lively scholarly debate about official and unofficial and regional/local dynasties whose names appear in the Chinese chronologies but are not always recognized as valid by Western scholars. This era is generally bracketed by the Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE) and followed by the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). China scholars acknowledge that there is disagreement on the dates for this era. The dynastic subgroups referred to in this article may be best characterized as unofficial local dynastic units whose names appear in unofficial or altered official histories.

During the Southern and Northern dynasties internal strife divided the north and south, and two dynastic successions were formed. Many northern Chinese migrated to southern China, whereas non-Chinese immigrants (primarily Xianbei steppe nomadic tribes) migrated to northern China and to some tribal areas in the south. Among these new migrants the process of sinicization accelerated. The two regions—roughly divided at the Yangzi (Chang) River—had significant ecological distinctions, with the level northern steppes conducive to livestock and horse breeding and large-scale cavalry warfare with heavily armored, fast-moving, and well-organized horsemen. The stirrup, which gave an advantage to armed riders, was developed during the earlier Western Jin dynasty and was adopted by the horse nomads of northern China and central Asia. The mountainous south was crosscut by major rivers, and warfare included the use of ships and riverine naval tactics as well as armies of foot soldiers. Naval fleets on the Yangzi River formed the line of defense against the non-Chinese from the north. The construction of irrigation works (dams, canals, and terraces) facilitated rice production to feed a population that was increasing as a result of a high birth rate and Chinese immigration from the north. Small communities grew in size, and major urban centers arose.

Buddhism, introduced into northern and southern China during the first century CE, spread and flourished in the north in part because the aristocrats who had been the main followers of Confucianism migrated to the south, and the north was then controlled by immigrant non-Chinese who were not committed to either local shamanism or Confucianism. In addition, Buddhist religious tenets and scriptures appealed to the northern farmers and craftsmen who had been oppressed by the previous nobility, especially because of the promise of an afterlife, which is not found in Confucianism.

Daoism also had its adherents. The two sects were the Supreme Purity Sect and the Numinous Treasure Sect. (The preferred way to translate into English or romanize the name Daoism, a native Chinese religion and
philosophy, has been the subject of controversy.) Buddhism in southern China was influenced by the teachings of monks such as Hui Yüan (334–416).

Cultural Advances

During this era the Southern dynasties especially enjoyed major cultural achievements in technology and manufacturing and a proliferation in arts and crafts, literature, and the sciences. Important advances occurred in astronomy, mathematics, cartography, medicine, and porcelain production; gunpowder was invented for use in fireworks. The arts, including the composition and recitation of poetry, the composition of music and the playing of instruments, and calligraphy and painting, prospered mainly under the emperors in the south, and members of the Chinese nobility were expected to master these endeavors to gain prestige among their fellow aristocrats. Among them were the influential poet Tao Qian (365–427), the calligrapher Wang Xizhi (307–365), and landscape artists such as Gu Kaizhi (344–406). Knowledge and the application of the sciences were also held in high regard; for example, a noted mathematician and astronomer, Zu Chongzhi (429–500), was esteemed in the south at the capital of Nanjing, where he calculated the length of the solar year, predicted eclipses, and worked out the value of pi. Institutions of higher learning were established, including the Zongmingguan (Imperial Nanjing University). The Southern dynasties were in commercial contact with the Indian subcontinent by sea and with the kingdoms of Funan and Champa in Southeast Asia (the latter are situated in contemporary Cambodia and Vietnam).

Southern Dynasties

The Jin dynasty was succeeded by four Southern dynasties, each led by military commanders who seized power for brief periods but were unable to establish hereditary succession; these dynasties were the Liu Song (420–479 CE), Southern Qi (479–502 CE), Liang (502–557 CE), and Chen (557–588 CE). In spite of naval strength, building and maintaining land armies were difficult. There were shortages of conscripts; troop desertsions caused shifting political alliances and social statuses because specific households had been designated for military service to the exclusion of others. The sovereigns of the Liu Song dynasty included Wu Di (420–422), Shao Di (423–424), Wen Di (424–453), Xiao Wu Di (454–464), Qian Fe Di (465), Ming Di (465–472), Hou Fei Di (473–477), and Shun Di (477–479). The Southern Qi had seven emperors: Gao Di (479–482), Wu Di (483–493), Yu Lin Wang (494), Hai Ling Wang (494), Ming Di (494–498), Dong Hun Hou (499–501), and He Di (501–502). The subsequent Liang dynasty had six sovereigns: Wu Di (502–549), Jan Wen Di (549–551), Yu Zhang Wang (551–552), Yuan Di (552–555), Zhen Yang Hou (555), and Jing Di (555–557). The Chen dynasty had five emperors: Wu Di (557–559), Wei Di (560–566), Fei Di (566–568), Xuan Di (569–582), and Hou Zhu (583–589). Emperor Wen Sui (581–604), the first emperor of the Sui dynasty, constructed a fleet in Sichuan and was able to conquer the south and reunify China.

Northern Dynasties

The proto-Mongol Xianbei nomadic tribes dominated northern China and established the Northern dynasties, which included the Northern Wei (386–535), Eastern Wei (534–550), Western Wei (535–556), Northern Qi (550–577), and Northern Zhou (557–588). The Xianbei maintained a polity (political organization) of social stratification between them and their Chinese dependents but employed Chinese as low- and mid-level bureaucrats for political administration.

The Northern Wei had fourteen sovereigns: Dao Wu Di (386–409), Ming Yuan Di (409–423), Tai Wu Di (424–452), Nan An Wang (452), Wen Cheng Di (452–465), Xian Wen Di (466–471), Xiao Wen Di (471–499), Xuan Wu Di (500–515), Xiao Ming Di (516–528), Xiao Zhuang Wang (528–530), Chang Guang Wang (530–531), Jue Min Di (531–532), An Ding Wang (531–532), and Xiao Wu Di (532–535). The Northern Wei emperor, Xiao Wen, had mixed ancestry—a Toubi clan Xianbei father and a Chinese mother—and renamed his clan “Yuan” (Chinese for “first” or “primal”). He relocated the capital city from Pingcheng to the old Eastern Han and Western Jin dynasties’ imperial site at Luoyang (which had a population of one-half million by 510) and constructed a series of Buddhist temples.
Ultimately more than twelve thousand Buddhist temples and monasteries were built. The temples were used for worshipping and for storing scriptures, and the form of the buildings derived from Buddhist stupas (dome-shaped structures serving as Buddhist shrines) but assumed the appearance of Chinese pagodas.

In addition, Xiao Wen Di instituted a major sinicization program in 493 that required that the Xianbei elite conform to certain Chinese standards, which included wearing Chinese garments rather than Xianbei clothing at the royal court. He encouraged intermarriage among the higher-ranked clans of Xianbei and Chinese, and required the Xianbei who were under thirty years of age to learn the Chinese language. As another form of acculturation, tea, commonly drunk in south China, began to replace yogurt drinks as the beverage of choice among the northerners. Prince Donyang of the Northern Wei served as governor of Dunhuang from 523 to 538 and with the wealth of local families devised a monumental project to honor Buddhism with the modification and mural paintings in the Mogao Caves. Other Buddhist murals were painted in the Yungang, Longmen, and Maijishan grottoes.

Food shortages among troops garrisoned in the north led to several insurrections in 523 and from 526 to 527, and led to rebellions in the Northern Wei court. Xiao Jing Di assumed control of the Eastern Wei and the capital at Luoyang, while a rival took control of the west and the older capital at Chang’an in 535. After Xiao Wen Di’s death his successors gradually abolished the Xianbei-Chinese assimilation policy.

**Emperors**

The Eastern Wei’s sole emperor was Xiaojing (534–550), whereas the Western Wei dynasty had three: Wen Di (535–551), Fei Di (552–554), and Gong Di (554–556). The Northern Qi emperors were Wen Xuan Di (550–559), Fei Di (560), Xiao Zhao Di (560–561), Wu Cheng Di (561–565), Hou Zhu (565–577), You Zhu (577), and Fan Yang Wang (577). Lastly, the Northern Zhou dynasty had five sovereigns: Xiao Min Di (557), Xiao Ming Di (557–560), Wu Di (561–578), Xuan Di (579), and Jing Di (579–581).

The Eastern Wei monarch was forced to abdicate, and the Northern Qi dynasty was established under Wen Xuan Di. Emperor Gong Di of the Western Wei was deposed, and the Northern Zhou dynasty was created under Xiao Min Di. In 577 the north was reunified when the Northern Zhou conquered the Northern Qi, but Yang Jian (who became Emperor Wen Sui) overthrew the Northern Zhou in 581, and the Sui were able to conquer the south and reunify China for the brief period ending in 618, when the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) succeeded in maintaining this unity.

**Further Reading**


Southern Three and Northern Four Banks

The Southern Three and Northern Four Banks were the two leading private commercial banking groups during the 1920s and 1930s, the golden age of modern Chinese banking. Both groups adopted a Western banking-management style and helped support China’s modern industrial development until their decline at the outbreak of war with Japan in 1937.

The rise of the Southern Three and Northern Four Banks reflected the change of Chinese banking style from traditional qianzhuang (native bank) and piaohao (native draft bank) to modern corporate governance. The loose political environment after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912 created a situation prime for the development of private banking. A group of foreign-educated professionals combined the knowledge of Western management styles with the realities of the Chinese financial system to establish these seven banks, whose support contributed to China’s modern industrial development.

Southern Three

The Southern Three Banks 南三行 were the National Commercial Bank, the Zhejiang Industrial Bank, and the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank. The term Southern Three refers to the origins of the capital of these banks, which came from the southern Yangzi (Chang) River regions such as Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces.

The Zhejiang Provincial Railway Company founded the National Commercial Bank 浙江兴业银行 in May 1907 with the intent to develop industry in Hangzhou. Initially it was a joint state and private shareholding bank. After the Zhejiang railway was nationalized, however, the bank sold all of the Zhejiang railway shares to the mercantile community and individuals; therefore, it became a completely private banking company with limited liability. Ye Kuichu (1874–1949), a president of the National Commercial Bank, moved the headquarters to Shanghai in 1915. The bank became a fully functional commercial bank with the ability to grant loans for industrial development, accept savings and industrial deposits, and conduct trust business. The National Commercial Bank was ranked first in ability to attract deposits among Chinese commercial banks by Banker’s Weekly from 1918 to 1926. Its business gradually declined after the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) government took power in 1927.

The Zhejiang Industrial Bank 浙江实业银行 was founded in 1909 by the Zhejiang provincial government and local merchants. The bank was privatized after the Chinese Republican Revolution of 1911–1912. Li Ming (1887–1966), a native of Shaoxing in Zhejiang Province who graduated from Yamaguchi College of Business in Japan, favored liberal enterprise and developed this bank into an efficient operation with relatively small facilities. Li built diverse business connections with foreign companies and provided opportunities for the bank to operate in foreign exchange. Subsequently the bank was listed
as the second-largest private bank specializing in foreign exchange in the 1930s.

The Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank was founded by a group of Shanghai bankers under the leadership of Chen Guangfu (1880–1976) in June 1915. Chen Guangfu, a native of Dantu in Jiangsu Province who graduated from the Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania, adopted U.S. banking practices and emphasized efficiency and innovation. Chen believed that if a bank lacked pioneering spirit, it would not be able to compete in China’s modern society. Consequently he tended to deviate from conventional wisdom in Shanghai banking. Whereas others often sought short-term returns, he emphasized long-term returns; whereas others were often unable to deal with small accounts, he made them some of the bank’s major depositors. Chen created the one-dollar savings plan, travel agent offices, warehouse mortgages, railway transportation remittance, and foreign exchange business. Chen was the key figure in Shanghai bank growth. Compared with that of other private banks, the initial capital of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank was miniscule, earning it the nickname “the little Shanghai bank.” Nevertheless, it operated with a distinctive style by offering the one-dollar savings plan, which encouraged people to open a savings account in the bank with a one-dollar deposit. Through the accumulation of various savings resources, the bank developed into the number one private bank in China.

## Northern Four

The Northern Four Banks were the Yien Yieh Commercial Bank, the Kincheng Banking Corporation, the Continental Bank, and the China & South Sea Bank. These banks were founded mostly north of the Yangzi River, in contrast to the Southern Three Banks.

The Yien Yieh Commercial Bank was founded in March 1915 to assist the Chinese Salt Administration in tax collection. The bank was originally designated to specialize in the salt industry with official funding under government supervision. But because of a shortage of government funds, the Yien Yieh Commercial Bank was transformed into a private bank. Wu Dingchang (1884–1950), a native of Wuxing in Zhejiang Province and former superintendent of the Bank of China, was elected general manager. Because the majority of the bank shareholders were warlords, Wu’s administration was limited in selling and buying government and foreign bonds. Despite Wu’s limitations, he organized the first Chinese banking syndicate and founded the joint business office of the Northern Four Banks in 1922.

The Kincheng Banking Corporation was founded in May 1917 with a distinguished Chinese business name meaning the “golden city.” Zhou Zuomin (1884–1955), a native of Huai’an in Jiangsu Province, was founder of the bank. Initially the Kincheng bank set up a savings department to absorb floating capital from various channels and granted loans to Chinese industrial projects, such as cotton and flour mills, match manufacturers, coal mines, and chemical industries. Zhou tried to pattern the Kincheng bank on a Japanese model by joining banking capital with industrial syndicates. The bank also handled remittances from transportation, especially railways. In an effort to expand its business domain, the bank established the Pacific Insurance Company to handle shipping, automobiles, and fire insurance.

The Continental Bank was established in April 1919 with private funding by Tan Lisun (1880–1933), a native of Wuxi in Jiangsu Province who graduated from Tokyo Commercial College. The Continental Bank specialized in savings, warehouses, trusts, and real estate business. The bank set up savings services stations in universities, hospitals, and commercial areas. It built many warehouses and railways and engaged in foreign trade and trust businesses by opening the Continental Trade Company. The Continental Bank financed China’s northwest wool industry and northeast oil manufactures. Although initially its involvement in real estate had generated tremendous profits, the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan in 1937 destroyed the bank’s real estate development plans and created a significant amount of bad loans. This experience taught all private banks a huge lesson in the risks of engaging in real estate development.

The China & South Sea Bank was an overseas bank founded in 1921 by Huang Yizhu (1868–1945), a wealthy worldwide importer and exporter of sugar, and Hu Bijiang (1881–1938), a former branch manager of the Bank of Communications. The bank specialized in overseas Chinese business and foreign currency exchange
and remittances. Because the bank was an overseas Chinese investment bank, the Chinese Beiyang government granted the bank special rights to issue banknotes abroad. In 1922 the China & South Sea Bank joined other three northern banks to form the Joint Four Bank Business Office. The other three banks transferred interbanking funds to support the China & South Sea Bank in issuing banknotes and instituted the Four Banks Reserve Fund, with 60 percent cash reserve and 40 percent reserve in securities or bonds. Although the Four Banks Reserve Fund guaranteed all notes issued, each bank had its own logo on the notes, acknowledging its own responsibility. The joint efforts to issue banknotes were unique in the banking history of China.

In 1923 the Four Northern Banks organized the Joint Savings Society of the Four Banks in Shanghai to absorb floating capital in the market. This society shared profits with its customers by distributing annual dividends to them. To promote its image, the society built the twenty-four-story Shanghai Park Hotel in 1934. The hotel was the first skyscraper in Asia and became a landmark in Shanghai in the following half century.

Compared with the Southern Three Banks, the Northern Four Banks had stronger capital components, with financial resources derived from former Qing dynasty (1644–1912) officials, warlords, and overseas Chinese. Similar to the Southern Three Banks, the Northern Four Banks also had an excellent team of managers. These bankers were all friends who met weekly to discuss political and economic issues. They organized the Chinese Bankers Association and published Banking Weekly magazine.

The rise of the Southern Three and Northern Four Banks reflected the change of Chinese banking style from traditional qianzhuang (native bank) and piaohao (native draft bank) to modern corporate governance. The collapse of the Qing dynasty created a loose political environment for private banking development. A group of foreign-educated professionals applied its Western management knowledge to the system of the Chinese banking already in operation to create these seven banks. These private banks supported China’s modern industrial development.

The golden age of the Southern Three and Northern Four Banks was short-lived—from 1907 to 1937. China’s modern banking development was interrupted by the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan. With the government wartime banking and financial control, which continued during the civil war period, little room was left for private banks’ development.

The Southern Three and Northern Four Banks became part of history after the political and financial system changes that came with establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. In 1951 all private banks were progressively reorganized into a few groups with joint state-private ownership, a principal form of state capitalism adopted during the socialist transformation. The Northern Four Banks became a joint state-private ownership banking group on 1 September 1951. The Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, however, moved its capital to its Hong Kong branch, then to Taiwan. The other two southern banks also joined the state-private ownership enterprises in China. At the end of 1952 all private banks in China were nationalized.

Further Reading
Southern Weekend
Nánfāngh Zhouruí 南方周末

Southern Weekend’s editorial liberalism and the free-market orientation of its business reporting often contrast with the positions of its parent, Southern Daily, the official publication of the Communist party in Guangzhou. Southern Weekend is internationally known for its investigative reporting on topics such as health, environment, and corruption.

Appearing first in 1984 as a weekly culture supplement to Southern Daily, the Communist Party’s official daily paper in Guangdong Province, Southern Weekend developed into a free-wheeling, commercially-oriented subsidiary with a nationwide circulation and an international reputation as a pacesetter in investigative reporting.

Also called Southern Weekly—the English translation added to the nameplate after a redesign in 2006—this broadsheet paper is one of more than a dozen publications of the Southern Daily Press Group that has a history of ups and downs that exemplify both the opportunities and pitfalls of operating under the umbrella of an official party organ. While the parent Southern Daily retained the role of authoritative propaganda mouthpiece, Southern Weekend emphasized a market-driven business philosophy along with a professional approach to journalism that allowed for aggressive reporting on controversial subjects.

With savvy editorial leadership sustained by networks of influence in the relatively open atmosphere of Guangdong and further buoyed by outstanding commercial returns, Southern Weekly tended to avoid direct criticism of officials in its home base of Guangzhou by focusing its toughest reporting elsewhere. Through the 1990s, it gained acclaim for investigations of public health problems such as AIDS and SARS, stories about environmental degradation, and exposés of corruption and police brutality. Foreign media accounts described the paper as “outspoken,” “semi-independent,” and China’s “most probing major newspaper.”

After the late 1990s, increased government interference and dismissal of several cohorts of senior editors—with several imprisoned on flimsy corruption charges themselves—put a damper on critical reports and commentaries, even as sports, business, entertainment, and lifestyle coverage remained vigorous and the paper’s editorial philosophy remained adamantly liberal and free-market oriented.

Southern Weekend continued to survive in China’s competitive media mix and to draw attention for its reporting contributions to major stories, including the 2007 discovery of forced labor at Shanxi Province brick kilns and revelations about shoddy construction of schools that collapsed during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Through blogs and leaks to foreign media, its editors and reporters periodically have divulged political pressures to suppress stories, including information about tainted milk and suspicions about corruption in a government-backed charity. The paper’s popular website also sometimes provides previews of stories that fail to make it into print.

As of 2005, Southern Weekend claimed a national
circulation of 1.3 million, although periodical circulation figures in China are notoriously unreliable. In 2008, during a period of declining ad revenues after a two-decade boom, it still was a desirable venue for national and multinational advertisers, with a listed rate of RMB500,000 (US$73,000) for a quarter-page color ad. The paper drew criticism in late 2008 for running two pages of content about the producer of Maotai, China’s most famous brand of grain alcohol, that appeared to be a corporate “advertorial,” or advertisement in news format.

More so than perhaps any other periodical, Southern Weekend embodies and reflects the real and active trends of modernism and capitalism in Chinese society today.

Judy POLUMBAUM

Further Reading


A honeyed mouth hides a daggered heart.

口蜜腹剑

Kǒu mì fù jiàn
Space Program

China's space program had its start in 1956 with the development of ballistic missile technology. In recent years, China has made important progress across a broad range of space technologies—including launchers, satellites, and human space flight—and has taken a leading role in regional space cooperation. In 2003, China launched its first astronaut into space on the Shenzhou-5. The human space flight program ultimately plans to create a permanent manned space station.

China is widely regarded as a rising space power. While China's progress in space technology was slow from its inception until 2001, China has since made marked progress in nearly all areas of space flight technology, including launchers, satellites, and human space flight. China's space program is designed to assist the country in achieving its military, economic, and political goals. Militarily, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is transforming itself into a military reliant on using information to win wars in which space may play a major role in developing an advanced C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) system as well as developing antisatellite (ASAT) technologies to deny the use of space to potential adversaries. Economically, China's support for its space program lies in its potential as a driver for economic and technological advancement.

Politically, China's expanding international cooperation on space activities establishes it as a leader in the field with growing influence to shape events. In addition, by participating in a robust space program with high-profile activities, such as human space flight, the Chinese Communist Party demonstrates to the Chinese people that under its leadership China can achieve a more respected world position.

History

China's space program was established on October 8, 1956 with a focus on the developing of ballistic missiles to support China's nuclear weapons program. The first China-built ballistic missile was launched on November 5, 1960 and by 1966 China's first operational ballistic missile, the Dongfang-2 (DF-2), was entered into service. China's first satellite, the Dongfang Hong-1 (DFH-1), was launched on April 24, 1970 and broadcast the song, The East is Red, for 6 days. Shortly thereafter, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) approved a human space flight program, which was given the name Shuguang (or “Dawn”) and also codenamed the 714 Project. The program's goal was to launch a human into space by 1973. The project suffered setbacks due to lack of funding and the political upheaval caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and was cancelled in 1975 due to more pressing economic concerns. On the other hand, China successfully launched its first recoverable satellite in the same year, a satellite model that remains in use today performing photo-reconnaissance missions.
China’s space program from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s suffered from a low level of activity with no more than four launches per year. Most launches were of the Shijian (SJ) space experimental satellite or the recoverable satellite. In 1988, China launched its first communications satellite. In 1992 the Chinese government approved a human space-flight program, and research and development continued throughout the 1990s on the capsule and the launcher, with one unmanned test flight occurring in 1999.

Also in the 1990s China established itself as a low-cost provider of launch services and though the total number of annual launches per year did not increase, the number of satellites launched were increasingly made up of foreign satellites. At one point China was approaching a 9 percent share of the global launch service market. Its success as an international launch provider was put to an end in 1996, though, after the failed launches of a Long March-2E (LM-2E) in 1995 and a LM-3 and LM-3B in 1996. Chinese rockets were deemed to be too unreliable by the international launch insurance market to insure. In addition, satellites containing U.S. components were forbidden to be launched on Chinese rockets after it was determined that a U.S. company had illegally provided the Chinese space industry with export controlled information that was used to correct the launch malfunctions. This ruling effectively shut down China’s commercial space launch efforts.

China’s progress in space technology accelerated in the early twenty-first century with increased funding and a higher profile. During this time, China launched a variety of new satellites, improved its launcher reliability to international standards, initiated a lunar exploration program, and conducted three human space flight missions. During the period from 2001–2005, for example, China launched more satellites than in the previous 31 years combined. China at this time also began to receive international recognition as a leading space power, sparking speculation that a new international space race could result.

Elements of China’s Space Program

China’s space program can be broken down into four main elements: launchers, without which no space program would be possible; satellites, in several varieties; human space flight, centered around the seven (to date) Shenzhou missions, the last three of which were manned; and the lunar program, which hopes to land an unmanned rover on the moon in the near future for exploration purposes.

Launchers

The Long March series of launchers, named for the Chinese Communists’ 9,600 kilometer march across China from 1934–1935, is China’s main launch vehicle. China has thirteen versions of the Long March, each designed to launch different payloads into different orbits, including Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Sun Synchronous Orbit (SSO), and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) (See Table 1). The LM-2F is dedicated for human space flight missions and includes an escape tower to separate the space capsule from the rocket in event of mishap. The Long March booster has reached a reliability of 94 percent success rate based on 115 launches at the end of 2008, a figure on a par with international standards. The success rates of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rocket</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
<th>Total Launches</th>
<th>Failed Launches</th>
<th>Success Rate (percent)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LM-1</td>
<td>LEO</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LEO</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LEO/GEO</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>LM-2F**</td>
<td>LEO/GEO</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>115</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>94</td>
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*Marketed to international customers
**Dedicated for Shenzhou missions

NOTE: LEO: Low Earth Orbit; GEO: Geosynchronous Earth Orbit; SSO: Sun Synchronous Orbit
Long March family vary widely depending on launcher, however. The LM-2C continues to be a solid work horse with no failures and thirty launches by mainly launching China’s recoverable satellites. The LM-3, on the other hand, has just a 79 percent success rate.

China is developing a new family of launch vehicles that offer increased reliability and adaptability. These new launchers will, in part, support China’s human space flight and lunar exploration programs by launching a space station into Earth orbit and satellites to the moon. The new generation of rockets will be divided into light, medium, and heavy-lift versions and will be able to send a 1.5- to 25-ton payload into low-Earth orbit (LEO) and a 1.5- to 14-ton payload into geosynchronous orbit (GEO). The first launch of the new rocket is scheduled to occur by 2013.

**SATELLITES**

China has made steady progress in satellite development since 2001. China now has four different types of remote sensing satellites—meteorological, ocean, ground, and radar—in orbit on a continuous basis. These systems are able to provide different types of information to monitor weather and disasters, as well as providing information for national security applications. In addition, in 2000 China also established its first satellite navigation and positioning system, Beidou.

**Recoverable Satellites**

The recoverable satellites are China’s most frequently launched satellites. These satellites are used for reconnaissance missions and remain in orbit for no more than 30 days. At the end of their mission, the satellites return to earth via a ground landing with the aid of a parachute, at which point the imagery is removed for analysis. Recoverable satellite technologies, such as heat shielding, were the basis for China’s human space flight capsule.

**Yaogan**

China launched a total of five Yaogan remote sensing satellites by the end of 2008. Their exact nature is unknown and the China government has only stated that they are intended for scientific experiments, land survey, crop yield assessment, and disaster monitoring. There is speculation that this series of satellites is composed of optical imagery and synthetic aperture radar satellites, however.

**Fengyun**

Fengyun class meteorological satellites provide data such as cloud cover and precipitation to China’s National Weather Bureau. By 2015, China plans to build a stable observation satellite system and achieve directable three-dimensional observation of the Earth’s land masses, oceans, and atmosphere. The first Fengyun satellite, the FY-1A, was launched on 7 September 1988 and was equipped with four visible channels, three near infrared channels, one short wave infrared channel, and two long wave infrared channels. Subsequent versions of the satellite have been improved. The FY-2C was launched on 19 October 2004 and was China’s first non-experimental meteorological satellite. It was officially put into operation on 1 June 2005.

**Ziyuan**

The first Ziyuan satellite was launched on 14 October 1999 and is a joint project with Brazil, in which China has a 70 percent stake. It was equipped with sensors to conduct photo-reconnaissance of the earth, including a three-meter optical imagery resolution, and 80-meter and 160-meter resolution infrared sensors. It also has two wide band imagers with a resolution of 256 meters. By March 2002, Ziyuan satellites had already imaged China more than 23,000 times and covered 96 percent of Chinese territory. In 2004, a network of three Ziyuan satellites was established to provide timely coverage of the Earth. China has also established a database of satellite imagery with an archive of 800,000 images using the Ziyuan satellites.

**Haiyang**

Haiyang ocean observation satellites conduct environmental observation of the oceans by collecting data on the characteristics of seawater, including chlorophyll density, sea surface temperature, suspended sand content, and maritime contamination. The first Haiyang was launched on 15 May 2002 while the second was launched in April 2007. They use visible light and infrared spectral coverage to collect data on water and are equipped with remote sensors that can transfer digital images back to earth.

**Beidou**

The Beidou satellite system is a regional navigation and positioning system. The first two Beidou satellites were launched on 31 October and 21 December 2000.
After the launch of these two satellites, China was said to have established its own satellite navigation and positioning system to be used primarily for road, rail, and ocean traffic. The third Beidou satellite was launched on 25 May 2003. Beidou is based on a system called radio determination satellite service (RDSS) involving at least two satellites in geostationary orbit, at least one ground station, and customer receiver/transmitters. This system can achieve accuracies up to 20 meters with the use of multiple ground stations. The Beidou system can also provide communication between user terminals and ground stations. It will eventually be replaced by a system similar to the U.S. global positioning system (GPS) that will be free of charge.

**Communication Satellites**

Chinese communication satellites are based on the satellite bus of the Dongfanghong-3 (DFH-3) and DFH-4, but when launched are given the designation of Chinasat or Sinosat. Chinese communication satellites are used to broadcast television programming to the entire nation and to bring telephone service to the rural areas of China. By the end of 2005, the Chinese government reported that 98 percent of administrative villages now have
phone service. China for the first time exported satellites by building and launching communication satellites for Nigeria (Nigcomsat-1) and Venezuela (Venesat-1) in 2007 and 2008, respectively.

**Double Star**
The Double Star 區星 satellite project is the result of an agreement signed on 9 July 2001 between the China National Space Agency and the European Space Agency (ESA) to research the effects of the sun on the Earth’s environment. China’s two satellites have joined four ESA satellites of the Cluster project to form a monitoring network. The first launch occurred on 30 December 2003 and the second satellite was launched on 25 July 2004.

**Human Space Flight**
China’s human space flight program is its space industry’s most difficult and largest mission. China has conducted seven launches, the last three of which were manned. On 15 October 2003, China launched its first astronaut into space on the Shenzhou-5. This mission lasted less than 24 hours but proved that China was technologically capable of sending a human into orbit and returning him to Earth safely. China’s second manned space flight occurred on 12 October 2005 and lasted five days with a crew of two. China’s third manned mission was launched on September 25, 2008 and lasted three days. The mission of Shenzhou-7 was to conduct an extravehicular activity. China’s human space flight program is planned to eventually result in a permanent manned space station.

**Lunar Program**
China’s lunar exploration program, known as Chang’e, was officially announced in January 2003. The program is composed of three stages. The first stage began in 2007 and involved sending a satellite to take three-dimensional images of the moon and ended on March 1, 2009 when the satellite was purposefully crashed onto the lunar service for scientific reasons. The second phase will begin before the end of 2011 and will involve landing an unmanned space vehicle on the moon that will carry a lunar-rover, a seismograph for detection of “moon-quakes,” and a telescope. The final stage is to be completed before 2020 and will involve sending an unmanned space vehicle to the moon to take samples of the lunar soil that will then be sent back to the earth via a return vehicle.

**Launch Centers**
China has three launch centers to serve different types of orbits. China has also announced that it will build a fourth launch center on the island province of Hainan, off China’s south coast.

**Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center**
The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, located in Gansu Province in northwestern China, was founded in 1958 and is China’s first and most widely used launch center. The launch center is used to launch satellites into low and
medium earth orbits. Most notably, Jiuquan is used for China’s human space flight missions.

**TAIYUAN SATELLITE LAUNCH CENTER**

The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Shanxi Province, was founded in 1966. The launch center is used to launch satellites into sun synchronous orbits.

**XICHANG SATELLITE LAUNCH CENTER**

The Xichang Satellite Launch Center, located in Sichuan Province, began operation in 1984 and is used to launch satellites into geostationary orbits.

**WENCHANG SATELLITE LAUNCH CENTER**

The Wenchang Satellite Launch Center, located in Hainan Province, was approved in 2008. It is scheduled to be completed in 2012 with the first launch to be conducted in 2013. Due to its closer proximity to the equator, rockets will require less energy to reach orbit. Consequently, Wenchang will be used to launch heavier payloads, such as a space station and lunar lander, into orbit.

**Kevin POLLPETER**

**Further reading**


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*Steer one’s boat where the winds lead.*

看风使舵

Kàn fēng shǐ duò
Special Economic Zones
Jīngjì tèqū 经济特区

During the 1980s, China established the first of its Special Economic Zones with the intention of attracting and accommodating foreign businesses and investments to China. Their development and expansion—and more liberal systems and regulations—played an important part in China’s global economic transition.

China’s late-twentieth-century process of economic transition began with the establishment of what are known as special economic zones (SEZs). SEZs are geographically insulated areas opened economically to the outside world. They are regulated by the government, with preferential policies in their favor, so that special and flexible economic policies and measures are adopted primarily to promote foreign investment, technology transfer, and exports. In 1979 China designated the first four SEZs—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen—as part of its domestic economic reform. By limiting its experiment to those four SEZs, China sought to minimize the unnecessary economic, social, and political costs often associated with a drastic policy switch and to gain the necessary experience in carrying out the transition.

Serving both as windows to the outside world and as laboratories to test and refine various reform policies, the SEZs played a pivotal role in China’s overall economic transition during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Numerous measures aimed at reforming the existing economic system and reaching a higher degree of economic openness were developed in and spread from the SEZs. In many regards the effect of the SEZs has far exceeded their limited geographical boundaries. It is safe to say that without the successful operation of the SEZs, China’s reforms would not have gone as far, and the transitional process would not have been as smooth.

China’s Approach to SEZs

At the outset of economic reform and an open door policy, the Chinese central government realized that development could not happen in all places at once (that would have been too costly), and that certain policies needed to be tested within limited areas before being implemented nationwide. The government planned to take advantage of the global trend of industrial relocation to attract foreign investment to its capital-starved economy. Foreign investment would allow China to make full use of its large reserve of inexpensive surplus labor to produce labor-intensive goods for export and, ultimately, to create foreign-exchange earnings. The government also recognized the importance of advanced foreign technology for stimulating growth and for making possible technology transfer. It was hoped that inland enterprises could later learn from the experience of the SEZs.

Supported by growing local enthusiasm for such policies, particularly from Guangdong Province, the SEZs functioned as a laboratory where various methods aimed
at overcoming the drawbacks associated with a central-planning system could be developed. Market mechanisms were foreign to the Chinese reformers, and economic efficiency was hard to achieve. Fourteen more cities were designated as coastal open cities in 1984. Here, the entire city adopted policies similar to those implemented in the SEZs, such as promoting foreign investment. In 1985 the Yangzi (Chang) River, Pearl River, and southern Fujian deltas were declared open economic zones. In April 1988 a fifth SEZ was established in Hainan, after Hainan was newly designated as a province, so that the entire province functioned as a zone. In the same year, a coastal development strategy, officially called the weixiang xing fajian zhanlue (Outward-Oriented Development strategy), was launched in the coastal areas. This policy had a much larger scale and wider range, embracing twelve provinces and cities under the direct control of the central government. In April 1990 the Pudong New Area was formally established—with policies favorable for inducing rapid construction, large investments, and other economic development—for building a center of finance, commerce, and high technology. In the eighth five-year plan (1991–1995), the focus was placed more on the development of particular industries than of regions. Through the special economic zones, China's reform spread from region to region by expanding the geographic areas where preferential reform policies could apply.

Economic Incentives and Political Considerations

In the Chinese SEZs, flexible and innovative packages were assembled that offered incentives for foreign investors. These included preferential tax rates; concessions; and exemptions from certain taxes, administrative fees, and the need for high-level or mid-level approval. Most exported and imported items were exempted from custom duties and the industrial and commercial consolidated tax. The SEZs also introduced reform measures dealing with labor-related issues. Employment contracts with specified term limits and dismissal of unqualified employees were permitted for the first time.

There were certain political considerations in establishing the early SEZs. The zones were not selected on the basis of whether there was a strong industrial base, an adequate urban infrastructure, or a technologically innovative capacity. The SEZs had to be easily separated from the vast inland areas because drastically different policies were to be tested in the zones, and no one could be certain that the policies would succeed. In the early stages, fences were built around them, and checkpoints were stationed to inspect traffic. Administrative procedures were also used to control population inflow to the zones. The SEZs were not built into major industrial centers at first to avoid significant losses if the experiment should fail. Moreover, the central government intended to use these zones as intermediary or buffer zones for the future reunification of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan with the mainland, and so they were chosen partially for their proximity to those places. Finally, the overseas Chinese community was targeted as a potential source for productive capital. The southeast coast in Guangdong and Fujian, where the SEZs were set up, were the places of origin of many overseas Chinese.

As an integral and critical component of China's gradualist approach toward economic reform and opening up, the SEZs have developed into self-contained mini-economies along the lines of “one country, two systems.” In these SEZs, nonsocialist measures could be adopted. The SEZs have moved China much further down the path to economic transition than would have been possible with export-processing zones because these zones may not reform the traditional socialist system but mainly processes products for export. The measures that proved to be effective and successful in the SEZs have been extended, whenever feasible, to the rest of the country. This, in turn, has helped the entire economy gradually to become more open and efficient. As the country moves further into the twenty-first century, the policy differences between the original SEZs and the rest of China are being minimized.

Assessment

Judged by most social and economic indicators, the performance of the SEZs has, for the most part, been extraordinary. Despite the unfavorable initial conditions—such as a lack of industrial, infrastructure, and technological
support—the pace of development of the zones has not only exceeded the national average but also narrowed the gap with some major industrial centers, such as Shanghai, that have long been considered to be the backbone of growth and trade in the Chinese economy. This happened within a short time.

Xiaobo HU

Further Reading


One never comes to pray in the Temple of Three Treasures if he is not in trouble.

无事不登三宝殿

Wú shì bù dēng sān bǎo diàn
Chinese sports have been influenced by the more harmonious physical disciplines of Chinese tradition, as well as the need for military preparedness, but in the modern post-opening era Chinese athletics are starting to more closely resemble western sports in their practice.

Chinese physical culture has always oscillated between two poles: at one extreme, violent competition; at the other, the peaceful quest for physical and spiritual harmony. Boxers, wrestlers, and other athletes embody the first extreme; devotees of tai chi (taijiquan), a kind of graceful gymnastic exercise, represent the second. Chinese sports, which fall by definition into the first category, have often been modified by influences from the second. For millennia, Chinese culture has had gentle sports as well as rough ones. Good form has often been prized above competitive success.

Traditional China

In ancient China, as in European antiquity, most sports were rough. Extant references to sports frequently refer to them in conjunction with military preparation. During the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), for instance, soldiers ran, jumped, threw objects of various sorts, wrestled, and practiced their skills as archers, swordsmen, and charioteers. They seem also to have demonstrated their prowess as weight lifters. Kangding (tripod lifting) was popular as early as the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).

Wushu and Archery

By the time of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), foot soldiers and mounted knights had replaced charioteers as the mainstay of the army, and the practice of *wushu* (military skills, also translated as martial arts) was highly developed. Although the unarmed techniques of *wushu* were especially prized, archery too had numerous devotees, and the sport was immensely popular during the Song dynasty (960–1279). An eleventh-century district survey found 588 archery societies enrolling 31,411 members, nearly 15 percent of the local population. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), China’s Manchu rulers preferred that their subjects not practice the martial arts. *Wushu* nonetheless experienced a surge in popularity during the nationalistic reaction to Chinese defeat in the First Opium War in 1842.

Ball Games

Ball games, played with carefully sewn stuffed skins, with animal bladders, or with found objects as simple as gourds, chunks of wood, or rounded stones, are universal. Ball games of all sorts were quite popular among the Chinese. When they began is unknown, but stone balls have been dated to the sixth millennium BCE. *Cuju*, which resembled modern soccer football, is mentioned in the *Shiji*, one of the oldest extant Chinese texts. The famed Han dynasty poet Li Yu (50–130 CE) also wrote of football.
A silk fan painting from the Song dynasty shows a gathering of ballplayers and spectators. The different and colorful costumes, which were strictly regulated by occupation during the Song dynasty, shows a total disregard for social status in the sporting world. Attributed to Su Hanchen, twelfth century.

Games similar to modern badminton and shuttlecock were played in the first century CE.

**Racket Games**

Through most of China’s recorded history, racket games were popular among women. A Ming-dynasty (1368–1644) scroll painting, “Grove of Violets,” depicts elegantly attired ladies playing *chuiwan*, a game combining elements of modern billiards and golf. According to the *Wanjing* (1282), the players took turns striking a wooden ball and sending it into holes marked with colored flags. The ethos of the game stressed fairness and harmony among the players.

**The Mongols**

Harmony seems not to have been foremost among the values of China’s Mongol rulers. The martial arts flourished, and mounted archers were the backbone of the army. If the Venetian traveler Marco Polo (1254–1324) can be believed, the Mongol rulers produced a royal heroine comparable to the Greek girl Atalanta, who raced against and defeated a number of suitors. Princess Aiyaruk was said to have owned more than ten thousand horses, winning one hundred at a time as she outwrestled a long line of doomed suitors.

Mongol emperors like Khubilai Khan (1215–1294) were passionate about the hunt, but the golden age for that sport seems to have been during the Manchu Qing dynasty. Emperor Kangxi (1654–1722, ruled from 1662) was said to have hunted with a retinue of seventy thousand horsemen and three thousand archers, which suggests that his prey had very little chance of survival.

**Aristocratic Disdain and Archery**

Throughout Chinese history, aristocrats obsessed with the quest for harmony tended to disdain sports, a tendency strengthened by the arrival of Buddhism during the Han dynasty. In the moralistic eyes of Confucian sages, playing ball games was little better than drinking, gambling, and womanizing. Yet even Confucian scholars succumbed to the seduction of archery and granted the sport a half-hearted endorsement. “There is no contention among gentlemen,” wrote Confucius (551–479 BCE). “The nearest to it is perhaps archery.” It was not, however, the warrior’s grimly competitive archery. “Even the way
they [the archers] contend is gentlemanly” (Riordan/Jones 1999: 28).

Archery was also a sport for women. It was practiced by a number of court ladies, including the Dowager Empress Chonga. For men and women who found archery too bellicose a pastime, there was touhou, which required the player to toss an arrow into a vase. In time, the game was refined to the point where nine officials were required for a two-person match.

**Kite Flying and Dragon Boat Racing**

Adults as well as children flew kites, some of which were fanciful works of art in paper and wood. This form of amusement was known as early as the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) but became a national obsession during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). In its competitive version, contestants sought to maneuver their kites so that they cut the strings of their opponents’ kites. A much older sport, dragon boat racing, elicited the same aesthetic impulse. This sport evolved from impromptu races among boats decorated with images of dragons that protected the crews from storms. Eventually, races were held to commemorate the drowned. The most famous of these races was in memory of the poet Qu Yuan, who perished in 278 BCE. By the Tang dynasty, there were fixed dates and strict rules for the races, which had become major events. Some of the boats were “manned” by female crews. The Dragon Boat Festival (Duanwujie) is today one of China’s most important traditional Chinese festivals, falling on the fifth day of the fifth month in the lunar calendar.

**Polo**

Polo, which probably had its origins on the plains of Central Asia, reached China in 627 CE. It became a passion among those wealthy enough to own horses. All sixteen emperors of the Tang Dynasty were polo players. One of them, Xizong (reigned 874–888), remarked that he would take top honors if civil-service examinations were based on polo. The army used the attractions of the game as a way to improve its men’s equestrian skills. This may not have been a good idea. When the Mongols invaded, several Chinese generals were said to have been more competent at polo than at warfare. If numerous terracotta figures can be trusted as evidence, polo was also played by aristocratic Chinese women. The sport lost favor during the Song dynasty.

**Introduction of Western Sports**

Western sports came to China toward the end of the Qing dynasty. Europeans resident in China established the Canton Regatta Club in 1837. The first modern track meet was held at St. John’s University, a Christian school, in 1890. Six years later, American missionaries introduced basketball at the Tianjin YMCA. YMCA workers were responsible for the first national sports festival, held in Nanjing in 1910, and for the quadrennial Far Eastern Games (1913–1934), at which Chinese athletes competed against those from Japan and the Philippines. Other Americans

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Liu Changchun, China’s first Olympic athlete, competed as a sprinter in the 1932 Olympics in Los Angeles.
founded and directed educational institutions such as the Chinese Physical Training School (Shanghai, 1914).

As the Confucian scholar’s disdain for the merely physical waned, Western sports increasingly influenced the behavior of Chinese men, especially those of the urban middle and upper classes. In time, modern sports revolutionized the lives of middle-class and upper-class women. In the course of the twentieth century, images of the ideal female gradually changed from the delicately immobile court lady barely able to hobble on her deformed feet to the robustly active young girl racing up and down a basketball court. Female athletes became “icons of desirable sexuality” (Hong 1997: 275). From a feminist perspective, modern sports have been emancipatory.

From 1912 to 1949, modern sports were mainly an urban phenomenon. Although national sports festivals were an increasingly salient aspect of Chinese culture, the nation’s athletic elite did poorly in international competition. China’s National Olympic Committee was not officially recognized until 1931. At the 1932 Olympic Games, where Japanese swimmers astonished the world by winning eleven of the sixteen medals in the men’s competition, sprinter Liu Changchun was the lone Chinese representative. He was eliminated in the heats.

The low level of elite sports (and the generally unhappy state of Chinese physical education) from the 1920s to the 1950s can be explained by the trauma of civil war and foreign invasion. Communist victory in the Civil War over the Nationalists in 1949 heralded the transformation of Chinese sports as well as the rest of Chinese culture. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) had written in 1917 that physical education is “more important than intellectual and moral education” (Hong 1997: 131), but resources were scarce in 1949, and progress was slow. In 1951, the government inaugurated an inexpensive way to enhance the nation’s fitness. China’s masses began to perform early-morning out-of-doors gymnastic exercises in accordance with commands broadcast by state radio. The sequence of national sports festivals was resumed in 1959.

In this first decade of Communist rule, the emphasis was on national defense. The government’s physical culture program included not only tai chi and conventional sports like track and field but also paramilitary training with bayonets, hand grenades, and other weapons.

Although the regime’s avowed aim was to promote fitness and sports for the masses, the state-run All-China Athletic Federation recognized that athletes who broke world records and won international championships contributed to their country’s prestige. Limited government support for elite sports bore early fruit in the 1950s. Chen Jingkai set a world’s record in bantamweight weight lifting; Zeng Fengrong and Rong Guotuan won world championships in high jumping and table tennis. Quarrels with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) over the

A poster advertising baseball, with a racist image of a Chinese man missing a catch. China has had to overcome a stereotypical reputation for having a physically unfit populace.
status of Taiwan culminated in 1958 with Chinese resignation from the committee. At the same time and for the same reason, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) withdrew from the international federations for soccer and other sports. The PRC did not make its debut at the Olympic Games until 1984.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) continued to send teams to the Olympics. In the 1960 games, held in Rome, Yang Chuan-kwang barely lost the decathlon to his close friend, the American Rafer Johnson.

Unfortunately for those who dreamed of international supremacy, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) drastically altered the regime’s approach to sports. Mao’s motto was “Friendship first, competition second.” Sports contacts were, however, limited to friendly nations like the People’s Republic of Korea. Athletes and coaches who had had international experience were suspect: Were they truly committed to Maoism? Some of them, like Zhuang Zedong, the world champion in table tennis (1961–1966), were sent to prison. Others, like table tennis stars Rong Guotuan and Fu Jifang, committed suicide. At the elite level, Chinese sports were devastated.

During the PRC’s ten years of turmoil, athletes representing Taiwan continued to compete internationally. One of the island’s most successful sprinters, Chi Cheng, was third in the 80-meter hurdles at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City. Two years later, competing in the United States, she set world records in the 100-yard and 200-yard sprints (10.0 and 22.7 seconds) and in the 100-meter hurdles (13.2 seconds).

The policy of the PRC veered again in the 1980s. The new motto was “Break out of Asia and advance on the world.” To achieve this goal, the government invested heavily in sports infrastructure. Although physical education was required in all schools, gifted athletes received special attention. Borrowing from the model developed by the Soviet Union, the government established a network of special schools to train an athletic elite. By 1990 there were 150 such schools (while the Soviet Union had a mere 46). Large sums went to build sports facilities. Research into sports physiology and sports psychology was strongly supported at Beijing University. To maximize performance in Olympic sports, the government decided in 1997 to eliminate all traditional Chinese sports (except wushu) from the annual national sports festival.

Current Emphasis on International Sports

The system worked. The achievements of Chinese athletes have been spectacular. Thanks in part to substantial government investment in sports infrastructure and relatively generous subsidies to athletes, the Chinese began to win international championships. At the 1982 Asian Games in New Delhi, Chinese athletes won sixty-one events and ended thirty-one years of Japanese domination. Two years later, Chinese Olympians returned from Los Angeles with fifteen gold, eight silver, and nine bronze medals.

To ensure Olympic success at Seoul in 1988, the PRC spent over a quarter of a billion dollars, more than fifty million dollars for each gold medal earned. Generous rewards for individual athletes were a part of the regime’s
program; diver Fu Mingxia’s victory brought her a bonus that was three hundred times a teacher’s annual salary.

In the 1990s, female runners like Wang Junxia set new world records by astonishing margins. Wang Junxia’s time over 3,000 meters was 8:06.11 minutes, an unprecedented improvement of 3.28 percent over the old record. (No previous track record had ever been lowered by more than 2.51 percent.) At the 1994 world swimming championships, Chinese women won twelve of a possible sixteen gold medals. In response to the suspicion that such performances were drug enhanced, Chinese coaches referred to hard training and the ability of peasant women to “eat bitterness.” It was true that Chinese athletes trained harder than their Western counterparts, but it was also true that Chinese men had failed to achieve such stellar performances and that a large number of female athletes tested positive for anabolic steroids. Between 1972 and 1994, ten of the world’s elite swimmers had failed drug tests; in 1994 alone, eleven Chinese swimmers failed.

In 1993, the desire to “break out of Asia and advance on the world” motivated the government to modify its ban on openly professional sports and launch a twenty-four-team soccer league (followed by leagues for basketball and volleyball). In keeping with the regime’s new openness to capitalist development, soccer teams pay their players ten times the salary of the average Chinese worker. Transfer payments are allowed and foreign players are lured with bonuses. The money comes not only from ticket sales but also from corporate sponsors such as Hyundai, Samsung, Panasonic, and Pepsi-Cola. The sports of the People’s Republic seem more and more like the sports of Europe and North America, a tendency that was accelerated in 2008, when Beijing hosted the summer Olympic Games.

The 2008 Olympics were an athletic success for China, and were also an economic success and a political success. China had, for the first time, more Olympic champions than any other nation. They also experienced a huge boom in tourism and advertising revenue, and short of several small incidents, the Olympics were also a political success, avoiding any major pitfalls. The chief accomplishment of the Beijing Olympics to history will probably be as a symbol of China’s rise as an athletic superpower and the increasing presence of sports in China as a westernized, commercial activity.

Allen GUTTMANN

Further Reading

Basketball has exploded in popularity in recent years amongst Chinese youth. PHOTO BY BERKSHIRE PUBLISHING.
Sports Sponsorship

Corporate sponsorship is an essential aspect of modern sports. At the 2008 Beijing Olympics companies spent millions of dollars to get their names before a worldwide audience. Foreign companies found that they had to weigh the advantages of the publicity that sponsorship brings against potential backlash from activists and politicians who used the Olympic spotlight as a chance to criticize the Chinese government.

China has hosted several big sporting events recently, including the Nanshan Open (a snowboarding event), the Shanghai Showdown (China’s first Gravity Games, an extreme-sports competition), and the 720 China Surf Open. The X Games Asia, which have been hosted by South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia, were hosted for the first time by China (in Shanghai) in May 2007.

2008, though, marked the first time that China hosted the world’s most prestigious sporting event: the Olympics. Along with the sports competition came the competition (and controversy) of sports sponsorship.

The big sporting events leading up to the Olympics provided China with practice for the main event. Kia Motors, the South Korean automaker, was just one sponsor of the 2007 X Games Asia, which were also sponsored by ESPN, ESPN STAR Sports, and the Chinese Extreme Sports Association. Kia Motors, a secondary sponsor of the X Games Asia since 2005, renewed its sponsorship with a three-year primary sponsorship both to develop the games in China and to gain product exposure. In 2005 alone, according to Kia Motors, exposure from the X Games Asia was worth $12 million.

Given such successes and the enormity of the Chinese market, the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) had little trouble finding sponsors and partners to finance and coordinate the 2008 games. The Beijing 2008 sponsorship program consisted of three tiers of support: partners (who paid approximately $40 million), sponsors (who paid $20–30 million), and suppliers (who provided services and goods).

The Johnson & Johnson company, one of the Beijing Olympics’ U.S. sponsors, was glad to take advantage of the billions of viewers who, in the words of Brian Perkins, Johnson & Johnson vice president of corporate affairs, looked at Beijing and China “with amazement.” Herbert Heiner, CEO of Adidas, the German sportswear manufacturer, whose sponsorship was reportedly $80–100 million in cash and services, was similarly enthusiastic: “The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games will once again be a worldwide visible proof of our dedication to athletes, products, innovation, and leadership. At the same time the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games provides us with a unique platform to build the Adidas brand image and business in China, as well as the whole of Asia,” Heiner said in an official statement to the BOCOG when Adidas sponsorship was announced in 2005.
Olympic Sponsors

The Bank of China (BOC), the most international of China’s commercial banks and the country’s second-largest bank, is another institution that benefited from the first Olympics to be held in China. In July 2004 BOC became the sole banking partner of the Beijing Olympics. As such, BOC was the exclusive provider of both investment and commercial bank services and products. It was also a major player in the BOCOG licensure and ticketing programs.

BOC, in partnership with the Visa credit card company, improved the financial infrastructure necessary for ticketing, automatic teller machines (ATMs), and other point-of-sale services. Multinational partnerships such as this one also provided Chinese companies with a chance to learn from the experience of longtime Olympic sponsors (Visa has been an Olympic sponsor for more than twenty years).

Chinese manufacturers such as Haier, which makes home appliances, mobile phones, televisions, and theater systems, welcomed the increased global brand

Sponsors are eager to get a foothold in Chinese sports. During the Beijing Olympics in 2008 the deals signed brought multimillions in revenue. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
recognition that sponsoring the Olympics brought. As a sponsor, Haier provided funds, home appliances, and other services to the Beijing 2008 Olympics, the Beijing 2008 Paralympic Games, BOCOG, and the Chinese Olympic Committee. Haier is headquartered in Qingdao, the sister city host of the Olympics, where the sailing events were held.

The chances are good that most viewers of the Olympics did not see the home appliances that Haier provided, but the advantage of Haier’s sponsorship came from the company’s being able to label itself an official sponsor and being able to market globally on that label.

“Haier becoming an official sponsor of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games will greatly boost the preparations for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, especially the Olympic sailing events,” BOCOG Executive Vice President and Secretary-General Wang Wei said when the Haier sponsorship was announced in August 2005. “Sponsoring the world’s greatest sporting event also provides Haier with an unparalleled platform to build up its prestige on a global basis.”

Other Chinese companies that were sponsors and partners of the Beijing Olympics included the computer manufacturer Lenovo, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), Air China, and Tsingtao Brewery Company.

Challenges for Foreign Sponsors

With the Olympics being hosted by Beijing, foreign companies found that they had to weigh the advantages of the publicity that sponsorship brings against potential backlash from protestors, activists, and politicians who used the spotlight of the Olympics as a chance to criticize the Chinese government.

The 2008 Olympics were not the first Olympics to meet with opposition—the 1980 Moscow Olympics are another example. Indeed, any country that has hosted the Olympics in the past twenty-four years has had detractors who have protested the host country and called for boycotts of sponsoring companies. Longtime Olympic sponsors such as Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola, and General Electric, with their worldwide influence, have often been the targets of such protests. The difference is that with so much media, Internet, and global connectivity in 2008, the Beijing Olympics were the first Olympics for which grassroots activism could have as large an impact on the image of the games as could the sports competition itself.

Interest groups such as Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters without Borders), Play Fair, and OlympicWatch.org were at the forefront of efforts to persuade countries, athletes, and sponsoring companies to boycott or at least withdraw their sponsorship from the Beijing games. These groups were concerned about censorship, unfair working conditions, China’s role in Sudan, and other human rights issues.

Such activism was an additional challenge and distraction for the Beijing Olympics’ international sponsors, which included Eastman Kodak, Adidas, Coca-Cola, General Electric, Johnson & Johnson, McDonalds, and Visa. These companies, despite their deep pockets and global clout, jealously guard their corporate image and the reputations of their brands and thus had to take into account opposition to Beijing’s hosting of the Olympics.

Such companies faced two choices, both of which had negative ramifications: acknowledge the activists and their criticism and risk alienating the Beijing government or ignore the activists and risk alienating the consumers whom those activists might rally to their cause. Public relations firms and organizations such as Future 500, a nonprofit liaison service between corporations and stakeholders, tried to walk the line. Future 500’s China initiative was designed to generate constructive interaction between corporations and nongovernmental organizations and other activist groups. As Future 500 reminded companies in The China Stakeholder Initiative on its website, “For industries that operate on the global stage, anything said by anyone anywhere—true or not—can impact your brands everywhere . . . That [fact] will be increasingly important between now and August 2008 when three billion people tune in to television and the Internet to watch the Olympic Games in Beijing. There, center stage will be not only the athletes, but corporations as well.”

Future 500 reminded companies that they needed to approach the Olympics with a measured amount of support for both the activist causes and their Chinese hosts. One issue that was problematic for the Beijing Olympics
was genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. China’s continuing investment in Sudan and support of Sudan’s government led some protestors to refer to the Beijing Olympics as the “Genocide Olympics.”

When Adidas was confronted by activists about another issue—labor conditions in China—Adidas said it would pressure its suppliers in China, with whom the company had direct influence, but that Adidas would not try to pressure the Chinese government. To most companies that approach—addressing poor labor conditions, human rights abuses, or other issues without directly challenging the Chinese government—was the least damaging and therefore most palatable approach.

Corporate logos and messages were much in evidence during the Beijing Olympics as foreign companies advertised to an audience in the billions, hoping to increase their brand recognition and future profits in China. Likewise, Chinese companies used the platform of the Olympics to introduce their brands to the rest of the world.

Scott ELDRIDGE II

Further Reading


Sports Training System

Xùnliàn tīzhì 训练体制

China has used the success of its economic reforms to create an elite sports training system that finds and develops athletes from the country’s vast population. The effectiveness of this system was shown in the 2008 Olympics, when China won fifty-one gold medals—more than any other country.

In 1932 Liu Changchun 刘长春 became the first Chinese athlete to participate in the Olympic Games and was the lone representative of Republican China (1912–1949) at the Olympics in Los Angeles.

Seconds later—11.1 seconds, to be precise—the first chapter of Chinese Olympic history was over as Liu Changchun was eliminated in the first preliminary heat of the 100-meter race, finishing well behind most of his competitors.

Liu’s defeat became yet another in the long history of defeats that China had suffered at the hands of foreign powers. For almost a century humiliation had been a constant of Chinese history, beginning with the losses of the Opium Wars during the mid-1800s at the hands of the technologically superior Western powers. The First Sino-Japanese War of 1895, lost to an until-then inconsequential neighbor, was even more damaging to China’s self-image. Finally, just a month before the Olympics in Los Angeles, Japan had overrun a helpless Chinese army in Manchuria. Sprinter Liu Changchun’s failure in the preliminary heat seemed to be yet another sign of Chinese weakness.

More than seventy years later another young Chinese athlete, again named “Liu,” crouched into his starting position for an Olympic race, the 110-meter hurdles. The expectations of a whole nation again weighed on a young man’s shoulders. However, this time the expectations of a nation did not drag down the young man. Indeed, Liu Xiang 刘翔 seemed buoyed by those expectations. He fairly flew over the hurdles, and 12.91 seconds later, equaling the world record time, Liu had won China’s first Olympic gold medal in track and field and was about to become one of China’s greatest athletic heroes.

Liu’s gold medal was China’s crowning glory at the 2004 Olympics in Athens, placing China second only to the United States in the gold medal total. However, the real significance of Liu’s victory was the fact that he won in a sport in which the Chinese were traditionally not seen as strong competitors because of their smaller and less-muscular physique. Liu Xiang’s gold medal marked the beginning of the end of the presumption that Chinese athletes can excel in only a narrow range of sports. Interviewed after his victory, Liu said before he burst into tears: “I proved that Chinese people, Asian people, and yellow-skinned people are able to do well in track events” (Armitage 2004).

His sentiment expressed not only his pride in his victory but also the frustration that past generations of Chinese had suffered. His words echoed a sentiment that remains important today: the joy—and relief—that the Chinese feel at finally having overcome an era of weakness and isolation. During a short time China has risen from being, in athletic terms, a developing country to being one of the world superpowers. This rise, reflecting
China’s overall rise to political and economic power, has baffled many experts and begs this question: How did China do it?

**Keys to Success**

The foundation of athletic success in China is, as in every other country, athletic talent residing within the population. China, being the most populous country in the world, has the obvious advantage of a vast number of people from which to draw sports talent. This extraction of talent, however, requires a highly organized sports system that identifies and develops talent. The development of China’s elite sports system, which made an unprecedented “great leap forward” during the last two decades, required the interplay of two ingredients: organizational infrastructure to find and accommodate athletic talent and the financial and human resources to provide sports facilities and training technology.

To provide these two ingredients, China developed an elite sports system that combines characteristics of the Western approach with the old Soviet approach.

**Elite Sports System**

China’s elite sports system, adopted during the period of reform and opening up starting in the 1980s, is based on the **Juguo tizhi** 举国体制 approach—the support of the whole country for the elite sports system. This approach, which gives priority to elite sports development, assures that all available sports resources are channeled into elite sports.

The organizational infrastructure of the system follows many of the principles of the old Soviet sports system. It features a tightly controlled, highly centralized, strictly hierarchical, state-led system that almost entirely relies on state funding. Efforts to transform the system that was established during the 1950s into a more decentralized system that promotes self-supporting (and less-government-dependent) sports development have so far largely failed.

A key aspect of the organizational infrastructure of China’s elite sports system is the far-reaching system of talent scouting and advancement, often called the “pagoda system.” The foundation of the pagoda system is mandatory physical education in regular schools and in spare-time sports schools.

Only by a thorough scouting system on this fundamental level can the potential of China’s vast gene pool be tapped and athletic talent found. Sports scouts canvass the country, visiting regular schools in their search for students with sports potential. They find athletes who are as young as five or six years of age. If young athletes show enough talent, they might be invited into the multilevel elite sports education system, which consists of a network of specialized sports schools. Such children, depending on their age, are sent to one of almost five hundred elite sports primary schools or more than two hundred elite sports middle schools and high schools.

About 400,000 young athletes are being trained in these schools. Their potential for different sports is examined, and their training is individualized accordingly. If they excel during competitions against their peers, they are promoted to the upper levels of the pagoda system at the municipal- and provincial-level sports schools, where they have full residency and are trained extensively. From there they have the chance of being promoted to the national teams and to compete in international competition. On the national level China trains approximately three thousand world-class athletes—almost three times as many as the United States.

**Financial and Human Dimensions**

Organizational infrastructure alone, however, cannot explain the rise of Chinese sports. The Chinese sports system for decades suffered from a lack of material resources—which is not surprising in a developing country. That lack of resources translated into inadequate training facilities and backward training technology. The organizational system to find and accommodate talent might have been in place, but China lacked the monetary means to transform talented children into world-class athletes.

China’s impressive economic strides after the reform of its economy during the 1980s provided the necessary second key to athletic success: financial and human resources. After the initiation of economic reform, sports facilities and equipment for elite sports education received a massive upgrade. Since then more funding has been directed into the improvement of sports facilities and
into the introduction of foreign, state-of-the-art training technology.

Training methodology also has become more scientific. The traditional training methodology is based on the “three unafraids” (unafraid of hardship, difficulty, and injury) and the “five toughnesses” (toughness of spirit, body, skill, training, and competition). That methodology still plays an important role in Chinese training, but it is now being complemented by more scientific coaching, sports psychology, and sports medicine techniques. To achieve this transformation, China has imported foreign expertise in training methodology by hiring successful sports coaches from all over the world.

For example, legendary Yugoslavian soccer coach Bora Milutinovic led the Chinese national team into the 2002 World Cup finals and enjoyed great popularity in China. With such a flow of material resources into its sports system, China possesses the most potent features of two worlds: the meticulousness and strictness of the Soviet-style sports system and the innovation and sophistication of Western-style training, methodology, and technology. All the ingredients for China’s rise as a world sports power were present by the mid-1980s.

Political Will of the Party
An organizational infrastructure and financial and human resources, important as they are, do not by themselves produce successful sports system. Also necessary is an intense interest in sports accomplishments by people who have the power to direct resources into elite sports. In China’s case the prerequisite is the political will of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The determination and enthusiasm that the CCP shows for the advancement of Chinese sports suggest that the political hay to be made from athletic success is particularly appealing to China’s political leadership. Athletic success yields three forms of political dividends in particular: intensification of national unity, strengthening of international esteem, and demonstration of systemic strength.

An important element in China’s unparalleled economic development, which is based on foreign direct
investment to an extent, is the Western image of China as a land of limitless opportunity and economic growth. Most investors, however, are nervous by nature, and capital, even in China, is increasingly mobile. The narrative of China’s rise, therefore, must constantly be fed with new successes. Winning Olympic gold medals is one way to provide new successes. Victories by China’s athletes in international competition, especially in events that are the focus of public attention, are one good way of asserting China’s power and winning international esteem. Likewise, international esteem is necessary for earning a more influential position in international politics. The success of Chinese athletes, therefore, indeed has a big political payoff on the international stage.

Today’s athletic arenas are the crucibles of today’s national heroes. The ascent of China’s sports has created many national heroes, such as Liu Xiang in track and field, Guo Jingjing 郭晶晶 in Olympic women’s diving, and Yao Ming 姚明 in basketball. Such heroes have become a focus of national sentiment that bridges the ethnic, socioeconomic, and cultural gaps that divide China today. In a nation as vulnerable to fragmentation as China is, in a nation whose national cohesiveness is always threatened by deep divisions running through society, all-encompassing icons of national unity have great political value. When Chinese watch a Chinese athlete win, it does not matter if those spectators are poor farmers from Guizhou or rich businessmen from Guangdong, Uygurs from Hohhot or Han Chinese from Beijing.

When such spectators watch Chinese athletes outperform their opponents, deep cultural divisions are forgotten, and all of these spectators are, at least for the moment, one thing: Chinese. Sports can create a feeling of national connectedness that trumps the divisions of class, age, and ethnicity. For China’s political leaders, whose power is directly tied to China’s susceptible unity and coherence, this power of sports pays an enormous political dividend, creating a political incentive to channel resources to the elite sports system.

A third vital political dividend is the power of association. Success in international sports is the privilege of nations that are rich and powerful. China’s ascent in athletics thus can be used as a symbol of the strength of China’s political system and its leadership, as a symbol of the competence of the Chinese Communist Party. The gleam of the medals around the necks of Chinese athletes also reflects positively on the performance of China’s political elite. And indeed most Chinese athletes are versed in reiterating that they owe their success to the Chinese state and the party. At a time when the Chinese Communist Party faces great political challenges to its power, when its legitimacy is measured not by revolutionary heritage but rather by tangible political success, the CCP looks for new ways to show its vitality. Creating great athletes is one way for the CCP to show that vitality and to strengthen its claims that the current political leadership can lead the country into a future filled with challenges.

The political dividends of success in sports have been high since the beginning of the period of reform in the 1980s. The organizational structure needed to create a superlative sports power was already in place, and the material means began to be available. China was ready for the world. And that is why its flag was seen many times as the national flags were raised at the medal ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. China won fifty-one gold medals—more than any other country—and one hundred medals in all, second only to the United States.

**Further Reading**


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Spratly Islands Dispute

Nánshāqúndào zhēngduān 南沙群岛争端

Although the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea cover barely 5 square kilometers of dry land, they are a focus of international boundary disputes due to their strategic location. China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines all lay claim to all or part of the archipelago; Brunei claims fishing rights to part of the area, as well.

The Spratly Islands (Nansha qundao in Chinese) include about one hundred reefs and islets totaling less than 5 square kilometers spread over 410,000 square kilometers in the South China Sea (Nanhai). Today these tiny specks of land are important as symbols of national pride, as military outposts astride vital shipping lanes, as fishing grounds, and as sources of oil or natural gas. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have made claims to all or part of this archipelago. Brunei also claims a fishing zone that overlaps the southern portion of the Spratlys.

Chinese texts dating from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) appear to describe the islands, and Chinese would later claim that sovereignty was established by a Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) naval expedition. Certainly for centuries Chinese traders and fishermen were aware of the Spratlys (probably named for nineteenth-century British captain Richard Spratly). The PRC emphasizes that Qing dynasty (1644–1912) maps include the Spratlys as part of the empire.

Claims to sovereignty were bolstered when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government accepted the Japanese surrender in the South China Sea, including both the Spratlys and the Paracel Islands (Xisha qundao), in late 1945. While Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek were Cold War adversaries, both sought to burnish their nationalist credentials by making strong territorial claims in the South China Sea as well as in islands at the southern edge of the Ryukyu Islands.

China’s adamancy and presence in the Spratlys have been a function of its growing military power and economic needs. In the 1960s and 1970s China and the Philippines announced the discovery of oil around the Spratly Islands, thus adding urgency to contending claims. The Chinese navy began regular patrols in the area in the mid-1980s. In 1988 Beijing highlighted the Spratlys’ ties to China when the island of Hainan was promoted to full-fledged provincial status (the PRC considers the Spratly Islands to be part of the new province, which was split off from Guangdong Province in 1988). That year marked the last serious military conflict concerning the islands, a clash between China and Vietnam during which seventy Vietnamese sailors lost their lives. This followed close to a decade after the PRC’s invasion of Vietnam in February of 1979 (which China says was in response to attacks by Vietnam), during which China claimed to have captured several cities and counties before announcing a withdrawal on 5 March. The Chinese gradually increased their presence in the South China Sea through small military outposts and markers.

Tensions grew in the 1990s with the increase of oil and...
gas exploration among the islands. In particular, China and Vietnam granted overlapping drilling rights and began to cooperate with foreign oil firms. One focus of regional concern has been a Chinese military installation on Mischief Reef on the eastern edge of the Spratlys. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement in 2000 reiterating China’s historical claims in the context of modern international law.

Over the past half decade the PRC has taken a more cooperative approach as part of its overall diplomatic strategy toward Southeast Asia. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and China in 2002, called for mutual consultation and confidence-building measures by all parties to the dispute. Further, the PRC has begun to cooperate on oil exploration ventures with Southeast Asian nations. The dispute over the islands has become a test case of a rising China’s claims of peaceful intentions in the region.

Steven PHILLIPS

Further Reading


Perseverance can reduce an iron rod to a sewing needle.

铁杵磨成针

Tiè chú mó chéng zhēn
St. John’s University, known as “St. John’s College” until 1905, was one of Shanghai’s first Christian colleges. Founded in 1879 as a secondary school for boys, by the 1920s St. John’s (shèng yuēhàn dàxué) was regarded as one of China’s most prestigious universities and enjoyed the reputation of being the “Harvard of the East.” It has been the site of East China University of Political Science and Law since 1952.

St. John’s University (1879–1952), was one of China’s most prestigious universities prior to the Communist revolution of 1949. St. John’s became China’s first institution to grant the bachelor’s degree in 1907, and exerted great influence on the history of modern China through its educational programs and alumni leaders in the fields of diplomacy, politics, business, education, and medicine. It was divided into several specialized public colleges with the Communist organization of the education system in 1952.

St. John’s founder, Samuel Isaac Joseph Schereschewsky (1831–1906), was sent to China by the American Episcopal Church as a missionary in 1859 and was elected bishop of Shanghai Parish in 1876. Bishop Schereschewsky launched a financial campaign for the college in 1877 and raised $26,000 of his $100,000 goal, with a three-year promise of an additional annual $6,000 appropriation from the Board of Missions of the Episcopal Church. The cornerstone of St. John’s first building was laid in 1879.

Bishop Samuel Isaac Joseph Schereschewsky, the founder of St. John’s University in Shanghai in his study in 1902. On his left is his Chinese secretary, Lien; on his right, his Japanese scribe, Bun.
laid in the Jessfield suburb of Shanghai on 14 April 1879. St. John’s first pupils, thirty-nine boys transferred from Baird Hall and Duane Hall, two small Episcopal schools, arrived in September.

St. John’s education, guided by the aim of educating outstanding Chinese ministers, was for a decade directed at the secondary level. The majority of students were Christians who were provided with food, clothing, housing, books, and supplies. In October 1881 St. John’s admitted students for the study of English. This move, along with a subsequent decision to teach Western subjects in English, proved of great importance to the development of the institution as well as to the history of China’s Christian colleges. St. John’s became a center for English language study and a lightning rod for arguments about the negative impact of English on the secularization of Christian education, the dilution of missionary educational goals, and the denationalization of Chinese students.

A key turning point in St. John’s history was the arrival in 1886 of Francis Lister Hawks Pott (1864–1947), who would guide the school for fifty-two years and become a leading advocate of Christian higher education in China. Pott was born into a New York Anglican family and graduated from Columbia University in 1883. Pott raised St. John’s standards by establishing entrance examinations in Chinese and English, adding a three-year collegiate course, and securing funds for infrastructure expansion. In 1905, patterned on the structure of Columbia University, St. John’s became a four-year college.
comprehensive university with schools of theology, medicine, and arts and sciences. St. John’s became China’s first institution to grant the bachelor’s degree in 1907 and gradually became known as the school of choice among Shanghai’s affluent merchant families, whose brightest sons could enroll directly into premier U.S. graduate programs.

In 1952 China’s institutions of higher learning were fundamentally reorganized for the Communist era, and St. John’s schools were incorporated or transferred into several specialized public colleges. The campus, designed to harmonize Chinese and Western architectural aesthetics, is now the site of East China University of Political Science and Law. St. John’s is recognized as an institution that exerted great influence on the history of modern China through its educational programs and its many alumni who became leaders in diplomacy, politics, business, education, and medicine.

Heidi ROSS and Yuhao CEN

Further Reading
St. John’s University. (1929). St. John’s University, 1879–1929. Shanghai: Kelley & Walsh.
General Joseph Stilwell, known as “Vinegar Joe” to his soldiers, spent much of his Army career in Asia. As a young officer he briefly visited Shanghai and Hong Kong in 1911. After World War I he requested to be assigned to China. Because of his language skills he was accepted by the Nationalist Chinese, and was made Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek. He became the senior U.S. military officer in China during World War II.

General Joseph Stilwell was the senior U.S. military officer operating in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater during World War II. He is best remembered for extending the Burma Road, a 1,800-kilometer supply route, which originated in Ledo, India, went through Burma (now Myanmar), and ended in Kunming in Yunnan Province.

Joseph Warren Stilwell was born in 1883 in Palatka, Florida, and was accepted into the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1900. He was commissioned as an infantry officer in 1904 and sent to the Philippines, recently acquired from Spain during the Spanish-American War, for a short tour of duty. While on this assignment Stilwell travelled to Japan and China. When he returned to the United States, he taught English, Spanish, French, and history at West Point.

By 1917 the United States had become involved in World War I, and Stilwell was sent to France as a liaison officer. After World War I, Stilwell briefly returned to the United States before being sent to China from 1920 to 1923. He went back to China in 1926 and stayed for three more years. When he returned to the United States in 1929, he was stationed in Fort Benning, Georgia, where he was given his nickname “Vinegar Joe” because of his tendency to let a soldier know that he had done something wrong.

In 1935 Stilwell returned to China for his third tour of duty. As the military commander at the U.S. embassy in Peking (now Beijing) from 1935 to 1939, he became fluent in the Chinese language and very knowledgeable about Chinese customs and culture. He was in China in 1937, when Japan first invaded the country. Despite his expertise on China, he had lagged behind his fellow officers and expected to be retired from the Army upon his return to the U.S. However, during his return he learned that he had been selected for promotion to the rank of brigadier general and assigned a brigade command at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Stilwell’s use of the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division in military exercises, in which he used tactics he had seen by the Japanese in China and which Germany would use in Europe, embarrassed senior generals. He was rewarded with promotion to the rank of major general and given command of the Seventh Infantry Division at Camp (later Fort) Ord, California.

Stilwell demonstrated his excellent command of troop movements during the training of his division, and particularly of new recruits and reserve officers at Fort Ord, leading to his appointment as commanding general.
of the III Army Corps (later changed to the IIIrd Armored Corps headquartered at the Presidio of Monterey, California.

When the United States entered the war in the Pacific in 1941, General Stilwell went to Asia, but instead of commanding troops, he was sent to the CBI theater to establish an American military force and to assist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of China’s Nationalist (Guomindang) forces, as his chief of staff. Stilwell had been selected by Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson because of his expertise on China. Chiang respected Stilwell because of his ability to speak Chinese, and Stilwell’s expertise in China was a major asset that allowed him to get involved quickly with operations in the CBI, when he arrived in February 1942.

11 October 1944. General Joseph W. Stilwell talking with Major General Curtis E. LeMay of the 20th Bomber command, at a B-29 base. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek with Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, China Expeditionary Forces, on the day following a Japanese bombing attack [the Doolittle Raid]. Maymyo, Burma (Myanmar) 1942. US NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
Retreat and a New Road

By that time Japanese forces were making huge strides in taking over China. Singapore and Burma had already been invaded by Japanese forces. General Stilwell was able to persuade Chiang to give him control of some Chinese forces to help push back the Japanese. Stilwell was not the highest Allied officer in the CBI theater; British General Harold Alexander, Allied commander in Burma, was the superior ranking officer. From March to May of 1942, Stilwell tried to help Allied forces in Burma, but Allied command problems and strategic moves by the Japanese caused Allied forces to retreat. Most British forces retreated to India, while some Chinese forces went back to China. Rather than evacuating by aircraft, General Stilwell retreated on foot with his men. Chiang was irritated by the Chinese losses and blamed Stilwell for these, causing a rift in their relationship that would only worsen as the war went on.

As soon as Stilwell arrived in India, his main focus was on how to retake Burma from the Japanese forces. His plan was to connect the Burma Road with China so that more supplies could be moved into China from Rangoon, Burma (now Yangon, Myanmar). When the Japanese took control of southern Burma, a new proposal was made. General Stilwell’s operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank D. Merrill, recommended building a road from Ledo, India, to Burma, connecting with the old Burma Road, which had been built in 1937–1938, to provide a land supply route from India to China and Burma for support of the Allied soldiers who were fighting in the north Burma region. The connection of the road from Ledo, India, through northern Burma, would permit shipment of supplies to Kunming, China.

In late 1944, barely two years after Stilwell accepted responsibility for building the Ledo Road (which later came to be known as the Stilwell Road), the route was connected to the Burma Road. The first convoy reached Kunming on 4 February 1945.

Air and Ground Fighting

To establish air superiority to protect the Burma Road and to drive Japanese forces out of Burma, a plan for capturing the Japanese-controlled city of Myitkyina in Burma was developed. This win would allow Allied airplanes under the command of Claire Chennault, the commander of an American volunteer group, the Flying Tigers, to use the runway there to attack the Japanese and provide a strategic area from which to launch new offenses.

The ground offensive against the Japanese also continued. Frank Merrill, now brigadier general, took command of the 5307th Composite Regiment, a group that came to be known as Merrill’s Marauders. This group attacked the Japanese Eighteenth Division in February 1944, enabling Stilwell to gain control of Burma’s Hukawng Valley.

Before and during the ground and air offensives against the Japanese, General Stilwell had to deal with the political battles with Chiang Kai-shek, who was fighting Mao Zedong’s Communist forces as well as the Japanese, in addition to contending with disagreements among the Allied forces, especially the British, who had issues other than Burma as priorities.

Although the completion of the road from Ledo to Kunming and the success of the air route pushed the Japanese occupation of China to the east, the war came to an end with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. General Stilwell was present at the signing of the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945.

Postwar geopolitics kept General Stilwell from full recognition. His animosity toward Chiang Kai-shek led to statements that were seen as pro-Communist, and he returned to the United States after the Japanese surrender, in charge of the Western Defense Command in San Francisco, the same post he had held at the outbreak of the war. Just over a year later, on 12 October 1946, General Stilwell died from stomach cancer.

Thomas P. DOLAN

Further Reading:
Stock Markets

Gǔpiào shichǎng 股票市场

Shanghai is the largest, both in number of companies listed and in market capitalization, of the three stock exchanges most important to Chinese companies. Hong Kong is the oldest but now second to Shanghai in size. Shenzhen, the newest and smallest of the three exchanges, focuses on small- to medium-tier companies that are often state-owned. All three exchanges have suffered declines in market capitalization from their 2007 peak.

Mainland China has two stock markets, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, and the Hong Kong Exchange also plays a major role in China. Before the establishment of the mainland exchanges, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange served as the principal exchange in which Chinese companies could raise capital. The maturing of the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges has given Chinese companies the alternative to raise capital within China in its local currency (renminbi).

The Three Exchanges

Japan’s Tokyo Stock Exchange is the Asian leader in terms of market capitalization (US$1.32 trillion in 2008). But today, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges together list more than 1,500 companies with a combined market capitalization of US$1.78 trillion (2008). With the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (US$1.33 trillion in market capitalization in 2008), China can truly claim to rival Japan.

The Shanghai Stock Exchange

Located on the eastern coast, Shanghai is China’s largest city. As a center of commerce since the nineteenth century, it has been a hub of international commerce since the 1930s. Foreign investment was halted in 1949 with the Communist party takeover, but with economic reforms of the 1990s, it has regained its place as the center of finance and trade in mainland China.

Closed during the first years of the People’s Republic of China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE, 上海证券交易所) reopened in 1990. A non-profit, membership institution, it is directly governed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. As mainland China’s largest exchange, its listed companies include Chinese gas and oil companies, banks, insurance companies, and high-tech sectors. The SSE treasury bond market is the most active of its kind in China. Trades in A shares are restricted to domestic investors, while B shares are open to all investors.

The SSE is the sixth largest exchange in the world and second only to Tokyo in Asia, with 861 companies listed. At its peak in 2007, its market capitalization was US$4.04 trillion. Reflecting the losses of 2008, the January 2009 market capitalization was US$1.557 trillion.
THE HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE

The Association of Stockbrokers in Hong Kong was established in 1891, although there are reports of securities trading going back to the mid-nineteenth century. Economic reforms in 1999 led to the merger of the Stock Exchange with Hong Kong Futures Exchange to form the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx 香港交易所). At the end of 2007, Hong Kong Stock Exchange had 1,241 listed companies with a market capitalization of almost US$2.7 trillion, making it Asia’s third largest. In January 2009, its market capitalization was US$1.24 trillion.

HKEx’s listed companies include property development and strategic investment holdings companies (Cheung Kong Holdings), banks (HSBC, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), and utilities (Hong Kong and China Gas). The principal regulator of Hong Kong’s securities and futures markets is the Securities and Futures Commission, which is responsible for administering laws governing securities and facilitating development of these markets.

SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE

Shenzhen, a city in Guangdong Province less than 50 kilometers from Hong Kong, was established in 1980 as China’s first Special Economic Zone. It has become an important business and economic center and is home to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE 深圳证券交易所). The smallest of the three China exchanges, it is the ninth largest stock exchange in Asia, based on a market capitalization of US$7.85 billion in 2007 and US$3.89 billion in January 2009.

Listings on the SZSE are mostly small- to medium-tier companies; many are state-owned enterprises in which the Chinese government, which views the stock market as a means of raising capital, has a controlling interest. Among the most actively traded stocks are Tang Steel, a large state-owned steel manufacturing enterprise; China Vanke company, the largest residential real estate developer in the People’s Republic; and Guangdong Electric Power Co. Like the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange is governed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

Chinese Companies Abroad

The Chinese exchanges are, in comparison to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), smaller and less active. But the role of Chinese companies on the international exchanges is growing. The NYSE celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China with the ringing of the opening bell by National Committee on United States–China Relations president Stephen Orlins on 5 January 2009. Accompanying Orlins were former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, China’s ambassador to the United Nations, China’s consul general in New York, and the Commissioner of the National Basketball Association—because the NBA is fast expanding its presence in the Chinese media market. The forty-five People’s Republic of China companies listed on the NYSE had a market capitalization of US$802 billion.

Growth and Contraction

The year 2007 could be called one of “market frenzy.” The Chinese rushed to invest savings in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets; Shanghai grew more than 300 percent in market capitalization over 2006. China led the world in the number of new shares offered. The companies with initial public offerings were, in general, big state-owned enterprises in the oil and gas industries, mining, and banks. Alibaba, Asia’s number one business-to-business portal, drew international attention and acclaim with its initial public offering on the Hong Kong stock exchange, raising US$1.5 billion.

The decline in manufacturing caused by the global downturn of 2008 forward had drastic impact on Alibaba and on new Chinese companies hoping to follow in its success. In 2008, the Shanghai exchange lost over 60 percent of its market capitalization; Shenzhen exchange lost close to that. The Hong Kong exchange, which lost approximately 49 percent of its market capitalization in 2008, continues to play an important role as an exchange for Chinese companies.

Chinese officials have expressed optimism that economic stimulus efforts by the Chinese government in
2009, including investment in infrastructure, along with increased commercial lending will reverse the downward slide that stocks suffered in 2008.

The Editors

Further Reading


Storytelling ▶

A man’s greed is like a snake that wants to swallow an elephant.

人心不足蛇吞象

Rén xīn bù zú shé tūn xiàng
A popular art form in China since the second century BCE, storytelling has many styles, often geographically based. It can utilize both narrative and song and sometimes verse and musical instruments as well. Over time, it has evolved to reflect cultural and societal changes, frequently mixing well-known traditional tales with modern political commentaries.

Storytelling styles in China have roots in the telling of anecdotes, tales, and jokes as far back as the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). By the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), Buddhist monks told religious tales in a popular style. Narration and song, presented with rich description and a lively delivery, attracted many listeners; this use of both verse and prose became an important feature of storytelling in China. At times, Buddhist monks also used visuals (bianxiang, or pictures showing magic transformations) to help illustrate some stories.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), storytellers emerged in more professional or semiprofessional roles. The luckiest ones told their tales in teahouses or in private houses, protected from the elements, while the less fortunate shared theirs in the streets, festivals, and markets, dependant on coins collected from listeners. Many had to travel through difficult terrain to reach rural audiences, often using fortune-telling and begging to supplement their incomes.

In the seventeenth century Liu Jingting, often called the father of Chinese storytelling, moved many people with his narratives, including true stories from the collapse of the Southern Ming dynasty (1368–1644). From this time, several important storytelling centers and styles flourished, with many storytelling venues offering pinghua/pingshu storytelling without music, and tanci storytelling with a blend of singing, speaking, and instrumental music. The garden city of Suzhou and busy Yangzhou were two cities known for storytelling; by the 1940s, there were sixty to seventy storytelling houses in Suzhou alone.

In nearby Shanghai, changes in storytelling reflected urban growth. In the late nineteenth century, storytelling beggars, often hungry and disabled, often were found in the Chinese part of the city. Fifty years later, the conditions of many storytellers there had improved, with the musical tanci style developing into a sophisticated, popular form. Modern areas of Shanghai, with electricity and improved building techniques, soon boasted entertainment centers up to ten stories high and storytelling theaters seating five hundred listeners. In the 1930s, more than twenty area radio stations had daily storytelling programs; by the early 1940s, Shanghai had over five hundred storytelling venues and two powerful storytelling guilds.

After 1949, storytelling was seen as an important means to spread ideas in the Communist revolution, since it was both a low-cost and well-received form of entertainment in much of China. Many intellectuals tried to teach traditional tellers from various backgrounds and styles to use more modern themes, including new stories praising governmental campaigns or glorifying the role of workers. Traditional storytelling guilds were disbanded and...
the government started training programs and institutes in order to have more control over content.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) many storytellers were put out of work and had to take up other jobs. Others were imprisoned, or retrained to tell stories about revolutionary heroes like the model soldier Lei Feng, or stories ridiculing superstitions and reactionary beliefs. Stories were sometimes cut in length, too, to accommodate work schedules. Most of the traditional stories were forbidden as reactionary or were censored and changed to reflect the political philosophy of the time.

In the late 1970s, storytelling returned in part to its former state, only to find great competition from both the media and a faster pace of life with more distractions, especially in urban areas. Some forms, like the xiangsheng comic style or tanci, still found many followers while other styles either disappeared or depended on the support of the government to continue. Audiences in the storytelling houses today are usually elderly males, although radio and television performances reach much larger audiences. Stories will always be shared in China for education and for entertainment, but the future of many traditional storytelling styles is in question, with too few younger storytellers emerging to take the place of today’s aging tellers.

**Style**

The narrative storytelling arts in China, covered by the word *quyi* since 1949, number over three hundred; the term *storytelling* covers a varied number of these, depending on the definitions used. In most of them, the teller’s voice is often a powerful instrument, accompanied at times by simple percussion instruments—bamboo clappers or drums—and at times with more elaborate stringed instruments. Even something as simple as a small wooden block, the *xingmu*, adds to the drama in many styles, capturing the audience’s attention and providing a dramatic emphasis or portraying effects: the slash of a sword, a hero’s moan, horses’ hooves, or the cries of a solitary bird.

The use of humor is also found in many styles, with the lively art of *xiengmiang* best known for its comic style. Description, too, is a basic tool of the Chinese storyteller, who often combines well-known descriptive formulas to create images of, for example, a hero: eight-feet tall, with a square mouth and full lips, tiger eyes, a face like the round moon, and two long ears.

Often adding to the storyteller’s attraction is the use of onomatopoeia: *ming, ming, ming* (wind), *hua, hua, hua* (rain), *gululu* (thunder), *danglanglang* (something shattering), *guang, guang, guang* (cannon shots), and many others. In some styles, sound effects—galloping, roaring, crying—were important as well. Although the use of visuals to tell stories, such as scrolls and paintings, is an important genre in nearby India, such props appear to be less popular in Chinese storytelling, according to the scholar Victor Mair. Other objects used at times include a folding fan and a handkerchief.

Several well-known storytelling genres, under a broad definition of storytelling, are introduced below; many other exciting varieties (for example, Beijing Clapper tales that use two types of bamboo clappers) as well as simple folk styles also exist.

**Xiangsheng**

Performers satirize both society and human foibles in the comic form *xiangsheng*, which has roots in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Its humor (with puns, double meanings, and impersonations), fast-paced delivery, and ability to quickly respond to societal changes and concerns have made this a popular variety. The *xiang* in *xiangsheng* refers to *xiang mao*, or facial expressions, while *sheng* refers to *sheng yin*, or voice. Xiangsheng performers combine facial and vocal expression to make the four basic skills of *xiangsheng*: singing, talking, joking, and imitating. This narrative style can be performed with one, two, or three performers, but the two-person type is the favorite.

The language of *xiangsheng* is Beijing Mandarin, thus the form is most popular in Beijing, Tianjin, and throughout northern China. Stories before 1949 tended to be risqué and full of stereotypes and insults, thus appealing to the lower-class males who made up the audience. After 1949, the stories and delivery were cleaned up to appeal to all classes, male and female. The popular *xiangsheng* star Hao Baolin helped to raise the art’s status and promoted the use of fine singing during the sessions. His skill at imitations, along with his other talents, even made him a favorite of Mao Zedong, a great fan of this form.
Traditionally, xiangsheng tellers, like many other storytellers and performers in the oral tradition, apprenticed with a master teller. Today’s tellers are expected to write and create their own material, and amateurs also embrace the art; in 2004, the first Internet xiangsheng competition was held. Recent story topics show a wide range, including housing problems, filial piety, corruption, the effects of government policies, eating dumplings, and even changing one’s job or trade. In the past, the stories might last for about an hour, but today many stories have a shorter format, around twenty minutes, to fit the needs of radio and television broadcasts.

Pinghsu and Pinghua

These two examples of storytelling, from the southern (pinghua) and the northern and central (pinghua) areas of China, feature well-known classics told with expression, but without music. In the past, storytellers in these styles apprenticed to master tellers and worked to perfect episodes that could stretch for months of daily two-hour sessions, with scenes carefully stopped at a dramatic moment to bring the crowd back again. Today’s tellers learn such techniques both in drama schools and from masters, but they tell their tales over a shorter time period.

The stories are often shared in storytelling houses where hanging scrolls welcome listeners with well-known couplets:

- Today again you have heard me tell of things long past.
- If you have time to spare, please come early tomorrow.

Inside, audience members, usually elder males, are given tea leaves, glasses, and plentiful hot water. They often munch on sunflower seeds and other snacks to help pass the time happily while listening. A large fan (symbol of the story arts), calligraphy, and or a painting might be found behind the storyteller. The stage is usually a raised platform, with a table, tea, a fan, and the xingmu block (known as the zhiyu, or “talk stopper,” in Yangzhou storytelling).

The stories recounted in these nonmusical forms are usually the great favorites that have been long told, and were also read as novels, including Xiyou ji (Journey to the West), which follows the adventures of pilgrims seeking Buddhist scriptures; Shuihu (Water Margin), about a bandit group in the twelfth century; and San guo (Three Kingdoms), which tells of battles and heroes during an unsettled time.

Intricate descriptions, dialogue, sound effects, facial expressions, and actions bring the stories to life. Today,
this style reaches beyond the traditional venues into homes for the aged, business and government functions, and over both radio and television broadcasts.

**Tanci**

Stringed instruments are popular in the sophisticated form of tanci (“plucking lyrics”) enjoyed especially in Suzhou and Shanghai. The *pipa* (a pear-shaped lute) and *sanxian* (the three-string banjo) are played by a pair of tellers, today usually a male and a female, although some solo performers are found. Most of the listeners in the storytelling houses are elderly and male. They come regularly to the programs, which usually start at 2 p.m. with an opening ballad. Audience members sip tea as they listen to the storyteller/s weave a tale for a two-hour period. In the past stories could stretch on for months, but most stories today continue for two-weeks worth of such daily sessions.

Traditional and new love stories of gifted scholars and talented beauties are popular in this elegant, refined tradition. New stories share political thought as well: stories of exploitation, corruption, crimes, or working-class heroes. Musical melodies support the various characters and scenes; besides basic melodies used by male and female roles, special melodies include the go-between tune for matchmaking, the wild-rooster-crowing tune for rapid descriptions, and a creepy tune for evil characters.

Traditional training for this type of storytelling, usually from master to student, covered the four basics of speech, humor, the music of stringed instruments, and song. The student performed various services for the master and began to learn pieces by listening and repeating, accompanying the master teller to his performances, and observing. In this art, as in others, oft-repeated and concise formulas helped to teach:

- Fast, but not confusing; slow, without pausing
- Pausing the sound, but not the spirit
- Loud but not noisy; soft but not inaudible
- Happy but not hysterical; sad but not morose

Today’s training is done in government institutes, with a short storytelling apprenticeship at the end. Students attracted today to the three-year course in Suzhou (which also leads to a junior-college diploma) frequently come from the rural areas, know little of the art, and are often drawn by the diploma and the chance for an urban residency permit. Grade sizes have dropped to approximately sixty to seventy students in recent years, while in Shanghai very few students study tanci at all.

Chinese oral storytelling is a rich and varied art, changing as it moves into the twenty-first century. It will indeed survive as an art, even though specific forms may weaken, change, or suddenly appear, for it answers a basic need to communicate and to share both heritage and humanity.

Cathy SPAGNOLI

**Further Reading**


John Leighton Stuart was an American missionary born in China. He was the founder and first president of Yenching University in Beijing and also served as the U.S. ambassador to China just before the Communist takeover. He was famously derided by Mao Zedong as being the last representative of western imperialism.

John Leighton Stuart, born in Hangzhou, China, to American missionaries Mary Louisa and John Linton Stuart, was an important figure in twentieth century Chinese-American relations. He lived in China until the age of eleven, when he was sent to the United States to attend school in Mobile, Alabama; he later enrolled at Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia, where he received his BA as well as his LLB. As a young adult, he did not return to China because he felt that missionary work in the land of his birth was without merit. However, he changed his mind and, following in his father’s footsteps, became a minister, obtaining his theological degree from Union Theological Seminary in New York City. In 1904, he married Aline Hardy Rood, and the following year he was ordained as a Presbyterian minister and sent by the church as a missionary to China.

In his early years as a missionary, Stuart became an educator. From 1908 to 1919, he taught Greek at Nanking Theological Seminary (now Nanjing Union Theological Seminary) in Jiangsu Province, during which time he wrote an essential Greek-English-Chinese dictionary of the New Testament, as well as a handbook to New Testament Greek for Chinese speakers. He wrote several other books in Chinese, mostly exegetical works on the Scriptures.

In 1919, he began to work on establishing a new university in Beijing. He aggressively sought out benefactors
and found a prominent one in Charles Martin Hall, the inventor of tinfoil. With secured funds, Stuart purchased a royal garden that he turned into a campus. Yenching University opened in 1926, specializing in law, medicine, theology, and arts and science. Stuart was its first president; his objective was to make the institution the very best in Southeast Asia. To that end, he helped to create the Harvard-Yenching Institute in 1928, a joint effort by Harvard and Yenching universities that concentrated on furthering arts and science education in the region. As a result, by 1930 Yenching University was one of the very best in all of China, where scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese, taught, studied, and researched.

At the start of the Second Sino-Japanese war (known in China as the War of Resistance against Japan) in 1937, Stuart remained in Beijing. While the Japanese occupied the city, he played an important role in maintaining a balance between the Japanese occupiers and his university students, who often led anti-Japanese protests. After 1941, however, with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, he was imprisoned because he was a citizen of the United States. He remained there until the defeat of the Japanese in World War II in 1945.

Following the Second World War, Stuart served as the U.S. ambassador to China from 1946 to 1949; his mandate was to assist General George C. Marshall in finding a détente between the Nationalists and the emerging Communists. The efforts proved unsuccessful, and the Communists took control of mainland China, with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists relegated to Taiwan. Stuart would be the last U.S. ambassador to China until 1979, when normal relations resumed between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

Stuart returned to the United States and wrote extensively about his experiences; he did not visit China again. He died in Washington, D.C., in 1962. Stuart’s legacy in China rests upon his active involvement in furthering education in China, especially in the hope that it might serve to weaken age-old feudal traditions and usher in a new sensibility for Chinese youth whereby they might engage fruitfully and beneficially with the world at large.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


Su Shi was perhaps the most renowned scholar-official of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), with pathbreaking accomplishments in several aesthetic fields, including all major genres of poetry (shi, ci, and fu), old-style prose (guwen), calligraphy, painting, and even cuisine.

Su Shi was the renaissance man of what was arguably the renaissance in Chinese intellectual and cultural history of the tenth and eleventh centuries. This period marked a threshold in Chinese history with the rise of the scholar-official class empowered by a merit-based examination system, new infrastructures of travel that made the new scholar-official elite a mobile and cosmopolitan class, and an intellectual revival of Confucianism that encouraged this new class to conceive of itself as “co-rulers” of the empire alongside the emperor. However, Su Shi’s most enduring impact on the Chinese literary tradition was the way he responded to the challenges of displacement in official travel and exile through his literary works.

Su Shi was born in the southwestern mountain town of Meishan (Sichuan Province). In 1057 at the age of twenty-one he traveled with his father, Su Xun (1009–1066), and younger brother, Su Che (1039–1112), to the capital, Kaifeng, in the north to take the official examination. Su Shi placed second in this highly competitive exam and thereby came to the attention of Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072), the chief examiner and a major political
reformer of the time. Many groups of scholar-officials sought to have their visions for “ordering the world” implemented by the court, but the day was won by Wang Anshi (1021–1086), who advocated a set of “New Policies,” a kind of state socialism that sought to build up the central government’s wealth and military strength vis-à-vis its nomadic neighbors to the north. Su Shi’s outspoken opposition to some of the inadvertent ill effects of these policies on the local populace caused him to be sidelined to a series of provincial appointments. In addition to directly criticizing the New Policies, Su wrote satirical poems addressed to his allies to voice his protest. He was arrested in 1079 on a trumped-up charge of high treason and was subjected to the “Crow Terrace Poetry Trial” in which his literary works were gathered and examined for treasonous passages. After one hundred days, a death sentence was commuted to an open-ended exile to the Huangzhou (Hubei Province) in the central Yangzi (Chang) River valley. This five-year period of exile (1080–1084) was a time of intense self-reflection and Buddhist practice for Su Shi during which many of his greatest literary works were written. Su Shi sustained himself during his exile by farming a plot of land known as the “Eastern Slope,” and it was from this plot of land that he took the name “Layman of the East Slope.” The death of Emperor Shenzong and the regency of the Grand Empress Dowager (Shenzong’s mother) brought the return of Su Shi and other opponents of the New Policies to the capital. During this brief period Su Shi wrote the greatest number of “poems on paintings” (tihuashī). These poems, along with his prose writings on the arts of the brush, crystallized the theories of literati painting, including the idea that painting possesses the same expressive capacity as poetry. The ascent of Shenzong’s son, Zhezong, to the throne in 1093 led to the restoration of the New Policies administration of his father, and Su Shi was exiled for a second time to the distant south, first to Huizhou (Guangzhou Province) from 1094 to 1096 and then to Qiongzhou (Hainan Island) from 1097 to 1100. Although he was allowed to return to the mainland in 1101 in order to take a post in his home province, he fell ill and died on the road home.

Shī poetry was a classical form of verse written in lines of five or seven characters, organized in couplets with rhyme falling on the even numbered lines, with roots stretching back to the Zhou dynasty (1100–256 BCE). By the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1279 CE) dynasties,
shi had become perhaps the highest ranking genre of poetry and the ability to compose shi became one of the criteria by which candidates for employment in public office were chosen. As such, shi poetry became associated with literati expressions of commitment to the affairs of the state. Su Shi’s shi poetry continued within this tradition, but his shi poems had a strong philosophical and discursive or prosaic flavor, as was characteristic of Song dynasty shi poetry. In his shi poetry, like his ancient-style prose, he developed a style that embodied both spontaneity and objectivity, emphasizing the images of flowing water and the moon that represent the continuity or pattern (li) that he discovered within change.

He also took up the song lyric (ci), a genre of poetry quite unlike shi poetry in both form and generic status. The song lyric was a form of verse of relatively low generic status written within the format of popular songs, often characterized by uneven line lengths and more colloquial language, and was associated with urban entertainment quarters, the female performers who sung them, and the themes of delicate emotions and romantic love. Su Shi elevated the status of this popular song lyric by expanding its topics to include aspects of public life that were formerly the domain of shi poetry. While he wrote song lyrics on romance and the more delicate emotions, he also expanded the thematic scope of the song lyric to focus on longing for place and for like-minded historical figures of the past.

Su Shi was a scholar-official of multifaceted accomplishments who drew the full range of poetic genres and art forms into the common repertoire of literati aesthetic pursuit while leaving the indelible imprint of his own signature style on each.

Benjamin RIDGWAY

Further Reading
Military campaigns—against the Chen to reunify north and south China, against Turks north of the Great Wall, and against Koguryô in Korea—dominated much of the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). Legal and administrative reform, infrastructure improvements, engineering marvels, and construction of cities and palaces were hallmarks of the period. The dynasty ended after only two emperors.

The Sui dynasty lasted only thirty-seven years, from 581 to 618 CE, and had only two emperors, Sui Wendi and Sui Yangdi. A hallmark of the dynasty was territorial expansion. The dynasty began with Wendi’s successful campaigns to reunite north and south China under his rule; the dynasty ended when the huge loss of life and wealth caused by Yangdi’s failed campaigns to expand into Korea incited rebellion and overthrow. Wendi began legal reforms and the building of a large imperial library that Yangdi continued. Both emperors built grand new capitals and improved and extended China’s infrastructure of canals, roads, and the Great Wall. Administrative reforms, such as the creation of civil service exams, strengthened imperial bureaucracy at the expense of the aristocracy and provincial officials.

Reunification of North and South China

The crowning achievement of the Sui dynasty was the reunification of China, ending nearly three centuries of division between Southern and Northern dynasties (220–589 CE). Sui Wendi acceded to the emperorship of north China by usurping his grandson. Almost immediately after his enthronement on 4 March 581, Sui Wendi turned his attention to the problem of “swallowing the region south of the Yangzi River,” that is, conquering the Southern Chen dynasty (557–589 CE) that ruled the region. On 28 March, he took the first step toward realizing his ambition by appointing two of his most successful generals to posts as Governor-Generals for regions on the Yangzi (Chang) River’s northern bank. But the emperor had to delay preparations for the campaign in order to deal with threats from his Turkish neighbors.

The preparations resumed in earnest during 585. The most urgent need for the Sui campaign was a navy. The Yangzi River was a formidable obstacle, forming a natural barrier that the Chen relied on for defense against attacks from the north. The southerners had established eight fleets along the river’s course to thwart Sui invasions. On 6 September 585, Wendi appointed Yang Su (c. 561–606), his most able commander, to the post of Governor-General for Xinzhou (on the Yangzi in southwestern Sichuan), with instructions to construct a fleet. The emperor supplied him with two million yuan in cash, one thousand lengths of silk, and two hundred horses to
accomplish the task. The most impressive craft that Yang built were large warships, each of which had castles of five stories that rose more than one hundred feet above their deck and could accommodate eight hundred men. On the prow, stern, starboard, and port, the general installed six spiked booms fifteen meters tall that pivoted down to strike enemy ships. During a battle the booms dropped vertically onto opposing vessels to damage or pin them. Yang Su also constructed a large number of troop transports with room for one hundred naval soldiers each.

On 22 November 586, Wendi appointed his third son Yang Jun (570–600) nominal head of a temporary government that had control over thirty-six districts on the Han River, a northern tributary of the Yangzi. The emperor charged him with building a second navy. The prince’s staff gathered a force of soldiers, sailors, and marines that exceeded 100,000 men. Wendi also had a third maritime fleet constructed and stationed in the Yellow Sea off modern Haizhou in Jiangsu Province. This fleet was under the command of Admiral Yan Rong (fl. 557–604), who earned an unenviable reputation for cruelty.

To solve the problem of supplying a large military force with provisions, Wendi undertook the construction of the Shangyangdu, a canal that linked the Huai River to the Yangzi. Its completion, on 15 October 587, enabled the Sui to ship materiel and provisions to the front faster.

Section from the painting *Portraits of the Emperors* by Yan Liben. (Ink and color on silk.) Emperor Sui Wendi is pictured in the right foreground and is followed by his son and successor Emperor Sui Yangdi. Wendi and Yangdi were the only emperors of the short-lived (thirty-seven-year-long) Sui dynasty.
and cheaper than over land. In the same year one of Wen- 
di’s commissioners procured 100,000 horses to serve as 
mounts for his cavalry and as teams for supply wagons.

Another prerequisite for launching the campaign 
against the Chen was the subjugation of the Liang dy-
nasty, a small state sandwiched between the Han and 
Yangzi rivers. Its ruler came to pay homage to the Sui 
court on 25 September 587. Wendi took advantage of the 
monarch’s absence from his state and ordered one of the 
Sui armies to attack the Liang capital. On 25 October, it 
camped outside the city’s walls, and the following day 
the Liang court along with 100,000 men and women fled 
into Chen territory.

The order of battle was fixed on 22 March 588, when 
Wendi issued a decree calling for an eight-pronged as-
sault on the south with three navies, the two armies the 
emperor had established in 581, and three additional 
forces—one under the command of his son Yang Guang 
(later emperor Yangdi)—that he created later. Altogether 
he had 518,000 men under arms who faced some 100,000 
Chen warriors. The main objective of the campaign was 
to seize Jiankang (modern Nanjing), the Chen capital.

The war began in late 588, when Yang Su’s navy of sev-
eral thousand ships sailed down the Yangzi through the 
Three Gorges and encountered a Chen fleet of one hun-
dred vessels at a set of rapids. During the night the general 
led his ships past the white water while his marines seized 
two strongholds on either side of the river. Yang Su pur-
sued the retreating Chen forces downstream, where he 
ran into three iron chains strung across the river to pre-
vent the passage of his fleet. Again Sui marines attacked 
Chen forts, carried them with the loss of five thousand 
troops, and removed the chains. In the next engagement 
Yang sent four of his huge warships against the enemy 
fleet. They destroyed a dozen or more of the Chen vessels 
with their spiked booms and scattered the remainder. Af-

terward the general sailed east, sweeping aside all opposi-
tion, and joined forces with Prince Yang Jun at the mouth 
of the Han River. By that time Jiankang had fallen, and 
the combined force took no further action. Meanwhile 
Admiral Yan sailed up the Yangzi where he captured a 
strategic city.

While the navies were maneuvering on the Yangzi, Sui 
armies invaded Chen. One of Wendi’s generals had sold 
old horses to purchase two sets of boats. He hid the set 
of new, fit boats in inlets along the northern bank of the 
Yangzi. He moored the set of broken-down craft on the 
river in full sight of the enemy as a ruse to convince them 
that his troops could not possibly make a crossing. Under 
the cover of darkness on the night of 22 January 589 (the 
lunar New Year), some contingents of the army landed on 
southern bank of the Yangzi and established a foothold. 
Sui forces then poured across the river and crushed Chen 
armies in several battles. On 2 February, they seized Ji-
ankang and overcame the Chen emperor.

Afterward Wendi had Jiankang razed to the ground 
and converted it into farmland so that it could not serve 
as a focus for resistance by Chen loyalists. Yang Su put 
down the last of the southern rebellion in 591. The con-
quest of Chen extended the borders of the Sui empires to 
the South China Sea, adding 130 districts and four hun-
dred counties to its territory.

Actions on the Frontiers

The Turks, nomadic tribes inhabiting the steppes north of 
China, posed the greatest threat to the Sui dynasty. Dur-
ing the Northern Zhou dynasty (557–581 CE), the Turk-

ish Empire, which controlled the region from modern 
Manchuria to the borders of Persia, was strong enough 
to exact tribute in the amount of 100,000 lengths of silk 
a year from the Chinese emperor. In the summer of 582, 
the Turks launched incursions into northwest China on 
such a massive scale that Wendi had to station an army 
across the Wei River from Daxing, his capital, to prevent 
them from sacking the seat of his government.

One of the Sui dynasty’s responses to the depredations 
of the alien nations on their frontier was to strengthen the 
Great Wall, the traditional barrier erected to protect the 
sedentary agricultural population of China proper from 
its nomadic pastoral neighbors. In 581, Wendi ordered 
fifty thousand laborers to construct or repair it. Wendi 
undertook larger projects in 586 and 587 when he assigned 
110,000 and 100,000 men respectively to work for twenty 
days on the Wall. In the summer of 607, Yangdi sent a 
host of one million to build a new section of the wall that 
was more than 540 kilometers long. Five or six out of ten 
laborers perished during the twenty days that it took to 
complete that part of the Great Wall.

The Great Wall often failed to thwart Turkish raids. 
Fortunately for the Sui, dissension broke out among the
Sometime between 582 and 584, the western tribes of the Turkish empire split from their eastern brethren. War frequently broke out between the two divisions of the empire. After a serious invasion that threatened Daxing in 601 and an attack in 602 on Qaghan Qimin (also called Khan Qimin, reigned 599–611 CE), the Sui’s puppet who occupied the steppes between the Huang (Yellow) River and the Great Wall, a revolt by one of its tribes forced the western Turks to withdraw. As for the eastern Turks, a split at court over the question of succession to the khanate arose in 582, and the Sui skillfully played one faction against the other thereafter. In 597, Wendi forged a marriage alliance with Qaghan Qimin by presenting him with a Chinese bride. The emperor also provided him with military support that enabled the khan to defeat his rivals. Thereafter the khan became a compliant servitor to the Sui throne. Further serious problems with the Turks did not arise until 615.

The Tuyuhun, a proto-Tibetan nation that occupied grazing lands around Lake Kokonor on the western frontier, also made periodic incursions into Chinese territory. In 608, they requested assistance in their struggles with the Turks, and Yangdi sent an army out to help them. Intimidated by the size of the Sui forces, the Tuyuhun fled. The Chinese commander captured their commander, took more than a thousand heads, and enslaved four thousand men and women. The Sui then took possession of Tuyuhun territory (some 2,200 kilometers from east to west and 1,000 kilometers from north to south), established local administrative districts, and populated the territory with criminals sentenced to exile for their offenses.

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Centralization of Power

Wendi had only one political model to follow in reforming his government, that of the centralized autocratic monarchy that the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) first established in the third century BCE. Since the first century CE, however, power had gravitated to an aristocracy of great families who controlled local governments to the detriment of the emperor and his bureaucracy. Wendi set out to correct the problem by undermining the regional patricians. To that end, he forbade provincial officials from appointing subordinates (thereafter a prerogative of the Department of Personnel in the capital), from serving in their native districts lest they favor their relatives or partisans, from occupying a post in any district where they had served before so they could not build a base of power, and from taking their parents and adult sons with them when they assumed a new office. The emperor dealt a further blow to the aristocracy in 583, when he eliminated genealogy as a qualification for holding office.

Wendi also wanted to ensure the competency of the bureaucracy and root out corruption. To accomplish that end, he limited the tenure of local governors to three years and ordered them to send representatives to the capital three times per year to report on affairs in their districts. The emperor required the officials to undergo a yearly evaluation of their merits and faults by the Department of Personnel; the results of those appraisals were recorded in the men’s dossiers and were instrumental in determining their promotions or demotions, rewards, or penalties. Furthermore, he dispatched inspectors, the eyes and ears of the emperor, to local districts, where they scrutinized the performance of the governors and rated their conduct.

A competent bureaucracy also required a system for selecting talented men. An edict issued in 587 ordered governors of prefectures to recommend three men annually (a total of around nine hundred men per year after the conquest of Chen in 589). In addition, the Sui established three (later four) civil service examinations that evaluated the learning and literary skills of the candidates. Those apparently lost 80 to 90 percent of its officers and men. The final military interventions were three campaigns prosecuted against Koguryo between 612 and 614.
who passed the oral and written tests received entry-level appointments to posts in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Substantial revenues were, of course, critical to the Sui’s centralization of government. In 583 the throne discovered that there was widespread tax evasion among its subjects living east of Luoyang. Household registers were the government’s instruments for determining the liability of families, and the easterners had been falsifying them by listing adult males as minors or seniors who were exempt from taxation. So Wendi sent out inspectors to make an accurate head count. As a result, the agents added 1,641,000 delinquent taxpayers to the tax rolls. Another round of inspections conducted in 609 added another 641,000 names to the registers.

Standardization of the currency was another important measure that Wendi adopted to centralize state control over the empire. When he assumed the throne, there were several forms of cash (round copper coins) in circulation. The emperor had new coins minted, a thousand of which weighed 2.75 kilograms. In 583, he sent specimens of them to customs barriers with orders that officers there were to confiscate any coins that did not conform to the samples and melt them into copper for the state’s use. By 585 the older coins disappeared. The new currency no doubt had a very salutary affect on trade. Unfortunately, during Yangdi’s reign the government lost control of minting of the coins, and it slipped into private hands. Not only did the weight of coins drop to half and then to a quarter of the original standard, but also manifold currencies appeared, such as iron, leather, and paper coins.

Legal Reforms

One facet of Wendi’s drive to reform the government was the revision of the legal code. Deliberations ordered in 581 resulted in the elimination of three forms of capital punishment (hanging, dismemberment, and exposure of the condemned’s head in the market), leaving throttling and decapitation as the only legitimate types of execution. The new code also substituted beating with a rod for flogging with a whip. Two years later, the emperor promulgated the Kaihuang Code, which reduced the number of articles (1,537) in the Zhou legal code of 563 to five hundred and arranged them under twelve headings. The Kaihuang Code is no longer extant, but it was the basis of the Tang Code that had the same number of headings and 501 articles. The Tang Code remained virtually unchanged until the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and served as the basis for the legal codes of Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.

The limitation of capital punishments to throttling and decapitation did not apply to cases of treason. Twice Yangdi had men—a son of Yang Su along with ten of his party and a general who defected to Korea—“quintered.” That form of execution involved tying ropes to the condemned’s neck and limbs and attaching the ropes to chariots. At a signal the charioteers simultaneously spurred their teams of horses in five different directions, dismembering and beheading the man. The flesh of the defecting general’s body was also butchered, roasted, and given to court officials who ate it at Yangdi’s command.

Such acts were exceptional. Wendi took great care to ensure that mistakes were not made in imposing capital punishment. The emperor did not trust provincial officials to apply it justly, so in 592 he forbade them from executing criminals until the Court of Supreme Justices in the capital had reviewed their judgments. In 595 he also commanded the justices to report such sentences to him three times for his approval before they issued the authorizations for executions.

By and large the Sui Dynasty was a period of great leniency toward malefactors. From 581 to 615 Wendi and Yangdi issued sixteen Great Acts of Grace. Those proclamations nullified the sentences of all criminals and emptied all prisons throughout the empire.

Libraries and Literature

One aspect of the Sui’s reunification of China was the assembly of a great library to establish the cultural heritage of the dynasty. In 583, Wendi ordered commissioners to hunt for books that were missing from the imperial library. According to his stipulations, agents were to borrow the books and compensate their owners with one roll of silk for every scroll of text. When the works arrived at the capital scholars selected the best versions and collated them, weeding out forgeries in the process. Then imperial scribes made fair copies, and the originals were returned to their owners. After the conquest of the Northern Chen dynasty, the process continued and contributed to integrating northern and southern cultures.
Yangdi continued collecting manuscripts for the great library. Fascinated with things mechanical, he had a special library constructed in Luoyang for his books. When the emperor visited the library, a maidservant, who preceded him bearing incense, stepped on a trigger device set in the front of the library hall. The trigger activated machinery that raised curtains, swung the two leaves of the door back into the interior, and opened the doors of the bookcases. When he left, the process was repeated in reverse. By the end of the dynasty the capitals had huge libraries. A catalogue compiled early in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) listed 14,466 titles in 89,666 scrolls.

Korean Campaigns

In the latter part of his reign, Yangdi was obsessed with conducting three wars against Koguryo, a state in present-day Liaoning Province and northern Korea. The emperor wanted to accomplish what his father had failed to do in 598. In preparation for the campaign he ordered the construction of a maritime fleet on 24 April 611. One of his mandarins went to the northern coast of Shandong peninsula with orders to build three hundred war ships. Workers labored day and night, not daring to rest. Maggots infested them from the waist down, and three out of four perished. After Yangdi arrived at his palace in Zhuojun (near present-day Beijing) on 1 June, he set about marshalling his resources for the war. He called up thirty thousand crossbow men, thirty thousand javelin throwers and ten thousand seamen. To provide ample provisions for his armies, canal barges transported huge quantities of cereals from the granaries on the Huang River to his base in the north. The quantity provided by the barges was apparently insufficient, so the emperor ordered thousands (perhaps 300,000) of two-man wheelbarrows loaded with 180 liters of grain each to make their way up the roads from the south. But before they reached the base at Zhuojun the porters had consumed all of the cereals and fled. Yangdi ordered up fifty thousand carts to carry uniforms, armor, and tents to the front.

By 7 February 612, a host of some 600,000 troops and civilians had assembled at Zhuojun. On 3 March, the first of the armies advanced toward the west bank of the Liao River. On 19 April, the soldiers assaulted a bridge across the waterway, but failed to take it when they met fierce resistance from the Koreans. Yuwen Kai then constructed three pontoon bridges, but he seriously miscalculated the distance. They were 2.4 meters short of the eastern bank. Nevertheless, several contingents leapt into the water from the truncated span and assaulted the Koreans on 24 April. The enemy pushed them back, and three Chinese generals died in the battle. Two days later an engineer fixed the bridges, and the armies crossed the Liao River on them and defeated the Koreans.

Sui forces then laid siege to the stronghold at Ryotongsong (modern Liaodong city). When their repeated assaults failed, Yangdi changed his strategy. He sent nine corps south to attack P’yŏngyang, the capital of Koguryo. That expeditionary force marched to within sixteen kilometers of the city. Realizing that his men were too exhausted to proceed and short of provisions as well, their commander-in-chief withdrew. As the retreating Sui armies were fording a river, the Koreans attacked and inflicted staggering losses on them.

In the meantime Admiral Lai Huer (d. c. 617) sailed from Shandong with his warships. His navy landed on the Korean coast thirty-two kilometers from P’yŏngyang where Sui marines inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy. Afterward forty thousand troops advanced and assaulted the city. They carried the outer wall, but a counterattack by the Koreans overwhelmed them, slaying or capturing all but several thousand of the marines. The admiral retreated to the coast and waited for the arrival of the northern army. When it retreated, he led his fleet back to Shangdong.

On 26 August, Yangdi’s disbanded his armies. Of the 305,000 troops that had crossed the Liao River, only 2,700 returned. Despite the enormous loss of life and military equipment, Yangdi immediately began preparations for a second campaign.

On 28 January 613, Yangdi called for the mobilization of more troops to invade Koguryo. That announcement immediately sparked disaffection throughout the empire. The first in a series of rebellions broke out five days later, and a further fifteen uprisings erupted before the end of the year. Nevertheless, the emperor doggedly persisted in prosecuting the war, and his forces crossed the Liao River again on 21 May. The army besieged Ryotongsŏng for the second time, but failed to capture it after a siege of more than twenty days. Yangdi then ordered one million hemp bags filled with earth to build a ramp 42 meters wide and
the height of the city wall so that his troops could ascend and overrun the ramparts. He also had his engineers build siege towers on eight wheels that were taller than the wall. When soldiers pushed them close to the city, archers could shoot into it.

All that effort was for naught. On 25 June, the son of Yang Su, Yang Xuangan, revolted. Xuangan was in charge of the giant granaries at the end of the canal on the Huang River, so his insurrection cut the supply line to the armies in Koguryo. On 6 July, the rebel forces encamped outside an eastern gate of Luoyang, defeated the army sent to oppose him, and breached the city’s outer wall. Making matters worse, one of Yangdi’s commanders defected to the Koreans on 18 July. Yangdi had no choice but to disband the expeditionary army in the north on 20 July. The emperor dispatched one of his generals south to suppress Yang’s rebellion. After the general destroyed the rebel forces, Xuangan ordered his own brother to kill him. On 21 August, Xuangan’s corpse was dismembered in the eastern market of Luoyang. Three days later his remains were butchered and burned. His father’s corpse was exhumed, and the raw bones were burned.

When Yangdi asked for opinions on the question of conducting a third campaign against Koguryo on 14 March 614, his advisors were dumbfounded and dared not offer counsel for several days. Undaunted, the emperor summoned more troops on 4 April, but many of the soldiers did not arrive in time due to rampant rebellions throughout the empire. The army in the north proved ineffectual again, but such was not the case for the navy. Admiral Lai made a third crossing to the Korean coast, and his marines defeated the Korean army. Lai’s men then besieged P’yŏngyang. Yŏngyang (reigned 590–618), the king of Koguryo, was in desperate straits. On 7 September, he pleaded for peace and begged to surrender. Yangdi accepted the capitulation on face value and disbanded his armies five days later.

The Korean king’s surrender was a ploy to buy time. He ceded little territory and no powers over his subjects to his powerful neighbor. When Yŏngyang refused to visit Luoyang to pay homage to the emperor, Yangdi contemplated a fourth invasion of Koguryo, but nothing came of it. The emperor harvested only bitter fruit from his adventures in Korea. Rebellions increased in intensity and ferocity year after year from the beginning of the campaigns until the end of his reign.

**Fall of Sui Dynasty**

On 19 June 615, Yangdi left for one last tour of the northern frontier. On 6 September, the Chinese wife of Qaghan Shibi, (reigned 611–619), successor to Khan Qimin, sent word that her husband planned to attack the emperor’s entourage with twenty thousand horsemen. Yangdi quickly repaired to Yanmen (north of Taiyuan inside the Great Wall) four days later. On 11 September, Shibi’s warriors surrounded the city. A month later, the Turks lifted the siege when Sui reinforcements arrived on the scene, and Yangdi returned to Luoyang, his capital. The humiliating confinement at Yanmen was the last blow to whatever prestige the emperor had salvaged from the colossal catastrophe of his Korean campaigns.

After his return to the capital, Yangdi obstinately refused to recognize the looming danger, and he became increasingly incapable of dealing with the numerous insurrections that proliferated within his realm. When rebel forces threatened Luoyang in 616, Yangdi decided to flee and to abandon the north. He executed two officials who objected to his flight and set sail on his dragon barge for Jiangdu on 27 August. He languished there for a year and seven months. In desperation he even toyed with the idea of establishing a new capital in the south, but it was too late.

In the morning of 11 April 618, a body of his troops, many of them northerners who ardently desired to return home, stormed the palace, entered its bathhouse, and forced Yangdi into a chair. Aware of his impending doom, the emperor requested permission to take poison wine in an effort to save his dignity, but his captors refused. So he undid his belt sash and handed it to one of the officers who throttled him. Yangdi’s death at the age of forty-nine effectively brought a close to the Sui dynasty, although a grandson reigned over the dynasty nominally as a puppet of the Tang in Daxing for another thirty-six days.

**Heritage**

At the height of the Sui dynasty in 609 the empire stretched 5,022 kilometers from the Pacific Ocean to the steppes north of Tibet and 8,000 kilometers from the Great Wall to Vietnam. Within its boundaries there were 190 prefectures, 1,242 counties, and 357,468 square
kilometers of arable land and pastures. The census of that year recorded a population of 46,019,956, the largest since the Han dynasty.

In that year the Sui dynasty was a success by any measure. It was at peace with its neighbors. No serious internal insurrections had erupted since 591. A relatively impartial and efficient bureaucracy governed the capitals and provinces. The justice system appears to have maintained order fairly according to a well-defined code of laws, and the country was prosperous. Had it not been for Yangdi’s catastrophic campaigns in Koguryo, the dynasty could well have endured for three centuries instead of three decades.

Charles D. BENN

Further Reading


Wendi (family name Yang Jian) founded the Sui dynasty. His greatest achievement as emperor was the reunification of north and south China. An able administrator, he built a new capital city, reduced taxes, and created granaries to guard against famine. A devout Buddhist, he expanded the number of monasteries and monks throughout the country.

Yang Jian (541–604 ce), Wendi, was the founder of the Sui dynasty in 581 and the unifier of China in 589. He was born in a convent at Fengxiang west of modern Xi’an on 21 August 541. A nun told his mother that the child should not dwell among the laity because he was quite extraordinary, a sign that he would rise to a high position. The nun then took responsibility for raising the boy in a lodge set aside for him.

Jian was the son of a powerful general whom the first emperor of the Zhou period of the Northern dynasty (557–581 ce) ennobled as the Duke of Sui for his meritorious service in founding that dynasty. After his father’s death Jian succeeded to the dukedom and later adopted the title as the name for his dynasty.

After attending the imperial college for the sons of nobles and high-ranking officials in Chang’an, Yang Jian received his first official appointment by virtue of hereditary privilege at the age of fourteen. Subsequently he rose through the bureaucracy and held three posts as Grand General.

On 16 August 575 Emperor Wudi (543–578) ordered Yang Jian and another officer to lead a navy of thirty thousand men east as part of Wudi’s plan to conquer the neighboring Northern Qi Dynasty (550–578). This campaign failed, and the admirals were forced to burn their ships. Wudi renewed his campaign to subjugate the Qi in 576 and appointed Jian and seven other generals to take command of the Zhou armies and strike eastward. Those forces vanquished the Qi on 8 March 577. The victory united virtually all of China north of the Yangzi (Chang) River, and the emperor bestowed the title Pillar of State on Jian as a reward for his meritorious service during the war.

Fortune smiled on Yang Jian in 578 when Emperor Xuandi (669–580) elevated Yang’s eldest daughter Lihua (560–609) to the dignity of empress on 29 July. After the emperor’s death in 580, Jian was installed as regent for his grandson, the eight-year-old boy who succeeded to the throne. Yang soon acquired total control over the government and its military forces. He ruthlessly dealt with the threat to his growing power by the royal house. By the end of the year he had sixteen Zhou princes—one of whom actually attempted to assassinate him—as well as forty-one of their sons and brothers killed. After annihilating the entire royal family, he suppressed a number of rebellions instigated by Zhou loyalists in the provinces.

On 4 March 581 ce, Yang Jian assumed the throne and received the imperial seals. To commemorate the occasion he bestowed a Great Act of Grace granting amnesties to criminals throughout northern China. Two days later he raised his wife, Madam Dugu (552–602 ce), to the dignity of empress, and on 9 July he had the last Zhou emperor murdered.
The Empress

Madam Dugu, who possessed the independent character of northern steppe women from whom she was descended, controlled the dealings of her household and also exercised influence over affairs of state. When her husband conducted official business, she rode to the audience chamber in a litter next to his. After he entered she waited outside and sent a eunuch in to report on what was transpiring. When she discovered some fault in Wendi’s decisions, she sent in her counsel advising him to set a new course. The emperor usually yielded to her suggestions. Her clout was so great that palace attendants thought of her as a second emperor.

The empress was staunchly monogamous. When she married Yang Jian at the age of fourteen, she exacted a promise from him to have no children by any other woman. She was also extremely jealous, so much so that palace ladies dared not approach him. Among the children of Wendi and his empress were Yang Yong, the eldest, who was deposed as crown prince; Yang Guang, an army leader during battles against Chen who succeeded his father as emperor; and Yang Jun, a naval leader during battles against Chen who was removed from office for wastefulness.

Madam Dugu shared her husband’s concern for placing public interests over private. Once when an official suggested that she purchase a casket of pearls worth eight million yuan, she rejected the proposal. The empress argued that the money should be spent on rewarding the armies battling the Turks and Tuyuhun on the northern and western frontiers.

Conquest of South Dynasty and Unification of China

The victory against the Qi leaders of the North dynasty while Wendi was a general of the Northern Zhou rulers united all China north of the Yangzi River. Sui Wendi’s successful campaign against the Southern Chen, who ruled the area south of the Yangzi, achieved the reunification of all China after nearly three centuries of division.

The Chen relied on the natural barrier of the Yangzi and their fleets along the river for defense against attacks from the north. To overcome this obstacle, Wendi appointed Yang Su (c. 561–606 CE) to the post of Governor-General for Xinzhou (on the Yangzi in southwestern Sichuan Province) and gave him many resources to construct a fleet. Among the naval craft that Yang Su had constructed were large warships with spiked booms that dropped vertically onto opposing vessels and large numbers of troop transports. Two other fleets were created, one under the command of Wendi’s son Yang Jun. Other preparations for war included expansion of armies (one under the command of son Yang Guang), procurement of horses as mounts for cavalry, and teams for supply wagons, and construction of a canal linking the Huai River to the Yangzi for fast transportation of men and materiel to the front. By the time the war began in late 588 CE, the Sui forces numbered 518,000 men compared with 100,000 men under arms for the Chen forces.

Thanks in part to superior warships, Sui forces achieved naval victories, including the removal of three chains across the Yangzi that had prevented their progress down river. Sui army forces crossed the Yangzi on the night of 22 January 589, the lunar New Year, and established a foothold in Chen territory. Sui forces then poured across the river and crushed Chen armies in several battles. On 2 February they seized the Chen capital of Jiankang and overcame the Chen emperor. Wendi had Jiankang razed to the ground and converted into farmland so that it could not serve as a focus for resistance by Chen loyalists.

The conquest of Chen extended the borders of the Sui empires to the South China Sea. Wendi supported military victory with administrative moves: he forced Chen nobles to move to Daxing, bringing southern cultural traditions to the north; reduced taxes in the south; and used Buddhism as unifying religion.

Daxing

Among Wendi’s greatest accomplishments was the construction of a new capital, Daxing, to replace the seven-hundred-year-old Chang’an, which was too cramped, and its water was brackish. Work commenced in 582 at a site about 10 kilometers southeast of Chang’an. An outer wall enclosed an area that was 84 square kilometers. The
city, built in a grid pattern, included a palace compound at the center of the city, a compound for the offices of the central government, and two vast, self-contained markets. The remainder of the city, 89 percent of its area, consisted of 109 walled wards for the dwellings of its citizens. Broad streets, up to 152 meters wide, ran the length and breadth of the city. Daxing was the largest capital ever built in Chinese history: Beijing of the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1912) was 25 percent smaller at 62 square kilometers.

Emperor Wendi and his government moved into their new quarters on 15 April 583. The emperor then ordered the flooding of the palaces at Chang’ān so that, it was said, the ghosts of the men that he had murdered would have no place to return. After the Tang took Daxing over and renamed it Chang’ān, the city became the grandest metropolis in the world and served as a model for capitals built in Japan and elsewhere. Unhappily, a warlord razed it to the ground in 904, and Chang’ān never again served as the seat of China’s central government.
Statecraft

Wendi was a legalist at heart. He insisted on the rigid, strict, and uniform enforcement of the law, the imposition of harsh punishments on malefactors, and the bestowal of liberal rewards on the meritorious. In his view justice had to replace mercy, and all subjects were equal before the law, even his kin. When his third son built a flamboyant palace embellished with jade and jewels, the emperor stripped the prince of all his offices and confined him to a mansion in the capital. Despite appeals for clemency from several of his mandarins, he did not relent. But Wendi sometimes bent the law when a valued friend committed a crime. He once commuted the death sentence imposed on a provincial official who had sold cereals to reduce the price of grain during a famine.

The emperor could be harsh and cruel. He would not tolerate corruption among officials and had venal offenders beaten for as many as four days in his audience hall. Wendi once had a man flogged to death with a horse whip for complaining that his favor for a certain minister was excessive. He had an official beheaded for not beating an offender with enough force. The emperor himself often beat people on the palace grounds. Wendi also went to extremes in his legislation. In early 596 he imposed the death penalty on thieves who stole cereals from a granary and enslaved their families. On another occasion the emperor prescribed capital punishment for thieves in the capital who stole property that was worth as little as one yuan. He later had to rescind the decree because of widespread protests against it.

Wendi was essentially pragmatic and had little or no regard for the frivolous, the extravagant, or the exotic. In the summer of 581, he dismissed all the government’s entertainers—acrobats, jugglers, wrestlers, dwarf, magicians, and the like—and sent them back to the people. In the same year the emperor forbade tribute of choice dogs, horses, vessel, toys, and delectable foodstuffs that were customary gifts sent by the prefectures to the throne. Like his wife, he was parsimonious. Rather than have new carriages built for him, he had the old ones repaired. He also insisted that only one dish of meat be served at his banquets.

The emperor had little esteem for Confucianism. The only one of its texts that he favored was the Classic of Filial Devotion because it bolstered his authoritarianism by stressing absolute submission of inferior to superior. It is not surprising, then, that in the summer of 601 Wendi abolished all schools—the bastions of Confucianism—in the empire save a single college in the capital that had seats for only seventy students. He reasoned that there were too many students (nearly one thousand in Daxing at the time), that they were slothful, and that they had neither virtues nor talents that were useful to the state.

Wendi took the traditional paternalism of the monarchy very seriously: He was the father and his subjects were his children. Fourteen days after ascending the throne he distributed five thousand government cattle to the poor. In 585 Wendi ordered the civilians and soldiers in all prefectures to dig underground pits for the storage of grain. Annually farmers deposited a small portion of their harvests in them for relief in times of famine. After the completion of Daxing in 583, Wendi reduced the corvée—the annual labor obligation of adult males—from thirty to twenty days and reduced the tax paid in cloth by half. In 586 the emperor sent commissioners out to the provinces with orders to dispense relief to all families of warriors slain in battle. (In 593 he granted a year’s remission of taxes for the same.) After the conquest of Chen in 589, the emperor granted the south a tax remission for ten years and excused the other areas of his realm from paying their levy in grain for one year.

Buddhism

Wendi, his empress, and their sons were devout Buddhists, attending services held in the palace every evening. In 580, while he was regent, Yang Jian had a decree issued in the name of the emperor that rescinded the proscription of Buddhism. That act, promulgated in 574, had defrocked the clergy, destroyed monasteries along with their images, and confiscated monastic lands. As emperor, Wendi ordered the restoration of all cloisters destroyed during the proscription, donated silk for repair of damaged monasteries, and called for the reinstatement of images in the temples, making their destruction a capital offense. His promise of free charters to anyone who constructed a monastery in the new city of Daxing resulted in a total of 120 Buddhist cloisters in the capital (in contrast to the ten Daoist abbeys). Outside in the provinces the growth of Buddhism was equally spectacular. In 585
the emperor founded forty-five government monasteries in the prefectures of north China. Between 601 and 604 he had 111 stupas (mounded tombs) built throughout the empire to enshrine Buddha’s relics—hair, nail clippings, teeth, bones, and the like. Wendi also created Assemblies of Twenty-Five whose monks scattered throughout the empire to spread the Buddhist doctrine (dharma). By the end of the Sui dynasty, China had 3,792 Buddhist monasteries with a clergy of 230,000.

The emperor took the vows of a Buddhist layman in 585 and came to be known among the faithful as the bodhisattva Son of Heaven. In 586, in a very rare surrender of imperial prerogatives and dignity to a clergyman, Wendi invited a prelate to lecture on the dharma in order to dispel a drought. The monk ascended the throne and faced south while Wendi and his court sat on the ground facing him. Wendi cast himself in the role of the universal Buddhist monarch, claiming that he owed his rise to dharma, predestined fate. He employed Buddhism among his subjects as an ideology to unify China by spreading a single faith yoked to the state. His patronage laid the foundation for Buddhism’s golden age in the Tang dynasty.

Last Years

In the summer of 604 Wendi contracted an illness, reputedly brought on by his debauchery with two consorts who occupied his affections after the death of his wife. On 13 August, he died under suspicious circumstances at the age of sixty-four. There are strong indications that his son Yangdi committed patricide. When called to attend his father during his last days, he made sexual advances to one of the old man’s consorts. The woman informed Wendi, who decided to remove him as heir-apparent and to install his eldest son in his place. Fearing that he would lose his chances for the throne, Yangdi arranged the murder of Wendi before he could change the order of succession.

Wendi was ruthless, brutal, harsh, capricious, and autocratic. While those were not admirable traits in a man, they may have been exactly the qualities that the establishment of a new dynasty and the unification of China required. By and large the emperor was a diligent and effective ruler who was responsible for most of the Sui dynasty’s achievements.

Charles D. BENN

Further Reading


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The reign of Sui Yangdi was marked by the building of canals, the construction of grand palaces, and extravagant entertaining. The expense associated with these achievements, along with huge loss of life and burdensome taxation of the populace in wars against Koguryo in modern-day Korea, resulted in widespread rebellion, Yangdi’s ultimate death, and the downfall of the Sui dynasty.

Yang Guang (569–618 CE) was the second son of Sui Wendi and the second and last emperor of the Sui dynasty (569–618 CE). His father ennobled him as the Prince of Jin at the age of thirteen. In 588, the emperor placed him nominally in charge of the land forces that vanquished the Southern Chen dynasty the following year. In 590, Wendi appointed him Governor-General of the southern province of Yangzhou with headquarters at Jiangdu (modern Yangzhou). Except for a brief stint as a commander of an army sent against the Turks and yearly visits to pay court in Daxing, Wendi’s capital, Yang Guang spent ten years in the post. He became an ardent admirer of southern culture during that period, even learning the Wu dialect of the territory under his administration. Unlike his father, who was anti-intellectual and anti-Confucian, Yang Guang patronized hundreds of Confucian scholars and southern literary men, inviting them to Jiangdu where they taught and wrote.

When the crown prince, Wendi’s eldest son, incurred the extreme displeasure of Empress Dugu in 600, a cabal of officials including Yang Guang succeeded in unseating him. Wendi then installed Guang as his heir-apparent. On 21 August 604, Yang Guang ascended the throne in Daxing, eight days after the demise of his father, whose death he probably engineered. In November, Yangdi left for Luoyang, which became the real seat of his court. Although there were very important political and economic factors in the emperor’s decision to shift his capital to Luoyang, he had a real aversion to Daxing and spent little time there. A geomancer had informed him that Daxing was a threat to him because metal (the element of the west) governed it whereas wood (the element of the east) governed his personal destiny (axes hew trees).

Luoyang

Yangdi was not happy with the existing city of Luoyang, another capital built in the Han dynasty and rebuilt several times thereafter. In April 605, he ordered the construction of a new city to replace the older metropolis, assigning two million adult males to erect walls, grade roads, and raise buildings. On 11 April, Yangdi ordered over twenty thousand wealthy merchants and great traders to move their families into the capital in order to fill its markets. The city was completed in February 606, a mere 294 days after Yangdi issued the decree inaugurating the project.

The city, encompassing about 46 square kilometers and laid out in a grid pattern, included a palace, administrative compound, three markets, and 103 walled wards.
for dwellings. Luoyang straddled the Luo River, so it had a distinct advantage over Daxing because transportation by water was easy and inexpensive. But it also had a terrible disadvantage because the river periodically flooded, heavily damaging homes and other structures.

West Park was among the most extravagant of Yangdi’s expenditures at Luoyang. The wall of that pleasure garden was 70 kilometers in circumference. The palace was constructed of extraordinary timber and wonderful stones; rare flora and fauna filled its gardens. A large lake surrounded three man-made mountains, purportedly representing the fabled mountains of the immortals rumored to lie in the eastern ocean. Ingenious kiosks and observatories on the mountains, operated by hidden machinery, rose from and fell into the ground as if levitated by some divine magic.

Unlike his frugal father, Yangdi was profligate and spent large sums on building palaces, including the conversion of his former mansion at Jiangdu into an enormous and extravagant palace. The emperor raised at least seventy palaces at various sites in the provinces during his short reign of less than fourteen years.

The Grand Canal

Yangdi is probably best known to history as a builder of the Grand Canal. The first branch replaced an older canal that linked the Huang (Yellow) River to the Yangzi (Chang) River. On 14 April 605, he ordered some 500,000 soldiers and laborers from Henan (the region south of Luoyang) to build a segment from the Huang River to the Huai River and 100,000 from the south to repair his father’s canal from the Huai River to the Yangzi. Two broad roads, lined with elm and willow trees to provide shade, flanked the 119-meter-wide waterway, and twenty-six palaces erected along its course served as rest stops.

The second branch was a true innovation. On 23 January 608, Yangdi issued a command conscripting one million men from northern armies for the construction of a canal from the Huang River to a point between modern Beijing and Tianjin, a distance of about one thousand kilometers. When the number of adult males proved insufficient for the task, the emperor impressed women to fill the ranks. Completed in 609, its primary function was to provide transportation of provisions north for his campaign to conquer Koguryo, in modern-day Korea. Early in 611, he ordered the construction of a third branch, again a replacement for an older canal, from the Yangzi to Hangzhou. The total length of the system was approximately 2,357 kilometers.

The Imperial Flotilla

The renovation of the canals from the Huang River to the Yangzi served to improve the transportation of grain and silk revenues to the central government in the capitals, but the emperor also wanted an impressive waterway on which a flamboyant flotilla could carry him to Jiangdu. On 23 April 605, eight days after ordering the construction of the canals, he commissioned two of his mandarins to select timber for the construction of a fleet of twenty thousand vessels on the Yangzi. A quarter of the boats were built for the imperial flotilla. First and foremost among the vessels was the Dragon Barge: 13.5 meters high, 15 meters abeam, and 60 meters from stem to stern. It had a superstructure of four decks crowned by a main hall and two audience chambers. Eighteen hundred “hall legs” working in three shifts grasped six giant hawsers and towed the ship from the roadways on banks of the canal. The empress rode in the Circling Hornless Dragon barge, towed by nine hundred “hall legs.” The remainder of the boats carried an assortment of passengers and their regalia: consorts, palace women, princes, princesses, capital officials, clergymen, foreign emissaries, as well as imperial guard units. When Yangdi sailed on the canal, he took his entire court and much of the central government’s bureaucracy with him. The completed flotilla—5,245 vessels requiring a total of 45,930 haulers—arrived in Luoyang during September. It departed for its first voyage to Jiangdu on 2 October. In all, the flotilla sailed five times to and from Jiangdu during Yangdi’s reign.

Northern Tours

During the second phase of his reign Yangdi devoted the better part of his time to dealing with the Turks on China’s northern borders. His strategy called for overwhelming them with China’s cultural superiority by the display of clever contrivances. To that end, he personally conducted
tours in the north and northwest ostensibly to inspect the Great Wall. In 607, he ventured north of the Great Wall to Yulin, where the emperor feted the Turkish Qaghan Qimen (reigned 599–611) and his entourage in an enormous tent, large enough to accommodate the khan and 3,500 of his tribesmen. During the feast Chinese entertainers performed the hundred acts—acrobatics, wrestling, juggling, and the like—for the amusement of the guests. The Turks, who were duly startled but pleased, presented a huge number of cattle, sheep, horses, and camels to Yangdi. Yangdi reciprocated with gifts of silk and gold jars.

On his second tour in 608, Yangdi traveled north of the wall again and stopped at Wuyuan. The emperor brought with him a portable wooden fortress that was assembled on the spot. Its crenulated walls were 178 meters square and 12.46 meters high. When the imperial cortege encamped, spear chariots encircled the fort, and iron spikes were scattered on the ground inside the enclosed space to injure any horses that intruded. Rotating crossbows rigged with trip wires automatically fired at any trespassers. During his sojourn Yangdi ordered the construction of a city replete with dwellings, curtains, couches, and cushions for the Qaghan Qimin. The khan respected Chinese culture and was thinking of changing his barbarian customs, and Yangdi wanted to reward him.

Yangdi’s third tour in 609 took him to the region of Lake Kokonor in the far northwest to inspect the new territories that one of his commanders had acquired from the Tuyuhun the preceding year. For the occasion a large touring car was constructed, its roof large enough to accommodate a unit of imperial guards numbering several hundred who stood watch there.

On 27 July, Yangdi boarded the car. As a sign of special favor he invited the King of Turfan and the Chieftain of Hami—both oasis states on the northern silk route—to ascend the hall and dine with him. Other legates from more than twenty foreign nations sat in the courtyard outside to eat. Court entertainers performed foreign and Chinese music for the amusement of the guests. Afterward the emperor bestowed gifts on everyone.

**The Korean Campaigns**

During the third phase of his reign Yangdi was obsessed with defeating Koguryô, a state in present-day Liaoning Province and northern Korea, something his father had failed to achieve. Yangdi mounted a total of three campaigns against Koguryô. In preparation for the first campaign, he ordered the construction of a maritime fleet of three hundred warships, called up thirty thousand crossbow men, thirty thousand javelin throwers and ten thousand seamen. To provide ample provisions for his armies, canal barges, supplemented by thousands of two-man wheelbarrows on the roads, transported huge quantities of cereals from the granaries on the Huang River to his base in the north. In addition, Yangdi ordered fifty thousand carts to carry uniforms, armor, and tents to the front.

By 7 February 612, a host of some 600,000 troops and civilians had assembled at Zhuojun. Sui armies crossed
the Liao River on pontoon bridges and had initial success, but suffered staggering losses at P’yŏngyang, the capital of Koguryŏ. Naval and marine forces under Admiral Lai Huer also suffered huge losses after initial victories. On 26 August, Yangdi disbanded his armies. Of the 305,000 troops that had crossed the Liao River only 2,700 returned. Despite the enormous loss, including enormous amounts of military equipment, Yangdi immediately began preparations for a second campaign.

On 28 January 613, Yangdi called for the mobilization of more troops to invade Koguryŏ. That announcement immediately sparked disaffection throughout the empire. The first in a series of rebellions broke out five days later, and a further fifteen uprisings erupted before the end of the year. Nevertheless, the emperor doggedly persisted in prosecuting the war, and his forces crossed the Liao River again on 21 May and besieged Ryotongsŏng. They used siege towers on eight wheels to shoot arrows over the city wall, finally scaling the walls on a ramp of earth-filled hemp bags.

All that effort was for naught. A revolt by the man in charge of the giant granaries at the end of the canal on the Huang River cut the supply line to the armies in Koguryŏ. In July, the rebel forces encamped at Luoyang and defeated the army sent to oppose them. When one of Yangdi’s commanders defected to the Koreans, Yangdi had no choice but to disband the expeditionary army in the north. The rebellion was suppressed, the leader killed, and his corpse dismembered in the eastern market of Luoyang.

Undaunted by opposition to a third campaign against Koguryŏ, the emperor summoned more troops on 4 April 614, but many of the soldiers did not arrive in time due to rampant rebellions throughout the empire. The army in the north proved ineffectual again, but forces under Admiral Lai defeated the Korean army and besieged P’yŏngyang. On 7 September, Yŏngyang (reigned 590–618), the king of Koguryŏ, surrendered. Yangdi accepted the capitulation and disbanded his armies five days later.

The Korean king’s surrender was a ploy to buy time. He ceded little territory and no powers over his subjects to his powerful neighbor. When Yŏngyang refused to visit Luoyang to pay homage to the emperor, Yangdi contemplated a fourth invasion of Koguryŏ, but nothing came of it. The emperor harvested only bitter fruit from his adventures in Korea. Rebellions increased in intensity and ferocity year after year from the beginning of the campaigns until the end of his reign.

### Last Days

Rebellions by the Turks and the Chinese populace against Sui authority dominated the last days of Yangdi’s reign. While on a tour of the northern frontier in June 615, Yangdi received word that the Qaghan Shibi (reigned 611–619) planned an attack on the emperor’s entourage. Yangdi retreated to Yanmen, inside the Great Wall, but Shibi’s warriors surrounded that city and besieged it for a month, until Sui reinforcements arrived. Yangdi then returned to his capital at Luoyang.

The humiliating confinement at Yanmen was another blow to Yangdi’s prestige and authority over the populace. He refused to recognize the extent of the danger to him, however, and became increasingly incapable of dealing with the numerous insurrections proliferating within his realm. When rebel forces threatened Luoyang in 616, Yangdi decided to flee and abandon the north. He boarded his Dragon Barge and set sail for Jiangdu.

On the morning of 11 April 618, a body of his troops, many of them northerners who ardently desired to return home, stormed the Jiangdu palace and surrounded Yangdi. Aware of his impending doom, the emperor requested permission to take poison in an effort to save his dignity, but he was strangled with his own sash. Yangdi’s death at the age of forty-nine brought a close to the Sui dynasty.

### Heritage

Traditional historians classified Yangdi as a “bad last ruler”; the indictment lodged against him by the captors on the day of his death contained many of the criteria for making such a judgment. He had abandoned the dynasty’s ancestral shrines (the north), had pursued foreign wars that resulted in the death of many men (Koguryŏ), had spent too lavishly and extravagantly (Luoyang, palaces, the flotilla, and the northern tours), had destroyed the livelihood of his subjects (his enormous exaction of taxes and huge levies of corvée for public works), and had caused rebellions. While all of the charges were
true, they failed to acknowledge that some of his vast expenditures for projects (Luoyang and the Grand Canal) reaped great benefits for the empire. Furthermore, the hardships that he imposed on his people between 605 and 611 caused no serious disaffection among his subjects. In the end the colossal waste of men and resources on the Korean wars that yielded no tangible results brought him down and earned him the opprobrium of “bad last ruler.”

Charles D. BENN

Further Reading


Just outside Beijing's Forbidden City, the Summer Palace of Yiheyuan was first built in the mid-eighteenth century during the reign of Emperor Qianlong. After being burnt down and subsequently damaged it was restored as a quintessential imperial compound, with spectacular gardens, imposing architecture, and panoramic views.

The Summer Palace or Yiheyuan (Garden of Nurtured Harmony) on the northwestern outskirt of the Forbidden City is noted for sophisticated landscaping that combines woods, a hillock, water, and architecture. Commissioned in 1750 as a villa during Emperor Qianlong’s reign, it was burnt down in 1886, and was subsequently rebuilt and given its current name. It again suffered partial damages in 1900, but was soon restored and has since remained the epitome of Chinese imperial gardens. It is now a United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site.

The park of 290 hectares is composed of a hillock in the north, lakes in the south, and a palatial compound at the northeastern corner. The principle palace (Hall of Benevolent Longevity) and its courtyard can be accessed through the main gate on the east. This exquisitely decorated building compound, arranged with axial symmetry, features architecture on a grand scale designed with intricate detail such as gabled and hipped roofs and other attributes appropriate for demonstrating imperial power.
Its stately halls once served as a functional administration center to hold court and receive dignitaries. The living quarters nearby consist of separate quadrangles and appear relatively modest and intimate. A multi-story, sophisticatedly equipped grand theater also is part of the architectural complex in this area.

West of these courtyards lies a covered painting-exhibition arcade (728 meter long) that traverses the heart of the park along the northern rim of the central lake. Rising up from the lakefront is the Longevity Hill (60 meters high), on which buildings cluster amidst a landscape designed with distinct features characteristic of Chinese classical gardens. Along a north-south axial line on the hill is the courtyard of a ceremonial hall (Cloud Dispelling Hall), followed by an imposing octagonal tower (Pavilion of Buddhist Incense) on a high platform, and a temple (Sea of Wisdom) wrapped in glazed ceramic tiles and miniature Buddhist images at the summit. Beyond these glittering architectural structures down the northern slope is a somewhat subdued and densely wooded area that also is the site of a temple complex and a few smaller buildings. The slope overlooks a narrow lake, which meanders along the secluded northern edge of the park to be integrated at the eastern foothill into a lotus pond within an elegant southern-style garden. The riverbanks near the northern gate are lined with houses that originally included commercial shops built exclusively for royal visits. The landscaping and building designs here replicate scenic spots in poetic marshy lands south of Yangzi (Chang) River, a region famous for private villas with fine gardens.

The lake area of the parkland offers impressive panoramic views projecting beyond the perimeter of the park. Here small islands and dikes in conjunction with differently shaped bridges divide the central Kunming Lake into sections that mimic picturesque areas south of the Yangzi. Major attractions, such as the Marble Boat, South Lake Island, Seventeen-Ache Bridge, Jade-Band Bridge, and a willow-tree-lined long avenue called Xiti, are among the hallmark features of the Summer Palace. The expansive vista over the unassuming water surfaces compliments the textured relief of woodlands inside and outside of the park, incorporating spontaneously true nature into an artificially molded setting.

TzeHuey CHIOU-PENG

Further Reading

Sun Daolin’s charismatic performances made him a mainstream cinema icon in the People’s Republic of China. Although a lifelong actor, his artistry included forays into literary criticism and poetry. During the post-Mao era, an abiding commitment to cultural internationalism further cemented Sun’s status among overseas and official arts patrons alike.

A prolific and popular screen actor after World War II, Sun Daolin entered Yanjing (Yenching) University in 1938, majoring in philosophy and writing his thesis on Aristotle’s *Poetics*. At the same time, this son of a wealthy, Belgian-educated engineer began devoting increasing amounts of time to stage acting. After first joining the university’s drama society, Sun performed with several troupes devoted to employing the theater as a mode of social transformation as well as entertainment. His early repertoire included works by the influential playwright Cao Yu and the novelist Ba Jin, as well as European authors Nicolai Gogol and Alexandre Dumas.

After graduating in 1947, Sun Daolin began his screen acting career the next year, first appearing in the Qinghua Film Company’s *The Big Reunion* (1948) before taking a lead role in the well-received *Crows and Sparrows* (1949). This event solidified Sun’s position within the Shanghai film industry, and drew the attention of those within the nascent state-run film industry of the People’s Republic, many of whom—like Sun himself—had ties to the world of pre-1949 commercial cinema. The fact that Sun appeared in numerous films throughout the early 1950s, at a time when domestic feature production had dipped precariously, attested to his popularity with crowds, filmmakers, and cultural officials alike. In 1957 Sun was awarded a “first-place” individual award by the Ministry of Culture for his work between 1949 and 1955, recognizing him for his service to the state.

Sun Daolin’s career was predicated upon his versatility. He played a politically irresolute intellectual in *March of the Democratic Youth* (1950), an engineer in *Female Driver* (1951), and a steely-willed Communist officer in *Reconnaissance across the Yangzi* (1954). While reprising many of these roles in early 1960s works of socialist cinema such as *A Revolutionary Family* (1960) and *Early Spring, February* (1962), Sun also lent his voice to numerous dubbed foreign features, and served as a council member during the fourth and fifth conferences of the China Film Workers Association.

Following the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Sun returned to filmmaking as an actor, while also writing and directing several of his own screenplays. The film *Zhan Tianyou* (2000), a biography of the eponymous early twentieth-century Chinese railroad engineer, won him China’s highest award for a feature. Sun also continued to work as an interpreter of foreign culture for Chinese audiences, both in his voiceover work and through translations and adaptations of Western plays. At the same time, he gave extensive interviews to foreign journalists and scholars interested in China’s state film industry. Sun’s most notable overseas appearance came in 1988, when he appeared as a special guest performer in an American...
Sun Daolin and family. Sun was the heartthrob of movie-going women from the 1950s through the 1970s.

Conservatory Theater production of Eugene O’Neill’s Marco’s Millions, playing the role of Khubilai Khan.

Married to the famous Yue Opera (the main regional opera style of Zhejiang Province and Shanghai) artist Wang Wenjuan, Sun Daolin spent the majority of his career as a performer for mass audiences within the Chinese-speaking community. Retiring only two years before his death, his lifetime as a mainstream cultural icon was recognized by China’s highest-ranking political leaders and the international press, along with countless admirers.

Matthew JOHNSON

Further Reading

SUN Yat-sen
Sun Zhōngshān 孙中山
1866–1925 Revolutionary leader

Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary leader and founder of Republican China (1912–1949). An uprising in 1911 resulted in his election as provisional president of the new republic and the abdication of the Qing dynasty emperor in 1912. He devised what he called the “Three People’s Principles” for the new republic: nationalism, democracy, and livelihood. Those principles are today the guiding ideology of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Sun Yat-sen was born near Guangzhou (Canton) to a family of farmers. His personal name was “Wen,” his style or secondary name was “Yat-sen,” and his revolutionary name (for which he is better known in China) was “Zhongshan” (中山 Chung-shan). He first attended a village school, went to Honolulu at age thirteen with his older brother for his secondary education, then received a medical degree at the College for Medicine for Chinese in Hong Kong. Alienated by the ineffectiveness of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Sun became a revolutionary. Travels to Hawaii, Hong Kong, and later to England and the United States had a profound influence on him.

In 1894 Sun Yat-sen founded the Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui 開中會) among overseas Chinese with the goal of expelling the Manchus from China and establishing a republic. Later he devised a set of ideals for the republic that he called the “Three People’s Principles”: nationalism, democracy, and livelihood, which are roughly analogous to U.S. President Abraham Lincoln’s phrase “of
the people, by the people, and for the people.” Sun also en-
visioned a combination of the best government concepts
of the West with those of traditional China in a five-power
constitution that would consist of the executive, legisla-
tive, and judiciary branches plus a censorate (to check
abuses by officials) and an examination system to recruit a
bureaucracy. The Revive China Society was incorporated
in 1905 by the Tongmenghui (同盟会 United League)
with membership among military officers of the Qing
army, Chinese students abroad, and overseas Chinese.

After ten abortive uprisings between 1895 and 1911, the
eleventh— the Wuchang Uprising of 10 October 1911—
was successful, resulting in Sun’s election as provisional
president of Republican China (1912–1949), with his capi-
tal in Nanjing, and the abdication of the Qing emperor
on 12 February 1912. Sun resigned as president in favor
of General Yuan Shikai on condition that Yuan support
the republic.

However, Yuan betrayed the republic by abrogating
the elected parliament, which was dominated by the Na-
tionalist Party (in 1912 the Tongmenghui became the Na-
tionalist Party or Guomindang 国民党), culminating in
Yuan’s failed attempt to become emperor. After Yuan’s
attempt at usurpation politics in China degenerated to
civil wars among rival warlords.

Sun, frustrated in attempts to obtain help from
Western democracies, turned to the newly established
Communist government in Russia for military and or-
ganizational help in 1922. Sun agreed to the Russian
stipulation that the Nationalists accept members of the
new Chinese Communist Party into their ranks. Sun
then reorganized the Nationalist Party and assigned his

Bust of Sun Yat-sen. Sun devised a set of ideals for China’s new republic that he
called the “Three People’s Principles”: nationalism, democracy, and livelihood.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
lieutenant, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), to assemble an army committed to Sun’s ideology. Sun died of cancer in Beijing while making a last attempt to negotiate a peaceful unification of China. Because he had expressed a desire to be buried in Nanjing, his body was temporarily kept in the Biyun Temple in Beijing until a mausoleum could be built in Nanjing.

Four years later, in May of 1929, the mausoleum was completed. A train carried Sun’s body from Beijing to Nanjing; the body was then moved along a newly built boulevard (named Sun Yat-sen Road) to the site of the new mausoleum, officially known as the Mausoleum of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The mausoleum is engraved with the phrase “Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood.” A public memorial service was held for three days before Sun was laid to rest on 1 June 1929.

China honors Sun Yat-sen as the father of the republic, and his Three People’s Principles are the guiding ideology of the Republic of China (1949– ) on Taiwan.

Jiu-Hwa Lo UPSHUR

Further Reading
Sunzi

Sūnī 孙子

Said to have flourished early fourth century BCE  Military strategist

Sunzi, a military strategist said to have flourished during China’s chaotic Warring States period, is known for a work attributed to him usually translated as The Art of War. During a time when 600,000 men could participate in a single battle, strategy became paramount for a state’s survival; Sunzi reserved his highest praise for a strategist-general who could win a war without ever fighting a battle. Centuries later Mao Zedong would use his advice in his campaigns against the Nationalists.

Sunzi 孫子 was the most famous and successful of many Chinese strategists. In self-defense every one of the seven Warring States of his time (he was said to have flourished in the early fourth century BCE) identified someone to prepare strategies and counter-strategies. Little is known of his life, despite the historian Sima Qian’s (c. 145–87 BCE) having identified him as a strategist serving the state of Wu. What is certain is that the thinking assembled under his name reflects the cumulative wisdom of the Warring States period in Chinese history (475–221 BCE), which came to an end with the unification of China under the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). This period saw incessant warfare among the seven states which were gradually swallowed up by the state of Qin until in 221 BCE it succeeded in unifying all of China under the first emperor, Qin Shihuang.

Stratagems along similar lines were recommended in a number of widely distributed treatises during these warring centuries that led to China’s consolidation under the Qin.

The military thinking of these strategists paralleled the newly emerging ideas about governance developed by thinkers commonly known in the West as Legalists (fajia 法家), led by Han Fei Zi. The Legalists advocated strong central control as the surest way to enhance the power of the state. The Qin state, which was the successor state in the Zhou homeland around what is now known as Xi’an, had been led by Legalist ministers for many years. It succeeded in dominating all its neighbors, though this first empire disintegrated after only a few years with the death of Qin Shihuang. The Legalist philosophy of authoritarian control as a means of prosperity and social stability, however, far outlasted the Qin, and has had a persistent influence throughout Chinese history.

Before the Warring States period, warfare in China was conducted largely in an aristocratic mode that emphasized individual feats of valor. The armies typical of the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) were led by aristocrats driving chariots. The largest armies of the sixth century BCE assembled 50,000 men. Two centuries later the Warring States could muster up to 600,000 men in a single battle. Under these pressures, honor was no longer relevant as a motivation for soldiers. Instead they were to be strictly obedient within a top-down command structure. The orders were given by the king’s most trusted servants, the strategist-generals.

Sunzi seems to have been the earliest or at least the
most famous of the strategist-generals, outlining the models to be applied afresh to each particular situation. The text attributed to Sunzi, usually translated as The Art of War (or Warfare), seems to have been widely available, read by would-be strategists and ministers throughout China. In it the strategist recommends avoiding direct confrontations with an enemy. In fact, he reserves his highest praise for a strategist-general who can win a war without ever fighting a battle. The best means for doing so depend on outsmarting the enemy, but that in turn requires intimate knowledge of how the enemy has situated his assets. Sunzi recommends the liberal use of spies, false informers, simulated retreats, or indeed any technique that is likely to yield his side the upper hand.

**The Ambush at Maling, 342 BCE**

Twelve years after the state of Zhao was saved through the siege of Wei, the state of Wei in turn attacked the Han state. The Han ruler called on the state of Qi for help. Tian Ji and Sun Bin (the chief general and the chief strategist, respectively), commanding the Qi army, immediately led it in an attack against the Wei capital. As soon as Pang Juan, commander of the Wei troops, heard about this, he pulled his army back out of Han territory. Strategist Sun Bin (believed to be a direct descendent of Sunzi) knew of General Pang Juan’s arrogance and his low opinion of the Qi troops. Faced with an advancing Wei army, Sun Bin began an apparent retreat. On the first day, his troops left behind traces of 100,000 campfires; on the second day 50,000, and on the third day only 30,000. Pang Juan, eager for victory, concluded that the Qi army had been seriously weakened by mass desertions. So he left the bulk of his infantry behind and set out in pursuit with some lightly equipped troops.

He covered two days’ worth of ground in a single day’s march. Sun Bin had calculated that Pang Juan would reach Maling at dusk.

Sun Bin set an ambush there and waited. As planned, the Wei troops arrived exhausted from their forced march, and Sun Bin’s army demolished them. General Pang Juan committed suicide on the battlefield, much to the delight of Sun Bin, who had previously had his kneecaps cut off on Pang Juan’s orders after having been framed by the general as a traitor.

**Medieval Applications**

Centuries later the Chinese were still fascinated by wily strategists, as attested by the fourteenth century classic fiction called The Romance of the Three Kingdoms (sanguo yanyi). This work, written by Luo Guanzhong, is one of the four all-time classics of Chinese fiction. It was set during the turmoil of the third century CE associated with the fall of the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and weaves together the schemes and wars of an entire century into an orderly whole, analyzing the strategies...
used in great detail. The hero, Zhuge Liang, whose tomb is still preserved in Chengdu, is widely honored because his strategies outwitted those of all his adversaries.

**Modern Application of *The Art of War***

Sunzi’s approach to warfare has applications reaching into the modern era. In his essay “Strategic Problems of the Revolutionary War in China,” dated December 1936, Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) wrote, in reference to his fight against the Nationalists under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975):

If an attacking opponent is superior to our army in numbers and firepower, we can alter the balance of power only when the enemy has penetrated deep into the interior of our base territory and there has drained the cup of bitterness to the lees, so that “the fat grow lean and the lean exhaust themselves to death.”… At that point the enemy army, though still strong, has been substantially weakened; its soldiers are tired out and demoralized, and many of the enemy’s weaknesses are revealed. The Red Army is still weak, but it has been preserving its strength, storing its energies, and awaiting the exhausted enemy at its ease. At this point it is possible, as a rule, to strike a certain balance in the strength of the two sides or to transform the enemy’s absolute superiority into a merely relative superiority—sometimes it is even possible for us to gain the upper hand.

Mao, who had studied the Chinese classics as part of his schooling, has clearly learned from Sunzi, at one point even echoing Sunzi’s idea of an army awaiting the exhausted enemy at its ease.

In condensed form, Mao formulated the essence of the strategy in a sixteen-character poetic formula for guerrilla warfare, which translates as:

- When the enemy comes, we go.
- When the enemy rests, we disrupt.
- When the enemy is exhausted, we fight.
- When the enemy goes, we give chase.

As this passage indicates, the military tactics of Mao, fighting against the Nationalists, owed a substantial debt to the Chinese tradition of strategical thinking.

**John G. BLAIR and Jerusha McCormack**

**Further reading**


A clone of *Pop Idol* in the United Kingdom and *American Idol* in the United States, *Super Girl* was a reality program that was launched in 2004 by Hunan Satellite TV Station in China. The program has had an enormous impact on China’s television and media industry and on society, and has become highly controversial among the public.

*Super Girl* was a reality program launched in 2004 by Hunan Satellite TV Station of China. The program to some degree was a clone of overseas entertainment programs such as *Pop Idol* in the United Kingdom and *American Idol* in the United States. The *Super Girl* competition was open to any female contestant regardless of her origin, appearance, or singing ability. The program challenged some traditional rules and encouraged the audience to participate.

The program was divided into three parts: initial selection of contestants, preliminary regional rounds, and knockout competition. The first two parts were regional selections, held in five of China’s provinces. The weekly broadcast knockout competition was held in Changsha, Hunan Province. The singer with the fewest votes was then eliminated. Each year a grand finale of the show took place between the final three contestants. In a change from traditional judging rules, a few dozen “audience judges” were selected from different backgrounds in society in addition to several professional judges. Television viewers were able to watch each part of the contest, and beginning with the second part they could vote for their favorite singers. Voting was conducted by telephone and text messaging. Thus the outcome of the contest was to a large extent dependent on the preferences of the public.

### Impact of the Show

Mengniu Milk Group reportedly paid ¥14 million to Hunan Television for rights to sponsor the show’s broadcast outside Hunan Province beginning with the 2005 season. The 2005 contest was estimated to have generated a total of ¥766 million. The indirect business impact of the contest was estimated at several billion yuan.

Television advertisement slots cost an average of ¥33,400 for fifteen seconds in the 2006 season. During the finals of *Super Girl* the price went to more than ¥110,000 per fifteen seconds, with advertising sales reaching about ¥200 million for the season.

According to the TV survey institute CVSC-SOFRES Media, during the 2005 season the audience rating of Hunan Satellite TV Station ranked second in mainland China, exceeding 10 percent and surpassing the ranking of China Central Television’s New Year’s gala earlier that year; the audience rating of *Super Girl* was the highest among the programs presented in the same time frame. More than 100,000 candidates signed up during the 2005 season, and the total TV audience for all the finals was 400 million, with one final peaking at 280 million viewers. More than 2.8 million comments were posted at the *Super Girl* section of www.Sina.com, an influential website in China.
Significance of the Show

One of the main factors contributing to the show’s popularity was that viewers were able to participate in the judging process by sending text messages with their cell phones to vote for their favorite contestants. During the 2006 regional contest in Guangzhou alone, 612,713 text message votes were cast for the top three contestants. In the final contest the votes for the champion and runner-up were 5,196,975 and 4,818,125, respectively. This reaction was considered to be one of the largest “democratic” voting exercises in mainland China.

Super Girl was so popular that many provincial satellite TV stations have imitated it, an indication of how the Chinese TV industry has become increasingly competitive and that the TV industry, as well as all of China’s media, has become more focused on entertainment. But some elites in the Chinese intelligentsia, such as Dake Zhu, a Shanghai cultural scholar, criticize the broadcasting of talent shows such as Super Girl. Zhu thinks Super Girl was a victory in terms of audience rating and revenue earned from advertising but was a disappointing cultural phenomenon. On the other hand, many elite scholars supported Super Girl. Cui Weiping, a professor at Beijing Film Institute, pointed out that the real significance of Super Girl lies in examining the show as a realistic performance of democracy. That position has opened up a debate about whether the show’s appeal was the result of audience projection of the so-called reality program into the political realm by fantasizing about having a vote in an issue of “real” significance.

Since August 2007 the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television has placed some restrictions on some vulgar phenomena in talent shows. Super Girl, after three seasons, was replaced by Happy Boys in 2007. Nevertheless, talent shows will continue to play a prominent role in the development of Chinese TV program patterns.

Junhao HONG and Wenfa HE

Further Reading

Supervisory System, Ancient
Gǔdài de jiānchá zhìdù 古代的监察制度

A system developed in ancient China that primarily served as the means by which bureaucratic institutions and government officials were monitored, and which ensured that the growing empire was governed and functioning properly.

The Chinese traditional supervisory system could trace its origins back to the times when China created the first bureaucratic governing machine under a monarch. While being exploited to strengthen monarchical control over the extended executive branch of the state, the supervisory system witnessed its own expansion, formalization, and bureaucratization over the centuries. As the bureaucratic machine became indispensable for governing the growing Chinese empire, highly adaptable supervisory institutions governed under a different set of regulations played a crucial role in monitoring the Chinese bureaucratic machine’s function and in keeping it on a “correct” track.

The bureaucratic post of yushi (censor), which in later periods was commonly entrusted with the supervisory power over administrative officials, already existed in the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). In Zhouli, or Book of Rights—a collection of the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE) institutes believed to have been compiled by scholars of the Spring and Autumn (770–476 BCE) and Warring States (475–221 BCE) periods—it was written that to keep a complex bureaucracy functioning properly under the Zhou kings, serious crimes committed by officials were targeted, and a post of chief judge (shishi) was established for prosecuting those who were involved. Two posts of grand steward (dazai) and his lieutenant (xiaozai) also were set up to be in charge of impeaching officials who violated government regulations and disciplines.

During the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE) a post of yushi was established in Qin, Zhao, Han, and Qi as these decentralized feudal domains were transformed to warring states governed through functionary officials and clerks.

Preliminary theories and practices regarding how to keep officials and bureaucratic offices in check were widely discussed and implemented by prominent statesmen and political advisors of the time, such as Guan Zhong (d. 645 BCE), Shang Yang (390–338 BCE), and Han Feizi (281–233 BCE). Shang Yang in particular firmly believed that in order to make the supervisory system work, the power of censorial officials ought to be separated institutionally from that of administrative officials being supervised.

Major Developments during the Qin and Han Dynasties

The centralized imperial system established by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) and consolidated and perfected during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) was a major institutional development in Chinese history. Although this political system, under which the vast Chinese empire was unified and governed, was centered
on an imperial house, it was maintained through a well-organized bureaucracy.

Under the first emperor (reigned 221–210 BCE) the Qin central government was divided into three branches controlled by, respectively, the counselor-in-chief (chengxiang), the military commander-in-chief (taiwei), and the censor-in-chief (yushi). These three paramount officials were ranked head to head as “three grand dukes” (sangong), with each deriving his power directly from the emperor. Although the censor-in-chief had an official duty to assist the counselor-in-chief and could succeed the latter when a vacancy was created, he also headed the Censorate (yushifu) and could impeach the counselor-in-chief. Since the censor-in-chief was also the chief secretary serving the emperor, the Censorate staffed by a number of censors (yushi) was mainly managed by the junior censor-in-chief (yushi zhongcheng). At the local level supervising censors (jian yushi) affiliated with the Censorate were periodically sent down to inspect activities of commanding governors (junshou) and other subordinate officials.

During the Han dynasty, while the supervisory system established under the Qin was further expanded, several important changes took place. First, the former censor-in-chief (rank: wanshi [ten thousand shi of grain—one shi of grains weigh about 110 pounds]) assumed more formal secretarial duties to serve the emperor and was eventually transferred from the Censorate to a purely administrative post. As a result, the junior censor-in-chief (rank: qianshi [one thousand shi]) became the highest official responsible for running the Censorate, while the institute itself became specialized exclusively in censorial services during the mid-Han. From the monarchical perspective it would be much easier to control imperial censors, who wielded a wide range of powers, if they were low-ranking officials.

Second, to monitor the ever-expanding officialdom, the supervisory organization itself grew to become a more complex body. It was expanded to include several related divisions that could check on each other, making the emperor less worried about the possibility that the supervisory system would spin out of control. Besides the junior censor-in-chief, who had forty-five professional censors working under him, an additional supervisory post of rectifier (chengxiang sizhi) was established under the counselor-in-chief to monitor different administrative divisions of the central government. Moreover, under Emperor Wu (reigned 140–87 BCE) a powerful independent censorial post of metropolitan commandant (sili xiaowei), together with twelve supporting clerks, was added to the supervisory operations. While personally controlled by the emperor, the metropolitan commandant had power to supervise, investigate, arrest, and impeach any suspicious officials in the imperial capital and its surrounding areas.

The local supervisory work was also enhanced during the Han dynasty. Under Emperor Wu thirteen regional censors (cishi) affiliated with the Censorate were appointed. Their duties were confined to six areas (liutiao) defined by the emperor, which made local magnates, commandery governors, and various marquis (nobles) their main targets. Each commandery governor also appointed five local inspectors (duyou) to tour counties in the jurisdiction.

**Supervisory Institutes after the Han and in the Tang Dynasty**

During the periods between the Han and Sui (581–618 CE) dynasties when the empire was in disunity, specific supervisory practices varied under different rulers, but they all retained the basic Qin and Han organizational structure and features. Key supervisory institutes remained under direct control of the emperor and were made flexible enough to meet different imperial needs. To break the monopoly of great families over governmental posts, low-ranking supervising officials, including clerks coming from poor families (dianqian), were asked to spy on local officials. Moreover, supervising inspectors could also report activities of officials to the emperor anonymously and were even allowed to impeach them based on unconfirmed hearsay (wenfeng zoushi). Therefore, it was not surprising that censors were often found abusing their power. High-ranking officials, particularly after the Jin dynasty (265–420 CE, one of the dynasties during the Southern and Northern dynasties [220–589 CE] period), were thus forbidden to take on the post of junior censor-in-chief. Regional standing censorial offices were regarded as unreliable by emperors, and censorial inspections instead were often assigned to ad hoc imperial censors.
Supervisory practices during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) were more institutionalized and formalized. Before, the Censorate had been located inside the imperial inner quarters and treated more like the emperor’s personalized tool of control. During the Tang dynasty the office of the Censorate was moved to the outer court, while the post of censor-in-chief was restored, lifting the Censorate from rank 4a to 3a. The Censorate was more bureaucratized as it was formally divided into three bureaus (sanyuan): Headquarters Bureau (responsible for handling daily affairs and impeachments), Palace Bureau (responsible for controlling high-ranking officials’ ritual conduct), and Investigation Bureau (responsible for touring prefectures and counties and investigating local officials). The expanded Tang Censorate, which had its own jail, had the power to review important judicial cases, supervise economic matters handled by both central and local officials, and investigate corruption cases of the military. Besides ad hoc tours and inspections of local prefectures and counties carried out by censors sent down from the Censorate, more regular supervising posts were established in ten and then in fifteen regions (Dao) to carry out censorial work confined to the six categories specified by the Tang emperors, which had a different focus compared with those six areas defined by Emperor Wu of the Han.

Another major development during this period was a series of appointments of formal remonstrance officials, particularly those who were affiliated with the Chancellery (menxia sheng). These remonstrance officials had the power to examine and rebut not only proposals coming from the Secretariat (zhongshu sheng) but also state policies formulated in imperial edicts. The most reputable Tang remonstrance official was Wei Zheng (580–643 CE), who often openly rebutted the edicts of the Taizong emperor (reigned 627–649 CE). According to Tang rules, without the approval of the Chancellery, even a Tang emperor could not get the concerned policies promulgated.

Supervisory Practices from the Song to the Qing Dynasty

During the Song (960–1279) and Yuan (1279–1368) dynasties the supervisory institutes were further centralized, while the rank of the censor-in-chief was promoted from 3a in the Tang to 2b in the Song dynasty and then to 1b in the Yuan dynasty. To increase the efficiency of the Censorate, the number of its formally appointed censors was reduced considerably, while the number of clerks was increased during the Song. Also, each of the six branches of the central government was put under a censor’s watch. Song emperors increased imperial control over the supervisory system, requiring each censor to submit at least one report per month. Censors were allowed, again, to impeach officials based on hearsay. At the same time, remonstrance officials were detached from policymaking institutes and increasingly worked as censors who targeted officials rather than as imperial advisors.

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) supervisory system comprised several overlapping institutes, and its effective control over officialdom was enhanced through combined bureaucratic and monarchical efforts. To consolidate formalized bureaucratic supervisory institutions, the old Censorate (yushi tai), which had comprised several bureaus during the Tang dynasty and had been trying to coordinate their functions since the Song dynasty, was reorganized into a single but expansive institute called “Supervisory Headquarters” (ducha yuan), which was run by two censors-in-chief (zuo you duyushi) (rank: 2a) who, in turn, were supported by two vice censors-in-chief (rank: 3a) and two assistant censors-in-chief (rank: 4a). The Supervisory Headquarters was fully bureaucratized and established a number of internal offices to oversee the supervisory work in the empire.

The Ming local dao supervisory system had several components. First, in each of the thirteen provinces (customarily called dao) there was a provincial surveillance commission (tixing anchashi si) headed by a commissioner (rank: 3a). As agencies of the central government established in provinces to be responsible for overseeing local judicial matters, these commissions were often collectively called the “Outer Censorate” and communicated with the throne through the Ministry of Punishment and the Supervisory Headquarters, although they were neither branch agencies of nor controlled by the latter. Under these provincial surveillance commissions forty-one circuit branches (Dao fensi) throughout all provinces were set up to supervise officials working at a lower level.

Second, in times of need the task of overseeing provincial affairs was formally delegated to general
superintendents (zongdu) or provincial inspectors (xunfu). Affiliated with the central government and the Supervisory Headquarters, a general superintendent or provincial inspector often carried concurrently a title of censor or vice censor-in-chief and was also responsible for coordinating the operations of different government branches at the provincial level.

Third, 110 investigation censors (jiancha yushi) were listed under the Supervisory Headquarters. Carrying a title of regional inspector (xunan yushi) while inspecting provinces, these investigation censors actually reported directly to, and even had an obligation to watch over the Supervisory Headquarters for, Ming emperors.

The most important Ming supervisory institution at the central government level was the so-called ke system controlled directly by the emperor. Two years after abolishing the prime ministership, the Hongwu emperor (reigned 1368–1398) in 1382 created the so-called Six Offices of Scrutiny (liuke), which were independent from the Supervisory Headquarters and enabled the emperor to control the six administrative ministries (liubu) more directly. Each Office of Scrutiny was led by a low-ranking (7a) chief supervising secretary (du jishizhong), who worked with two assistant chief supervising secretaries (rank: 7b) and four to ten supervising censors (jishizhong) to oversee a particular ministry. Proposals made by each ministry had to be examined and approved first by its corresponding Office of Scrutiny before they could be submitted to the emperor.

This dao-ke bifocal supervisory institution of the Ming dynasty was, with some modifications, inherited by the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). A major change, however, took place in 1723 when the Six Offices of Scrutiny were incorporated into the Supervisory Headquarters, making the latter the most centralized and formally bureaucratized supervisory institute in Chinese history. To regulate various censorial organizations and their operations, the Qing dynasty established comprehensive laws, such as the imperial ordained rules governing the Censorate (Qinding taigui) (established in 1743 and revised in 1802, 1827, and 1890), and the regulations of the Supervisory Headquarters (duchayuan zeli). The Qing dynasty also established other institutions, such as the confidential palace memorial (zouze) system operated since the Kangxi reign (1662–1722), to enhance dual (namely, monarchical and Manchu ethnic) control over both Manchu and Chinese officials.

Yamin Xu

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The Censorate Bureau of Remonstrance

*Thoughts from Su Shih, a statesman of the Song dynasty (960–1279), on the Censorate Bureau of Remonstrance, from Charles Hucker’s The Censorial System of Ming China.* Hucker writes:

Su’s memorial is of particular interest because it reveals his attitude toward the service expected of the Censorate and the Bureau of Remonstrance. He considered that the state’s gravest problem was to maintain a proper balance between forces favoring centralization and those favoring decentralization. Overcentralization made it possible for evil ministers to gain imperial favor and usurp the authority proper to the sovereign, while extreme decentralization permitted regional authorities to become strong enough to do so. The Sung government, Su thought, tended toward centralization and was thus susceptible to the abuses of cunning men in high places. He said that he could not presume to explain entirely the measures that dynastic founders had instituted to prevent overcentralization and its dangers, but he added:

However, in regard to the single matter of their employment of a Censorate and a Bureau of Remonstrance, this is the sages’ perfect preventive plan. Successively considering [history from] Ch’in [Qin] and Han and on to the Five Dynasties period [907–960 CE], there were undoubtedly several hundred men who met their deaths because they remonstrated; but from the Chien-lung era [960–962 CE] on, no critics have ever been punished. Even though they were reprieved they have forthwith been granted extraordinary promotions. Being permitted to make use of hearsay evidence, they have not been intimidated by high rank or prestige and have paid no attention to the honorable or humble [status of those criticized]. When their criticisms extended to the imperial person, the emperors have shown disturbance; when [the spoken of] matters concerning state policies, the grand councilors have expected trouble. Thus in the time of the Je- tsung (reigned 1022–1063) public opinion ridiculed the grand councilors, (saying) that they merely accepted and enacted the criticisms of the Censorate and the Bureau of Remonstrance, and that’s all.

The constitution of the People’s Republic of China includes a section on sustainable development that stipulates: Development must use natural resources in a manner that takes future generations into consideration. China’s goal is to restructure the economy to one of low consumption and low pollution, while addressing the needs of the world’s largest population, much of which is uneducated, poor, and aging.

Sustainable development—a use of natural resources that meets human needs while preserving the environment so that those needs can be met not only in the present but also in the future—is one of China’s state strategies. Ever since the term entered China’s public policy vocabulary after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, sustainable development has been accepted as a must for China in its modernization drive.

Guideline

China’s basic sustainable development strategy gives priority to peoples need and interests; it aims to coordinate efforts to improve and develop the economic and political aspects of the country, in part by balancing growth among urban and rural regions, and to improve the spiritual quality of life in China by fostering harmony between humans and nature. This guideline, known as the “Scientific Outlook on Development,” has been written into the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.

The “Scientific Outlook” guideline emphasizes sustaining development by taking into consideration the needs of both this and future generations. It aims to build on existing economic and political strengths and lay down a solid foundation for China to rank among the medium-developed countries by the middle of the twenty-first century.

China’s sustainable development strategy specifically aims to: restructure the national economy from the old mode of growth characterized by high consumption of resources, high pollution, and low efficiency to a new pattern of low consumption, low pollution, and high efficiency; justify the utilization of resources and alleviate pressures that would deplete resources and harm the environment; bridge regional gaps in development and narrow the urban-rural divide; eliminate poverty and improve the overall quality of the destitute population; and build up a national economic system that is environmentally friendly.

Population

Because of its size and impact on both resources and development, population constitutes a key concern in China’s sustainable development strategy. Although the world’s largest population of 1.33 billion could be a resource in itself, the limited educational level in China
often works to the country’s disadvantage. Adult literacy has increased from less than 20 percent in 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, to reportedly more than 90 percent at present, but the average time spent in school for those older than fifteen remains low at 8.3 years. According to Niu Wenyuan, principal investigator of the sustainable development strategy project with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, any trifling problem in China can be enormous if multiplied by 1.33 billion, whereas any achievement, however brilliant, will pale if divided by the same figure. China’s annual 10–12 million net new births may cost one-fifth of the increased gross domestic product (GDP).

China has succeeded in bringing down its population growth rate from 2.3 percent in 1990 to 0.6 percent in 2005 and has shifted from the reproduction pattern of high birth rate, low infant mortality, and high growth rate to the pattern of low birth rate, low infant mortality, and low growth rate. But the lowered growth rate has changed the age structure of the population, and senior citizens at or above sixty years old have surpassed 10 percent of the total population, meaning that the developing country is also an aging society.

That change may explain why human resources development is placed high in China’s sustainable development strategy. The country needs to control the population growth to alleviate the pressures on resources and the job market. The need to control the population growth has generated a series of policies to facilitate fewer births; improve people’s living quality with adequate food supply, housing, and better health care; guarantee full employment and support of the old; and provide education for all to maintain a competent labor force. Policies favor parents who practice family planning in rural areas. For
example, they receive priority in loans and in their children’s education and employment. Such policies have helped refute the traditional concept of “more children bringing about greater fortunes.”

An important goal of China’s population policies and sustainable development strategy is to alleviate and eliminate poverty. Statistics shows that 23 million rural people still live below the poverty line of an annual per capita income of 700 yuan, and nearly 50 million barely have adequate food and clothing, in addition to 28 million who are impoverished in urban areas (2006). By the United Nations poverty standard of daily per capita consumption of $1, China’s poor population may exceed 200 million.

Most of the rural poor live in western China, an area

An old man holds his grandchild. While China’s one-child policy has helped to slow the rate of population growth, it has resulted in a disproportionately large population of elderly Chinese. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
in which the populations typically suffer from remoteness, poor accessibility, primitive modes of production, low grain yields, and meager sources of income. China established the Leading Group on Poverty Alleviation and Development under the State Council in 1986 to eradicate poverty. Such programs focus on increasing people’s competence so that they can subsist on their own. While increasing government budgets to alleviate poverty, China also has mobilized the whole society to join the effort. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, for example, dispatches researchers to assume official posts in some poverty-stricken counties in Inner Mongolia, where the researchers introduce appropriate technologies to local people with which they can reduce desertification and become more prosperous. This transformation, however, is not without its challenges.

Environmental Protection

A population’s ever-increasing demands for material and cultural riches can easily take its toll on resources and the environment. As China has accelerated the pace of industrialization and urbanization since the 1980s to respond to pressures imposed by a rapidly growing population, deterioration of the eco-environment has become an increasing problem for China’s sustainable development strategy.

While pursuing sustainable development as an inevitable strategic choice, China has taken the official line that, for a developing country such as China, economic growth is the precondition for sustainable development. “Only when the economic growth rate reaches and is sustained at a certain level can poverty be eradicated, people’s livelihoods be improved, and the necessary forces and conditions for supporting sustainable development be provided,” states the White Paper on China’s Population, Environment, and Development in the 21st Century issued by the State Council Information Office in 1998 (State Council Information Office, Chapter 2).

But domestic and international lessons learned have convinced the Chinese that neglecting the environment can offset achievements made in economic development. As stipulated by China’s eleventh Five Year Plan (2006–2010) China aims to decrease energy consumption annually by 8 percent per unit of GDP, but by mid-2008 had only achieved a 5.7 percent reduction (Kirk 2009). Environmental protection is commonly recognized as vital to China’s sustainable development.

China began to promote environmental protection after the first world conference on the environment, the United Nations Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972. Environmental protection policies aim to rationalize industrial structures in favor of those that save energy or use clean energy, develop environmentally friendly high-tech industries and tertiary services (the sector of the economy other than manufacturing or agriculture, such as insurance or banking), improve management of enterprises and the environment, integrate pollution prevention and control, and commit polluting enterprises to bear the cost of recovering wastes and controlling pollution. Along with a quota system for waste discharge, legislation can close plants that use outdated equipment and are small in scale but high in energy consumption and environmental pollution.

Environmental protection has been incorporated into national and local programs for economic and social development. With regard to environmental problems caused by unwise planning of projects, often approved through officials’ preference and intervention, China enacted the Law of Environmental Impact Assessment in 2002. This legislation aims to define the government administration responsible for construction project approval, control the irrational sprawling of destructive development, and prevent hazards to the environment caused by faulty planning by project owners. Environmental impact assessment has been applied to some key construction projects, including the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (completed in 2005), where results are considered positive because the impact on the environment is minimal.

Changing Viewpoints

Another challenge to China’s sustainable development strategy is changing the viewpoint of its officials, who have traditionally identified development as the growth rate of GDP and used that increase as a tool for self-promotion. As a result, social development lagged behind rapid economic growth in many places.

A pivotal moment in changing the viewpoint of Chinese policymakers came in 2003 after the epidemic of
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), which killed 791 people out of 8,300 infected cases in some thirty countries and regions worldwide, with a death toll of 348 in the Chinese mainland. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the epidemic cost China $11.3 billion, or 0.8 percent of its 2003 GDP. Two high-ranking officials—the mayor of Beijing and the minister of health—were sacked for dereliction of duty at the outbreak of the SARS epidemic.

Heeding calls in the wake of the SARS epidemic to balance economic growth with social development, the Chinese government increased funding to overhaul the country's long-neglected health system, earmarking $822 million for the central and local centers for disease control and prevention to improve their capacity to handle the outbreak of infectious diseases. An additional $1.38 billion was allocated to facilitate handling of infectious diseases in less-developed western China. Such action is in contrast to disproportionate government spending on public health in the previous two decades. From 1991 to 2000 the proportion of overall medical costs in China's GDP increased from 4.11 percent to 5.3 percent, with the annual sum rising from $11 billion to $59.5 billion. Yet the proportion of government spending on public health in
overall medical costs dropped from 22.8 percent to 14.9 percent, while the share of individual spending rose from 38.8 percent to 60.6 percent.

China has yet to produce a set of statistical tools to take into account the utilization of resources and costs of environmental damage in its GDP, but policymakers are abandoning the conventional practice of measuring the quality of governance with the GDP growth rate only. For example, in 2005 the provincial government of Qinghai removed GDP as a criterion in the assessment of officials working in the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Yushu and Guoluo, where the Yangzi (Chang), Huang (Yellow), and Lancang (Mekong) rivers have their sources, so that they could concentrate on the conservation of the nature reserve, which is the largest in China.

Public Participation

The deteriorating environment has increased people’s awareness of the need for sustainable development, and public participation has become indispensable in environmental protection. The Law of Environmental Impact Assessment allowed public participation for the first time in China’s legislative history, and the country’s burgeoning civil society is playing a more active role in the decision-making process on projects with considerable environmental impact and in monitoring enterprises to assure they abide by laws on environmental protection.

Based on officially released data, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, a Beijing-based non-governmental organization (NGO), produced a list of polluters and their products. Twenty-one environmental NGOs from across China then sent out a petition in March 2007 to consumers nationwide asking them to boycott these products. The action forced a number of offenders to control their pollution and to make an apology to Chinese society through the media. Actions such as the boycott put data released by the government to good use and exert a “healthy supervision” over the government while putting social pressure on polluters, said Mou Guangfeng, an official in charge of environmental assessment at the State Environmental Protection Administration.

Sustainable development in China is a long-range undertaking that will require consistent effort for generations. The government’s openness to public participation is promising for the success of China’s sustainable development strategy.

Xiong LEI

Further Reading


Suzhou

Sūzhōu Shì 苏州市
6.16 million est. 2007 pop.

Suzhou is located in the eastern province of Jiangsu in the Yangzi (Chang) River delta. It was a center of Wu civilization from the fifth century BCE. The Venetian traveler Marco Polo reportedly called the city the “Venice of the East.” Today it is a tourist destination popular for its architecture, canals, gardens, and nearby Lake Taihu.

Suzhou (sometimes referred to as “Soochow”) is one of China’s most beautiful cities, known for its canals, architecture, arcing bridges, and classical gardens. The Venetian traveler Marco Polo (1254–1324), according to legend, called Suzhou the “Venice of the East.” A popular Chinese saying is that “above the earth, there is the heaven, and on earth, there are Suzhou and Hangzhou.” 上有天堂，下有苏杭, to describe these beautiful Chinese cities.

The city’s gardens, along with Lake Taihu west of the city, are popular tourist destinations. Rail and motor traffic between Nanjing and Shanghai pass through Suzhou’s jurisdiction. The city’s economy has grown rapidly during the past ten years; although its agricultural base has decreased as its industrial system has increased.

The city is located in southern Jiangsu Province and was founded in the fifth century BCE. Much of Suzhou is

Mid-Lake Pavilion of the West Garden in the city of Suzhou. The city’s private gardens, as well as its canals, have survived over the centuries. PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL.
surrounded by the Outer Moat. The Grand Canal (the world’s longest human-made waterway, connecting Beijing and Hangzhou) also passes through the city. After the canal was completed during the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE), Suzhou became an early trade center.

Suzhou was the capital of the kingdom of Emperor Wu (140–86 BCE), although the city wasn’t named “Suzhou” until the Sui dynasty. The city was destroyed during the fourteenth century and again during the Taiping Rebellion of 1851–1864 (the largest rebellion in China’s history). In 1896 Suzhou became a treaty port and was opened to the West. The city was occupied by the Japanese during World War II and taken over by the Chinese Communists in 1949.

Historically silk has been the most famous of Suzhou’s exports, and the city also is known for its embroidery. The city is located in the subtropical zone and has a mild climate and enough rain and sunshine for good rice crops in the surrounding paddies. The economy is diversified with chemicals, paper, cotton textiles, ceramics, metallurgy, machine tools, and electronics. However, rapid economic growth has harmed Lake Taihu. Suzhou was not located in one of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping’s original four special economic zones (SEZs) established in 1979. Nevertheless, the city’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is twice as high as that of the rest of Jiangsu Province, and Jiangsu is the third-wealthiest province in China (after Guangdong on the south coast and Shandong to the north of Jiangsu).

One of the city’s many economic successes is Suzhou Industrial Park, a China-Singapore joint venture. For the past few years fifty to one hundred of the Fortune 500 U.S. corporations have had a corporate presence in Suzhou.

The Humble Administrator’s Garden is the largest of the ten most famous and well-preserved gardens.
of Suzhou, and the Garden of the Master of the Nets is the smallest. The scholar-officials who constructed the Suzhou gardens during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties (1644–1912) were weekday Confucians and weekend Daoists. They luxuriated at the end of their work week in the splendor of their nature retreats. To them it was important that the gardens included the five elements of water, specific plants, large and porous rocks, buildings, and calligraphy. In 1997 the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) named the Classical Gardens of Suzhou to its list of World Heritage Sites.

**Carole SCHROEDER**

**Further Reading**


In the sky there is heaven, on earth there are Suzhou and Hangzhou.

上有天堂，下有苏杭

shàng yǒu tiān táng xià yǒu sū háng

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Tai Chi

Taijiquan 太極拳

Tai chi is a martial art practiced worldwide whose gentle structured forms combine with deep breathing to balance internal energy, or qi, to improve health and well-being. More popular than ever in its five-hundred-year history, tai chi venues in China today range from large synchronized outdoor groups of all ages to highly competitive tournaments.

Tai (taijiquan) is a Chinese martial art that is linked to the Daoist meditative, philosophical, and medical tradition. In China invalids and the elderly often perform the soft, slow movements of the popular Yang style of tai chi to strengthen the constitution and to promote longevity. Advocates say that disciplined daily practice enhances the quality and circulation of qi (vital energy) within the body, improves bodily functions, tones muscles, and engenders a relaxed mental attitude. The majority of the millions of people who practice tai chi in China and elsewhere do so for these benefits, but tai chi also is a premier martial art that can be practiced even late in life.

Origins

Chinese legendary history attributes tai chi’s origin to Zhang Sanfeng, a Daoist expert who probably lived in the thirteenth century, but was canonized in 1459. Tai chi entered recorded history centuries later as a martial art practiced esoterically by the people of Chenjiagou in Henan Province. A form of the art was first demonstrated and taught in public in Beijing by Yang Luchan (1799–1872), who had learned it in Chenjiagou. Scholars say Yang accepted all challenges from the many Beijing martial arts masters, never to be defeated and never to seriously injure an opponent. He became known as “Yang the Invincible” and was appointed martial arts instructor to the imperial court. Yang Luchan publicly taught the slow and soft performance of a lengthy sequence of patterns, but he transmitted a much larger and more varied body of lore to his private students, a practice in keeping with martial arts tradition. Popular conceptions of tai chi as an only vaguely martial exercise, although beneficial to health and longevity, are drawn from Yang’s and his successors’ publicly taught form. This process of simplifying and softening has made tai chi accessible to many more people than would otherwise be the case. But the more obviously martial and physically strenuous Chen style continues to be practiced, as do the derivative Sun, Wu, and Hao styles.

Practice

As a martial art tai chi employs a subtlety of touch to sense an opponent’s strength in order to redirect his or her motion so that one’s defensive movement neutralizes it and becomes a counterattack as well. In describing this capacity practitioners use such phrases as “when the opponent is still, be still; when the opponent moves, move first,” and “use four ounces to deflect a thousand pounds.”
The technique depends upon the ability to maintain gentle physical contact with the opponent without resisting, that is, to never meet force with force. The tai chi player’s counter to the aggressive move, after the instant has been seized and the movement’s force captured, can be any of several techniques. Most benignly and simply, the tai chi player can accelerate or redirect the opponent’s motion, sending him or her many feet away. Alternatively, a player can use any of several in-fighting techniques, ranging from low kicks to punches to open-hand strikes and grappling techniques, singly or in combination, practically simultaneously with blending with the opponent’s force. The initial contact is said to be as soft as cotton; the counter that is said to be as springy as steel.

The strength, sensitivity, skill, and mental attitude required to perform such feats spontaneously and without effort are cultivated partly by the practice of solo forms (sequences of patterns) and partly by other means. Forms vary in length and in their composition and sequence of techniques; players can practice them at different speeds with larger or smaller patterns and in higher or lower stances. In some forms the tempo is even; in others it varies. Instructors say a player should practice forms with the continuity of one “reeling silk from a cocoon.” In appearance form practice should resemble an eagle in flight; the attitude should be that of a cat when about to pounce on a mouse. Form practice is a kind of meditation in motion and requires concentration without tension. Paired practice routines, in which one works with a partner to simulate martial encounters, have degrees of formality ranging from duo form sequences to freestyle sparring. The full range of tai chi skills includes the use of weapons as well; the sword, broadsword, staff, and spear are used. In some schools students practice auxiliary exercises to facilitate the development of the physical conditioning, skills, and mind-set appropriate to tai chi; in others schools tai chi itself is considered the only necessary exercise. In either case the expectation is that players will learn to direct and augment the flow of vital energy within the body with their mind in harmony with the breath and that bodily functions will be enhanced as the body is renewed by improved circulation of chi. Through this internal aspect of tai chi the body is expected to become supple and limber; both traits are essential to good health and to proper performance of tai chi.

Tai chi’s mechanical principles involve erect stances that combine stability with nimbleness of foot. Movement begins at the dantian, an anatomical point at the body’s center of gravity just below the navel. With no tensing of muscles and with mechanical efficiency and relaxed precision, the weight is shifted and energy is transmitted via the waist to the hands. In effect the legs, spine, and arms become like five bows, resulting in springy whole-body strength to be applied at the optimum instant. Footwork should be like the tread of a cat. Tai chi sport competition involves solo form performance and sometimes tuishou, or push-hands, a demonstration of mastery of the principles of tai chi.

A group of men practice tai chi on the Bund in Shanghai, circa 1970. An admiring crowd has gathered to watch. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
From a Chinese cultural perspective the psychological and medical value of the art and its martial potential are reasonable expectations. Both are in harmony with Daoist philosophical principles that are believed to be universally valid. The Daoist classics Daodejing and I Ching promulgate these principles, the interplay and balance of opposites that tai chi embodies. Thus, one can see tai chi as an art of harmonization with nature that includes the ability to harmonize with an opponent’s attack and the nurturance of chi that animates every living thing in the universe: Tai chi is considered to be a spiritual discipline as well.

The Future

During China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) tai chi was under political attack in China, but the situation has changed. Tai chi has been reinstated as a national treasure and a uniquely Chinese form of art and sport. Basic tai chi is taught publicly in parks and other suitable places, as it is in other parts of the Chinese world. Advanced instruction is available, and form competitions are held. Lacking knowledge of Chinese philosophy and its implications for self-defense and medicine, Westerners have generally been drawn to flashier martial arts. However, that situation is changing, too; gradually tai chi is becoming better known in the West. It is of growing interest to the international medical research community and to martial arts scholarship, but tai chi is still best known in the West as a health and longevity exercise of particular benefit to seniors. Both physically and philosophically, tai chi both influences and defines Chinese health and well-being more than any other non-medicinal practice.

Michael G. DAVIS

Further Reading


Tainan, the oldest Chinese settlement on Taiwan, is the island’s fourth-largest city. Tainan is an important center of culture, industry, education, and tourism. Two hundred temples ranging from the Tainan Confucius Temple (1662) to the elaborate new Temple of Matzu (Goddess of the Sea) provide some of the best remaining examples of southern Chinese architecture in Taiwan.

Tainan, located on the coastal edge of the fertile Jianan Plateau, is the oldest Chinese settlement on Taiwan and the island’s fourth-largest city. Until the late nineteenth century Tainan was the cultural, political, and economic center of Taiwan. Tainan was a Dutch settlement and trading post from 1624 to 1662. In 1661 the Chinese rebel leader Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662), better known by the English name “Koxinga,” failed in his attempt to restore the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and fled to Taiwan. His army soon overcame the Dutch, and he established his government in Tainan. In 1684 the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912) conquered Taiwan and incorporated Taiwan into Fujian Province of China. Tainan flourished during Japanese administration (1895–1945) but declined relative to the city of Taipei after the arrival of the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1945.

This history has left Tainan with many historic sites, including two forts built by the Dutch and more than two hundred temples, ranging from the Tainan Confucius Temple (1662) to the elaborate new Temple of Matzu (Goddess of the Sea) at Luermen. These temples provide some of the best remaining examples of southern Chinese architecture in Taiwan.

Tainan is an important center of education, culture, industry, and tourism. Historically the area has been important for rice and sugar cultivation, fisheries, oyster raising, and salt production. Tainan is home to some of Taiwan’s largest private industrial enterprises, including petrochemical and food-processing plants. It became a...
high-tech center and enjoyed a new period of growth after completion of the Tainan Science-Based Industrial Park in 2002.

Scott SIMON

Further Reading


Taipei

Taipei, the largest city on the island of Taiwan, was founded in the eighteenth century and has been the capital of the Republic of China since 1949. It is a major political, commercial, and industrial center.

Taipei, the largest city on Taiwan, has been since 1949 the capital of the Republic of China (the Chinese state that does not recognize the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China). Located in the far north of the island, in the basin of the Keelung, Tamshui, and Takokan rivers, Taipei is a major political and commercial center with a wide range of businesses, cultural institutions, and temples.

China’s ruling Qing dynasty (1644–1912) in 1885 declared Taiwan a separate province, and Taipei, a city formed from Chinese and aboriginal settlements, became its capital. During Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, Japan’s treatment of Taipei’s Chinese population varied between repression of nationalism and accommodation to some political aspirations of the emergent middle-class elites. When Taiwan reverted to Chinese rule in 1945, tensions with the new Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) governor, Chen Yi, led Taipei to become a major center of the February 28th Incident of 1947, when city dwellers’ protests against the Nationalist government were quashed with some brutality. After 1949 Taipei became the “temporary” capital of the administration of Nationalist Party Chairman Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975). Taipei benefited during this period from the economic boom in East Asia and became a prosperous city. After Chiang’s death Taiwan democratized, and in the years 1994 to 1998 for the first time Taipei’s mayoralty was held by an opposition politician, Chen Shui-bian. The mayoralty has become a stepping-stone to island-wide power, as Chen’s successor, Ma Ying-jeou (mayor 1998–2006), was elected president in 2008.

Taipei’s architecture reflects the city’s stages of development. Little is left from the pre-1895 era, but the Japanese period left many colonial baroque buildings, including the Presidential Office Building and National Taiwan University. Beginning in the 1950s many undistinguished concrete buildings were hastily built, a process aided by Taipei’s lack of planning laws, but since the 1980s
more care has been taken to build more sympathetically, with many new buildings, such as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial and the Central Rail Station, incorporating traditional Chinese architectural themes. In 2004 the modernist Taipei 101 building, designed by C. Y. Lee and Partners, was opened and officially acknowledged as the world’s tallest completed building, a position it will hold until the Burj Dubai (Dubai Tower) skyscraper is completed in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (scheduled for completion in 2009).

Taipei’s environment is plagued by pollution. Until the early 1980s highly polluting soft coal was burned without effective restrictions, and Taipei’s position in a basin worsened the resulting smog. Taipei’s relative decline as a manufacturing center reduced emissions (between 1954 and 1986 the proportion of Taiwan’s industrial workers based in Taipei fell by one-half to less than 8 percent), and city authorities have attempted to decrease vehicular traffic by building a mass transit rail system, which has been highly effective.

Rana MITTER

Further Reading


One dog snarls at a shadow; a hundred howl at each others barking.

一犬吠影，百犬吠声
Yi quan fei ying, bai quan fei sheng
Led by Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), a frustrated candidate in the civil service examinations and the self-proclaimed younger brother of Christ, the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) seriously challenged China’s Qing dynasty and was the largest rebellion in Chinese history. Millions of lives were lost in the ensuing chaos.

The Taiping rebellion occurred in a period of unprecedented crisis, when the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was plagued by an exploding population (the population tripled in two centuries to exceed 430 million by the 1850s) and challenges from Western powers that it could not meet, as evidenced in its defeat in the First Opium War (1839–1842).

Origins
From a peasant family of the Hakka ethnic group in a village close to Guangzhou (Canton) in southern China, Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864) was raised to pursue a career as a scholar-official. Having repeatedly failed to pass the civil service examinations in Guangzhou, Hong suffered an hallucinatory episode in 1837. A few years later, upon reading a set of Christian tracts, Quanshi Liangyan (Good Words for Exhorting the Age), which was compiled by a Chinese Christian, Hong made connections between Christian theology and his visions and was convinced that he was actually God’s second son, Jesus’s younger brother, and that he was sent to earth to expel devils, namely the Manchus (who ruled China during the Qing dynasty), from China.

Having baptized himself and a few friends and relatives, Hong began his evangelical mission in his hometown. Later, along with one of his converts, Feng Yunshan (1822–1852), Hong went to Guangxi after having lost his teaching post at the village school because of his Christian convictions. In the poverty-stricken Zijing Mountain area, Hong and Feng found enthusiastic adherents among poor peasants. A religious community was formed, which began secretly preparing for an armed uprising.

Early Stage (1851–1856)
In late 1850, Hong called for a rebellion against the Qing dynasty. He proclaimed the establishment of Taiping Tianguo (the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace) in January 1851 and declared himself the Heavenly King shortly after. The Taipings, as they become known in English, set up an elaborate military system in which men and women were segregated and submitted all their properties to a public treasury. They began to march north to the Yangzi (Chang) River valley in 1852. The Qing armies, which had not encountered such a fierce enemy for decades, failed to stop the advances of the spirited Taipings. In the spring of 1853, the Taipings, then in the hundreds of thousands, took Nanjing, a political and economic center in southeastern China. Hong made Nanjing his capital and renamed it Tianjing (Heavenly Capital).
After taking Nanjing, the Taipings moved quickly to expand their military victories. A northern expedition was dispatched to take Beijing, the capital of the Qing dynasty, and a western expedition was sent to take control of the middle Yangzi River valley and the areas surrounding Nanjing. Although the northern expedition failed, the Taipings were successful in expanding their territories in the middle and lower Yangzi River valleys. Administrative apparatuses were set up on the conquered territories, which combined military and civil functions. A utopian land program blueprinting equal distribution of land was promulgated. Many social and cultural reforms—including banning opium smoking, foot binding, and prostitution—were carried out. Repudiating Confucianism as the devil’s teaching, the Taipings adopted Hong’s version of Christianity as their official religion and used it as the basis for their civil service examinations, in which both men and women were encouraged to participate.

Intrigued by the Christian dimensions of the Taiping rebellion, Britain, France, and the United States sent envoys to Nanjing to investigate the new regime. Although the Westerners were deeply disappointed by the Taiping religion, which they thought was a great distortion of Christianity, and by the rebels’ lack of commitment to order and construction, the Western powers decided not to act against the Taipings immediately because they had not settled their conflicts with the Qing government. As a result, they adopted temporary neutrality toward the rebellion.

When the Taiping Rebellion reached its peak in 1856, fatal infighting occurred. Threatened by the swelling power of Yang Xiuqing (d. 1856), the de facto prime minister of the Taiping regime, Hong had him killed by another leader, Wei Changhui (1823–1856). Later Hong also had Wei killed. Tens of thousands of Taiping followers were slain in the incident. Feeling that he was no longer trusted, Shi Dakai (1831–1863), a talented general, led his army out of Nanjing and carried on an independent campaign against the Qing.

**Late Stage (1856–1864)**

The Taiping Rebellion was greatly weakened by the events of 1856 and the losing of much territory to the Qing armies in the wake of the infighting. Meanwhile, the Qing dynasty found a powerful force in suppressing the rebellion, the Xiang (Hunan) army led by Zeng Guofan.
Zeng commanded strong support among the gentry class by upholding Confucian values in countering the Taipings’ form of Christianity. Recruited exclusively from Zeng’s hometown in Hunan Province and highly paid and well trained, the soldiers of the Xiang army pushed the Taipings into a defensive position. Two new leaders and outstanding generals of the Taipings, Li Xiucheng (1823–1864) and Chen Yucheng (1837–1862), orchestrated a series of successful campaigns to break the impasse, advanced to eastern Jiangnan, and approached Shanghai, an important treaty port since the end of the First Opium War (1839–1842). Hong Xiuquan’s cousin, Hong Ren’gan (1822–1864), arrived in Nanjing after having stayed in Hong Kong for years, breathing new life into the waning regime by attempting to reform the Taiping political and economic systems by using Western models.

From 1856 to 1860, the Qing dynasty was engaged in the Second Opium War (also known as the Arrow War) with Britain and France. The conclusion of the war coincided with a change of leadership within the Qing dynasty. The new leaders, the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908) and Prince Gong Yixin (1833–1898), effected a radical turn in foreign policy, becoming cooperative with the West, which encouraged the Western powers to side with the Qing dynasty in China’s civil war. In early 1862 Li Xiucheng attacked Shanghai again, triggering Western intervention. A foreign mercenary army, the “Ever-Victorious army,” headed first by Frederick Townsend Wade (1831–1862) of the United States and then by Charles George Gordon (1833–1885) of Britain, became the major agent of the Western intervention. After 1862, the Taipings retreated city by city under the joint attack of the Xiang army and the Ever-Victorious army. In June 1864 Hong Xiuquan died of illness. One month later the Xiang army captured Nanjing, which ended the Taiping Rebellion, even though the remaining Taiping forces continued to fight until 1868.

About 20 million lives were lost in the extensive warfare associated with the Taiping Rebellion and other rebellions of the period. One consequence of the rebellion was that the Qing government lost much of its power to the provincial authorities. Although Taiping Christianity failed to leave any lasting impact on Chinese society, its anti-Manchu nationalism was inherited by the anti-Qing revolutionaries, and its utopian egalitarianism was echoed in the Chinese Communist revolution in the twentieth century.

Yingcong DAI

Further Reading
Taiwan (Republic of China)

Táiwān (Zhōnghuá mínguó)

台湾 (中华民国)

The economically dynamic island of Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, is considered by mainland China to be China’s twenty-third province. Most of Taiwan’s 22 million citizens prefer the status quo: de facto independence from the People’s Republic of China, but with ever-increasing economic and social ties to the mainland.

Taiwan, or as it is known by its official name, the Republic of China (Zhong-hua min-guo, in Mandarin), is a hot spot in today’s world politics. China insists that it is a renegade province of the mainland, while for more than four decades the island’s former ruling party, the Nationalists, (Kuomintang, KMT) insisted that the island was the true government of China in exile. After the Nationalists were defeated by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000, the DPP president, Chen Shui-bian, (in office 2000–2008) insisted that Taiwan was “independent” and tried repeatedly to get the United Nations and other international organizations including the World Health Organization to recognize it as a sovereign nation; Shui-bian’s claims and efforts infuriated China. Meanwhile, the United States, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, is bound by Congress to defend Taiwan should China try to reunify with Taiwan by force; yet at the same time the U.S. government follows the line that “there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China,” which it first accepted when President Carter formalized diplomatic ties with the mainland in 1979.

Further complicating the matter is that the overwhelming majority of polls show that most of Taiwan’s 22 million citizens prefer the status quo—that is, de facto independence yet with increasing economic and cultural ties to mainland China—regardless of their leaders’ rhetoric.

Geographically, Taiwan is quite small, comprising 13,977 square miles of islands (36,000 square kilometers; about half the size of Ireland, with five times the population), including the main island of Taiwan, Penghu Islands (the Pescadores), Quemoy and Matsu, which are the two closest islands to China, and a few other minor islands, some located in the South China Sea. At its closest, the island of Taiwan is a mere hundred miles from the Chinese coast.

The main island of Taiwan is composed of high mountain ranges running from the northeast to the southern tip. In addition to the central range there are volcanic mountains, foothills, terrace tablelands, coastal plains, and basins. The climate is subtropical.

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) Taiwan was added to the Chinese empire, and Han Chinese, many from nearby Fujian Province, began to migrate to the island during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Before that time, the island had been the home to an estimated eleven aboriginal tribes. During this time, Chinese and Japanese pirates also began to set up residences on the island and turn it into their base.

By 1624 there were some 30,000 Chinese settlers on
the island when the Dutch invaded. The Dutch newcomers promptly set up a trading post. Two years later, Spaniards landed at Keelung and occupied the northern coast. But the Dutch drove the Spaniards out in 1641.

In 1661, after the Ming dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus in China, a Ming general, Cheng Cheng-kung (known in the West as Koxinga), took over the island of Taiwan to use as a base from which to attack the Manchus with the goal of restoring the Ming dynasty. However, the Manchus defeated the Ming exiles in 1683 and Taiwan was made into a prefecture of Fujian Province. In 1886 Taiwan was officially named a full province under the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), which was established by the Manchus.

China's claim to Taiwan grew murkier as the Qing dynasty weakened in power under the attack of Western and Japanese military forces. After the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1985) the Manchus were forced to cede Taiwan to Japan. But at the end of World War II Japan was forced to return all the lands it tried to take over from China back to the Chinese government, and so Taiwan was returned to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist-controlled government, that is, the Republic of China, on 25 October 1945. Taiwan thus again became a province of China.

A civil war between Chiang's Nationalist forces and Mao Zedong's Communist-led People's Liberation Army soon broke out (1945–1949). Mao defeated Chiang's forces in 1949, establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949 in Beijing. Meanwhile, Chiang, along with some two million Chinese, reestablished his Nationalist-controlled Republic of China on Taiwan. Mao was poised to take over Taiwan in 1950, when the Korean War broke out and the U.S. government decided to intervene in the Chinese conflict. In an attempt to stop the spread of Communism in Asia, President Truman sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits, and thus prevented Mao from absorbing Taiwan into the PRC. From then on, the United States assumed the defense of Taiwan and helped Chiang to build up Taiwan into a modern and prosperous independent state with $5.7 billion worth of aid between 1950 and 1965, as well as with modern military equipment.

From 1949 until his death in 1975, Chiang Kai-shek always insisted that the Republic of China on Taiwan was the true government of China and that the island was a mere base that he intended to use to retake the mainland from the Communists. As a result, he tolerated no political dissent and established martial law on the island. After his death Chiang's son Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the presidency (1978–1988) and began to liberalize some of his father's policies, easing up on restrictions that forbade all contact between Taiwanese and their families back on the mainland, for example. But both Chiangs insisted that Taiwan was a part of China and never saw the island as an independent nation.

After Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, a new era opened in Taiwanese politics. Many political parties formed and democratic elections were held. Although the first Taiwanese-born president, Lee Teng-hui (in office 1988–2000), was a member of the KMT party, he broke with the Chiangs' tradition and refused to acknowledge that Taiwan was a part of China. The next president, Democratic People's Party (DPP) member Chen Shui-bian (in office 2000–2008), went so far as to call for Taiwan's official independence and even tried to push a referendum in the 2008 presidential election to use the name "Taiwan" rather than the "Republic of China" in order to seek admission to the United Nations, which Taiwan has not been a member of since 1971.

Currently the Taiwanese people have shown they do not want to provoke China into an all-out war by declaring independence. Chen Shui-bian's party, the DPP, was defeated in the 2008 legislative election by the KMT (and
The “One-China” Policy

The issue of cross-strait relations (that is, the relationship between mainland China and the island of Taiwan) has reverberated in the global community since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. Whether and how Taiwan should be included in various international bodies, from the International Olympic Committee to the World Health Organization, has been one source of disagreement. This text comes from a statement issued by the [mainland] Chinese National People’s Congress in the 1990s:

U.S. President Bill Clinton recently signed two bills passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate: one is supportive of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) and the other, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, contains clauses showing such support, in an attempt to help Taiwan squeeze into international organizations where statehood is a prerequisite.

The act of the U.S. Congress and Administration wantonly violates the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, severely infringes upon China’s sovereignty, brutally interferes in China’s internal affairs, and tramples on the basic norms governing international relations, and for this we express our utmost indignation and strong opposition.

Taiwan is but a province of China no matter how Lee Teng-hui tries to blur this. This fact is universally recognized by the international community including the United States.

As part of China, Taiwan is not qualified nor entitled to participate in any international organization that only sovereign countries can enter. This is a most basic principle guiding international relations that nobody can negate.

The U.S. leaders and administration have repeatedly and openly stated their adherence to the “one-China” policy, and even after Lee Teng-hui started to advocate his “Two-States” remarks in an attempt to split the motherland, they again clearly promised not to support “Taiwan independence,” not to support “two-Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” and not to support Taiwan to enter into any international organization that only sovereign countries can enter. However, the U.S. government so quickly went back on its words and, regardless of the universally-recognized international law and basic norms governing international relations, openly came out to support Taiwan in “participating” in the WHO that only sovereign countries can enter, trying to bolster the Taiwan authorities in their attempt to create “two-Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” and to lay obstacles for China’s reunification cause.

The Taiwan issue is the most essential and most sensitive at the core of Sino-U.S. relations. The governments and leaders of the two countries have a consensus understanding of this. The Taiwan issue is a matter concerning China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, from which the Chinese people will never retreat.


Further Reading


The “Taiwan economic miracle” is the island’s rapid economic growth of the last forty years. Most scholars credited the surge to implementing neoliberal principles of a free-market economy.

Since 1962 the economic growth of Taiwan has been impressive. In 1962 Taiwan had a per capita gross national product (GNP) of just $170, placing the island’s economy between those of Zaire and Congo. By 2002 Taiwan’s per capita GNP, adjusted for purchasing power parity, had soared to $22,760, contributing to a human development index similar to that of the wealthy Asian nations of South Korea and Singapore. Business and scholarly communities recognize this economic achievement, with Taiwan often being touted as the prime example of growth with equity. In both Taiwan and abroad this rapid economic growth was called the “Taiwan economic miracle” and in Taiwan was usually associated with the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and its adherents.

Most economic scholars attributed Taiwan’s economic growth to the implementation of neoliberal free-market economic principles. Others emphasized the role of KMT policy as leading to a developmentalist state. Still others argued that Taiwan’s economic miracle was the result of a Chinese Confucian culture that stresses family values, education, and an industrious work ethic. In all of its variations the Taiwan economic miracle justified KMT rule of Taiwan through depiction of the island as the embodiment of bureaucratic efficiency, capitalist productivity, and Chinese tradition. The ideology of the miracle linked capitalistic development with nationalist...
sentiment, making opposition to capitalism seem unpatriotic and non-Chinese.

But after martial law was lifted in 1987 both Taiwanese and Western scholars questioned the ideology of the Taiwan economic miracle. Some scholars noted that Taiwan’s phenomenal economic growth actually had begun under Japanese occupation of the island. Some pointed out the influence of U.S. aid on Taiwan, which contributed greatly to Taiwan’s gross domestic product during the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s and opened up the U.S. market to Taiwanese products. These historical arguments were usually identified in Taiwan with the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party).

Some scholars looked beyond the miracle at problems such as the evolution of economic classes, ethnic divisions in Taiwanese society, and the environmental destruction wrought by rapid industrialization. Within Taiwan the feminist and labor movements most vocally criticized the nationalist implications of the ideology. After all, if people believe that hard work is a Taiwanese national characteristic and a reason for the economic miracle, for example, it is difficult for unions to advocate a forty-hour work week. Therefore the ideology has had largely a conservative influence on society, creating greater adherence to the KMT and inhibiting the growth of progressive political movements in Taiwan. In the 2008 presidential elections KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou capitalized on this theme, promising a return to rapid economic growth if the KMT were reelected. He won in a historic landslide vote. In 2008, however, a global financial crisis led to economic slowdown and a drop in the Taipei stock market, disappointing some of Ma’s supporters and leading others to place hope in closer relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Scott SIMON

Further Reading


Taiwan Strait
(Cross-Strait Relations)

Táiwān Hǎixiá 台湾海峡

“Taiwan Strait” is political shorthand for relations between mainland China and the breakaway (as China sees it) island of Taiwan (officially known as the Republic of China), as well as the name of the actual body of water separating the two nations.

“Taiwan Strait” has become the shorthand political term for the gulf in relations between the government on Taiwan and that on mainland China, as well as attempts to bridge that gulf. Technically the Strait is the body of water—a mere 160 kilometers at its narrowest—that separates the island of Taiwan from the mainland. “Cross-Strait Relations” is the Chinese media term used to describe interactions between Taiwan and China.

Over the years Cross-Strait Relations have undergone many phases, from armed conflict to periods of negotiation. After the civil war ended in China in 1949, the losing Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, fled the mainland to the island to re-establish the Republic of China under U.S. protection. Some 2 million refugees from the mainland also fled the Communist regime to live on Taiwan. During Chiang’s reign, he actively campaigned to retake the mainland from his base on Taiwan, and even sent military missions across the Strait to attack mainland sites. He forbade all contact between the citizens of Taiwan and family members on the mainland.

Taiwanese politics changed dramatically after Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, died, in 1975 and 1988 respectively. Taiwanese natives succeeded them, first President Lee Teng-hui and then President Chen Shui-bian, both of whom were determined to create a new Taiwan with its own identity, separate from China. Lee was less radical and more cautious in his dealings with China. For example, he established a National Unification Council on 23 February 1991. Lee also established a semi-official body, the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) to make direct contact with China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). During Lee’s administration, millions of Taiwanese were permitted to visit China, invest in businesses on the mainland, and establish permanent residences in China. Trade prospered, especially for the Taiwanese. Chen, on the other hand, wanted nothing to do with China and actively promoted a pro-independence political agenda. Relations deteriorated, Taiwan’s economy suffered, and at times it seemed that military conflict was imminent.

President Ma Ying-jeou (elected 2008) promoted the idea of closer ties with the mainland in his campaign and insisted there would be no war with China. After his inauguration, he immediately began encouraging the most open trade policies and travel arrangements for mainland and Taiwanese citizens across the Strait since 1949; direct flights from Beijing to Taipei resumed in July 2008.

Cross-Strait relations, however, still pose security issues for both U.S. and Japanese regional security strategies. Many American conservative and “neo-con” groups do not want to see closer ties between Taiwan, a democracy, and the nondemocratic People’s Republic of China. As for the Japanese, some politicians fear the implications
of Taiwan-China integration, either in economic or political terms, as they feel it threatens Japan's position of power in East Asia. Also, Japan's industries rely almost completely on overseas energy sources, which must pass through the Taiwan Strait and which Japan does not want to see fall into China's hands; nor does Japan want China to be able to control Japan's energy resources. Thus the political atmosphere surrounding the Taiwan Strait will continue to be an issue fraught with tension in the twenty-first century. China is planning to build a tunnel to connect the mainland with Taiwan in twenty years. This Chinese version of the Chunnel (the tunnel under the English Channel connecting England and France) may bring increased economic cultural ties or increased conflicts.

Even more recently, cross-straight relations have been improved by increasing dialogue and the election of more unification-minded politicians in Taiwan. Limited direct flights and trade has resumed between the island and the mainland, and political exchanges are reaching new heights of cooperation and conciliation.

Winberg CHAI

Further Reading
Taiwan–China Relations

Liǎngàn guānxi 两岸关系

Relations between the island of Taiwan (the Republic of China) and its giant neighbor across the Taiwan Strait, mainland China (the People’s Republic of China, which considers the island a breakaway province), stretch back thousands of years and continue to evolve to this day.

Taiwan’s first residents, who make up the island’s aboriginal tribes, migrated to the island about six thousand years ago and are related to ethnic groups from southern China, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines. They now constitute just over 1 percent of the total population. Although Taiwan appeared in Chinese historical records before the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the colonization of Taiwan by Chinese settlers began only in 610 CE, during the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). The next large migration of Chinese to Taiwan started in the twelfth century. During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), many Chinese settlers in Taiwan were ordered to return to the Chinese mainland by imperial edicts. But Chinese pioneers managed to continue to migrate to Taiwan in spite of the imperial prohibition. Soon Taiwan became a base from which Japanese and Taiwanese pirates attacked shipping in the South China seas.

Europeans also began to arrive on Taiwan. In 1590 Portuguese sailors landed on the main island and named it “ilha Formosa,” meaning “beautiful island.” Formosa remained the name by which Europeans knew Taiwan for centuries. In 1624 the Dutch invaded and occupied the main island. Two years later, the Spanish landed at Keelung, a northern port; they controlled Taiwan’s coastal areas for two years. They were finally driven out by the Dutch in 1641.

In 1661, the Ming-dynasty general Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662), known to the West as Koxinga, took Taiwan from the Dutch and established an exiled Ming government in Anping (Tainan) in southern Taiwan. The Ming dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus (Qing dynasty, 1644–1912) on the Chinese mainland, but Zheng’s son ruled Taiwan with a large number of Chinese followers until the Manchus finally took Taiwan in 1683. By then, Taiwan’s population had exceeded 2.5 million, most of them from China’s Fujian and Guangdong provinces.

By the nineteenth century, China was experiencing economic difficulties and political chaos. Western countries controlled territory along the eastern seaboard. At the end of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Japan began its colonization of Taiwan and used it as a major military base for fifty years until the end of World War II.

Relations under the Two Chiangs

In 1911, the Qing dynasty on the Chinese mainland was overthrown by a nationalist revolution (the Qing emperor did not abdicate until February 1912) spearheaded by the Guomindang (on Taiwan, Kuomintang) under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and Chiang Kai-
The International Olympic Committee invited both the PRC and Taiwan to participate in the 1952 Helsinki Games; Taiwan withdrew in protest, stating that it could not "compete with Communist bandits on the same sports field."
mainland radio broadcasts, or even receiving mail from friends or relatives still living on the mainland.

After the death of Chiang Kai-shek on 5 April 1975, the real power in Taiwan fell into the hands of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988), who was formally elected to the presidency in May 1978. Like his father, he absolutely opposed any demand for Taiwan’s independence. Both Chiangs believed that Taiwan was a base from which the Kuomintang, and thus the ROC, could regain control of the mainland. To the two Chiangs, Taiwan was part of China, period.

However, Chiang Ching-kuo took significant steps to relax tensions with the Communist mainland government. For example, he permitted indirect trade and contacts with the mainland by Taiwan’s residents. He was prepared to begin negotiations with the Communist government shortly after lifting the travel ban in October 1987, but before direct negotiations could begin, he died of cardiac and pulmonary failure on 13 January 1988.

**Relations under the Native Taiwanese Leaders**

The death of Chiang Ching-kuo opened a new era in Taiwanese politics. A native-born Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, succeeded him in 1988. Since then Taiwan has become a more democratic and pluralistic society. In addition to the Kuomintang, another major political party, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) is gaining considerable support among Taiwanese voters.

At first Lee Teng-hui continued his predecessor’s open door policy toward the Chinese mainland. Lee established the National Unification Council under the auspices of the President’s Office (the White House of Taiwan). In February 1991 the council adopted “Guidelines for National Unification,” which outlines three phases of unification: Short term (exchange and reciprocity), middle term (trust and cooperation), and long term (consultation and unification). However, Lee refused to set a timetable for the implementation of the guidelines.

Lee Teng-hui also authorized the establishment of a semi-official “Strait Exchange Foundation” (SEF) to make direct contact with the Chinese mainland’s counterpart organization, the “Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits” (ARATS).

The Chinese Communists have always maintained that Taiwan is a Chinese province and must be reunited with the mainland. Their plans to achieve that goal have varied. Before 1978, the official policy was to use military force. In 1978 the third plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress adopted a new resolution calling for “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. Beginning in 1983, the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) made a number of concessions to Taiwan, and in early 1984 China offered a proposal that would take into account Taiwan’s political and economic concerns: The “one country, two systems” proposal. “One country, two systems” continued to be China’s official policy under Jiang Zemin (b. 1926) and Hu Jintao (b. 1942).

Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in 1995 to give a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. No Taiwanese top official had set foot on U.S. soil since the United States recognized the PRC in 1979. China feared Lee’s visit indicated a move toward independence and would lead to recognition of Taiwan as a state by the world community. As a result, China conducted military exercises across the Taiwan Strait involving 400,000 troops. By 1996 four Chinese missiles had been fired within approximately fifty-one kilometers of the island state. During that tense period, the United States dispatched two nuclear-armed aircraft carrier groups into the area. Ultimately, China concluded its military exercises...

Relations between China and Taiwan have become extremely tense again since July 1999. At that time Lee Teng-hui introduced a new element by insisting that negotiations must be based on a “special state-to-state” relationship. As a result, China published a white paper, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” on 21 February 2000, in which it declared that they “cannot allow the resolution of Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely.”

A political earthquake erupted in Taiwan on 18 March 2000, when Taiwanese voters elected a pro-independence DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian (b. 1950), as president of Taiwan with 39 percent of the votes in a three-way race. China demanded that Chen accept the “one-China” principle based upon an agreement made by Lee Teng-hui’s SEF and China’s ARATS representatives, who in June 1992 came to a “consensus” (known as the 92 Consensus) that both sides accepted the principle of “one China” but with different interpretations of which side represented that one China. However, Chen instead began to promote
a policy of “Taiwanization” within the island while advocating independence in the international community. China reacted with its own anti-Chen and anti-Taiwan policies, passing an anti-secessionist law and installing hundreds of missiles across the Taiwan Strait.

Upon taking office, U.S. president George W. Bush was a strong supporter of Chen and Taiwan. He publicly announced on 26 April 2001, that he would do whatever it took to defend Taiwan. He also approved the sale of a large weapon system to Taiwan.

However, as Chen began his second term in 2004 (which he won in a much disputed election) the U.S. found Chen to be untrustworthy and no longer a “faithful ally” and worried that Chen wanted to start a war between the U.S. and China. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s economy deteriorated under Chen’s administration.

Chen’s DPP originally had offered itself as a “fresh” alternative to the KMT, which had become infamous for its corruption, known as “black gold politics.” After eight years in power, Chen and his DPP had themselves become notorious for their own brand of corruption. Many of Chen’s officials were indicted, including Chen’s son-in-law and Chen’s wife. Chen himself avoided prosecution only because of the immunity afforded the sitting President.

Taiwanese voters on 12 January 2008 ousted Chen’s DPP and returned the old KMT to power with 81 of a total of 113 seats in the legislature. Chen’s presidential successor was the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, who won a resounding victory over the DPP candidate. Both the U.S. and China welcomed Ma’s victory. President Bush personally called Ma to congratulate him. Chinese President Hu Jintao invited Ma’s vice-president-elect Vincent Siew to meet with him at the April 2008 Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan, China.

Taiwan’s SEF and China’s ARATS met and signed several agreements including the resumption of direct flights between China and Taiwan, and the arrival of Chinese tourists and officials in Taiwan.

### Future Prospects

The victories of the KMT in Taiwan’s 2008 elections will undoubtedly change the dynamics in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations for years to come. Ma pledged not to declare independence and to accept the “one China” principle under the 92 Consensus. Ma also pledged to Taiwanese voters that he would not seek reunification with China during his presidency. However, he welcomed better and peaceful relations with China and invited China’s investments on the island itself.

China, too, promised cooperation during Ma’s tenure, including a continuation of its favorable economic policy toward Taiwan, which gives Taiwan a considerable trade surplus. Both sides expressed the desire to create an interdependent and harmonious environment for the twenty-first century.

**Winberg CHAI**

### Further Reading


The Taklimakan Desert, the world’s second-largest sand desert, is located in the southern part of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in northwestern China. The desert covers 338,000 square kilometers (nearly the size of Greece) and is one of the farthest places on earth from the sea. At its lowest point the desert is 154 meters below sea level.

About 85 percent of the desert consists of shifting sand dunes, averaging 100-150 meters in height, whereas dunes in the western parts average only 5-25 meters in height. The desert has a temperate climate and low precipitation of less than 50 millimeters annually. The Taklimakan Desert constitutes the central part of the Tarim Basin, which in the western part rises to 1,560 meters above sea level. The basin is partly surrounded by mountains that rise more than 6,000 meters above sea level. In the north the desert borders on the Tian Shan (Celestial Mountains) range, and in the west and the south it borders on the Kunlun and Altun Mountains. Glacial streams from the mountains run far into the desert, where they disappear into the sands or evaporate. Poplar and tamarisk trees grow along the riverbeds.

The Silk Roads—a network of trade routes that connected Asia with the Mediterranean area—traversed the Taklimakan desert in two routes: a northern route, which ran along the northern edge of the desert, and a southern route along the southern edge. A few oasis towns exist along the Hotan River, which also is the main route across the desert from south to north. Since the 1980s large oil fields have been exploited, and in the 1990s more than 500 kilometers of roads were constructed for the oil industry.
There are small populations of the critically endangered wild Bactrian camel (*Camelus ferus*) found in the Taklimakan. There are an estimated 600 individuals surviving in China in three separate pockets (the largest of which is the Taklimakan) and 350 in Mongolia. The rare Asian wild ass (*Equus hemionus*) also is to be found.

**Bent NIELSEN**

**Further Reading**


The Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) was a golden age of imperial China. Buddhism developed; poetry flourished; money drafts were invented. Political, legal, cultural, and economic developments of the Tang dynasty influenced later dynasties.

The Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), founded by Li Yuan (also known by his temple name “Gaozu,” reigned 618–626), marked one of the most glorious periods in China’s history. After the short-lived Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) the Tang dynasty ruled China for almost three centuries, governing one of the most successful empires in the world at the time. With its government institutions, cultural achievements, legal establishments, economic developments, and territorial expansions the Tang dynasty exerted significant influence on later Chinese dynasties and defined the identity of Chinese civilization.

Dynastic Politics

Li Yuan, who inherited the title of dynastic duke of Tang during the Sui dynasty, was a member of a northern aristocratic family who had intermarried with the ethnic minority Xianbei tribal aristocracy. When the Sui dynasty collapsed in 617, Li seized the Sui capital Chang’an and ascended the throne in 618, thus founding the Tang dynasty.

During Gaozu’s reign the Tang dynasty expanded and consolidated the empire and established various institutions. Gaozu’s armies defeated several major rivals and completed the pacification of the country in 624. Gaozu basically continued the administrative institutions of the Sui dynasty. In the central government three agencies reported to the emperor (the Secretariat, the Chancellery, and the Department of State Affairs, which were collectively known as the “Three Departments”). They served as the administrative core. Local administration consisted of two tiers: the inferior district and the superior prefecture. The military system of garrison militia (fubing) combined agricultural and military duties. Gaozu revived the civil service examination system to recruit government officials on the basis of merit, although aristocrats continued to be influential in dynastic politics.

Like that of the Sui, the Tang legal system consisted of four major components: the Code, Statutes, Regulations, and Ordinances, which not only laid the foundation for later dynasties of imperial China but also influenced the legal systems of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.

Gaozu’s second son Li Shimin (temple name “Taizong,” reigned 626–649) took the throne in a military coup. Taizong’s reign, traditionally known as the “era of good government,” was one of close personal interaction between the ruler and his Confucian advisers. Generally, Taizong developed and refined the policies of his father’s reign, including revision of the law codes and expansion of the civil service examination system. He made particular efforts to balance the political influence of the regional aristocratic groups and to uphold the preeminent position of his own clan, the Li. In foreign affairs Taizong subdued...
the eastern Turks and began to expand Chinese power in central Asia.

The Rise of Empress Wu

Taizong’s ninth son, Li Zhi (temple name “Gaozong,” reigned 649–683) ascended the throne at the age of twenty-one. In the early years of his reign Gaozong relied on advice from the statesmen of his father’s court and continued some reform programs. Gradually, however, Gaozong’s court came to be dominated by Wu Zhao (627–710, reigned 690–705), one of the most remarkable women in Chinese history. Born into a merchant family, Wu Zhao had been a low-ranking concubine of Taizong who managed to become Gaozong’s legitimate empress in 655. In 660, when Gaozong suffered a stroke, the empress took charge of the central government. Over the next twenty years, while Empress Wu continued many of the policies of the former Tang rulers, she initiated some practices to consolidate her position. For instance, she designated Luoyang as a second capital in 657 and took up permanent residence there in 683, thus removing the political center from the base area of the northwestern aristocracy. Empress Wu also encouraged lower ranks of bureaucracy by creating new posts, providing more opportunities for advancement, and increasing salaries. In order to promote the legitimacy of the dynasty, Empress Wu revived the ancient feng and shan sacrifices on Mount Tai (Taishan), the eastern holy peak in present-day Shandong Province, and patronized Buddhism.

Under Gaozong and Empress Wu the Chinese continued their efforts to extend and consolidate the empire. By 661 they had defeated the western Turks and established a Chinese protectorate in the western regions. But the Chinese faced serious threats from Tibet. By the early seventh century Tibet had emerged as a unified state. Although Tibet became China’s tributary state under Songtsen Gampo (reigned 620–649), the Tibetans exerted constant pressure on present-day Qinghai and Sichuan provinces. After Gaozong died in 683, Empress Wu, now the empress dowager, took control of the imperial succession and purged her opponents at court by means of terror and a secret police force. In 690 she ascended the throne and proclaimed a new dynasty, sometimes referred to as the second Zhou period (690 to 705). Empress Wu then formally became an “emperor,” the only woman sovereign in China’s history. Some senior officials at court forced her to abdicate in 705 and restored the Tang dynasty.

Li Longji (temple name “Xuanzong,” reigned 712–756) took the throne by means of a series of political intrigues. The early years of his reign were the heyday of the Tang dynasty, a time of institutional progress, economic prosperity, and cultural flowering. The most important change occurred in the military. In the early Tang dynasty troops were organized through the fubing militia system, under which men of agricultural households served in the army on a rotation basis. Such a system proved inadequate to defend the empire against threats from the highly mobile nomadic horsemen of the frontiers. Xuanzong’s reign brought the development of professional soldiers who settled permanently in military colonies and a consequent growth of the military commanders’ power. In the 740s some non-Chinese governors were appointed to take charge of certain strategic military domains, among whom An Lushan, a professional soldier of Sogdian and Turkish ethnic background, rose to prominence and later led a rebellion.

Under Xuanzong the aristocracy reasserted its political dominance. Although under Empress Wu and in the early years of Xuanzong’s government many chief ministers had obtained their positions by passing the civil service examinations, after the year 720 men of aristocratic origins increasingly received appointments. What complicated court politics more was that from the 740s, the emperor refused to take an active interest in government affairs, being taken up by the charms of his concubine Yang Guifei, one of the most famous beauties in Chinese history. Those close to the emperor strove to become the power behind the throne; among them was An Lushan, who rebelled against the Tang dynasty in 755.

An Lushan’s Rebellion

The An Lushan rebellion (755–763) marked a turning point in the history of the Tang dynasty and indeed nearly destroyed the dynasty. The rebel troops seized the Tang capitals Luoyang and Chang’an and controlled most of north China. Xuanzong fled to Sichuan Province. Although An Lushan was assassinated by a subordinate in 757, the rebellion continued for six more years.
Eunuchs

Although the rebellion was put down, the Chinese lost their grip on many frontier areas, including the western regions. Within the Tang empire the political authority of the central government declined. Some northern regions became virtually autonomous, and other regions fell under the control of military governors who enjoyed enormous power in both military and civil matters. Under Xianzong (reigned 805–820) the Tang court regained a great deal of control over the powerful provinces and put down several major rebellions in Sichuan Province, the Yangzi (Chang) River delta, Hebei Province, and Shandong Province. Xianzong's success, however, to a great extent was based on the loyalty of his eunuchs, who controlled the dynasty's elite palace armies and supervised the provincial administrations. Eunuchs began to play an increasing role in Tang politics under Daizong (reigned 762–779). They murdered Xianzong and determined the succession of most subsequent young emperors. Although Wuzong (reigned 841–846) temporarily revived the fortunes of the dynasty by imposing some restrictions on the eunuchs’ power, Yizong’s reign (859–873) brought a resurgence of their influence at court.

During the last several decades of the Tang dynasty severe floods and drought, as well as political chaos and foreign threats, caused suffering and turmoil. In 874 a wave of peasant rebellions broke out; their leader, Huang Chao (d. 884), took Luoyang in 880 and Chang’an in 881. Although the rebel forces were finally suppressed, and the Tang court returned to Chang’an, the dynasty was left powerless. Most parts of the empire were either occupied by non-Chinese forces or controlled by rival military leaders. In 907 the warlord Zhu Wen ended the Tang dynasty and established his own Liang dynasty at the beginning of the Five Dynasties period (907–960).

Economic Prosperity

The Tang dynasty enjoyed economic prosperity. Under Gaozu the government undertook a land distribution policy known as the “equal-field system.” This system had been used during the northern dynasties and under the Sui dynasty; it granted peasants a certain amount of land, in return for which they paid taxes in grain, cloth, and labor on public works projects. This land and tax system remained in force until An Lushan’s rebellion. Gaozu also established mints and issued a new currency that remained standard throughout the Tang dynasty. The Grand Canal, an extensive system of waterways that was constructed during the Sui dynasty to link wealthy south China with the Huang (Yellow) River valley, facilitated the Tang economic transactions as well as political stability.

The Tang dynasty was cosmopolitan and open to foreign influence. About 2 million people lived in the capital Chang’an, the most populous city in the world at that time. A variety of foreign goods was displayed in the marketplaces of the major cities, where Chinese mingled with people from other Asian countries, including Japan, Korea, and India. Foreigners not only came to trade and study but also served as grooms, entertainers, dancers, and musicians. Some foreign customs, such as playing polo, became fashionable.

The social structure of the Tang dynasty changed significantly after An Lushan's rebellion. With the decline of the aristocracy the ruling class obtained its political power more from education and possession of landed property than from birth alone. When the equal-field land distribution system collapsed, many peasants disposed of their lands and, on the basis of formal contracts, became tenants or hired laborers of the rich. Local elites seized opportunities to establish large, landed estates that were managed by bailiffs and cultivated by tenants, hired workers, or slaves.

After the mid-750s the old taxation system ceased to function. During Dezong’s reign (779–805) the chief minister, Yang Yan, applied a new two-tax system generally to the empire. This system combined various taxes into a single tax, which was to be paid, in the summer and autumn, on the basis of the value of property instead of the number of household members. This taxation system generated revenues for the Tang dynasty and remained China’s basic tax structure until the sixteenth century.

The late Tang dynasty also brought important demographic changes. By 742, according to an official population survey, about 9 million households or more than 50 million registered individuals lived in the empire. Because of factors such as warfare and natural disasters, the population in the north declined dramatically, and more
and more people migrated to the lower Yangzi River valley and into Zhejiang Province.

Despite political instability the economy continued to grow in the late Tang dynasty. The population movements to the south promoted the agricultural expansion in the more fertile and productive lands of the country. New crops such as tea, sugar, and new varieties of grain were developed, and the double-cropping of land with rice and winter wheat produced greater quantities of foods. Silk production also increased rapidly in the Yangzi River delta region. The merchant class enjoyed legal freedom to engage in business and became prosperous by dealing in salt, tea, banking, and overseas trade. In addition to the two great markets in Chang’an and Luoyang, large markets appeared in local areas, and the local markets facilitated the development of new urban centers. The increased volume of trade brought an increasing use of money, particularly privately circulated silver, and credit and banking institutions began to emerge. To facilitate commercial transactions, in 811 money drafts were invented.

**Buddhism Develops**

One of the most dramatic cultural achievements of the Tang dynasty was the development of Buddhism. Although members of the Tang court gave their preference to Daoism because of the claim that they were descended from Laozi, the legendary founder of the belief system, they also recognized the strength of Buddhism and provided it with great favor and patronage through most of the period. The famous pilgrim Xuanzang (602?–664) went to India in 629 and returned in 645 with a large number of Buddhist sutras (precepts summarizing Vedic teaching). During the Tang dynasty Buddhist doctrine became sinicized, and Chinese indigenous Buddhist schools emerged. Three were most prominent. The Pure Land (Jingtu) school believed that salvation, or rebirth in the Pure Land, could be attained by chanting the Buddha’s name. The Celestial Terrace (Tiantai) school, named after a famous monastery, emphasized synthesis and harmony of all Buddhist teachings. The Meditation (Chan) school stressed intuitive enlightenment through
meditation. Buddhist monasteries, free of obligations to the state, acquired great wealth by accepting gifts and conducting business. These communities, however, often encountered criticism from Confucianists and Daoists because of intellectual rivalry and because all these belief systems competed for economic resources from the government. From 843 to 845 the pro-Daoist emperor Wuzong persecuted Buddhism; during that period some 4,600 monasteries and 40,000 shrines and temples were destroyed, 260,000 monks and nuns were returned to lay status, and much monastic land was confiscated and sold. This suppression marked the beginning of Buddhism’s decline in China.

Other intellectual currents also developed in the Tang dynasty. Because Confucianism offered political theories and institutional rules to build the centralized empire, the court promoted its spread, particularly through the civil service examinations. During the late Tang dynasty the prominent writer Han Yu (768–824), while attacking Buddhism, emphasized the revival of the orthodox Confucianism, which influenced the development of neo-Confucianism during the Song dynasty (960–1279). Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Nestorian Christianity also entered China.

During the Tang dynasty many fields of art flourished. Poetry reached its golden age. About three thousand Tang poets are known to us today, among whom Li Bai (701–762) and Du Fu (712–770) are perhaps the most prominent. The essayists Han Yu (768–824) and Liu Zongyuan (773–819) promoted the “ancient style of prose” (guwen) movement to reform literature. The Tang dynasty also included the first serious attempts to write short stories. Both Buddhist and secular sculpture flourished. Artisans created large monumental sculptures in Buddhist rock-cave temples and small metal images of the Buddha and bodhisattvas (beings that refrain from entering nirvana in order to save others and that are worshipped as deities in Mahayana Buddhism). The six relief sculptures of Taizong’s battle horses that guarded his tomb represented the masterpieces of the secular sculpture of the age. The frescoes at the caves of Dunhuang synthesized the cultural themes and artistic styles of China, India, and central Asian countries. Under the Tang dynasty wood-block printing also developed.

Legacy of the Golden Age

The Tang dynasty represented the golden age of China’s imperial times. The early Tang dynasty epitomized Chinese civilization to that point in time; the late Tang dynasty initiated reforms that had long-lasting effects on later dynasties. The extensive and unified empire strengthened a political ideology of “great unity.” Its achievements in political institutions and religion attracted a great number of foreign students to study and had far-reaching influences on neighboring countries. Japan, for example, learned from the Tang dynasty the imperial institutions, bureaucracy, law codes, written language, Confucianism, Buddhism, literature, art, and architecture. The economic prosperity in the Tang dynasty promoted international trade, which in turn promoted cultural exchange between Chinese and other peoples. The technology of making paper, for instance, was transmitted to the West during the Tang dynasty. The Tang dynasty was so influential on Chinese culture that present-day overseas Chinese call Chinatowns Tangren jie (streets of the Tang people).

Jiang Yonglin

Further Reading


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Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty was a benevolent ruler who created perhaps the greatest administration in Chinese history. He encouraged people to criticize his policies; he created a bureaucracy based on merit; and in foreign affairs he built alliances and won allegiance by fair treatment.

Emperor Taizong (reigned 626–649 CE) of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), who is hailed in Chinese history as exemplifying the ideal Confucian rule of benevolence and righteousness, established a cosmopolitan empire and facilitated the spread of culture and trade in eastern, central, and southwestern Asia and beyond. The fine administration and prosperity of his reign lay the foundation of a strong Tang dynasty; his empire extended to the steppes, and he controlled the Silk Roads in central Asia.

Overview
During Taizong’s reign Chinese government, laws, and culture (including Confucianism, poetry, and architecture) spread to other East Asian states and were incorporated into the local culture. Japan’s Taika Reforms (from 645 CE), in which the Japanese court adopted a Chinese-style centralized government, system of taxation, and law code, is one example. Unlike rulers of later dynasties, Taizong also embraced cultural diversity. While adopting Confucianism as state guideline, he also supported the translation of Buddhist sutras (Buddhist sacred texts) into Chinese, honored the ancient philosopher Laozi and Daoism, and built a Nestorian Christian church along with Zoroastrian temples in the capital city, Chang’an. Magnificent in appearance and culture, Chang’an attracted foreign envoys, traders, and clerics who traveled there by the Silk Roads and by sea. People from all over Asia and even Africa, including the Turks, Persians, Arabs, Japanese, and Koreans, lived among the Chinese in Chang’an and in southern port cities. Their food, clothing, arts, and the religion of Buddhism became part of the Tang culture, while Chinese technology, silk, and other goods spread to the other lands.

Life
Tang Taizong (actually the emperor’s reign title; his birth name was Li Shimin) came from an aristocratic family from northern China. His mother and his wife were both of non-Chinese descent, but they were known for Confucian propriety and were skilled in Chinese literature or calligraphy. Li Shimin was the second son of Li Yuan, a provincial governor under the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). In 617 Li Yuan rebelled against the unpopular Sui emperor Yangdi. Modern historians question the traditional account of Shimin’s pivotal role leading to the uprising, but all agree that in the next four years Shimin defeated various contenders for the throne. At age twenty-four he secured the empire for his father, who established the Tang dynasty.
Li Shimin excelled in cavalry and was an excellent strategist and commander. His exceptional achievements, however, led to fierce rivalry with his elder brother, who was the crown prince, and with his younger brother. In 626 Li Shimin triumphed over both brothers, who were killed, and ascended the throne at the age of twenty-nine when Li Yuan retired.

Domestic Affairs
Taizong created perhaps the finest administration in Chinese history. To rejuvenate a land devastated by wars, he adopted a benevolent rule. He distributed land to farmers and collected taxes accordingly (approximately one-fortieth of income) in kind. He was frugal in his expenditures and adopted a conciliatory foreign policy in his early reign to avoid wars.

He also established a bureaucracy based on merit, responsible officials, and thoughtful policy (state policies were prepared and reviewed by different offices before implementation). He discussed policy with chief ministers, appointed officials and generals based on their ability, regardless of class, ethnicity, or personal connections, and held civil service exams with questions based on the Confucian classics. Many of his most accomplished and devoted officials and generals had been on the staff of his former enemies or rivals. Independent examiners regularly reviewed officials; the emperor tolerated no abuses, even from his own kinsmen. He also encouraged criticism of any of his policies or behavior that people judged inappropriate. His most outspoken critic was Wei Zheng (580–643 CE), who had once served one of the emperor's brothers. It was not always easy for a monarch to hear frank criticism, but the emperor restrained himself and rewarded his critics when their arguments were reasonable. He kept Wei Zheng at his side and referred to him as his mirror that allowed him to see his mistakes. In fact, he credited Wei Zheng and other officials for making him a fine ruler. Tang Taizong also asked his chief ministers to receive remonstrance. The emperor told them: “If you cannot accept remonstrance yourself, how can you remonstrate against others?” Throughout his reign the emperor and his officials remained vigilant, consciously preserving good rule and bequeathing it to their descendants.

Taizong also ordered the revision of the penal code; the revised code reduced cruel punishments and became the foundation for later Chinese penal codes.

Foreign Affairs
In foreign affairs Taizong preferred forming alliances and winning allegiance through the appeal of fair and kind treatment. In 630 he dispatched troops and defeated the eastern Turks (in modern Mongolia), who often raided Tang cities. In the following years his army conquered more territory, but, more important, it secured the submission of tribes and kingdoms in Central Asia and around the Silk Roads without resorting to war. Often Taizong offered Tang princesses in marriage to tribal leaders to forge friendly diplomatic relations. When leaders submitted to Tang rule, Taizong made them governors of the regions they had formerly ruled independently, and he rarely...
intervened in their affairs. He allowed migration and in some instances ransomed back nomads’ clansmen who were seized by their enemies.

**Arts and Culture**

Taizong loved fine horses, but he was also well versed in poetry and was an accomplished calligrapher. He ordered the compilation of the five Confucian classics, as well as a commentary on them, and these became the standard texts for later dynasties. He wrote a preface for Xuanzang’s monumental translation of hundreds of Buddhist sutras; he also wrote three commentaries in the official history of the previous dynasties. He revered Daoism and claimed its founder, Laozi, whose family name was “Li,” as his royal ancestor.

**Legacy**

When Taizong died in 649, he was buried in Zhaoling on a mountain that eventually was the site of more than 160 tombs. Some of these were the resting places of imperial relatives, but most of the tombs housed meritorious officials, including more than a dozen nomadic generals: Taizong had granted meritorious ministers the right to be buried in his mausoleum complex and included them in his extended political family.

Tang Taizong and his officials created a political legend in Chinese history. His recorded discussions with officials, the Zhenguan zhengyao (Essentials of Government of the Zhenguan Period), became part of the imperial curriculum for later Tang and all subsequent Chinese emperors, as well as for the rulers of Japan and Korea. It influenced even the non-Chinese Khitan, Jurchen, and Mongol peoples. Taizong’s theory and practice of rulership have a unique place in world history.

**Further Reading**


Guang Si-ma. (1972). *Zi-zhi tong-jian* [Comprehensive mirror for aid in government]. Taipei, Taiwan: Shijie Shuju. (Original work compiled 1084)


Lily HWA
Attuned to the contemporaneous intellectual trends of political reform, philosophical experimentation, and literary innovation, Tang Xianzu invested song-drama with a new philosophical seriousness. His resulting oeuvre, particularly the romance entitled *Peony Pavilion*, has earned him a lasting reputation as one of China’s most accomplished dramatists.

Confronted with the highly autocratic politics, intellectual ferment, and literary experimentation characteristic of his era (the Ming dynasty, 1368–1644), Tang Xianzu transformed song-drama from a vehicle of entertainment, moral didacticism, or political allegory into a literary-yet-accessible, serious-yet-comic medium for the consideration of new philosophical ideas. Born into a scholarly family in Linchuan, a town in the rapidly commercializing region south of the Yangzi (Chang) River, Tang quickly earned the lower civil service degrees at ages fifteen and twenty-one before eventually achieving the highest rank of palace graduate (*jinshi*) at the age of thirty-three. But his unwillingness to ingratiate himself with the powerful and ruthless grand secretaries had not only delayed his metropolitan examination success until 1583 but also precluded any high-level appointments thereafter. More poignantly still, in 1591 a scathing memorial directed at the machinations of one of the grand secretaries incurred the wrath of the Wanli emperor and precipitated Tang’s demotion to a lowly post at the southern periphery of the empire. He was eventually reinstated as a district magistrate in 1594, but even his voluntary resignation in 1598 did not spare him the humiliation of being stripped of all titles in 1600. From 1598 until his death he primarily resided in his native Linchuan.

Even if Tang was too forthright to succeed in the fractious realm of late Ming dynasty politics, his studies and his career nevertheless brought him into close contact with the intellectual avant-garde of his day, who would in turn influence his plays. Tang became the disciple of the Wang Yangming–inspired neo-Confucian Luo Rufang (1515–1588), befriended the luminaries of the political reform movement such as Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612) and Gao Panlong (1562–1626), had lifelong ties to Buddhist notables such as the Buddhist master Zibo Zhenke (1544–1604), conversed and corresponded with other aspiring dramatists such as Mei Dingzuo (1549–1618), Tu Long (1542–1605), and Zang Maoxun (1550–1620), and avidly read the freshly printed works of the iconoclastic thinker Li Zhi (1527–1602).

Tang’s extended sojourns in Nanjing shaped both the form and content of his literary activities. Apart from encountering popular performances and printed dramas in the city, Tang was also exposed to older northern ritual music and newer southern-style performances during his service under the auspices of the Board of Rites. Inspired by a quest for moral integrity and by the potential of new literary forms on the one hand and increasingly disillusioned by the realities faced by public-spirited scholar-officials on the other, Tang elevated *chuanqi* song-drama to a new level of ethical expressiveness and aesthetic sophistication. After earlier dramatic experiments with another play, he completed *Peony Pavilion* (*Mudanting*)
in 1598 and went on to compose two more song-dramas in short order, all of which would collectively be known as the *Four Dreams of Linchuan*. The instant and enduring critical and popular success of *Peony Pavilion* eclipsed Tang’s attainments in other literary forms. Several recent highly acclaimed versions of *Peony Pavilion* staged in China and abroad have cemented his standing as one of China’s most accomplished dramatists of all times.

Patricia SIEBER

Further Reading


TANG Yin

Táng Yín  唐寅

1470–1523  Ming dynasty painter, poet, and calligrapher

Tang Yin, who wrote under the pen name Taohuaanzhu, meaning Master of the Peach Cottage, was one of the four masters of the Wu Painting School during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). After failing to gain a political position in the Ming civil service he joined the ranks of the literati, integrating poetry, calligraphy, and painting into a coherent and harmonious entity.

Ming dynasty (1368–1644) literati painter, poet, and calligrapher, Tang Yin (1470–1523) was born into a tradesman’s family in Wu, the ancient name of Suzhou in Jiangsu Province. In his teen years during the middle Ming dynasty Tang was already acquainted with a literary circle of educated elite. He received the highest honor in the provincial juren (recommended man) civil service examination in 1498. In the next year Tang went to Beijing for the national examination, but he was implicated in bribing the exam supervisor. At trial he was fined, and his juren degree was rescinded. This blow crashed Tang’s hopes of a political career forever.

Tang Yin was one of the four masters of the Wu Painting School, along with Shen Zhou, Wen Zhengming, and Qiu Ying. Tang learned from the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) master Li Tang (1066–1150) in depicting monumental mountains. In one of his famous paintings, Whispering Pines on a Mountain Path (hanging scroll, ink and color on silk, 1516, National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan), the dominant mountain recedes diagonally to the background and then rises majestically near the top of the painting space. Willows sway in the breeze by the lake, and the setting sunlight permeates the whole painting. Long, thin brushstrokes portray the scene, while light washes of blue green and grayish brown define the shade and texture of the rocks. Two figures, one in a scholarly dress, enjoy the waterfall over a bridge and below the densely foliaged pine trees. It is a refreshing view that embodies the splendor and totality of nature as well as the beauty and elegance of rural scenes.

Tang Yin also excelled in painting tree and flower subjects, such as bamboos, plums, and lilies, a fitting theme that symbolizes the perseverance and regeneration of the ideal literati. In his Plum Blossoms an old bough breaks off short, and in the middle of the break strong young shoots spring to both sides in opposing movements. However, Tang Yin was particularly fond of peach blossoms, as his pen name “Taohuaanzhu” (Master of the Peach Cottage) suggests. He wrote many poems about peach flowers.

When he painted human figures, Tang Yin’s depiction of ordinary ladies and maidens speaks about his familiarity with traditional subjects and his sympathy toward courtesans and prostitutes. In Silk Fan in the Autumn Breeze (hanging scroll, ink and color on paper, Shanghai Museum), a beautiful young lady stands alone, silhouetted against the diagonal hill slope and the shaded rocks. The accompanying inscription disapproves of the degraded
human relations and criticizes those who sought favor with people in power.

Tang Yin contributed to literati painting by combining the intensity and heroism of the northern school’s landscape painting with the subtlety and warmth of the southern school that appeared in the early Northern Song dynasty. He integrated poetry, calligraphy, and painting into a coherent and harmonious entity and expanded the scope of literati painting in a broad range of subjects.

Yu JIANG

Further Reading


Lady with Fan, by Tang Yin (1470–1523).
Tangshan Earthquake, Great

Tàngshān Dà Dìzhèn 唐山大地震

The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976 lasted only fifteen seconds but was one of the worst natural disasters of all time. The earthquake, possibly the deadliest in recorded history depending on the source consulted—the central government did not release death toll figures for three years—is considered symbolic of the end of Mao’s era in Chinese history.

The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976 killed 255,000 people and injured more than 160,000 in the city of Tangshan in northern China’s Hebei Province. The earthquake, with a magnitude of 7.5, occurred directly under Tangshan at a depth of 8 kilometers at 3:42 a.m. on 28 July. Over 90 percent of Tangshan’s buildings were flattened, and economic losses were estimated at 3 billion yuan (US $375 million). The earthquake lasted only about fifteen seconds. It was followed by an aftershock of magnitude 7.1 about fifteen hours later. The tremors caused damage in cities as far away as Beijing, Qinhuangdao, and Tianjin. The Chinese government did not report a death toll until 1979, after economic reform had begun.

Although the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) lists the official death toll at 255,000, it estimates that the death toll may have reached as high as 655,000. That figure would make the Tangshan earthquake the deadliest in modern times and the second deadliest in recorded history. The 2004 Sumatra earthquake in Indonesia killed 283,106, and the Kanto earthquake in Japan killed 142,800 in 1923. The earthquake of 12 May, 2008 in Sichuan Province is estimated to have killed 87,000 people and was the nineteenth deadliest in recorded history.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name of Earthquake</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td>830,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>227,898</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1138</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Damghan</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>856</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Chihli</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>100,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Magnitude unknown.

Note: Although the 1556 Shaanxi earthquake is estimated to have killed 830,000 people, figures from this period are hard to verify.


Aid Refused

In 1976 the chief members of a radical political faction of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), known as the “Gang of Four,” considered natural disasters a domestic issue and regarded the refusal of aid and sympathy from the international
community as an opportunity to “display the socialist system’s superiority of being self-reliant” (Rong, 2006).

The Chinese government has changed its attitude after more than three decades of economic reform. When the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic rocked China and the rest of the world in 2003, the Chinese government joined with worldwide medical and scientific experts to prevent and control the killer disease. China received international aid of $37.5 million, including medical equipment and epidemic prevention materials, from nearly thirty countries, international organizations, and foreign companies. On 12 May 2008, during the Great Sichuan Earthquake, which killed near 70,000 people, the Chinese government also made a great effort to receive international aid and to allow the media the freedom to report the disaster.

After the Tangshan earthquake the Chinese government’s efforts at relief were criticized as inadequate. The government also was criticized for having ignored scientists’ warnings of the need to prepare for an earthquake. Even today earthquake prediction is far from accurate.

The Tangshan earthquake was one event in what came to be referred to in China as the “Curse of 1976.” At the time any extraordinary natural phenomenon, whether snow in summer or droughts in spring, earthquakes or insect plagues, was interpreted as a sign of the displeasure of heaven, indicating that the Mandate of Heaven, which bestowed legitimacy on the Chinese ruling group, might be withdrawn. Enormous political significance was attached to the Tangshan earthquake. In the early 1970s the chaotic Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) had placed the country in a state of social and ideological anarchy. The leadership took great pains to explain away any political significance that might be attached to expressions of cosmic displeasure. For many Chinese the Tangshan earthquake indicated that important developments were about to take place. Many people in Tangshan reported seeing strange lights (so-called earthquake lights) the night before the earthquake. The “Curse of 1976” was also identified with the deaths of Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) in January, Communist military leader and statesman Zhu De (1886–1976) in July, and CCP leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) in September, and with the arrest the Gang of Four in October. The power struggle between Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, and CCP leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) began in 1976 as well.

From Rubble to Recovery

Today more than 7 million people live in the 134,720-square-kilometer Tangshan municipal area, including an urban population of 3 million. By 2006 Tangshan’s gross domestic product had increased to 236.2 yuan, ranking first in Hebei Province. In 2006 the per capita disposable income for urban residents was 12,376 yuan ($6,514) and 5,155 yuan ($2,713) for rural residents.

On 28 July 2006 President Hu Jintao visited Tangshan to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the earthquake. In July 2007 the Chinese government, along with the Architectural Society of China, decided that a memorial park would be built on the earthquake ruins; as of 2008, applications for design ideas were still being accepted. The park will cover about 40 hectares around the ruined site of the Tangshan Rolling Stock Plant. The park will be a museum of earthquake science and will provide a place for the public to pay tribute to earthquake victims.

Unryu SUGANUMA

Further Reading


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Tao Yuanming was one of the most eminent of pre-Tang poets, effortlessly blending poetic expression with the Confucian and Daoist ideals of simplicity. He was a recluse who rejected the life of the court in favor of that of the country; his poetry exhibits a great concern for the small delights of everyday life. A little over a hundred of his poems survive.

One of the foremost poets of the Jin period (265–420 CE) of the Southern and Northern Dynasties (220–589), Tao Yuanming 陶渊明 or Tao, also known as Tao Qian, was a recluse, preferring rustic settings to courtly splendor and fineries. He was born in Jiujiang in Jiangxi Province to a family that had long served the emperors but had fallen into poverty.

Trained as a scholar-official, Tao was given various minor posts at court, but he could not bring himself to agree with the way things were done by his superiors; he was known for being outspoken and critical. When he lost his sister to an illness, his priorities changed, and at the age of 30, he resigned his post, sold his house, and retreated to the country to do those things that he deemed important in his life—farming and writing poetry—stating famously that he would not humble himself for a few measures of grain. (The salaries of court officials were calculated in measurements of grain.)

At court he saw himself as a caged bird or as a fish in a small, artificial garden pond. During this period of seclusion a theme emerged in his poetry that would define it: bucolic ease. Linguistically he abandoned all things courtly and expunged from his verse all artificially ornate expressions that represented the grave excesses of a life rooted in the rituals and concerns of the court. He chose instead to write about simple pastoral pleasures, such as drinking or appreciating rural landscapes, developing an austere and simple style that reflected the essence of his rural life.

Perhaps in an effort to describe the peace and tranquility he had achieved by escaping from the constraints of the court, he wrote his renowned Peach Blossom Spring (Tao Hua Yuan, 桃花源記), a utopian description of pastoral life in which the virtues of living harmoniously with nature and with fellow human beings are extolled. The story tells of a fisherman who drifts along a stream in his boat and finds himself in an enchanted and unknown valley, where the inhabitants know nothing of the outside world's ills and are concerned solely with living in harmony with nature. When the time comes for the fisherman to return home, he carefully marks his path so that he might visit the valley again, but when he tries to find it he fails; the charmed place is lost to him, and he must live the rest of his life with the knowledge that he briefly lived in a paradisiacal place to which he can never again return.

Tao died on his farm, which he had made into his own utopia. Tao Yuanming is not remembered for his erudition, but rather for his poems that are so intimate and so well crafted that they become perfected reflections on
the individual as he seeks a place within the flow of history. This placing of the infinitesimal within the infinite marks his verses, making their appeal transcendent of both time and space.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


Known for its sparse vegetation and extreme climate, the Tarim Basin is located in the northwestern corner of China and will play a major role in China’s oil and energy production in the coming century. It is one of the largest endorheic basins in the world, meaning that rivers that flow into it dry up rather than flowing on to the sea.

The Tarim Basin is located in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in northwestern China between the Tian Shan and Kunlun Shan mountain ranges. The basin encompasses 906,500 square kilometers (a little over half the size of the state of Alaska) of mostly shifting sands, undulating expanses of arid terrain, and dry lake beds. Rivers that flow into it off the surrounding mountains dry up into the earth or evaporate rather than flowing on to the ocean. (The Great Basin in the American west is an example of another such “endorheic” basin.)

The Taklimakan Desert, which is the fifteenth-largest nonpolar desert in the world and the world’s second largest sand desert, occupies the lower basin of the Tarim. The Silk Roads—a network of trade routes that connected eastern, southern, and western Asia with the Mediterranean area, including northern Africa and Europe—threaded the region and was split into two routes. The northern route ran along the northern edge of the Taklimakan Desert, and the southern route ran along the southern edge.

An Uygur Muslim cemetery in northwest China, Tarim Basin, Turfan, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The Uygurs, a Turkic minority people, have inhabited the basin region for two millennia.

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
The term tarim describes a river that either flows into a lake or meanders amid desert sands. The desert climate has temperature extremes of −20º to 50º C and precipitation of just 50–100 millimeters a year. The snow on K2, the world’s second-highest mountain, flows into glaciers that creep down valleys to melt. This melted water forms rivers that flow into the Tarim Basin. Vegetation is sparse except for riparian (relating to the bank of a natural watercourse) stands of wormwood and poplar and willows, Ural licorice, sea buckthorn, and Indian hemsps.

The Han Chinese wrested control of the basin from the Xiongnu people at the end of the first century under General Ban Chao (32–102). Today the basin is sparsely settled by Tajiks and Uygurs and other Turkic peoples. Oasis agriculture in far-flung and small settlements produces cotton, fruits, grains, wool, and silk. Khotan jade, a nephrite jade that occurs in a variety of colors, is mined, and tourism is increasing in importance. Recent discoveries of oil and natural gas will make these an important source of China’s energy supplies in the next century.

Since the 1980s archaeologists have discovered remains of bodies dating back almost four thousand years in the eastern and southern parts of the basin. Dating from 1800 BCE–200 CE, some of the mummies have been linked to Indo-European Tocharian languages in the basin, although evidence is not conclusive. The cemetery at Yanbulaq yielded twenty-nine mummies, which have dated from 1100–500 BCE. The mummies have both Mongoloid and Caucasoid characteristics, suggesting ancient contacts between East and West. Their clothing indicates a common origin with Indo-European Neolithic (8000–5500 BCE) textile techniques. Many of the mummies are in excellent condition because of the desiccation of the corpses caused by the dryness of the desert.

Nuclear tests have been conducted at Lop Nur, a saline, marshy depression at the east end of the basin. Although once an important stop along the Silk Road, the lake, which has a tendency to shift its location due to blowing sands, has mostly dried up, mostly because of human activity.

Stephen F. CUNHA

Further Reading

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China's tax system is probably the most ancient and, at the same time, the most recent in the world. While records of land taxes go back almost four thousand years, the current tax structure did not come into existence until after 1980. Despite the Western influences of China's current tax system, it remains compatible with China's culture and politics.

The Chinese tax system looks like other tax systems in many ways. It consists of income taxes, consumption taxes (similar to sales taxes), property taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes. The functions of taxation are to raise revenue, to stimulate economic growth, and to facilitate social and political stability. China's current system is the result of major reforms since the 1980s.

**Tax Reforms**

Soon after the People's Republic of China came to power in 1949, the Communist Party reconstructed the economy. Private capital was nationalized, and foreign investment gradually left China. A type of sales tax and a property tax were introduced and administered by the general tax bureau. The reconstruction was more or less complete by 1956. From 1956 to 1978, a strict Soviet-type economy was practiced, and the private sector almost vanished. Industry and commerce were controlled by publicly owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises delivered all their profits to the government, and sales taxes were generally used to facilitate the transfer of funds from enterprises to the government's coffers. At the peak of the political and economic turmoil during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), law and order were in disarray, the role of taxation was disregarded, and the tax department existed only in name.

In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Communist Party changed its policy from political struggle to economic development. Deng made it clear that the need for economic development prevailed over the pursuit of the party's socialist ideals. Economic reforms changed the relationship between the state and the market, allowing for the creation of a tax policy.

The new economic policy had two objectives: opening up China to the outside world and reforming the domestic economic system. Establishing a modern tax system was considered critical to the success of the economic policy. To facilitate the transition, a two-track tax system was introduced so that a Western-style tax system would apply to foreign firms and individuals and another system would apply to Chinese firms and citizens.

The foreign track was created first and consisted of the individual income tax, targeted at foreign individuals (1980); the equity joint ventures income tax (1980); and the foreign enterprise income tax, applicable to foreign-owned enterprises and other foreign entities doing business in China (1981). An earlier tax—the consolidated industrial and commercial tax—remained applicable to...
foreign investors because it was the only tax in effect before 1980.

The domestic track was created in 1983 and 1984. State enterprises became subject to taxes, a reform commonly referred to as *li gai shui* (taxation replacing profit delivery). Separate taxes applied to the emerging collective enterprises and private enterprises; sales taxes applicable to domestic enterprise were introduced; and numerous miscellaneous taxes on property and transactions were reintroduced.

More substantive reforms began in 1986. In 1991 the foreign track was consolidated to create the enterprise income tax on foreign investment enterprises and foreign enterprises (FIE tax). In 1994 the three domestic enterprise income taxes were replaced by a one consolidated domestic enterprise income tax. The foreign track merged with the domestic track in the areas of sales tax and individual income tax. The 1994 reform also resulted in a new tax assignment between the central government and local governments as well as a new system of tax administration. Overall, the foreign track is a more Western-style tax. Because China wanted to follow the international tax norm, the FIE tax addresses international issues. The domestic track has more features from the old Soviet-style economy and is much less detailed than the FIE tax is. With respect to deductible expenses, FIEs may deduct the cost of wages, salaries, and employee benefits, whereas domestic enterprises can deduct only the amount of wages in accordance with the standard set by the government.

As of 1 January 2008, China implemented a fundamental enterprise income tax reform that adopts a lower general tax rate and unifies the tax rules applied to all enterprises. This new Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) replaced FIE tax and domestic enterprise income tax. It is a hybrid of international tax norms and China’s indigenous rules. For example, the new tax legislation provides anti-avoidance rules such as transfer pricing rules and thin capitalization rules, which seem to be the most direct adoption from international tax rules and are designed to prevent multinational corporations from shifting profits away from China without paying Chinese taxes. On the other hand, the legacies of economic transition and Chinese culture find their ways into this legislation. For instance, there are still a number of “residual” clauses authorizing the government to determine “other” amounts or issues in the new tax system.

**Current Tax Structure**

The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is responsible for administering tax laws in China. Its national head office is in Beijing. Local tax bureaus collect local taxes and some taxes shared between the central government and local governments. Although they are part of the local government, they fall under the SAT in terms of tax law interpretation and policy.

Four types of taxes are collected in China: consumption taxes, income taxes, property taxes, and miscellaneous taxes.

**Consumption Taxes**

Consumption taxes (*liu zhuan shui*) generate more than two-thirds of the total tax revenue. A consumption tax is a type of sales tax.

The value added tax (VAT) is the most productive source of revenue—generating about 37 percent of total tax revenue in recent years (e.g., 36.7 percent in 2006 and 37.5 percent in 2005). This tax applies to the sale of goods and certain services. The standard rate is 17 percent; a lower rate of 13 percent applies to necessities, certain culture products, agricultural supplies, and certain other goods. Small suppliers are taxed at 6 percent. Exports are not taxed. The business tax is imposed on business activities that are not subject to the VAT, mostly services. The tax rate is 3 percent for transportation, construction, postal communication, and cultural and athletic activities; 5 percent for banking, insurance, services, and the transfer of intangible property and immovable property; and 5 percent to 20 percent for entertainment (the applicable rate is determined by the local government).

The consumption tax is imposed on the sale and importation of luxury goods, such as tobacco, liquor, cosmetics, fireworks and firecrackers, gasoline, diesel, tires, motorcycles, and automobiles. The tax rates range from 1 percent on nonluxury cars to 45 percent on top-quality cigarettes. This tax is imposed in addition to the VAT.
The resource tax is imposed on the production and sale of crude oil, natural gas, coal, nonferrous metals, ferrous metals, and salt. The amount of tax payable is determined by the Ministry of Finance according to the mining or production conditions of the taxpayer.

**INCOME TAXES**

Income taxes are the second major source of revenue, generating about 22 percent of total tax revenues. Income taxes have been growing faster than consumption taxes since the late 1990s. For example, VAT grew by 22 percent in 2000, while FEI tax grew 50 percent, individual income tax grew 59 percent (SAT http://www.chinatax.gov.cn).

The individual income tax is a schedular tax; that is, different types of income are subject to different tax rates, and certain deductions are allowed. Income from employment is taxed monthly at progressive rates ranging from 5 percent to 45 percent. Income from the business of industrial and commercial activities and enterprise leasing and management are taxable annually at progressive rates ranging from 5 percent to 35 percent. Income from personal services is subject to a 20 percent flat rate tax. Investment income, incidental income, and capital gains are taxed at a flat rate of 20 percent. In computing the taxable amount, a deduction for actual expenses is allowed only in the case of business income. A standard deduction is allowed in the case of employment income, income from services, rents, and royalties. Interest, dividends, and incidental income are taxed on a gross basis. Taxes are withheld at the source. Enterprise Income Tax now applies to all enterprises (any business or organization that is not a sole proprietorship or partnership).

**PROPERTY TAXES**

A large number of taxes are imposed on property, transactions, and other real estate activities, generating about 8 percent of total tax revenues. Taxes on real estate are the most significant. A real estate gains tax was introduced in 1993 to regulate the growing real estate market in China. It applies to gains from the transfer of land-use rights, buildings (other than residential housing), and other structures on the land at progressive rates ranging from 30 percent to 60 percent. The urban real estate tax is imposed on the owners of real estate in urban areas. The deed tax is levied on the transfer of land-use rights and the sale, gift, or exchange of houses and buildings.

**MISCELLANEOUS TAXES**

The stamp tax applies to the signing or issuing of commercial contracts and documents. For example, loan contracts are taxed at 0.005 percent of the loan amount, and technology contracts are taxed at 0.03 percent of the contractual price. Taxpayers pay the tax by purchasing and affixing tax stamps.

The banquet tax is levied at 15 percent to 20 percent of the cost of each banquet costing over 250 yuan (about $37). The tax is withheld by the restaurant.

**Tax Revenue Sharing**

A key function of taxation is raising revenue. Since the 1980s, taxation has become a main source of government revenue. Most taxes in China are collected by the use of consumption taxes. Compared to income taxes, consumption taxes are easier to administer. These taxes are collected from enterprises, not consumers, thereby reducing the cost of administration and compliance. The tax mix has been favorable for generating revenue. Sharing the revenue from taxes between the central government and local governments is an enormous challenge.

China’s financial system is highly decentralized. Expenditures by local governments account for 71 percent of government expenditures. The central government has exclusive taxing powers in terms of legislation. All taxes are introduced by the central government. However, revenue from specific taxes is assigned to local governments. Overall, local governments receive about 50 percent of total tax revenues.

Under the current revenue-sharing system, local governments are entitled to the revenue from the following taxes: 100 percent of property and transaction taxes; 25 percent of the VAT; business taxes (with minor exceptions); domestic enterprise income taxes (other than those paid by centrally owned enterprises, local banks, financial institutions, and railway, banking and insurance companies that pay income tax centrally through their
Taxation and Taxes

head office); FIE taxes (other than those paid by foreign banks); and resource taxes (other than those paid by offshore oil companies).

Tax Expenditures as Policy Instruments

Using tax expenditures as policy instruments is consistent with China's previous practice of central planning, the need to accommodate local economic conditions of different regions of the country, and the desire to compete with other developing countries in attracting foreign direct investment. International competitiveness has always been a key concern in Chinese tax policy.

China has used tax expenditures extensively in both the income tax system and consumption tax system. Every major tax contains tax expenditure provisions. For example, the VAT exempts contraceptive medicines from taxation. The business tax exempts child care, education, and medical services. The individual income tax exempts a large variety of items from taxation. They include awards from the government, settlement fees to military personnel, and salaries of foreign experts sent to work in China international organizations.

The new enterprise income tax law provides a general low tax rate and unified tax incentives to both domestic and foreign investment enterprises. The nominal enterprise income tax rate is 25 percent, which is internationally competitive. The new tax incentives are designed to achieve tax equity between domestic enterprises and FIEs, to reduce administration and taxpayer compliance costs, as well as to achieve an overall, long-term, sustainable development of Chinese economy. They favor high-tech, industry-oriented or environment-oriented investments, and nonprofit organizations, or small, low-profit enterprises. These eligible enterprises obtain tax preferences based on the nature of their investments, other than the form of ownership or special locations.

Tax Policies and Development

Development in any country has three broad dimensions: economic, legal, and social, which are generally interrelated. Since the 1980s, China's tax policies have had varying effects on development.

Tax Policies and Economic Development

In many ways China’s experiment with economic development has been unique. China is a socialist country governed by a single party. The economy is highly fragmented and in transition toward a socialist market economy. China had no modern tax system until the 1980s. Chinese leadership has always resisted the advice of international experts to go for “big-bang” economic reforms in favor of a more gradual, pragmatic approach.

China's development goal has been to build up a relatively well-off (xiaokang) society in which people generally are not rich but have adequate food, clothing, and other material goods necessary for a decent life. Economic development is a precondition for reaching this goal.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China's gross domestic product (GDP) grew from 362 billion yuan in 1978 to 21.18 trillion yuan in 2006. In 2006, China was the world's fourth largest economy measured by the size of GDP, the third largest trader, and one of the largest recipients of foreign direct investment.

Unequal Development

But amid its rapid economic development, China has achieved social development only in certain areas. Poverty has been noticeably reduced. The unemployment rate for 2007 stood at 4 percent in urban areas though it was much lower in rural areas. China’s human development index has improved continuously since the 1990s, according to United Nations reports on human development. China’s global ranking rose from number 101 in 1991 to number 81 in 2007.

On the other hand, there have been increasing income disparities, regional disparities, and urban and rural disparities in China. In the early 1990s, for instance, the top 10 percent of the population held 40 percent of the savings in China. In 2006, saving deposits in urban and rural areas were 161.58 trillion yuan; the top 5 percent of the population owned about 50 percent of the national savings. Some parts of the country, typically the
southeast coastal areas and provincial capital cities, are more developed.

Disparities also exist between women and children and men, and between racial minorities and the more dominant ethnic groups. The Chinese tax system disproportionately benefits men because they are generally the higher income earners. In China women make up a smaller proportion of the white-collar workforce than men do, and the ratio of female-to-male earnings is about 0.82.

The regional disparities and shortages of financial resources at the local level also have had significant adverse effects on women and ethnic minority groups. Ethnic minority groups generally live in less-developed regions. A lack of resources at the local level often results in a lack of funding for hospitals, schools, housing, and other public works. Thus local service providers have to charge for their services. Local schools, for example, charge what are high fees for peasants. This has led to a dramatic shift in educational opportunities for women in rural areas. A son is the future “retirement plan” for his parents. A daughter is someone’s wife and will help support the husband’s parents. Thus, in the rural areas and minority areas where the one-child policy is not strictly applied, the daughter is often required to work to pay for the schooling of her brother. The results are that many fewer girls than boys are going on to higher education. Tax policies have played no significant role in income redistribution. By its very design, the tax structure in China cannot play a key role in alleviating inequality in income and wealth. In developed countries, the income tax, especially the personal income tax, has been used as the main instrument for redistributing income. But in China the role of the individual income in redistribution remains largely symbolic. This tax accounts for about 6 percent of total tax revenues. It is progressive only with respect to employment income and business income. Other types of income are taxable at a flat rate. The fraction of population paying the tax grew from 0.1 percent of all wage earners in 1986 to about 32 percent of all wage earners in 2001 and the average amount of annual tax paid by each wage earner was 314 yuan (less than $40) in 2002. More than one-third of the total individual income tax on employment income was collected from workers at foreign investment enterprises. Given the current situations in China, the individual income tax cannot be a meaningful tool of redistribution.

Some provisions of the sales taxes have some progressive features. For example, the consumption tax is imposed on luxury goods and services at progressive rates. This tax is presumably borne by high-income earners. The VAT is slightly progressive with a lower rate on certain necessities, such as grain, edible oil, and running water. Overall, however, these taxes worsen the urban/rural disparities because low-income rural residents must pay these taxes. In many poor rural areas, these taxes are the only taxes collected.

### Tax Policies and Social Development

Compared with the wide variety of tax preferences for economic development, tax expenditures for social development have been fewer in number and less in amount. Most of the tax expenditures under the individual income tax relate to disaster relief, family planning, payments to military personnel, and retired cadres. These measures are largely in response to other policy decisions and are not designed to promote any social activities.

Arguably, tax expenditures on social development are as important as those for economic development during an economic transition. At a time of increasing income gaps, the economic reforms smashed the “iron rice bowl” style of social security (which was tied to lifetime employment at a work unit) when state-owned enterprises were transformed into “economically efficient” entities. Redundant workers lost their jobs as well as their welfare system, which typically consisted of subsidized housing, medical insurance, and retirement income. The government has not introduced any meaningful tax subsidies for housing, education, charitable donations, child care, medical care, family support, or retirement savings. No specific tax expenditure has been designed to create jobs or workers’ training or relocation. Although the government has flirted with the idea of tax-subsidized retirement plans, no concrete tax policy has yet been enacted.

Retirement income security is a significant social and political issue in China. The Chinese population is aging at an accelerating rate owing to three possible factors: the baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s; the single-child policy,
which has produced the four-two-one family structure (four grandparents, two parents, one child); and the increasing longevity of the Chinese people. The percentage of individuals aged sixty and older in the Chinese population was 10 percent in 1999 and is expected to be 20.4 percent in 2030. All this means that there will be fewer young people in the future to pay taxes that can adequately support the elderly.

Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has regarded employer-sponsored retirement plans as an important pillar in the retirement system and the tax policy as a key instrument for supporting retirement plans. Employer-sponsored retirement plans are expected to supplement the public retirement pillar, which is designed to provide a basic retirement of up to 40 or 45 percent of the average salary at the time of retirement. It is estimated that retirement funds in China could exceed $160 billion by 2030 and become the world’s third largest retirement market. Many enterprises created retirement plans for their workers in order to attract and retain workers in an increasingly competitive labor market. The government introduced regulatory measures in 2004 to require that all retirement plans be defined as contribution plans and be managed in accordance with market principles. Under existing tax legislation, contributions made by an enterprise into a privately funded retirement plan are generally not deductible.

**Tax Policies and the Law**

Taxes and taxation are complex and create the need for rules, regulations, and laws to oversee implementation and collection, protect taxpayers’ rights, and prohibit abuses by taxing agents. Although China does not have the rule of law, it has enacted a number of tax laws.

China’s primary tax policy objectives are revenue, efficiency, and international competitiveness. Establishing a system of taxation based on clear rules is important in achieving these objectives because tax rules are written to govern not only the relationship between taxpayers and the government but also relationship between the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and local tax offices and the relationship between the tax administration and other government departments.

In terms of promotion of economic development, predictable and clear tax rules are undoubtedly important. Taxpayers need these rules to arrange their affairs and even to decide whether to invest in China. One reason for the two-track enterprise income tax system was to create a tax system that would be perceived as predictable and fair by international investors. The two-track system is highly discriminative now, but its original rationale was sound in the 1980s. China has always been sensitive to its international image, and creating a rule-based system was considered to an important part of projecting a positive image. This sensitivity helps explain why the foreign track of the tax system is regulated by laws enacted by the National People’s Congress.

**Sources of Tax Laws**

Tax laws in China include not only statutes (laws) enacted by the legislature but also administrative regulations authorized by the State Council and administrative rules introduced by the SAT. China has three major tax laws (the Individual Income Tax Law, the Enterprise Income Tax Law, and the Tax Administration and Collection Law), thirty or so administrative tax regulations, and about fifty administrative rules. Administrative policies and documents that have no force of law in Western countries have the status of legislation in China. Court decisions do not have the force of law in China.

Since the 1980s, tax legislation has become more detailed and comprehensive. The trend has been to elevate administrative rules to administrative regulations or to tax laws. For example, tax collection and administration had been governed by administrative regulations until 1991 when the Tax Administration and Collection Law (TACL) was enacted. The TACL, with 94 articles, modernized the collection system, set clear standards on the collection of taxes at both the national and the local levels, and established penalties for various violations of the law. It also provided the framework to allow tax authorities more access to taxpayer information and to better define the rights and responsibilities of both tax officers and taxpayers. The implementation rules for the TACL, 113 articles, provided detailed implementation guidance for the supervision and administration of tax collection in China. The TACL, along with the implementation rules,
has been acclaimed as a breakthrough in China’s tax administration system.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

In the area of taxes, the role of the court is limited to adjudicating tax disputes between taxpayers and the tax administration. There are generally two types of disputes. One involves the interpretation of tax legislation to determine tax liability. The other involves taxpayers bringing tax officials to court for wrongful or illegal administrative actions. Because administrative appeals are available to taxpayers in the case of the first type of disputes, most taxpayers resort to administrative appeals. Judicial appeals on matters of interpretation are virtually nonexistent in China. With respect to the second type of disputes, more and more taxpayers bring their lawsuits in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Law. Local tax offices are generally named as defendants in such cases for assessing tax penalties, enforcing tax collections, or other unlawful actions. In such administrative cases, taxpayers have won more than two-thirds of the cases.

The judiciary’s role is limited for several reasons. First, the courts do not have the exclusive power of interpretation: The body that introduces the law has the final power to interpret it. As such, the legislature, the State Council, or even the State Administration of Taxation has the sole power to interpret the meaning of statutory provisions. Since most of Chinese taxes are governed by regulations or rules introduced by the State Council or the SAT, the SAT has the sole power of interpretation in most cases. Even with tax laws enacted by the National People’s Congress (the highest state legislative body) the legislation is vaguely worded, leaving the tax administration with broad powers of interpretation. In the case of entitlement to tax preferences, the legislation generally requires taxpayers to apply to the tax administration for approval before they can enjoy the preferences. This makes it difficult for the court to challenge the administrative interpretation.

Another reason for the limited role of the judiciary is the lack of tax expertise in the judiciary. Tax expertise is concentrated within the tax administration. Although some tax officials have joined private practice, none has become a judge. The small number of tax cases makes it difficult for judges to develop tax expertise. There is a general lack of confidence in the judiciary in treating taxpayers equally in interpretative matters.

Finally, the court and the local tax bureaus are part of local governments. The payroll and benefits of judges and tax officials are determined by the same government. Local protectionism is a serious problem. Local tax bureaus may treat local taxpayers differently than they treat outsiders, whose tax revenue belongs to the central government. The courts’ decisions are sometimes influenced by the local government. Promoting local interest may prevail over the strict application of the law. Personal relationships between a judge and tax officials may also make it hard for the judge to overturn officials’ interpretations.

TAX ADMINISTRATION

The administration of taxes has been increasingly governed by rules and procedures. In addition to the TACL, there are rules governing invoice management, tax administrative reviews, tax audits, internal inspections, assessments of tax penalties, and tax litigation. The administration of taxes has progressed in providing services, becoming more transparent, and respecting taxpayers’ rights.

At the beginning of the economic transition in China in the 1980s, a direct assessment system was necessary because taxpayers were unfamiliar with the tax laws. With the continuing of the transition, direct assessment was gradually replaced by taxpayer reporting. By 1997 a three-part administration system was established: filing of returns by taxpayers coupled with taxpayer services, utilization of information technology, and centralization of tax collection and targeted tax audits and inspections. Taxpayers file tax returns at tax-service centers. Tax collectors are no longer directly involved in establishing a taxpayer’s tax liability. There is less face-to-face contact between taxpayers and tax officials who assess their tax liabilities and thus fewer opportunities for dishonest taxpayers and tax collectors to collude in cheating on the tax system.

Taxpayer services have been improving. Tax officials are required to smile at taxpayers or just be polite and put themselves in the shoes of taxpayers. The move to self-assessment has been accompanied by computerization.
and information technologies. Opportunities for cor-
ruption have been reduced greatly after the computer-
ization of taxpayer records and initial selection of targets
for audit.

The level of transparency in the tax administration
has also improved over the years. During the early years
of reform, many tax documents were labeled “Confiden-
tial,” out of reach to taxpayers. Now the SAT publishes tax
legislation, interpretation documents, rulings, and other
types of information on its website or in print through
the China Taxation Press. The SAT is also developing an
advance ruling system, especially in the area of transfer
pricing. The process of negotiating advance pricing agree-
ments is governed by certain implementation rules.

Taxpayers’ rights are specified in the TACL and Im-
plementation Rules. Taxpayers (and withholding agents)
have the following rights: to request that the tax author-
ities treat the information provided as confidential; to ap-
ply for tax reductions, exemptions, and refunds according
to the relevant tax laws; to make a statement or to defend
themselves against the decision of the tax office; to resort
to the process of administrative and judicial review and
to request compensation for damages incurred; and to use
and disclose illegal activities conducted by the tax
authorities and tax officials. In addition, taxpayers have
the right to deny a tax inspection if tax officials fail to pres-
ent a tax inspection certificate and tax inspection notice
and to request an extension to file returns and to make
tax payments.

Tax authorities and tax officials are required by the
TACL to be independent and impartial in enforcing tax
laws, to act with integrity and courtesy, to respect and pro-
tect the rights of taxpayers and withholding agents, and to
avoid conflicts of interest when carrying out collections or
investigations. If taxpayers’ rights are unlawfully infringed
upon or violated, taxpayers can sue for damages. Tax offi-
cials may be sued for inappropriate conduct, such as with-
holding or seizing taxpayers’ accommodations (including
residential property), misusing daily living necessities in
enforcing tax collections, or abuse of power. Penalties are
enforced on tax officials who show favoritism; commit
malpractice; fail to report criminal acts to lawful authori-
ties; retaliate against taxpayers for reporting tax officials’
wrongdoing; intentionally delay, advance, or allocate rev-
ene quotas; or wrongfully collect taxes.

To secure revenue, the SAT has worked hard to in-
troduce rules to clarify the obligations and rights of
taxpayers as well as those of local tax offices and other
government agencies. The head office of the SAT does not
actually collect any taxes, the SAT requires clear tax rules
to guide and monitor the work of local offices. Clear rules
also enable the SAT to fend off the interference of local
governments with tax collection. In principle, national
taxes are collected by the local offices of the SAT, and lo-
cal taxes are collected by local tax bureaus. For example,
income tax owed by state-owned enterprises under the
control of the central government is collected by the SAT,
while other types of domestic enterprises pay taxes to the
local tax bureaus. Under the previous central planning
model, enterprises were managed by different level of
governments. This legacy has continued into the current
tax system. Since the SAT has only a weak supervisory
role, and there is no effective system for distributing and
enforcing common policy, the SAT sometimes has to rely
on more clear and authoritative legislative rules to carry
out its policies.

To ensure productive cooperation between the SAT
and other government departments (such as the police,
the People’s Bank, and the courts), the TACL specifically
provided the obligations of these agencies in enforcement.
In the absence of legislative rules, departmental conflicts
or noncooperation could be a serious problem. A lack of
support from the police has been a main reason for the
SAT to request a special tax police force and a specialized
tax court. To regulate departmental relations, the rules
must come from a superior body, the State Council or the
National People’s Congress. That is why the TACL is one
of three pieces of taxing statues enacted by the NPC.

The excessive use of tax expenditures as policy instru-
ments threatens not only revenue collection but also the
effectiveness of tax policy and respect of the SAT and tax
legislation. There is a misconception that the tax system
is about obtaining preferences as opposed to collecting
taxes. Once these preferences are considered tradable
commodities, they breed corruption and disrespect for
the tax system. Because most tax preferences are granted
at local levels, they provide opportunities for local pro-
tection. More centralized rules are expected to deal with
these problems.

The number of tax professionals who assist taxpayers
in tax planning, compliance, and dispute resolution has been growing. At present, tax practice is dominated by accountants. On average, 30 percent of the revenue of accounting firms is from tax work. Lawyers are also engaged in tax practice but on a much smaller scale. There are also more than 62,000 certified tax agents, including 20,000 active practitioners who assist taxpayers with compliance, dispute resolution, and other dealings with the tax administration.

A Homegrown System

Overall, the Chinese tax policy is generally compatible with China’s culture and politics. The best tax policy is one that suits local conditions, and China’s tax policy is largely homegrown. At the same time, international influences have helped shape China’s tax policy. The Chinese have always used foreign ideas to meet Chinese needs.

Development is a universal issue, but the path to development is unique for every country. As an instrument of social development, the tax policy has not been used much in China. Redistribution of income has been minimal. Social spending through tax expenditures is insignificant. On the other hand, China’s tax policy has spurred economic development and contributed to major changes in the legal system.

Ultimately in China everything is political. All reforms, changes, and development have taken place within the confines of socialism and under the leadership of the Communist Party. This distinct model of development defines China’s distinct tax policy.

LI Jinyan and HUANG He

Further Reading

Drinking tea—traditionally a brew made from the leaf, bud, or twig of the *Camellia sinensis*—is today universal in East Asia and much of the world, but the beverage took a long time to catch on. The precise form of tea consumed has also varied over time and by culture, reflecting different times and different tastes.

Tea is a drink made from the leaf, bud, and twig of the *Camellia sinensis* plant, which was probably first domesticated in Southeast Asia, although a number of possible sites have been named, including some in south China. Several varieties exist; some, such as Assam tea from India, are quite distinctive. Tea is cultivated at moderate altitude in China in tropical and semitropical areas, usually in marginal soils not suited to growing highly productive food crops such as rice. This fact was a major reason for tea’s economic importance. During Song dynasty (960–1279) China, for example, tea could be cultivated on a broad scale without limiting food production in any way. At the time it became an economic powerhouse and a primary basis for the prosperity of the dynasty.

Initially tea was grown in hilly areas of Fujian Province and neighboring Jiangxi Province, but its cultivation was later expanded to other suitable areas. It cultivation was later established in Yunnan Province, for example, when Yunnan definitely became a part of China during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Fine tea, including some of the most famous varieties, is still grown there.

Tea Drinking

Tea drinking arose in China around the beginning of the first century CE but was at first a localized practice confined to the south. Tea, at first brewed from green leaves, was originally more a medicinal than a recreational beverage. By the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) the practice had become common in the south and north, and during the Song dynasty tea drinking became the rage, as it has continued to be to the present. Song dynasty tea was a product greatly in demand, not only in China but also in Tibet and other neighbors of China, later even in the far West.

Although the first teas were made from leaf, the preferred form of tea during Tang times was brick tea. This tea used large square bricks of pressed tea leaves boiled for long periods of time to produce a strong and thick beverage, consumed with milk and cream in central Asia. Later, particularly during the Song dynasty, powdered teas became common and were the form of tea later taken over by Japan as the basis for its tea ceremony. By late Song times carefully selected leaf teas had also become common, and these were associated with a substantial connoisseurship. More recently oxidized leaf and pressed teas, known incorrectly as “fermented teas” (although some teas were fermented), have been popular and were long the preferred tea for the European and U.S. export market. The story that a shipload of tea rotted and that Europeans, not knowing any better, liked the flavor of
the rotten tea, although entertaining, is folklore. Some of the oxidized teas are even highly regarded in China to this day.

Culture of Tea

China never had a tea ritual comparable with the Japanese tea ceremony, but China had a distinct culture of tea beginning during the period of disunity (third to sixth centuries CE) and continuing many centuries thereafter. Playing a key role in the development of this tea culture were Buddhist monasteries and monks. Like the Sufis (Muslim mystics) of the Islamic world, who helped introduce their favorite beverage of coffee to the Islamic world, Buddhist monks seem to have enjoyed tea as a stimulant during dull monastic work or meditation. Probably because of this practice, tea drinking became a formal part of monastic rituals, which helped stress the elegance, simplicity, and introspection involved. Because monasteries were never isolated from the secular world in medieval and early modern China, laymen soon became involved both in monastic tea culture and their own varieties of it. These varieties were developed outside monasteries but incorporated much of the ritualized content of monastic tea consumption. Tea drinking thus became an important link between the literati and the monastic culture of Zen in particular and was an earmark of Song dynasty culture.

Outside both literati culture and the monastery, strictly speaking, was another area of the Song dynasty’s concern with tea: the tea house. Restaurants, as they exist today, and, for that matter, tea houses, first appeared in China. Places where one could go, eat a few snacks, drink tea, and enjoy the company of others, especially females, were noticed by, among others, the Venetian traveler Marco Polo. He expressed amazement that one could go, rent a space—on the West Lake of Hangzhou, no less, famed for its beauty—and be served, individually or as a group, wonderful delicacies and be provided entertainment. Tea houses were more specialized than restaurants, and from the beginning the society of the tea house was associated with prostitution, but this did not make them any less popular. Tea houses were already present in the Tang capital of Chang’an in large numbers in the eighth century. During the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE) and Song dynasty, tea houses were associated not only with female entertainment but also with a particular form of poetry, the ci. The verses of ci were set to popular melodies and usually sung by the women of tea houses and the formal houses of prostitution. During the period the most famous literati wrote ci, although they did not originate the form, and through their verses we know a great deal about the popular tea houses of the Southern Song capital of Hangzhou, for example.

The more elegant tea houses had well-kept gardens. One could enjoy fine teas not only in repose but also in the most beautiful surroundings. Chinese teahouses became the eventual model for tea houses in the West.
Today Portland, Oregon, for example, has a fine tea house with scores of wonderful varieties of teas available in a beautiful garden closely modeled on the classic Chinese gardens of Hangzhou and Suzhou.

Literature of Tea

Going along with a distinct culture of tea was a distinct literature of tea. The most famous work in this genre is the *Chajing* (Tea Classic) of Lu Yu from the late eighth century. His ten-volume work is a compendium of tea lore, including its Daoist connection as a magic herb, the medical qualities of tea itself, its food value, even tea bowls. Other important books on tea were the *Chalu* (Record of Tea) of Tsan Xiang (1012–1067) and the *Daguan chalun* (Discussion of Tea of the Daguan Period) by Song Emperor Huizong (reigned 1101–1125), who was known for his painting, calligraphy, and refined tastes.

Porcelain

Porcelain tea bowls, created in special shapes, textures, and colors, and made just for tea drinking, became a key component of tea culture during Song times. Porcelain differs from other potteries in its raw materials and high firing temperatures. Although not invented during the Song dynasty, porcelain reached its first high point then. Most famous of Song porcelains were its celadons. They were created in a blue-green color by applying a thick glaze to a relatively delicate base. Celadon was the preferred porcelain of the court, but the Song period is also known for its blackware, including Jian tea bowls. On these bowls a black glaze was intended to contrast with

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*Tea House in the older district of Shanghai.* PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
the green color of the tea consumed in them. The body of the bowl, relatively thick, helped maintain the temperature of the beverage. Although considered a popular ware, such bowls were still used at court, by the literati, and at monasteries. Song porcelain was imitated throughout East Asia and beyond, and fine examples continue to be highly prized today.

Mongolian Tea

Although brick tea was already exported to Tibet during the Tang dynasty, tea drinking began much later as a general central Asian practice. The earliest reference to traditional Mongolian tea, long-boiled (later brick) tea with thick milk or cream, for example, dates only to the fourteenth century, where an apparent recipe is found in the imperial dietary for Mongol China, the *Yinshan zhengyao* (Proper and Essential Things for the Emperor’s Food and Drink). In addition to its early recipe for Mongolian tea—in this case a powdered tea boiled with liquid butter and mentioned in the dietary under a Turkic name, suggesting that the Mongols may have borrowed it from local Turks—that same source mentions the following kinds of tea as being drunk at court: jade mortar tea, made from tea and roasted rice; golden characters tea, a presented powdered tea from the south; Mr. Fan Tianshuai’s tea, a tribute bud tea from south China; purple shoots sparrow tongue tea, made from new shoots; another variety of swallow tail tea; Sichuan tea; clear tea, made with tea buds; Tibetan tea, made with liquid butter and highly bitter and astringent; roasted tea, tea buds fried in butter oil and orchid paste; and a powdered tea, flour, and liquid butter made into a paste and boiled in water as a kind of *tsampa* (a Tibetan staple foodstuff). The central Asian interests of the text are obvious, although one cannot be
sure that the teas in question are purely central Asian. The same source also lists a number of herb teas from various sources and even rates fresh waters.

With these beginnings, tea caught on in Mongolia in a big way, as witnessed by the position of tea in the Ming dynasty’s trade with the north. Similar to the Tibetans, who were Song China’s source of horses, Ming China traded masses of tea to the Mongols for ponies. In Mongolia itself tea quickly became a way of life. Not offering a visitor tea became unthinkable, and Mongols, like Tibetans, added barley and other ingredients to their tea, along with butter, to provide a hot staple that is still consumed today.

**Tea in the West**

Not only the central Asian peoples but also the Iranian west, then the Turkish world, and finally Europe became fond of Chinese tea. In Iran, where tea was first a medicinal (as in China) from as early as the ninth century, it has now become the drink of choice and has many local variants, although black teas are preferred. In Turkey tea drinking took hold, but after the sixteenth century coffee became the beverage of choice. Because Chinese tea bowls were preferred over cups with handles in many areas of the West, the tea cultures of Iran and Turkey were not that different from that of China. Even the tea gardens were similar.

Europeans were exposed to tea (and coffee) drinking by those in the Islamic world, but Europe still obtained most of its tea from China, as did the North American colonies. Although Britain tried to push the teas of India, where tea was domesticated and developed independently of China, Chinese teas continued to be imported both to Britain and elsewhere in Europe, leading to a vast trading crisis as European silver went east to pay for Chinese tea, the first true mass commodity of the European trading system, if one excludes slaves. The attempt by Britain to substitute Indian opium for silver to cut its costs ultimately led to a series of wars with China, but the tea trade continued, right down to the present when Chinese teas are making a comeback on the world market. This is the case in spite of the fact that coffee has been of growing importance in Europe and the United States since the eighteenth century. Coffee simply lacks the delicacy of tea, and coffee drinking lacks the simplicity and elegance of tea drinking, thus tea enjoys a continued importance throughout the world.

**Further Reading**


China’s television industry is a latecomer, by international standards, but it has become an important political and cultural apparatus. Although controlled by the state—as is all mass media in China—television offers a wide variety of programming, both domestic and foreign, to some 1.29 billion viewers, the largest TV audience in the world.

Compared to most industrial countries in the world, China has a much shorter television history. Television was not available until the late 1950s, more than a decade later than in most industrial nations. Since television emerged in China, the medium has experienced various drastic changes and has now become one of the largest and most advanced, sophisticated, and influential television systems in the world.

Short but Convoluted History

The country’s first TV station, Beijing Television, began broadcasting on 1 May 1958. Within just two years, dozens of stations were set up in major cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou. Most stations had to rely on planes, trains, or cars to send tapes and films from one to another.

The first setback for Chinese television came in the early 1960s when the former Soviet Union withdrew economic aid to China. Many TV stations closed. In a short time, the number of stations was reduced from twenty-three to five. The second setback derived from an internal factor, the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976. Beijing Television’s regular telecasting was forced to a halt in January 1967 by the leftists of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976). All other local stations followed its lead. Television stations were criticized for their bourgeois direction and changed to a new, revolutionary direction as a weapon for class struggle and anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism, and anti-capitalism campaigns both at home and abroad.

Beginning in the late 1970s, and the start of the country’s reform, television became the most rapidly growing medium. On 1 May 1978, Beijing Television changed to China Central Television (CCTV). As China’s only national network, CCTV had the largest audience in the world. From the 1980s through the 1990s, television developed swiftly. The number of TV stations once exceeded 1,000, with one national network, thirty-six provincial and major city networks, and several hundred regional and local networks. The government deregulated the development of television when it became somewhat chaotic in the late 1990s.

Since the early 2000s, China’s television industry has further substantially expanded. By the end of 2006, there were 296 national, provincial, and regional stations; 46 educational stations; and 1,935 local radio/television stations. In addition, there were 44,620 radio-TV transmitting-and-relaying stations and 2.2 million satellite-TV receiving-and-relaying stations. At the same time, China had 400 million TV sets, becoming the country with the most TV sets in the world. Statistically, there were two television sets for each Chinese family. By the
end of 2007, the penetration rate of television reached 97 percent, reaching 1.29 billion people. Among households with TV, 40 percent, or 153,246,800 households, had cable TV. Shanghai and Beijing had the highest cable TV penetration rates in the nation at 96 percent and 71 percent. In the same year, households with digital TV reached 26,860,500, which reflected a 112 percent increase from 2006.

Television broadcasting technology has also developed quickly. Most major stations use such technologies as virtual-field production and high definition. CCTV opened its Webcast service in 1996 to a worldwide audience, providing text, audio, and photographic and video images. Digital broadcasting has been set as one of the priorities of China’s National Development Plan. Based on a twenty-year digital television development plan, by 2015 all television programming in China will be transmitted via digital technology.

**Ideological Basis**

Despite the many changes since the reforms launched in the 1970s, all media is still state owned. Neither privately owned nor foreign-owned television is allowed. Receiving foreign TV programming via satellite is prohibited without government permission. There are no license fees for owning a TV set and no charge for viewing broadcast television. Until the late 1970s, television was not allowed to carry advertising; it was completely financed by the government.

Political theories undergirding the organization and uses of television flow directly from Marxis-Leninist doctrine. Mao embellished Marx’s idea of the importance of the superstructure and ideological state apparatus and Lenin’s concept of the importance of propaganda and media control, stressing that media must be run by the Communist Party and become the party’s loyal eyes, ears, and mouthpiece. The current leadership of the CCP inherited this concept and requires broadcasting to be kept in line with party doctrine and serve the party’s purposes voluntarily, firmly, and appropriately.

Under these guidelines, television is regarded as part of the party’s overall political machine. Television is used, to the greatest extent, by the party and state to impose ideological dominance on society. The party and the central government set the tone of propaganda for television at all levels. Although TV stations provide news, entertainment, and education, television’s first and most important function is to popularize party and government policies and motivate the masses in the construction of Communist ideology.

A tightly controlled administrative system has been used to run television. The CCP is the ultimate owner, manager, and practitioner of television. TV stations are under the dual jurisdiction of the Communist Party’s Propaganda Department and the government’s State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television. The Propaganda Department sets propaganda policies, determines programming content and themes, and issues operational directives. Technological, regulatory, and administrative affairs are generally the concern of the Radio-Television-Film Bureau of the State Council. As media are crucial political organs of the CCP, virtually no independence of media is allowed or envisioned. Except for several years in the 1980s—which were criticized later by the party as the period of “Western liberalization” and “bourgeois spiritual pollution”—neither open and large-scale debates on ideology nor serious criticisms of the party, government policies, or high-ranking officials has been permitted, unless organized by the party to meet certain political needs. The self-censorship policy has been long and extensively used. Routine broadcasting material does not require approval from party authorities, but important editorials, news stories, and sensitive topics all require official endorsement before their dissemination.

**Programming**

Television programming in China consists of six categories: news, documentary and infotainment, variety and entertainment, TV plays, advertising and service, and sports and other programs. In 2007, 14,546,700 hours of TV programming were broadcast, a 7 percent increase over the previous year’s hours. The bulk of programming, 45 percent, was TV dramas and movies, followed by advertising (13 percent), news (12 percent), variety (11 percent), services (10 percent), and entertainment (9 percent).

Before the 1970s, most entertainment programs were old films of revolutionary stories, with occasional live
broadcasts of modern operas about model workers, peasants, and soldiers. Newscasts from that era were mostly what the CCP’s official newspaper, The People’s Daily, and official news agency, the Xinhua News Agency, reported. Production capability was low; production quality was poor; equipment and facilities were simple; and broadcasting hours, transmitting scales, and channel selections were limited. Television broadcasted usually three hours a day.

Part of the explosive development of TV since the late 1970s is a result of the CCP’s new move toward openness and reform. Many taboos were eliminated, restrictions lifted, and new production skills adopted. Entertainment programs in the form of TV plays, soap operas, Chinese traditional operas, game shows, and domestic and foreign feature films have become routine. News programs have also changed substantially and expanded enormously. International news coverage and live telecasts of important news events are now often seen in news programs. Educational programs in particular have received special treatment from the government. Production capability has been enhanced as well.

CCTV expanded from two channels in 1978 to sixteen channels in 2006. Channel 1, the main channel, focuses on news; Channel 2, economy and finance; and Channel 3, culture, arts, and music. Channel 4 is dedicated to overseas Chinese and international audiences. Channel 5 shows sports; Channel 6, movies; Channel 7, social programs; and Channel 8, TV plays and series. Channel 9 is an English-language channel that broadcasts twenty-four hours a day, targeting an international audience. Channel 10 focuses on science; Channel 11, Chinese opera; Channel 12, law-related programs; Channel 13, news; Channel 14, children’s programs; and Channel 15, music. Channel 16 is a Spanish-language and French-language channel aimed at audiences in Spanish-speaking and French-speaking nations.

Most provincial and major city networks have also increased the number of their broadcasting channels and offer more programs. In 2006 alone, 546 TV plays with 18,133 episodes were produced. In contrast, during the two decades from 1958 to 1977, only 74 TV plays were produced. TV broadcasting hours have increased considerably as well. In an average week of 1980, 2,018 hours of programs were broadcast. The number went up to 7,698 in 1985, 22,298 in 1990, 83,373 in 2000, and 261,538 in 2006.

**Internationalization and Commercialization**

The most important indication of the internationalization of China’s television industry is the change in the importing of programming. Before the late 1970s, TV imports were quantitatively limited and ideologically and politically oriented. From the late 1950s to the late 1970s, only the national network was authorized to import TV programs. During those years programs were imported almost exclusively from socialist countries, and the content usually concentrated on the Soviet Revolution and the USSR’s socialist economic progress. Few programs were imported from Western countries, and they were restricted only to those that exemplified the principle “Socialism is promising, capitalism is hopeless.”

In the early 1970s, imported programming accounted for less than 1 percent of programming nationwide. That figure jumped to 8 percent in the early 1980s, to 15 percent in the early 1990s, to around 25 percent in 2000, and remained at 20 percent in recent years. Although they still face various kinds of restrictions, central, provincial, regional, and even local television stations are looking to other countries, mostly Western nations, for programming. The government now stipulates that, unless special permission is obtained, no imported programming is allowed to be shown during prime time (7–10:30 p.m.) and that imported programming cannot fill more than 15 percent of prime time.

Another sign of TV’s internationalization is the effort to expand the exporting of China-produced TV programs. Major Chinese TV stations have produced programs for the global market and have even become main programming suppliers of some television stations in other Asian countries. CCTV and a few major city networks have set up offices in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Russia, Egypt, Japan, Hong Kong, Macao, India, Thailand, and Australia to promote business. In addition, CCTV and a few other major Chinese TV stations have established joint-venture businesses with television stations in North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Oceania to broadcast programs via satellite. CCTV’s international and English-language channels are now broadcast via China’s own satellite and are available in most countries. In 2006 CCTV alone exported 6,000 episodes, more than 4,000
hours of television programs. CCTV’s Channels 4, 9, and 16 are now watched in eighty-six countries by 68 million household subscribers.

Another significant change in China’s television industry since the reforms is commercialization: the resurrection of advertising on television and its impact on programming. Economic reforms have revived the importance of market forces and the power of advertising. Both foreign and domestic advertising have been resurrected. Since the early 1980s, revenue from advertising has increased at an annual rate of 50 to 60 percent.

By the 1990s television had become the most commercialized and market-oriented medium in China and attracted a large portion of advertising investment from both domestic and foreign clients. For the hundreds of television stations across the country, advertising and other commercial activities now constitute the majority of programming revenue, ranging from 40 percent to 90 percent. All television stations are now supported by advertising revenue.

While media advertising accounts for 70 percent of China’s total advertising expenditure, television advertising alone accounts for 80 percent of total media advertising expenditures. Over the last several years, advertising revenues for almost all other media have been declining, but television advertising has continued to increase. In 2006 advertising revenue for the broadcasting industry reached 527 million yuan (approximately $75 million at the time). Some 453 million yuan was from television advertising revenue, a 12 percent increase from 2005. In 2007 advertising revenue for the broadcasting industry reached 601 million yuan (approximately $86 million). Advertising revenue in the television industry alone reached 519 million yuan, a 15 percent increase from 2006.

The television structure in China is quite different from that in most Western nations, where national networks usually are the biggest advertising revenue makers. In China, by contrast, in 2007 provincial TV stations reaped 57 percent of the total of TV advertising revenues, followed by 21 percent for the regional and county-level TV stations, and only 18 percent for the national networks. Over the last several years the top three commodities of China’s TV advertising have been cosmetics, medicine, and food, occupying 21 percent, 16 percent, and 14 percent of the total television advertising in 2007. The top-ten list of television advertising also included ads for telecommunication devices (mobile phones and computers), Chinese liquors and beverages, entertainment and leisure activities, the service industry (hotels), and transportation (cars and domestic/foreign airlines). This list is quite similar to the top-ten list of television advertising in developed nations, a reflection of China TV’s move toward a Western model.

The telecasting of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games was one of the biggest events not only in China’s TV history but also in the history of world television. More than 4 billion people across the world watched the televised games, a new record in world TV history, surpassing the audience for the 2000 Sydney games (3.4 billion) and the 2004 Athens games (3.9 billion). The Beijing Olympics opening ceremony was said to have hit a record high TV rating: more than 90 percent of TV audiences across the world watched the event. Thanks to the 2008 games, China’s total advertising revenues in 2008 were estimated to have increased 29 percent over 2007 revenues. For CCTV alone, its advertising revenues during the seventeen days of the games were estimated to have reached 2 billion yuan (approximately $300 million). The Beijing Olympics also made many global companies very interested in China’s huge media market. The biggest foreign sponsors of the telecasting of the Beijing Olympics included Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Adidas, and Johnson & Johnson. In 2008, because of the Beijing Olympic Games, Coca-Cola’s advertising expenditure in China increased 24 percent; Visa’s, 30 percent; Kentucky Fried Chicken’s, 39 percent; Adidas’s, 100 percent; and Nike’s, 143 percent.

**Internet Viewing**

Watching television on a computer or mobile device is increasingly popular in China, as it is in the United States and Western countries. In fact, Westerners looking for their favorite programs sometimes watch pirated versions, in English with Chinese subtitles, on Chinese websites. This unstructured and uncommercialized Internet viewing is even said to have cut into the market for pirate DVDs in China. Volunteer groups download popular U.S. televisions show such as 24, American Idol, Survivor, and Battlestar Galactica from BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file-sharing site, immediately after new episodes are broadcast in the United States. They locate closed-captioned English scripts, made for the hearing-impaired, and translate them into Chinese. Perhaps in future a commercial version like
the U.S. Hulu.com will compete, but that would be possible only if the Chinese government allowed the distribution of more Western programming.

Future Direction

Under the modernization plan, the open door policy, the transformation from a state economy to a market economy, and the tendency toward lessening controls since the late 1970s, television in China has become a very popular medium, a very technologically advanced broadcast system, and a highly professionally performed service. Television's function has evolved from a single-purposed one for political and ideological propaganda to a multi-purposed one for serving both the party/government and the society/public.

However, by and large, television in China is still a state-owned and party-controlled political and ideological instrument, despite its having evolved to fulfill other purposes. Television, like all other mass media in China, is required to run in the socialist track, but, at the same time, it is forced to operate in a Western way, the capitalist way. This conflict has brought about many unprecedented problems to television.

No signs of change in the character of television are seen for the near future. As long as the country's political system does not change, the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine on the media, including television, will not change. This obstacle will not be overcome until fundamental changes in the political system occur. It is certain that television's internationalization and commercialization will continue, despite fluctuations that may occur as a result of the change of the political climate and the ideological needs of the Communist Party. But it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that television, along with all other media in China, will become an independent social mechanism, nor will it become truly free from the control of the party and government.

Television in China has developed unevenly. For historical and economic reasons, most TV stations in China—especially those that have larger audiences and, therefore, are more influential—are in the eastern coastal areas or central section of the country, places such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Hunan. For example, in 2007, 22 percent of the total TV advertising revenue was from Beijing alone, 47 percent from the eastern coastal areas, and 21 percent from the central part, whereas only 11 percent was from the western section of the nation, which has more than 30 percent of China's total geographic area and population. All of the top ten provincial TV stations of China's television advertising were in the eastern coastal area or central part, with Guangdong first, Jiangsu second, and Shanghai third.

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China's television industry has undergone a profound shift toward conglomeration as China aims to become more competitive in the global television arena. New ways of doing business and new technologies will help the television industry thrive and be an important part of Chinese culture.

Junhao HONG

Further Readings


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Television—Dramas and Reality Shows

Diànshìjù yù zhēnrén jīshíxiù
电视剧与真人纪实秀

Everyone likes a good story, and China’s TV viewers are no different. Dramatized retellings—with added embellishments—of the exploits of ancient officials and emperors, and fictionalized accounts of modern revolutionary heroes are among the most popular entertainment on Chinese TV. At the same time, reality-based programs, so popular in the United States, are also gaining an audience.

The most widely viewed television show in the world is the New Year’s extravaganza that China Central Television (CCTV) presents each year. But television dramas and Chinese equivalents of American Idol and other reality shows are also hugely popular.

Rise of Drama

Entertainment programs dominate Chinese television, but dramas have consistently garnered the highest share of ratings since 2000. In 2004 television dramas accounted for 29.4 percent of all program ratings, followed by news programs (16.8 percent), variety shows (7.9 percent), special features (7.7 percent), sports (7.0 percent), and films (5.6 percent). In 2004, 505 television dramas, with 12,265 episodes, were shown. In that same year, 156 channels operated by 33 city television stations aired 1,598 dramas totaling 183,123 episodes.

Dramas’ Run

The average television drama in the early 2000s ran for twenty episodes. Since 2004, that figure has increased to twenty-six, with many dramas having as many as fifty to sixty episodes. Each episode runs about thirty-eight minutes. Among all types of TV programs, dramas have garnered the largest amount of television advertising revenue. In 2004 receipts from television dramas accounted for 44.1 percent of all television advertising revenue. In that year television advertising revenue amounted to over 150 billion yuan ($22 billion). By comparison, box office revenue for the Chinese film industry in 2004 was 360 million yuan ($53 million). This includes domestic revenue of 250 million yuan ($37 million)—of which 100 million yuan ($15 million) came from television broadcasting—and 110 million yuan ($16 million) in international revenue. The number of television dramas produced and broadcast and the advertising revenue generated indicate that television drama, not film, is the top form of entertainment in China.

The first Chinese TV drama was a thirty-minute play called A Veggie Cake (Yikou cai bingzi 一口菜饼子), the bitter story of a starving peasant family under the old regime. It was aired live on the Beijing television station on 15 June 1958. From 1958 to 1966, nearly two hundred single-episode dramas were performed and telecast live. Television drama production—along with much other TV productions—ceased during the Cultural Revolution and did not resume until 1978. In the early 1980s, Chinese
television stations began to broadcast foreign television serials, or soap operas, from Japan and the United States. But domestic television drama arrived in 1990 with the fifty-episode Yearning (Kewang 渴望). Yearning entranced thousands of millions viewers with its melodramatic portrayal of the lives and struggles of ordinary citizens during the Cultural Revolution.

**Popular Dramas**

Modern television dramas not only amass the highest ratings but also covers a rich diversity of subject matter and genres. In 2004 the most popular genres were romance, domestic drama, martial arts, romantic and youth idol drama, crime, revolutionary drama, and history.

Drama genres can be classified in various ways. Romance, for example, can include fictional historical drama, the most popular genre. Within this genre themes from the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) are extremely popular. Examples include Prime Minister Hunchback Liu (Zaixiang Liu luoguo 宰相刘罗锅) (1996), the story of a legendary witty and honest Qing prime minister who fights imperial officialdom and corruption, and Iron-Toothed Ji Xiaolan (Tiechi tongya Ji Xiaolan 铁齿铜牙纪晓岚) (2001), a comic tale about a Qing scholar who bravely challenges the treachery of the emperor. Stories like these touch on popular sentiments against corruption and age-old expectations of honorable officials (qingguan 清官). Also popular are romantic stories that place actual historical figures—such as Qing emperors, princes, and princesses—in totally fictional situations. One such romance, Princess Pearl Returned (Huanzhu gege 还珠格格) (1999), with its mischievous and rebellious teenage heroine, is enormously popular. Although taking place in the distant past, it reflects radically changed social stereotypes and expectations of modern Chinese girls.

Also popular are historical dramas about famous Chinese emperors that recapture China’s past imperial glory, such as The Great Han Emperor Wudi (Han wu dadi 汉武大帝) (2004); Yongzheng Dynasty (Yongzheng wangling 雍正王朝) (1999); and Kangxi Dynasty (Kangxi diguo 康熙帝国) (2003). Revolutionary dramas, such as Years of Burning Passions (jiqing ranshao de shuiyue 激情燃烧的岁月) (2002), remind TV viewers of the revolutionary legacy that is part of modern history. Other popular subgenres include adaptations of Chinese classical novels—such as Dream of the Red Chamber (Hong lou meng 红楼梦) (1987), Journey to the West (Xi you ji 西游记) (1986), and Romance of Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi 三国演义) (1995)—and adaptations of the popular martial arts novels of Jin Yong, such as Dragon’s Eight Tribes (Tianlong babu 天龙八部) (2004).

In recent years television dramas from Korea have become popular creating a Korean cultural boom among urban youth. This trend has caused some concern among officials of the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television and among domestic television drama producers. China’s imports of television dramas have remained quite small (only about 5 percent of all dramas in 2004), but more cultural and media exchanges are likely to increase the import and export of television dramas.

**Spring Festival Gala**

One television program stands out among all the rest and attracts the largest audience in the world: the Spring Festival gala, or celebration show, produced by CCTV. The gala, which has been an annual event since 1983, is a spectacular variety show. It includes dance and musical performances, sketch comedy, and appearances by national celebrities and is broadcast live on Chinese New Year’s Eve from 8 p.m. till after midnight on New Year’s Day. The program boasts of ratings of more than 90 percent, or approximately 1 billion viewers. It is so popular that it has become a new custom of the Chinese New Year celebrations.

Each year the gala’s producers try to work in new forms of popular culture to go along with traditional folk forms and Beijing Opera while satisfying the Chinese Communist Party’s demand to make the show a comprehensive representation of mainstream, official ideologies. But the most popular part of the show is the comic sketches, often mild satires of modern life. For example, in the 2009 show, Jiang Kun, a popular actor, made the audience laugh with his routine on China’s new look after thirty years of reform and opening up. “In the past,” he said during his skit, “we had no traffic jams and no highways. Now we have congestion everywhere, even though we have so many highways.”

Because of its large scale and the tremendous advertising revenue it generates, the gala is often troubled with
scandals and power struggles. Zhao An, a former director of the gala, was sentenced to ten years in prison in 2004 for taking bribes. In recent years, criticism of CCTV’s monopoly on New Year’s television shows has increased, as the CCTV gala now has to compete with a greater variety of entertainment forms, some of which were unavailable when it first started. However, as a cultural ritual with widespread appeal, the gala remains the highest rated television program in the world.

New Developments

Challenges to CCTV’s monopoly on reality programs have surged in recent years. Hunan Satellite TV has captured the hearts of young, especially teenage, viewers with its enormously successful program Super Girl (Chaojinusheng 超级女声), which debuted in 2004. Modeled after American Idol, Super Girl is a blend of reality show, singing and dancing contest, and beauty pageant. Viewers can vote for contestants by cell phone (more than 300 million viewers cast their votes by cell phone in 2005), and thousands of millions of teenage girls and their families participate. A Super Girl craze swept China in 2005, ending in the selection of three winners. Two of the three—Li Yuchun, the first-place winner, and Zhou Bichang, the second-place winner—were widely regarded as amateurs with poor singing skills and music talent. But their alternative and often defiant and androgynous style attracted fans. As expected, mainstream and academic circles have criticized Super Girl for its vulgarity and bad-taste sensationalism and populism.

CCTV has refused to allow any of the Super Girl winners to appear on its programs. Nevertheless, because of the huge popularity and enormous profitability of the show, many local television stations have introduced copycat shows. In 2005 Dragon TV, the satellite TV channel of Shanghai Media Group, introduced My Hero (Hao nain’er 好男儿), a male version of Super Boy, with only male contestants, and My Show (Wo xing wo Show 我型我), which included both male and female contestants. Since 2006, there has been fierce competition for music talent contest show. Even CCTV has introduced such programming, but in 2007 the central government issued a series of directives to all TV stations to tone down such music contests and reality shows and to uphold high moral and educational standards. Consequently, Super Girl and its clones have lost much of their momentum.

The consistent high ratings of television dramas and the popularity of shows like Super Girl indicate that entertainment is playing a vibrant role in the Chinese television industry, with far-reaching implications for the future of Chinese mass media. Chinese television, despite being caught between political pressure from the Chinese Communist Party and market competition, has rapidly developed into a cultural indicator as well as a profitable industry.

LIU Kang

Further Reading


Television—News

Diànshì xīnwén 电视新闻

Television news in China has been broadcast since TV became available in the country in the late 1950s. China Central Television (CCTV)—the national network owned and managed by the government (and the standard for all TV news stations in China)—has begun to offer several popular “news magazine” shows that cover everyday events or touch on a wide range of hot topics in China and the world.

After dramas, news bulletins are the most popular TV shows with Chinese viewers. Broadcast news in China is ubiquitous, popular, and influential. The government stipulates that each television station must have a comprehensive channel to broadcast important news. The people of China are well informed—up to a point. The power of the press belongs to those who own the press. In China the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) owns and manages TV news, along with all other mass media.

News Policy

China Central Television (CCTV), the country’s first TV station, is the only national network and the standard for all other TV networks. CCTV has eighteen channels. CCTV-News, launched in 2003, broadcasts news twenty-four hours a day. CCTV’s domination of news programming is shown by its prime-time Network News (Xinwen lianbo), a program that began broadcasting in 1978, and which still runs daily from 7 to 7:30 p.m. The government requires all local stations to broadcast this program simultaneously.

The editorial board of Network News consists of senior officials of CCTV, overseen by the network’s president. Network News is the model for Chinese television news programs. It serves as one of the most important news outlets for the CCP, in addition to the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) and the Central People’s Radio Station (Zhongyang renmin guangbo diantai). Network News adheres to CCP media theory and guidelines: Television’s first purpose is to serve as the “mouthpiece” of the government and the party, and should mainly cover political and economic successes and the positive aspects of government, and not spread negative thinking or foster low morale. This media policy is part of the political and ideological agenda of the CCP. And there are no signs that the CCP will relinquish its firm hold on the media in the foreseeable future.

Program Format

The format of Network News has remained unchanged since its first day of broadcasting. Any radical changes in the format are unlikely, and any changes are incremental and gradual. There are two presenters, one male and one female. Two or three pairs of presenters rotate daily. These presenters are merely announcers and have no editorial power to determine the selection of news.

Network News always begins with the public activities
of the top leaders, in order of their rankings in the highest political body, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP. The first appearance is reserved for the general secretary of the CCP. Conferences, meetings with foreign visitors, tours, and speeches involving the top leaders usually take up the first ten minutes, or a third of the program. The next ten-minute segment covers economic news from across China. Some segments are prerecorded and produced weeks or even months in advance. Most news stories are produced by local television stations and cover positive reports of growth, development, and technological advances.

Other News Programming

As part of reforms in news programming, CCTV launched two news magazines in 1993, Oriental Horizon (Dongfang shikong) and Focus (Jiaodian fangdan).

Oriental Horizon is a one-hour program broadcast at 7 a.m., before most of the audience goes to work or school. It features coverage of events in the daily lives of ordinary citizens, portraits of well-known figures, and in-depth reports on a single issue. The program is hugely popular, and some observers claim that it has caused a silent revolution in daytime television.

Focus is a thirty-minute current affairs program broadcast at 7:30 p.m., prime time. It touches on a wide range of hot topics in China and the world, with background analysis, on-the-spot reporting, and in-studio interviews. Focus usually covers issues of significant social impact and of considerable interest to both the government and the public. Sensitive issues—such as corruption, injustice, and rising social disparities—are approached using an investigative reporting style. This kind of tough reporting has made Focus extremely popular. It usually trails only Network News in the ratings.

In 1996 CCTV launched the news magazine, News Probe (Xinwen diaocha), a forty-five-minute weekly program that provides in-depth investigative reporting of sensitive social issues. It is broadcast on CCTV-1 first at 10:30 p.m. on Mondays and then repeated on CCTV-News the following Tuesday, Saturday, and Sunday, all during off-peak times. The issues exposed and the criticism of social problems on News Probe are sometimes more distressing or controversial than those covered on Focus, partly because it is aired during off-peak hours. The editorial board reckons that because fewer people watch the show, its impact is less widespread.

News programs like Focus and News Probe are governed by a complicated and difficult process of selection, negotiation, framing, and censorship. A former director of Focus admitted that for each program he had to carefully weigh the question of its possible negative effects on political stability, in general, against the resolution of the problems it uncovered, in particular. To satisfy the government and meet the public’s demand to know the truth behind incidents, crimes, and disasters, journalists and editors need to walk a fine line. Their work in recent years reflects a trend toward more accurate, balanced, and fair news reporting in an increasingly open society.

In October 1998 then-premier Zhu Rongji met with Focus editors and reporters, and left a written message that paid tribute to the program. Zhu expressed the hope that Focus would function as a leader in reform, the government’s mirror, and the “people’s mouthpiece.” Observers noted that the change from the party’s mouthpiece to the people’s mouthpiece was a significant shift, especially when articulated by a top leader. Although no substantial reorientation occurred at CCTV after this visit, local television stations took the cue from Zhu in their efforts toward reform.

A trend toward a diverse range of television news programs and news magazine shows continued on local television stations into the early 2000s. These programs devote more attention to local issues that have direct impact on the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. On 1 January 2002, Jiangsu Television’s City Channel launched the prime-time news program Nanjing Zero Distance (Nanjing lingjuli), which airs from 6 to 7:30 p.m., overlapping with CCTV’s Network News. (City Channel’s sister channel Jiangsu TV-1 obligingly airs Network News.) Nanjing Zero Distance ushered in a new way of covering the news of people’s lives (minsheng xinwen), dealing mostly with the everyday events and issues that concern the residents of Nanjing. Because Nanjing is the provincial capital of one of the most prosperous provinces on China’s east coast, events in the city have implications for all of Jiangsu Province. The program’s ratings soon soared, and it attracted the highest Nielson rating (17 percent) of all television programs in Nanjing and vicinity, an area of more than 6 million people.
More than ten programs of this type emerged in Jiangsu and Nanjing alone over the next few years and have dominated television broadcasting and ratings. Across China, similar programs have appeared on provincial and city television stations, creating a sort of TV war for programming. Such local news programs meet the needs of a public with ever-growing concerns about issues that affect the rights and well-being of individuals. In addition, such programs are in keeping with the government’s policy priority of building a harmonious society.

LIU Kang

Further Reading


Temple of Heaven
Tiāntán 天坛

The Temple of Heaven was the imperial site of prayer to Heaven during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. The Temple’s most spectacular structure is The Hall of Prayer for Good Harvest 祈年殿, 38 meters (125 feet) tall, built entirely of wood without using a single nail.

The Temple of Heaven, or Altar of Heaven, was built between 1406 and 1420 in Beijing during the reign of Zhu Di 朱棣, the Yongle emperor (reigned 1402–1424). Zhu Di is also credited for overseeing the planning and construction of the Forbidden City. The Temple of Heaven served as the prayer site for the emperors of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties in China. It is regarded as a Daoist temple, although Heaven worship was practiced before the rise of Daoism.

Every year, on the fifteenth day of the first lunar month, the emperor would come to the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvest (祈年殿 Qi Nian Dian) to pay homage to Heaven and pray for a good harvest. He would honor his ancestors as well, as he was regarded as the Son of Heaven. In early winter the emperor would come again to thank Heaven for the good harvest. If a drought plagued China during the summer, the emperor would come to the temple to pray for rain. Accompanying the emperor on these visits would be his entourage of officials, all wearing special ceremonial robes. Ordinary Chinese were not allowed to view the emperor’s procession from the Forbidden City to the Temple of Heaven or the ceremonies that followed.

The temple grounds cover 2.7 square kilometers (1.5 square miles). On the site are three imperial sacrificial
sites: the Imperial Vault of Heaven, the Circular Mound Altar, and the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvest. Within the Imperial Vault of Heaven is the Echo Wall, a marvel of acoustical engineering that can carry sounds across long distances. The Circular Mound Altar is the altar proper. It is comprised of three rounded white-marble platforms. The bottom platform represents Hell; the middle, Earth; and the top, Heaven.

The Hall of Prayer for Good Harvest lies at the center of the grounds and is the most spectacular building on the site. It is a tripled-gabled circular building 38 meters (125 feet) tall, built entirely of wood with no nails. It is considered a masterpiece of traditional Chinese architecture. The hall was designed with many symbolic features. Of the twenty-eight pillars that support the domed structure, the four large ones represent the four seasons, the twelve inner pillars represent the months in the lunar calendar, and the twelve outer pillars represent the twelve two-hour periods of a day.


Jian-Zhong LIN

Further Reading
The uncovering of thousands of clay statues that were buried in 210 BCE during the Qin dynasty has taught archaeologists and other scholars about classes of soldiers, beliefs of the period, and skills of craftspeople. The clay army, originally painted in vivid colors to distinguish different groups of soldiers and featuring individual facial features, is one of China’s most iconic images.

One of the most spectacular archaeological finds of the twentieth century is the army of nearly eight thousand life-size terracotta soldiers and horses that guards the tomb of China’s first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi (d. 210 BCE), whose name means First (Shi) Emperor (Huangdi) of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), a short-lived and authoritarian dynasty.

The army was discovered beginning in 1974 by peasants digging a well, and is located twenty-two miles east of Xi’an (formerly Ch’ang-an) in Shaanxi Province and about one mile east of the unexcavated mausoleum of the ruler. The figures are distributed over three pits (a fourth was found to be empty) built of rammed earth. The buried army yields more complete and detailed information on Qin military science than the fragmentary texts from the period can provide.

Today, the soldiers are part of a large complex known as the Museum of the Terracotta Army, which opened in 1979 outside of Xi’an. More recently, the burial army was made accessible to an audience outside of China when the British Museum mounted a ground-breaking exhibition in London in 2007. Among the 120 objects on display—the largest number of material related to China’s First Emperor ever to be shown outside China—were twelve complete soldiers and artifacts excavated from around his tomb, which highlighted the achievements of this short but important period in China’s history.

At about 14,300 square meters, Pit 1 is the largest of the pits and contains nearly six thousand figures, primarily armored and unarmored infantry, including archers and charioteers. The pit also contains terracotta horses, the remains of six chariots, and bronze weaponry such as swords, crossbows, halberds, and long and short daggers. Rectangular in form and dug to a depth of five meters, Pit 1 arranges the soldiers in precise military formation in eleven corridors separated by earthen walls. The extreme left and right corridors consist of archers who face outward as if anticipating a flank attack. In the nine wider corridors soldiers stand four abreast with a chariot and four horses at the head of six corridors. Three corridors of unarmored soldiers with bows and crossbows take up the front and the rear. Each corridor is paved with bricks, and has wooden rafters and crossbeams above. Woven matting was used to absorb any moisture that seeped in; on top of the matting the builders put a layer of clay. The pit was originally covered with a mound of earth.

At about 6,000 square meters, Pit 2 is smaller than Pit 1, and held the cavalry. It contains around a thousand figures that include cavalry men and their horses,
eighty-nine chariots each drawn by four horses, and some archers and foot soldiers. Pit 3 is 520 square meters in area and most likely represents the command unit. It contains sixty-eight officers, four horses, and one chariot. Together, these three pits represent a single army composed of an infantry unit, a smaller and more mobile mounted unit, and a command post to oversee operations.

Realistic, Colorful, and Armored Soldiers

The figures were made with local clay and fired in kilns that would have been set up close to the mausoleum. It was generally thought that these kilns were made in an upright pit, but research suggests that the process was much more complicated. The figures were hand built and had solid legs for stability but hollow torsos. The heads were made with molds, but facial features and details such as hair and headgear were added by hand.

The realism of each soldier’s face, individually modeled to show age as well as the multicultural backgrounds of the emperor’s soldiers, and the meticulous detail paid to the clothing are remarkable. Originally, the figures were brightly painted, but much of the pigment has flaked off. The colors were used to distinguish between the different units of the army. For example, Pit 1 had two color schemes. One group had green robes with lavender collars and cuffs, dark blue trousers, and black shoes with red laces; its armor was black with white rivets, purple cords, and gold buttons. The other group had red tunics with pale blue collars and cuffs; its armor was dark brown with red or light green rivets and orange cords.

The terracotta army yields valuable information on armor and weaponry in early China. Eight different styles of armor were used, falling into two categories: armor made by fastening rectangular scales to a base layer and armor constructed by stringing scales together without a support layer. These scales were probably made of lacquered leather—no metal plates from this period have yet been found—and were probably attached to one another by knotted leather strips to allow movement with the body. The armor was slipped over the head and buckled with a right front closure.

The armor in both categories ranges from simple to complex. In all cases the armor was adapted to the rank and weaponry of the individual warrior. The most basic armor of the first type covered only the front of the wearer and was held in place by straps crossed in back. In contrast, the commanding officers wore the most distinctive and complex protection: the front portion of each piece of their waist-length armor had a flexible triangular extension in front that covered the lower abdomen. The wide-sleeved undergarment and the intricate threading of the armor plates signified the overall high rank of the wearer. In addition to the armor, some wore a bright, tasseled cape at the shoulders.

Cavalry, infantry, and charioteers wore armor of the second type. Cavalry wore a short vest, which was suitable for riding because it was trim and efficient. Charioteers wore more substantial and complex armor than any other soldier. Covering more of the body, it included
a neck guard and articulated sleeves, which covered the arm to the wrist. More than three hundred intricately arranged plates allowed for freedom of movement while protecting the wearer.

**Technical Know-How**

The pits also indicate that the Qin metalworkers had a high degree of technical know-how and produced a wide range of bronze weaponry, including swords, daggers, halberds, crossbow mechanisms, and arrows. More than ten thousand finely made weapons were found, and many of them were inscribed, indicating where and when they were cast. Even after two thousand years underground, many of the weapons showed little signs of corrosion.

The terracotta soldiers and the mausoleum they were to protect were designated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1987 as a World Heritage Site. A museum established at the site covers approximately 16,300 square meters and includes Pits 1, 2, and 3, each covered by large hangar-like structures. Visitors to Pit 1, for example, can view nearly 1,000 restored soldiers and horses arranged in battle formation as well as watch the on-going excavations at the site.

Catherine PAGANI

**Further Reading**


Before the events of September 11, 2001, international terrorism was a remote concern for China. But now that terrorists have attacked in Asia—and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement is a threat on China’s own soil—the Chinese government is no longer willing to sit on the sidelines. As an increasingly large player in global strategic affairs, China has joined the international antiterrorism coalition.

The spread of international terrorism in Asia is of particular concern to China, since terrorism threatens China’s efforts to modernize economically, establish social stability, and improve relations with its neighbors. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States put antiterrorism at the top of Asia’s political and security concerns, creating an unusually strong consensus among Asian nations in support of antiterrorism action on all levels—bilateral, regional, and international. China had its own political reasons for joining the U.S.-led war on terror—specifically, the elimination from the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of its main terrorist threat, the separatist East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), supported by al-Qaeda. But China’s cooperation and leadership in the war on terror underscored a more important strategic decision by China to abandon its traditional position of noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs as well as its opposition to multilateralism. In other words, China’s efforts to combat international terrorism indicate that a much broader strategic role is emerging for China in the world and may well elevate China to the ranks of the great powers.

**Background: Terrorism in the 1990s**

Before September 11 international terrorism was a rather remote concern for China and did not figure prominently in its foreign policy. Its exposure to terrorism was limited, and China had been basically on the sidelines in the fight against international terrorism. Although China had signed and ratified most of the international conventions and treaties against terrorism, the participation of China in international counterterrorism activities had been minimal, generally. International terrorism was considered mainly a scourge of the developed world, since the vast majority of terrorist acts were committed in Europe or the Middle East. China and East Asia were largely untouched by terrorism throughout the later years of the Cold War, allowing the region to concentrate more on developing its economies and maintaining internal stability. Furthermore, China was more concerned about its position in the strategic balance of Asia than about conflicts or antiterrorism far removed from China’s sphere of influence.

Of course, some violent and terrorist activities, mostly with economic motivations, did occur in China—for example, kidnappings, bank robberies, and armed drug trafficking. Most kidnappings and robberies took place in the eastern coastal regions, where the economy and overseas
connections were more developed, while drug trafficking generally originated in the northwest (for example, in Afghanistan and Xinjiang) and in the southwest. To be sure, terrorism of a political nature—such as the occasional hijacking of airplanes to Taiwan—also occurred. Yet even these hijackings were often simply a way to escape prosecution for economic crimes committed on the Chinese mainland. On the whole, the Chinese government treated these activities as ordinary criminal acts rather than acts of terrorism.

China became concerned about international terrorism in the early 1990s, after terrorist acts in Xinjiang by the separatist group ETIM; they were the most significant terrorist attacks to occur within the borders of China in modern times. These attacks, which involved bombings and armed attacks that targeted Chinese police and security facilities and personnel, compelled Chinese authorities to formulate an antiterrorism strategy for combating East Turkistan separatist groups—particularly the ETIM, which had gained the support of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan—and for ensuring the security and stability of Xinjiang. In this context, an antiterrorism corps was organized in Xinjiang with the support of the central government. Moreover, because the East Turkistan movement crossed borders, the Chinese authorities recognized that antiterrorism would need to include mechanisms for international cooperation.

But the problem of terrorism was not nearly as acute or pressing in East Asia as it was for the West during the immediate post–Cold War period and was overshadowed both on the international front and in China itself by globalization and the economic and political consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, bringing to an end the strategic rivalry between the two superpowers. For most of the 1990s, Chinese scholars and government officials remained focused on keeping up with the rapid pace of global change and the transformation of China’s economic system, while scholars of security and strategic issues were also busy tracking and analyzing the episodic crises on the Taiwan issue, tensions on the Korean peninsula, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and China’s strategic relationships with the United States, Japan, and the European Union. The importance of these international economic and strategic issues to China’s development and role in the world pushed the subject of international terrorism to the background.

Impact of September 11

It was only near the end of the 1990s that Chinese scholars and policy makers began to take more interest in the problem of international terrorism—particularly, that of militant Islamic groups, which were migrating to South Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Terrorism was no longer a distant threat; it was actually approaching China’s doorstep. The danger became even greater after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. China’s sense of security was profoundly shaken by September 11 (as was that of the whole international community), causing a rapid shift in Chinese foreign policy toward Central and South Asia to meet the direct threat of al-Qaeda.

Antiterrorism became an urgent consideration in China’s relations with its Asian neighbors—particularly, countries to the west—after the September 11 attacks. Although al-Qaeda and its brand of Islamic extremism were a known and gathering terrorist threat to China’s western frontier prior to September 11, the al-Qaeda terrorist network’s long reach into Southeast Asia, unearthed after U.S. forces went into Afghanistan, was cause for considerable concern, as it might undermine the progress made in regional cooperation and might derail China’s agenda for regional economic integration and development. Thus, antiterrorism cooperation joined regional and global economic cooperation as top Chinese diplomatic goals.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, based on its new security concept, China has been actively promoting international antiterrorism cooperation on all levels. On the international level China has spoken out in favor of giving the United Nations the leading role in international efforts against terrorism, arguing that the organization provides an international legal framework for antiterrorism activities and that the Security Council—particularly, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)—is the best mechanism for coordinating counterterrorism activities. On the regional level, China has made antiterrorism cooperation a priority issue in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF).

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, China led the push to strengthen antiterrorism
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a small Islamic extremist group based in China’s western Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. It is the most militant of the ethnic Uygur separatist groups pursuing an independent “Eastern Turkistan,” an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang Uygur A. R. of China. ETIM is linked to al-Qa’ida and the international mujahedin movement. In September 2002 the group was designated under EO 13224 as a supporter of terrorist activity.

Activities

ETIM militants fought alongside al-Qa’ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. In October 2003, Pakistani soldiers killed ETIM leader Hassan Makshum during raids on al-Qa’ida–associated compounds in western Pakistan. US and Chinese Government information suggests ETIM is responsible for various terrorist acts inside and outside China. In May 2002, two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan as well as other US interests abroad.

Strength

Unknown. Only a small minority of ethnic Uygurs supports the Xinjiang independence movement or the formation of an Eastern Turkistan.

Location/Area of Operation

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and neighboring countries in the region.

External Aid

ETIM has received training and financial assistance from al-Qa’ida.


In October 2001 China, at the request of the United States, sealed its border of over ninety kilometers with Afghanistan to coordinate with American military actions in that country. After the United States captured some East Turkistan terrorists of Chinese nationality in Afghanistan, Chinese security officials were invited to join the interrogation of the detainees. In August 2002 the U.S. State Department formally included the ETIM on its list of terrorist organizations. This act was followed by a similar move on the part of the U.N. Security Council through an antiterrorism statement and cooperation plan. A year later an ASEM antiterrorism conference was held in Beijing. At the sixth summit meeting of China and ASEAN in November 2002, China agreed to expand its cooperation with ASEAN countries on nonconventional security issues like drug trafficking to include antiterrorism cooperation.
the joint efforts of China, the United States, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan. China-U.S. antiterrorism cooperation has become institutionalized through a number of expert-level working groups that exchange information and methods on terrorist financing, security of container ships, and intelligence. Significantly, the FBI now runs an office in Beijing, which also facilitates bilateral cooperation against drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, illegal immigration, and various other cross-border crimes. Similar bilateral consultation and cooperation mechanisms have been set up with Russia, India, and Pakistan. China has also had a series of bilateral dialogues and negotiations on antiterrorism with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

On the Domestic Front

The September 11 terrorist strike, which shocked the world, also reinforced the determination of Chinese leadership to come up with a domestic antiterrorism mechanism for China. Shortly after September 11 China established the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) headed up by Hu Jintao. The National Ministry of Public Security also set up an antiterrorism bureau, which is responsible for the research, planning, guidance, coordination, and implementation of national antiterrorism efforts and for all counterterrorism investigations and enforcement. The antiterrorism bureau works closely with other ministries including foreign affairs, national defense, state security, customs, finance, and the People’s Bank of China, as well as with provincial and municipal antiterrorism bureaus, to improve China’s domestic counterterrorism capabilities.

The antiterrorism mechanism developed by the NATCG has four elements: (1) an early-warning and prevention system, which monitors the activities of terrorist groups in order to preempt terror attacks well in advance and to cut off their sources of funds; (2) a rapid-response system, which is designed to quickly remove terrorist threats or to contain the fallout of terrorist attacks (in almost every provincial capital China has deployed armed rapid-reaction antiterrorism troops); (3) an emergency control-and-management system, which focuses on the control of both physical and human losses in the wake of terrorist attacks or during their development (striving to contain the destructiveness of terrorist attacks and to restore order, China has drawn on New York City’s experience of September 11 and has increased coordination of police, fire fighters, armed troops, emergency rescue and medical personnel in emergency cases); and (4) a mass education and mobilization system, which increases the general public’s awareness of the government’s antiterrorism efforts and policies.

China has also expanded and clarified provisions related to terrorism in Chinese administrative, financial, criminal, and national security laws so as to more rigorously and effectively combat terrorism at home and abroad. The most extensive antiterrorism provisions can be found in the Chinese criminal code. In 1997 the Standing Committee of the eighth National People’s Congress amended the criminal code to include a specific antiterrorism provision—Article 120:

Whoever organizes, leads or actively participates in a terrorist organization shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years; other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention or public surveillance.

Whoever, in addition to the crime mentioned in the preceding paragraph, commits other crimes of homicide, exploitation or kidnapping shall be punished in accordance with the provisions on combined punishment for several crimes.

After September 11 the Chinese government adopted another criminal-law amendment that is even more specific and detailed on terrorist crimes and brought the criminal code into conformity with counterterrorism obligations and requirements of international conventions on terrorism and relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, particularly, resolution 1373.

Long and Difficult Fight Ahead

The priority target of the Chinese antiterrorism campaign is four East Turkistan organizations: the ETIM, the East Turkistan Liberation Organization, the World Uygur Youth Congress, and the East Turkistan Information Center. While the government has had some success
in thwarting terrorist attacks by these groups in 2007 and early 2008, it has not been able to stop them totally as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks in the Xinjiang towns of Kashgar on 4 August 2008 and Kuqa on 10 August 2008, despite the extraordinary security measures for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. China recognizes that it has a long and hard fight ahead in overcoming the Xinjiang insurgency and will have to strengthen its antiterrorism cooperation, regionally and globally, to win.

China's war on terrorism is not restricted to battling the ETIM in Xinjiang and Central Asian terrorist groups that support and supply the ETIM. China is well aware that the global networks of terrorists and other international criminal organizations are a significant threat to the international system and to China's national strategic and economic interests, which have progressively expanded beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, it is not surprising that China has been very active in the international antiterrorism coalition. The war on terrorism has involved China in global strategic affairs at a much higher level than ever before, testing China's power and influence in the world. Beijing is acutely aware of how much is at stake and that the price of failure will be high. So far, China has demonstrated that it has the capacity and capability to play a leading role in the international antiterrorism coalition alongside the other great powers.

James P. MULDOON Jr.

**Further Reading**


Textile and Clothing Industry

China became a major textile manufacturer beginning in the early 1980s. Its industry quickly expanded to become a top producer and, by the late 1990s, China had become the world’s leading textile-exporting nation. Today, expansion into technical textile products reflects a general trend toward innovation and higher-value products for the domestic as well as export markets.

Textile production has played a key role in the initial stages industrial development in China and its East Asian neighbors. Because it is labor intensive and does not require a large amount of capital, the textile and clothing industry is well-suited to developing economies that have little capital and plenty of low-wage labor. As the industry matures, exports generate foreign capital, mechanization and production techniques become more sophisticated, and wages rise. This leads to a shift toward more capital-intensive and higher-value industries.

Textile Industry in the Newly Industrializing Economies

The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea began developing their textile and clothing industries in the 1950s and 1960s. Production and exports steadily increased throughout the 1970s as did their export share in the Japanese, U.S., and European markets. As their industries matured, they shifted toward more high-value products, such as manmade fibers. By the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the quality of synthetic fibers coming from the Asian NIEs had improved enough to be competitive with other exporting countries.

Hong Kong became the world’s leading clothing exporter from 1973 to 1977 and again from 1980 to 1985. Taiwan’s industry peaked in the 1980s, briefly becoming the leading apparel exporter to the U.S. market and the second leading producer of manmade fibers (after the United States). Throughout the 1980s, the textiles industry played a critical role in South Korea’s exports, consisting of US$11.9 billion, or 19.6 percent of total export earnings. In 1989, the total value of South Korea’s textile exports reached US$15.34 billion, an 8 percent increase over the previous year.

By the late 1980s, the low-wage advantage that the Asian NIEs held in the labor-intensive clothing segment began to dwindle as their industries advanced and labor costs increased. Their textile exports, accompanied by a shift to synthetic fibers, remained at around a quarter of total world trade in the 1990s, while their share of garment exports fell steadily from around a quarter in the 1980s and early 1990s to 16 percent by 1999.

A common response to this situation was for the NIEs to upgrade their technology and the quality of their products. Production was upgraded through automation, mechanization, and computer-aided design. Emphasis was placed on producing upmarket and high-fashion apparel. Taiwan and South Korea increasingly moved away
from the production of textiles and clothing to manufacturing value-added products such as electronics and semiconductors. In addition, as the NIEs and Japan increasingly outsourced the labor-intensive manufacturing of such items as clothing to China and other low-cost producers, they were able to devote more resources to higher value-added activities while still maintaining demand for their textile exports.

**Trade Barriers and Market Shifts**

Throughout their development, East Asian textile exporters confronted challenges that pushed the industry to undergo structural reform. First, considerable trade barriers existed in the global textile trade. In 1974, the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was adopted by the United States, Canada, and the European Union. It was intended to prevent textile and garment industry jobs in developed nations from moving to developing nations where manufacturing and labor was cheaper.

The effects of the MFA in East Asia were complex. For example, limits on exports for Japan and Hong Kong led to greater export opportunities for Taiwan and South Korea. When quotas were placed on exports from Taiwan and South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia reaped the benefits. This created a shift in the market in which investment in textile production spread throughout the region and often to those countries not yet limited by the MFA. What had been an attempt to limit exports sometimes resulted in greater exports from countries that otherwise might not have attracted the capital and expertise to develop a textile industry of their own.

In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which...
called for a 10-year phaseout of the MFA. And in 2005, the MFA ended, giving all WTO members unrestricted access to the U.S., Canadian, and EU markets.

A second challenge faced by East Asian nations was the increase in labor and production costs that accompanied the expansion of their textile industries. As costs increased, their textile industries became more vulnerable to competition from low-cost producers. In many cases, this resulted in relocation of manufacturing facilities to the very countries that housed their low-cost competitors. Hong Kong, for example, relocated factories to China on a large scale beginning in the 1980s, bringing to the mainland the benefits of massive investments and training. Japan also began moving its manufacturing operations offshore in the late 1980s and early 1990s. China received the bulk of these investments, seeing new Japanese-backed plants go from 23 to 187 in the late 1980s while spending rose from US$16 million to US$120 million.

Third, the formation of regional trade blocs, such as the European Union in 1993 and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, threatened market shares of the NIEs in Europe and North America. Hong Kong was hit especially hard, for example, by the erosion of its U.S. market share to lower-cost Mexican and Canadian producers.

China’s Textiles and Clothing Industry

China became a major player in the world textile market after it initiated market reforms in the early 1980s. The production value of its textile and clothing industry grew at an annual rate of 15.6 percent from 1986 to 1995, while exports increased from US$8.5 billion to US$38 billion. In 1991, China surpassed Italy to become the economy with the biggest trade surplus in textiles and clothing. In 1999,
after a decade of 13 percent annual growth, China’s clothing sector captured 16.2 percent of world trade, while Hong Kong garnered 12 percent. In 1997, and again in 1999, China passed Germany as the world’s top textile exporter.

However, as a socialist economy undergoing market reforms, China’s economy suffered from the burden of money-losing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The SOEs dominated the textile industry but were plagued by labor redundancy, high pension and benefit costs, and outdated equipment. Reform of these enterprises took precedence in government efforts to transform the state-owned sector in 1998. As a result, money-losing factories were closed by the hundreds, 1.16 million workers were laid off, and 9.6 million antiquated cotton spindles were taken out of production by 1999.

After China joined the WTO at the end of 2001, it began upgrading its textile and clothing manufacturing equipment. In 2002, it imported US$3.3 billion worth of advanced equipment, mainly from Western textile producers who had outsourced production to lower-cost producer nations such as China and India. With this new equipment, Chinese textile manufacturers improved their productivity and the quality of their textile exports.

China’s textile industry also saw an increase in investment from internationally renowned corporations, such as Toray Industries and Asahi Chemical Industry of Japan, DuPont of the United States, BSF of Germany, and others from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. Enterprises from other sectors, such as coal, steel, and chemical manufacturing, also stepped into China’s textiles industry with big investment projects. This influx of funds helped finance upgrades in textile and clothing manufacturing equipment.

In 2003, the industry saw its exports reach US$80.4 billion, a jump of 27 percent over the previous year, accounting for 18 percent of the country’s total export value. But with the surge in exports came problems in the form of trade friction with Western nations, especially the United States. Claiming that Chinese imports were creating a disruption in the U.S. market, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced in 2005 that it was imposing temporary quotas on cotton shirts, cotton trousers, and underwear from China. The announcement came just five months after the lifting of quotas under the Multi Fibre Arrangement.

In 2007, China’s textiles and apparel exports reached US$171 billion, a rise of 16 percent year on year, but 8.5 percentage points lower than the previous year. In the first two months of 2008, China’s exports of textiles and clothing grew by 8.19 percent, a drop of 0.9 percentage points over the previous comparable period. Factors contributing to the slowdown included a higher-valued Chinese currency, cuts in export tax rebates, rising raw materials costs, and higher wages. Since 2003, China’s average wages have risen more than 50 percent, and the value of the yuan has gained about 18 percent against the U.S. dollar since lifting the unit’s peg in 2005. This has made Chinese textiles more expensive and has taken away their cost advantages compared to products from Vietnam, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India.

Although some in China’s textile and apparel industry have appealed to the government for help, such as adjustment of the export tax rebate, many experts and industry insiders realize that a slowing of the industry offers a good opportunity for restructuring. Many see China’s industry shifting away from production capacity to innovation and product upgrades. For example, the China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) urged the country’s textile manufacturers to focus on innovation, environmentally friendly production methods, and high-end apparel for the international market. The council supports a strategy of developing Chinese brands and targeting overseas markets with high-end, China-made fabrics and Chinese-designed clothing. Innovation and technological advancement are the two primary directions for the industry at this time, according to the council.

Meanwhile, the government has established a Textile Industry Technical Advancement and Development Program as part of its Eleventh Five-Year Plan, and set up a fund of $180 million to drive technological development and innovation. Many textile factories have continued to upgrade their equipment. According to the German Engineering Federation, China is one of the largest buyers of German textile machines. The Chinese government is seeking faster modernization and higher value, the federation said in a recent report.

Future Trends in the Industry

One of the most promising areas for the future of the textiles industry is technical textiles, which includes those products used for their performance or functional
characteristics rather than for their aesthetics. Technical textiles account for about one-third of the world’s annual consumption of fibers, both natural and manmade. Volume growth in developing countries is expected to average between 4 percent and 5 percent annually to 2010, with a large portion of production coming from China and India. China imported nearly 500,000 tons of technical textiles in 2004, and its consumption has averaged 11 percent a year since 1998.

As China has developed into a consumer society, its demand has grown for technical textile products, such as diapers and feminine hygiene items. Higher standards for medical care have led to an increase in demand for disposable bed sheets, surgical drapes, gowns, and caps. The microelectronics industry has also spurred growth through demand for clean-room (protective) clothing. And the rise in car ownership has resulted in a sharp jump in demand for technical textiles in the auto manufacturing sector.

Chinese companies have increasingly expanded into specialty areas previously occupied by producers in developed countries. And its strategy of innovation and self-sufficiency is likely to be applied to the technical textiles segment. Success in this area will likely help it turn the tables to become a major exporter of technical textile products in the future, although the global financial meltdown of 2008 makes predicting future trends difficult.

The financial meltdown is likely to affect China and its Asian neighbors adversely in the near future: even number-one China has experienced a drop of 10.7% in the growth rate of its textile and garment exports in 2008 as compared to 2007. The State Council announced on 4 February, 2009 a comprehensive national plan to reinvigorate China’s textile industry by increasing the tax rebate rate for textile and garment exports to 15%, providing financial assistance for technology upgrades and branding, promotion of the domestic market, and other measures.

Robert Y. ENG
Further Reading


Ancient Chinese trade routes through central Asia are collectively called the “Silk Roads,” indicating the importance that textile has long had for China’s economy. Textile designs, created by weaving, embroidery, or fabric printing, often reflect symbology important in Chinese religious and official life: dragons are symbols of imperial power; fans are motifs in Daoist philosophy.

Chinese textiles reflect many centuries of technology, trade, government, religion, and art. They provide continuing evidence of the Chinese culture’s rich heritage. Although the best known and most highly valued fabrics are of silk, the earliest people relied on reindeer skins, gut, and sinew before beginning to use fibers from stems of plants, such as hemp and ramie, silk, and cotton.

Archaeological Evidence of Early Cloth Production

Loom pieces from Hemudu, an early Neolithic site that dates to over six thousand years ago, are the earliest evidence of cloth production. The Hemudu culture lived in modern-day Zhejiang Province, on the southeast coast. A cut-open cocoon of the silkworm moth (*Bombyx mori*) in Xiyingsan and parts of equipment for reeling silk at Qianshanyang point to the cultivation of mulberry trees for raising silkworms at this time. Other early examples of textile production include parts of backstrap looms at Liangzhu and Yunnan provinces from the second century BCE. Actual silk fabric fragments surviving at a number of late Neolithic sites are the best evidence of the early development of yarn and fabric construction in early China.

Developing Technology and Trade

As looms evolved, so did structures of weaving and ways of creating woven motifs. The addition of shed sticks to looms allowed weavers to incorporate warp patterns into cloth. Early examples of this technology have survived in Scythian burial mounds in the Altai Mountains. The atmosphere of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) supported an unprecedented growth of the arts. Surviving figured, pile, and gauze weaves testify to the magnificence of Han fabrics, which made up much of the trade along the famed Silk Road, an interconnecting network of caravan trails across Asia extending to the Mediterranean Sea. A new, complex draw loom in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) produced many weft-faced patterned damasks and brocades, slit tapestries, and crepes for the court and for export. Motifs in some of these cloths reflect trade with the Persian Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651 CE) just as Sasanian patterns show eastern influence.

Embroidery also developed into a highly skilled method of decorating fabrics. Traders included the
exquisite embroideries that incorporated a great variety of stitches and silk yarns into packs for the Silk Road trade. Like woven cloths, high quality embroideries still play an important role in Chinese life and trade, as do so-called “resist” methods of printing cloth, including batik and tie-dye, that produce stylized and abstract designs on silk and cotton fabrics.

From a practical standpoint, the Chinese have used textiles for bed hangings and bed covers; on screens, walls, chairs, and tables; for cushion covers, boxes, cases and books; for garments, purses, hats, shoes, and gloves; for banners, curtains, canopies, and as altar coverings for commemorative and religious ceremonies. The rich history of cloth documents its past use as currency, tax payments, tributes, bribes, and dowries. The extensive trade in textiles has sustained the economy and has introduced Chinese design and technology to faraway places, but this trade venue has also brought foreign ideas and customs into the country.

The Power of Design in Dragon Robes

Patterns in woven and embroidered Chinese fabrics reflect governmental efforts to create an orderly universe as well as the philosophical and religious thought of Chinese culture. Dragons, probably the most famous and ubiquitous of Chinese motifs, denoted imperial authority and power.

Dragon robes of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) are among the most frequently held Chinese textiles in private and public collections. Bright yellow robes reserved for the emperor and empress have eight dragons woven into or embroidered on them. Four of the dragons surround the wearer’s head with positions at each shoulder, at the center front, and at the center back. A pair of dragons set in clouds facing each other in a mirror image decorates the front and back of the robe’s lower section.

The Manchu added twelve ancient symbols of imperial authority among the clouds to the emperor’s garments in the mid-eighteenth century. They include a sun with a three-legged cockerel and a moon and rabbit with the elixir of life on the left and right shoulders, respectively. The other ten symbols had specific positions on the robe and were not present on the robes of the heir apparent.

Creating Order with Rank Badges

Textile collections also often have rank badges that reflect attempts to maintain an orderly society in the four hundred years before the twentieth century.

Conferred by the emperor, a civil official’s rank designated his level of achievement on rigorous tests. In the
Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties, a round or more often square badge incorporated a specific bird that represented each level of achievement. Since the civil officials supplied the badges for themselves and their wives to place on the front and back of their robes, the methods of construction and quality varied greatly. The most expensive rank squares have the bird, clouds, and other motifs incorporated into the tapestry or patterned weave or embroidered design. Others have motifs surrounding a blank center to which a pre-embroidered bird was appliquéd. Upgrading to a higher level would be easier and less costly with the generic ground.

Military officials also had hierarchical badges, but with an animal rather than a bird. Today, these are rarer than civilian squares, especially ones of the lowest ranks. If one of a pair of rank squares is cut in half vertically, the official intended it for a Han-style robe that opened at center front; solid squares fit Manchu-style robes that fastened on the right side. Made of narrow-width silk fabrics, the agrarian Han garments opened in the center front and had a center-back seam. Manchu-style robes, based on a leather tradition and appropriate for horseback riding, originally had large front and back pieces. After taking over (and establishing the Qing dynasty) in the early seventeenth century, the Manchu switched to narrow woven silk fabrics that required center seams, but the silhouette of the garment did not change.

Reflections of Philosophy and Religion in Textile Designs

For over four thousand years printers, painters, embroiderers, and weavers have incorporated symbols representing Chinese culture into their products for individuals, homes, and temples. Many long-established motifs may have represented Confucian philosophy, which became a major influence on the customs and thought of the Chinese people during the Han dynasty. Ancient motifs include stylized pearls, coins, books, scrolls, rhinoceros horns, leaves, clouds, coral, bats, and designs representing the opposites—yin and yang. Even then, these motifs mixed with those of Daoism and Buddhism.

The Chinese often have ordered symbols in groups of eight or four. Eight motifs symbolizing Daoist philosophy and beliefs in textiles and other art forms include a fan, sword in a sheath, pilgrim’s staff and gourd, castanets, a flower basket, a tube holding two rods, a flute, and a lotus blossom. Many textile patterns depict one or more of eight Immortals often holding one of these specific Daoist symbols.

Two Daoist Immortals (reversible slit tapestry weave [kesi]; nineteenth or early twentieth century). Source: University of Rhode Island Historic Textile and Costume Collection.
Buddhism, the third major Chinese religion, came from India during the last half of the Han dynasty. Eight Buddhist symbols represent specific beliefs of the religion, but interpretations have changed over the centuries, and original meanings sometimes become obscure. These symbols, whose meanings are often related to happiness and well-being, include the following: a protective canopy; an ever-changing wheel; a sacred vase; a fish or a pair of fish with the latter possibly representing yin and yang; a lotus representing purity; an endless knot or mystic diagram; a conch that called worshipers to prayer; and a parasol. Particularly by the nineteenth century, artisans mixed the motifs from the three religions along with patterns of other symbolic groupings.

Patterns for Ceremonies and Expressions of Nature

Symbols of indefinite origin support special ceremonies, such as weddings, which also incorporate the color red or red-orange. A bride’s robe may contain motifs such as a pomegranate with some exposed seeds (symbolizing fertility), ducks (because they mate for life), and phoénixes (reserved for the empress and brides who became an empress for a day). Wishes for a marriage to produce many children are reflected in numerous “hundred children” or “thousand children” designs that depict colorfully dressed children playing a variety of games.
Many designs in Chinese textiles reflect nature and familiar scenes, often incorporating architectural features.

Beautifully executed colored blossoms and butterflies decorate skirt panels, robes, and sleeve bands. Many textile collections have women’s robes with embroidered bands sewn on the bottom edge of wide sleeves. Collections also may hold sleeve bands not sewn to a robe. Sometimes these bands are decorated only in the areas that are exposed to a viewer when the wearer holds her bent arms in front of her body. The surface of the band on the side of the sleeve toward her is undecorated since this area would be subject to abrasion.

**Worldwide Influence of Chinese Textile Design**

Occasionally the design in Chinese textiles has reflected outside influence, such as roundels with a pair of affronted mounted warriors from the Sasanid dynasty in Persia, but more often textiles in other parts of the world contain Chinese motifs. That these patterns have been such an inspiration to other cultures speaks for their strength, beauty, and appeal, even without their symbolism. The entire world is enriched by the heritage of China’s textiles.

Margaret T. ORDOÑEZ

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**Mandarin Ducks on Bride’s Red Robe (embroidered; twentieth century). SOURCE: UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND HISTORIC TEXTILE AND COSTUME COLLECTION.**

**Scene on Sleeve Band (embroidered; late nineteenth century). SOURCE: UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND HISTORIC TEXTILE AND COSTUME COLLECTION.**

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**Further Reading**


The Third Front policy, a response to the perceived threat of U.S. and Soviet aggression at the height of the Cold War, refers to an ambitious but ultimately wasteful program for the military-industrial development of China’s remote mountainous hinterland.

The large scale of “Third Front” or “Third Line” (da sanxian) policy, a reaction to China’s vulnerability to U.S. and Soviet aggression during the Cold War, entailed massive investment in developing a military-industrial complex, including mining, metallurgy, machine building, and transportation that could serve as the basis for continued military capability in the event of an invasion of China’s capital, coastal cities, and core territories. Although the most intense period of investment and construction was brief, from 1964 to 1971, the effort had a strong negative impact on China’s economic development and provided few lasting benefits.

Origins of Third Front Policy

The term “Third Front” was first used by Lin Biao in a speech in January 1962 to refer to a redoubt (fortification, in this case military-industrial) in Anhui Province in the event of the need to retreat from Shanghai. By the time Mao Zedong revived the program and incorporated it into the revised Third Five-Year Plan in 1964, the area defined as the “Big Third Front” included a vast swath of territory stretching from Beijing in the north to Hainan Island in the south. Much of this area is rugged mountainous terrain 500 meters or more above sea level, including the provinces of Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan in the southwest, Gansu and Qinghai in the northwest, and parts of the provinces of Shaanxi, Hubei, and Hunan. It was hoped that this region, distant from both the coast and the northern plains, might serve as a base for a continued war of resistance in the event of an invasion from the north or the Pacific. As the economist Barry Naughton puts it, through the “Third Front” strategy, “China was preparing to fight a ‘people’s war’... in which the ‘people’ were equipped with the products of modern industry” (Naughton 1988).

There was no precedent for the massive effort to build up advanced industrial capacity and the accompanying infrastructure in this mountainous region. During the Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945, the Nationalist government retreated to southwest China, moving an impressive amount of industrial capacity, including armaments factories, into Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. But this was a temporary emergency measure and not an attempt to build up a permanent industrial base.

From 1963, as China was recovering from the disasters of the Great Leap Forward (begun in 1958), Chairman Mao and Lin Biao, who became Minister of Defense in 1959, actively promoted the ‘Third Front’ policy. There would seem to have been a strong consensus in favor of the policy among the party’s top leadership in the years leading up to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). China’s nascent nuclear program, which successfully tested its first atomic weapon in 1964, was also located in the western...
provinces of Qinghai and Gansu. There were also considerable mineral and hydropower resources available in the southwest and northwest, including steel and aluminum. The Third Front policy was also broadly consistent with the economic policies implemented since 1949. In the 1950s, the government consistently transferred resources, including plant, capital, and personnel, from the industrial centers of the east coast and Manchuria to inland provinces and rural areas in order to distribute the benefits of economic development more evenly throughout the country. Similarly, the emphasis on heavy industry such as mining, metallurgy, and machine building was consistent with the investment policies of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) and the Great Leap Forward. Nonetheless, the attempt to develop a massive military-industrial complex in some of the most remote and mountainous terrain in China was extraordinary, and was motivated primarily by international and strategic concerns.

**Policy Implementation**

The initial impetus for the first phase of Third Front projects was the intensification of U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. That year, the government of the People’s Republic of China initiated a program of railroad construction and development of heavy industry in the southwestern provinces of Guizhou and Yunnan that was intended to facilitate both Chinese defense of the region and support for the Communist forces in Vietnam.

It soon became apparent, however, that while the U.S. was taking great pains to avoid conflict with China, China’s relationship with the Soviet Union had reached a crisis. In January 1966, the USSR signed a mutual defense pact with Mongolia and stationed large forces there. By 1969, the two socialist giants had fought several border skirmishes, and Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine (that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene to preserve the socialist system in other countries) made China’s leaders apprehensive. By the autumn of 1969, Lin Biao had ordered the evacuation of the party’s top leadership from Beijing, and China’s leaders were expecting and prepared for an apocalyptic final conflict between socialism, imperialism, and revisionism.

The amount of resources invested in Third Front projects reflects the urgency and importance of this defense-related program. From 1965 to 1970, the “third front” received more than half of all state investment, and an even higher proportion of investment in capital resources. Third Front projects also received the most advanced industrial equipment and some of the most skilled personnel China possessed. Initially, the Third Front was centrally managed, and “general command headquarters” for construction were established at key project sites. These projects also enjoyed direct and priority access to funds and materials through supply offices and branches of the Construction Bank established at various project sites. As the planning system broke down during the Cultural Revolution, however, control over these projects devolved to local authorities.

Changes in the international and strategic context are reflected in shifts in Third Front investment, and the Third Front policy can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, from 1964 to 1969, investment and construction was focused mainly in the southwestern provinces of Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan. The first task was to connect the railroad lines feeding into the region from Shaanxi and Guangxi provinces with the French-built line from Vietnam. The link from Chongqing to Guiyang was completed in October 1965 by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of laborers and shifting funds from the national rail network to this single priority project. The centerpiece of the project was the massive iron and steel combine built at Panzhihua, on the mountainous border between Yunnan and Sichuan. The first phase in the southwest also developed mining operations and hydroelectric power to supply the new heavy-industrial base. Armaments and machine-building factories were established in the area of Chongqing and northern Guizhou, including facilities for aluminum smelting and stamping, rubber, precision instruments, and optics. Hundreds of factories throughout China, including the famous Anshan Iron and Steel Complex in Manchuria, sent skilled personnel and equipment to support Third Front projects in the southwest. In some cases, entire plants were relocated, along with their employees, to remote valleys from coastal cities like Shanghai.

The second phase, from 1969 to 1972, was partly a response to the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations and the threat of invasion from the north. Second phase projects were located mainly in the mountainous region where
the borders of Shaanxi, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Hunan provinces meet. Like the first phase, the second phase included rapid and large-scale development of railways, hydroelectric power, and metallurgical and machine-building industries. An effort to build a steel complex at Wuyang in Henan Province, smaller than but similar to the one at Panzhihua, was ultimately unsuccessful. The second phase continued the high rates of investment and mobilization of hundreds of thousands of workers to build three new railway lines, which were completed in less than four years. Construction of what was then China’s largest dam, at Gezhouba, was also initiated in 1970, but the project was not completed until the 1990s.

Machine-building industries, mainly for military uses, dominated the second phase projects, especially the Number Two Automobile Plant at Shiyan in the mountains of Hubei Province, which was built to produce two-and-a-half-ton trucks. More than 140 factories, including the Number One Auto Factory in Changchun, provided assistance in the form of personnel and equipment. This reflected an effort to remove productive capacity from the northeast, which was vulnerable to Soviet attack, into the mountain vastness of northwestern Hubei. Nearly all of the equipment installed in the plant was designed and produced in China, which had only begun producing its own trucks with Soviet equipment in 1957. Like many Third Front projects, however, the plant suffered from flaws in design and inefficiencies born of perceived defense requirements. Subsidiary factories were built in mountain valleys, and even caves, dispersed across 32 kilometers. This naturally created transportation difficulties and dramatically increased production costs.

Throughout the same period, several projects in the northwest provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai were also included in the Third Front. Railways and military industries, including China’s nuclear program, were built up in this region from the 1950s. From 1964, these projects were accelerated and supported with massive investment from the central government. Projects designed to supply specialty steel and hydroelectric power to the nuclear program in Gansu Province were given top priority from 1965. As in other Third Front regions, these projects were supported by the transfer of resources from other parts of China, and factories were dispersed and built into sites that were naturally fortified but difficult to access.

The year 1972 marked a sudden and dramatic reversal of the Third Front policy and the beginning of the third and final phase of the program. Most Third Front projects were discontinued by 1973 and many construction crews were transferred to new projects in eastern China. There were several reasons for the reversal of policy, but with the death of Lin Biao, one of the policy’s most ardent advocates, as well as the beginnings of rapprochement with the United States, the sense of military urgency was reduced.

Most importantly, however, the dramatic inefficiencies and tremendous waste inherent in the effort to establish a modern industrial base in China’s mountainous hinterland had become apparent to central leaders. The levels of investment required could not be sustained given China’s level of economic development. When Premier Zhou Enlai regained control of the organs of government in 1972, following the peak years of chaos and violence during the Cultural Revolution, he quickly ordered a reduction in the rate of investment. Third Front projects were particularly inefficient. The entire program was so massive that it was clearly impossible to complete most of the individual projects in a timely fashion. The push for immediate accomplishments and practices such as simultaneously designing, constructing, and operating new plants produced many design problems. Poor design and siting necessitated wasteful redundancies.

Despite these many obvious problems, however, and the need to reduce the rate of investment, from 1972 to 1978 some Third Front projects continued to receive support from central planners. Continued concern with the Soviet threat was one motivation. But the simple fact that so much manpower and resources had already been invested in these projects inclined the party’s leaders to continue to develop certain key projects, such as the Panzhihua iron and steel complex. By 1979, however, it had become clear that even these key projects were unworkable. Following China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1978, military preparedness became less of a priority and the Third Front program was finally abandoned.

Implications of Third Front Policy

In the short term, the Third Front probably did enhance China’s capacity to withstand a major conventional invasion. But this event was unlikely even at the height of
China’s strategic isolation, and the threat passed well before most of these projects came on line. The goal was far more ambitious than previous attempts to remove industry to the interior during a military crisis as the Third Front aimed to establish a comprehensive industrial sector from mining and electric power provision to metallurgy to machine building. Only 20 percent of Third Front investment went to specifically military industries. The rest was for transportation or dual-use industries such as steel making.

The program was too massive and ambitious, however. It would take too long to complete and would require more resources than China possessed at the time. It is furthermore doubtful that these installations were that much more protected than any other part of the country considering the developments in military technologies such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range bombers, and nuclear weapons. In any case, much of this investment in China’s defense was wasted and many projects were left uncompleted. Only one of the four large steel plants included in the Third Front was operating near capacity by the 1980s. In some locations, such as Wuyang, advanced equipment and skilled personnel were wasted because insufficient supplies of ore and poor transportation made the plant’s efficient functioning impossible.

The total costs of the Third Front projects are still unknown, but it is clear that the central government invested tens of billions of yuan, most of it never recovered and left to rust in the form of disused or inefficient plants located in remote mountain valleys. According to Barry Naughton’s estimates, China’s industrial output in the 1980s was 10 to 15 percent below what it would have been if China’s leaders had not pursued the Third Front policy.

Most economists similarly agree that the Third Front projects, in contrast with other efforts at developing inland industries, provided little or no benefit to the national economy. Not only were many projects abandoned before completion, they were often located in the most inaccessible areas, which prevented them from fostering the development of industries supplying inputs in the immediate neighborhood. For example, the construction of Number Two Auto in northwestern Hubei could have spawned a whole string of support industries. But the plant’s remote location prevented it from serving as an engine for further industrialization. By the mid-1980s, this problem led to the removal of 121 factories (and their personnel) from their rural mountain locations to urban centers such as Chongqing.

Even the construction of a railway network in China’s mountainous regions, perhaps the most positive legacy of the Third Front, exhibited many problems. Priority development of Third Front railway lines diverted resources for the maintenance and expansion of the rest of China’s national rail network, and the costs per kilometer of track were five or six times higher than average. Nonetheless, the expansion of rail service to remote hinterland areas is one of the few positive legacies of this otherwise wasteful and misguided project.

Robert CLIVER

Further Reading

Thirteen Ming Tombs ▶
Thirteen Ming Tombs
Míng Shísānlíng 明十三陵

Built between 1409 and 1644, the Thirteen Ming Tombs is the largest imperial burial compound in the world, with thirteen emperors and twenty-three empresses entombed. Dingling 定陵, the only excavated mausoleum of the compound, is known as the Underground Palace. On display in the Palace are the emperor’s intricately woven gold crown and the empress’s phoenix crown laden with pearls and precious stones.

Situated in Tianshou Mountains (Heavenly Longevity 天寿山) in Beijing’s northwestern suburb of Changping (Prosperity and Peacefulness, 昌平), the Thirteen Ming Tombs is the largest complex of imperial burial grounds in the world, covering an area of more than forty square kilometers (15 square miles).

Emperors’ Resting Place
In these mausoleums, about fifty kilometers from Beijing, rest thirteen emperors, twenty-three empresses, two princes, more than thirty concubines, and one eunuch of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The construction of the mausoleums started with Changling (Perpetuity Mausoleum 长陵) in 1409 and ended with Siling (Remembrance Mausoleum 思陵) in 1644.

Of the sixteen Ming dynasty emperors, thirteen constructed their last dwellings in the Tianshou Mountains. The Thirteen Ming Tombs has the densest population of former emperors anywhere in the world. Chronologically, the mausoleums and their respective emperor occupants are as follows:

1. Changling 长陵 (Emperor Chengzu 成祖)
2. Xianling 献陵 (Renzhong 仁宗)
3. Jingling 景陵 (Xuanzong 宣宗)
4. Yuling 裕陵 (Yingzong 英宗)
5. Maoling 茂陵 (Xianzong 恭宗)
6. Tai Ling 泰陵 (Xiaozong 孝宗)
7. Kangling 康陵 (Wuzong 武宗)
8. Yongling 永陵 (Shizong 世宗)
9. Zhaoling 昭陵 (Muzong 穆宗)
10. Dingling 定陵 (Shenzong 神宗)
11. Qingling 庆陵 (Guangzong 光宗)
12. Deling 德陵 (Xizong 熹宗)
13. Siling 思陵 (Sizong 思宗)

Architectural Wonder
Closely observing Chinese feng shui guidelines, architects of the Ming mausoleums sought harmony between architecture and nature, and between Heaven and human. Each mausoleum stands by a mountain, which enabled the builders to integrate the mountain landscape.
with the underground space of the mausoleum. Each mausoleum is square in the front and circular in the back, corresponding to the ancient Chinese concept of “circular heaven and square earth.”

Listed as a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site in 2000, the Thirteen Ming Tombs is a popular tourist attraction. To date, only two of the mausoleums have been opened to visitors: Changling and Dingling (Stability Mausoleum), the latter being the only excavated mausoleum of the complex.

About 120,000 square meters (100,890 square yards), Changling is the mausoleum of Chengzu, the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty, and his Empress Xu. As the first mausoleum built in the complex, Changling is the centerpiece of the Ming tombs. A ruler for twenty-two years, Chengzu started constructing the mausoleum in the sixth year of his rule and saw it completed five years later. With walls, gates, buildings for ceremonies, security, storage, and cooking, the mausoleum looked like a functional small imperial palace. Its layout influenced the designs of other mausoleums in the years that followed.

Marble Gateway, the entrance to the mausoleums, was added as part of Changling in 1540. On the grand five-arched Gateway are carved auspicious symbols such as dragons, clouds, lions, and qilin (a mythical animal). Changling’s ten-kilometer-long (6 miles) Divine Path has served as the main path to all the mausoleums. It is flanked by twenty-four stone sculptures of animals and twelve stone sculptures of imperial officials. To the left of the Divine Path stands the Dragon Hill while the Tiger Hill crouches on the right, matching the Daoist preference in placing dragons on the left and tigers on the right for beneficial positioning.

While each mausoleum has a Ling’en Hall (Hall of Most Imminent Favor) for memorial services, Changling’s Ling’en Hall is exceedingly magnificent, measuring 1,956 square meters (1,644 square yards), almost as large as Taihe Hall (Supreme Harmony, the largest structure at 2,377 square meters (1,997 square yards) in the Forbidden City, where emperors met their ministers to discuss state affairs. Most impressive in the hall are the thirty-two precious nanmu wood pillars with diameters up to 1.12 meters (4 feet). These majestic one-piece wood pillars came from nanmu trees that grew in China’s southwest. They are even more precious today, as no one is able to find nanmu trees of similar sizes any more. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, Changling’s Ling’en Hall was the designated location where shrines of deceased emperors and empresses stood and where emperors held memorial services for family members.

Located at the foot of Zi Jin Shan (Purple & Golden Mountain) in an eastern suburb of Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, these two elephants guard the Sacred Way that leads to the Tomb of the first Ming Dynasty Emperor Hongwu (reigned 1368–1398) and Empress Ma. Nanjing was the capital of Ming China during this period. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Dingling Mausoleum

In power for forty-eight years (1572–1620), Dingling’s occupant Shenzong was the longest ruling emperor of the Ming dynasty. It took six years to build the mausoleum of 182,000 square meters (152,941 square yards) at the cost of over eight million ounces of silver—the equivalent to two years’ taxes collected by the central government. Excavation of Dingling, which lasted from May 1956 to July 1958, unveiled the mystery that had shrouded the mausoleums. An all-stone underground palace lies 17 meters (56 feet) below the ground. The underground vault, free of beams and pillars, is 87.34 meters (287 feet) long and 47.28 meters (155 feet) wide, divided into five halls with a total area of 1,195 square meters (1,004 square feet).

In the central hall are three thrones for the emperor and his two empresses, all carved out of stone. Images of dragons are carved on the emperor’s throne while those of phoénixes are on the empresses’ thrones. In front of each throne is a large porcelain container, originally filled with oil, which was meant to provide lighting for the emperor and the empresses.

The three coffins are placed in the rear hall. Twenty-six wood trunks, lacquered in red and filled with sacrificial objects, lie next to the coffins. Among the more than three thousand unearthed artifacts are the emperor’s 24-centimeter-high gold crown with images of two dragons at play, which is woven with extremely fine gold thread, and the empress’s phoenix crown, adorned with 3,500 pearls and 150 precious stones.

Jian-Zhong LIN

Further Reading

Three and Five Antis Campaigns

Sanfăn Wŭfăn  三反五反

The Chinese Communist Party’s Three Antis Campaign of 1951–1952 targeted waste, corruption, and bureaucratism. The party’s Five Antis Campaign, launched soon afterward, targeted bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating on government contracts, and theft of capital. Both campaigns led to mass suicides, as well as placing many hitherto private industries in the hands of the government.

In the early years after the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched two political campaigns to reinforce party control over the population over 1951–1952. Both campaigns targeted mainly urban dwellers and people who worked in the modern business sector.

First, the CCP launched the Three Antis Campaign against waste, corruption, and bureaucratism. The campaign targeted cadres in industry and government, especially those who had become (or were thought to have become) overly acquainted with China’s capitalists. Second, the party launched the Five Antis Campaign against bribing, evading taxes, stealing state assets (that is, state property and economic information), cheating on government contracts, and stealing capital. This campaign targeted capitalists themselves. Some of the blacklisted capitalists were left to function as government employees; many were simply eliminated and disappeared. Estimates vary, but it is thought that upwards of 200,000 disgraced or displaced people committed suicide during the two campaigns (Chow 1980, 115 and 133, quoted in MacFarquhar 1997, 37).

The Five Antis Campaign also had a hidden agenda: It seized factories and capital from the blacklisted capitalists and placed them under government control. Through these efforts the CCP expanded its influence over China’s modern economic sectors. At the same time the campaign helped the party to identify people who could be recruited into the party, thereby consolidating the party’s grip over every aspect of Chinese society. Between 1947 and 1953 membership of the CCP increased from 2.7 million to 6.1 million.

Stephanie CHUNG

Further Reading
The Three Fundamental Bonds and the Five Constant Virtues are separate Confucian terms for the most important human relations and social virtues. In early Confucianism, one who perfectly fulfilled these relationships and manifested these virtues was the highest form of human—a sage. The neo-Confucians combined these two terms into a single cosmological principle that stood for human social order.

The expression Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues sums up a Confucian doctrine that was designed to guide people’s behavior and aspirations in traditional China. The Three Fundamental Bonds deal with traditional society’s most fundamental social relationships: father and son, lord and retainer, and husband and wife. As essential relationships, these three serve as shorthand for all human relationships. The Five Constant Virtues mean the Confucian virtues of benevolence (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 義), propriety (li 義), wisdom (zhi 智), and trustworthiness (xin 信). As with the Fundamental Bonds, these five virtues are the most significant ones and thus serve as shorthand for all the Confucian virtues. In other words, the Three Fundamental Bonds designate the social relationships that are essential for structuring human social life, while the Five Constant Virtues are the values needed to live a moral life.

For late imperial neo-Confucians the Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues (sangang wuchang 三纲五常), or the shorter Bonds and Constants (gangchang 二常), was the heart of Confucianism. Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), the great synthesizer of Neo-Confucian thought, criticized the teachings of Buddhism and Daoism in the following manner:

[It] is unnecessary to analyze them to understand that they both abandon the Three [Fundamental Bonds] and Five Constant Virtues. Just this one omission earns them a reputation for committing a grave crime. It is unnecessary to say anything else about them.

In other words, if a teaching did not promote the Fundamental Bonds and constant virtues, then not only was it of no account, but, even worse, it was guilty of promoting disorder. Zhu Xi believed that humans could become sages by perfecting these three relationships and realizing these five virtues. Interestingly though, in terms of China’s long history, these concepts of the Three Fundamental Bonds and the Five Constant Virtues did not have an ancient pedigree: they were creations and expressions of the unified Han empire (206 BCE–220 CE). Hence, one could cynically argue that the guides and virtues were Confucianism in the service of the state. The full four-character term sangang wuchang was not commonly used until the tenth century CE.

Three Fundamental Bonds

Searching the Confucian classics for a reference to the Three Fundamental Bonds, one encounters Confucius’s...
conditions for a well-ordered society: “Let the lord be lordly, the retainer loyal, the father fatherly, and the son sonly” (Analects 12.11, Lún yǔ 论语). Here though, Confucius presents only two relationships: lord and retainer, and father and son. In the Mencius (Mèngzǐ 孟子) one finds five rather than three principal human relationships (renlun 人倫); moreover, the text stresses their reciprocal basis: “Father and son have love [for each other]; lord and retainer have obligations [to each other]; husband and wife have distinct [spheres]; senior and junior have precedence; and friends have faith [in each other]” (Mencius 3A.4). Although clearly a strong sense of hierarchy pervades each set of relationships, both Confucius and Mencius underscore that everyone, whether a superior or an inferior, has obligations to properly fulfill his or her role. As the Confucian scholar Hsü Dau-lin has pointed out, the first text that more overtly promotes what would become the Three Fundamental Bonds is one of the later chapters of the Legalist text written by Han Fei Zi 韓非子. The chapter, which probably dates from the beginning of the unified Han empire, states: “A retainer serves his lord; a son serves his father; a wife serves her husband. If these three principles are followed, then all-under-Heaven is well-governed; if these three principles are betrayed, then all-under-Heaven is in chaos” (Chapter 51). What is striking is that no mention is made of mutual obligations.

The first person to label these relationships was Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (197–104 BCE), the great Han dynasty Confucian philosopher and statesman. Dong called them the Three Cardinal Guides or Bonds (sangang). For him, these relationships are not social constructions; instead, they are natural expressions of the cosmological principles of yin and yang. He tells us in The History of the Han (Han shu 漢書):

The lord is yang 陽, the retainer is yin 隱; the father is yang, the son is yin; the husband is yang, the wife is yin. The way of yin cannot proceed anywhere on its own…. Therefore, the retainer depends on his lord to gain merit; the son depends on his father; the wife on her husband, yin on yang, and the Earth on Heaven…. The Three [Fundamental Bonds] of the kingly way can be sought in Heaven. (Chapter 53)

Since for Dong yang is superior to yin, lords are superior to their retainers, fathers to their sons, and the husband to his wife. In other words, Dong accepts Han Fei Zi’s formulation of these relationships as entirely vertical and one sided. That Dong was living in a centralized empire and serving a powerful monarch undoubtedly helps explain his view.

The most extensive formulation of the concept behind the Three Fundamental Bonds is found in Baihutong 白虎 (“Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall”) by Ban Gu 班固 (32–92 CE). The book devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of this notion. Interestingly though, here the Three Fundamental Bonds are not matched up with the Five Constant Virtues but rather with the Six Rules (Liuji 六紀), which are relations with one’s paternal uncles, brothers, clansmen, maternal uncles, teachers, and friends. The Three Fundamental Bonds
and Six Rules thereby incorporate all the most important social relationships that constitute society. Without them society falls apart. This same book tells us: “In past times, the Three Fundamental Bonds and the Six Rules did not yet exist; as a result, people only knew the identity of their mother, not their father” (Chapter 2). That is to say, without these fundamental relationships, civilized social order cannot exist.

The Five Constant Virtues

Even though the Five Constant Virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness) were articulated as such only in the Han dynasty, the idea of five interrelated virtues appears earlier. The fourth-century BCE Confucian text known as the Wuxing 五行 (“Five Types of Action”) argues that there are five types of favorable behavior: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and sagacity (sheng 聰). The person who harmonizes and enacts four of these actions, is good. The person who realizes all five of these actions is a sage (shengren 聰人), in accord with heaven. Here, four of the Five Constant Virtues are articulated, and sagacity substitutes for trustworthiness. The Mencius sets forth four of Five Constant Virtues, leaving out sagacity. In an argument about whether human nature is intrinsically good, Mencius notes: “Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded onto me from the outside. They are that which I have always had” (Mencius 6A.6). In other words, these four virtues are inherent in all people.

Once again, Dong Zhongshu, the Confucian statesman and philosopher, was the first person to unambiguously use the term wuchang to designate the Five Constant Virtues. He relates:

Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness—i.e., the Way of the Five Constant Virtues—should be that which the king cultivates. If the king cultivates the Five Constant Virtues, then he will receive blessings from Heaven and will enjoy the spiritual efficacy of the spirits; moreover, his virtue will extend across the world and will reach all creatures. (The History of the Han 56.2504)

Many scholars believe that Dong added the fifth virtue, trustworthiness, to Mencius’s four-virtue formulation so that it would be in accord with the Five Phase (wuxing) cosmological theory that was in vogue during the Han dynasty.

The Baihutong provides the first extensive discussion of the Five Constant Virtues. It states:

What are the Five Constant Virtues? They are benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness. Benevolence means not being able to endure (seeing others suffer), loving others, and aiding all living things. Righteousness means doing what is proper. In making judgments one hits the mark. Propriety means to enact. That is, to realize the way and perfect the refined. Wisdom means knowledge. One has a special understanding and can know things before hearing about them. He is not befuddled by matters and can discern the subtle. Trustworthiness means sincerity. One cannot be deterred from his purpose. Therefore, people are born and respond to the Eight Trigrams, thereby obtaining the five energies (qi 氣) that are the Constant Virtues. (Chapter 30)

In other words, the five virtues are inherent in us and consist of qi (energy, ether, psychophysical matter). The Baihutong further equates the Five Constant Virtues with the Five Viscera; hence, benevolence resides in the liver, righteousness in the lungs, propriety in the heart, wisdom in the kidneys, and trustworthiness in the spleen. Similarly, because of the existence of the Five Constant Virtues, there are also the Five Musical Notes, the Five Classics, and the Five Cardinal Directions.

The Neo-Confucian Interpretation

From the Han dynasty on, scholars and politicians made frequent mention of the Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues, but usually separately, not together. However, by the Song dynasty (960–1279), these two lists were often fused. In fact, for Zhu Xi, the Three
Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues became cosmological principles:

Within the cosmos there is but one eternal principle. Heaven, by getting hold of it, becomes heaven. Earth, by getting hold of it, becomes earth. All things which live between heaven and earth, by getting hold of it, become what they are. Expanded, it becomes the “three bonds.” Elaborated, it becomes the “five constants.” All these are this principle in operation. Wherever one goes, it is there. (Hsü, 1970–71, 32)

Rather than naming humankind as the third element of the cosmos (which is the common formulation), Zhu Xi puts the Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues in that place. Hence, heaven, earth, and the Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues compose the universe. Clearly these human relationships and virtues were the most important characteristics of mankind. Chen Chun (1159–1223), Zhu Xi’s student, thought that the Five Constant Virtues were so important that he devoted a whole chapter of his book Beixi ziyi 北溪字義 (Neo-Confucian Terms Explained) to explaining them. He believed that all good stemmed from these virtues: “Generally speaking, in human nature there are only the four virtues of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. All the ten thousand good deeds are produced from them. In reality, they are a summary of the ten thousand good deeds” (Chan 1986, p. 85). Goodness is born out of these virtues, so to become a sage it is essential that one practices them. Likewise, since the Three Fundamental Bonds constitute the most significant human relationships, Zhu Xi believed that perfecting them would also lead to sagacity. As Hsü Dau-lin indicates, though, in making the Three Fundamental Bonds a cosmological principle, the neo-Confucians enshrined the guides’ emphasis on the hierarchical rather than the reciprocal duties inherent in the relationships. As a consequence, Zhu Xi stressed that parents could never be wrong, while another neo-Confucian philosopher, Cheng Yi (1034–1106), emphasized that a woman could never remarry.

By late imperial times, the Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues had been transformed from being general Confucian concepts about social structure and virtues to being a specific term that designated all social relationships and values and, by extension, human social order itself. To not adhere to these Confucian norms and virtues was to threaten both social and cosmological order. Hence, particularly in the late imperial period, Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues was a concept of immense significance.

Keith N. KNAPP

Further Reading


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Three Gorges Dam

The Three Gorges Dam project, the world’s largest engineering venture, will harness the mighty Yangzi (Chang) River and supply China much needed hydroelectric power. But the costs of the project—financial, environmental, political, and cultural—have many people questioning its true worth to China and the world.

The Three Gorges Dam project is the world’s largest engineering feat and the largest in China since the building of the Great Wall. Electricity generated by the dam will meet almost 10 percent of China’s requirements. But the project has forced the relocation of 1.3 million people, drowned valuable farmland, and destroyed ancient settlements of historical and cultural importance. Declining water quality resulting from submerged industrial sites, increased landslide risk, biodiversity decline, and accumulating silt are unresolved problems. The full impact of the dam on China is yet to be realized.

Old Dream

For centuries Chinese emperors and dictators dreamed of building a great wall across the Yangzi (Chang) River. This cradle of Chinese civilization originates in perpetual snows of the lofty Qinghai–Tibet Plateau. It flows southward across treeless plains before dropping 4,000 meters (13,123 feet) into the deep valleys that separate Sichuan from Tibet. Near Yibin the river enters the fertile Sichuan Basin, where the Minjiang, Tuojiang, Jialing, and Wujiang Rivers—just four of more than seven hundred tributaries—swell its size. Beyond the industrial city of Chongqing, the Yangzi slices through limestone strata of the Wushan Mountains to create a spectacular 200-kilometer (124-mile) section of narrow and precipitous gorges: Qutang, Wuxia, and Xiling. Beyond these celebrated Three Gorges, the river spills onto the fertile Yangzi Plain at Yichang and meanders to the Pacific Ocean. At 6,276 kilometers (3,900 miles), the Yangzi is China’s longest river and the third longest in the world, behind the Nile and Amazon. The watershed covers 19 percent of China’s total landmass.

As one of Asia’s most emblematic landscapes, the Three Gorges of the Yangzi River figure prominently in Chinese cultural lore. Although local water diversions date to the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), modern China’s revolutionary founder, Sun Yat-sen, first proposed damming the river in 1919. During the 1940s the United States Bureau of Reclamation cooperated with the Chinese to explore potential dam sites and evaluate costs and benefits. The Chinese civil war (1945–1949) derailed these plans until the 1950s, when the victorious Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, revived the idea, although political and economic problems again trumped construction. In 1992, with the urging of Chinese Premier Li Peng, a trained engineer, the National People’s Congress approved the plans by the smallest margin in the history of that normally compliant legislative body. Construction on the $25 billion project started in 1994 at a site below the Three Gorges in central Hubei Province.
The World Bank declined support, citing major environmental and human rights concerns. The closing of diversion gates in 2006 promoted nationalistic pride. The government predicts that the full hydropower complex will operate by 2009.

The concrete gravity dam at Three Gorges is the world’s largest engineering feat and the largest in China since the Great Wall. It consumed record amounts of soil, steel, and concrete. It also forced relocation of a record 1.3 million people. The project continues to generate unprecedented domestic and international controversy, fanned by the concurrent evolution of digital communications and emerging supranational environmentalism. The controversy stems from environmental and human rights concerns.

**Environmental Challenges**

Declining water quality in the Three Gorges Reservoir quickly emerged as a major problem. The rising waters submerged 1,600 industrial enterprises (factories, mines, and waste dumps) that retained tons of unmitigated hazardous waste and other pollutants. Added to this waste is ongoing waste from municipal, agricultural, and industrial enterprise that continues to flow unrestricted into the reservoir. Whereas the free-flowing Yangzi once diluted and transported pollutants downstream, trapped chemicals now trigger algal blooms that contaminate municipal drinking water and kill fish. A recent bloom in Fengdu County, for example, tainted domestic water for fifty thousand people.

Landslides are another major problem. The rising waters exert pressure on unstable hillsides that encircle the 5,300-kilometer (3,293-mile) shoreline. Seepage into rock joints weakens the steep slopes. Hundreds of slides occur each month, although Chinese officials overseeing the project insist the new reservoir does not promote instability. In 2007 a landslide just upstream from the Three Gorges Dam crushed railroad workers and a bus, killing more than thirty people. More slides are expected as the reservoir rises to a maximum expected height of 175 meters (574 feet) in 2012.

Trapped silt behind the static reservoir waters presents two problems. Silt deposited during floods in the lower Yangzi Basin now settles in the reservoir floor. Accumulating silt is already reducing the hydropower capacity of tributary dam projects, and planners expect sedimentation to become an issue within twenty years near the city of Chongqing at the upper end of the reservoir. Furthermore, although the dam should reduce catastrophic downstream flooding, it will also block much of the silt that has enriched the lowland soils for centuries and was the source material for the natural levee system.
As a result agricultural productivity in the lower Yangzi basin may suffer from the loss of flood-deposited silt.

Scientists are also monitoring riparian (relating to the bank of a natural watercourse) and aquatic biodiversity loss resulting from the changes in the flood regime, water temperature, and water chemistry.

The potential for an earthquake-induced failure of the dam itself also exists although the dam has been build to withstand large earthquakes. The dam survived the massive 7.9 Richter scale quake in May 2008 and the subsequent aftershocks. But there is some speculation that the dam itself may have caused the quake. A phenomenon known as reservoir-induced seismicity occurs when the sheer weight of water in a reservoir causes tectonic plates to shift, resulting in an earthquake.

**Human Cost**

The Three Gorges reservoir inundated 17 cities, 109 towns, and more than 1,500 villages, forcing permanent relocation of a 1.3 million people. Resettlement began in 1997 and is four times greater than any prior infrastructure resettlement program in world history. The government was not prepared to manage or mitigate the three-pronged humanitarian crisis resulting from forced displacement, labor dislocations, and the more recent unanticipated dislocation of people fleeing landslides. Moreover, this ancient and densely populated land offered few places for resettlement, especially of farmers, who comprised half the number. As population density in resettlement zones increased to double the national average, farmers pushed higher into steep and less fertile hillsides where forest clearing contributed to slope instability. Resettled people had little involvement in policymaking and relocation decisions. Many were forced to change livelihood and move far away from their former homes. Those resettled face unemployment and poverty rates higher than those of people who were not removed, and one-third live in severe poverty. Insufficient government compensation for this loss of land and livelihood is magnifying the crisis although an effective state security apparatus minimized both refugee flight and

**Boats on the river at the Three Gorges Dam, which forced the resettlement of more than 1.3 million people.**
Three Gorges Dam

vocal resistance. In 2007 the Chongqing municipal government decided to relocate an additional 4 million people as a result of new slope instability problems.

The reservoir is also destroying thousands of cultural and archaeological sites, including temples, hanging tombs, and historic landmarks. Evidence of human habitation in the area dates to the Paleolithic era (2 million–10,000 BCE). Many sites in newly depopulated areas are looted before underfunded government teams arrive to catalog and remove the artifacts.

Benefits versus Risks

The government believes that the benefits of the Three Gorges Dam exceed the environmental and social challenges. When the twenty-six generators reach full operational capacity in 2009, the 8,200 megawatts of power will meet almost 10 percent of current Chinese requirements and be the largest source of clean, renewable energy in the world. It may also temporarily curb the millennia-old problem of downstream flooding, such as the 1998 event that killed thousands. The placid reservoir now allows 10,000-metric ton freighters to safely navigate 2,250 kilometers (1,398 miles) inland from Shanghai, free of the treacherous shallows and strong currents of the once-untamed Yangzi River.

The project gave birth to a nascent Chinese environmental movement. An unexpected twist occurred in June 2007 when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly announced that solving the environmental problems created by the Three Gorges Dam should be a national priority. It remains to be seen how the government and the Chinese people will adjust to the economic, environmental, and social changes—good and bad—of the world’s largest engineering project.

Stephen F. CUNHA

Further Reading


The Three Obediences and the Four Virtues describe precepts for womanly behavior that derive from Confucian ideals of harmony and order. The first century CE book Lessons for Women states that the proper role of a woman is to be a submissive daughter, wife, and mother who restrains her speech, dresses in a pleasing manner, and manages her household.

The role and function of women in Chinese society has long been defined by the Confucian moral precept of the Three Obediences, or Submissions, and the Four Virtues. The Three Obediences seek to give stricture to the entirety of a woman’s existence, and accordingly state that the woman, in her youth, should be obedient to her father and her older brothers; in married life, she should be obedient to her husband; and as a widow she should be obedient to her son. The Four Virtues, on the other hand, impart rules of propriety, whereby a woman may be able to govern her life and her conduct. The first virtue is the ability of a woman to know and adhere to a submissive place in society and to modulate her behavior accordingly. The second virtue consists of restraining speech, since a talkative woman is not only considered impolite but even tiresome. The third virtue instructs a woman to dress and adorn herself in order to please a man. The last virtue states that a woman must know the proper management of her household and she must cheerfully do all the work needed in the home.

Origins

The idea of defining and instilling a mode of conduct for women may be traced back to the first half of the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), during which time the scholar Dong Zongshu (179–104 BCE), who was instrumental in making Confucianism the state religion, formulated his Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues, through which he sought to describe the ethical relationship that existed between humankind and heaven. The Three Guides consisted of axiomatic formulations on the proper correlation between the individual and institutional power. Thus it was stated that (1) a prince was the guide of his ministers; (2) the father was the guide of his sons; and (3) the husband was the guide of the wife. These Three Cardinal Guides led to the Five Constant Virtues, which consisted of mercy, correctness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness. The guarantor of both the Virtues and the Guides was heaven itself, which required obedience in order to ensure that human society functioned well, and in order to bring about a consistent ethical balance, or harmony, in the world. Therefore, to go against the Virtues and the Guides was to go against the will of heaven itself. For women, the stipulation of being obedient to the husband meant that the state of being a mother and a wife was deemed the highest achievement, which brought about an ethical stability of sorts, in which all persons knew their place in society.

The perception of women as wives and mothers is intimately related to the Confucian understanding of the two essential principles that govern both the world and the universe: the yin–yang (shady/sunny), and the
Three Obediences and the Four Virtues

nei–wai (inner/outer). Care must be taken to ensure that these principles are not interpreted as mutually exclusive or even oppositional; rather, they are to be seen as complementary opposites, in that the one principle finds completion in the other; nor can the one exist without the other or come into a position of dominance; and both are required to achieve harmony and balance. Whereas the yin–yang principle defines the characteristics of men and women, the nei–wai elaborates the realm in which each of them functions.

The Four Books for Women

It was within this Confucian context that the earliest woman historian of China, Ban Zhao (45–116 CE), composed her small but influential book Lessons for Women, in which she expounded the precept of the Three Obediences and the Four Virtues. The book received wide acclaim and was often entirely memorized by women to serve as a convenient vade mecum (Latin for “manual”) of proper behavior and comportment. The book consists of seven chapters: “Humility,” in which the female is described as being humble by nature; “Husband and Wife,” in which a woman is instructed to do all she can to serve and attend to her husband; “Respect,” in which a man is given the nature of hardness, while a woman is soft and yielding—therefore, a husband and wife are to treat each other with respect; “Female Virtues,” in which the Four Virtues and their benefits are stipulated; “Devotion,” in which a wife is advised to be entirely devoted to her husband; “Obedience,” in which the Three Obediences are outlined and explained; “Harmony among Younger In-Laws,” in which a wife is advised to work towards creating harmony among in-laws that are younger than she, as if she were their mother.

These various moral precepts sought to describe the ideal station for a woman in the world, namely, that of a wife and mother. Wisdom for a woman, therefore, resided in her ability to gain the knowledge that would ensure the achievement of her place in society. In other words, the realm of the woman was the house; that of men was the public sphere. But a woman did not naturally come by such domestic wisdom; she had to be taught it, just as men had to be taught the ways of the world. This brought about a concern to create and establish a system of education for women that would inculcate in them the spirit and willingness to become good mothers and good wives. Indeed, it was argued that just as men brought order into the world, so women brought order into the family and to the house; and an orderly family led to an orderly society. By the time of the latter Ming period (1368–1644), a specialized educational system for women was firmly established. Just as men studied the Four Books (The Analects, The Mencius, The Doctrine of the Great Mean, and The Great Learning), women were provided with their own four books, the first of which is Lessons for Women. The other three are The Women’s Analect by Song Ruoxin, the eldest of the famed Song sisters, in which the proper behavior of a woman is outlined: how she may educate...
herself in womanly virtues, how she is to bring up her children, how she is to treat her husband and her in-laws, and how she is to observe the various religious rituals. Then, there is Domestic Lessons, written by the Empress Xu, wife of the Ming Emperor Ch’engtsu (1360–1424), in which the courtly behavior of women is delineated: the rules of proper conduct, the need for restraint and moderation, and the pursuit of those things that will bring honor in her dealings with those around her. Lastly, there is The Traditions of Exemplary Women, by Liu Xiang (77–6 BCE), in which the traditional Three Guides and the Five Virtues were made relevant to women living in the domestic sphere by way of examples drawn from the past.

The Traditions of Exemplary Women brought about a subgenre of books for women in which the lives of women deemed worthy were recounted, the reading of which would provide tangible examples which other women could imitate in order to become worthy themselves. However, these biographies of sorts do not simply relate the lives of good mothers and wives; rather, they show women involved in the entire breadth of Chinese society. For example, there are women who are both virtuous in the Confucian sense, as well as women who exist outside this traditional definition, namely, demonic and power-hungry women who act for their own benefit and advancement, and women who are skilled in debate, argumentation, and intellectual and cultural activities. Further, these biographies in no way show women to be docile creatures, who submit to the will of fathers, husbands, and then sons; rather, they show women who seek to fulfill their destinies as they will them to be, entirely outside the demands and wishes of men. Thus we read of women admonishing and shaming their husbands into action, of women defiantly mutilating their faces in order to avoid having to marry a man they cannot respect or love. In effect, these biographies seek to define what the realm of a woman is in Chinese society; they do not seek to demarcate that realm. It may even be stated that when we read of such active and engaged women, we are being presented with the various possibilities available to them, rather than simply reading about the reification of the docile and submissive woman. But these examples may also be seen as the chaos that results when a woman does not follow the precepts that have been laid down for her.

Women and Universal Harmony

The Confucian ideal of womanhood was closely related to notions of order and disorder, in that personal behavior reflected universal harmony. Thus, a disobedient woman who acted without virtue created chaos in the sphere assigned to her, namely, the home; this chaos extended outwards to disrupt the world and society. Since women were inseparable from domesticity, they had no right to divorce or separate from a husband. But a husband could divorce his wife if she failed to obey and serve her in-laws, if she bore no son, if she talked too much, if she stole, if she was libidinous, or even if she became ill with some disease. The only time a husband could not divorce his wife was if he had married her when he was poor and had eventually
got rich, if she had given birth within a given year, if she had no family to return to, or if she had officially mourned the passing of one or both of her husband’s parents.

The strength of this tradition is still prevalent in China, despite Maoist teachings to the contrary, and the old adage that men are in charge of external things and women are in charge of internal things is very much part of Chinese society.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


Historical illustration of two Chinese girls caring for their younger siblings. Being a mother and wife was traditionally viewed as the highest achievement a woman could reach.
Tian Han was a founder of the Chinese spoken drama (huaju 话剧) and a prolific writer who produced a large body of plays, operas, and film scripts. His death during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) represented the tragic fate of many Chinese intellectuals caught up in this political upheaval.

A native of Hunan Province, Tian Han followed the trend of his time to study in Japan. During his stay in Japan from 1916 to 1921 Tian discovered the works of many Western dramatists, which inspired him to devote his life to drama. In 1921 he and his fellow students, Guo Moruo 郭沫若 and Yu Dafu 郁达夫, established the Creation Society (Chuangzao She 创造社) to promote romanticism in literature and the arts.

His Early Plays: In Search of the Self

After his return to Shanghai in 1922, Tian Han organized the Southern Drama Society (Nanguo She 南国社), which became an important training school for actors as well as a production company for the performance of modern plays, including Tian’s own works. Representative plays of his early period, Night in a Café (Kafei dian zhi yiye, 咖啡店之夜, 1922), The Night a Tiger Was Captured (Huo hu zhi ye, 获虎之夜, 1924), and Death of a Famous Artist (Mingyou zhi si 名优之死, 1927), all deal with adverse effects of social environment on love and artistic fulfillment. They also reflect Tian’s own search for the meaning of life and art.

His Proletarian Dramas: Art to Serve Politics

His agonized search ended in 1930 with publication of his article “Our Self-Criticism” (Women de ziwo piping 我们的自我批评), in which he criticizes the petty bourgeois sentiments in his and other dramatists’ writings. In the same year he joined the League of Left Wing Writers. These events marked a turning point in his career. The romantic tone of his early plays would be replaced by realism; his belief in art for art’s sake would shift to that of art serving political goals; and his Southern Drama Society would henceforth produce proletarian dramas. During the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside of China as the Second Sino-Japanese War and fought in the context of World War II) Tian Han wrote a number of patriotic plays such as The Song of Beautiful Women (Liren xing 丽人行, 1947), which depicts the suffering of the Chinese people under Japanese occupation. He also tried to reform traditional opera by incorporating...
modern stage techniques and injecting new meaning into old plays. In his Beijing Opera (Jingju, a style of opera known for its spare stage sets evoking the Ming dynasty) adaptation of *The Legend of the White Snake* (*Baishe zhuan* 白蛇传, 1950), for example, the “snake monster” is transformed into a brave young woman who fights for her right to love and happiness.

**His Historical Plays: Using the Past to Criticize the Present**

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Tian Han’s creative output decreased, but he did produce two historical dramas worthy of note: the spoken drama *Guan Hanqing* 关汉卿 (1958) and the Beijing Opera *Xie Yaohuan* 谢瑶环 (1961). The first play tells the story of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) dramatist Guan Hanqing, who wrote the play *Injustice Done to Dou E* (Dou E yuan 拼娥怨) about a young woman wrongly accused of murder by corrupt officials. The courageous Guan who spoke out for the people could be Tian Han’s self-image, and the oppressive rule of the Mongols depicted in the play could also be a reflection of the current situation in China. In *Xie Yaohuan*, Tian Han created another character who dared to speak out for the people—a woman official in the court of Empress Wu Zetian of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE).

Tian Han’s use of the past to criticize the present (*jie gu feng jin 借古讽今*) was, of course, recognized by the authorities. After the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a political campaign launched by Mao Zedong against his enemies, Tian was arrested and died in prison in 1968. Like many other writers and artists who perished during this upheaval, Tian Han became a victim of the Communist revolution that he had supported for forty years.

Shiao-ling YU

**Further Reading**


Tian Shan
Tiānshān 天山

The Tian Shan range, located mainly along the border between China and Kyrgyzstan, is 2,414 kilometers long and covers more than 1 million square kilometers. Oil and gas extraction, mining of nonferrous metals, and tourism are all important industries. The highest point in the range is 7,439 meter Pobeda Peak, famous among mountaineers.

The great arc of the Tian Shan range and its intervening valleys stretches 2,414 kilometers east to west along China’s frontier with Kyrgyzstan and southeastern Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of southwestern China. The range is 320 to 480 kilometers wide and covers 1,036,000 square kilometers. The Pamir ranges lie to the southwest, the Dzungarian and southern Kazakhstan plains lie to the north, and the Tarim Basin lies to the southeast.

A central cluster of tall peaks reaches 7,439 meters on Pobeda Peak, which is also the highest point in Kyrgyzstan and lies on the border with China. The second-highest peak of the Tian Shan is Khan Tengri (Lord of the Spirits). At 7,010 meters it lies on the Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan border. These two peaks are known among mountain climbers as the two most northerly mountains...
of more than 7,000 meters, although whether or not Khan Tengri qualifies as a 7000m peak is a matter of debate: its geographical elevation is 6995m, but its glacial cap brings the peak to 7010m.

At 154 meters below sea level the Turfan Depression is the lowest elevation in the Tian Shan and the lowest point in central Asia. Issyk-Kol, in western Tian Shan, is the ninth-largest lake in the world by volume.

The Silk Roads that linked China and Southwest Asia to the Mediterranean world followed the southern edge of the Tian Shan. To early travelers of the Silk Roads these “heavenly mountains” (tian is Chinese for “sky” or “heaven”) offered an alpine respite from the steppe (a vast, usually level and treeless tract in southeastern Europe or Asia), forests, and glacial lakes. The interior continental location of the Tian Shan produces short, cold winters that are followed by long, hot summers. Winds of Gulf of Arabia and Mediterranean origin bring moisture to the windward western and northwestern slopes (up to 800 millimeters annually) but leave the eastern and interior regions in an arid rain shadow (less than 100 millimeters annually). Common fauna include bear, snow leopard, wolf, fox, wild boar, mountain goat, Manchurian roe, and mountain sheep.

Mount Tian Safari Park, located north of Liumu Lake, covers 63 square kilometers and is part of the Bogeda South Foot Conservation Area. It is home to sixty-nine species of animals. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is considering naming the western Tian Shan to its World Heritage List.

The Kyrgyz people predominate in the western Tian Shan; Uygurs predominate in the eastern Tian Shan. Ethnic Kazakhs, Tajiks, Russians, Chinese, and Tartars also settle the periphery. The economy revolves around irrigated agriculture (in the lowlands) and livestock herding (in the uplands). Oil and gas extraction, mining of nonferrous metals, and tourism are also important.

The eastern Tian Shan contains an autonomous county for Mongols, who remain Buddhists. Sunni Islam

Snow on Mount Tian, 1755, Palace Museum, Beijing. This painting by Hua Yan (sometimes considered one of the Eight Eccentrics of Yangzhou) is reproduced in Three Thousand Years of Chinese Painting.
predominates among the Uygur and Kyrgyz communities, whereas small Russian Orthodox Christian and Jewish communities are settled in and around Ürümqi in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

Stephen F. CUNHA

Further Reading


Tiananmen Square
Tiān’ānmén Guǎngchǎng 天安门广场

Events in Tiananmen Square, at the heart of Beijing, have shaped modern China, and the People’s Republic of China’s sixtieth anniversary celebrations in October 2009 will again bring the world’s attention to the largest public open space in the world. The student protests of 1989, which took place there and elsewhere in China, significantly influenced China’s diplomatic relations with the United States and other nations and continue to symbolize the Chinese government’s determination to control the pace and focus of social change.

Tiananmen Square 天安门广场 is located in the center of Beijing, the capital city of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Originally designed and built in 1651, the square was enlarged fourfold in 1958 to cover 100 acres, making it the biggest public square in the world. It is best known in the West for the “Tiananmen Incident” (Guāng chāng shì wèi 天安门广场示威) of 1989.

The square is named for the Tiananmen Gate (Gate of Heavenly Peace), which is on the northern side of the square. Outside the gate are two marble pillars called the huabiao. The huabiao are said to date back to the sage kings of Yao and Shun in China’s mythical times. Originally wooden, they served as the notice boards, or “wood of direct speech” (jiēbǎng zhī mù), which stood just outside the court for the purpose of soliciting public criticism. They were replaced during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) by stone pillars, eventually becoming elaborately sculpted columns in traditional Chinese architectural style and a common sight on the grounds of imperial palaces. But they still symbolize people’s right to speak up against official injustice.

The Presence of Mao

The posthumous presence of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) is visually and physically prominent at the square. The official portrait of the former chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has hung on Tiananmen Gate since 1949. It is flanked by two slogans: “Long Live The Unity of the Peoples of the World!” and “Long Live The People’s Republic of China!” Mao is also the only permanent resident of the square: In a mausoleum on the south side, the body of Mao lies in a crypt covered in a crystalline sarcophagus surrounded by flowers. The body is retired after public viewing hours to an earthquake-proof chamber deep in the bowels of the square. An Ancestral Hall of the Revolution contains relics of other first-generation revolutionary leaders like Liu Shaoqi (1898–1974), Zhu De (1886–1976), and Zhou Enlai (1898–1976).

In the center of the square, a marble obelisk known as the Monument to the People’s Heroes commemorates those who died for change and revolution in China from 1840 on. Every morning at daybreak a ceremonial guard facing it hoists the five-star red flag of the PRC. To the east, the Museum of History and the Revolution has more often than not been “closed to the public” due to the constant
vacillation of party policy and the rewriting of Chinese history. Instead, it has been used for exhibiting official and avant-garde artwork, contemporary fashion shows, and so forth. To its west is the Great Hall of the People, which, with its ten thousand seats, is the annual meeting site of the National People’s Congress. All major plenums of the CCP and government are held there as well.

The Tiananmen Incident

On 15 April 1989, students gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn the death of reformist CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang. When government officials refused their petitions at the Great Hall of the People, the students clashed with police. The party mouthpiece, People’s Daily, published an editorial on 26 April accusing a “handful of plotters” of creating “turmoil” with the object of overthrowing the regime. The next day, 200,000 students from over forty universities marched to the square in protest. Hundreds, then thousands, of Beijing University students began a hunger strike on 13 May around the Monument to the People’s Heroes. Premier Li Peng (b. 1928) and moderate officials affiliated with General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919), who was later dismissed, failed to defuse the situation before the arrival of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931) for a summit with Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), China’s paramount leader. The welcoming ceremony at the square for Gorbachev was abandoned: Chinese president Yang Shangkun (b. 1907) later gave Beijing’s loss of face and international prestige as one reason for the crackdown. On 20 May, martial law was
declared, but for two weeks the students, now joined by workers, reporters, army personnel, and civil servants—numbering at one point over 2 million—blocked the advance of 150,000 troops toward the city. On 3–4 June, army tanks rolled in, clearing the square and killing an undisclosed number of civilians.

The term “pro-democracy” would oversimplify description of a student-led movement that made a complex set of demands, which included dialogue with the government, crackdown on official corruption, vague political reforms, greater funding for education, a freer press, and so forth. The students used the word “democracy,” but they were short on specifics. They stressed the need to improve the existing system, not to overthrow it. Many acknowledged party leadership and believed that an American-type democracy was unsuitable for China. It may also be argued that they were not sufficiently versed in liberal democratic traditions to represent their interests and aspirations. They did, however, think that by playing to the international news media (over one thousand foreign journalists had converged in Beijing for the Deng-Gorbachev summit), they could gain Western sympathy and thereby advance their cause. This partly explains why, on 30 May, students unveiled the ten-meter-high Goddess of Democracy statue in the square. Ironically, Deng himself had been misled by Premier Li to believe that the demonstrators wanted to overthrow the party government.

This was not the first time Chinese students demonstrated against government policies in the twentieth century, but it was certainly one of the biggest demonstrations and the focus of huge international media attention. The Tiananmen Square protests represented a debate between young, liberal, and progressive-minded students and an older generation of political leaders attempting to maintain control even while considerable economic and social transitions were underway. There were repercussions within the government itself: Some leaders took a more sympathetic approach; others were committed to a strong and swift response, including military action against the students.

In the aftermath of the 1989 incident, the CCP organized Young Pioneers parades to show that the “revolutionary successors to the Communist enterprise” had taken back the square from protestors.

Today Tiananmen Square remains a source of tension for Chinese officials, with a considerable police presence, as it is thought to be a focal point for some activist groups. Security concerns often focus on such events as the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests in June 2009. Western media companies were, after lengthy discussion with Chinese Olympics officials, allowed to broadcast live from the Square during the 2008 Olympic Games. The Square remains, nonetheless, a major tourist attraction and venue for public events.

Anthony Alexander LOH

Further Reading

An ancient system for dating events, *tiangan dizhi* was replaced after the end of the Chinese imperial system by the Gregorian calendar. But some Chinese people still rely on the sixty-year cycle of *tiangan dizhi* to determine where and when to plan events both momentous and mundane in the course of their lives.

*tiangan dizhi* is a cyclical time-measuring system used in China since antiquity. The system juxtaposes two parallel sequences: the sequence of heavenly stems (*tiangan* 天), which consists of ten equal-length named units, and the system of earthly branches (*dizhi* 地支), which consists of twelve equal-length named units. Specifically, the calendrical system identifies major time units, principally a year or a day, by pairing one stem and one branch.

Because of the difference in the number of stems and the number of branches, it takes sixty counts before the original pairing reappears, thus forming the sexagesimal, or sixty-year, cycle in Chinese time reckoning. Enumerated below are the sixty pairings that occur as the heavenly stems, numbered here 1 through 10 for the purpose of illustration, pair with the heavenly branches, coded here A through L for the purpose of illustration. (The actual *tiangan dizhi* system does not use numerals and letters; the system uses Chinese characters to stand for the ten branches and twelve stems.)

1A, 2B, 3C, 4D, 5E, 6F, 7G, 8H, 9I, 10J,
1K, 2L, 3A, 4B, 5C, 6D, 7E, 8F, 9G 10H,
11I, 12J, 13K, 14L, 15A, 16B, 17C, 18D, 19E, 20F,
11G, 12H, 13I, 14J, 15K, 16L, 17A, 18B, 19C, 20D,
11C, 12D, 13E, 14F, 15G, 16H, 17I, 18J, 19K, 20L,
11A (the beginning of a new cycle) …

**History of Tiangan Dizhi**

Scholars generally agree that this sexagesimal system began during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE), when the kings attached the names of the heavenly stems to their personal names. The paired names also appeared on oracle-bone inscriptions (called *jiaguwen*, 甲骨文 which means “words carved on tortoise shells or cattle scapulas” and which were used by Shang kings for divination purposes). The paired names carved on bones were used to indicate the day but not the year when a spiritual quest was to be performed. The late historian Derk Bodde believed that it was not until the Han dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE) that this sexagesimal system was used to date both years and days.

This sequential system had been complicated in the late Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), when other cosmological signs or beliefs were correlated with *tiangan* and *dizhi* to map space and time. The ten heavenly stems were split into the duality of yin and yang: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 belong to yang and 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 belong to yin. The ten heavenly stems were further paired to correlate with the five elements (wuxing, 五行) or the “five movements”—wood bending (1, 2), fire rising (3, 4), soil growing (5, 6), metal molding (7, 8), and water sinking (9, 10)—and the five cardinal
directions—east (1, 2), south (3, 4), center (5, 6), west (7, 8), and north (9, 10).

In the same manner, the twelve earthly branches were categorized into the yin–yang dichotomy: yang—A, C, E, G, I, K; yin—B, D, F, H, J, L. They were further correlated with the twenty-four solar terms (jieqi 氣節) in a solar year, the twelve zodiac animals representing the years (rat, ox, tiger, hare, dragon, serpent, horse, sheep, monkey, rooster, dog, and boar), the twelve lunar months in a year (the Chinese months are called by their numerical order), and, lastly, the twelve two-hour units (shicheng 时辰) in a day.

These two greatly enriched sequences in post–Han China (after 220 CE) thus constituted a composite cosmological order of space-time configuration for interpreting the existence and meanings of ephemeral human lives, from the nature and affairs of the emperor to individual mundane existences. For example, unlike the followers of the lineal Gregorian calendar, which extends from the time of Christ’s alleged birth to infinity and represents a year by a number in sequential order, the Chinese typically chronicled and named years following this sexagesimal cycle of each reign, such that the Gregorian 1840 CE was chronicled as the 1G year of Emperor Daoguang. Besides chronicling the yearly order for the entire state, the court astronomers also determined the auspicious time and place for the emperor to visit, the proper direction of the main gate of the court, the spatial allocation of household furniture—all based on the calculation of this tiangan dizhi system. At the time of the emperor’s death, the court astronomers also prescribed the most auspicious time and location for the funeral, the physical construction of the coffin and the tomb, and the direction of the cemetery.

**Tiangan Dizhi Today**

With the downfall of the imperial court in 1912, the sexagesimal system was replaced with the Gregorian calendar system. Except for respected scholars who still date important events by using the traditional and formal tiangan dizhi names, few people today use tiangan dizhi to name the years.

Other parts of the tiangan dizhi system are better preserved and widely in use in daily life. For instance, people may figure out the unique characteristics of a specific space-time period, or node, and arrange activities (such as scheduling a haircut, launching a new business, taking a trip, and so on) accordingly. This practice has persisted throughout Chinese history, down to the twenty-first century. A newborn baby’s birth characters called shengcheng bazhi (生辰八字 the eight characters of birth)—for the birth year, month, day, and hour—are still carefully recorded according to the designated characteristics of the paired heavenly stems and earthly branches. Fortune-tellers use these eight birth characters to predict the ebb and flow of an individual’s life cycle. It is a common practice for parents to bring the eight birth characters of a prospective bride and groom to a fortune-teller to see if the two sets are compatible. At the time of death, a fortune-teller or a Daoist priest will analyze the eight birth characters of the deceased in order to pick the proper time and location for the funeral.

**Further Reading**


Tianjin 天津

Tianjin is one of the four Chinese municipalities that reports directly to the State Department. It is important for its role as the economic center of China. It is the third largest city in China after Shanghai and Beijing (which it is linked to by a new high-speed rail), and serves as the gateway to the capital city, 120 km away. It is a port city and an economic powerhouse.

Tianjin, China’s third largest city, is one of China’s four province-level municipalities (the others being Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing). It is a relatively young city by Chinese standards. The city received its current name (which translates literally as “ford of heaven”) from the Ming emperor Zhu Di (r. 1403-1424), who marched through the area with his army on his way south to dethrone his nephew in 1400 CE. To commemorate that auspicious event, Zhu created a walled garrison next to a settlement called Zhigu in 1404, bestowing on the new walled city the name Tianjin. Located at the confluence of the many navigable rivers of the North China Plain, the Grand Canal, and the Haihe, which drains into the Bohai Gulf (an arm of the Yellow Sea), the city’s commerce began to prosper.

Tax collectors soon followed, joined by the Changlu commissioner and his sprawling bureaucracy, who supervised the production, collection, transportation, and distribution of salt as a state monopoly and were responsible for the collection of the gabelle (salt tax), a major source of revenue for the central government behind land tax. Wealthy salt merchants were joined by traders importing goods from central and south China through a vibrant coastal junk trade, as well as by native bankers specializing in long distance remittance banking.

Recognizing Tianjin’s economic importance, the city was promoted in 1725 from a guard station to a department and became the seat of Tianjin Prefecture in 1731. By the nineteenth century, if not earlier, the city served as the economic center of north China (as opposed to Beijing’s cultural and political centrality), with a commercial hinterland that stretched from the coastal plain over the Taihang Mountains and into the steppes beyond.

The arrival of foreign imperialism altered Tianjin’s developmental path. In the aftermath of the Second Opium War (1858–1860), the city was declared a treaty port, and foreign concessions were established. The city suffered xenophobic incidents such as the Tianjin Massacre in 1870, during which foreigner missionaries and residents were killed, and the Boxer movement in 1900 which resulted in the occupation of the city by the Allied Expeditionary Force until 1902.

In the aftermath of the destruction, Chinese reformers began to promote industrial development and modernization, stimulating Tianjin’s early industrialization, led by the Beiyang arsenal, the telegraph service, and flour and cotton-spinning mills, and followed by heavy industries such as the Kailuan Mining Administration and Yongli Chemical Industries. Before the Second World War, the city was the country’s third largest industrial center (after Shanghai and Wuhan) and the largest in...
north China, while serving as the provincial capital for Hebei Province.

Under Beijing’s shadow, after 1949, the role of Tianjin changed yet again. State investment largely bypassed Tianjin, while the city served the capital as a transportation hub with railroad and ocean links. The post-Mao economic reforms created an even larger gap between the city and growth centers such as Shanghai, Canton, and Shenzhen.

The 2006 master plan for the city finally made it the core of the Bohai economic region. With the construction of a high-speed rail link between Tianjin and Beijing, Tianjin and the capital are becoming one, supported by a ring of cities to form a circum-Bohai economic region. In 2008, the central government authorized Tianjin as the site for new land use and financial policies. Utilizing the new high-speed rail, it served as a venue of soccer events for the 2008 Beijing Olympics at the newly created
Tianjin Olympic Center Stadium, and has become a host city for many international conferences. A new exchange for over-the-counter (OTC) trading of equity securities and corporate bonds, together with direct access to the Hong Kong stock market, ensured that the city would reclaim its place as the economic center of north China, while Beijing would continue as the political and cultural center of the country.

KWAN Man Bun

Further Reading


The first truly Chinese school of Buddhist thought, Tiantai, was founded in the sixth century. With its Chinese perspective on an Indian religion, Tiantai spread through East Asia, establishing itself in Japan and Korea.

Geographically, Tiantai refers to a mountain as well as a mountain range in Zhejiang Province; historically, this mountain became home to a school of thought that came to revolutionize Buddhism in China, imbuing it with a uniquely Sinitic approach that broke away from a continued dependence upon India as the place of authority for all things Buddhist. Therefore, Tiantai philosophy gave the Far East (China as well as Japan and Korea) its own form of Buddhism.

The infiltration of Buddhism into China depended on the sporadic appearance of texts and traditions retrieved by travelers to India. Consequently, the result was a plethora of teaching and practices that were both divergent and even at times contradictory. For example, some prescribed strict observance of rituals, others denied such practices entirely. More importantly, however, the Chinese worldview was most unlike the Indian Buddhist one, for the former gave eminence to the development and nurturing of the individual and the body while the Indian view regarded the body and the person as only a brief illusion. In effect, China was strongly Confucian and Daoist; that is, Chinese culture was intensely “humanistic,” concerned with understanding how to live in the world and how to achieve a just society through good governance. Buddhism, on the other hand, was antihumanistic; for it cared for neither of these things and privileged the search for nonexistence as the chief end of human existence; the body was a barrier that needed to be overcome in order for the soul to be free from suffering. Thus, the real source of the varieties and disparities of Buddhism in China was the result not only of divergent texts, but also of divergent cultures. China was not northern India, and the process of inculcating Buddhism was not simply a matter of transplanting what had worked in India and Central Asia. The process of translation of an entire worldview required the creation of a new set of ideas and ideals. Indeed, translation is not only a linguistic act, it is also a philosophical one.

It was the monk and philosopher Zhiyi (538–597 CE), who came to a Buddhist retreat at Tiantai Mountain around the year 587 and began to address the twin problems facing Buddhism this far from its place of origin: First, how to make the faith relevant to China, and second, how to synthesize and unify Buddhist teachings so there would not be confusion and disparity.

The immediate need was for synthesis, and Zhiyi took an innovative approach. Rather than seeking to refute each and every text that contradicted another, he instead provided a methodology to understand the contradictions, and he did not deny that the Buddha himself was the source of these contradictions. In this way, Zhiyi avoided creating conflict among the various followers of these contradictory traditions, each of whom believed in the verity of what they taught and practiced. He stated that the various approaches, texts, and scriptures found in the China of his time were certainly teachings of the
Buddha, but they were only partial ones, because over his lifetime the Buddha realized that a person could not encompass the entirety of the enlightenment process in one attempt; rather she or he had to achieve this state gradually. Therefore, each of the many teachings and texts that appeared contradictory were in fact small steps towards enlightenment; or in the words of his famous dictum, “All was One, and One was All.” In effect, the model he used was that of the student who proceeds from an initial, preparatory stage, to a beginning stage, to a middle stage, and finally to an advanced one. The many teachings represented each of these stages, and each was important for it brought the student to the highest, most accomplished state. Once this highest state was reached, the student had no more need for the other stages. Thus, each stage was utilitarian and not complete in itself. Accordingly, the many teachings would ultimately be abandoned once they had fulfilled their function. Truth, implied Zhiyi, is revealed a little at a time; once it is known in its fullness, partiality or semi-concealment is no longer possible. For example, the experience of reading a book for the first time can only be undertaken once, a page at a time. Once the book is entirely read, nothing remains hidden. This is what Tiantai philosophy refers to as “Round Teachings,” or that approach which encompasses everything so there is no room for contradiction or conflict.

For Zhiyi, the highest state of all was explained in one text only, the Lotus Sutra, which is a very significant Mahayana sutra that takes the form of a dialog with the Buddha and which consists of parables that seek to explain skillful means, or those skills through which an individual may terminate suffering and also acquire the ability to teach others in the path of the Buddha. It became the central work for Tiantai philosophy. The purpose of this sutra is to expound on the nature and purpose of those means that will allow a person to reach the highest state, that is, the end of personal suffering. Importantly for Zhiyi, the suta also hints at the notion that the teaching found in it replaces all other Buddhist teachings. This brought authority to Zhiyi’s notion of the various stages.

Further, Zhiyi gave precision to the definition of phenomena, or, things that are observed. He saw their nature as threefold: Things are empty because they contain nothing intrinsically their own; things exist solely because they are the result of external causes and are therefore impermanent; and things are middle, meaning that things are both empty and temporary, and thus their true reality is ultimately unknowable. This epistemology led Zhiyi to conclude that each phenomenon is one with true emptiness (the state of being devoid of absolute identity, the complete lack of permanence, the entire erasure of the self). And on a more pragmatic level, he found room for all activity; even deluded thoughts are initial, preparatory steps towards achieving enlightenment. This guided Zhiyi to formulate various methods of contemplation or meditation to allow the individual to observe his or her mind in order to continue climbing upwards into enlightenment.

This approach makes Tiantai philosophy uniquely Chinese and forever ruptures its connection to India. By equating things to provisional instances of enlightenment, the phenomenal world acquires significance and this in turn leads to a uniquely Chinese Buddhist position: The erasure of the self is not self-negation but the acquisition of bliss, permanence, and purity. Perhaps it may even be said that in China the purpose of meditation is to confront the world and seek to solve its problems because the process is a step towards enlightenment. This broadening of perspective allowed Buddhism to extend easily throughout China and into Japan and Korea. Tiantai is still important in China, but in Korea and Japan it has lost its Chinese perspective and has been made more indigenous, such as Nichiren Buddhism in Japan.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading
From the Lotus Sutra

The Lotus Sutra is by far the most popular and influential of Mahayana scriptures. This excerpt translated by Kumarajiva in 406 CE illustrates one of the main doctrines of the text: that the Lotus Sutra itself embodies the Buddha’s truth.

At that time Sakyamuni Buddha saw the Buddhas that were his emanations all assembled, each sitting on a lion seat, and heard all these Buddhas say that they wished to participate in the opening of the treasure tower . . .

Sakyamuni Buddha with the fingers of his right hand then opened the door of the tower of seven treasures. A loud sound issued from it, like the sound of a lock and crossbar being removed from a great city gate, and at once all the members of the assembly caught sight of Many Treasures Thus Come One seated on a lion seat inside the treasure tower, his body whole and unimpaired, sitting as though engaged in meditation. And they heard him say, “Excellent, excellent, Sakyamuni Buddha! You have preached this Lotus Sutra in a spirited manner. I have come here in order that I may here this sutra.

At that time the four kinds of believers, observing the Buddha who had passed into extinction immeasurable thousands, ten thousands, millions of kalpas in the past speaking in this way, marveled at what they had never known before and took the masses of heavenly jeweled flowers and scattered them over Many Treasures Buddha and Sakyamuni Buddha.


Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region
Xīzàng Zìzhìqū 西藏自治区
2.84 million est. 2007 pop. (this figure is debatable) 1.22 million square km

Tibet—“the Roof of the World”—is one of China’s five autonomous regions. A distinction is made between “political” Tibet, the area governed by the Lhasa government before 1950, and “ethnic” or “cultural” Tibet, the area inhabited by mainly Buddhist people of Tibetan origin. Tibet has been the focus of international attention because of calls for increased autonomy or independence, and at the same is being developed as an international tourist destination.

Tibet—since 1965 officially known as the Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region (TAR)—is made up of the central Asian landmass between the Kunlun mountain range to the north, the Himalayan Mountains to the south, and the Karakoram range to the west. It is one of China’s five autonomous regions (areas dominated by one or more of China’s fifty-five officially recognized minority ethnic groups: in this case, the Zang people).

On the east Tibet is bounded by a region of three great rivers: the Yangzi (Chang), Mekong, and Salween. With most of its territory located above 4,500 meters and its capital, Lhasa, located at 3,607 meters, Tibet has been called “the Roof of the World.” The total Tibetan population remains uncertain, and is a highly-politicized issue, particularly given the movement of Han Chinese into the TAR over the last five decades. While around 130,000 Tibetans live in exile in India and elsewhere, estimates of the Tibetan-speaking population of China range between 2 and 5 million.

Although the degree to which Tibet was a part of China in earlier eras is disputed, Tibet certainly has been a part of China since the Chinese Communist invasion in 1950 and exists today only in the much-reduced area of the TAR. A Tibetan government-in-exile, headed by the Dalai Lama (the spiritual and temporal leader of the Tibetan people), has been established in India, and significant Tibetan exile communities exist in the United States and Switzerland. The Tibetan government in exile continues to campaign for self-determination for Tibet, and the ongoing Sino-Tibetan dispute invests facts and figures regarding Tibet with political implications. However, a distinction historically has been made between “political” Tibet, the area governed by the Lhasa government before 1950, and “ethnic” or “cultural” Tibet, the area inhabited by mainly Buddhist people of Tibetan origin.

Geographic Features

“Political” Tibet had an estimated population of 1.8–3 million, around half of whom were seminomadic yak herders. The settled urban and agricultural populations were concentrated in the river valleys, particularly in the triangle formed by the major settlements of Lhasa, Gyantse, and Shigatse (Xigaze). Today the TAR population includes a large number of Han Chinese immigrants, and with the
completion of a railroad connecting Lhasa with other Chinese cities, the Han Chinese are now believed to form a majority of the Lhasa population.

Although Tibet is located at a latitude similar to that of Algeria, the location and altitude of the Tibetan plateau produces a cold and generally dry climate, although southeastern Tibet includes tropical jungle. The western Tibetan area around the Gangdise (Kailas) mountain range and Lake Mapam Yumco (Manasarowar) is the source of four great rivers: the Indus, Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Sutlej. Mount Everest, located on the Tibet-Nepal border, at 8,848 meters is the world’s highest mountain.

Tibet’s climate limits its sedentary agriculture. Barley is the major crop and, in its roasted form as tsampa, comprises, along with yak meat and tea (a traditional import from Sichuan and other parts of China), the staple diet of most of the Tibetan population.

**Origins**

The origins of the Tibetan peoples appear to be linked to central Asian nomadic tribes such as the Yue Zhi (Tokharians) and Qiang. The first unified Tibetan state was a tribal confederacy formed in the seventh century under the rule of King Songtsen Gampo (or Srong-brtsan Sgam-po (c. 608–650 CE), who established his capital at Lhasa. The introduction of a Tibetan script and Buddhist teachings is among the innovations attributed to his reign. His dynasty lasted until the assassination of King Langdharma around the year 842.

During this period Tibet was a formidable military power, constantly warring with neighboring powers and strong enough to sack the Chinese capital of Xi’an in 763. At its zenith the Tibetan empire reached as far west as Samarqand in modern-day Uzbekistan. Buddhism became
increasingly important, particularly in the court, and the first monastery in Tibet was established at Samye around 779. However, there was considerable opposition to the new religion among aristocratic factions associated with followers of the indigenous Tibetan belief system, which was later identified with the Bon faith but probably at that time was an unsystematized tradition that included elements of divine kingship and sacrifice.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries Buddhism became firmly established when Indian Buddhist texts were translated into the Tibetan language. Of the four major sects of Tibetan Buddhism that developed on the basis of these teachings, the Gelugpa sect eventually emerged as prominent, and from the sixteenth century onward Tibet was ruled by a line of incarnate Gelugpa monks with the title of “Dalai Lama.” Religious factions in Tibet tended to seek Mongol or Chinese patronage, and in the eighteenth century China became increasingly involved in events in Tibet. Thus, from 1793 until 1911–1912 China exerted at least nominal suzerainty (dominion) over Lhasa.
The British imperial government of India in 1903–1904 dispatched a mission to Lhasa that forced Tibetans to accept British representatives and effectively opened the country to Western influences. However, despite some modernization during the next couple of decades, Tibet remained an essentially conservative religious society and strongly resisted change. The thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876–1933), a strong nationalist leader, led Tibet to independence after the Chinese revolution in 1911, and Tibet survived as a de facto independent state until the Communist Chinese invasion in 1950. However, its independence was not officially recognized by any major powers, with China continuing to claim Tibet.

**Society**

In spite of the continuing existence of the Bon faith and its many cultural manifestations, the outstanding feature of Tibetan culture generally is considered to be its unique...
form of Buddhism, a synthesis of the Mahayana and Tantric forms of the faith. Buddhism influenced virtually all aspects of traditional society. An estimated 20 percent (although some estimates place the figure as high as 50 percent) of the male population were monks, and more than six thousand monasteries were located throughout the Tibetan cultural world. These were important economic and political centers as well as guardians of Tibetan artistic and cultural expression. Aside from the monasteries, pilgrimage to sacred cities and mountains was an especially significant religious expression for all classes of people.

A small aristocratic class enjoyed considerable privilege, although the Tibetan peasantry, in comparison with their contemporaries in neighboring states, were tolerably well treated. Women also enjoyed greater-than-average freedom, particularly in the economic and social spheres, although they were almost entirely excluded from religious power.

Cultural influences from both India and China were present, but Tibetan culture was strikingly distinct from the culture of its neighbors. This was particularly true in such areas as literary traditions (in particular the Gesar of Ling epic), language, and art and architecture, with buildings such as Lhasa's Potala Palace and Jokhang Temple, as well as the regional monasteries, being of striking originality. Some of this culture has been destroyed in the TAR, but much is remembered or preserved in exile, and the Chinese government has in recent years focused on developing Tibet as a domestic and international tourist destination. The Qinghai-Tibet railway links the Tibetan capital of Lhasa with Beijing and is the world's highest railway line, with nearly 1000 km of track at an altitude of more than 4,000 meters above sea level.

Alex McKay

Further Reading


Tibetan Uprising of 1959

1959 nián Xīzàng Qìyì 1959 年西藏起义

In 1959 Tibet, now an autonomous region of China, revolted against Chinese rule. Many Chinese were surprised when they were not welcomed as liberators following the 1949–1950 invasion, viewing their takeover of Tibet as succor from a feudalist system. The Tibetans were greatly outnumbered and ill-equipped for revolt. Their uprising was crushed, and the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual and temporal leader, was forced to flee to India.

The status of Tibet, located in southwestern China, has long been disputed. Tibet enjoyed de facto, if not legally recognized, independence during the era of Republican China (1912–1949), but the Chinese, in their period of turmoil, oddly claimed that Tibet was still part of their territory and that the Tibetans were one of the “five races” that made up China. They continued to claim Tibet as part of China in such forums as the Simla Convention of 1914—at which British India and Tibet agreed on the Indo-Tibetan frontier and various trade issues, but China’s participants refused to sign—and at the 1922 Washington conference, a meeting between nine nations to decide post–World War I policy in the Far East.

The Communist takeover in China in October 1949 was an obvious threat to Tibetan self-determination because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976), was prepared to use military force to take over Tibet, for Mao, like his Republican predecessors, considered Tibet to be a part of China lost as a result of the actions of the European imperial powers. During 1949–1950, Communist forces took over Tibetan-speaking areas such as Amdo, and gathered on the frontiers of the Lhasa-controlled regions of Kham (eastern Tibet). After attempts to arrange negotiations on neutral territory failed, in October 1950 Chinese military forces invaded Tibet from the north-east and east and quickly conquered the largely demilitarized Tibetan state after the commander of their garrison at Chamdo, Ngawang Jigme Ngapo, fled and was captured by the Chinese.

During the 1950s China applied with increasing force policies designed to transform traditional Tibetan society and to integrate Tibet into the Communist system. As a result, Tibetan resistance to the assault on their culture and religion quickly increased, culminating in the nationalist revolt of 1959. However, the Tibetans were greatly outnumbered and ill equipped for armed conflict. Their resistance was crushed, and the fourteenth Dalai Lama (b. 1935), Tibetan spiritual and temporal leader, was forced to flee into exile in India. Since then China has continued to rule Tibet by military force, and the Dalai Lama, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, remains leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile in northern India.

Events of 1950–1958

In January 1950, when India formally recognized the new Communist government in Beijing, China informed India of its plans to peacefully “liberate” Tibet from its
traditional monastic rulers and from foreign powers. To the Communists the Tibetans were an oppressed people living at the mercy of a feudal elite, and the Chinese expected to be welcomed as liberators. When Sino-Tibetan negotiations failed, China launched a full-scale military invasion of Tibet on 7 October 1950. An appeal by El Salvador on behalf of the Tibetan Government-in-exile to the United Nations went unanswered because of Tibet’s ambiguous status under international law. Tibet had an army of only eight thousand men, and within days Chamdo, the main Tibetan administrative center in Kham Province, fell to the invaders.

Kham was home of the Tibetan-speaking Khampa peoples, who, although loyal to the Dalai Lama as head of their Tibetan Buddhist faith, had considerable autonomy and did not necessarily view themselves as subjects of either Lhasa or Beijing. The Khampas had a strong martial tradition, and Kham became the center of armed opposition to China.

After the invasion by China the Tibetan National Assembly asked that the young Dalai Lama assume full secular power in Tibet several years earlier than planned. Meanwhile, China forced a Tibetan delegation to sign the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951 (known as the “Seventeen Point Agreement”), by which Beijing absorbed Tibet into its territory. China soon breached guarantees of Tibetan autonomy and religious freedoms in that agreement as China began to absorb the Tibetan administration and to usurp functions of the Tibetan government. Chinese soldiers and settlers moved into Tibet in increasing numbers, especially after completion of a drivable road to Lhasa through eastern Tibet in 1954. Many Chinese Communists had sincerely expected to be greeted as liberators by the people they saw as feudal masses; they were surprised by Tibetan opposition to China.

In 1954 the Dalai Lama went to Beijing, where he met Mao Zedong, and in 1956 the Dalai Lama was allowed to travel to India for celebrations of the 2,500th anniversary of the enlightenment of the Buddha. While he was there the Indian government advised him to accept Chinese control of Tibet, and, with China hinting at compromise, the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet hoping to reach a solution through discussion with the Communist leadership.

The years 1955 and 1956 brought a quick acceleration of the transition to Communism throughout China, climaxing in the disastrous Great Leap Forward policy in 1958. Tibet experienced an accelerated program of collectivization, the widespread institution of “class struggle,” especially against monastic authorities, and attempts made to render the large Tibetan nomadic population sedentary.

These Chinese policies triggered a strong reaction by Tibetans. By 1956 a guerrilla movement, the Chushi Gandruk (Four Rivers, Six Ranges) was active in eastern Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s policy of nonviolence meant he was not able to offer his personal support to the guerrillas, and he continued to attempt to mediate a peaceful solution to the crisis until his departure from Tibet. However, many elements of the Tibetan government supported the guerrillas, who were then defending primarily Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan social system rather than explicitly trying to create a nationalist movement.

Tibet’s resistance to the Chinese Communists attracted the intention of the intelligence services of various countries, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By 1958 CIA aid began to reach the guerrillas.

Uprising and Exile

By 1959 the turmoil in eastern Tibet had created a sizable influx of refugees entering Lhasa, which worsened food shortages created by the large numbers of Chinese troops stationed there. By early March of 1959 the population of Lhasa was further increased by the large crowds who gathered for the Monlam Chenmo (Tibetan New Year) celebration, traditionally an unruly period when the monastic powers dominated the secular structures of state.

Contributing to the instability in Lhasa was an invitation to attend a theater performance issued to the Dalai Lama by the Chinese military commander in Lhasa. On 9 March the Dalai Lama was instructed by the Chinese to come to the military barracks the next day without his usual armed escort. The Tibetan public interpreted his invitation as a Chinese attempt to seize the Dalai Lama.

A crowd estimated at thirty thousand people (Lhasa’s population in 1950 was around twenty thousand) gathered around Norbu Lingka, the Dalai Lama’s summer palace. The primary goal of the crowd was to prevent the Dalai Lama from accepting the Chinese invitation, but the apparently spontaneous demonstration took on
a nationalist character as the crowd also began to protest Chinese presence in Lhasa and to demand Tibetan independence. A showdown became inevitable.

On 17 March Chinese troops fired artillery shells into the grounds of the Norbu Lingka, apparently in an attempt to frighten the Tibetans into submission. That night a plan was put into operation whereby the Dalai Lama, disguised as a Tibetan soldier, was smuggled out of the palace. His escape was kept secret for several days, and with a small group of supporters he traveled south through the mountains to India. Eighty to a hundred thousand Tibetans joined him in India, and a Tibetan government-in-exile was established at Dharmsala in northern India.

Meanwhile, in Lhasa the Chinese began a full-scale military crackdown. Exact figures are difficult to ascertain, but thousands of Tibetans were killed or executed, with Chinese army intelligence reports admitting that Chinese forces “eliminated” 87,000 of their opponents in Lhasa and surrounding areas in March–October 1959 alone.

Forgotten Footnote

The Communist invasion of Tibet stimulated a sense of Tibetan national identity, and in the eyes of Tibetans and much of the world, the uprising of March 1959 was a nationalist uprising against the rule of a foreign power. Tibetan resistance subsequently coalesced around the Dalai Lama, whose insistence on nonviolent resistance has meant that armed Tibetan resistance to China has been largely forgotten. The uprising of 1959 remains a historical division between traditional and modern Tibet and with events in 1989 and 2008 is often referred to by those who are involved in campaigns for Tibetan autonomy or independence.

Alex McKay

Further Reading

Living in the highest mountainous region in the world, the Zang people of Tibet arrived from India over two thousand years ago. Numbering around 5.4 million people in the 2000 census, they are one of China’s fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minority groups.

The Zang ethnic minority of China, or Tibetans, mainly live in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. Their population in the 2000 census was around 5.4 million, although statistics can be unreliable. The Zang’s ancestors, known as Ch’iang, were nomads from India who herded sheep and cattle. They moved westward, climbing the Himalayan mountain chain along the Yarlung Zangbo River over 2,000 years ago. Zang live in the highest mountainous region in the world, about 7,000 meters above sea level, which is remote and inaccessible, with virtually uninhabited high mountains and plains of intense cold, and abundant mineral resources.

Zang people developed two basic ways of life: one agricultural, settled in the warmer river valleys, and the other nomadic, which spread north and east into mountainous steppe grasslands also inhabited by Mongolian tribes.

Today Zang people live in three main regions: U-Tsang (west and central Tibet), Kham (Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces), and Amdo (northeast and Gansu Province), and speak regional dialects of a Tibeto-Burman non-tonal language. They have their own writing system, based on the Devanagari script similar to Sanskrit, which was developed in the 600s under the great Tibetan warrior king Srong-btsan sGam-po (620–650? CE) who unified the country. He is credited with introducing Buddhism to Tibet and building the Jo-Khang temple in the capital of Lhasa, influenced by Nepalese and Chinese
Tibetans (Zang) - Xizànggrén - 西藏人

wives. The Chinese Princess Wencheng cemented an alliance with the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE).

Zang have been known for their great devotion to religion. Tibetan Buddhism or tantric lamaism is a mixture of Mahayana Buddhism and the Tibetan nativist religion of Bon, a kind of animistic shamanism. It has a number of schools emphasizing different traditions, and, until the era of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), many Tibetan males (estimates vary between 20 and 50 percent of the male population) lived as monks in thousands of monasteries. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) it is claimed that 6000 monasteries were destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of religious killed or forcibly laicized. In recent decades, the government of the PRC has rebuilt many of the destroyed monasteries and permitted some monks to return.

The Tibetan kingdom from the 660s to 1200 was powerful and independent until the rise of the Mongols. After envoys of Chinggis Khan (1162–1227) demanded Tibetan submission in 1207, the Mongols and the Tibetan Buddhist sect of Sa-skya developed a Patron-Priest relationship with the Mongolian army installing its grand lama as the religious leader of Tibet in exchange for support of Mongolian military and political power in Tibet. The ṢPhags-pa Lama (1235–1280) became the tutor of Khubilai Khan (1215–1294), who introduced Tibetan lamaism to his court during the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368). With the end of Mongol rule in China, Tibet degenerated into political and religious turmoil.

Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419) was a great Buddhist reformer who established the dGe-lugs-pa (“Yellow Hat”) sect of reincarnating lamas. The highest reincarnation was called the Dalai Lama. This system rose to religious and then political supremacy in Tibet through the support of Western Mongol leaders, particularly Altan Khan (1507–1582), who created the title of Dalai Lama and renewed the Patron-Priest alliance between Tibet and Mongolia of Khubilai’s period that competed against the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). A Mongol army invaded Lhasa to install the 5th Dalai Lama (1617–1682), the first to combine religious and secular power in Tibet and the builder of the Potala Palace (the largest structure in Tibet). During the Manchu Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), Tibet closed itself off from foreigners, who were not allowed to enter the capital of Lhasa under pain of death. In 1720s the Kham and Amdo regions of Tibet were incorporated into the Qing Empire and Chinese high commissioners (ambans) were posted in Lhasa. The Qing emperors financially supported lamaism and engineered the selection of the Dalai Lamas by the drawing of lots in Beijing.

The twentieth century was a turbulent one for the Zang. The British Younghusband expedition of 1904 invaded...
Tibet to temporarily occupy Lhasa. Chinese armies invaded in 1905 and in 1910, but retreated during the decades of civil war and Japanese invasion, although neither the Republic of China nor the PRC ever renounced claim to control over Tibet. In 1951 Tibetan and PRC authorities signed an agreement affirming Chinese sovereignty. In 1959 an anti-Chinese rebellion spread to Lhasa and the 14th Dalai Lama (b. 1935) fled to Dharamsala in north India where he still lives with his government in exile; in 1989 the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1965 U-Tsang and western Kham were made an autonomous region, monastic estates were disbanded, and secular education introduced. The regional government today includes Han Chinese as well as members of the Zang ethnicity. Since 1980, economic development has accelerated, most religious freedoms have been restored, and Tibet has been opened up for tourism, although the situation of the Zang is a sensitive issue for the PRC and the outside world, and violent demonstrations are not uncommon.

Tibetan culture and customs are unique. Its Buddhist iconography, epitomized by thankha painting, is vividly colored with elaborate religious representation. The palace and temple architecture consists of massive wooden structures with flat roofs and multiple windows, and ornate interiors. Homes are made from rocks, wood, and cement, while nomads live in yak-hide tents. Zang men and women have plaited hair. Women wear long-sleeved wrapped gowns over white blouses with colorfully stripped woolen aprons, while nomadic men wear trousers covered by a long-sleeved gown. Zang often exchange khatas, a long, usually white, ceremonial silk scarf.

Tibetan cuisine is distinctive, utilizing the main agriculture crop, barley. Tsampa, the main staple of Tibetan cuisine, is barley flour that is roasted and rolled into dough; barley is also made into meat-filled dumplings called momo. Yak, goat, and mutton meat, cheese, yogurt, and buttered milk-tea are common. Tibetan wool rugs, a Tibetan calendar, and Tibetan medicine are renowned. Zang celebrate many religious festivals and the Tibetan New Year’s festival.

Alicia CAMPI

Further Reading
Once a royal symbol of war, tigers have become a casualty of both traditional Chinese medicine and environmental destruction in modern China, fading into extinction. The most endangered species of tiger, the South China Tiger, has not been spotted in the wild since the 1960s, and only a few dozen survive in captivity, making it “functionally extinct.”

Deeply ingrained in Chinese culture as a fierce symbol of war, tigers were, for millennia, the emblems of the highest ministers of defense in China, second only to the dragon and the phoenix of the emperor and empress. The Asian equivalent of the lion as the “king of the jungle,” the strong and elegant tiger has also been an important icon as the White Tiger of the West, one of the Four Constellations of Chinese astronomy, and a prevalent image in Buddhist lore and martial arts such as Shaolin.

Although the Indochinese tiger (Panthera tigris corbetti) is found in China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Vietnam (the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources estimates that only 630 survive), the South China or Amoy Tiger (Panthera tigris amoyensis), is the indigenous species with which most Chinese relate. With no official sighting since 1964, the Amoy has faded into “functional extinction” since the 1950s, when at least four thousand

A paper cut-out depicting Wu Sung, the folk hero from the famous Chinese novel Water Margin, who was revered for killing the tiger that had terrified the people living on Mount Ching Yang.
remained in the wild forests and grasslands of central and southeastern China. Now one of the world’s ten most endangered animals, the dilemma of the South China tiger is three-fold: first, the dried bone of the tiger has been a coveted ingredient in Chinese traditional medicine (TCM) for thousands of years; second, agricultural expansion has put it at odds with farmers and herders upon whose cattle, pigs and goats it naturally preys, qualifying it as an official “pest” in the anti-pest campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s; and third, China’s burgeoning population has converted much of its wooded habitat and previous range. By 1982 it was estimated that only 200–300 of these tigers remained; domestic trade of traditional medicines and “tiger wines” made from tiger bones was outlawed in China in 1993. Other preservation efforts have included the establishment of nature reserves by China’s State Forestry Administration in the 1990s. Nevertheless, by 1996 the Amoy tiger population had been reduced to less than one hundred animals, with less than fifty in the wild. Today, about sixty-five individuals live in zoos and on breeding preserves, all located within China. However, since 2002 an organization called Save China’s Tigers has sponsored a project in coordination with the Chinese government in which several Amoy have been exported to a South African preserve, with some breeding success. The hope is that a wild population can be developed there for eventual repatriation to China. But some genetic research suggests that all of these captive tigers are descended from only a few animals, making the genetic pool too small to prevent eventual attrition from inbreeding.

The South China Tiger (Panthera tigris amoyensis) is thought to be the original “stem” tiger from which all tiger subspecies evolved, and it is considerably smaller than its Siberian cousins. In addition to wild populations which some scientists and farmers insist still exist, it is as endangered as the panda and even more of an historic cultural symbol. Yesterday the tiger embodied China’s fierce power of conquest, and today it is an emblem of China’s modern environmental controversy.

Nicole MUCHMORE

Further Reading

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Tofu

Dòufu 豆腐

The Chinese food staple tofu, made from soybeans, is ancient. The discovery of how to process soybeans in order to derive food value from them was a breakthrough in human nutrition.

Scholars are not sure when the food tofu was first made, but the technology was well known in China by early medieval times and possibly as early as the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Scholars have cited imitation of cheese making in the Altaic region—between Mongolia and China and between Kazakhstan and Russia—as one possible source of the technology. Regardless, one of the great breakthroughs in human nutrition was the discovery of how to process soybeans, which are difficult to digest, into nutritious tofu (doufu). To make tofu one soaks soybeans overnight, grinding them finely with water, boiling them into a slurry, and filtering the slurry to produce soy milk. The milk can then be precipitated (caused to separate from solution or suspension) using settlers, commonly magnesium salts, and pressed into slabs.

Recently tofu has become a staple of Chinese cooking as a readily available and inexpensive source of protein. Tofu is less well represented in early recipe books, but this status might be because of tofu’s common origins. Other tofu products include the fermented choudoufu (“stinking bean curd,” an acquired taste) and the “skin” (doufupi), which is skimmed off and dried.

Paul D. BUELL

Further Reading


Tofu (bean curd) serves as a protein-rich meat substitute, and is an inexpensive and popular staple of Chinese cuisine. PHOTO BY J. SAMUEL BURNER.
**Tongdian**

**Tongdian** 通典

_Tongdian_ 通典 is an encyclopedia compiled in the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE) by the prominent scholar-official Du You 杜佑 (735–812 CE). A survey of the social, political and cultural institutions of Chinese history, the _Tongdian_ served as a longstanding model for the compilation of Chinese encyclopedias.

The _Tongdian_ (Survey of Institutions) is an historical encyclopedia of two hundred chapters that was presented to the court in 801 by Du You (735–812 CE). Widely revered for his broad learning, Du was a successful official and influential figure in politics of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), serving mostly in provincial posts with occasional appointments in the central administration. Drawing upon a wide range of sources for his compilation, Du took thirty-six years to complete the _Tongdian_.

During this period the empire partially recovered after the disastrous An Lushan Rebellion (755–763 CE), an era of great cultural and intellectual foment. Scholars such as Du You felt that a considered analysis of the social, political, and cultural institutions of Chinese history was crucial to understanding and addressing the challenges of his era. In his writings Du You held to the traditional Confucian view that the past serves as a guide for the present. In a rather non-Confucian stance, however, Du argued that the emulation of high antiquity is insufficient and that social and political institutions need to change with the times. Only by carefully examining the evolution of human institutions in history can proper administrative practices be determined. The _Tongdian_ reflected these concerns and was designed as a broad reference guide for the scholar-officials of the realm.

The _Tongdian_ is composed of quotations from varied sources, arranged in topical order, and punctuated with the compiler's own comments and observations. The materials included traced the institutions from the dawn of Chinese history up to the Tianbao reign (742–755) of the Tang dynasty, just before the An Lushan Rebellion. Du You intermittently added comments about changes made between that time and his own day. The inspiration for the _Tongdian_ was an earlier work, the thirty-five-chapter _Zhengdian_ (Institutions of Governance), compiled by Liu Zhi, the son of the famous Tang historian Liu Zhiji (661–721). The _Zhengdian_ is no longer extant, although the _Tongdian_ quoted liberally from this work. In fact, so much of this earlier text was incorporated into the _Tongdian_ that it is frequently difficult to discern Du's own views from those that apparently came from the _Zhengdian._

**Social and Political Focus**

Although the _Tongdian_ makes frequent references to Confucian moral cultivation and harmony, the focus of the text is social and political, economic, and pragmatic rather than philosophical or doctrinal. Du You did not include extended accounts of cosmology, metaphysics,
or moralistic historical judgment. The Tongdian presents a view of human history shaped largely by its social and political institutions. The bottom-line value in this encyclopedia is social and political order and the institutional formulations necessary to achieve it. In his opening chapter on economic matters, Du You observed that the first priority in governance is the edification of the people. That edification depends upon first making sure that the people have sufficient food and clothing.

Beyond these basic human needs, however, the Tongdian strongly emphasized ritual: the ceremonies and protocols of the court and society. One hundred chapters—half of the encyclopedia—are devoted to ritual prescriptions from earliest times down to the eighth century. Included here are important commentaries on early ritual texts that are no longer extant elsewhere. A large portion of the ritual section of the Tongdian dwells on current prescriptions. Much of this part was taken directly from the official Tang ritual code, the Kaiyuan Li (Rituals of the Kaiyuan Reign), compiled in 732.

Organization

The Tongdian is organized by a number of chapters grouped in categories and subcategories.

- **Economics** (*Shihuo*, chapters 1–12). A broad survey of economic management issues, including land tenure and organization, population fluctuation and registration, different forms of taxation, money and coinage, canal transportation, and the government salt and iron monopolies.
- **Civil Service Selection** (*Keju*, chapters 13–18). A description of the systems of selecting officials, dynasty by dynasty, followed by summaries of the various debates on civil service selection.
- **Bureaucracy** (*Zhiguan*, chapters 19–40). A survey of the various official positions and bureaucracies, the changing meaning of titles in different periods, and the allocation of rank and compensation for service. This section includes both the civil and military bureaucracy and both central and provincial administrations.
- **Rural** (*Li*, chapters 41–140). A broad summary of the ritual ceremonies and the protocol obligations of the imperial family, the court and top officials, and families throughout the empire. Prescriptions include ritual performances, clothing and ornamentation, transportation, seasonal timing of activities, and arrangements for birth, marriage, illness, death, and the veneration of ancestors.
- **Music** (*Yue*, chapters 141–147). A description of theories of music and its place in society, music offices in different dynasties, the twelve tones of music, instrument calibration, song, and ceremonial music.
- **Punishments** (*Xing*, chapters 163–170). A description of the theories of punishment and its uses and a survey of penal systems through the dynasties, followed by a summary of debates on the subject.
- **Administrative Districts** (*Zhoujun*, chapters 171–184). An overview of the administrative units of China, with a description of the evolution of each prefecture and county.
- **Border Frontiers** (*Bianfang*, chapters 185–200). A description of the tribes and kingdoms of the four directions.

Model for Later Works

The Tongdian was one of the first encyclopedias of its kind and served as a model for many future compilations. A two hundred-chapter sequel to the Tongdian, the Xu Tongdian, was commissioned by Emperor Taizong (reigned 976–997) of the Song dynasty (960–1279), although that work is no longer extant. Another 150-chapter work by the same name was ordered in 1767 by the court of Emperor Qianlong (reigned 1736–1795) of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The Tongdian was regarded as one of the “Three Surveys” (Santong), the other two being Zheng Qiao’s (1104–1162) Tongzhi (Survey Monographs) and Ma Duanlin’s (1254–1324) Wenzian tongkao (Survey of the
Du You’s Preface to the Comprehensive Institutions

In his preface to the “Food and Goods” section of the Comprehensive Institutions (Tongdian), Du You explains why he believes that satisfying the people’s material needs is a prerequisite to educating them.

Although I engaged in the study of books from an early age, because I was a dullard by nature, I did not succeed in mastering the arts of number or astrological sciences, nor was I good at literary composition. Thus my Comprehensive Institutions actually amounts to no more than a compilation of various records that, if used in dealing with human affairs, might be helpful in governmental administration.

The first priority in ordering things according to the Way lies in transforming the people through education, and the basis of education lies in providing adequate clothing and food. The [Classic of] Changes [I Ching] says that what attracts people is wealth. The “Grand Model” [chapter of the Classic of Documents] lists eight administrative functions, of which the first is food and the second provision is goods. The Guanzi says: “When the storehouse is full, then people can understand rites and good manners; when there is a sufficiency of food and clothing, people can understand the difference between honor and shame.” The Master [Confucius] spoke of enriching people first and then educating them. All these saying express the same idea.

To carry out education one must first establish offices; to establish offices, one must recruit people with the requisite talents; and to recruit talent one must have an examination system, establish proper rites to rectify popular customs, and have music to harmonize people’s minds-and-hearts. These were the methods employed by the early sage kings to establish proper governance.

It is only when there has been a failure in education that one resorts to laws and punishments, to commanderies and prefectures for local administration, and to fortifying the borders against barbarians. Thus “Food and Goods” come first; official recruitment next, offices next after that; then rites, music, punishments, and local administration, with border defenses last. Anyone who reads this book should keep in mind my reasons for arranging things in this order.


Further Reading
Tourism

Tourism in China has experienced revolutionary change, growing from its most basic level to a strategic industry in China's evolving socialist market economy. Two decades of development have brought positive experiences and presented some challenges, both with an impact on local attitudes, culture, and practice.

Before the economic liberalization that accompanied China's open door policy in 1978, the country really did not have a modern tourism industry. Even after opening and normalization, change in the tourism industry was slow. The structure of China's tourist industry remained relatively simple, although gradual changes could be noted as China moved more and more toward trade and commerce.

Not until the 1990s did an increase in the Chinese people’s annual income and improvements in public transportation infrastructure result in a considerable increase in domestic tourism. The number of domestic tourists increased from 300 million in 1991 to 629 million in 1995. Travel was becoming fashionable in China.

A 1998 survey on domestic tourism showed that the main motivations of Chinese tourists were sightseeing and visiting family and friends, accounting for 46.9 percent and 27.2 percent of the total, respectively. But such leisure travelers represented only the wealthiest portion of the Chinese population— even in 1998 the vast majority of people in China did not “vacation.” Rather, the only

In the harbor of Macao, an international tourist destination because of its famous casinos, a cruise ship approaches the dock. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
travel periodically done by the masses was for business, academic, health, and religious reasons.

Reformed Gold Weeks

The introduction of the reformed “Gold Weeks” holiday policy allowed the concept of leisure travel to really take hold in China, and the country began to experience an unprecedented travel boom. The Chinese government in September 1999 introduced a new holiday policy that extended three major public holidays—the Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), which occurs in January or February, International Labor Day (1 May), and National Day (1 October)—such that each became a week long. Zhu Rongji, prime minister at the time, hoped that this holiday policy would quicken development of the tourism industry in China, increase domestic demand, and stimulate economic growth. The new policy had an immediate effect. During the first Gold Week in October 1999, 28 million Chinese went on holiday, which earned 14.1 billion yuan ($1.8 billion) for China’s tourism industry. Experts have said that the institution of the Gold Weeks was probably the most effective policy ever introduced in China. Called “gold” because of the great economic benefits they would bring, not only did these holiday periods stimulate the development of the tourism industry, but also they had a great impact on Chinese lifestyle and culture. More Chinese, especially young people, have become willing to spend money on their holidays, traveling to tourist

Every morning at dawn thousands of Chinese tourists flock to Tiananmen Square to watch the flag raising ceremony and listen to lectures and musical performances.

PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
destinations inside or outside China. The word leisure has become a part of the Chinese vocabulary.

**Travel and Leisure**

Leisure, formerly a concept known only to the wealthy, now encompasses the masses in China. Farmers have embraced the concepts of travel and leisure, with more farmers traveling every year.

The holiday policy has had a direct impact on some of the most valued and prominent traditions in China. This impact is seen most poignantly by the nationwide debate of how to spend time during the Spring Festival, the most important festival in China—as important as Christmas is in the Western world. The festival traditionally is a time for families to reunite and to celebrate the New Year. But today more and more people are traveling elsewhere during the Spring Festival rather than returning home to their families. This option has created conflict. Generally speaking, the older generation insists that people respect the traditions of Spring Festival and return home for the holiday, whereas the younger generation insists that tradition is outmoded. For the young travel is a good alternative.

**Mixed Opinion**

Public opinion in China is varied regarding the impact of tourism. Whereas many people enjoy the benefits that the tourism industry offers, others point to the negative ways it has affected the lives of people, especially those living in tourist areas.

Tourism promotes interaction between people in the tourist destinations and the outside world. Travelers to remote areas bring new technology and ideas, which in turn can promote social development of the local community. Thus, most local communities appreciate the

*People traverse the Great Wall. The Great Wall remains one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world.*

PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
opportunities given them by tourism, including knowledge of other languages, lifestyles, and ideas, as well as the chance to share their own culture with others.

But many people believe that this exposure has been a corrupting influence, damaging the local culture of the people—often minorities—who live in remote areas, which include many of China's tourism destinations. With development of the tourism industry, many of these peoples have begun to adopt the language, clothing, and cultural values of tourists.

The development of domestic tourism in China has created a number of other problems, most notably problems of environment and heritage protection. Travel in China, extremely congested during the Gold Weeks, placed a great burden on most tourist destinations during those times. Lacking sustainable practices, many tourist destinations, especially natural and heritage sites, are suffering the impact of mass visitation.

For example, at the Dunhuang Caves, a United Nations World Cultural Heritage site in Gansu Province in northeast China, carbon dioxide and water vapor from the breathing of the great number of visitors during the Gold Weeks discolored the caves' centuries-old murals. Implementation of sustainable practices has often taken a backseat to recovery measures; people working with these attractions spend all year recovering damaged works.

Travel safety was always an issue from the time the Gold Weeks were first declared. The Traffic Control Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security always reported an increase of traffic incidents and fatalities during these times. According to its statistics, 1,107 people were killed in a total of 3,358 traffic accidents during the Spring Festival peak tourist season in 2007, although the death toll dropped by 36.5 percent and the number of injured people decreased by 56.7 percent fewer than the same period of 2006. As a result of the traffic and other problems Gold Weeks presented, National Day, along with Labor Day, was reestablished as a one-day holiday in December 2007.

Travel Abroad

As domestic tourism has increased, the Chinese have had a growing perception that the quality of their trips is declining significantly. Overcrowding and deterioration of attractions are having an adverse effect on the tourism experience during the Gold Weeks to the point that inbound tourists have learned to avoid travel to China during these times.

Chinese authorities in recent years sought solutions to these problems, such as introducing compulsory annual leave to ensure that workers had chances to travel during times other than the Gold Weeks. In the meantime a large middle-class population with disposable income has become more dissatisfied with traveling inside China, and outbound tourism has been increasing rapidly since the beginning of the twenty-first century. China's outbound tourists totaled 20.2 million in 2003, overtaking Japan's total for the first time. Around 100 countries or areas are open to Chinese tour groups with the USA receiving its first leisure tour groups in 2008. Also in July 2008, direct leisure flights from mainland China to Taiwan increased significantly.

What the increase in outbound tourism will mean is yet to be learned, but as with the increase in domestic tourism, the cultural and heritage implications are certain to include both positive and negative effects.

Peiyi DING and Noel SCOTT

Further Reading


Township and Village Enterprises

Township and village enterprises (TVEs) were businesses designated to operate in the countryside or in small and medium-size towns. These enterprises created a large number of jobs from the late 1970s to the 1990s, and are responsible for a huge proportion of China’s economic development. In recent years, their contribution has become more limited, and as more people move to urban areas the wealth gap between countryside and cities is increasing again.

The growth of township and village enterprises (TVEs) is linked to the first wave of China’s economic reforms from the late 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s. The implementation of the household responsibility system (HRS) and the decentralization program of the 1980s fueled the growth of TVEs and the industrialization of the countryside. The HRS revealed much underemployment in rural areas, possibly 100 to 150 million people, and part of this redundant labor force found jobs in TVEs.

The growth of TVEs can be divided into at least three phases. During the first phase (from 1978 to about the end of the 1980s) the scale of growth was unexpected, and academic and political debates emphasized the advantages of either the Wenzhou (city) model (i.e., the development of private enterprises) or the Jiangsu (Province) model (based on the importance of collective enterprises).

During the second phase (from the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s) growth accelerated further. Scholars then shifted to the debate over whether local governments or populations were more important in the course of local development. Finally, during the mid-1990s specialists began to question if the growth of rural enterprises was sustainable in the long term as the development of China became more urban driven.

Definition and Statistics

The amount of research generated by the growth of TVEs during the 1980s and 1990s has led to the proliferation of definitions of TVEs. Yet, the definition itself affects the interpretation one can have of this phenomenon (for example, whether or not individual enterprises are included). The most expedient solution is to refer to the official definition.

This definition has two major dimensions. The first is historical and geographical. Originally the term TVEs (in Chinese xiangzhen qiye 乡镇企业, or literally “town and township enterprises”) applied only to enterprises that were under the ownership of the People’s Commune and the Brigade of Production. They were collective in nature and anchored in the countryside. The second dimension includes details of the mode of property. With the HRS individual activities were greatly stimulated and resulted in the creation of “individual businesses” (of fewer than eight workers) and, since 1988 (officially), private enterprises (of eight workers or more). When such enterprises are located at the county (xian) level or at any administrative
unit under this level (towns and townships), they are also TVEs. Finally, TVEs also comprise enterprises created by several households, various forms of joint ventures, and so forth. In short, the official definition of a TVE incorporates any type of enterprise that is located at the county level or lower than state-owned enterprises. This categorization had to be gradually adjusted since the end of the 1990s because of a multiplication of the types of property, but the theoretical differences between the collective and private sectors remain. This is an important point because most TVE scholars have ignored the private economy (especially individual enterprises).

Indeed, a large part of TVE growth can be attributed to the private sector, which in 1990 employed more workers than the collectives for the first time. All in all, this growth has been impressive: In 1978 only 28 million people were working for TVEs, all of which were in collective enterprises. By 1996 the number of TVE workers reached 135 million, but since then the growth has slowed, inching up to 142 million by 22.5 million enterprises by 2005. That year total net TVE profits were RMB¥106.9 billion (US$133.63 billion) and the taxes they paid were RMB¥51.8 billion (64.75 billion).

Wenzhou Model versus Jiangsu Model

The origins of the TVEs are twofold. The first dates back to the collective era at the time of the promotion of rural industries. Even though this experience was not successful (especially during the Great Leap Forward), it gave the local cadres the experience of managing industrial ventures (particularly after the development of the “five small industries” during the 1970s). With the 1980s decentralization policies that placed resources in their hands, these cadres were able to make use of their experience and develop collective enterprises—mostly for local taxation income. The second origin relates to the long existence of nonagricultural activities in the Chinese countryside, a phenomenon already noted by John Buck, the then-renowned specialist of China agriculture during the 1920s, but which were banned during the collectivization period. The HRS revived these activities, especially small commercial and industrial businesses that did not require a substantial amount of capital.

During the 1980s the coexistence of these two forms of rural enterprise raised concerns among the Chinese leadership and academia alike. They perceived the growth of TVEs as a tool for keeping people in the countryside or in small and medium cities instead of having them move to large metropolises (in accordance with the strategy elaborated by Fei Xiaotong, the sociologist at the roots of the rural reforms in China). However, questions arose over the respective roles of the private and collective sectors within the national economy—sometimes over the very existence of the private sector itself. The debate converged on the mode of development of the two regions, which were especially successful in terms of TVE growth. The first mode one was in the Wenzhou area of Zhejiang Province, where the private economy was especially large; the other was in the Wuxi area of Jiangsu Province, which is famous for its collective sector. This debate was, of course, not only academic but also political because it questioned the role of the private sector in a socialist economy. Deng Xiaoping definitively settled this matter in 1992 with his highly publicized tour in the south, during which he gave explicit support to the private sector.

Government Intervention or Private Initiative

Therefore, beginning at the end of the 1980s the previous debate had to shift. The reasons for this shift were not only the definitive acceptance of the private sector and the conceptualization of the “socialist market economy” but also the appearance of multiple property forms in which private and collective sectors were tightly intertwined—making the distinction between them somewhat blurred. An increase in foreign investment (in particular in the coastal provinces) also contributed to the confusion. Therefore, after ten years of TVE growth, an assessment of the various roles of the private and collective sectors in this growth was necessary. Similarly, the reasons for the evolution of the mode of property and their complexity had to be analyzed.

Private enterprise (mainly in the form of individual enterprises) started in 1978 or even earlier, usually by people with little social and financial capital. A large proportion of these genuine entrepreneurs was demobilized.
soldiers, “educated youth,” former political prisoners, people with a “bad” class origin, the unemployed, and so forth. They offered services that were no longer provided in the countryside (such as small restaurants, tailors, etc.) or made simple goods that the planned economy did not provide. For example, in the Wenzhou area households started producing buttons for clothes. By the end of the 1980s Wenzhou’s button market became famous in China and beyond.

During the mid-1980s the economic success of these entrepreneurs stimulated a host of imitators, among them local cadres or their relatives. This second wave of entrepreneurs was much better connected and could access resources such as raw materials, information, technology, bank loans, and so forth. At the same time, to find enough financial resources for the development of their counties, local authorities also continued to stimulate the collective sector in order to reap the profits of and the taxes paid by these enterprises: Despite national regulations the separation between the budgets of the collective enterprises and the local budget was rather thin. Little by little the two waves of entrepreneurs started to merge into a single category while maintaining strong relationships with the local bureaucracies. Therefore, these enterprises were regarded, at the local and national levels, as a tool to promote the development of the local economy, not only through the employment they created but also through the taxes and the resources they generated.

In addition, the decentralization process put local authorities in control of major resources, such as raw materials, technological and marketing information, networks, and so forth, located in their areas. It was therefore necessary for private entrepreneurs to cultivate good relationships with the local authorities, who could either help them or ruin them (by refusing to issue the necessary authorizations or confiscating their ventures for example). Scholars such as Jean C. Oi described the phenomenon as “local state corporatism,” in which local governments act as corporate firms (Oi, 1996). Other scholars, such as Daniel Kelliher, emphasized the role of private initiative.

Whatever the position adopted, the collusion between private entrepreneurs and local authorities was patent and generated negative externalities (corruption, for example). On the other hand, the system generated confusion between the different modes of property, which stimulated growth: The collective made use of the flexibility of the private sector, while the private sector got protection from the collective. For example, during the economic downturn of 1988–1990 many private enterprises registered as collectives while keeping their original management structure because the private sector did not have much political momentum at the time. Similarly, many collective enterprises lost money because of poor management and were contracted to the private sector in order to be more competitive. Still others were sold to management teams or to the workers (under the so-called cooperative system) while officially remaining under the collective banner. In this last case the decisions might have rested with the local cadres.

This system shaped a development pattern that was controlled by the local authorities and in which a strong bond existed between the private and collective sectors, so it was difficult to draw a border between the two property modes. Whether or not this arrangement is still suitable for the future development of China’s economy and TVEs remains to be seen.

**TVEs as a Factor for Development**

In 2001 out of 21 million TVEs, 18.5 million were individual enterprises employing more than 60.2 million people (46 percent)—an average of three people per enterprise. Another 2 million private TVEs employed an average of eighteen people per enterprise. This meant that nearly all TVEs (20.5 million), totaling 97 million workers (or nearly 75 percent of the TVEs’ labor force), were small businesses. A more recent breakdown is unavailable, but partial statistics confirm the previous trend.

These enterprises have been instrumental in creating employment, lowering the revenue gap between rural and urban areas, and offering a partial solution to unemployment. Nevertheless, despite their overwhelming statistical importance, these enterprises do not constitute a solution for China’s long-term development because most have not increased in size or provoked organizational or technological changes. Their contribution to investment, for example, remains extremely limited. This is why most TVE scholars mistakenly omit them in their analysis.

In fact, few TVEs have played a major role in transforming the countryside, apart from those in selected...
rural areas (the Pearl River delta in Guangdong Province, for example). These enterprises have built connections with local authorities, as described earlier. Nevertheless, their functioning mode has also cast a shadow on their potential for sustainable development because the opportunities to benefit from both the collective and private systems in the short term are offset by the confusion over the property system. To give one example, enterprises that have been contracted to private hands have to return to collective management at the end of the contract (typically five years). However, in practice contractors and local governments have held endless debates over this setup, especially when the contractors have invested a significant amount of money (which is usually the case) in the venture. Signs indicate that the mode of development based on local government control of their resources has provoked waste and duplicated infrastructure, while corruption feeds growing discontent in the countryside. This is why Beijing now aims, with difficulty, to recentralize.

China’s development based on TVEs has lost momentum since the end of the 1990s. The wealth gap between rural and urban areas has increased again, showing that the full potential of TVEs to provide jobs and be a tool for development has been reached. In recent years urban areas have generated most of China’s economic growth, which has provoked a shift in the interest of researchers. The development of TVEs, however, remains an important experience and demonstrates to the developing world the potential of the countryside.

Louis AUGUSTIN-JEAN

Further Reading


Since its beginnings in the 1920s, China’s toy industry has grown to become the largest in the world. Though faced with accusations of poor working conditions and taking the blow of recent recalls, the toy market in China remains the leading toy market today.

China is the world’s largest toy maker and exporter with more than 8,000 toy manufacturers producing around 30,000 kinds of toys. The country’s toy exports in 2005 totaled $15.18 billion, accounting for 70 percent of the world toy market. But the industry suffered a blow in 2007 with a series of recalls that dented the industry’s reputation but did not alter predictions for continued growth, especially in the country’s expanding domestic market.

**Growth of China’s Toy Industry**

Toy making in China began to take shape with the arrival of tin-can manufacturing around Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s. Western influences in the area led to the manufacture of Western tin-plate toys that became quite popular. War-related toys, such as fighter planes, tanks,
and soldiers, dominated the market around the time of the Japanese invasion of China in the mid-1930s. After the Communist Revolution of 1949, toys became a vehicle for propaganda, especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) when dolls in Mao suits and cars painted with political slogans flourished.

By the early 1980s, Hong Kong had become the world’s largest toy exporter, but rising labor and land costs pushed the colony’s toy manufacturers to relocate across the border to China. In 1984, China designated Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, its first special economic zone (SEZ), offering foreign investors a tariff-free environment with low-cost labor and cheap factory space. Hong Kong toy manufacturers moved more and more production into China while leaving in Hong Kong the value-added work, such as product design, production planning, quality control, management, and marketing.

Drawn by the incentives of the SEZs, multinational toy companies began to set up shop in China, especially in the Pearl River delta region of Guangdong. China developed a solid network of supporting industries and services, such as logistics, communications, and component manufacturing, which helped international companies to strengthen productivity, reliability, and delivery.

By 1993, China had become the world’s largest toy manufacturer and leading exporter, reaching an export volume of $8 billion. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 strengthened its domestic industry, and its exports rose sharply. In 2006, China exported 22 billion units of toys worth $7.5 billion. By the end of the year, Chinese toys accounted for 75 percent of world output.

### Economic Challenges

By 2005, many toy factories faced difficult challenges that threatened to impact the structure of the industry. Powerful foreign buyers demanded lower prices while the cost of labor and raw materials increased. In addition, U.S. and European brands increased pressure on China’s toy companies to meet their high labor standards. This caused some manufacturers to leave Guangdong for second border locations or even the Chinese hinterland. Other Chinese manufacturers blamed Western corporations for squeezing their margins so tightly there wasn’t enough money to improve worker conditions. Bama Athreya, director of the International Labor Rights Forum, testified before the U.S. Congress in 2005 that “Wal-Mart bears a lion’s share of responsibility for pushing the [Chinese] toy industry to a place where worker health and safety are basically nonexistent” (Written testimony, 2007).

China’s toy industry also faced increasing scrutiny of its product safety. The Chinese government responded in 2006 with the China Compulsory Certification (CCC) scheme, which allowed only those toys that meet CCC standards to be exported to foreign markets or sold domestically. Later the same year, the government, responding to an EU report that many “problematic imported products” were toys from China, signed a draft Guide for the Strengthening of Sino-EU Cooperative Action for Toy Safety. A month later, China and the EU held a toy-safety forum on enforcing stricter quality and safety standards.

Despite the persistent quality and safety issues, foreign buyers remained confident in China’s toy manufacturing industry. Besides, international toy companies and China’s manufacturers had become so intertwined trade group Toy Manufacturers of America estimated that U.S. toy consumers would see prices rise up to 50 percent, and 25,000 jobs in the American toy industry would be lost.

After much pressure from both sides of the controversy, President Clinton renewed China’s trade privileges in 1994, saying that the United State needed to see its relations with China in a “broader context” than simply human rights. He renewed China’s trade privileges annually until 2000, when the U.S. Congress voted to grant China permanent Normal Trade Relations status.
over the years that neither could easily survive without the other. “China has a very systematic toy production system involving layers of suppliers in screws, paint, electronics, and other components. No other countries have this cutting edge,” said Ben Lau, technical director of toys and premiums at Specialized Technology Resources, an international safety and testing lab, in an interview with a Forbes magazine reporter. “There is no alternative to China, no contingency plan. If you shift production to other countries, you’ll face similar problems or even worse” (Shen 2007).

The Year of Recalls

Problems for China’s toy industry escalated in mid-December 2006, when the first warning in what was to become a spate of recalls was issued by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Chinese-made products, such as bell rattles, Christmas lights, and four other types of toys, were listed as having parts that posed a choking risk to children. High lead content and leaking batteries were given as other reasons for the warnings. Several retail outlets in the United States recalled the toys. The EU also issued warnings around the same time for a list of fifteen toys made in China.

In February 2007, the CSPC and international toy maker Hasbro recalled nearly 1 million China-made Easy-Bake Ovens because the door could trap children’s fingers, causing serious burns. In June of the same year, the CSPC and RC2 Corporation recalled 1.5 million Thomas & Friends railway toys because the paint on the toys contained unsafe levels of lead.

In July, the CSPC and Hasbro recalled another 1 million Easy-Bake Ovens, citing an additional 77 cases of children’s hands or fingers getting stuck in the door. In one case, a 5-year-old girl suffered serious burns that required the partial amputation of fingers.
In August, Mattel twice announced recalls of China-made toys due to unsafe levels of lead and magnets that could be swallowed by children. In September, Mattel recalled another 8,440,000 toys because of high lead levels. In all, Mattel recalled about 20 million toys. The scandal cost the Dali Toy Limited Company, a Mattel supplier in Guangdong, a devastating $30 million and drove CEO Zhang Shuhong to commit suicide.

Mattel apologized for the recalls, but the damage was done. With the toy scandals combining with earlier recalls of tainted seafood, toxic toothpaste, and poison-laced dog food, U.S. and European consumers were losing faith in the “Made in China” label.

The Chinese government responded by setting up a task force led by a well-known trade official, Wu Yi, to get a handle on product quality and food safety. The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine promised to check every shipment of goods leaving the country. And new rules were put into effect that required Chinese companies that manufacture defective products to cease production and sales until the problems are resolved.

Some analysts suggested that the recalls underscored the problems facing toy makers and other manufacturers in China. Pressure to keep prices low in the face of rising costs for labor, raw materials and transportation, as well as an appreciating yuan, pushed some manufacturers to cut corners and use cheap and illegal substitutes.

Despite the recalls, China’s toy exports grew in the first 10 months of 2007, reaching $7.07 billion, a 20 percent increase over the previous comparable period. The United States and EU bought 67.6 percent of those toys.

Outlook for China’s Toy Industry

Many analysts see economic changes in the U.S. and China as the real threat to China’s toy industry. In China, efforts to improve safety checks have caused shipment delays and product rejections. In 2007, the yuan appreciated 7 percent against the dollar, migrant-labor wages increased at least 17 percent, and new environmental controls all helped to push up the cost of production.

In the United States, a slowing economy resulted in slower retail sales of toys. An industry report released in February 2008 said that U.S. retail sales for toys were down 2.2 percent in 2007, a downward trend that has continued into 2009.

Nevertheless, toy companies don’t see a realistic alternative to China as a producer nation. Its infrastructure and manufacturing costs still give it an edge over alternative locations. Philip Shoptaugh, owner of the Oakland, California-based Shoptaugh Games, quoted in an article posted on the Green Options blog, wondered whether consumers would pay more for toys produced in other locations. “Are you going to spend twice as much for a doll because it’s not made in China? The thing is you cannot make these things in the United States and have them be competitive on the shelf” (Lance 2008).

Meanwhile, China-based toy makers are looking at the potential of its domestic market. By some estimates, China has a population of 300 million children in the under-eight-year-old age group compared to 50 million in that group in the United States. Industry experts also stress the importance of the Chinese toy industry to undergo innovation-oriented reforms and create its own brands.

The global financial meltdown of 2008 has made the reorientation towards the domestic market and the upgrading of quality a matter of urgency for the toy industry, which suffered the closing of 49 percent of its export-oriented companies by early 2009.

Robert Y. ENG

Further Reading


The China Seas, a term coined by European navigators and cartographers, comprise five bodies of water adjacent to the country’s 14,000-kilometer-long coastline. Although the Chinese were not generally seafarers, throughout much of China’s history the major ports of the China Seas have been important in coastal, regional, and long-distance trading patterns.

During most of its long history Chinese civilization turned its back to the sea and looked inward, towards fertile river basins in which most of its people lived. As a general rule the Chinese were not seafarers. Only a small fraction of the population derived its livelihood from maritime activities—fishing, overseas trade, piracy, or naval warfare. Chinese mariners, with the notable exception of Admiral Zheng He (c. 1371–1433), attempted few long-distance voyages, and China never ruled any of the major oceanic waterways. However, having a coastline of 14,000 kilometers makes maritime defense a major part of any government’s security policies, despite the fact that historically, most threats to China came from the north. Even more important, port cities developed along that coastline, many of them in the river estuaries of south and central China. The main economic function of these cities was to organize exchange with commercial communities across the China Seas.

Three Functions of the China Seas

China Seas is a summary term coined by European navigators and geographers. The term is rarely used in China. Chinese maps and geographic manuals distinguish between five expanses of water adjacent to the Chinese coast: the Gulf of Zhili, called in Chinese “Bohai,” south of Manchuria; the Yellow Sea, called “Huanghai,” between north China and the Korean peninsula; the Strait of Taiwan, called the “Taiwan Haixia,” separating that island from Fujian Province; the East China Sea, called “Donghai,” into which the Yangzi (Chang) River discharges its waters; and, finally, the South China Sea, called “Nanhai,” which is the maritime “foreland” of the southernmost Chinese province, Guangdong.

These five maritime spaces are clearly separated from the high seas of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Yet in an important way they form a connection between both: For centuries after the arrival of European shipping in East Asia, the main route from India into Pacific waters led through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea and then around the northern tip of the Philippine archipelago.

This fact points to the triple function of the China Seas, considered in terms of economic geography. First, the China Seas serve as an avenue for China’s coastal trade. Coastal trade has always been vital for the integration not only of the various seaboard districts but also of all of China’s eastern provinces. Before the advent of the railroad coastal trade was indispensable for transporting...
bulky goods in a north-south direction. Second, the China Seas are the arena in which regional trade between China, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia transpires. No other function is more vital than this one. The China Seas gave rise to and still support a thick network of commerce connecting different economic systems that in many ways complement one another. Third, access to the oceans necessarily leads through the China Seas. In the long run the China Seas’ transit function is probably their least important, assuming major importance only with the rise of the Canton (Guangzhou) trade in the early eighteenth century. But at least for modern times, it forms part of the complete picture. By definition the predominant emporia (places of trade) are those that combine all three functions. These major ports are pivots of coastal, regional, and long-distance traffic and commerce.

Trade from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Century

Modern scholars have reconstructed the great achievements of Chinese nautical engineering for epochs even earlier than the establishment of the empire in 221 BCE. Only with the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), however, does a comprehensive picture of maritime trade emerge. The basic type of ship, in use for many centuries, had already been developed during the tenth century. This “Fujian ship” (fuchuan) was safe, spacious, fast, and admirably suited to the trading conditions in the China Seas. It later evolved into the cheap and popular “shallow-water ship” (shachuan), an even more advantageous flat-bottomed watercraft. Southeast Asian shipbuilders also provided technical innovation. The result was the ubiquitous junk (the word junk probably originated in Javanese but later was applied mainly to Chinese ships), which shaped European perceptions of the Asian maritime world.

Extended trading networks covering the South China Sea emerged as a result of two developments that occurred in the fifteenth century. First, the Chinese government dispatched several huge fleets under the aforementioned Admiral Zheng He to establish contact with numerous countries in Southeast Asia and on the Indian Ocean. Although the government soon discontinued this policy, several of the links formed by these naval missions were maintained as “tribute” relationships, in which ritual, diplomacy, and commercial interest interacted in a complicated way. The best example of a tribute relationship with a strong economic content was the Sino-Siamese (Thai) tribute trade, conducted officially between the Siamese royal court and imperial representatives in South China. Its material underpinnings were the complementary structures of the two economies: Siam produced rice, which was needed to feed the rapidly growing population of the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. The Chinese demand for rice, in turn, was partly the result of the conversion of rice paddies into fields for cotton, tea, and mulberry trees for silk—all commodities used at home and in trade. In the opposite direction Siam imported copper from mines in the Chinese province of Yunnan. This trading pattern persisted until the middle of the nineteenth century.

Second, during the fifteenth century emigration from Guangdong and Fujian seems to have increased. Chinese merchant communities settled in various parts of insular and continental Southeast Asia. The Ming dynasty viewed them with suspicion, and after the Chinese authorities restricted maritime commerce much of their trading activity was considered illegal. This ban did not prevent a flourishing trade in spices, silk, timber, copper, tin, skins, gold, medicinal materials, and other goods. Apart from Chinese merchants, many local groups, Arab traders, Indian businessmen (many of them from Gujarat), and even Japanese ships participated in these commercial transactions, many ultimately driven by demand in an increasingly thriving Chinese market. For example, the famous pepper trade to Europe found its equivalent in vast exports of pepper from Sumatra and other islands to China.

The arrival of European ships altered the established trading patterns within the region without overturning them. The main advantage of Europeans lay in the size and armament of their ships. After a brief period of intrusive violence, the Portuguese understood the wisdom and even the necessity of partially adapting to Asian trade. The Dutch and later the British developed their own forms of “country trade,” conducted by private European trading firms along intraregional trading routes. European traders were closely dependent on indigenous producers, merchants, and providers of credit. Long-distance trade to Europe remained in the hands of the European chartered companies. Whereas the East
India Company (EIC) preferred direct contact with Chinese merchants in Guangzhou and other south Chinese ports, the Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company or VOC) relied on Batavia (present-day Jakarta) as its central emporium and collecting point in the East. Thus, Batavia served as a link between the various Eastern networks and the transoceanic shipping routes.

Little statistical evidence exists for the scope of trade in the China Seas in the early modern era. Data on maritime customs revenue collected at ports in south China, however, indicate that the volume of trade multiplied between the 1500s and the 1820s. The expansion of foreign trade facilitated regional specialization all around the China Seas and thus had a huge effect on economic activity in the entire region. The rise of port cities, with their cosmopolitan communities of sailors and traveling merchants, contributed greatly to social differentiation. Yet China made no steady progress in opening up to the world. Japan’s Tokugawa shogunate, the military government in power from 1600/1603 to 1868, drastically limited Japan’s foreign trade from the 1630s onward, and although Chinese maritime commerce flourished after about 1720, many noncolonial entrepôts (intermediary centers of trade and transshipment) in Southeast Asia lost their dynamism at about the same time. Trade in the China Seas not only constantly changed its patterns in space but also went through long-term as well as short-term cycles of expansion and contraction. These cycles were partly driven by political and military factors.
because the market economy of maritime Asia in early modern times operated under conditions set by rulers and nations.

**Treaty Ports, Steam Ships, and the Global Market**

The opening of China and the establishment of the earliest treaty ports (ports designated by treaty for trade) in 1842 were soon followed by the introduction of steam shipping to Chinese coastal and riverine traffic. Although Chinese-type sailing vessels proved remarkably resilient and were completely superseded hardly anywhere, steamers had advantages that had a great impact on trading patterns. Their carrying capacity was virtually unlimited; they could easily operate on the sea as well as on major rivers; and their deployment could be organized by large-scale capitalist enterprises. In the China Seas, especially in the south, steam and sail continued to coexist. The most dynamic lines of business, however, were captured by modern forms of transportation.

From the 1820s through the 1870s illegal and, from 1858, legalized shipments of opium from India to China dominated China’s foreign trade. This trade used the South China Sea for transit but hardly affected Southeast Asia, where different networks of drug traffic existed. An important change occurred with the economic development of the European colonies in that area of the world during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The introduction of large-scale plantations and of mechanized mining as well as the intensification of peasant production for export integrated Southeast Asia much more into the world economy than ever before. Expatriate entrepreneurs of Chinese origin were pivotal in forging these connections. By this time an impoverished China was no longer the promising market it had been. China now became important as a supplier of cheap labor. Chinese emigrants took advantage of the agricultural and mining opportunities in insular and continental Southeast Asia and beyond. The migration of contract labor from southern China to various overseas destinations, termed the “coorie trade” by contemporaries, was largely organized by Chinese recruiting firms, although transport remained in the hands of European-owned steamship companies.

A structural hallmark of Chinese foreign trade between the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 was that indigenous shipping companies secured a substantial share of the market in coastal and inland transport but never succeeded in entering overseas shipping. China’s lack of a merchant navy was symbolic of the country’s subordinate position in the international economy. Another new feature of the early twentieth century was incipient industrialization. British sugar factories in Hong Kong and Japanese sugar factories in colonial Taiwan exported their products to countries around the China Seas. Part of the factories’ raw sugar came from the Dutch East Indies.

**Fall and Rise of Maritime Commerce**

The Great Depression of the 1930s, along with Japanese aggression against China and the Western colonies in Southeast Asia, severely strained the trading networks in the region. Exports of conventional commodities fell sharply during the Depression as demand fell in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Chinese emigration, formerly a mainstay of steam traffic in the South China Sea and also between north China and southern Manchuria, declined. After the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the activities of Japanese shipping companies became ever more imperialistic. The formation of a Japanese-dominated trading sphere known as the “yen bloc” was a bid for autarky (self-sufficiency) and protected export markets. In the early 1940s the Japanese restructured large segments of long-distance trade according to the needs of their war economy. The United States’ petroleum embargo against Japan, imposed in July 1941, made it clear to the Japanese that a self-sufficient empire unaffected by the world market was an impossibility; economic factors such as this contributed to Japan’s aggression on all fronts of war in the Pacific (the War of Resistance against Japan, often called the Second Sino-Japanese War) and World War II itself.

The collapse of the Japanese empire in 1945, the Chinese revolution of 1949, and the disappearance of European colonial rule in Southeast Asia after World War II ruled out a return to prewar patterns of maritime commerce.
Only Hong Kong survived as a first-rate emporium, now with a substantial industry of its own. A large part of the People’s Republic of China’s trade with Southeast Asia and Europe was channeled through Hong Kong. At the same time the Communist government in China began the long-term process of reestablishing China’s lost military sea power and mercantile presence in the China Seas and on the world’s oceans. Today that process continues.

Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL

Further Reading


Transfer Gas from West to East Program

Xī qì dōng shū 西气东输

As an increasingly important energy source in China, natural gas needs to follow the rule of balance between supply and demand. But the supply of natural gas, mainly from western parts of the country, and the demand for natural gas, mainly from eastern parts, are not balanced; this created the background of the project “Transfer Gas from West to East.”

In 2003 China surpassed Japan to become the second largest energy consumer in the world after the United States. China’s consumption of natural gas has been increasing with amazing speed through the years. During the tenth Five-Year Plan (2000–2005), the annual consumption of natural gas was 13 percent of total energy consumption, and this number increased to 20 percent in the past two years. In response China launched the Transfer Gas from West to East Program (the Program) in 2002.

Supply and Demand

China’s supply of natural gas comes from west China. Some 77 percent of China’s natural gas is located in the Talimu Basin (which stores 22 percent of China’s total natural gas reserves), E’erduosi Basin, Sichuan Basin, Chaidamu Basin, Yingqiong Basin, and East Sea Basin. The first four basins mentioned store 60 percent of China’s total natural gas deposits.

The demand for natural gas, the other side of the energy story, comes largely from east China, in which the Yanzgi River delta stands out as an example; 85 percent of the energy used in the delta, including natural gas, comes from outside the area. Experts predict that natural gas consumption in the Yanzgi River delta will only continue to rise. The area consumed 4 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2002 and 10 billion cubic meters in 2003 and is projected to use 20 billion cubic meters in 2010.

The economic law of supply and demand is the theoretical foundation of the Transfer of Gas from West to East Program. In addition, sending what is needed to areas of high demand will do more than provide a balance between supply and demand. It will also stimulate related industries, further activate the industrial base in the west, and reduce pollution. This program, therefore, is extremely important in one of China’s preeminent national strategies: the Great West Development Plan.

The Program’s Impact

The first phase of the Transfer of Gas from West to East Program involved building a 4,000-kilometer gas pipeline network stretching from the west to the east of China. The pipeline starts at the Talimu oilfields in Lunnan; continues through Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai; and terminates in Baihe town in Shanghai. The pipeline is the first world-class pipeline designed by China. Construction began in February 2002, and the pipeline began to transport natural gas on 1 October 2004. It is estimated...
that the gas pipeline can transfer at least 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.

The Program, however, undertakes more than setting a balance between gas supply in the west and gas demand in the east. The Program will help promote related industries—such as steel, cement, and machinery—which will form a new industrial growth belt. The pipeline project itself used 1.74 million tons of steel, 5,100 tons of welding rods, and many air pumps and other hand tools and precision instruments, along with enormous amounts of water and timber. Some 67 percent of the gas pipeline runs through the west of China, which greatly stimulates local economies and connections between the west and the east. In Xinjiang, for example, the Program attracted more than 20 billion Chinese yuan in investments. The Xinjiang part of the Program also created large tax revenues for local governments and created employment opportunities for local peoples.

China’s energy consumption structure will be largely upgraded by the Program. Natural gas can be widely used not only for people’s daily needs but also for fueling industry by generating electricity. And compared to coal, natural gas is a much more environmentally friendly choice of fuel, especially in areas of rapid economic development. The development of the gas pipeline should actually help improve the environment.

**Improving the Environment**

Natural gas is much more effective than coal is in terms of thermal efficiency, cost, and negative impact on the environment. Coal is a heavily used source of energy in China, accounting for 72 percent of China’s total energy consumption. Although burning coal creates power, it also creates sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), carbon dioxide (CO2), and dust, which are all harmful to the environment. China exceeds the United States in SO2 emissions, and is now Number 1 in the world. China ranks second in CO2 emissions, right behind the United States.

Twelve billion cubic meters of natural gas—the amount the pipeline can transfer annually—is equivalent to 9 million tons of coal. At these amounts, using natural gas instead of coal would eliminate 135,000 tons of SO2, 153,000 tons of NOx, and 270,000 tons waste-smoke emissions and dust from the environment. While producing the same amount of thermal efficiency, the ratio of dust emissions from burning coal to natural gas is 148:1; the ratio of SO2 emissions is 700:1; and the ratio of NOx emissions is 29.1. The ecosystem of east China is fragile and can no longer afford the pollution burden from burning coal. Moreover, Shanghai and Jiangsu suffer from a high frequency of acid rain.

In many ways it appears that utilizing natural gas from the west of China is an effective choice for minimizing environmental pollution without significantly sacrificing the country’s drive toward economic development.

The construction of the west-to-east natural gas pipeline is only the first stage of the Program. A planned project based on market forces is making a success of the Project Transfer of Gas from West to East, and this combination of markets and government planning is going to speed up both economic development and environmental protection in China. With the success from Project Transfer Gas from West to East, more similar projects started, to boost commodities exchange, smooth supply and demand and further apply the rules of market economy.

ZHOU Guanqi

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Transportation Systems ▶
As China expands its economy, increases its population, and opens up to the outside world, its political leaders and urban designers face increased pressure to create more efficient and environmentally friendly transportation systems.

China, with its enormous and increasingly urbanized population, faces unprecedented challenges and opportunities in the way in which it transports its people and goods. The country’s recent rapid economic growth will continue for the foreseeable future, placing increased pressure on its political leaders and urban designers to create more efficient and environmentally benign transportation systems.

Roads

The main focus of upgraded transportation systems has been on China’s road and vehicle network. China’s light industry and agricultural sectors rely heavily on road-based transportation. China has roughly 88 motor vehicles per 1,000 people, compared with approximately 765 motor vehicles per 1,000 people in the United States. The number of motor vehicles in China more than tripled between 1985 and 2000; by 2007 some 118 million vehicles were traveling the nation’s roads. As of early 2009, China is on the verge of surpassing the U.S. to become the world’s largest vehicle market (Kurtenbach 2009).

More foreign automobile companies are entering China to meet the demand for new vehicles. Volkswagen began manufacturing automobiles in Shanghai in 1985. Other major companies have also begun manufacturing

In the last two decades China has built many super highways—but every Chinese wants to own a car and traffic is fierce. While China produces its own makes of cars, joint ventures with international car makers and foreign car imports offer potential car buyers a choice. Photo by Tom Christensen.
for the Chinese market, including Daihatsu, Citroen, Peugeot, General Motors, and Daimler-Chrysler. Most vehicles are built in the Shanghai region and near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning.

China has enlarged its road system such that now all towns can be reached via the highway system. Approximately 1.3 million kilometers of roads stretch across the country. In 1998 alone 37,000 kilometers of highways were built; of those, 1,487 kilometers were expressways. The central government’s eleventh Five-Year Plan (2005–2010) calls for investing $700 billion in highway infrastructure, with the goal of building 2.3–2.5 million kilometers of new roads, including 55,000 kilometers of expressway, which are being built to connect cities with populations of 200,000 or more.

A consequence of China’s growth in motor vehicles is increased use of energy (mostly oil). If China achieved U.S. levels of vehicle ownership, it would have more than 900 million vehicles—nearly 50 percent more than the total number of vehicles in the world in 2001. China would need to consume more oil than is currently produced throughout the world.

**Rail**

China has an extensive rail network, with Beijing being the hub for the north-south line to Shanghai and Guangzhou (Canton). Rail lines also extend to the west and connect China to Europe. New lines are being built, particularly in southern China and other industrial areas. In 2006, China opened a new 1,100 kilometer railroad from central China across the high Tibetan plateau to the Tibetan capital of Lhasa.

China’s first subway was constructed in Beijing in 1969. Many of the densely populated cities have developed or plan to develop commuter rail transportation systems involving subways and light rail. These include the cities of Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin in the northeast and other major cities, including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shenzhen, and Chongqing.

In April of 2008 China opened a new 120 km high-speed rail line linking the cities of Beijing and Tianjin in time for the Beijing Olympics; three trains initially operated at speeds of up to 300 km per hour, cutting travel time from 80 minutes to 30 minutes between the two cities. According to the Xinhua news agency, fifty-seven high-speed trains (reaching speeds up to 350 km per hour) are expected to be in commercial operation by the end of 2009.

In 2004 the length of China’s rail system was approximately 75,000 kilometers. By 2020 it is expected that 100,000 kilometers of rail transit systems will have been built at a construction cost of more than 130 billion yuan ($15.7 billion).

**Air**

Since 1970 China has constructed and expanded numerous airports, mainly to handle increasing tourist traffic and to link remote areas. As of 2007 there were 148 airports open to civil airplanes. Beijing is the hub of domestic air travel from which airlines reach all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. The other two international gateway airports are in Guangzhou and Shanghai. Around thirty Chinese airlines serve the domestic market. China has a fast-growing fleet of Western aircraft and is one of Boeing’s top three customers.
In 2009, China hopes to launch new airport hubs in Chengdu, Xi’an, and Guangzhou, and plans to invest over 200 billion RMB Yuan (about 28.6 billion USD) into the building of over forty regional airports.

**Water**

Because China has a coastline of more than 18,000 kilometers and 110,000 kilometers of navigable inland waterways, it is easy to understand why water transport has a long history in the country. Countless boats transport goods along rivers and the coast. The major inland navigable rivers are the Yangzi (Chang) (known as the “golden waterway” of China’s inland river transport, and much altered by the new Three Gorges Dam, expected to be fully operational by 2009), Huang (Yellow), Pearl, Heilongjiang, Huai, Qiantang, Minjiang, and Huangpu, as well as the Grand Canal between Beijing and Hangzhou. The volume of passenger transportation is approximately 12 billion trips per year. Around seventy major inland river ports have more than five thousand berths. China has twenty large ports for international shipping, with Shanghai Harbor being one of the largest in the world.

**Transport Options**

China is presented with enormous dilemmas concerning the most appropriate mode of development as the country continues its economic growth. The mode it chooses will significantly affect numerous countries. China’s transportation policies will increasingly influence the world energy market and transboundary environmental deterioration, particularly a reduction in regional air quality and an increase in greenhouse gases if there are

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**Historical illustration of junks on a river.** Water transport has a long history in China, which has a coastline of over 18,000 kilometers and 110,000 kilometers of navigable inland waterways.
increased emissions of gasoline-driven vehicles. China's transportation policies will also affect the health of its citizens because the emissions from gasoline-driven vehicles are detrimental to people's health. However, China can focus on less environmentally harmful alternatives, such as vehicles powered by natural gas or batteries, as well as electric hybrids and fuel-cell vehicles powered by nonpolluting and renewable hydrogen. China is relatively unhindered in developing these options because the country is not heavily dependent on oil. It has few petroleum vehicle-related investments, such as are common in many Western countries, and it can base its transport infrastructure on cleaner fuels. China is particularly interested in vehicles powered by natural gas because natural gas is abundant in several provinces.

China is investigating cleaner fuel technologies through institutions such as the Institute of Natural Gas Vehicles in Beijing. Currently China's transportation policy is focused both on developing "cleaner" vehicles and on increasing investment in mass transportation systems in the cities. China's latest Five-Year Plan focuses on coordinating economic development among different regions and between urban and rural areas. The plan increases the priority given to environmental protection and indicates that China will attempt to pursue less environmentally harmful transportation systems than were favored by many Western countries at a similar stage of economic development.

Warwick GULLETT

Further Reading
One of the most important of the “unequal treaties,” the Treaty of Tianjin developed as an outcome of the Second Opium War (1856–1860) and greatly expanded foreign rights and foreign control over the China coast.

The Treaty of Tianjin, signed in June 1858, was the chief diplomatic outcome of the Second Opium War (1856–1860, also called the Arrow War). Actually four separate Tianjin treaties were written with England, France, United States, and Russia. The British were the main force behind the war and the treaties. Lord Elgin, high commissioner to China, had been sent to China to force the Chinese government to agree to an expansion of foreign rights and to honor rights granted in the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), especially the right to trade in Guangzhou (Canton). For Elgin the most important rights were the right of residence for foreign ministers in Beijing and the right of Britain and the other powers to conduct relations with China on the Western model of diplomatic equality rather than as part of the Chinese tribute system (the traditional method of dealing with foreign relations).

Elgin was particularly concerned that China be willing to permanently accept whatever agreement was reached, which led him both to ignore some of the broader demands of British merchants in China and to be willing to use force to impress the Chinese court with the necessity of coming to a permanent accommodation with the foreigners.

After initial fighting around Guangzhou, a joint Anglo-French expedition sailed north and seized the Dagu forts and forced the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Tianjin. The treaty expanded the number of treaty ports—ports open to foreign trade and residence—from five to sixteen and opened the Yangzi (Chang) River to foreign navigation. The treaty also was to make travel outside the treaty ports easier for foreigners. The British and French each were to receive a large indemnity, which was to be guaranteed by the revenues of Chinese Customs. Foreign legations also were to be established in Beijing.

The Chinese court was unhappy with the treaty even after it was agreed to. Although officials in charge of dealing with the foreigners were convinced that China had no option but to accept the terms, the Xianfeng emperor (reigned 1851–1861) was convinced by more conservative advisors that diplomatic equality in particular could not be granted. The British fleet coming to exchange the final ratification of the treaty was driven off when it attempted to force a passage at the Dagu forts in June 1859, and the court took advantage of this unexpected victory to abrogate the treaty. A large Anglo-French force was sent to Tianjin in the summer of 1860. The foreign troops defeated the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) armies, and the emperor was forced to flee Beijing. The foreigners burned the imperial Summer Palace outside Beijing in retaliation for the killing of foreign prisoners, and the Qing court was forced to accept the terms of the treaty.

The Treaty of Tianjin, along with the end of the Taiping Rebellion, ushered in an era of rapid growth of foreign influence on the China coast. Foreign economic activity increased, and the number and geographical spread of
foreign missionaries, merchants, and military forces grew. The Treaty of Tianjin fully established the treaty port system. Although the treaty did not explicitly legalize opium, the Qing court did legalize domestic opium production in the aftermath of the treaty. After the treaty China also established the Zongli Yamen (the equivalent of a modern foreign ministry) to deal with diplomatic relations with Westerners and began its program of self-strengthening to begin borrowing foreign technology.

Alan BAUMLER

Further Reading


The 1844 Treaty of Wangxia set a pattern for Sino-American relations, as United States diplomats sought to build upon British imperialism and to stand apart from it, to establish principles, and to maximize profit. Chinese usually point to the 1844 treaty as proof that the United States had joined the ranks of the imperialists.

Before the 1840s, the Chinese, then led by the Manchu-dominated Qing dynasty (1644–1912), did not see the United States as important, particularly in the context of British naval power and wealth. The United States was a minor player in the Canton (Guangzhou) System, a monopoly of Chinese merchants created by the Qing to limit trade and contact with the West. The Chinese placed the United States in the context of the traditional tribute system and did not seek the establishment of formal diplomatic ties.

British victory over China in the First Opium War and the subsequent Treaty of Nanking spurred Americans to take more aggressive action. In response to lobbying by merchants, President John Tyler dispatched Caleb Cushing, a Massachusetts lawyer and former congressman, as commissioner to China. Cushing met with Qiyìng (Ch’i-ying), who represented the Qing dynasty as governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, and as superintendent general of trade and foreign intercourse of the five ports. The treaty itself was signed at Wangxia near Macao on 3 July 1844 but was not ratified and in effect until December 1845. The 1844 agreement was modeled on the 1842 Treaty of Nanking and included the right to trade in five treaty ports, extraterritoriality, and most-favored nation (MFN) status. Extraterritoriality gave Americans in China immunity from Qing criminal and civil law. The Qing, reflecting a traditional Chinese expectation that outsiders would more effectively police themselves, initially accepted extraterritoriality. Westerners portrayed China’s criminal procedures as barbaric and biased, and extraterritoriality became one of the most humiliating provisions of the unequal treaties. MFN meant that United States merchants and diplomats would enjoy whatever privileges or benefits were granted in future treaties with other nations. Although the MFN provision would devastate China over the next century, at the time the Qing hoped that it would spur competition among the Western powers to the dynasty’s benefit. Other provisions were less onerous to the Chinese. The treaty enabled Americans to benefit from future military conflicts initiated by the British or other European powers. The treaty stated that any ports closed to belligerents would remain open to American merchants with “full respect being paid to the neutrality of the flag of the United States.” Wangxia also called for diplomatic equality in official correspondence, in effect undermining the traditional Chinese practice of treating foreigners as “barbarians” because of their lack of knowledge of Confucianism and Chinese culture. Finally, the 1844 treaty outlawed the hated opium trade, although enforcement remained sporadic at best.

This agreement would be further expanded to the advantage of the United States in 1858, which occurred as a
result of another unequal treaty obtained by the British after the Second Opium War (1856–1860, also called the "Arrow War. While Americans would dream of a special, benevolent relationship with China, Chinese usually point to the 1844 treaty as proof that the United States had joined the ranks of the imperialists.

Steven PHILLIPS

Further Reading


A sly rabbit will have three openings to its den.

狡兔三窟

Jiāo tù sān kū
Tribute System
Cháogòng zhìdù 朝贡制度

In premodern China foreign relations were both hierarchical, with all foreign rulers paying tribute to the Chinese emperor as their superior, and systematic, conducted through a single set of bureaucratic rules and institutions. The forms taken by these relations varied greatly over the centuries; only from about 1425 to 1550 were all foreign relations actually managed through a single set of rules and institutions.

The premodern Chinese tended to conduct their foreign relations hierarchically, with all foreign rulers paying tribute to the Chinese Son of Heaven, the emperor considered to be the sole supreme ruler of the world, and to manage foreign relations systematically via a unilaterally developed set of bureaucratic rules and institutions. In the long span of China’s history as an empire, only for a little more than a century during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), circa 1425–1550, did China’s rulers seek to manage all of their foreign relations through a unified set of institutions centered on the tribute embassy, a tribute system in the full sense of the term.

The concept of tribute (gong) appears in the classics, most importantly in the “Tribute of Yu” (Yu gong) section of the Classic of Documents (Shu Jing). There it refers to gifts of representative products of various areas to the central sovereign as symbolic acknowledgments of his sovereignty. Such tribute from areas of foreign or “barbarian” nature is a small part of this picture. In another section of the same classic it takes the form of gifts of exotic animals, a theme that would recur in the lore of tribute embassies down to the elephants sent by Siam (modern Thailand) and the lion sent by Portugal to Qing-ruled Beijing. In the centuries of political transformation and bureaucratic unification from the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) to the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) and Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), there was much discussion of the differences between civilized and barbarian peoples.
but little focus on the ceremonial subjection of the latter; on the inland frontier it was all the Chinese rulers could do to keep the dangerous nomads at bay by building walls and buying peace with gifts and imperial princesses given in marriage. In the reign of Emperor Wu, 141–87 BCE, more assertive policies toward the Xiongnu had some success, especially when rival Xiongnu groups could be turned against each other, and the more submissive groups were required to leave hostage princes in the imperial capital. The mid-Han turn toward ceremonialism produced some disastrous attempts to give all foreign rulers titles inferior to the emperor’s under Wang Mang and some spectacular collections of homage-paying foreigners at the New Year in the early years of later Han dynasty.

It is instructive to follow the thread of ceremonial practice through the dynastic records of foreign relations. It is not at all surprising that the most elaborate set of ceremonies for receiving foreign envoys is recorded for the Tang dynasty. Envoys were received and banqueted and their presents displayed before the emperor, all in one dazzling ceremony. For powerful and threatening Inner Asian rulers, extra layers of splendor could be added. All this was in the service of the survival of the Tang dynasty in a polycentric world of powerful empires—Tibetan, Uygur, Turkic. The Tang rulers were not as distant in culture from their Inner Asian challengers as the Song and Ming rulers were and were quite capable of facing down an invading nomad army in person or, in desperate straits, of granting equality to the Uygur ruler with an imperial wansui (ten thousand years). The immense impression that the splendors of court and capital made on Korean and Japanese envoys was an important facet of the spreading influence of Chinese culture in those countries. In south coast ports, beginnings can be seen of the use of tribute embassies as instruments of marginal advantage for foreign traders.

The even more dangerous Inner Asian world faced by the Song dynasty (960–1279) was reflected in the differentiation of ceremonies for contemporary embassies—the Liao dynasty was most favored, then Koryo and Xi Xia, then all the rest. The treatment of the Liao as near-equals may have been a realistic solution to a dangerous confrontation but was criticized by many officials. The various acknowledgments of equality or even inferiority to the Jurchen Jin dynasty from 1142 on were widely resented and contributed to unrealistic calls for reconquest of the north; foreign relations were an important facet of the emergence of the moralistic Learning of the Way (Daoxue), or Neo-confucianism, in this period. Maritime trade to southern ports under the guise of tribute embassies flourished and became an important facet of the power and prosperity of such Southeast Asian states as Srivijaya on Sumatra and Champa in what is now southern Vietnam.

### Rulers Summoned

In the early Ming dynasty the example of wide conquests and lavish court ceremonies of the Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), resentment of the cultural alienness of the Mongol rule, and the mutual co-optation of an uncouth despot and some very able Daoxue literati produced visions of systematic institutional perfection in many aspects of government, not least foreign relations. Messages were sent to all known foreign rulers, ordering them to come and pay homage to the new dynasty. An early spectacular result was the parading through the streets of Nanjing, the first Ming capital, of elephants—forty in one year and forty-two two years later—from Champa. Fears of Japanese pirates and their Chinese allies, some left over from the rivals of the Ming founder, led to the prohibition of all maritime trade in Chinese shipping and the limitation of foreign shipping in Chinese ports to that in connection with tribute embassies. Maritime rulers, often advised by émigré Chinese, made the most of the loophole; the kingdom of the Ryukyu Islands was among the most successful.

The usurping Yongle emperor, a great warrior needing all the legitimation he could get, sent envoys and expeditions out in all directions to summon foreign rulers to present tribute; the maritime expeditions of Zheng He are the most famous of these expansionist efforts. The assembly of rulers and ministers paying homage at the new capital of Beijing in 1421 was without parallel since the early Tang dynasty. However, the elaborate ceremonies of the founding reign already had been somewhat reduced, and after the Yongle reign there were many limitations on the size and frequency of embassies. Of course, there also was only one more maritime expedition. Efforts to control the Mongols by giving them titles and trade in connection with embassies were not
successful. Management of relations among Hami, Turfan, and more distant Muslim city-states in Inner Asia was incoherent. The Jurchen people became experts in manipulating the privileges of the tribute system, sending oversized embassies that threatened mayhem in the streets of Beijing if they did not like the terms of trade or the quantities of gifts they received.

The succession of the Jiajing emperor in 1524 was accompanied by intense discussions of many facets of the imperial ceremonial tradition, the publication in the Da Ming huidian (Collected Statutes of Great Ming) of 1530 of the most comprehensively idealized picture of a millennial tribute system ever produced, and a major effort to enforce all the rules and restrictions of the system, which often had been violated in the previous reigns. The results included an epidemic of sham ambassadors from Inner Asian kingdoms and the growth of out-of-control piracy and smuggling networks along the coast. There were no more embassies from Japan after 1548. The Ryukyu tribute window was decrepit long before the Satsuma conquest of those islands in 1609. The trade agreement with Altan Khan, de facto ruler of the Western tribes of the Mongols, in 1570 used tribute rhetoric but did not allow the Mongols to come to Beijing. The Portuguese were allowed to settle at Macao without establishing any kind of place in the tribute system. Tribute rhetoric would live on, and the precedents of the full-fledged system would remain in place for later statesmen and the Qing conquerors to consult, but never again was the tribute embassy the center of a system for the management of all foreign relations.

The Manchu rulers were descendants of one branch of the Jurchen people who had been the most adept and cynical exploiters of the Ming tribute system. They understood its rules very well and had the Ming precedents on hand to use as starting points in working out their policies, but, being themselves outsiders with their own language and culture, they could scarcely be expected to go along with the culturally sinocentric rhetoric of the tradition. The Dutch sent three embassies in the early Qing dynasty and the Portuguese two. They were treated as tribute embassies and conformed to all the ceremonial routines but accomplished little for those who sent them. Court literati wrote poems about a lion brought all the way from Mozambique by the Portuguese embassy of Bento Pereira de Faria in 1678, and it gave the Kangxi emperor a chance to show favor to his court Jesuits and to Macao. But in 1684 the Qing dynasty moved to open trade in its ports to all foreigners regardless of their relation to the tribute system. This was the origin of the famous Canton (Guangzhou) trade of the eighteenth century; despite occasional pictures of Europeans in compendia on tributaries, their trade was institutionally completely separated from the tribute embassy matrix.

An early Qing dynasty illustration portrays nomadic representatives offering tribute to Chinese officials.

Unbending Resistance

Two more Portuguese embassies in the eighteenth century were received as tribute embassies and accomplished nothing for the beleaguered Catholic missions.
The famous embassy of Lord Macartney in 1793 was a British initiative, an effort to enlighten China concerning the wonders of open trade and European science. The ambassador’s resistance to the required ceremonies, especially the three kneelings and nine prostrations of the ketou (kowtow), became iconic in European-U.S. perceptions of a China mired in tradition and self-regard. The Qing dynasty was glad to find more compliant Europeans in the Dutch embassy of Titsingh and Van Braam in the years from 1794 to 1796 and in dealing with several more British and Russian embassies was anxious not to give any openings for Macartney-style resistance to the accustomed ceremonies.

The amazing widening of Qing control in Inner Asia in the course of the eighteenth century was a result of activist organization and leadership that owed much to the Manchus’ Inner Asian heritage and very little to the institutions and attitudes of the tribute system. Garrisons and resident administrators, assignment of grazing territories, and management of legal cases reaching all the way up to Beijing were key mechanisms; Inner Asian subordinate rulers might pay symbolic tribute, often of fine horses, to the emperor, but this was not the focus of their relation to the Qing dynasty.

The tribute system continued to be central in management of relations with Korea, Ryukyu, Annam (modern Vietnam), Siam, and Burma (modern Myanmar). Korea sent several embassies every year; it, Ryukyu, and Annam all had genuine affinities with Chinese elite culture, and their ambassadors exchanged poems in
classical Chinese while they were in Beijing. No regular formal communication existed between Qing China and Tokugawa (1600/1603–1868) Japan. The Siamese connection, astutely managed by émigré Chinese, facilitated the import to south China of substantial quantities of Siamese rice, exempted from import duties. When both Siam and Annam experienced major collapses of order in the late eighteenth century, the tribute system provided a matrix for reestablishment of normal relations. This was especially striking in the Annam case, where the Qing dynasty launched an ill-advised intervention in support of the collapsing Lê dynasty in 1788 and then had to accept the victorious T'y Sìn rebels as the new kings of Annam and then their conquerors, the new Nguyễn dynasty. Émigré Chinese advisors again were important, especially in the later, Nguyễn phase of the transition. Thus, in these cases a tribute connection seemed to have been of real use and to have revived under the new dynasty of foreign rulers, but the difficulties of the Annam changes probably also contributed to the anxiety with which the Qing rulers confronted the resistance to traditional ceremonies by Macartney and those who came after him. The distant tribute relation with the rulers of Burma does not seem to have either hindered or helped the Qing dynasty in its inept and costly ventures across the Yunnan frontier.

In the nineteenth century the heritage of regional hegemony (influence) embodied in the tribute system led the Qing dynasty into unsuccessful resistance to French conquest in Vietnam and Japanese conquest in Korea. Siam made its own transition to modern diplomatic standards and stopped sending embassies. The Ryukyus were fully incorporated into the Japanese state. European nations and the United States established resident diplomatic missions in Beijing after 1860 and were intensely opposed to any bit of language or protocol that might be a distant echo of the days when all foreign envoys reaching the capital would prostrate themselves in the great court before the Taihe Hall of the Palaces.

John E. WILLS Jr.

Further Reading
Tujia

Tǔjiāzú 土家族

The Tujia are a large minority ethnic group in central China, numbering 8 million in the 2000 census. The Tujia language, with no written form, belongs to the Tibeto-Burman subfamily of the Sino-Tibetan family. With a long history of involvement in China’s national politics, the Tujia have striven to maintain their traditional culture along with their efforts to develop modern education.

The Tujia are the eighth-largest ethnic group in China. Numbering 8,028,133 in the fifth national census (2000), they are more numerous than the better known Mongols and Tibetans. Settlements of the Tujia are distributed over western Hunan, western Hubei, and northeastern Guizhou provinces, as well as in several autonomous counties under the jurisdiction of the Chongqing municipality.

Tujia Language

Some linguists consider the Tujia language to be part of the Yi language branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. According to others, however, although the Tujia language shares some characteristics with the Yi languages, those characteristics are not enough to make the Tujia a member of that branch. Nonetheless, it is beyond question that the language, like those in the Yi branch and some others, belongs to the Tibeto-Burman subfamily of the Sino-Tibetan family. The language has no written form.

Chinese is the dominant language used by the Tujia. Many Tujia speak nothing but Chinese. Some are bilingual, speaking both Chinese and Tujia. A number also speak the language of the Miao (known outside of China as the Hmong), one of their immediate neighbors. Fewer than 200,000 Tujia still rely on the Tujia language as their major means of communication.

Tujia Names

In their own language, the Tujia call themselves Bijdzih-ka. Throughout history they have been called various names by their neighbors, based on perceived ethnic markers or distinguishing signs, such as their totem (the white tiger, at one time the totem of their chief), or names of rivers or places where they lived. The name Tujia came into being in the late seventeenth century when a large number of Han Chinese (the Chinese ethnic majority people) migrated into the Tujia area. The term, which means “aboriginal families” in Chinese, was coined to distinguish the natives from the immigrants. This name did not become official until October 1956, when the Tujia were granted the status of unitary ethnic group (danyi minzu) by the Chinese government.
Tujia History

The early history of the Tujia is a matter of dispute. Based on clues in Chinese historical literature, some scholars believe that the Tujia are descendants of the Ba, a tribe extinguished by the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BCE). Based on linguistic characteristics and some customs that are close to the Yi’s in Yunnan, other scholars think that the ancestors of the Tujia are the wuman, or black barbarians, who lived in southwestern China. The fact that in the 1970s two significant Neolithic sites were found in Tujia area suggests that those regions were inhabited as early as the prehistoric period.

The picture since the Later Han dynasty (25–220 CE) is clearer. Located close to the great historical powers, the Tujia have a longer history of involvement in China’s national politics than do many other Chinese minorities. As early as the tenth century, so-called bridled-and-tethered prefectures (jimi fuzhou), or native tributary administrations, were established in the area. The establishments were converted into a system of native chieftains (tusi zhidu) in the thirteenth century. Under this system minority areas in the Chinese empire were ruled by families of native chieftains instead of officials appointed by the central government. This system lasted in the Tujia area until 1723.

Conflict was the keynote of the recorded early history of interactions between the ancestors of the Tujia and Chinese society. With the establishment of the tributary system and the subsequent system of native chieftains, the Tujia became increasingly assimilated into the greater Chinese culture. During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, a considerable number of Tujia soldiers, called different names at different times, were sent to coastal areas to fight against the Japanese and British invaders.

In the meantime, many upper-class Tujia received a Confucian education and entered the gentry-scholar rank. Some accomplished poets and scholars of the Tujia gained national reputations. When the native-chieftain system was abolished in the eighteenth century, some Tujia customs and conventions were condemned as corrupted or ugly and were reformed by force. As a result the Tujia were further assimilated, and many of their ethnic characteristics were lost.

Tujia Culture

Love-based marriage was a tradition among the Tujia. In recent centuries until the early 1950s, however, parental approval had become a norm, and wealth and social status became decisive factors. Cross-cousin marriage (a preferential rule requiring marriage between cross-cousins: mother’s father’s brother or father’s sister’s daughter if such a person is available) and levirate (the custom whereby a man marries the widow of his deceased brother) are commonly practiced among the Tujia. In some areas maternal-parallel-cousin marriage (a convention in which one marries an opposite-sex child of one’s mother’s sister) is also practiced.

Seniority of age is highly venerated by the Tujia. Elderly men and women are respected and treated well while alive, and elaborate funerals are held at their death. Mortuary rituals are also held for people who die at a younger age, but with less care and expense. No ceremony is held for the death of a child.
There is no organized religion among the Tujia. Their faith—a mixture of animism, ancestor worship, and worship of deified deceased chiefs and heroes—has apparently been influenced by the folk religion of the neighboring Han Chinese.

The Tujia have a long tradition of sophisticated folk arts. More than seventy prescribed movements are available for dancers of the popular *bai shou wu* (hand-waving dance) to depict such things as hunting, agricultural activities, battling, and feasting. Legends tell about the genesis and migration of their ancestors as well as their aspirations for and fantasies about the ideal life. Almost every Tujia is an accomplished singer of improvised or traditional ballads, which cover all aspects of daily life and feeling.

The traditional Tujia economy is diversified. Agriculture in narrow strips of terraced fields is complemented by logging, hunting, fishing, and growing or working on cash crops. The Tujia are also known for their traditional weaving, knitting, and embroidery. A variety of light and heavy industries has been developed in the Tujia area, and Jishou University was established there in 1958. In the past two decades, more than 95 percent of Tujia children have received at least a primary education.

**Chuan-kang SHIH**

**Further Reading**


Twelve Muqam
Shi’er Mukamû 十二木卡姆

The Twelve Muqam are a suite of songs of the Uygur people of northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The pieces may be sung, danced, or instrumental, and may be performed individually or in small groups. Their lyrics are drawn from many sources, including Persian, Turkic, and folk poetry, although the actual origins of the Muqam are hazy. The lyrics are often infused with Sufi imagery.

The Uygur* people of northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region are closely identified with the Twelve Muqam, a suite of songs drawn from several Central Asian traditions that may be sung either individually or in small groups. The Twelve Muqam are related to the Arabo-Persian maqam system; the term muqam is the Turkic-language variant of this Arab term, and many names of suites are also drawn from Arabic. However, musically the Muqam are more closely related to central Asian art-music traditions, such as the Bukharan Shashmaqam (music of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Unlike the Arabo-Persian traditions, which involve some improvisation in performance, each of the Uygur Twelve Muqam is basically a tripartite (divided into three parts) suite consisting of (1) chong naghma (great music)—a series of vocal and instrumental pieces beginning with a meditative, unmetered bash muqam (introduction); (2) dastan (stories)—slower metered pieces; and (3) mashrap (festival)—fast dance pieces.

Rhythmic formulas marked out by the hand-held dap (drum) characterize the pieces. Each of the Uygur Twelve Muqam has a defining pitch range and mood, but the modulation of the notes played is so frequent that it is hardly possible to link a Muqam to one mode, or range of notes (as compared to a Western classical piece, for example, which generally stays in one key throughout the course of the piece).

The Twelve Muqam lyrics are attributed to the great Persian and Turkic poets or drawn from folk poetry. They are imbued with Sufi (Muslim mystic) imagery and ideals. Said to have originated in the fifteenth-century Kashgar court (an oasis city on the old Silk Roads, now in Xinjiang Uygur A. R.), their current form is more realistically traced back to the nineteenth century. Muqam may be performed by one singer with a bowed or plucked lute (satar or tanbur) and a drum or with a small group of supporting voices and instruments. Men, women, beggars, and religious men may practice this tradition for religious purposes or for enjoyment. The Twelve Muqam have an important place in Uygurs’ affections and are often referred to in terms of moral authority and spiritual necessity.

Rachel HARRIS

*The author uses the spelling “Uighur” in her publications, rather than Uygur; changes have been made to reflect encyclopedia style, both in the article and in the accompanying sidebar.
Heartbreak in the Twelve Muqam

The Twelve Muqam, an epic suite of songs of the Uygur people, often contain lyrics of heartbreak and loss, such as these from “Rak Muqaming Uchinchi Dastani.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[UYGUR]</th>
<th>[ENGLISH]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ey yaranlar qedirdanlar</td>
<td>Dear friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugun qiyamet qayum dengler</td>
<td>Today is the end of the world you say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishqi otida koydi janler</td>
<td>Love’s fire has consumed my life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ne boldi yarim kelimdi.</td>
<td>Why does my lover not come?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilurmen dep wede gildi</td>
<td>I will come she promised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilur muddetidin ashti</td>
<td>But the time of arrival has come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozum yoligha telmurdi</td>
<td>My eyes on the road hoping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ne boldi yarim kelimdi.</td>
<td>Why does my lover not come?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ygen ashim zeher boldi</td>
<td>The food I eat is poison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keygen tonum kepen boldi</td>
<td>My clothes are a winding sheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirayim zepireng boldi</td>
<td>My face is sallow like a (flower?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ne boldi yarim kelimdi.</td>
<td>Why does my lover not come?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chushtin keyin bolur peshim</td>
<td>What I did in the afternoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarning kongli bek ewrishim</td>
<td>My love is so soft and fine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewrishimdek boylarin g’ha</td>
<td>Like silk her figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirmeship olsem kashki.</td>
<td>Entwined with her I am happy to die</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Further Reading


Recordings

La Route de Soie, Chine, Xinjiang [The Silk Road, Xinjiang, China] [Recorded by Anderson Bakewell] (1992). On Recordings by Anderson Bakewell [CD]. Boulogne, France: Playasound PS.
The economic and political ultimatums presented to China by Japan in 1915 are called the “Twenty-One Demands.” They marked the beginning of Japan’s emergence as the most aggressive foreign power pressuring China.

In January 1915 the Japanese government presented the Chinese government with a diplomatic ultimatum that came to be known as the “Twenty-One Demands.” Many of these demands were fairly specific, aimed at expanding Japan’s economic and political influence in China, especially in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. The Japanese were particularly interested in the right to build railways in China and to deny other powers the right to do so. Specific demands also aimed at increasing Japanese control over the Hanyeping mines in central China, Japan’s most important source of coal and iron. China was also to allow Japan to keep the German concessions it had recently seized in Shandong Province.

Most troubling to the Chinese government was the fifth set of demands, requiring the Chinese to hire Japanese political, financial, and military advisors and to allow joint Japanese-Chinese administration of certain districts in China. All of the other demands were expansions of Japan’s existing position in China; the fifth set suggested that the Japanese were moving toward turning China into a protectorate.

From the Japanese point of view the Twenty-One Demands were a way of taking advantage of World War I to increase Japanese influence in China. Japan had been expanding its formal and informal empire in China ever since the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), but rivalry between the powers had limited the expansion of Japanese control. With the coming of World War I Japanese imperialism was no longer constrained by the balancing interests of other imperialist powers. The Japanese were not entirely sure what to do with this newfound freedom of action, as reflected in the mixed goals of the demands.

Yuan Shikai’s Chinese government realized that it could neither risk a war with Japan nor accept the demands as given, and so it attempted to negotiate a compromise. Yuan conducted these negotiations as publicly as possible. As expected, these public negotiations led to popular outcry among Chinese both in China and overseas. Anti-Japanese boycotts were organized, mass rallies were held, and citizens donated money to national salvation funds to prepare for war. Yuan’s attempts to resist the demands briefly increased his popularity, and Sun Yat-sen’s refusal to denounce them further isolated him from possible supporters. Yuan Shikai’s government was able, partially because of support from England and the United States, to get the Japanese to agree to withdraw the fifth set of demands and accepted the modified demands on 9 May. This result was unacceptable to almost everyone involved. Yuan himself called the agreement a “national humiliation” and the date was later remembered as National Humiliation Day. The Kato government in Japan eventually fell because it had not secured enough from the Chinese. The long-term effects were limited. The popular anti-Japanese movement quickly died out, although Chinese became increasingly
unlikely to take Japan as a model for Chinese development after 1915. The Twenty One Demands were a harbinger of things to come because in the following decades Japan would be the chief imperialist power attempting to expand its power in China, and China would attempt to resist by mobilizing public opinion and seeking aid from the United States and England.

Alan BAUMLER

Further Reading
The United Front strategy in China and Korea was the implementation of the theory that Communist groups should form a united front with Nationalists to win their liberation before beginning their socialist revolutions.

The United Front strategy developed from a belief of the Soviet Comintern (the international organization of Communist parties) that Communist groups in nations subject to foreign subjugation should form a united front with nationalists to win their liberation before beginning their socialist revolutions. The Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin expressed this tenet succinctly: “Hostile classes are united by a common interest in opposing foreign exploitation” (Schram 1969, 134). The strategy was first used in China and, after a successful start there, was adopted by Korea. In the end both attempts were unsuccessful, and the societal divisions that emerged linger in the divided Korean Peninsula and in the politically divided governments of China and Taiwan.

In China until the Communist purge in 1927, the union of the Communists and the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) led to the formation of a government with Communist participation; one Russian adviser even noted that members of the right-wing Guomindang were moving toward the left. This observation was premature, with the brutal purge of the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek’s (1887–1975) Nationalist group ending any hope of a strong united front to challenge Japanese imperialism in China.

In Korea the United Front strategy was intended to create “a broad national revolutionary front that included handicraftsmen, the intelligentsia, and the petty and middle bourgeoisie along with the workers and peasants” (Scalapino and Lee 1972, 95). The structure for this united front was the Korean National Party (KCP), which was formed in early 1926, organized by Korean Communists in an attempt to form an alliance with Korean nationalists. It thus placed Korean Communist Party members at its core. This effort was weakened by the roundup of many KCP leaders by the Japanese after the funeral of former Emperor Sunjong in June 1926.

Formation of the Singanhoe (New Korean Society) in 1927 was Korea’s best chance to unify rival factions. The society accommodated a variety of groups ranging from the moderate to the radical and soon established a national network of 386 branches with more than seventy-five thousand members. The beginning of the end for the New Korean Society came in 1929 when its leaders were rounded up by Japanese police and charged with supporting the student riots in Kwangju in 1929. The society’s subsequent move to the right caused many leftist members to quit, resulting in its demise in 1931 and ending hope for a Korean united front against Japan.

These efforts by the Soviets to create united fronts in China and Korea failed because of the political differences facing the leaders of the respective nationalist and conservative parties. In both nations these differences eventually erupted into civil wars, deepening divisions that persist into the twenty-first century.

Mark E. CAPRIO
Further Reading


A foot can be shorter while an inch can be longer.

尺短寸长

Chi duan cun chang
United Kingdom–China Relations

Yīn-Zhōng wàijiāo guānxì 英中外交关系

China and the United Kingdom have a long history of relations—some contentious, some collaborative—with Hong Kong at the center. In the twenty-first century, both countries look toward cooperation.

China and the United Kingdom, two nations that have greatly affected regional and world affairs for centuries, seemed destined by history to interact on a grand scale. Relations between the two nations since the eighteenth century have, in turn, helped and hindered China.

Empire to Empire

For a major seafaring and exploring nation, Britain was a late arriver in China. The main European interests in China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were from the Portuguese and to some extent the Dutch. But Britain’s interests, when they became more substantial in the eighteenth century, concentrated on trade. Britain sourced tea, silk, and spices in China and was part of what was largely viewed by the court of Emperor Qianlong (reigned 1735–1796) as unwelcome commercial foreign encroachment.

To defend its interests, Britain sent a trade mission in the late 1780s, which was aborted due to the illness of its main emissary. Britain sent a more successful and well-known mission under Lord Macartney in 1793. Macartney, a respected diplomat and statesman, was given tasks by the government of King George III of opening up the Chinese market and establishing some kind of embassy in Beijing. Summoned from Beijing to the emperor’s summer residence in Jahol, 100 kilometers (about 62 miles) northeast of the city, Macartney spent huge amounts of time and effort in negotiations with the Qing court on how he should kowtow before the emperor, finally agreeing to bow on one knee and not abase himself fully. In an early example of how an event is given “spin,” the Chinese account says that even having agreed to this, Macartney still fell to his knees when in the presence of the emperor, so overcome by awe was he. Conflicts regarding trade (and imperial protocol) were to become commonplace over the next two centuries and escalated when Britain’s requests were rebuffed. Qianlong famously responded that China had no need of Britain’s manufactures. This typified the empire’s inward-looking and somewhat conservative stance.

Britain’s interests in the next half century continued to be based on trade, but they would become increasingly fractious. The most highly industrialized and economically powerful nation at the time, Britain was keen to address what it saw as trade imbalances in China. Britain, part of the carefully controlled foreign presence in the open ports of Guangzhou (Canton), through its companies (particularly Jardine Matheson) became involved in the thriving opium trade, importing immense amounts into China. Dissatisfaction with this led to the Chinese government’s military opposition in 1839.

This First Opium War (1839–1842) escalated to full military conflict, which Britain, with its superior army
and firepower, easily won. The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, what has come to be called the first of the unequal treaties imposed on China, granted the island of Hong Kong to the British to house their warehouses and allowed them to continue trading in opium and other goods more freely.

Continued tensions over the freedoms granted to trading culminated in a second war in the early 1860s, which, like the first, resulted in China’s defeat and the granting to Britain of further land in Hong Kong (the Kowloon peninsula) and further trading privileges. In 1898 a ninety-nine-year lease was given for the rest of the Hong Kong area. British and the other European powers were attacked during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, resulting in massive reparations that financially crippled the Qing court. By 1911 the Qing era was over, although the emperor did not abdicate until 1912.

Modern Concerns

In the early part of the twentieth century, Britain was the largest investor in China, with massive interests, mostly headquartered in Shanghai, in energy and mining. Companies like British American Tobacco and Shell were already active. Britain controlled almost 70 percent of China’s energy supply through coal and electricity production. The British concession in Shanghai was the home to British entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and, to an increasing extent as the century went on, artists. This era of openness in China’s history was to result in a tragic outcome, however, when the war with Japan in 1937 created massive refugee issues and swept away much of the business community. By 1949 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), most of the business infrastructure (including banks) had been either eradicated or dramatically scaled down.

Britain was one of the first countries to recognize the PRC, in 1950, if only to preserve its key interests in Hong Kong, which remained under British control. For the next half century, this protectorate remained Britain’s priority, and Hong Kong became one of the world’s important business centers, something that the increasingly radical government of the PRC was to tolerate in view of the economic lifeline it gave to the rest of the world. By the late 1960s, even with the Cultural Revolution spilling over into Hong Kong and causing disruption and riots there—notably the sacking of the British Embassy Office by the Red Guards in 1967, when the Chinese demanded that the British release individuals convicted of perpetrating terrorist attacks in Hong Kong—the importance of this trade link was still recognized by Beijing. In 1971 Hong Kong–related trade accounted for almost all of the PRC’s foreign business. The visit by President Nixon in 1972, reopening relations between the United States and
China, was quickly followed up by a visit from British prime minister Edward Heath, who also upgraded relations to the ambassadorial level.

**NEW “LEASE ON LIFE” FOR HONG KONG**

While the issue had been put on hold during the uncertainties of the 1970s, the arrival of a more liberal leadership under Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) in 1974 raised the question of what would be done about the ninety-nine-year lease agreed on Hong Kong in 1898. Tentative enquiries in the early 1980s by British officials about the possibility of simply extending the lease by another ninety years were met with firm rebuttals. Deng suggested a one country, two systems arrangement, whereby Hong Kong’s unique political and economic structure be respected and the region be returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The Basic Law, which acted as a de facto constitution, was promulgated in the late 1980s. The shock of the Tiananmen Square riots in 1989, while causing panic and consternation in Hong Kong, did not prevent the final agreement for the full return of Hong Kong on time on 30 June 1997. The final five years under the reforming governorship of British politician Chris Patten, with whom the Chinese had strained relations, had not derailed the agreement. With the return of Hong Kong to China, one of the largest and most contentious issues between Britain and China had been resolved.

Since 1997, the government in Beijing has kept its side of the agreement, interfering very little in Hong Kong, allowing it to govern itself, and acting only in foreign affairs and military issues.

**TRADE RELATIONS**

In the meantime, Britain’s main interests in China have reverted to trade. Britain has continued to be China’s main investor from Europe, with more than 6,000 joint ventures with Chinese companies and almost $25 billion of contracted investment in every province and autonomous region. The largest British companies investing in China include energy companies BP and Shell, telecommunications company Vodafone, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and retailers like Tesco, B and Q, and Marks and Spencer.

Since 2003, China has also increased its investments in the United Kingdom, with more than 350 companies now active there, ranging from the Bank of China to the telecommunications giant Huawei. China has also invested through its State Administration for Foreign Exchange in more than 100 London-listed companies and bought a 3 percent stake in Barclays Bank. China’s role
as an investor in the United Kingdom is likely to increase dramatically in the years ahead.

Nevertheless, Britain shares with the rest of Europe and the United States concerns over the trade imbalance with China. In June 2008, while it increased its exports to China to $800 million a month, this still ran at a massive deficit, with China exporting back to the UK over $2 billion worth of goods. Britain undertook most of its negotiations on the trade deficit through the European Union.

**Toward an Understanding**

While relations have remained warm since 1997, history continues to leave a stain. Arguments within and outside China continue over the role that Britain played during what has been labeled China’s century of humiliation. Some historians argue that the Qing empire was complacent and that it overreacted to foreign overtures for greater links. If China had been sharper and more sensible in its reaction, it might have used these links to make itself more secure and stronger. Others argue that economic and social development in China, particularly in Hong Kong, was established and expanded by the Chinese with little help from the British.

In one particular area, Tibet, Britain’s colonial past still reverberates: Britain is the only country in the world that does not recognize Chinese sovereignty in the region. In spite of, or because of, past connections, Britain and China have expressed the desire for continued relations. Britain has become a destination for large numbers of Chinese tourists, though the fact that it is not yet part of the European Schengen visa zone (and unlikely to be one for the foreseeable future) has kept these numbers limited. In 2007 British prime minister Gordon Brown and Chinese premier Wen Jiabao agreed to joint efforts in further developing Sino-British cooperation in economic, educational, and cultural matters.

**Kerry BROWN**

**Further Reading**


United Nations–China Relations

China is a founding member of the United Nations and, as a permanent member of its Security Council, holds veto power over resolutions brought before the U.N. Due to political unrest in China during the years following the U.N.'s founding in 1945, China's representation in the U.N. became a source of unresolved domestic strife and international conflict for over two decades.

The United Nations was established as an international peacekeeping organization on 26 June 1945, several weeks after the conclusion of World War II in Europe, when representatives of fifty nations, including China, met in San Francisco to sign the U.N. charter. As one of the “Big Five” Allied nations (along with the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain), China participated in negotiations leading to the U.N.'s creation at the Teheran (1943), Dumbarton Oaks (1944), and Yalta (1945) conferences. China is not only a founding member but also one of the five permanent members of the U.N.'s Security Council.

The charter-signing ceremony was staged with great fanfare and publicity. Since each delegation signed in English alphabetical order, the Chinese were first and contributed to the pageantry by preparing fresh ink for traditional brush calligraphy. In 1945 the U.N. enjoyed support from the major political organizations in China. The ten-member delegation in San Francisco was comprised of high-ranking officials representing diverse political views but all officially appointed as delegates by Republic of China (ROC) president Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) (1887-1975). The ROC’s ruling Guomindang (Nationalist Party) sent four representatives: T. V. Soong (Soong Ziwen), minister of foreign affairs; Ambassador V. K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijin); Defense Council Minister Wang Chung-hui (Wang Conghui); and Ambassador Wei Tao-ming (Wei Daoming). Dong Biwu was sent by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The State Socialist Party sent historian Carson Chang (Zhang Junmai), and Li Huang represented the Nationalist Youth Party. Also in attendance were philosopher Hu Shih (Hu Shi), Ginling College president Wu Yifang, and Hu Lin. After ratification by the ROC’s People’s Political Council, the charter was signed by President Chiang Kai-shek on 24 August 1945. Soon, however, cooperation and goodwill among political rivals in China disappeared as civil war led to a CCP victory and the fleeing of Chiang and the Guomindang government to Taiwan. Within five years of the charter’s signing, China’s representation in the U.N. would be a source of domestic strife and international conflict that would not be resolved for over two decades.

PRC-ROC Conflict over U.N. Membership

The founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949 set in motion a controversy over which government, Beijing or Taipei, should occupy China’s seat. On 18 November 1949, Beijing’s premier Zhou Enlai
(1898–1976) communicated to U.N. authorities that the PRC was the sole legal government of China and the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. He further notified the president of the General Assembly that his government repudiated the legal status of the U.N. delegation headed by Ambassador T. F. Tsiang (Jiang Tingfu) (1895–1965) and called for the immediate expulsion of Guomindang representatives. However, during the 1950s and 1960s Cold War politics prevailed when the U.S. government worked to keep its ally, the ROC headed by Chiang Kai-shek, in the U.N. while the Soviets and many Third World nations called for the PRC’s admission. Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has blamed hostility to China’s new government and “deliberate obstruction,” mainly by the United States, for preventing the PRC from assuming China’s seat despite “unremitting efforts” by the CCP beginning in 1950.

In September 1950 the U.N. General Assembly first considered the question of China’s membership when it rejected resolutions supporting the PRC sponsored by the USSR and India. The General Assembly then set up a special committee to review China’s representation, during which time the ROC held China’s seat. In 1951 the USSR repeated attempts to secure Beijing’s admission by putting forward proposals to place the question of China’s representation on the General Assembly agenda. At the time, PRC forces were fighting U.N. troops in the Korean War. After Soviet efforts failed the General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by Thailand to postpone any review of China’s representation. Meanwhile, on 1 February 1951, the U.N. voted to condemn China as aggressor in Korea and initiated a global embargo of shipments of war materiel, further isolating the PRC from the international community. From 1951 to 1960, during

A delegation from the National Committee on United States–China Relations visits the United Nations in 1973. COURTESY OF NCUSCR.
each session of the United Nations, the General Assembly approved U.S.-sponsored motions to keep the question of China’s representation off the agenda. As a result, effective deliberation of the representation question was thwarted while the CCP openly condemned certain U.N. member states, particularly the United States, for what the Chinese referred to as subversive manipulation.

Despite Beijing’s failure to secure a U.N. seat, throughout the 1950s CCP leaders maintained a positive public outlook toward the U.N. CCP representatives occasionally participated in U.N. discussions on ad hoc basis on issues of concern to China, including talks on the agenda item entitled “Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)” (1950) as well as Security Council debate on the Korean War. In 1955 Premier Zhou Enlai told delegates at the Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference that the Chinese people supported the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. In addition, many of the bilateral treaties signed by the Beijing government cited U.N. principles. By the end of the decade, however, CCP leaders began to question the value of the U.N. as a vehicle to promote international peace and openly criticized its actions, claiming, for example, that the U.N. had begun to serve the goals of “imperialism” and “neocolonialism.”

The 1960s were years of transition for Beijing’s official position toward the U.N. As more Asian and African nations won independence and joined the U.N., many of their governments called for the PRC’s admission as the legitimate government of China. In response, supporters of the ROC successfully sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly to consider China’s representation as an “important question,” thereby requiring passage by a two-thirds majority vote of member states. Such procedural changes made Beijing’s case problematic into the next decade. As a result, the PRC apparently abandoned hope of replacing the ROC, publicly accused member states of departing from the charter’s intentions, and refused to participate in ad hoc deliberations on issues involving China. In 1965 the CCP called for revisions to the U.N. Charter and proclaimed its support for the establishment of an alternative “revolutionary” United Nations organization.

Beijing’s position was influenced by two issues during the 1960s: the Sino-Soviet dispute and the development of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). China’s open break with its former ally, public by 1960, led to assertions by the Chinese that both the United States and the USSR were conspiring to keep Beijing out of the U.N. The power struggle within the CCP and turmoil associated with the Cultural Revolution kept the government focused on domestic issues. The PRC press during these years avoided the topic of China’s U.N. seat and advocated that third-world nations either not join or drop out of the U.N. By 1969, however, CCP leaders acknowledged the dangers of international isolation and the potential threat of the USSR, causing them to take another look at U.N. membership. A more moderate tone toward the U.N. was apparent in an October 1969 speech by Premier Zhou Enlai honoring Premier Alfred Raoul of the Congo, in which Zhou thanked that country for taking up China’s cause in the U.N. and advocating the expulsion of the Guomindang delegation.

The early 1970s were characterized by significant changes in China’s foreign policy that coincided with a shift in the U.N. vote on China’s representation. In 1970 General Assembly members who supported Beijing’s claim outnumbered the opposition for the first time. The ballot question on China’s resolution sponsored by eighteen member states resulted in fifty-one nations voting for the PRC and forty-nine voting against, with twenty-five abstentions. Apparently emboldened by the more widespread support, the Chinese government began to adopt new strategies aimed at winning the U.N. seat. A multifaceted campaign promoted a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Abandoning the antiforeign polemics associated with the Cultural Revolution, the CCP began courting the goodwill of dozens of nations through improved relations, increased contacts, and aid programs. After the visit of U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to China in July 1971, Beijing’s success seemed assured, causing U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to predict the likelihood of a solution to the representation conflict in favor of the PRC. At the General Assembly’s twenty-sixth session in 1971, 131 nations voted on Resolution 2758, the question of China’s seat. Seventy-six voted pro-PRC, thirty-five opposed, and seventeen abstained. PRC representatives arrived in New York and replaced those of the ROC on 11 November 1971.

Beijing’s first delegation was an experienced team. Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua (1912–1983) served as delegation head until 1976. He had represented China at several international conferences and had been present at
the U.N. in 1950 when he spoke for the PRC as ad hoc participant during Korean War debates. The vice chairman and permanent representative to the Security Council, Huang Hua, also had considerable diplomatic experience and served as advisor to Premier Zhou Enlai. Huang was the PRC’s ambassador to Ghana and Egypt during the 1960s. Other delegates included Fu Hao, Chen Chu and U.S.-educated Xiong Xianghui, all of whom held high rank within the Foreign Ministry.

**Champion of the Third World**

In his first speech before the U.N. General Assembly in November 1971, Ambassador Qiao Guanhua outlined the theme for China’s role in the U.N. He announced that “like the overwhelming majority of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, China belongs to the Third World,” pledged Beijing’s support for “oppressed peoples and nations,” and condemned the “power politics and hegemony of big nations bullying small ones or strong nations bullying weak ones.” During the early 1970s the PRC occasionally used the U.N. as a stage to air its grievances against the two “imperialist superpowers,” the United States and the USSR, but, for the most part, the Chinese advanced their national interests with a pragmatic approach to U.N. politics aimed at improving relations with member states worldwide.

China’s early voting record revealed, for the most part, Beijing’s adherence to its stated goal of championing Third World initiatives. Throughout the 1970s China’s votes were more consistent with those of poorer Third World nations than with those of either the Western or Communist worlds. The PRC garnered favor with Asian, African, and Latin American nations by supporting, for example, resolutions on the “Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,” demands by Latin American governments to extend territorial seas to 200 nautical miles, enlargement of the Economic and Social Council so as to include more developing nations, and relocation of Security Council meetings from New York to an African city. Moreover, China’s delegates were known to mingle informally with Third World colleagues, a practice in which the United States and Soviet Union participated infrequently. In addition, the U.N. became the platform for China’s critique of U.S. and Soviet positions on several contentious issues, including Middle Eastern politics and arms control, that promoted, in China’s view, “superpower hegemony.”

**Veto Power**

As a permanent member of the Security Council, China is one of five nations that holds the power to veto resolutions coming before the U.N. China’s use of the veto has been selective compared with that of the other permanent members, which together already have cast 254 vetoes. Since the founding of the U.N. China has used the veto six times, including the 1955 veto of Mongolia’s admission by the ROC on the grounds that Mongolia is a province of China. The five resolutions that the PRC vetoed are admitting Bangladesh (1972); calling (with the USSR) for a ceasefire during the Yom Kippur War (1973); sending 155 ceasefire observers to Guatemala (1997); extending the U.N. Preventative Deployment Force in Macedonia (1999); and criticizing (with Russia) Myanmar (Burma) on its human rights record (2007). Beijing used the veto to promote China’s foreign policy goals as well as to challenge many U.N. initiatives that the Chinese deem to be violations of sovereignty or territorial integrity. For example, the Beijing government vetoed the sending of U.N. peacekeeping forces to Guatemala and Macedonia because the two governments accorded diplomatic recognition to the government of Taiwan and not the PRC at the time. Pressure by China in the U.N. bore some success for Beijing as Guatemala resolved to stop pressing Taiwan’s interests in the U.N., resulting in the PRC’s lifting the veto within weeks. The Republic of Macedonia opened bilateral ties with Beijing in 2001. With the remaining three vetoes China took unpopular stands on several contentious issues.

The PRC cast its first veto on 25 August 1972, when it refused to support a Security Council resolution granting Bangladesh U.N. membership. China’s blocking the admission of a new Third World nation appeared to contradict its aim of promoting the rights of poorer nations. The Chinese, however, had argued for postponement of the vote because issues involving Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan had not been resolved, including the status of over ninety thousand Pakistani prisoners of war held by India. The Chinese accused the Soviets of

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attempting to embarrass Beijing by introducing the measure prematurely, forcing the Chinese to take an apparently hypocritical stand. China’s veto was in support of Pakistan, its ally since the 1962 invasion of China by India. Bangladesh gained a U.N. seat in September 1974 with no opposition from China.

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War was the occasion for China to cast a negative vote along with the Soviets on a resolution calling for a ceasefire, presumably in protest of the United States’ sponsorship of Israel. After the cessation of hostilities the Chinese vigorously denounced what they deemed Soviet-U.S. manipulation of the Security Council when a U.N. emergency force (UNEF II) was deployed in the Sinai Peninsula. The Security Council representative, Huang Hua, referred to UNEF II as “an attempt to occupy Arab territories.” China, however, never blocked the establishment of U.N. peacekeepers for the Middle East and either abstained or was absent from Security Council votes on the issue.

The 2007 veto of a U.S.-sponsored Security Council resolution criticizing the government of Myanmar for its human rights record is consistent with Beijing’s view that the U.N. should not interfere in the internal affairs of member states. The resolution garnered support from nine Security Council members. Russia and South Africa also cast negative votes, while three others abstained. Beijing has maintained that the U.N. has no mandate to sanction governments for actions within their own borders.

Abstentions as Policy

Beijing’s sparse use of the veto since 1971 does not necessarily reflect China’s approval of Security Council actions that passed because the Chinese delegation failed to cast a negative vote. The Chinese have abstained or chosen not to participate in votes on many controversies. The strategy of abstaining is consistent with Beijing’s unwillingness to approve U.N. initiatives, such as peacekeeping forces or sanctions, that infringe upon a nation’s sovereignty or that could alienate China’s friends in the international organization. By not using its veto, China does no damage to its relations with either side in the conflict and also allows the U.N. to act.

The PRC has been critical of U.N. peacekeeping forces, claiming that they violate a nation’s sovereignty. The use
of sanctions, the Chinese argue, can be a “double-edged sword” that harms innocent civilians along with the target government. The Chinese have not, however, consistently upheld these principles. Beginning in 1990 the Chinese have deployed military personnel to thirteen U.N. peacekeeping operations. China did not veto Security Council Resolution 1333, which placed sanctions on Afghanistan in 2000, nor did China veto any of the Security Council proposals since 2004 that imposed sanctions on Sudan, a state with which China has close economic ties.

China’s actions during the first Persian Gulf War are another example of the strategic use of the abstention. The U.N. has authorized the use of force only twice—in 1950 in the Korean War and in 1990 against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. China approved the eleven Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq’s aggression during the first Persian Gulf War, including the imposition of sanctions, but condemned the use of U.N.-sponsored military force against Iraq. Nevertheless, the Chinese chose not to veto military intervention. China’s selectivity in its use of the veto has caused many Third World leaders to question whether China’s interests will continue to coincide with those of poorer nations.

Millennium Challenges

On 8 September 2000, the U.N. overwhelmingly approved the Millennium Declaration, whose objective is to promote peace, security and disarmament. It also pledged to reduce by half the number of people with incomes of less than one dollar a day by 2015. With its phenomenal economic growth, China is on target to meet the economic targets established by the U.N., but other challenges for the twenty-first century may not be so easily resolved.

Since 1991 the government of Taiwan has indicated its desire to return to the United Nations. In 2004 Taiwan’s president, Chen Shui-bian, made the provocative claim, “Taiwan is a sovereign state, and should join the United Nations by the name ‘Taiwan.’” As a result, the controversy of China’s representation has been revisited. Taiwan’s allies have attempted to put the question of Taiwan’s inclusion on the General Assembly’s agenda but have failed to procure the required votes. Beijing remains steadfast in its position that Taiwan is part of China. Since the PRC can veto any resolution that acknowledges Taiwan’s sovereignty, the likelihood of Taiwan’s gaining a seat in the U.N. is dim.

Beijing has also promised to veto efforts to enlarge the Security Council. In 2005 four nations referred to as the “Group of Four” (G-4)—India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil—have called for increasing the Security Council from its present fifteen members to twenty-five. The G-4, moreover, has demanded the veto. The Chinese claim that the proposal fails to uphold the interests of most developing nations. It also diminishes the clout of the original “Big Five” founders of the United Nations. As China’s rise as a global power continues, China’s role in the United Nations will evolve.

June GRASSO

Further Reading

United States–China Relations

China and the United States have recently forged close economic ties, but relations between the two nations have often been marred by political tension. Beginning in the eighteenth century when the U.S. emerged as a nation during China’s Qing dynasty, through the Nationalist period, and for much of Chinese Communist Party rule, the two nations often clashed.

In February 1784 the Empress of China left New York harbor on its historic voyage to China’s southeastern port of Guangzhou (Canton). In August it became the first U.S. ship to trade in China at a time when Europe had already dominated the China trade for decades. By the turn of the nineteenth century an average of twenty-five U.S. vessels arrived in Guangzhou annually, and continued to grow even during the periods of upheaval which typified the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twenty-first century China became the United States’ number one trading partner, surpassing European Union nations and powerful neighbors such as Japan. The development of U.S.-China relations, however, has not always been smooth, and political entanglements continue to complicate relations. Both economic and political conflicts have been the source of controversy for the governments of both nations, but throughout much of the comparatively brief history of the United States, commercial relations have played a paramount role in U.S.-China relations.

Competition with the British for Opium Trade

U.S. traders arrived in China in the late eighteenth century as relative newcomers who benefited from inroads made by their European counterparts. Like the Europeans, U.S. traders had few commodities to sell to the self-sufficient Chinese, so they had to use silver, primarily Spanish silver dollars, to pay for Chinese tea and silk until they, like the British earlier, turned to selling opium. Before 1820 U.S. traders had a profitable monopoly in Turkish opium that allowed them to take a small share of Guangzhou’s market from the British East India Company, which sold opium originating in India, a British colony. However, when British “free” or private traders began competing for Turkish opium sources, the U.S. traders found themselves at a competitive disadvantage because U.S. ships were prohibited from carrying opium directly from British India to China. Nevertheless, U.S. dealers became adept at procuring opium stocks from a variety of sources, and in the years leading up to the First Opium War one U.S. company, Russell & Company, was ranked third among foreign firms dealing in Indian opium in Guangzhou.

Attempts by the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) at halting opium sales led to war and consequently the “unequal treaties” that permitted foreign merchants and missionaries in China’s coastal cities. Still in the shadow of the Europeans, U.S. traders gained advantages from the terms of the treaties. The “most favored nation” clause in the Treaty of Nanjing ending the First Opium War granted foreign powers in China a share in whatever concessions
were granted to any one of them. Extraterritoriality, a legal provision that allowed foreigners to ignore China’s laws, made trade in opium possible without fear of prosecution. U.S. citizens and Europeans in China during the decades after the opium wars engaged in commercial and missionary activities, but, unlike the Europeans, the U.S. government did not seek territory in China. That difference in policy would influence U.S.-China relations into the twentieth century.

Burlingame Mission and Its Consequences

The Second Opium War concluded with China’s defeat by the British and French, who then demanded that the Qing rulers establish permanent foreign embassies in Beijing. The Treaties of Tianjin, signed with several European states and the United States, forced the opening of Beijing to foreign residence. In response the Chinese government created the Foreign Office (Zongli Yamen) to handle diplomatic matters. The first U.S. minister sent to Beijing was Anson Burlingame, appointed in 1861 by President Abraham Lincoln, who expected Burlingame to ensure U.S. interests by defending China’s territorial integrity in the face of European colonial expansion. In 1867, in an unusual move, Burlingame was recruited by the Foreign Office to head China’s first delegation abroad, serving as an official representative of the Qing throne. The three-year-long Burlingame mission featured visits to foreign capitals and other points of interest. One accomplishment included the negotiation of an amendment to the Treaty of Tianjin, called the Seward-Burlingame Treaty (1868), asserting that the United States did not have territorial designs on China and providing freedom for citizens of both nations to emigrate and trade without discrimination.

The Seward-Burlingame Treaty was denounced by members of the U.S. Congress from western states who, responding to intense nativism, worked to curtail Chinese immigration into the United States. In 1880 the treaty was revised when both Beijing and Washington agreed that the U.S. government could suspend but not prohibit Chinese immigration. Congress responded in 1882 by passing the first of the Chinese “exclusion laws” that suspended Chinese immigration for a decade. In 1892 California congressman Thomas Geary proposed an extension of the law for another ten years in the Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States, also known as the “Geary Act.” Despite protests by the Qing throne and Chinese-Americans, the Geary Act passed and was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1893. In 1902 Congress renewed the exclusion act with no terminal date and included the requirement that all Chinese in the United States possess a certificate of residence or face deportation. (The exclusion laws were not repealed until the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1943.) The restrictions placed on Chinese by the United States were in stark contrast to simultaneous attempts by the U.S. government to protect U.S. interests in China.

Open Door Policy

By the close of the nineteenth century the Qing dynasty faced increasing pressure from imperialist powers, especially after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The years from 1895 to 1900 have been referred to as the time of the “Slicing of the Melon” when China was carved into spheres of influence by Europe and
Japan. In 1899 the U.S. government responded to China’s situation with the concept of an “open door” aimed at protecting U.S. trade by promoting equality of economic opportunity in China. In 1899 U.S. Secretary of State John Hay sent the Open Door Notes to governments with interests in China, including Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan. Hay was successful in securing tacit acceptance of the principles of free and open markets throughout China, but within a year the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion (Yi Ho Tuan Movement) threatened to negate the agreements. As foreign armies fought their way inland to rescue their citizens in Beijing, Hay feared that the creation of colonies throughout China would follow the defeat of the Boxers and their supporters in the Qing royal family. In the Open Door Circular (1900) Hay reiterated the need to maintain open access to markets and emphasized that all nations should respect the “territorial and administrative integrity” of China. The Open Door agreements were not binding but were upheld by the United States over the next several decades.

When the Open Door policy was initiated, the United States had just begun to expand into the Pacific with the annexation of Hawaii (1898) and the acquisition of the Philippines and Guam from Spain (1899). Access to China’s markets served U.S. interests at a time when other powers, such as Russia and Japan, threatened to close their territories in China to foreign trade. After the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, the Open Door policy expanded to include the goal of preserving China’s independence. In 1915 Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan announced the Non-Recognition Doctrine after Japan attempted to colonize China with the Twenty-One Demands presented to President Yuan Shikai. Because of its commitment to the Open Door policy, the U.S. government refused to recognize any Sino-Japanese treaty that violated its principles.

The conclusion of World War I in 1918 brought new challenges to U.S.-China relations. Because China was an ally of the United States, many Chinese assumed that their country would benefit from having contributed to the victorious side. In particular, Chinese intellectuals counted on an international commitment to President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, one of which guaranteed “national self-determination.” But the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were disappointing; Japan won former German possessions in Shandong. The failure of the United States to uphold China’s territorial integrity reflected the complexity of the international situation, including Japan’s secret treaties with European powers, Wilson’s focus on Japan’s joining the League of Nations, and the timing of a joint British-U.S.-Japanese invasion of Siberia. The Chinese, however, responded to the rebuff with the widespread, violent antiforeign demonstrations of the May Fourth Movement (1919). Some of China’s
intellectuals then rejected U.S.-style democracy and turned to Bolshevism for a new model.

**Ties to the Guomindang**

The absence of political unity characteristic of the warlord decade (1916–1927) was relieved to some extent with the defeat by the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) of southern warlords and the establishment of the Republic of China’s (ROC) new capital at Nanjing in 1927. China’s new government, headed by the Guomindang’s Chiang Kai-shek, immediately sought to improve relations with Western nations. The close ties that Chiang forged with the United States produced an alliance that lasted for decades.

In 1927 Chiang embarked on a quest to alter China’s image from that of hapless victim of imperialism to that of a united and modern nation. He undertook a personal image change when he divorced his wives and married U.S.-educated Meiling Soong in a Christian ceremony in December 1927. Known as “Madame Chiang,” Soong was a political asset and a passionate advocate for an independent, Guomindang-controlled China. Beginning in the 1930s she raised money and lobbied for support from wealthy U.S. citizens and the U.S. Congress. Fluent in English, Christian, modern and attractive, Soong symbolized what many in the United States hoped would be China’s future. In 1937 Chiang and Soong were named *Time* magazine’s “Man and Woman of the Year.”

Despite U.S. support, Chiang’s government faced insurmountable challenges during the 1930s as Japan colonized Chinese territory, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became the Guomindang’s primary enemy. Although the U.S. government approved of the Guomindang’s anti-Communist posture, concern over Japanese aggression in Asia took precedence for U.S.-China policy. The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria and subsequent creation of the puppet state of Manzhouguo led the United States to reemphasize the Doctrine of Non-Recognition. When Japan’s large-scale military operations in China began in 1937, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull offered that the United States serve as a neutral ground for representatives from Nanjing and Tokyo to address the conflict. After Tokyo ignored the gesture, Hull announced the Doctrine of Non-Intervention aimed at keeping U.S. forces out of international conflicts while heaping condemnation on Japan for its aggression in China.

Japan’s attack on Hawaii’s Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and subsequent U.S. entrance into World War II caused President Franklin D. Roosevelt to strengthen ties to the Guomindang. In 1943 the United States negotiated a treaty on equal terms with the ROC that relinquished U.S. extraterritorial privileges and provided the United States with bases in China to facilitate the fight against Japan. Roosevelt pushed to elevate China’s international standing, making Chiang one of the “Big Five” Allies. Nevertheless, U.S.-China cooperation during World War II was troubled.

In March 1942 U.S. Army Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, Roosevelt’s choice to command the China-Burma-India theater of war, arrived in Chongqing, China’s wartime capital. Stilwell was initially welcomed by Chiang and appointed chief of staff, but their relationship soon became strained. For Stilwell conditions in the Guomindang army were cause for dismay. Civil conflict, tentative control over warlord forces, corruption, erratic supply lines, and overwhelming Japanese strength made the outlook bleak. Despite assistance from the American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers, who flew supplies to Chinese forces, the United States could not provide the logistical support needed to make the Guomindang army effective. As the war wore on, Stilwell opposed Chiang’s
tactics that he deemed defensive and criticized deployment of forces against Communist strongholds. In September 1944 Roosevelt urged Chiang to put Stilwell in command of Chinese ground units. When Chiang refused, Stilwell was replaced with Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, but relations between Roosevelt and Chiang cooled.

Japan’s defeat was followed by the repatriation of more than 1 million Japanese troops and the airlift of a half-million Guomindang forces to cities throughout China by the U.S. military. Then the United States stepped in to avert civil war by sending General George Marshall to mediate between Chiang and the CCP. The Marshall mission attempted to create a coalition Guomindang-CCP government with Chiang as head, but after talks broke down in 1946 civil war began. The United States sent to the Guomindang aid worth more than $2 billion, not including the nearly $2 billion in aid delivered during World War II. In 1948 the defeated Chiang and his government fled to the island of Taiwan.

**Recognition for the Republic of China**

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 was a blow to those in the United States who expected victory for their wartime ally, but the administration of President Harry Truman, aware of Chinese conditions, had predicted a CCP victory. In the State Department’s white paper on China released in August 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote: “The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States.” In the months after the CCP victory, Truman adopted a “wait and see” policy, assessing whether the United States would recognize Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong’s government and establish commercial ties, as it had in 1948 with the Communist head of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito. Many factors, however, worked against possible conciliation. An intense “Red scare” had reemerged in the United States. Provoked by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s allegations of Communists within the State Department, conservatives in Congress vehemently denounced the Truman administration for being “soft” on Communism. When the CCP signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950, Truman’s critics rushed to exaggerate his failures.

For Truman China’s entrance into the Korean War (1950–1953) ruined any chance for normal relations with Beijing and assured continued recognition of the ROC. The Korean War caused Truman to declare a national state of emergency, increase draft calls, urge the United Nations (U.N.) to condemn China as an aggressor nation, and station the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Premier Zhou Enlai denounced the action as “armed aggression against the territory of China.” Meanwhile, Moscow’s efforts to seat the PRC in the U.N. were blocked by the United States. In December 1950 the United States announced a total trade embargo on the PRC that would last for twenty-one years.

For two decades the United States recognized the ROC while adhering to the official position that “the
regime in Peiping” (Beijing) was not China’s government. Beginning in April 1951 the United States resumed direct military aid to the Guomindang. In 1954 the United States signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, followed by the passage of the Formosa [Taiwan] Resolution (1955), which guaranteed protection against armed attack. U.S.-China relations became inextricably tied to the intensification of the Cold War. U.S. policies were aimed at stopping the spread of Communism, while China policies focused on supporting the “revolutionary struggles” of former colonial peoples. In 1965 People’s Liberation Army commander Lin Biao described the United States as “the most rabid aggressor in human history” in his essay “On People’s War.”

Ping-Pong Diplomacy

The unlikely champion of opening ties with the PRC was President Richard M. Nixon, once a hard-line anti-Communist associate of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Nixon’s historic journey to Beijing in 1972 opened a dialogue when both sides saw advantages to ending the decades-long feud. China’s aging leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, in the years after the violent and divisive Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the failed coup attempt by Lin Biao (1971), began to moderate their views, even reappointing to government positions once-jailed associates such as Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, hostilities with Moscow made China increasingly isolated and vulnerable. On the U.S. side Nixon began sending positive signals to Beijing as early as 1969 when he sought to reevaluate U.S. policy in Asia and end the conflict with China’s ally Vietnam. The first break came in 1971 with the start of “people’s diplomacy” after the Chinese invited the U.S. table tennis team to Beijing. U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger followed up with a secret trip to China, arranging Nixon’s future visit and announcing that the United States would no longer block Beijing’s entrance into the U.N. In February 1972 Nixon and Zhou Enlai issued a joint statement, the Shanghai Communiqué, outlining the provisions for establishing diplomatic and commercial ties. Because no agreement could be reached on the future of Taiwan, separate statements summarized each government’s position. Full diplomatic relations between the United States and China were officially restored in January 1979, but Congress responded by passing the Taiwan Relations Act (April 1979), which encouraged continued economic, cultural, and military ties with Taiwan.

Two Superpowers

Cooperate and Compete

Beginning in 1978 economic reforms by Premier Deng Xiaoping opened China’s markets to the world. Soon China’s economy boomed from exports and foreign investment. U.S. citizens were quick to take advantage of opportunities once denied them and embraced new possibilities while ignoring, for the most part, the reality of the CCP’s strict authoritarianism. U.S.-China commercial ties, including joint ventures and buyouts of U.S. firms, rapidly expanded, and by 2005 China became the United States’ number one trading partner. But with closer economic ties came conflict. Citing complaints of closed markets, rampant infringement of copyright laws, and government crackdowns on dissidents, the United States blocked China’s initial bid to join the World Trade Organization in 1997. Eventually China’s entrance in 2001 gave Chinese greater access to member states’ markets and contributed to a trade surplus with the United States of nearly $300 billion in 2007.

With the Cold War’s conclusion the United States became the sole superpower, but China’s ascendance as a potential rival in east Asia is apparent. As China reaches superpower status, it will challenge U.S. hegemony (influence) in the Pacific. U.S.-China relations can be described as both cooperative and competitive. On the one hand, for example, Beijing was successful in curtailing North Korean nuclear proliferation after Chinese president Hu Jintao led six-nation talks that proved more effective at reining in North Korea than had earlier U.S. threats. On the other hand, unresolved issues, such as Taiwan’s future, continue to loom. The United States remains committed to defend Taiwan from military attack. The outlook for the twenty-first century appears to be characterized by close commercial ties, political disagreements, and strategic rivalry for the United States and China.

Recent events that continue to influence public opinion in China include the accidental 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the United States and
the forced landing of a U.S. spy plane on Hainan Island on 1 April 2001, as well as U.S. and other Western protests during the Beijing Olympic torch relay, all of which provoked a nationalist backlash both in China and from Chinese people living overseas. The U.S. plan to sell $6.5 billion of advanced weaponry to Taiwan announced in October 2008 also caused negative reactions in China, even though tension over Taiwan, the most important challenge to U.S.-China relations since 1949, had eased after PRC-Taiwan relations began a new phase with the election of Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008.

During the U.S. elections of 2008, the trade deficit and job outsourcing were prominent in the public discussion, and product and food safety were much commented on in the press along with extensive coverage of human rights and Tibet-related protests before the Olympic Games. These issues and differences of perspective continue to affect U.S.-China discussions.

The thirtieth anniversary of the “normalization” of U.S.-China relations was on 1 January 2009, and 1 March 2009 marked thirty years since the U.S. Embassy reopened in Beijing. Many celebratory events were held in the United States and in China to bring together those who were involved in the events leading to normalization with younger leaders in the diplomatic, academic, and business communities. Initiatives such as the Strategic Economy Dialogue started under President George W. Bush draw support from a broad spectrum because both countries and leaders around the globe recognize that in spite of differences the cooperation of the United States and China on the global economic crisis, climate change, and terrorism is essential to future global stability.
But tensions between the two countries escalated again just one week after the celebratory events on 1 March. An American surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, and five Chinese ships were involved in a military confrontation 60 miles off the coast of Hainan Island in the South China Sea on 8 March 2009. Director of Naval Intelligence Donald Blair called it the “most serious” dispute since the April 2001 EP-3 incident. Both sides have insisted their actions were justified; U.S. military leaders and policymakers met soon after the incident to discuss its ramifications on U.S.-China relations.

June GRASSO

Further Reading


University Education

China's university system, the world's largest, has the fifth-largest international-student enrollment in the world. Once funded solely by the state, today universities must raise an increasing proportion of their operating funds from such sources as tuition fees, research grants, endowment gifts, and income from university-run enterprises.

As China's economy has liberalized and grown, enrollments in China's institutes of higher education have been shooting up, with an unprecedented expansion just in the past decade. In 1990, only 3.3 percent of the age cohort between eighteen and twenty-two benefited from any form of higher education. This percentage reached 7.2 percent in 1995, 12.5 percent in 2000, 15 percent in 2002 (thus reaching the internationally acknowledged threshold of higher education for that age cohort), and 23 percent in 2007, with roughly 27 million students enrolled in 2008 in what has become the world's largest higher education system. The expansion of access to higher education in all subjects is an essential component to developing skilled workers who will be able to contribute to China's global ambitions. In fact, China is unique in educational history as it simultaneously pushes for rapid enrollment growth, institutes new governance structures, and seeks to build world-class universities.

Decentralization & Diversification

This rise in China's higher education system in the twenty-first century is qualitatively different from the rise it experienced in the 1950s under Soviet tutelage. The growth back then occurred within the parameters of detailed planning for a socialist economy and resulted in highly specialized institutions that trained personnel for each sector of the economy. The whole system was regulated from above, with minimal autonomy given to individual institutions or regions. Now the Chinese government has been gradually moving away from a centralized model of governance, in which it controlled the detailed operations of higher education institutions. As the numbers of institutions and students grew, it became increasingly difficult for the state to exercise control in a way that was compatible with the growing market economy.

As a result, the government began to develop the legal framework that would designate universities as independent legal entities and to establish the mechanism on which the universities' managerial autonomy could rest. The legal framework would allow universities to set their own strategic goals and define their own academic focus (including the establishment of new specializations) in order to respond to the increasing competition, and also to control their own resources. The architecture for a less centralized higher education system began to emerge in the late 1990s and was enshrined in the Higher Education Law that took effect on 1 January 1999.
A new and decentralized higher education structure, in which provincial governments play principal roles, has taken shape in China. The boundaries among different types of institutions have blurred, with universities now being allowed to add programs of their own choice. As a result of these changes is the impulse toward more comprehensive patterns of knowledge, with all higher education institutions seeking to broaden their curricular coverage. This has involved quite a remarkable development of social sciences and humanities programs in institutions originally designated to teach highly specialized technical subjects. The rationale of current reform seems to be to make “comprehensive universities” the norm, and to a large extent this trend has been driven by market forces that reward expanded enrollments.

The diversification also has implications for the financing mechanisms of higher education. Chinese universities used to be solely funded by the state, but today they must raise an increasing proportion of their operating funds from such non-governmental sources as tuition fees, research grants, services, endowment gifts, and income from university-run enterprises. Strategically, the state now concentrates resources on a small number of elite universities, while encouraging all other institutions to mobilize local resources through student fees and income-generating activities.

The Ambition for World-Class Status

This dramatic change in the size of China’s higher education system also has qualitative dimensions. The Chinese government launched programs, such as Project 21/1 in 1993, to enable one hundred top universities to reach world-class (elite) standards in the twenty-first century. Since 1998, Project 98/5 has been providing additional funding to a smaller number of top institutions. (It was named for the date of the centennial anniversary of Peking University, May 1998, since the project was announced shortly after that event.) The universities included in Project 98/5 were initially nine in number and have expanded to thirty-nine in 2009. The country’s two top universities, Peking University and Tsinghua University, are exclusively funded by the central government (getting ¥1.8 billion each for the first three-year cycle of the program), while the rest are funded by the Ministry of Education with matching funds from multiple sources at lower levels. The top echelon universities of the system enjoy significant advantages from the extra resources provided under the elite-university development projects and carry out most of the graduate education and research across the whole higher education system.

Chinese higher education institutions are being structured in a hierarchical way according to their functions and goals. On the top are the national elite universities that focus on research, mainly those in Project 21/1 and particularly those in Project 98/5. They educate the majority of doctoral students, in addition to master’s and bachelor-degree students. They are designated to function as the “national team” that will move China’s capacity for innovation to a higher level, play a leading role in performing research activities that are of great importance to national development and security, and to collaborate in international research efforts as well. The universities at the second rank are oriented to both research and teaching, mainly educating master’s and bachelor students, with doctoral students only in a few specific disciplines. The universities at the third rank are those that are fundamentally teaching-oriented, training mainly undergraduates. Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy is a new tier of institutions, the higher vocational college, providing only two-to-three-year sub-degree programs. Their number has grown rapidly since 1999, when the central government delegated authority over approving and establishing such colleges to local governments at the provincial level.

The last two categories constitute the majority of China’s higher education institutions, and they have increased their enrollment dramatically, taking on the main burden of enrollment expansion while the elite universities have played a mainly symbolic role. The deliberate policy of creating a hierarchical structure of higher education, combined with the integration of curricular offerings, serves China’s needs to address both global competition and domestic demands. With this approach China seems to be able to maintain the world’s largest higher education system, and nurture a few players at a global level.
Academic Autonomy

Recent reforms have made possible a higher degree of autonomy than has been seen since the revolution of 1949. University autonomy is usually viewed as an important condition for the protection of academic freedom, and there can be little doubt that academic freedom has also increased greatly in recent years in China. Nevertheless, China’s socialist government is still intensely concerned about maintaining “stability” in the face of the rapid economic transformation under way, and it still exercises considerable control over China’s press and publishing industry. For their part, Chinese scholars have never found it easy to limit themselves to critical comment in their fields of study; academic criticism tends to overflow into political and social arenas, as happened in the tragedy of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Given these opposing tendencies, the road to academic freedom is likely to be an arduous one.

In spite of the constraints on academic freedom that the government places on them, China’s universities have become global actors, capable of holding their own in international circles of research and scholarship in many fields of the natural sciences as well as in some social and professional areas of knowledge. They already have well-established patterns for offering support to countries in Africa through the training of students and through bilateral projects, and they have recently begun a series of dialogues with leading scientists and intellectuals in India to share ideas and perspectives on Asian responsibility for global development. It remains to be seen when they will be accepted as genuinely equal partners with universities in Europe and North America.

Characteristics of an Emerging Chinese University Model

Despite controversies around quality and equity issues in the rapid expansion of Chinese higher education, as well as some continuing constraints on academic freedom, a number of characteristics can be detected that might signal the emergence of a Chinese model of the university. China has a rich history of education, and some aspects of its traditional education philosophy and pedagogy are evident in its contemporary methods of teaching. As more and more Chinese universities organize their curriculum around a core of basic subjects and emphasize interdisciplinary education, they are deliberately connecting reform to their own educational traditions.

China is perhaps one of the first systems to take a bold step to concentrate public research resources in an effort to create world-class universities. Its world-class university development plans, Project 21/1 and Project 98/5, might be seen to have triggered a worldwide competition. Related to this competition, the Academic Ranking of World Universities, launched by China’s Shanghai Jiao Tong University since 2003, has quickly gained international prominence. It is now widely viewed as providing a legitimate evaluation of universities worldwide.

Chinese universities exhibit a high level of engagement with national and local development and thus can be seen as providing services for economic and community development. This can be regarded as a legacy from the planned economy, which formed self-enclosed higher education “systems” that related to various sectors in the economy, but it turns out to be a strength in the market context. The recent expansion in size has dramatically enhanced the capacity at both the institutional and system level to have an impact on national and local social development and economic growth. Most Chinese universities are engaged in unique industry–university relations or the so-called integration of production, teaching, and research, which enables the universities to contribute directly to building China’s capacity for innovation capacity and its infrastructure. In particular, top universities are facilitating a transformation of the national economy from one with a solely industrial focus to a more knowledge-based economy through a variety of ways, including the creation of a series of science and technology parks in their proximities, which combine education, research, and industry. The most famous of these, Zhongguancun Science and Technology Zone, which is often called “China’s Silicon Valley,” surrounds China’s two most renowned universities, Peking and Tsinghua, in northwestern Beijing.

In addition, China has been extremely active in internationalizing higher education. The past thirty years witnessed 1.2 million Chinese students and scholars studying
abroad, among whom nearly 320,000 have completed their study programs and returned to China, with the result that the majority of leaders and many faculty in top universities have had international academic exposure. China has also recently become the world’s fifth-ranking destination for international students. Chinese universities have responded to globalization in other ways as well, such as through active participation in international university consortia. For instance, Peking University is an active member of the prestigious International Alliance of Research Universities (IARU), along with the Australian National University, ETH Zurich, the National University of Singapore, the University of California at Berkeley, Cambridge University, the University of Copenhagen Oxford University, the University of Tokyo and Yale University.

Qiang ZHA

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Urban Geography

Chéngshì dìlǐ 城市地理

Urban geography addresses the development of cities—from their origins and organizational principles to their evolving infrastructures and policies. China’s urban development has been most dramatically affected by shifts in its economic strategies, from a focus on national self-sufficiency to an increasingly active participation in the free market.

China boasts the largest urban population in the world (516.57 million in 2005) and a long history of urban development; its earliest city can be traced back at least 4,000 years. China also has more officially designated urban centers than any other country: 661 cities and close to 20,000 towns in 2005.

Cities in the Pre-Socialist Era

The earliest Chinese cities were built as administrative centers and were hierarchical in nature, with the national capital at the top, then several province/prefecture-level administrative centers at the next level down, followed by many local centers, and then, finally, by outposts such as county towns. After a period of significant commercialization of agriculture and coastal trade in South China in the tenth and eleventh century, commerce-based urban centers emerged and grew rapidly, adding another layer of cities to the preexisting administrative cities. In the vast countryside of the more developed regions, large numbers of market towns, either permanent or periodic, came into being as a result of the rise in agricultural productivity. These cities were organized based on the economics of trade.

Some of world’s largest cities of the time, such as today’s Hangzhou, emerged in China in the thirteenth century. Most preindustrial Chinese cities, however, were smaller in size and population and were set up largely as extensions of the rural economy. Unlike medieval cities in Europe, traditional Chinese cities never developed into autonomous political entities but remained seats of the centralized imperial power. Chinese cities were where government officials, wealthy landlords, merchants, and their families and servants lived. The cities also housed other service personnel such as artisans, sojourning traders, and entertainers. In general, different social groups lived in segregated quarters of the city.

A different genre of cities and towns (about 100 in total), called treaty ports, came into existence or grew rapidly in size in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to a new set of political and economic imperatives. These port cities (including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hankou) were forced open for international trade under various unequal treaties whose terms were dictated by Western powers and Japan in this era of imperialism and colonialism. Hong Kong had a different political fate as a ceded territory to Britain, but the nature of its growth was very similar to many other treaty ports.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these cities also became the locus of modern China’s industrialization and Westernization. Extraterritorial
concessions controlled by Western countries were set up in many of them—a reflection of foreign dominance. The concessions were totally outside China’s legal and often administrative control. With a large foreign and domestic migrant population and a greater diversity of economic activities, the spatial social structure of the treaty ports was quite different from that of the “indigenous” cities.

**Urbanization from 1949 to 1978**

The industrialization strategy China adopted following the Communist victory in China’s civil war had tremendous impact on the urban geography of the country. The new government pursued an autarkic development strategy (one geared at national economic self-sufficiency) that put emphasis on promoting domestic industry—especially heavy industry—at the expense of agriculture; it also gave priority to production over consumption in an attempt to build a strong defense industry and catch up with the West in modernization. Achievement was often measured in terms of the physical output of steel and other industrial and military products. As part of this strategy, urbanization was curtailed in the 1960s and 1970s through the household registration (hukou) system, and other mechanisms tied to employment and housing. As a consequence, while China had a high industrial growth rate from 1950 to 1980, the rate of urban growth was comparatively low. Similarly, relative to China’s level of industrialization, its percentage of urban population was low by world standards.

This approach substantially curtailed the development of the service sector in cities and turned many cities into “producer cities,” cities heavily skewed toward manufacturing. The approach also fostered the emergence or growth of a large number of mining- and manufacturing-based cities, many of which were located in interior regions. The Third Front industrialization program in the period between 1965 and 1975 also pushed industrialization and the associated urbanization further inland. Inevitably, these producer cities became highly polluted. China’s command economy also reinforced the hierarchical nature of its cities. For example, provincial capital cities, as the centers of regional administration and economies, increased their dominance and became “primate cities” in the regional economy.

During this period, many elements of the urban landscape were designed to serve a specific political purpose and/or to showcase the grandeur of socialism. In almost all large and medium-sized cities, government buildings dominated the city center, large public squares were designed mainly for political gatherings, and statues of Mao were erected in the middle of traffic roundabouts in the

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**A worker at a Heavy Machinery Plant in Beijing. Although China’s industrial production increased rapidly during the beginning of the Communist era, China’s urban centers remained relatively small. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.**
city center. Chinese city centers during this period usually had a low residential population density.

In this era, the danwei (work unit) was the constituent unit of urban society and economy. A danwei is a state-owned enterprise or an institution, such as a government agency, university, hospital, or military office, but it functioned more like a comprehensive cellular economic and social unit. A large danwei often occupied a walled compound, with one or more normally guarded gates, and were divided into workplace and residential areas. The residential structure was typically composed of rows of functionally and visually homogeneous low-rise buildings. Basic facilities and services, such as hospitals or clinics, grocery stores, cinemas, and dining halls, were also set up near the residential area.

The danwei served as a mechanism through which the state provided social services such as child care, education, employment, marriage, housing, health care, and retirement benefits. The state also exercised its social and political control through the danwei. Even leisure activities, which consisted largely of political studies, sports, and watching movies, were organized by the danwei. It is not an exaggeration to say that every urban worker was tied to the danwei from the cradle to the grave. Urban land was owned by the state and was assigned to the danwei at no charge. Urban housing was considered to be a welfare benefit, which was mainly provided at a nominal rent by work units and local housing authorities. Urban residents had few housing choices and had to wait for subsidized public housing, which they received based on a set of criteria, such as seniority, job rank, and marital status.

Without competition from a private real estate market, the state had little incentive to invest much in building new residential housing, and a severe housing shortage developed as China’s population increased. The quality and maintenance of urban housing were also very poor; the average per capita living space in the late 1970s was below four square meters. Cities remained compact, and there was not much suburbanization.

Even though the official ideology was to construct a socialist society with a uniform spatial and social organization, and the physical settings might have appeared to be similar, the social space varied considerably because work-units were ranked according to status and access to resources. This social differentiation was reflected in many aspects of life, such as the quality of housing, schools, and medical benefits.

Urban Geography in the Reform Era (1978–present)

The late 1970s saw a significant change in China’s economic strategy. The autarkic approach was finally abandoned in
favor of producing goods for export. By the end of the twentieth century, China rose to become the “world’s factory.” At the same time, measures to marketize the economy were also gradually introduced, though even today the government still plays a decisive role in running the economy. With China’s rapid economic growth, cities have also grown and changed, one major change being the higher rates of rural-urban mobility (mostly in the form of “temporary” migration). By the 1990s, many large cities became increasingly cosmopolitan and diverse socially and culturally, and marked by unbridled consumerism.

“LETTING SOME PEOPLE AND SOME PLACES GET RICH FIRST”

Different regions and cities have fared differently in the reform era, depending on their development history and, more importantly, government policies. Under Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “letting some people and some places get rich first,” China’s development focus shifted to the coastal cities. Shortly after the beginning of the reform, four cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen) on the south coast were established in 1980 as special economic zones; Hainan joined this category in 1998. In 1984, fourteen cities on the east coast were designated as “coastal open cities.” The central government established economic development policies that favored these cities in an effort to attract foreign investment. Their good location and access to the international market and human resources has led to booming economic growth for these coastal cities.

THE WESTERN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The development gap between the coastal zone and the interior has widened and become a major public and policy concern. In 1999, the government announced its Western Development Program, which was designed to channel more attention and resources to the Western provinces in order to reduce these regional gaps. At present, the core of the Chinese spatial economy is concentrated in three major regions centered on several large cities: the Pearl River Delta region (including the cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Zhuhai), the Changjiang Delta region (based on the cities of Shanghai, Kunshan, Suzhou, Wuxi, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Ningbo), and the Bohai Gulf region (Beijing, Tianjin, and Dalian). Despite the establishment of the Western Development Program, the
western region and its cities are not an economic center, and the devastation wrought by the earthquake in May 2008 has created a further setback.

**Local Autonomy**

Fiscal decentralization since the 1980s has granted local governments (cities) more economic and political autonomy, and they have played a greater role in the national economy. Indeed, some have argued that local autonomy has brought *de facto* competitive federalism to China, but that is not an accurate reading of the situation. The hierarchical system of urban administrative jurisdictions means that local governments are evaluated by their supervisory units. Because the governments directly participate in the economy and because economic growth (fairly narrowly defined) is the prime objective of the central government, the criteria by which local cities are evaluated are necessarily heavily tilted to this set of rather parochial economic indices, such as various GDP indices, budgetary revenue, and foreign investment. To reach those targets, individual local governments adopt practices and policies that often sacrifice other public goods (such as the environment and labor welfare) and the broader regional and even national interests.

The pursuit of parochial interests within a small jurisdiction often leads to local protectionism as well as costly duplications. The hierarchical nature of the architecture of the administrative system is not congenial to horizontal cooperation. Answerable only to upper-tier governments and lacking a means to deal with neighboring jurisdictions, local governments often have to appeal to the upper-level governments to resolve interjurisdictional conflicts.

**The Transformed Landscape**

Rapid urban and economic growth has not only changed the spatial relations between regions and cities, it has also altered the internal structure of individual cities. There has been a parallel process of urban expansion and renewal. Economic growth in the urban sector has led to suburbanization and establishment of urban-type activity at the perimeter of urban zones. Cities push their administrative boundaries outward to include large amounts of farmland and many villages. Factories are relocated to the city outskirts, and new housing estates have mushroomed, encroaching on the farmland. At the same time, every major city has undertaken large-scale inner city (city center) redevelopment, striving to become an international economic and cultural center. Land development and sales are also important to local government finance.

Housing reform and urban land-use reform initiated in the late 1980s have contributed greatly to the transformation of the urban landscape. The urban land reform and land leasing system have commercialized urban space, which has gradually morphed into more discernible commercial, industrial and different grades of residential zones. The reform has opened households to more choices in housing location and tenure type. The traditional *danwei* have gradually declined, but they have not totally disappeared. Separation of workplace and residence has become increasingly common. However, the lack of coordination and governments’ and developers’ pursuit of short-term monetary benefits mean that the development is often piecemeal: Urban structure in Chinese cities is fragmented and multimodal, with mixed densities.

Many large Chinese cities now have a more Western look, with high-rise office towers, suburban housing estates, large shopping centers, special economic and technical zones, science parks, and college districts. These new, “modern” capitalist-type elements are juxtaposed, at times uncomfortably, with the large socialist-style public squares and uniform apartment buildings left from the prereform era. For example, the city center often contains both dilapidated lodging for the urban poor, new high-end apartment complexes, and skyscrapers hosting financial and commercial companies. In the suburbs, “economical” housing for low-income families are often put up next to luxury villas, and new industrial zones can be adjacent to residential neighborhoods and farmland. With continuing expansion and inner-city redevelopment, living in the city center has become more and more expensive. The suburbs and outlying areas have thus become a more important area for those who need to relocate, but many of these areas still lack quality facilities such as schools and shops.

Being gradual, adaptive, and partial in nature, economic reforms have resulted in a dual system of urban land and property development involving both market
and administrative mechanisms that are still fraught with problems, including corruption and disputes between displaced residents and developers and governments. At the urban periphery one finds many “villages in the city” that are often occupied by migrant workers who can only afford this type of low-end housing (they are not eligible for low-income public housing because they are not considered as “locals” under China’s hukou system). Many migrants congregate in enclaves based on their place of origin. A famous example is the Zhejiang Village in south Beijing. But the ambiguity of ownership makes these “villages” a headache for city planning and management; the common problems are overcrowding and the illegal installation of utilities infrastructure.

Even though the housing reform has improved people’s living conditions and granted them tenure, not everyone has benefited from it; new housing is too expensive for many urban residents, particularly rural-urban migrants, who have no association with the formal state sectors, and those who occupy the lower rungs of the employment hierarchy, such as laid-off workers from the state-owned enterprises. Due to increasing income and housing disparities, residential segregation, a term that was once alien to Chinese society, has become more frequently used within the lexicon of recent China scholarship.

Looking Forward: Accomplishments and Challenges

It is commonly acknowledged that China’s spatial environment and social space changed drastically after the reforms that began in 1978. Many big Chinese metropolises look much more cosmopolitan than their counterparts in other developing countries; as a whole, the national economy has grown rapidly, and many people’s living standards have been greatly improved. But these achievements have not been without costs and the improvement has not been equitably shared. In addition to the burden on the environment, there has been widening inequality among China’s population, due partly to the newly arrived market and partly to the many unreformed socialist institutions in the country. These pose serious challenges to the long-term sustainability of China’s development and urbanization model.

Kam Wing CHAN and Man WANG

Further Reading

Urbanization

Because of its agrarian nature and socialist control over cities, until the 1980s China’s level of urbanization remained low. Since then, rapid rural-urban migration and aggressive reclassification have quickly transformed China into an increasingly urban society. Urbanization, now seen as a tool for economic development, has given rise to problems of inequality, social stratification, environmental degradation, and loss of arable land.

Urbanization is defined as the increase in the proportion of the overall population living in cities. It refers also to the social and economic changes that occur as a society becomes more urbanized. In the twenty-first century, China is being transformed from a predominantly rural economy to one that is predominantly urban.

The Level and Speed of Urbanization

For most of its history, China has been an agrarian society. Its earliest cities, created during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE), served mainly administrative, political, and ceremonial purposes. From those early days to recent decades, for thousands of years, the vast majority of China’s population was primarily rural; the urbanization level was extremely low.

At the time of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) first national census in 1953, only 13 percent of its population lived in urban areas, which was considerably lower than the world’s average (about 30 percent) and lower than the levels in most Asian developing countries, including India, Thailand, and the Philippines. Between the 1950s and early 1980s, China’s level of urbanization increased, albeit at a slow speed. (See table 1.) Urbanization accelerated from the 1980s onward and gained an average of more than one percentage point annually between 1990 and 2007, a rate faster than that of most Western industrialized economies at their respective stages of urbanization. In 2007, 44.9 percent—just shy of 600 million—of China’s population lived in urban areas. It is projected that by 2030, China’s level of urbanization will reach 60 percent, surpassing the world’s average.

Table 1: China’s Level of Urbanization in Selected Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level of Urbanization (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030 (United Nations’ projection)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Except for the year 2030, all data are from China’s National Bureau of Statistics.
The measurement of urbanization in China is complex and hotly debated. For example, it is difficult to accurately estimate rural-urban migration, and reclassification often incorporates a large number of rural people into a newly defined urban area. These issues obscure the documentation of urban areas and urban population, a task delegated primarily to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. In the 1982 census, the urban population was defined as the total population found within the administrative boundaries of cities and towns. During the 1980s, however, the criteria for establishing cities and towns were significantly relaxed, and as a result, the number of cities and towns increased dramatically. Counting all the population in cities and towns as urban would have resulted in a grossly inflated level of urbanization. Therefore, in the 1990 census, a new and more restrictive set of criteria, focusing on population within cities’ urban districts and towns’ residents’ committees, was used. The 2000 census employed additional criteria of population density, population size, and the extent of built-up areas. Most scholars consider the definition used in the 2000 census more realistic and desirable than those in previous censuses. However, definitional changes from one census to the next have complicated comparison of urbanization levels over time.

Researchers have warned against taking Chinese urban statistics at face value. A common mistake is to neglect the role of reclassification when interpreting the number and population size of cities. The number of Chinese cities increased from 193 in 1978 to 655 in 2007. This rapid increase reflects not only rural-urban migration and urban natural growth but also aggressive efforts by rural and town governments to seek reclassification into cities, as reclassification would increase their autonomy and access to resources. At the same time, large cities have actively pursued annexation of adjacent counties and cities so the latter’s land could be put to revenue-generating uses. The city of Guangzhou in southern China, for example, incorporated Huadu County and the city of Panyu in 2000 and as a result more than doubled the amount of land under its jurisdiction. Chongqing became a municipality in 1996, and during that process incorporated a large span of rural areas. The total population of Chongqing in 2006 was close to 32 million, which has led some to consider it the largest city in the world, but in fact two-thirds of its population was rural.
While reclassification leads to an inflated picture of urbanization, the opposite occurs when only the resident population is considered and migrants are ignored. For cities that have received a large number of migrant workers, the difference can be enormous. For example, the number of permanent residents in Shenzhen in 2005 was less than two million, but if all migrants were included, then the city’s total population would have been more than 11 million.

**Socialist Control**

During the Maoist period (1949–1976), China followed a socialist model of development, one that emphasized industrialization, defined cities as sites of production rather than consumption, and discouraged rural-urban migration. Although rural-urban migration did exist—especially during the 1950s when rural collectivization, poverty, and crop failures pushed peasants to seek opportunities and survival in cities—the *hukou* (household registration) regulations that were promulgated in 1958 severely limited rural people’s ability to survive in urban areas and became a powerful tool for curbing rural-urban migration. The *hukou* system, which entailed state subsidies for urban dwellers, was also intended to accelerate city-based industrialization. Extending these subsidies to rural people would have bankrupted the state coffers, and thus controlling rural-urban migration became a necessity. Paradoxically, the state limited the growth of cities—interpreted by some as anti-urbanism—but its policy, in essence, privileged urban people and disadvantaged rural people.

The PRC inherited a spatial pattern of urban and industrial development that favored the eastern, coastal region. Not only did coastal cities enjoy geographical advantages such as good accessibility, but many had benefited in terms of trade and industrial development from their experience as treaty ports from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Policies and programs during the Maoist period, however, sought to undermine urban growth, especially the growth of cities in the eastern region. For example, the majority of state industrial investment during the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) went to the inland region. Convinced that the coastal area would be vulnerable if China were attacked, the state launched the Third

“Fully engage in the movement to increase production and to practice economy to set off a new upsurge in industrial production” propaganda poster from 1965, created by artist Yang Wenxiu. During the Maoist period, cities were defined more by production than consumption. COLLECTION STEFAN LANDSBERGER.
Front program (1965–1971), which involved moving factories and industrial workers from the coastal regions to remote and mountainous areas inland. Finally, justified on ideological grounds, the rustication movement during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) sent millions of urban youths, cadres, and intellectuals “up to the mountains and down to the countryside” to learn from the peasants. Some stayed in those remote locations for decades before finally returning to their urban homes.

Until the late 1970s, therefore, the pace of urbanization was kept slow and the size of cities was strictly controlled. The urban hierarchy—defined as the array of cities from largest to smallest—of China was rather flat, unlike most industrializing Third World countries, where one or two large cities (e.g., Jakarta, Mexico City) dominated the urban system. China’s development under Mao was therefore quite unique and has been aptly described as “industrialization without urbanization,” “industrialization with controlled urbanization” and “underurbanization,” in contrast with the “overurbanization” found in many developing countries, where massive rural-urban migration has given rise to acute problems of urban slums and unemployment.

Renewed Urbanization and Urbanism

Even after the economic reforms of 1978, China continued to adhere to a policy of controlling the size of large cities, moderately developing medium-sized cities, and actively promoting the growth of small cities and towns,
a policy inherited from the Maoist period. What is new in the first decade of the twenty-first century is that the Chinese state now sees urbanization as a powerful tool to modernize the nation and accelerate economic growth. But in order to avoid problems of overurbanization, the state pursues a strategy of steady, not speedy, urbanization. For example, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) has as its target for increase of urbanization only 0.8 of a percentage point annually.

Chinese urbanization during the reform period has been pursued via two tracks: city-based urbanization and “urbanization from below.” City-based urbanization depends on the rationale that large cities and agglomerations are more efficient than smaller places. Thus cities, especially large cities, are repositioned as the nation’s economic nodes. Special economic zones such as Shenzhen have been transformed from rural places or small cities into full-fledged, globalizing urban centers. Large investment is pumped into “city-building” projects; often foreign elite architects are invited to design landmark districts and buildings, such as the Pudong New District and the “bird’s nest” Olympic stadium, in order to transform Shanghai, Beijing, and other large cities into truly international metropolitan centers.

The economic bases of these cities, meanwhile, are shifting from industries to services. Western-style malls, promenades, and business districts have mushroomed across Chinese cities, a clear indication of rapidly increasing urban consumption. The internal structure of cities has changed as well. While the center of Beijing, with Tiananmen Square and other monuments and structures, still symbolizes a political and historical hub of power, the rest of the city is rapidly expanding outward and vertically. Work-unit (danwei) compounds used to be where most urbanites lived, but today new high-rise condominium buildings and gated complexes are proliferating in the city and its fringes, thanks to the housing reform of the late 1980s that boosted the housing market and promoted home ownership. Rapid urban transformation, however, has jeopardized historical and cultural landscapes such as Beijing’s hutongs, the narrow alleys between traditional courtyard residences, and the associated neighborhoods.

“Urbanization from below” describes urban development that is driven by industrialization of small cities and towns and often based on local entrepreneurship and resources rather than state investment or initiatives. Related concepts such as “rural urbanization” and desakota (combining the Indonesian terms desa for village and kota for town) have been used to describe the juxtaposition of agricultural and industrial activities in rural spaces and on urban margins. The Pearl River Delta in south China, for example, is characterized by a large number of industrial enterprises in small and medium-sized cities, towns, and even villages, that are supported by foreign investment, social networks with overseas Chinese, and a large influx of rural migrants. By connecting to the world market and global commodity chains, some rural places in China are industrializing and urbanizing rapidly and as a result enjoying remarkable economic growth.

Challenges

The recent path of urbanization in China has given rise to new challenges of national and global significance. China’s rural-urban income gap has widened since the economic reforms and is larger than that in most other developing countries. In 2005, real rural income per capita was only 39 percent of real urban income per capita. Inequality within urban areas has increased as well, with the urban poor comprising mainly laid-off workers (from state-owned enterprises), the elderly, and the disabled. Social stratification has intensified, and residential segregation and heterogeneity is increasingly seen in Chinese cities. Migrant enclaves, for example, can be found not far from secluded complexes of mansions for the newly rich. Social, economic, and rural-urban polarization is a major reason for the surge in protests across China in recent years.

Increase in urban consumption, in conjunction with a growing middle class, is exerting severe pressure on China’s energy supply and urban infrastructure. Ownership of passenger vehicles more than doubled between 2001 and 2005, and in 2006 China surpassed the United States as the leading emitter of carbon dioxide. Water scarcity, waste management, and urban transport are among the pressing problems facing Chinese cities. Finally, urban sprawl is taking place at the expense of rural land and the environment. Loss of arable land is most serious at urban margins and in rural areas that are urbanizing. These are also the places where the border between urban and rural jurisdictions tends to be blurry and where environmental
regulations may not be strictly enforced, thus permitting sustained pollution. Addressing the challenges of urbanization in China, therefore, requires commitments not only from urban governments but also from authorities at various levels from the countryside to the city and from the local to the national.

C. Cindy Fan

Further Reading

U.S.-China Business Council
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U.S.-China Business Council

Měi-Zhōng Mào'yì Quánguó Wěiyuánhuì
美中贸易全国委员会

The U.S.-China Business Council is a non-profit trade association representing over 250 major U.S. corporations. It has promoted economic engagement since its founding, as the National Council for United States–China Trade, Inc., in 1973.

The U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) is a private, nonprofit organization of more than 250 major U.S. corporations that do business with China. Founded in 1973 as the National Council for United States–China Trade, Inc., USCBC has offices in Washington, D.C., Beijing, and Shanghai. It provides information, advisory, and advocacy services to its membership; working with its counterpart organization, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT 中国国际贸易促进委员会), USCBC’s mission is to develop commercial relations with China to the benefit of members and, more broadly, the U.S. economy. The council focuses on rules-based trade, investment, and competition, and on developing a commercial environment in China that is predictable and transparent to all parties.

Member companies include American Express, Anheuser-Busch, Apple, AT&T, Coca-Cola, Walt Disney Company, Time Warner, and more than two hundred others. USCBC is governed by a board of directors composed of corporate leaders; its 2007–2008 chair was W. James McNerney Jr., chairman, president, and chief executive officer of Boeing, a company at the forefront U.S.-China relations after President Richard Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972, when trade with China resumed and the United States sold 10 Boeing 707 aircraft to China. Andrew N. Liveris, chairman and chief operation officer of Dow Chemical Company, took office as board chair on 1 June 2008.

USCBC History

The concept of turning to a private U.S. organization to encourage the development of trade relations through initiatives such as commercial missions and trade exhibitions arose from a report to Congress by House Majority Leader Hale Boggs and Minority Leader Gerald Ford. Reporting on their June–July 1972 China trip, Impressions of the New China, Boggs told the House that “until we have normal state relations with China, a quasi-public body” could lay a basis for U.S. trade with the PRC. Boggs urged private efforts to enlarge trade and business with China, and identified the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) as the PRC’s channel for fostering trade relations “where lack of diplomatic relations might otherwise be a barrier to international contact.” Ten members of the board of the newly founded National Council for U.S. China Trade, which would become known as the UCSBC in 1988, traveled to Beijing in early November 1973 as the first formal U.S. trade mission to China since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. Board members included the leaders of John Deere & Co.; JC Penney Co., Inc.; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.; and Westinghouse Electric Corp.
USCBC Today

USCBC hosts events featuring senior officials from the U.S. and Chinese governments. USCBC has received the following Chinese officials: President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, Vice Premier Wu Yi, and others from central and provincial governments. Recent U.S. public figures to meet with USCBC members in the United States and China have included Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez, former U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker III, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, and numerous specialists on U.S.-China affairs from the executive branch of government. Other USCBC events include forums on green business practices and meetings on labor issues.

The council produces the China Business Review and China Market Intelligence in addition to books and reports aimed at helping business people understand China and facilitating business with Chinese companies. USCBC also produces policy reports and advocacy statements regarding labor, economy, trade, human rights, and politics. The council collaborates on programs and events with other organizations such as the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, which, for example, cosponsored a luncheon held in New York in September 2008 for Premier Wen Jiabao, who, while in the United States, also addressed the United Nations and was interviewed on television by U.S. journalist Fared Zakaria.

The USCBC has been criticized for a pro-business, free-trade perspective that is insufficiently attentive to issues such as human rights, product safety, and child
America’s First Trade Mission to “the New China”

China’s market has been a magnet for U.S. merchants since the 1784 voyage of the U.S. ship, Empress of China. That vessel left New York and sailed east around the southern tip of Africa, across the Indian Ocean, into the Pacific, and up the Pearl River to Canton (Guangzhou), one of the Middle Kingdom’s thriving southern ports. The venture launched a trade that would grow and flourish until World War II.

In his report to U.S. Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay in 1785, Major Samuel Shaw, soon to be the U.S. Consul at Canton, explained how he got the Chinese interested in commerce with the United States: “By the map,” he related, “we conveyed to them an idea of the extent of our country, with its present and increasing population,” adding that the Chinese “were highly pleased at the prospect of so considerable a market for the production of their own empire.” And how “considerable” a market it would become—the two countries recorded $386.7 billion in bilateral trade in 2007 alone!


Further Reading


labor, and for government lobbying that focuses on the requirements of multinational corporations rather than small and medium-sized enterprises. As an established trade association it must continue to meet the needs of traditional members while attracting fast-growing, cutting-edge new businesses; it must also provide leadership in the midst of continued debate about trade restrictions, currency valuation, and cooperation as businesses and countries alike face the global economic challenges that began in 2008.

The Editors

Further Reading

The U.S.-China Education Trust provides China’s future leaders with resources to learn about U.S. society in the context of the political, cultural, and economic forces that have given rise to the United States and its values.

The U.S.-China Education Trust (USCET) is a program of the F. Y. Chang Foundation, a private, nonprofit organization founded in 1998 by Ambassador Julia Chang Bloch, the first Asian-American to be appointed U.S. ambassador to Nepal (in 1989). The foundation, established to commemorate Chang Fu-yun, the first Chinese graduate of Harvard Law School (1917), supports subsequent generations of China’s Harvard Law graduates. USCET, the foundation’s largest program, supports activities in China and in the United States designed to promote U.S.-China relations.

USCET provides China’s scholars, professionals, and future leaders with resources to understand U.S. society in the context of the political, cultural, and economic forces that have given rise to the United States and its values. USCET projects are aimed at building confidence, basic understanding, and trust between China and the United States through support for U.S. studies programs at academic and policy institutions in China. Thirty-three Chinese institutions are affiliated with USCET through its American Studies Network (ASN), which provides a platform for members in China to communicate and share ideas.

The trust sponsors the Congressional Practicum, its first initiative in China, which includes elections seminars, training sessions, and lectures focused on teaching Chinese professionals, officials, and students about the U.S. legislative and political process through the use of hands-on-training, case studies, and interactive exchanges between Chinese and U.S. experts. USCET also runs media programs that explore the role of a free press and free speech in a free society and provides resources so that media professionals and students from both the United States and China might learn from each other. Its flagship Journalist-in-Residence program sends Pulitzer Prize winners to campuses across China. Other endeavors include the Financial Media Institute, a certificate program for undergraduate and graduate journalism students; symposia on international economics; fellowship programs; and the Greenberg/Starr Scholarships, which provide funding for poor Chinese students to attend universities in China.

USCET is a nonprofit organization founded with funding from the Starr Foundation, established in 1955 by Cornelius Vander Starr, an insurance entrepreneur and philanthropist, and with contributions from other organizations.

USCET successfully completed its inaugural session of the All China Summer Institute for the Study of the United States. From 5 July 5 to 2 August 2008 twelve Chinese professors from ten universities in China were invited to attend the institute to study American history and politics (in Washington D.C.) and American society and culture (with travels to Kansas City; Reno, Nevada; and San Francisco). And in October 2008 the USCET, in partnership with its American Studies Network and supported by
the Henry Luce Foundation, published for the first time in English the *All-China American Studies Directory: An Overview of American Studies in China*, edited by the USCET founder Julia Bloch. The directory lists over thirty institutions offering American studies in China and provides detailed information about each institution’s programs, resources, faculty, course work, and mission.

Chris GAUTHIER

**Further Reading**


Uygurs are a Turkic group in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. During most of the past ten centuries they lived under the control of Mongolian peoples. After the Uygur rebellion of 1931–1934 the Chinese government granted the Uygurs the status of a minority people.

Uygurs are the largest of the Turkic groups who live in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, with an estimated modern population of 8 to 15 million in 1997. Uygurs account for almost half of the population of the area, with an additional third represented by the Han Chinese and members of other minority ethnicities accounting for the rest. During most of the past ten centuries these people lived under the control of Mongolian peoples. The Uygurs live in the Tian Shan range as nomads (although the nomadic population is decreasing). They herd sheep, cows, horses, goats, and camels. In oases near the Taklimakan Desert they farm with the help of irrigation canals or underground waterways to run meltwater. Popular crops are wheat, cotton, corn, and fruit (grapes, watermelons, and muskmelons). Trade is conducted across borders in the southwestern cities, where people weave traditional carpets.

The Uygurs today are Sunni Muslims, but earlier in their history they inclined to Manichaeanism (since the eighth century) and then Buddhism (since the tenth century). Before that they practiced shamanism and believed that heaven (tengri) gives order, power, and wisdom to people. Archaeologists have uncovered fragments of many kinds of texts on Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and Nestorian Christianity at archaeological sites in Uygur areas. Islam came to Uygur territory along the Silk Roads, and almost all Uygurs had become Muslims by the end of the fifteenth century, replaced Manichaeanism and Buddhism.

The Chinese government during the reform era (since 1978) has maintained an appeasement policy regarding religious expression, supporting the revival of religious activities, including reconstruction of mosques and religious schools and supporting publication of books in Uygur in an effort to promote reform and an open-door policy. This policy is an attempt to mend the damage done by the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when much of the culture of the pre-Communist period was destroyed. Muslim Uygurs hope that this policy will lead to a resurgence of religious and ethnic autonomy, but their optimism is cautious. They fear that their cultural and ethnic sovereignty will be overwhelmed by the region’s burgeoning Han Chinese population. China, for its part, is sensitive about issues affecting its sovereignty over the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

Early History

The term Uyghur originally was the name of one of the Nine Tribes (Tokuz Oghuz), a confederation of Turkic nomads that first appeared in the annals of Chinese history in the early seventh century. A clan of the Uyghur tribe,
the Yaghlakar, founded a state (744–840 CE) in what is now Mongolia. This state’s most noteworthy contribution was the military rescue of the Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) from the crises created by the rebellion of General An Lushan (703–757). In return, the Chinese emperor gave the Uygur state a large monetary award each year. The Uygurs strengthened their relationship with the Sogdian merchants (Sogdians were a people who lived in Transoxiana, now Uzbekistan), who traded horses from the Uygur state for silk from China. In 763 the Uygurs allowed the Sogdians to perform Manichaean missionary work. The city of Ordubalik (Town of the Palace), located on the Orkhon riverside and later named “Kara-balghasun,” enjoyed its greatest era during this time. The Sogdians traded with their colonies along the Silk Roads leading to China and the Uygur state.

The ruling classes of the Uygurs attempted to strengthen economic and social relations with the Sogdians, an attempt that caused unrest among nomadic Uygurs, who were suffering from famine and pestilence, and, in 839, from heavy snowfall. Probably recognizing the chance to take advantage of the situation, a large number of Kyrgyz—a Turkic tribe in the upper Yenisey Valley—allied with a discontented Uygur general and invaded and burned Ordubalik, bringing down the Uygur government in 840. Both Uygur nomads and nobles of the ruling classes emigrated, settling eventually in the area from the Tian Shan range to Gansu Province in northwestern China. Immigrant Uygurs established at least two new states—the Uygur kingdom of Ganzhou (890–1028) and the West Uygur kingdom (early tenth century–1284). Descendants of the Ganzhou Uygurs may be the Yugur in Gansu, traditionally known as the “Yellow Uygurs.”

**Chinggis Khan**

The Tangut people (herders from the Ordos Desert area of northern China) absorbed the Uygur kingdom of Ganzhou into their Xi Xia kingdom in 1028. In the 1130s the West Uygur kingdom fell under the control of the Kara Khitan. In 1209, unable to bear the tyranny of the local Kara Khitan magistrate, the king of the Uygurs had him killed. The king no doubt was emboldened by the promise of protection from a new and more powerful overlord: the Mongol conqueror Chinggis Khan (often spelled Genghis Khan). The king surrendered the West Uygur kingdom to Chinggis Khan in that same year; it survived as a Mongol vassal state until 1284. The Uygurs originally were supposed to provide military service for the Mongol empire but ended up holding higher positions in government.
At the end of the thirteenth century a dispute over succession among the Mongol khans turned the Uygur lands into a battlefield, and by the early fourteenth century the castle towns in the Turfan Basin were devastated by war. The Uygur royal family and its subordinates found refuge in Gansu in 1284, and the Uygur lands came to be ruled by the descendants of Chagatai Khan, son of Chinggis Khan. When the Kashgar Khojas, Islamic nobles, gained power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam and Islamic culture—for example, the Naqshbandiya order of sufi (Islamic mystics)—spread among the Uygur people. Galdan Khan (1645–1697), leader of the Oirats of western Mongolia, occupied the land of the Uygurs for seventy years after an invasion in 1679. During the first half of the eighteenth century under Galdan’s successors, many Uygur farmers (later called “Taranchis”) of southern Xinjiang were forcibly relocated to the Ili Valley on the northern border.

Chinese Rule

In 1760 the Uygur territory was conquered by military expeditions of the Chinese Qing dynasty (1644–1912). In 1881 approximately forty-five thousand Uygurs relocated to Semirechie in Kazakhstan. The Uygur people in the oases around the Taklimakan Desert came under Chinese rule in 1884 when Xinjiang Province was established there. After the Uygur rebellion of 1931–1934 the Chinese government granted the Uygurs the status of a minority people at last, which provided them with national recognition, various rights to promote their own culture, and, in the modern era, the right to disregard China’s one-child policy.

The Uygurs, with China’s Kazakh minority, founded a state (the East Turkistan Republic) in northern Xinjiang in 1944–1949, but the newly founded People’s Republic of China absorbed it in October 1949.
In 1955 the Chinese opened an administrative office in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region at Urumchi. About sixty thousand people, including Uygurs and Kazakhs, emigrated to Kazakhstan in 1962. Today more than two hundred thousand Uygurs are citizens of Kazakhstan.

Uygurs gained a certain amount of international attention in 2008 due to several violent incidents in western China by Uygur nationalists on ethnic Han Chinese, resulting in fatalities. While the Uighurs have had nationalist movements since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, it is since the attacks of September 11, 2001 that the government of the People’s Republic of China has used new techniques to encourage harmonious relationships between the Uygur minority population and the rest of China, and has focused on promoting all minority groups in the new face of China’s ethnic milieu.

**Further Reading**


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**Drinking the water of a well, one should never forget who dug it.**

吃水不忘挖井人

Chī shuǐ bù wàng wā jǐng rén
One of a number of Jesuit missionaries who were sent to China from Rome in the seventeenth century, Father Ferdinand Verbiest was befriended by the K’ang-shi emperor and became one of the foremost astronomers and scientists in China.

Father Ferdinand Verbiest was born in Pittem, a small town in what is now Belgium, and from an early age he studied at the institutions of the Jesuits in Belgium and in Seville, Spain. He excelled at mathematics, science, and astronomy, as well as languages: He was fluent in Flemish, Latin, German, Italian, and Spanish. At the age of eighteen, he joined the Society of Jesus in the hope of going to work in the missions in Central and South America. But the Jesuits had other plans for him; word had come from the Far East, calling for more priests to carry on missionary work in China. Father Ferdinand at once set about to learn Manchu, gaining much fluency by the time he left for China in 1658. He was one of about thirty-five missionaries sent by the Jesuits.

The subsequent years were difficult ones. The missionaries faced varying degrees of persecution and privations, since their fates were closely tied with Chinese politics. When the Shunzhi emperor died at a young age, the affairs of the state fell into the hands of four co-regents who governed on behalf of his seven-year-old successor, K’ang-shi. The regents looked unfavorably on the influence of the Jesuits, and sought to discredit them by an old custom in which they pitted them against renowned shamans of the court. The Jesuits, led by Father Johann Adam Schall von Bell, lost the competition to a Muslim shaman, Yang Guangxian. Schall and the others were imprisoned on the charge of spreading Christianity (labeled an evil religion), and sentenced to death. They were saved by an earthquake, however, which was interpreted as a sign of heavenly displeasure. All the inmates in the prison were released, including the Jesuits. A few years later, Father Verbiest underwent a similar competition, again against Yang, but this time the Jesuits won.

In 1699 the heir to the throne came of age and took power as the K’ang-shi emperor. He, like his father, favored the Jesuits, and within the year, Father Ferdinand was placed in charge of the royal observatory and was made the overseer of the dissemination of mathematical knowledge in the kingdom.

One of his first tasks was to complete a calendar that would reform an inaccurate lunar calendar, devised by a Muslim rival of the Jesuits, which had included an extra month. The new calendar that Father Ferdinand made used solar rather than lunar calculations and was personally approved by the emperor, thus becoming the new standard across China. Thereafter he and Father Ferdinand became close friends, and the Jesuit taught the young emperor mathematics and geometry, music, and philosophy. As a result, Father Ferdinand’s stature grew, and he became one of the most influential men of his time in China.

Among the things he devised for the emperor were star charts, a cannon, and even a steam-driven toy cart, which some say is the first automobile. The star charts, which became a great aid to navigation, clearly identified...
the various constellations and celestial bodies and located their exact position in the sky. The cannons that were cast were far superior to the ones then in use in the Chinese army, in that they could withstand prolonged use without fear of explosion from overheating. In addition, he designed and had cast six astronomical instruments in 1673, which were housed in a newly built observatory in Beijing. Replicas of these instruments may still be seen at the observatory; the original instruments were removed during the Boxer Rebellion and taken to Prussia by the Germans. Among the instruments that would prove the most beneficial were the sextant, which one could use to determine latitude; the ecliptic armilla, which was used to calculate ecliptical longitude and latitude of the stars and planets; and the equatorial armilla, which allowed for the computation of true solar time.

Father Ferdinand also wrote more than forty books on science, mechanics, astronomy, and theology. As special gifts for the emperor, he created a world map and a table of all lunar and solar eclipses for the coming two thousand years. This world map included the latest details available, and was the most complete of its time. Its impact was immeasurable in that it sought to chart the entire world from the Chinese point of view. China was the locus, from which the various points of longitude and latitude radiated.

Father Ferdinand died in 1688 after falling from his horse. He was buried in Beijing near equally renowned fellow Jesuits: Fathers Matteo Ricci and Johann Adam Schall von Bell. The emperor bestowed upon him a posthumous name; he was the only European to have been given such a royal honor. Through his work in mathematics, physics, engineering, astrology, mechanics, cartography, philosophy, and theology, Father Verbiest provided a wide-ranging and comprehensive view of Western scientific traditions to the Chinese intellectual tradition.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


Vernacular Language Movement

Báihuàwén Yùndòng 白话文运动

The Vernacular Language Movement, which fostered a radical change in the writing style of Chinese composition, developed from century-long usage of a northern dialect in literature and gained momentum during the student and intellectual-led New Culture Movement (1917–1923). It won nation-wide acceptance in the 1920s and has made a lasting impact on education, communication, and literary research.

The Vernacular Language Movement began with efforts of the radical wing of the educated elite in the early twentieth century. The efforts to replace classical Chinese (wenyan) with spoken language (baihua) in nearly all written works were stimulated by a sense of national crisis in the late nineteenth century. After sporadic, short-lived attempts at the turn of the twentieth century, the movement acquired momentum in the mid-1910s when using the vernacular in writing became a major agenda in the New Culture Movement (1917–1923), a period of student and intellectual protests. By the early 1920s vernacular in written Chinese finally gained nationwide acceptance as a reputable style in prose, poetry, and fiction and was officially designated the style for school textbooks.

The vernacular that became a national language in the 1920s was originally a northern dialect, spoken with varied local accents by people living in areas north of the Huai River. It acquired broader usage within officialdom, hence the name “Mandarin” (guanhua). National mobility in warfare, social advancement, and economic activities had contributed to wider usage of Mandarin Chinese since the Song dynasty (960–1279). Fiction, which came to maturity during the Song dynasty and drew inspirations from Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) bianwen (stories of Buddha and his disciples written in vernacular) and Tang chuanqi (short stories, or romance), as well as storytelling and stage performance, were written in Mandarin Chinese. By the end of the nineteenth century, fiction written in the vernacular and often intended for social criticism had national circulation. Although it was a noticeable force in literature, the vernacular remained heterodox because wenyan Chinese received institutional support as the normative style in the official Civil Service Examinations.

Several forces converged to propel the Vernacular Language Movement at the turn of the twentieth century. First among these, ironically, was awareness among the literati that wenyan Chinese restrained China’s progress. Wu Rulun (1840–1903), a leading member of the Tongcheng School known for its elegant style in wenyan prose, was among the first who viewed wenyan as contributing to China’s backwardness in comparison with the West. He considered a standardized form of Mandarin Chinese to be necessary for providing mass education. Huang Zunxian (1848–1905), a diplomat to Japan and an activist in political reforms, advocated the vernacular and experimented in using it to compose poetry in classical form.

Awareness of the need for a national language in the
vernacular was sustained by the growing forces of nationalism and modern mass media at the turn of the twentieth century. Liang Qichao (1873–1929), the energetic political reformer and journalist, had a lasting impact on the generations after him through his promotion of “new fictions” as a means to enlightenment and national strength. Liang also wrote fiction and poetry in the vernacular that were read by many. His passionate appeal and innovative experiments inspired further attempts.

Magazines that published “new fictions” written in spoken language—as well as newspapers such as Chinese Vernacular Newspaper, Hangzhou Vernacular Newspaper, Newspaper of Anhui Dialect, Anhui Vernacular Newspaper, Ningbo Vernacular Newspaper, Chaozhou Vernacular Newspaper, and Citizens’ Vernacular Daily—appeared in cities along the southeast coast. These publications, however, did not last long.

In 1905 wenyan Chinese lost its institutional ground when the Civil Service Examinations were abolished. The reform in education gave rise to a new generation of Chinese leaders whose education in Western-style schools in China or in the West gained social legitimacy. The most vocal advocates for the vernacular then were those who were well versed in both Chinese and Western traditions. Thus, it was not accidental that the most passionate discussion of language reform first took place among Chinese students abroad, who led the Vernacular Language Movement in the 1910s.

Language Reform

Between 1915 and 1917 a small group of Chinese students pursuing graduate degrees at Cornell, Columbia, and Harvard universities engaged in an informal but serious discussion of Chinese language reform. They all supported the ongoing New Culture Movement and saw language reform as necessary for a revolution in literature. Yet, some vehemently opposed introducing the vernacular into poetry. Ren Hongjun (1886–1961) and Mei Guangdi (1890–1945) held the deepest doubt about the feasibility of the vernacular in poetry, which they viewed as ill-matched for rhythm and elegance, the key elements in the form. Hu Shi (1891–1962), however, was determined to bring the vernacular into all forms of Chinese literature and composed verses in the vernacular as a means of debate with his friends. In 1917 he published an article entitled “A Preliminary Discussion on Literature Reform” in the New Youth, a magazine founded by Chen Duxiu, another advocate for literature in the vernacular.

The debate about literature in the vernacular instantly became a focus of the New Culture Movement, which

These members of the New Culture Movement advocated literature written in the vernacular language of the masses. Clockwise from left: Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Lu Xun, Cai Yuanpei, and Li Dazhao.
made *New Youth* its major forum. Qian Xuantong and Liu Bannong, two professors at Beijing University and major leaders in the New Culture Movement, engaged in a mock debate to promote vernacular literature. It caught national attention and became a memorable episode in the movement. In 1918 the Vernacular Language Movement established yet another landmark in publishing “A Madman’s Diary” by Lu Xun in *New Youth*. Other proponents, such as Zhou Zuoren, Liu Bannong, and Sheng Yinmo, also composed and published works in prose or poetry in the vernacular. By the end of the 1910s using the vernacular in written Chinese had gained acceptance beyond a small group of advocates and became a national phenomenon.

In the final phase of the vernacular’s rise, defenders of classical Chinese fought three rounds of battle before giving up. The first battle, ironically, came from Lin Shu and Yan Fu, who would otherwise be viewed as pioneers in modern Chinese literature and harbingers of the New Culture Movement through the influence of their translated works from Western literature and thought. Between 1917 and 1919 Lin Shu took a public stand against the vernacular by publishing three articles and two short stories. He attacked the Vernacular Language Movement by insinuating, through his fictional characters, that Chen, Hu, and Cai Yuanpei, their supporter and chancellor of Beijing University, were three “demons.” Yan Fu viewed Lin’s attack as “laughable” and refrained from making public statements. But Yan did express his disdain for the advocates of the vernacular as “spring birds and autumn insects” that would go away with the season. The second battle came from some scholars gathered around *Xueheng* magazine, who were mostly U.S.-educated scholars, while some, such as Ren Hongjun and Mei Guangdi, were friends of Hu Shi. The most active opponent of the vernacular among this group was Hu Xiansu (1893–1968), who wrote articles in debate with Hu Shi. Interestingly, the *Xueheng* group did not oppose a revolution in literature but warned against the radical tendency to abandon classical literature, a significant part of Chinese cultural heritage they cherished. The final attack came from Zhang Shizhao through the *Tiger Weekly* in 1925. By then the vernacular had been a “national language” for four years, since elementary school textbooks had been written in the vernacular in accord with an order from the Ministry of Education in 1920.

**Mass Communication**

The Vernacular Language Movement succeeded in incorporating the language of the masses into written works yet remained a movement of the elite. Its long-term impact can be found in education, in national communication, in writing style, and in research on Chinese literature. Using the vernacular in textbooks made education more accessible to ordinary people. The vernacular further developed and reinforced the historical practice of using Mandarin Chinese as the national language of communication. As the strict rules of composition in classical Chinese were abandoned when written Chinese took the form of the vernacular, it opened the way to importing more foreign (Japanese and Western) elements into the Chinese lexicon, grammar, and composition. In 1927 Hu Shi published *A History of Vernacular Literature*. The work provided the Vernacular Language Movement with historical justification in the Chinese context and encouraged further studies of Chinese vernacular literature in the premodern period.

**LU Yan**

**Further Reading**


Hu Shi. (1923). Wushi nian lai Zhongguo zhi wenxue [Chinese literature in the past fifty years]. In *Shenbao Guan, Shenbao wushi zhounian jiniance* [A volume in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Shenbao]. Shanghai: Shenbao.


The Treaty of Versailles marking the end of World War I did little to resolve issues of China’s national sovereignty. Japan, which fought on the side of the Allies, occupied German holdings in Asia during the war, including China’s Shandong Peninsula. The treaty condoned Japan’s actions, sparking Chinese nationalist protests.

The Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919, marked the end of World War I for Europeans but did little to resolve fundamental disputes related to China’s national sovereignty. Talks between world leaders began in January 1919. The most important participants were the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy. Russia had undergone Communist revolution in 1917 and did not participate. China was represented by delegates from Duan Qirui’s Beijing government, a warlord regime that actually controlled little of China. Asia was not the focus of talks, and China’s concerns were not paramount.

Tokyo had been determined to use World War I to increase its influence in East Asia. Shortly after fighting broke out in Europe, Japan joined the Allies and occupied German holdings in Asia, including China’s Shandong Peninsula. In early 1915 Japan presented the Twenty-One Demands to China. The demands were to give the Japanese privileges and power greater than what they had obtained through the unequal treaties, a series of agreements forced upon China by the imperialist powers since the 1840s. Yuan Shikai, leader of China until early 1916, attempted to weaken the demands and hoped to find a way to restore Chinese control in Shandong.

China entered World War I on the side of the Allies in 1917. Duan Qirui’s government sought to obtain foreign loans, international legitimacy, and a voice at the postwar peace settlement. To many Chinese, joining the Allies was a way to remove Japanese influence in Shandong Province. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, first articulated in January 1918, offered hope to Chinese Nationalists because the president called for open diplomacy, self-determination, and the creation of an organization “for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike” (Wilson, 1918).

Japan’s effective great power diplomacy and support for the Allied cause ensured that the Europeans acquiesced to Tokyo’s demands. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 had given the Japanese confidence that the United States would not interfere with Japan’s “special interests in China,” while the United States assumed that Japan accepted the Open Door principle and China’s territorial integrity. Weak protests from the U.S. delegation at Versailles, France, had little effect, and Wilson placed priority on enticing the European powers and Japan to support the League of Nations. Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles ratified Japanese control of Germany’s concessions in the Shandong Peninsula. Japan also obtained control over German possessions in the southwest Pacific as one of the treaty’s “mandates.” In short, the treaty ratified Japan’s wartime imperialism.

In China and among overseas Chinese communities
around the world, the Treaty of Versailles sparked outrage at the Japanese, China’s warlords, and imperialism in general. The protests and strikes that resulted were known as the “May Fourth Movement.” Although no longer in power, Duan was accused of being a puppet of the Japanese, as were the Chinese representatives at the peace conference. The Beijing government repudiated the Treaty of Versailles but was unable to modify Article 156 or other parts of the treaty. Many students and intellectuals were bitterly disappointed at the United States and Wilsonianism. Some of those people moved to political action by the treaty would go on to establish the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.

Further Reading

Steven PHILLIPS
Video Games
Diànzi yóuxì 电子游戏

Video games began to appear in China more than thirty years ago and are now ubiquitous. While this new form of entertainment has become a popular pleasure activity, especially among youths, it has also caused serious concerns among the public.

Historians generally agree that the U.S. physicist Willy Higinbotham invented the video game in 1958 when, to entertain visitors at Brookhaven National Laboratory in Long Island, New York, he demonstrated the interactive game Tennis for Two on an oscilloscope. One year later he improved this invention and displayed it on a 38-centimeter (15-inch) monitor.

Video game players use an interface device such as a paddle, joystick, mouse, or computer keys to manipulate images on a video display or television screen, and have changed quite dramatically from Higinbotham’s first version. In 1971 the first video arcade games appeared. In 1972 Magnavox marketed the first home television video game. In 1973 Pong was the first commercially available video game, marketed by Atari. The Atari Video Computer System (VCS) was released in 1977 with an introductory price of $199.95. It was the most popular video game console of its day and was available until 1990, being on the market longer than any other system in history. Several hundred games were developed for it. Atari software and hardware rights were sold to Hasbro for only $5 million in 1998.

Development in China

Video games in China developed more than thirty years ago, evolving from TVs and PCs to mobile phones, and from single PCs to networks to mobile games as developers made hardware and software innovations. In the early 1980s arcade video games appeared in some children’s entertainment places and adolescents’ activity centers in China. By the middle of the 1980s or so, electronic video games arrived in China. In the 1990s a new type of family computer quietly entered China—Family Computer (FC) of Nintendo in Japan. With the price gradually going down, FC went into more and more homes and became an indispensable part of the recreational facilities of many families. Around 1993 a new kind of game computer—the sixteen-bit Sega MD—was introduced in China. It had brighter colors and richer game content. Sega MD and the sixteen-bit Nintendo SFC have brought Chinese game players closer to the video world.

With the popularization of the Internet in China, online games also have become more accessible to Chinese players. In June 1998 the website OurGame was established as the first website specializing in online games in China. It provides such online games as Encirclement, Chinese chess, and Chinese checkers for registered users. By May 2001 OurGame had the most game players in the world. Later companies in Taiwan and South Korea began to promote games in China. In 2001 Shanghai Shanda Interactive Entertainment Limited, an agent of the Korean online game Legend, began amassing a legendary Internet fortune in China and has become the largest...
online game enterprise in China. At present video games in China concentrate on these media platforms: screen machines, palm screens, home televisions, Internet bar computers, mobile phones, and home computers. With the development of technology the last two platforms may become the most popular.

**Market for Online Video Games**

China has a large online game market. In 2002 players of online games outnumbered players of single computer games and arcade games. According to the 21st Report on China’s Internet Development by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), 120 million Netizens (active participants in the online community of the Internet) play online games; adolescents are the main players; 73.7 percent of Netizens under eighteen years of age have online game experience. Low age, low income, and low educational level are the three significant characteristics of online game players.

According to a 2007 survey of the Chinese game market, the scale of the Chinese electronic game industry increased considerably in 2006, and the industry’s overall income in 2006 increased 68 percent over that of 2005. Online games, other types of video games, handheld game consoles, mobile phones, and the like enable players to play games at any place without any limitation. The market for mobile phone games is also large, and it is expected to reach a total value of five billion Chinese yuan in 2008, which is about 714 million U.S. dollars. The video game market in China is rapidly growing and is reinforcing the development of local original software as domestically made games increase and dominate the market in China.

**The Future**

The central government has placed many regulations on video games, especially for young students playing in Internet bars. On the other hand, with the popularization of the personal computer, people will tend to play video games mostly in the home. The number of younger players is also likely to increase. To cater to the tastes of those younger people, the research and development departments of video game companies will focus on content and design. In China new college curriculums attract majors in animation, art design, and creation, reflecting societal needs and desires and also the potential of the consumption of video games.

Junhao HONG and Wenfa HE

**Further Reading**


Vietnam–China Relations
Yuè-Zhōng wàijiāo guānxi 越中外交关系

China and Vietnam share a complicated history. Their relationship has been characterized by long periods of collaboration and shorter periods of conflicts. Currently relations and collaboration are expanding and the two countries are addressing their territorial disputes through negotiations.

Vietnam was a part of the Chinese empire for more than a thousand years before gaining independence in the tenth century CE. However, the independent Vietnam remained under Chinese cultural and political influence, and a tributary relationship developed. The period of French colonial rule in Vietnam during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth ended this close relationship.

After Vietnam regained independence from France in 1954, relations between China and Vietnam were officially closed until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Thereafter, relations deteriorated further into open hostilities in early 1979, and tensions remained high for most of the 1980s. During the late 1980s relations started to improve, leading to full normalization in November 1991. The 1990s were characterized by two contradictory trends: expanding and improving relations in most fields on the one hand and recurring periods of tension relating to border disputes on the other hand. Both countries are trying to manage and eventually settle the border disputes. The early 2000s have been characterized by less tension compared with the 1990s relating to territorial issues and by expanding political and economic relations.

Background

Relations between the countries were close during the 1950s and for two decades China provided the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with extensive economic and military assistance. China sent thousands of advisers to assist in various fields. China also provided considerable assistance during the Vietnam War. However, differences between the two nations developed during the 1960s and into the first half of the 1970s because of varying perceptions of the Soviet Union and divergent views on relations with the United States. After the 1973 Paris agreement, which led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and established a cease-fire in the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese claimed that Chinese leaders had advised them to diminish the level of the fighting in the south for a few years, advice perceived as aimed at keeping Vietnam divided. China rejected this claim.

Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1975–1991

In 1975 China’s allies emerged victorious in the war in Vietnam, and experts expected that relations between China and Vietnam would continue to be very close. However, relations between China and Vietnam dramatically declined from seemingly good in 1975 to war in
1979. Relations deteriorated over several issues. First were differences in opinion concerning the Soviet Union and China’s uneasiness about Vietnam’s relations with that country. Second were conflicting interests in Cambodia and China’s gradually increasing support for Cambodia in the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. Third, territorial disputes between China and Vietnam caused tension. Fourth, the way in which the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were treated became an issue. In fact, the mass migration of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in the spring of 1978 officially led to the public deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries.

The overall deterioration of relations led to a militarized conflict that escalated into China’s attack on Vietnam in February and March 1979. China declared that the attack was a response to Vietnamese attacks on China. China claimed to have captured three of six provincial capitals in the bordering provinces of Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Lao Cai as well as seventeen cities and counties before announcing a withdrawal on 5 March. China
announced that the withdrawal was completed by 16 March.

The normalization process between China and Vietnam began with low-level contacts in the mid-1980s and expanded to high-level meetings in early 1989. In early September 1990 a (then-secret) high-level meeting was held in China. Despite this meeting the normalization process lacked momentum on the political front. This situation prevailed until mid-1991, when the normalization process gained momentum. The increased diplomatic interaction paved the way for a high-level summit in early November 1991, when bilateral relations were officially fully normalized.

The full normalization of relations between China and Vietnam was made possible by the removal of the differences between the two countries regarding relations with the Soviet Union with the Sino-Soviet normalization of 1989 and by the formal resolution of the Cambodian conflict through the Paris agreements in October 1991, which removed two deeply dividing factors from the agenda.

**Relations since 1991**

After full normalization the relationship between China and Vietnam was characterized by two contradictory trends in the 1990s: expanding contacts and cooperation in many fields but tension relating to territorial disputes. The early 2000s have been characterized by continued expansion of relations and collaboration and by less tension relating to the territorial disputes as compared with the 1990s.

The positive trend in bilateral relations can be seen in the expanding political, cultural, economic, and military contacts between the two countries. Official delegations from one country regularly visit the other country to discuss ways of expanding relations in various fields. Increased economic ties since 1991 can be seen in bilateral trade, which grew from $32 million in 1991 to $1 billion in 1996 and from $10.42 billion in 2006 to $15.85 billion in 2007. The bilateral trade displays a steadily growing trade surplus for China. China has also provided loans and assistance to upgrade Chinese-built factories in northern Vietnam. In the political field the close relationship between the two ruling parties—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)—expanded through a steady stream of exchange visits at various levels. The contacts between the armed forces of the two countries have also expanded through regular exchange visits.

Sharp differences relating to all the territorial disputes (that is, overlapping claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, to water and continental shelf areas in the South China Sea and in the Gulf of Tonkin, and to areas along the land border) were prevalent from May to November 1992. Differences relating to oil exploration in the South China Sea and the signing of contracts with foreign companies for exploration were prevalent during parts of 1994, 1996, and 1997. During 1998 shorter periods of tension relating to the disputes occurred.

During 1999 talks focused on reaching a settlement of the land border dispute and resulted in the Land Border Treaty on 30 December 1999. This treaty was ratified in 2000, and the demarcation process is expected to be completed before the end of 2008. The border disputes created no significant tension during 1999. During 2000 the focus was on resolving the Gulf of Tonkin dispute and led to the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones, and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin on 25 December 2000. On the same day the two countries signed the Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf and the Regulations on Preservation and Management of the Living Resources in the Common Fishery Zone in the Gulf of Tonkin. The agreement on demarcation was ratified and entered into force in 2004 after the completion of additional talks on supplementary protocol of the fishery agreement had been completed. The trend of no significant tension caused by the remaining border disputes in 1999 continued to prevail in 2000.

Since 2001 tensions relating to the disputes in the South China Sea have mainly been contained through talks at government and expert levels. However, official protests have been issued in response to a limited number of actions carried out in or in relation to the South China Sea area.

**The Future**

The future of relations between China and Vietnam will be determined by how successfully the two sides handle disputes. Deepening bilateral cooperation in different fields and expanding economic interaction have
Vietnam–China Relations

contributed to building a more stable bilateral relationship. The progress in managing the territorial disputes has also improved the prospect of long-term stability in the bilateral relationship.

Despite these positive developments the disputes in the South China Sea area remain a threat to a stable relationship both through the overlapping sovereignty claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes and the disputes over resources in maritime areas. Potential future challenges to bilateral relations include risks associated with economic competition and uneven trade relations as well as risks associated with developments affecting the Mekong River.

Ramses AMER

Further Reading


Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) was one of the most important scholars of the Ming–Qing period whose pragmatic philosophies of statecraft challenged long-standing traditions, and his writings influence cultural ideas of Chinese nationalism even today.

Wang Fuzhi was one of the most important Chinese thinkers and scholars of the Ming–Qing period (1368–1912), and his philosophies influence cultural ideas of Chinese nationalism even today. He wrote more than one hundred books during his lifetime and fought against the Manchu invaders during their campaign establishing the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

A native of Hengyang in Hunan, Wang Fuzhi passed the provincial examinations in 1642, but his political career was quickly ended by nationwide peasant rebellions and the Manchu invasion. Devoting the rest of his life to reading and writing, Wang completely withdrew from politics in 1650 after his anti-Manchu military activities failed. Wang’s scholarly interests included Confucian classics, philosophy, history, textual criticism, literature, military strategies, medicine, astronomy, calendar, numerology, astrology, and Western science introduced by the Jesuits. Most of Wang’s writings were unknown to the wider audience of readers before they were edited and printed beginning in the late 1830s. His most cited philosophical works include Outer Commentary to the Book of Change, Commentary on Zhang Zai’s Correction of Youthful Ignorance, and Record of Thoughts and Questions: Inner and Outer Sections. Wang’s main ideas on history and politics can be found in his On Reading Comprehensive Mirror and On the History of the Song Dynasty.

Wang was obsessed with rectifying the flaws he saw in Song–Ming neo-Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist teachings and with reforming political and economic institutions, drawing lessons from history, and preserving and carrying forward Chinese culture while the alien Manchus ruled China.

Wang firmly rejected Daoism and Buddhism: He disapproved that these teachings advocated a denial of the real world in order to achieve absolute emptiness and quiescence of the mind. He criticized the Song neo-Confucian studies of *li* (理) for paying too much attention to abstract principles while overlooking human society and the material world from which these principles were derived. Wang also attacked the neo-Confucian studies of *xin* (心) (mind) for equating the concepts of the human mind (*neng* 能) with the outside world (*suo* 所), and knowledge (*zhi* 知) with practice and action (*xing* 行).

To rectify these empty and impractical teachings, Wang returned to Zhang Zai (1020–1077) and further advanced his materialistic philosophy. Wang stated that no materials can be added to or reduced from the universe and that no materials can be created from nothing; all materials follow their own *dao* (道), to be transformed from their original form, *qi* (material force), to what they are now. Wang discarded the idea that human nature is completely innate and never changes. To Wang, although human nature bears some innate qualities, which are the ultimate source of moral goodness, it reflects the mind’s (*xin*) experiences in real human life.
Wang laid down a philosophical foundation for Qing pragmatic statecraft. Whereas his philosophical focus was on the material world, his political focus was on specific political and socioeconomic problems. In Wang’s view, human society faces different problems in different times, and people of different historical periods should try hard to find specific solutions for their own problems. While denouncing those Song philosophers who put abstract principles above substance, Wang strongly rejected those who put general rules, particularly the ones set up by ancient statesmen, above specific institutions created for solving contemporary problems. In this regard, Wang pointed out that a specific problem that caused the Ming (1368–1644) to fall was the imbalance between the monarch and scholar-officials headed by a prime minister. Wang also vigorously defended Chinese culture against barbarism of non-Chinese nomads, causing his writings to become a cultural source of modern Chinese nationalism. The most prominent modern Chinese intellectuals and statesmen, such as Zeng Guofan, Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, and Mao Zedong, who intensely searched for solutions for problems faced by China, were all inspired by Wang and his works.

**Further Reading**


Yamin XU
An early and fervent supporter of Sun Zhongshan’s Chinese Nationalist revolutionary cause, Wang Jingwei became a leading rival to the Nationalist Army commander Chiang Kai-shek after Sun’s death in 1925. Wang led the left wing of the Nationalist Party, but proved no match for Chiang. After war broke out with Japan in 1937 Wang lost all hope for Chiang’s government in Chongqing and agreed to lead a pro-Japanese government in Nanjing.

Wang Jingwei began his political career in 1905 associated with the Tongmenghui leader Sun Zhongshan and died in 1944 as a Japanese collaborator. In between he aligned with various Nationalist Party (Guomindang) factions on both the left and right in his unsuccessful pursuit of power. The main theme of his life after 1925 became his rivalry with Nationalist Army Commander Chiang Kai-shek, who regularly bested Wang Jingwei’s challenges.

Wang Jingwei was born into a poor but well-educated family in Guangdong Province. In his early twenties he studied in Japan on a Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government scholarship. In Japan he joined Sun Zhongshan’s fledgling revolutionary movement, Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance), aimed at ending the Qing dynasty. Wang became widely known through his writings and public speaking on behalf of the Tongmenghui. In 1910 he led a plot to assassinate the Qing dynasty’s Prince Regent Caifeng by means of a roadside bomb. Authorities discovered the plot; Wang was imprisoned but not executed.

The end of the Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty did not make Sun Zhongshan and his associates leaders of the new Chinese Republic. Rather, the former Qing dynasty general Yuan Shikai became president of the new Chinese Republic and suppressed Sun Zhongshan’s political supporters. In 1912 Wang Jingwei withdrew from Chinese domestic politics and married Chen Bijun, daughter of a wealthy Chinese merchant from Penang, the British-ruled island in the Malaya States. For the next few years Wang devoted himself primarily to Chinese literati pursuits.

In 1917 he rejoined Sun Zhongshan in Guangzhou (Canton), where Sun was raising forces to overthrow the northern warlords. Over the next seven years Wang became ever closer to Sun Zhongshan. Wang Jingwei followed Sun in moving toward stronger anti-imperialist views and practical cooperation with the Soviet Union. When Sun died of cancer in Beijing in 1925, Wang Jingwei was at his side.

After Sun’s death Wang Jingwei advocated continued radicalization of the Nationalist Party along Soviet lines. Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Nationalist military, became a powerful opponent for leadership of the Nationalist Party. By 1929 the two men had reached open confrontation. Chiang Kai-shek, who possessed a wide range of factional supporters, repeatedly bested Wang Jingwei, who relied primarily on his personal leadership strengths. After several of these contests Wang Jingwei withdrew temporarily to Europe, only to return to China with renewed but futile hopes of gaining power. Wang
remained a prominent Nationalist Party figure but increasingly isolated and disgruntled.

By the 1930s three Chinese positions emerged for dealing with Japan. One position, most strongly associated with the rural revolutionary leader Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists, called for armed resistance to Japan. Chiang Kai-shek argued for grudging appeasement of Japan until the Nationalist government became strong enough to thwart Japanese aggression. Wang Jingwei, in a major shift from his position in the 1920s, became spokesperson for a third position. He now accepted Japanese leadership and Japan’s dream of a new pan-Asian order from which Western capitalist colonialism would be excluded. This vision of an Asian-led anti-imperialist strategy fit with Wang’s views from the 1920s. It also had considerable appeal to many Asian nationalists until the realities of World War II made Japan’s own imperialist nature clear. Wang Jingwei’s pro-Japanese stance had raised fierce patriotic Chinese opposition even in the mid-1930s. In 1935 an assassin seriously wounded Wang, and in 1939 while he was in Hanoi, Vietnam, another attempt on his life was made.

In 1940 Wang Jingwei left Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government in Chongqing and accepted leadership of a Japanese-sponsored Chinese regime at Nanjing (Nanking) that claimed the Nationalist Party mantle. Wang’s government reached agreements with Japan that restored some of China’s compromised sovereignty, but his government clearly served as a Japanese puppet. Wang Jingwei’s health continued to decline from injuries suffered in the 1935 assassination attempt. When in November 1944 he went to Japan for treatment and died there, his reputation as a Japanese puppet and traitor to the Chinese nation already had been fixed.

David D. BUCK

Further Reading
Wang Mian was a Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) painter most renowned for his momei (ink plum) paintings on silk and paper. In his compositions he integrated pictures and words by framing his calligraphic inscriptions with images of flowering plum branches.

Wang Mian was a Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) artist noted for his momei (ink plum) paintings. He also composed poetry. He was born into a farmer’s family in Zhuji, Zhejiang Province, and received his Confucian education and mastered classics. But Wang failed the civil service examinations, and he later rejected several civil appointments. After spending one year in Beijing Wang retreated to his hometown in the Guiji Mountains, where he made a living by selling his paintings.

Wang Mian’s poetry, recorded in Zhuzhai shiji (Poetry Collection of the Bamboo Studio), conveyed his awareness of the danger and uncertainty of late Yuan society, expressed his concern for the suffering of the people, and criticized the failure of the government to protect them. During his later years Wang witnessed ethnic Han Chinese rebellions against the Mongolian court and probably even offered his advice to the rebels.

Wang painted plums on both silk and paper. He juxtaposed image and inscriptions in such a way that the image framed the inscriptions, his calligraphy enhancing the beauty of flowering plums. The organic forms and elegant, S-curved plum boughs contrast with the square, rustic, poetic or prose inscriptions and characterize the radiant beauty, self-assurance, and reclusion of Wang’s plum world.

Wang’s extant dated works span the period of 1346–1355. He painted the plums either in a plain style, with S-curved bough, or in a more ambitious style. In the plain style he used smooth, even brushstrokes to portray the rhythm and grace of the gentle main plum branch. The round petals of the blossoms were often rendered in several overlapping ink washes to symbolize the purity and virtual transparency of the flower. In the ambitious style the plum bough is painted in an S-curve, forming the backbone of the composition, which is often counterbalanced by blossom-bearing branchlets. Thick and thin applications of ink create varied tones that suggest the uneven texture of the branches. The main bough also defines the space where inscriptions are placed, although the inscriptions sometimes overlap with the plums. In the ambitious style massive old plum trunks and boughs meander through the painting space. The main bough gradually tapers toward the top, with secondary branches growing from the bough. The balance between the monumental old branch and the graceful, snowy petals is remarkable. The inscriptions never compete with the image in the ambitious style. Surely Wang Mian was associating himself with the old plum tree that lives a tough life but still grows younger branches with blossoming flowers. He took pride in his own perseverance, confidence, heroism, and ultimate triumph over harsh conditions. By using stylized forms and masterfully contrasted petals and boughs, Wang Mian created an idealized world of
flowering plums as emblematic of the gentleman’s endurance and resilience.

Wang Mian’s influence on later ink plum specialists cannot be overestimated. They expanded the aesthetic scope of the ink plum genre and set a new standard that brought grandeur, intensity, scale, and visual power to later practice.

Yu JIANG

Further Reading

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A scroll painting of a blossoming plum branch by Wang Mian, who inscribed six poems on the painting. Four of his contemporaries also added their own poems; calligraphy often served as a frame for the images or became an integral part of the composition.
WANG Wei

Wáng Wéi 王维

701–761  Tang poet and painter

Wang Wei earned himself an enduring reputation in both poetry and painting. His greatest works in both art forms involve themes of reclusion or subtly portrayed political and natural landscapes.

Wang Wei earned himself an enduring reputation in both poetry and painting. His pen name, "Mojie," was adopted from the Buddhist sutra (one of the discourses of the Buddha that constitute the basic text of Buddhist scripture) Weimojie jing (Vimalakīrti-nirdesa-sūtra) and is emblematic of his belief in Buddhism. The synthetic Buddho-Confucian philosophy informed the style of his artwork.

Wang composed his first poem at the age of nine. When he was twenty-one he passed the national jinshi (advanced scholar) examination. Upon the political demise of his patron Zhang Jiuling (678–740), a result of corruption of the time, the disappointed poet began to express in verse his intention to retreat from political life. Thereafter he lived a half-reclusive life while enjoying high official positions. In 756 the rebels of An Lushan’s (d. 757) stormed the Tang capital Chang’an (modern Xi’an), from where Emperor Xuanzong (reigned 712–756) fled the bloodshed to Shu (modern Sichuan Province). Wang was captured and forced to serve the rebel government. He was convicted of treason and given the death penalty when the new Tang emperor, Suzong (reigned 756–762), recovered the capital. Evidence of his loyalty to the Tang dynasty was found in a poem composed in captivity, and his life was pardoned, but he was demoted. This peril facilitated Wang’s conversion to Buddhism. Indeed, the vicissitudes in Wang’s life seemed to parallel those of the high Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) in the eighth century.

Wang Wei’s greatest works of painting and poetry involve themes of reclusion or subtly portrayed political and natural landscapes. In some of his early poetry he presents himself as a knight-errant or a brave soldier. His wife’s premature death and his political setbacks led Wang’s poetic style to a radical change, and he began to load his poetic imagery with philosophical messages. The natural scenes in his later works became more serene, and this serenity of imagery was often employed as a metaphorical presentation of meditation. In the interplay between the scene and the poet’s mind lay the quintessence of his poetry.

The setting for many of Wang’s most famous poems was a villa that Wang acquired in the early 740s that once belonged to the early Tang poet Song Zhiwen (d. 712). Located in the Zhongnan Mountain area in the countryside surrounding the capital, the villa provided a resort with wonderful scenery for his reclusive and artistically productive life. Anthology of the Wang River, a collection of poems by Wang and his friend Pei Di, was based on their excursions in the extensive villa gardens and vicinity.

Not much is known about Wang Wei’s paintings because only imitations have survived. Although The Snowy Brooks has been regarded as representative of Wang’s work, a false attribution to Wang makes no guarantee that it is at all indicative of Wang’s painting style.
Su Shi’s (1037–1101) famous evaluation of Wang Wei—“If one savours Mojie’s [Wang Wei’s] poetry, there is painting in it; if one gazes at Mojie’s painting, there is poetry in it” (Yang 2007, 191)—guides us in appreciating Wang’s work and provides at the highest level of Chinese poetry and painting.

**Further Reading**


Wang Xianzhi

Wáng Xiànzhī 王献之

344–388 CE  Calligrapher

Wang Xianzhi 王献之, the youngest of Wang Xizhi’s 王羲之 seven sons, was the only male in the family to follow in his father’s footsteps as a calligrapher. But the style Xianzhi created, called yibishu 一笔书, or one-stroke writing, was unique and difficult to match, and it eventually elevated him beyond his father’s fame.

Wang Xianzhi (also known as “Wang Zijing”) was the seventh and youngest son of the master calligrapher Wang Xizhi (303?–379? CE); father and son are called the “two Wangs” of Chinese calligraphy. Xianzhi’s ancestors lived in Shandong Province until his grandfather relocated to Shaoxing in Zhejiang Province, where Xianzhi was born. Unlike his father, who was adept in almost all calligraphic styles, such as standard (kai), running (xing), and cursive (cao), the junior Wang excelled at first only in cursive script.

Xianzhi was born when his father was forty-one. When his father died, Xianzhi was seventeen. Xianzhi then followed Zhangzhi (?–361 CE) as his teacher in the art of calligraphy. By combining running and cursive scripts Xianzhi created a style for which he became famous—later critics called it yibishu 一笔书, or one-stroke writing—in which characters connect in one brushstroke in a freeflowing style. The yibishu 一笔书 became a model for calligraphic connoisseurs and practitioners who revered Wang Xianzhi’s accomplishments more than those of his father. Some of Wang Xianzhi’s famous works are available to us through traced copies, stone engravings, ink rubbings, and handwritten copies. Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322 CE), a later calligrapher, described Wang’s “Luoshenfu” (Song to the Goddess of the Riven Luo) in the standard script as “spirited and untrammeled, the tonality flows in motion” (Ecke, 1971). The thirteen-line fragment that survived shows a certain casualness and is less compact than the writing by Wang Xizhi.

Wang Xianzhi’s “Duck Head Pill Note” (yatouwantie, fifteen characters reproduced on silk in the Tang dynasty [618–907 CE]) and “Mid-Autumn Note” (zhongqiutie, twenty-two characters), both in the cursive-running style, were described by Mi Fu (1051–1107), the famous Song calligrapher, as “natural, true, transcendental, and untrammeled” (Harriet and Fong, 1999, 51). The Qing emperor Qianlong (reigned 1736–1795) included Wang’s works in his imperial collection and considered them a national treasure. The “Mad Cursive Script” (Kuangao) school, with Zhang Xu (flourished 713–740 CE) and Huaisu (737–798 CE) as its representatives, was also influenced by the work of Wang Xianzhi.

Wang Xianzhi served as secretary-general of the imperial court. Known for righteousness and integrity, Wang once refused an order by Xie An, the grand councilor, to write an inscription for a new hall. His reason was that the hall was built against the will of the people.

Legend tells that Wang had two wives and a concubine. His first wife was the daughter of his maternal uncle. They had a harmonious relationship until the Jin emperor selected Wang as his son-in-law; Wang was then compelled to divorce his wife and marry Princess Xinan. In
Wang Xianzhi created a unique style of calligraphy, yibishu, in which the characters were connected in one flowing brushstroke.

his later years he took in a concubine, Taoye, with whom he had a meaningful relationship. Their love was the subject of a song he wrote for her entitled “Song of Taoye.”

Fatima Wu

Further Reading


WANG Xizhi

Wang Xizhi 王義之
303?–379? CE  Calligrapher

Wang Xizhi, referred to as the “Saint of Calligraphy” in China, was the author of the famous Lantingjixu 兰亭集序 or Preface to the Orchid Pavilion Gathering. A rare talent who was adept to almost all calligraphic styles, Wang was an inspiration to past and present calligraphers and connoisseurs.

Wang Xizhi (also known as “Wang Shaoyi”) was born during the politically chaotic Jin dynasty, (265–420 CE) part of the North and South dynasties period (220–589 CE). During this unsettled period members of the Wang family of calligraphers and literati moved from their native area in Shandong Province and relocated to Zhejiang Province in the south. Wang’s father, who came from a line of respected calligraphers, was a minor court official and the first calligraphy teacher of his son.

As Wang grew he proved to be a man of character. One anecdote tells of how he was chosen to be the son-in-law of Commander Shi. The latter announced that an interview would be conducted in the prime minister’s residence to select the right man for his daughter. Young men of letters flocked to the palace dressed in their best clothes. Wang, not anxious to please, arrived late in casual clothing. He managed to find a seat near a bed. Because of the heat, he untied his belt and bared his abdomen. Such behavior marked him as different from the rest, and he left an impression of spontaneity on those who were present.

When Shi heard this report, he decided to give Wang his daughter’s hand.

Following the Confucian tradition, Wang received a military position at court as general of the right. However, his real interest lay in art, especially the calligraphy by which he was known. When young, he had practiced calligraphy with a female master named Madam Wei (272–349 CE). Later he perfected nearly all calligraphic styles, such as standard (kai), running (xing), and cursive (cao), and became known as the “the saint of calligraphy.” His most famous work was the “Preface to the Orchid Pavilion Gathering” (Lantingji Xu), done on the third day of the third month in 353 CE when he and about forty scholar friends met together in the Orchid Pavilion in Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, to celebrate the Spring Festival. After most of his friends wrote poems for the occasion, Wang, intoxicated by alcohol, added a preface written in the running script. The calligraphy he did that day was outstanding, and the brushstrokes were often described as “longwo hutiao” or “Leaning Dragon and Leaping Tiger.” Wang tried to copy it afterward, but he could never achieve that ease and style again. This particular work was such a treasure to connoisseurs that the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) emperor, Li Shimin (Taizong, reigned 626–649 CE), who obtained the original after much difficulty, ordered it to be buried with him at death.

Other famous pieces by Wang include “Essay on Yue I,” dated 348 CE in standard script, and “Three Passages of Calligraphy: Pingan, Heta and Fengju” and “Short Note of a Sunny Day after a Pleasant Snow,” both in running script. Out of the thousands of Wang’s calligraphic pieces, only a small fraction survived, thanks to the traced copies, stone engravings, ink rubbings, and hand copies by later calligraphy masters. For more than a thousand years Wang’s
Calligraphy has been used as the example for all who practice this art. He and his son, Wang Xianzhi (344–388 CE), are called the “two Wangs” in Chinese calligraphy.

Wang, disillusioned by the political upheaval of his era, retired early at the age of forty-nine and switched to neo-Daoism to pursue a life of simplicity and peace. Three stories of his death are told. The first is that he died of an illness at age fifty-nine. Another claims that Wang was executed by the emperor when he refused to come to court. The last one, which most critics feel is valid, tells of Wang’s pursuit of immortality by way of alchemy and his subsequent death by poison.

Fatima WU

Further Reading
Wang Yangming School

Wang Yángmíng Xuéxiào 王阳明学校

Neo-Confucianism combined principles from the three major ancient philosophies of China—Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism—and the Wang Yangming school was one of its dominant and most influential movements.

The Wang Yangming School was named after the philosopher Wang Yangming (1472–1529), who began to critique the Confucian concept that material things alone are worthy of investigation. Instead, Wang advocated broadening of the definition of the “thing” to include not only materiality, but also moral precepts and ideas or thoughts.

Neo-Confucianism

The need for Confucianism to address ideas that had become established in Chinese society, namely Daoism and Buddhism, led to a synthesis of sorts during the Song Dynasty (960–1279). The pragmatic approach of the Confucians, with its concern for the here-and-now and the betterment of the individual and society, was tempered first by the Daoist view that human beings were essentially good and required institutions and a society that would permit this goodness to exert itself; and second, by the Buddhist notion that the world was both illusory and filled with suffering, and one’s concern should be on being rid of this pain. These three dominant philosophies amalgamated to fashion what is commonly known as neo-Confucianism.

One of the hallmarks of neo-Confucian thought was the explication of unity within duality, that is, a thing possesses two opposing elements, which in their dissimilarity unite as one in order to give the thing its being. Neo-Confucianism also maintained that the self can be morally constructed by way of educating and contemplating human intuition, which was innate to all people.

Neo-Confucianism focused on the investigation of material things by seeking to place the individual within his/her social context. This could only be done by cultivating the mind in order to affect change for the better upon those things that surrounded and influenced the individual, namely, society and government. A fulfilled life was one which sought to perfect the self in order to perfect society and the state.

Wang Yangming

In contrast to the contemporary neo-Confucian thought, Wang Yangming theorized that material things were in truth comprised of three elements: material reality; the idea of that reality, that is, its intellectual expression; and the moral import of the thing. For example, a friend is a person, a word, and a moral relationship (Is the friend good or bad?). Wang sought to combine materialism and idealism in order to arrive at a moral understanding of human actions. In this way, he was very much grounded in the Confucian notion that people must continually strive for betterment. But he wanted to know how to achieve
this betterment; it could not be attained by merely following ancient sages and one’s ancestors as Confucians would have it. Rather, Wang placed the onus on the individual: It is up to each person to construct mental moral principles, intellectual moral things that may be used as guides to a better life. Such an understanding further led Wang to define what the actions of the mind may be. He said that the life of the mind involves not only cold, hard facts, but also deep human emotions, such as joy, sadness, and empathy. The mind becomes that location where dissimilarities unite and intellectual activity merges with the emotions. The resultant unity is the surest guide to truth and a truthful life. Wang stressed the necessity of knowing the mind and the self by educating the intuition; this means that it is the moral responsibility of the individual to educate the mind so that she or he will intuitively choose the morally right action for his or her own and the good of the world.

Wang, of course, did not ignore the importance given by Confucians to right actions. But he suggested that such actions must be guided by the mind. He linked action to both knowledge and morality. Indeed, one cannot have action without knowledge, nor can one have knowledge without action; by extension, all knowledge is morality because the chief end of knowledge is to better the self, society and the state. Betterment requires a principle of morality, in that the lesser is raised to a higher level. This is more than mere tautology (needless repetition of an idea), for Wang pointed to a larger precept: the unity of all things. By this principle, humans and their actions are part of materiality, which is both action and idea, and it is through action (or the manifestation of ideas) that humans become part of the world around them and even part of the universe. Thus, that which is good for the individual is also good for society, the world at large, and the cosmos. Each component must work harmoniously within its larger context to bring about an essential unity of all creation, because all things, in fact, are one body. Each thing shares a pattern (the li), or a way of being, with another thing, just as we eat living things in order to live. For example, theoretical physics states that all things in the universe are constructed from an elementary particle, called the Higgs boson, or what Wang would call a pattern.

The concept that all things are united by shared patterns is an important contribution of the Wang Yangming school. With this theory, it broke free from the Confucian valorization of the family: Confucian thinkers such as Mencius (371–289 BCE) said that society and the structures of the world were versions of the family. In the place of such an analogy, Wang suggested that the relationship between things is not a familial one at all; rather, it is a far more intimate harmony of similar patterns. The universe—all of creation and reality itself—is not a family, it is a single body.

In order to know and comprehend this harmony, Wang refined the concept of the mind. First there exists the mind of the Way—which may be defined as a state of calm and lucidity, which permits the mind to apprehend universality (the Principle); that is, universality and the individual become one so that individual begins to carry out the will of heaven (the Principle)—and second there exists the human mind. The former is the mind in its purest primordial state. This is the mind in itself, while the
human mind is that which has lost its purity by becoming ensnared in selfish desires. The object of education and of contemplation is to once again purify the mind and return it to its original state, free from all selfish entanglements, so that it might realize its essential role in, and its implicit bond with, the moral order of the self and of the universe. For Wang, such a liberated mind alone could successfully guide the individual to the good. As is obvious, Wang’s debt to Buddhism was apparent in this explanation; however, he entirely negated the Buddhist self-centered ideal of purifying the soul in order to gain freedom from pain and suffering by nullifying individuality, leading the soul to escape into nothingness. For Wang, purification of the mind was not an end in itself, nor was it selfish to flee from the world. Instead, Wang described a more inclusive approach because he did not neglect the Confucian demand for a pragmatic view of action. A pure mind is the only possible guarantor of morality, because to see all things as one body is also to care for that body fully and completely. In brief, the school of thought that he established may be summarized thus: Personal morality alone saves the world and the universe. The influence of the Wang Yangming school reached its apex during the late Ming and the Qing periods. In present-day China, the influence of the school has waned, although its stress on education as a way of bettering the self and society remains as a dominant mindset.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading
The Words of Wang Yangming

There can be little doubt that among the new trends in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) the teachings and personal example of Wang Yangming were to have the most explosive effect.

Whenever I think of people’s degeneration and difficulties I pity them and have a pain in my heart. I overlook my own unworthiness and wish to save them by this teaching. And I do not know the limits of my ability. When people see me trying to do this, they join one another in ridiculing, insulting, and cursing me as insane . . . Of course, there are cases when people see their fathers, sons, or brothers falling into a deep abyss and getting drowned. They cry, crawl, go naked and barefooted, stumble, and fall. They hang on to dangerous cliffs and go down to save them. Some gentlemen who see them behave like this . . . consider them insane because they cry, stumble, and fall as they do. Now to stand aside and make no attempt to save the drowning, while mocking those who do, is possible only for strangers who have no natural feelings of kinship, but even then they will be considered to have no sense of pity and to be no longer human beings. In the case of a father, son, or brother, because of love he will surely feel an ache in his head and a pain in his heart, run desperately until he has lost his breath, and crawl to save them. He will even risk drowning himself. How much less will he worry about whether people believe him or not?


WANG Yiting

Wáng Yìting 王一亭

1867–1938 Painter and businessman

Wang Yiting was a businessman, painter, patron, and devout Buddhist who helped found numerous art societies throughout Shanghai and was active in the relief efforts of a disastrous 1923 earthquake in Japan.

Wang Yiting was born in Shanghai and began work as an apprentice in a picture-mounting shop, later becoming a comprador (intermediary) for a Japanese company. He was successful in his business career and served as chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce.

Wang Yiting was also a generous supporter of artists and helped to found many art societies in Shanghai. He was proficient in painting historical figures, folk legends, birds with flowers, animals, and landscapes and was renowned for his Buddhist figures and dragons.

In addition to his skill and participation in China’s artistic scene, Wang Yiting also volunteered his services when an earthquake on 1 September 1923 struck the region of Kanto on the Japanese island of Honshu and devastated the city of Tokyo. Leading a relief effort that involved shipping much needed materials and organizing Buddhist prayer services, Wang was a huge asset to the Japanese during the tragic event and strengthened his connections with Japan.

In later life Wang became a devout Buddhist and once was president of the Chinese Buddhist Association.

Kuiyi SHEN

Further Reading


The tumultuous Warring States period led to the unification of China under the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE. The period also was the foundational era of Chinese philosophy.

The Warring States (Zhanguo) period (475–221 BCE) was a period of Chinese history that ended with the unification of China under the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) in 221 BCE. Although scholars agree that the Warring States period ended in 221, the date of its beginning is a matter of contention: Some place it in 481, when the chronicle known as Chunqiu (Springs and Autumns) draws to a close; others in 453, when the state of Jin was divided into three territories; still others in 403, when each of these three new states was formally recognized by the Zhou king. For the purposes of this discussion, the Warring States period begins in 475 BCE, the first year of the reign of Viscount Xiang of Zhao, one of the three states that supplanted Jin. The Warring States period constitutes the second half of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE), whereas the first half of the Eastern Zhou dynasty is known as the “Spring and Autumn period” (770–476 BCE), after the chronicle of the same name.

The Eastern Zhou kings were recognized as the heaven-ordained rulers of the terrestrial world, but they were forced over the centuries to cede more and more power to the feudal lords occupying the lands around them. During this time the most powerful of the semi-independent statelets gradually conquered and annexed their neighbors, so that by the Warring States period, only eight contenders remained: Zhou, Qin, Qi, Chu, Zhao, Wei, Han, and Yan. In 256 BCE the last Zhou king, who was by this time nothing more than a figurehead, was finally deposed, and the Chinese world awaited the final victory of the state of Qin.

Political Changes

The political landscape of the Warring States period was determined by the intensification of several interrelated geopolitical processes that began in the Spring and Autumn period: the ongoing decline of centralized power, the rise of warlike and expansionist states with their own domestic and foreign policies, and the continual diminution in the number of autonomous states as the weakest were annihilated by the strongest. By Warring States times these underlying historical forces had brought about pervasive political, economic, social, and intellectual changes that radically transformed the character of Chinese life.

“Agriculture and war” became a popular slogan as states recognized the substantial benefits of a healthy economy and a mighty army. As the stakes of battle rose, the conception of war necessarily changed from a ritualized competition between educated aristocrats (as in the Spring and Autumn period) to a lawless and bloody struggle between infantry armies as large as could be mustered.

The logistical problems associated with raising, training, and supplying a massive army induced rulers to rethink their approach to governing their territories. Those
rulers who could most fully exploit their resources gained a sizable advantage in the theater of war. Thus, the demands of battle led to the restructuring of the state as a vast production ground of people and munitions, maintained by an efficient and organized administration and serving a single king, to whom the entire population owed unquestioning allegiance. Kinship ties, ritual obligations, and traditional practice, which had been significant considerations guiding human action in earlier times, were now subordinated to the material requirements of the “warring state.” In this manner the imperial model of Chinese statecraft was being forged even before the establishment of the empire itself. The governments of the Qin and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties were largely based on the precedents of the Warring States.

Birth of Chinese Philosophy

The Warring States period is celebrated as the foundational era of Chinese philosophy. Historians sometimes ask why such a tumultuous and perilous time provided the context for some of the most sophisticated philosophers in Chinese history, but the reasons for this intellectual burgeoning are not obscure. The competing lords valued any resource that might aid them in their quest for world dominion, and so they were willing to listen to new ideas. The old ways, after all, were leading the Zhou dynasty to assured extinction. The demand for original thinkers resulted in the growth of a new profession: “wandering persuaders” (youshui), who traveled freely from state to state in search of landed patrons, earning their bread alongside diplomats, generals, diviners, and other educated specialists.

The two foremost philosophical schools in Warring States times were those of the Confucians and the Mohists. The former were followers of the ethical worldview laid down by Confucius (551–479 BCE); the latter group was founded by Mozi, or Master Mo (Mo Di, c. 480–c. 390 BCE), who preached a philosophy of “universal love” (jian’ai). The Confucians and Mohists were irreconcilable enemies—Confucians could never accept the Mohist tenet that one should love the father of one’s neighbor as one loves one’s own father—but they were alike in that their doctrines did not always coincide with the desires of the lords whom they served. Confucians, for example, believed that loyal advisers should remonstrate (jian) with their lord when he is in error, and their outspoken criticism often alienated their superiors. Mohists, for their part, believed that human acquisitiveness is at the root of all suffering in the world, and they actively disrupted campaigns of conquest in the hope of deterring warlords from preying on their neighbors.

Other philosophical orientations were more amenable to the aspirations of rulers. Political philosophers such as Shan Buhai (flourished 354–340 BCE), Shen Dao (b. c. 360 BCE), and Han Fei (d. 233 BCE) formulated an ideal of statecraft (often misleadingly called “legalism”) that relied on standardized laws, proto-bureaucratic administrative systems, and unfailing adherence to the protocols of reward and punishment. The political aspect of philosophy was so important that even the Laozi (or Daode
jing), a text whose primary purpose is to elucidate the benign cosmological notion (an idea based on a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe) of the “way” (dao), takes pains to point out the political applications of its teachings.

The term Warring States is usually said to derive from Stratagems of the Warring States (Zhanguo ce), a collection of anecdotes about the period compiled by Liu Xiang (79–78 BCE). But the term zhanguo was already used in an essay by the statesman Jia Yi (201–169 BCE); this suggests that the era was known as the “Warring States” almost as soon as it had ended.

Paul R. GOLDIN

Further Reading
Chinese practices for regulating the water supply, known as water conservation (shuili), are as old as China’s civilization. The three major objectives of water conservation are irrigation, flood control, and transportation. The commitment to intensive water management has shaped Chinese history.

Access to fresh water is essential to human life. Domesticated plants also require water to survive, ideally in precisely regulated amounts. But the location, quantity, and timing of the water supply are highly variable. China’s monsoon climate, its location amid the watersheds for much of the eastern Himalaya snowpack, and its ecological diversity guarantee a water supply that fluctuates dramatically from place to place and from season to season. Control of water is at the heart of farming and, indeed, civilization itself, and water engineering is one of the areas in which humans have struggled most vigorously to free themselves from constraints imposed by nature.

Turning Water to Advantage

Water conservation is known in Chinese as shuili, which literally means, “turning water to advantage.” The objective of water conservation is to reduce the risk of flood and drought. The wet-rice agriculture of south China requires fields to be drained and flooded at different times in the life cycle of the crop. Water conservation for rice requires methods for ensuring the availability of water when needed and for letting it in and out of the fields when necessary. Historically, both drought and flood were concerns of the Chinese. Archaeologists have excavated drainage canals at the late Neolithic village of Banpo, which flourished around 7,000 years ago in the vicinity of modern-day Xi’an. And queries about rainfall and flooding are a preoccupation of the oracle bones, China’s first written documents, produced from the thirteenth to the eleventh century BCE. From the emergence of their civilizations, people in China devoted substantial energy to regulating the flow of water in riverbeds and to moving water out of its natural courses and into new channels and pools that met their needs for farming, transportation, and settlement. These activities have profoundly shaped Chinese history.

Irrigation and Drainage

Irrigation is the name for the set of technologies devoted to bringing water to places where it is needed for growing crops, while drainage systems channel excess water out of fields. In China irrigation and drainage were practiced widely, beginning in the Neolithic era. By the time of the Song dynasty (960–1279), the world’s most intensive and highly engineered agricultural economy, irrigation and drainage allowed people to grow crops where it would otherwise have been impossible, particularly in the Yangzi (Chang) delta. Irrigated and drained agriculture
supported the commercial revolution of the Song and the population growth of that and subsequent eras.

Irrigation systems include an intake, where water enters an engineered system from its natural course, and a series of branch canals that bring water directly to fields. Many systems also include gates that control the flow of water through the branch canals. Drainage systems rely on pipes or canals that move water downhill and frequently also involve piling up earth to create fields that are raised above the water table and isolated from the surrounding marshes by bunds (embankments) and polders.

The use of polders (low-elevation fields protected by earthen dikes) appears in Chinese texts dating to the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE), a millennium before their emergence in Northern Europe. During the Song dynasty, the introduction of new strains of early ripening rice made double cropping possible, and there were many important improvements in fertilization and cultivation techniques. Water conservation was an essential element of the new intensive rice agriculture of the Song; in turn the promise of high yields rewarded the massive labor that water conservation demanded. During the Northern Song (960–1126), an expansionist state directly sponsored projects to drain wetlands, fill lakes, and irrigate dry lands. By the Southern Song (1127–1279), the government and large landowners collaborated on polder construction on a massive scale that transformed the Yangzi delta into the most populous and wealthy region of the empire and permitted intensive rice farming and commercial agriculture on the rich alluvial soil of former wetlands. The largest polders, which measured several square miles, were subdivided into smaller diked fields, demarcated by networks of natural streams and irrigation and drainage canals, and controlled by locks. Homes were situated on dikes and clustered around embankments. Boat traffic linked villages to the outside. Dikes also served as overland routes. Breaches in the earthen and stone walls would flood the villages as well as the fields. Hillsides were also leveled and diked to conserve soil, regulate water, and create terraces for wet-rice agriculture.

Water conservation initiatives often coordinated political, economic, and engineering challenges at a regional scale. Engineers had to regulate the speed, location, and timing of water flows throughout entire complex systems. It was often difficult to balance competing priorities, and individual water control projects were seldom effectively integrated. In the Yangzi delta, for instance, Song polders to the north of Lake Tai interfered with the lake’s drainage, which resulted in flooding along the Grand Canal. When the canal managers drained excess water, they inundated adjacent fields, to the wrath of landowners, who built embankments to block the water. Until the fossil fuel era, irrigation systems were created and maintained by human and animal labor. According to Song History, one instance of restoring thirty-six silt-clogged canals around the city of Suzhou in 1158 CE required 3.3 million
man-days, an equal number of strings of cash, and more than 100,000 bushels of grain. Some 6,000–7,000 farmers-soldiers were resettled in Suzhou to maintain the system and prevent flooding. Water engineering on the Chinese scale required abundant labor.

Coastal land reclamation deserves special mention. The Pearl River delta around modern Guangzhou and Hong Kong is a human creation, engineered by coastal farmers who learned to capture alluvial silt to create fertile agricultural land. Seawalls, which create barriers between ocean water and fresh water, have been an important feature of Chinese water conservation. The seawall that began to extend south of the Yangzi to the southern side of Hangzhou Bay in the Tang allowed a region of China larger than the Netherlands to be transformed from a land of shallow inlets, salt marshes, sandbars, and brackish creeks into a world of drained polders and navigable canals that supported population densities that were among the world’s highest. Inside seawalls water becomes gradually less brackish, farmers can capture fertile sediments, and agriculture gradually overtakes salt production, fishing, and other coastal pursuits. However, like other massive waterworks, seawalls required constant attention to avert flooding and salinization. According to a 1347 description, rebuilding approximately 6 kilometers of seawall (out of a total length of 400 kilometers) required 63,000 tree trunks and close to a million cubic feet of stone.

Along with canals and polders, irrigation and drainage systems included reservoirs, pools that stored water for future use. In central and south China, where rainfall was abundant, water-storage ponds were ubiquitous from an early date. Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) grave offerings, dating as early as the first century CE, include clay models that depict irrigation ponds separated from adjacent rice fields by dikes or bunds. By the Later Han (25–220 CE), some historical Chinese reservoirs had become large collectively maintained structures that occupied more than 50 hectares. The Peony Dam, built under sponsorship by the state of Chu between 608 and 586 BCE, produced a great reservoir of nearly 100 kilometers in circumference that was maintained until the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). Small reservoirs were dug by individuals who farmed fish and turtles and grew lotuses and water chestnuts at the same time that they irrigated their own rice fields. Dams and sluice gates built into watercourses controlled the flow of water in and out of reservoirs.

Flood Control

All rivers carry some load of silt, or sediment suspended in water. While silt is naturally washed into rivers through processes of erosion, its quantity is exacerbated by farming and deforestation. When rivers descend quickly, their flow is turbulent and rapid, and silt remains in suspension. But when they pass slowly across flat plains, silt is deposited on riverbeds. In the absence of human settlement, rivers periodically readjust their courses across broad alluvial plains—with fertile soils and broad, shallow waters.

Song Ching-Chang’s reconstruction of the earlier survey by Chin Chiu-Shao, paying closer attention to the reality of the geography, and adding more detail, such as the sluice-gate at the entrance to the parallel canal. The main canal runs along ½ li away from the river and takes 2½ li to reach that position. Source: Needham, Joseph, (1959). Science and Civilisation in China.
also optimized for agriculture—as their beds become full of silt and rise. The Huang (Yellow) River is the most sediment laden waterway in the world, carrying an average 1.6 billion tons of silt annually. It is an amount so great that the coastal plain at its mouth grew at a rate of 6 square kilometers per year by the 1200s and even more rapidly thereafter. Agrarian civilization emerged in the fertile loess sediment that the Huang River deposited in north China, and along with it came efforts to confine the river to a predictable course. Nevertheless, its levees, the earthen embankments that paralleled the river’s course, failed more than 1,500 times beginning in the sixth century BCE. Indeed, they were sometimes breached intentionally as the court sacrificed people to the floods in order to stop invading troops or mitigate flooding elsewhere in the system. There have also been eighteen major changes of course. Death tolls from Huang River floods are among the highest associated with any natural disasters in human history. Other rivers, such as the Miju in Yunnan, also began to flood more frequently by the mid-Ming as sedimentation followed from land clearance and deforestation, and increasingly urgent regimes of dredging and levee construction thereafter, along with conflicts over property rights and land use. As the sediment-filled riverbeds rose, people constructed ever-higher levees, which eventually towered 20 feet or more over the landscape and raised the stakes of flooding as well.

When the Huang burst its dikes in the late twelfth century, it split into multiple branch streams that ran both north and south of the Shandong peninsula. Hydrologists decided to encourage this state of affairs by removing many levees to create a broader delta and a slower watercourse. While this solution reduced the likelihood of disastrous floods, it increased total sediment buildup and the overall cost of water management. In the late sixteenth century, Pan Jixun engineered the course of the river around its confluence with the Huai and the Grand Canal to eliminate the multiple channels, force the river into a single route, and constrict the channel that remained. His activities—building 1,200,000 million feet of earthen embankment, 30,000 feet of stone embankment, and four stone spillways; dredging 115,000 feet of riverbed; stopping 139 breaches; and planting 830,000 willow trees to stabilize the tops of the dikes—served to increase the velocity of the water flow and scour out silt at this most important junction. Even after Pan Jixun’s accomplishments, the maintenance work of dredging and diking in this vicinity required half a million workers and 800,000 ounces of silver annually; and sediment, simply deposited further downstream, remained a challenge.

Transportation Canals

Water transportation was about twenty times cheaper than overland transportation before the age of fossil fuels. In the lower Yangzi, natural watercourses and drainage and irrigation canals required few alterations to be used as transportation routes. But elsewhere massive earth-moving projects and innovations in hydrological engineering were required to create navigable waterways. The lure of long-distance commerce and travel made the outlay of labor that this involved a worthy investment. All of China’s great natural waterways flow from west to east, and canals were the lifeline linking the distinct physiographic and cultural regions of north and south China into a single, integrated empire. In 809 an imperial official named Li Ao, traveling with his pregnant wife, conducted a nine-month trip from Luoyang to Guangzhou almost entirely by water. Canals were used for transportation, drainage, sewage, mechanical power, defense, and irrigation, aims that were sometimes in competition with one another.

Transportation canals in China have a long history. The Wild Goose Canal linked the states of Song, Zhang, Chen, Cai, Cao, and Wei during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). By 130 BCE a 124-kilometer canal terminating in the Han capital facilitated grain shipments and was used for irrigation. But the Grand Canal was the single achievement in Chinese canal building. More than 1,000 miles long, the Grand Canal allowed rice and other products of the wealthy south to support the opulent courts of the north and the vast northern armies that confronted nomad power on the steppes. It integrated all of China into a single economy, empire, and culture. To this day it is the longest canal in the world. The Grand Canal is closely associated with Emperor Sui Yangdi, who unified China in 589 after more than 300 years of warfare. Between 605 and 609, he directed efforts to link and straighten existing canals into a single system that connected the Huai,...
Transportation canals of all sizes have a long history in China.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.

to the Huang River. The Grand Canal was extended and improved during the Tang dynasty, as the court turned increasingly to the south for its supplies. When the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) moved the capital north and east to Beijing, the canal was extended yet again. From the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, it remained a significant route for trade and communication, particularly the transport of the annual grain tribute from south to north. In 1793 Britain’s Macartney Embassy traveled the canal to Beijing with a crew of artists and naturalists who left a vivid record of this extraordinary waterway. Nevertheless, ecological decline set in by the turn of the nineteenth century. The system collapsed altogether by the 1820s, and in 1832 troops were needed to quell an uprising of peasants who had rallied against flooding along its disintegrating course.

Maintaining the Grand Canal inspired hydrological innovation throughout the imperial era. During the Tang, Liu Yan discovered how to manage currents and earthworks to permit the Grand Canal to meet the Huang River. Pan Jixun’s efforts to reduce silt buildup in the Huang were also directed at maintaining the Grand Canal, though some other efforts to stabilize the Canal produced unintended hydrological consequences, such as sediment buildup along tributary streams. In the early 1700s, Zhang Pengge improved the canal’s lock mechanisms and dredging regimes to mitigate the massive floods that plagued agricultural lands along the southern part of the canal’s path.

Water Conservation and the History of China

The study of water conservation in Chinese history, at least in Western languages, is closely associated with the theories of the German-born historian and sinologist Karl Wittvogel (1896–1988), who argued that flood control was the formative activity that fostered a strong—in his words “despotic”—imperial state in China. Wittvogel
overlooked many details that have become apparent to subsequent scholars. Water-control systems come in all sizes. Sometimes even the most heavily engineered of agricultural environments arose organically through centuries of small-scale collective activity with no state intervention. A great deal of water engineering was orchestrated according to local collective action, not by an authoritarian state. For instance, at the Dujiangyan waterworks in Sichuan, and at the Sangyuan polder in Guangdong, customary village associations and publicly selected representatives apportioned irrigation water among the various fields. Likewise, many constituencies needed to come together to allow the construction of Yangzi delta polders during the Song. An ambitious state in search of tax revenues, land owners seeking to increase property values, local officials seeking fame, and a growing population of civilians and military colonists eager for public works employment all played a role in water management in imperial China. All of these interests needed to be aligned for water conservation initiatives to succeed. By the Southern Song, water conservation in the lower Yangzi was funded jointly by the state and private investors, and labor was often voluntary and paid for in cash. Even the spectacular projects orchestrated from the court proceeded by trial and error, grand initiatives in one place producing unintended consequences in another.

An engineered water regime truly required not a despotic state so much as a perpetual, consultative, expensive and backbreaking commitment to the everyday maintenance of an inherently unstable and entirely artificial environment. It also required social and technological solutions for managing conflicts over priorities. The tension between the objectives of flood control, transportation, and irrigation were acute. For instance, the Huang River dikes were often breached intentionally by farmers seeking to irrigate their wheat fields. Finally, once any system was in place, it was only by dredging channels and building up earthworks that people could forestall disastrous, fatal floods. Once dense populations depended upon intensive agriculture that required water management, there was no going back.

Bracketing this critique, Wittvogel deserves credit for pioneering work on the primal role of water engineering in the development of China’s empire and civilization. He and his successors have ensured that understanding the complex systems that human intervention has brought to bear on the movement of water remains a topic at the forefront of the study of imperial China. Water conservation is crucial for exploring many topics in Chinese history, including agriculture and its intensification, labor, technology, the commercial economy, environmental history, and state power.

Ruth MOSTERN

Presentation about the Water Conservancy Project at Yangzhou, 1979.
PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Further Reading


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Water Margin

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One of the four Chinese classic novels of the Ming and Qing dynasties, *Shui hú zhuan* (Biographies of Water Margin) is based on historical events, but its authorship is in dispute. The complex story involves a group of 108 rebels who plot against the royal government. Some of the rebels are so vividly presented that they have since become heroes of the Chinese.

*Shui hú zhuan* (Biographies of Water Margin), also called *Zhongyi Shui hú zhuan* (Faithful and Just Men of Water Margin), is one of the four classic novels of the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1644)—the others being *Dream of the Red Chamber*, *Journey to the West*, and *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. Originally named *Jiānghú huoke zhuan* (Robbers of Rivers and Lakes) and *Shuí hú* (Water Margin) for short, this novel was translated into English as *All Men Are Brothers* by Pearl S. Buck (later a Nobel laureate) in the late 1920s and as *Outlaws of the Marsh* by Sidney Shapiro in the 1970s. *Shuí hú* literally means “waterside,” a reference to Mount Liang at today’s Dongping Lake, the alleged base of operations for the rebel heroes depicted in the novel.

*Water Margin*’s authorship is disputed. Some ascribe it to Shi Nai'an, some to Luo Guanzhong, and others to both. The most accepted theory is that Shi Nai’an wrote it and Luo Guanzhong rearranged it later. The biographies of the coauthors are largely speculative; the only known fact about them is that they lived some time during the Yuan (1279–1368) or Ming (1368–1644) dynasties.

The novel tells a tragic story about 108 people of different backgrounds who were forced to become rebel leaders on the lakeside Mount Liang. The book begins with treacherous officials of the Song court (960–1279) bullying their subordinates and their families, driving them into the camp of the Mount Liang rebels led by Song Jiang. Meanwhile others join the rebels for various reasons. After many a successful battle against the government army, Song Jiang and his men surrender after the emperor made them believe that they were being offered amnesty. The emperor then dispatches them to repulse the invasion of Liao, a kingdom established by the Nuchens north of Song, and to put down a series of peasant uprisings; many of the 108 rebels die. The rest are then killed with poisoned wine “gifted” them by the emperor.

*Water Margin* is based on a true event that took place from 1119 to 1121, when Song Jiang led his thirty-five fellow rebels in fighting the government. Stories about the event later found their way into compilations such as *Zuìwēng tānlu* (Tales of a Drunken Man) and *Dasong Xuanhe yishi* (Incidents of the Xuanhe Era of the Great Song). By the Yuan dynasty, all the 108 rebels of *Water Margin* had appeared in popular dramas of the time known as *zaju* (miscellaneous plays). Apparently the novel *Water Margin* was a re-creation based upon all the above creative efforts predating it.

The original text of *Water Margin* is long lost, but
different block-printed editions, both simplified and detailed, remain. The detailed editions are more popular, and better known among them are the 120-chapter edition compiled and supplemented by Yang Dingjian around 1614, the 70-chapter edition edited by Jin Shengtan (1608-1661), and the 100-chapter edition published by Guo Xun during the reign of the Jiajing Emperor (1522-1566).

Water Margin is of great literary value, being the first Chinese chapter novel written in vernacular Chinese. It seamlessly weaves multiple individual lives into an organic whole and yet manages to create distinct personalities with characters such as Lin Chong, Lu Zhishen, Li Kun, and Wu Song. Its intriguing plots are full of twists and turns and packed with action.

Water Margin has been interpreted differently by different people in different times. It has been either dismissed as advocating banditry or welcomed as singing the praises of heroism. In the 1950s the book was regarded as an ode to peasant uprisings. In the 1970s, however, Mao Zedong condemned it for setting a negative example, even though it had been one of his favorite childhood books.

The stories from Water Margin are so popular that many efforts have been made to adapt them into dramas, movies, and TV series. The 43-episode TV series Shui hu zhuang, directed by Zhang Shaolin in 2003, is the most popular, and inspired by its success a new, 120-episode TV series is in production.

Further Reading


Water Resources

Shuǐlǐ zíyuán 水利资源

With the advent of frequent water-pollution incidents such as algae blooms that make the water unusable for millions, the necessity of irrigation for more than 70 percent of its grain and cash crops, and a perennial water shortage, China’s water resources are at the center of one of the most important legal reforms in modern Chinese governance.

More and more people in China, including Chinese officials, are beginning to approach their country’s water supply as a vulnerable resource—one that is inexorably linked to their future—rather than a free natural resource to be used without restraint and consideration. In the first decade of the twenty-first century problems contributing to China’s water sustainability can be generalized in three categories: shortage, pollution, and abuse.

Shortage

With a total volume of freshwater resources of 2.8 trillion cubic meters, trailing only Brazil, Russia, and Canada, China’s water resources equate to 2,220 cubic meters per capita—just one-fourth of the world’s average.

These limited water resources are unevenly distributed both spatially and temporally. Some 80.5 percent of China’s water resources are concentrated south of the Yangzi (Chang) River, where only 40.5 percent of the population lives on only 35.2 percent of the country’s total arable farmland. The remaining 53.5 percent of the population is in the north, living on 64.6 percent of the arable farmland, and, by contrast, they have access to merely 19.5 percent of the water resources. Because about 71 percent of the volume of water in China relies on direct recharge by precipitation, waterfalls are vital to replenishing and sustaining China’s water supply. Yet the average annual precipitation in China is 618 millimeters, 19 percent less than the world average of 800 millimeters (over land). While the precipitation is mostly concentrated in the four months from June to September during the flood season, which may amount to 70 percent of the annual total, this volume ranges in magnitude from more than 2,000 millimeters in the southeastern coastal areas to less than 200 millimeters in the northwestern hinterlands. In Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, for example, annual precipitation is around 305 millimeters, while annual evaporation is as much as 2,000 millimeters. The precipitation drops further to 50 millimeters in the Tarim and Turpan basins in Xinjiang and Chaidamu Basin in Qinghai. For comparison, average annual precipitation in the central Sahara Desert is less than 25 millimeters, while that of Scotland is approximately 1,500 millimeters.

Similarly uneven distribution is seen in groundwater, which constitutes about one-third of China’s freshwater resources. Southern China claims 67.7 percent of the total groundwater, leaving merely 32.3 percent to the arid north. Because groundwater accounts for 70 percent of the drinking water supply and 40 percent of agricultural irrigation, the uneven distribution aggravates the water shortage in northern China.
With rapid economic growth and urbanization, the water shortage has become even more acute. China’s absolute urban population increased from 172 million in 1978 to 562 million—or 43 percent of the total—in 2005, and the demand for water is growing accordingly. According to the Ministry of Water Resources, China has an annual shortage of water totaling 40 billion cubic meters, while 2 to 2.6 million square meters of land area suffer draught. The water shortage costs 15 to 20 billion kilograms of grain production and more than 200 billion yuan of industrial output value every year. Meanwhile, over 70 million people across China have difficulty accessing safe drinking water.

Pollution

While northern China thirsts for water, the water-affluent south has suffered ever more frequent water shortages due to pollution, although pollution is not unique to the south. Of the five-hundred sections of China’s nine major river systems that are monitored for water quality, only 28 percent have water suitable for drinking, while 31 percent have water quality of limited or no functional use. The Haihe, Liaohe, Huang (Yellow), and Huaihe river systems are the worst polluted all in the north, although all the rest of China’s river systems have also had high nitrogen or other pollutant concentrations to various degrees as well. In addition, more than 75 percent of China’s lakes have been polluted. A sample survey reveals that 97 percent of the 118 cities investigated have groundwater that is polluted to varying degrees; 64 percent have seriously polluted groundwater (Ministry of Water Resources 2005). Lake Baiyangdian, China’s largest natural lake, is a source of food and drinking water for people who live around it. Sometimes called the “kidney” of north China, the lake has had an historical role in filtering the waters of nine rivers that flow through it. It has been polluted by arsenic and mercury from sources such as coal emissions, agricultural runoff, and sewage discharge.

Water pollution is caused by increasing discharge of domestic, industrial, and agricultural wastes that often receive little treatment. Unreasonable industrial layout has seated many old, heavily polluting or toxically dangerous industries along rivers. A survey conducted by the State Environmental Protection Administration (2004) shows that, among the 7,555 chemical or petroleum projects in China, 81 percent are located in environmentally sensitive areas such as water networks or densely populated habitats. Of the 1,441 environmental incidents reported in 2004, half were related to water pollution.

Until 2000, only 24 percent of the total 62 billion tons of sewage and wastewater annually discharged in China were treated at the national standard. Along the Yangzi River, China’s longest river, which meanders through eighteen provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, a number of pollution belts have formed out of industrial and domestic wastes discharged short of the treatment standard. These belts run 600 kilometers in total length. Pollutants include micro-organisms, oils, volatile phenols, cyanides, sulfides, mercury, cadmium, lead, chromium, and arsenic. Projects designed for flood control and alleviation of arid areas also have an detrimental impact on the quality of water in the Yangzi. The Three Gorges Dam exacerbates water pollution in the Yangzi by impounding water and reducing the velocity of the river. Impounded water submerges parts of the existing sewer system and wastewater treatment facilities. Plans to divert water from the Yangzi to arid north China will reduce the volume of the water flowing through the Yangzi and thus reduce its ability to dilute and flush toxins.

Pollution has aggravated the shortage of water in the water-scarce north, and it has caused water famines in the water-affluent south. According to the State Environmental Protection Administration, China now faces intensive
outbreaks of water pollution incidents as a consequence of neglecting environmental protection over the past decades; reports of a water pollution incidents have been as frequent as every two or three days on average since the end of 2005. A sudden burst of foul algae blanketed the Taihu Lake in southern Jiangsu in late May 2007, cutting the drinking-water supply to more than 2 million people in Wuxi city, a leading economic engine house of the country, for a week. In the Pearl River delta in Guangdong, where the volume of freshwater resources averages at 330 billion cubic meters a year, rapid economic growth since the 1980s has coupled with pollution to nearly every river course in the urban areas. The pollution has resulted in a water shortage affecting 16 million people in the province (Ministry of Water Resources 2005). Nationwide, the safety of the drinking water more than 300 million people is in question.

**Abuse**

The Ministry of Water Resources maintains that the exploitation of water resources in China in general is not very high, at about 19.5 percent in 2000, although some experts have warned about abuses of water resources.

A traditional farming country, China’s agriculture depends on irrigation: Some 90 percent of cash crops and 70 percent of grain crops are irrigated. In the nine provinces and autonomous regions along the Huang River alone, irrigated farmland increased from 1.4 million hectares in the early 1950s to nearly 5 million hectares in the late 1990s, while the water consumption by agricultural, industrial, and domestic users increased from 1 billion cubic meters a year to well over 30 billion cubic meters. Scientists believe the use of the Huang River water is excessive and beyond the capacity of China’s second largest river, a river that provides water to nearly half of the nation and that cradled the origins of Chinese civilization. This excessive use was identified as one of the causes for the river running dry in its lower reaches for 226 days in 1997. That year the Huang River carried only 1.8 billion cubic meters of water into the sea, compare to an average of 20 billion cubic meters.

Groundwater is also excessively exploited at a volume of more than 9 billion cubic meters per year. This has led to ground subsidence or clefts in many areas, especially in the north, forming seventy-two depression cones across the whole country. According to the Ministry of Land and Resources, about fifty cities in China have reported sinking ground, with the worst occurring in Shanghai, Tianjin, and Taiyuan, where sinking has averaged more than two meters per year since the early 1990s.

The pressure from population growth and economic development has affected wetlands as well. In the fifty-seven years since 1950, China’s total lake area has shrunk by 16,585.36 square kilometers; an average of twenty lakes vanish each year (2007). For example, Qinghai Lake, China’s largest inland saltwater lake at 4,300 square kilometers, lost more than 380 square kilometers between 1959 and 2006. Government plans to address the problems at Qinghai Lake include moving hotels, restaurants, and other tourist facilities to an area at least 3 kilometers from the bank. The Yangzi River valley alone lost 3,000 square kilometers of lake surface area during this period. The surface areas of Dongting Hu and Poyang Hu lakes, two of the major detention basins for Yangzi floods, have shrunk by 46 percent and 40 percent respectively, with their stored volume decreasing from more than 30 billion cubic meters to around 17 billion cubic meters. Hubei, once dubbed as “the province of a thousand lakes,” had 1,066 lakes in the late 1950s. Now only 182 lakes are left.

In contrast to the withering of natural lakes is the construction of eighty-five thousand reservoirs of various sizes, with a total storage volume of 520 billion cubic meters (2000). The controversial Three Gorges Dam...
Rafts on the Yangzi River, 1980, now the source of water power at the Three Gorges Dam. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.

tops this list: it is the world’s largest hydropower project, and more than 1.2 million people were displaced before it began to generate electricity in 2003. Despite the criticisms of opponents about the environmental and social impacts of the reservoirs (i.e., threats to living conditions of aquatic species, hazards to local vegetation and biodiversity, sedimentation, and induction of geological havocs), hydropower is prioritized as part of China’s pursuit of new and clean energy. Figures from the Ministry of Water Resources, the leading dam builder, show that China has over 500 million kilowatts of exploitable water power, while the installed hydroelectric capacity by the end of 2005 was 117 million kilowatts, about 24 percent of the potential. The target is to boost the capacity to 180 million kilowatts by 2010 and to 300 million kilowatts in 2020. That means more river sections will be dammed for hydropower projects. Measures to meet these goals include construction of large hydroelectric power stations, such as the Xiaowan Dam on the Lancang River. Second in size to the Three Gorges Dam, this power station will be capable of generating 4.2 million kilowatts by 2013. China is also investing in small hydroelectric power stations that generate 25 megawatts or less.

Although agriculture accounts for 70 percent of the total water consumption in China, the efficiency of irrigation trails other countries. The average efficiency of irrigation water nationwide is 0.43 (2000 estimate), meaning that 57 percent of the water fails to reach the end crops; this figure is 0.7 in advanced countries elsewhere. The reuse rate of industrial water is 55 percent compared with 75 to 85 percent in other advanced countries.

Lessons

China has enacted at least four laws concerning water, namely the Water Law, the Law on Flood Control, the Law on Water and Soil Conservation, and the Law on Water Pollution Prevention. This legislation has institutionalized the water-drawing permit, the utilization of water resources upon payment, the economic use of water resources, and has placed a penalty on polluters.
Programs have been created to conserve headwaters; to prevent and control water pollution; to make comprehensive use of various water resources including surface water, groundwater and flood water; to reduce water consumption; and to improve water efficiency. Meanwhile, surveillance of water quality has been enhanced, involving both government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Enforcement of the laws and regulations poses the largest question. While there has been much talk about enhancing modern water management, so far the chief administrator of water resources, the Ministry of Water Resources, is seen as being keener on tapping rather than protecting the water resources. Water pollution inspections are often conducted by environmental protection agencies, yet they lack the authority to really execute effective punishment because the polluters are usually protected by local governments by virtue of their “contributions” to the local revenue.

Perhaps incidents like the outbreak of foul algae in the Taihu Lake is teaching decision makers to manage pollution more effectively and is driving home the idea of protecting the water environment more immediately. The pollution control of the Taihu Lake had been conducted for more than ten years prior to the incident, but to no avail. Following the outbreak, however, the provincial government of Jiangsu recognized that controlling lake pollution is an urgent priority and began to treat it as a debt that had to be paid to nature. The Jiangsu government decided to shut down more than 2,000 small chemical plants around Taihu Lake by 2008 and to build a green shelter around the lake 1 kilometer wide. In this area some 660 hectares of cropland will be restored and replanted with trees and grass in order to reduce the discharge of agricultural waste to the lake. According to the local media, this plan is unprecedented. The provincial government pledged to clean the lake even if it is causes a 15 percent downturn in the province’s GDP.

Numerous lessons have shown that it is essential to strike a harmonious relationship with nature rather than conquer it. More and more people in China, including officials at the Ministry of Water Resources, have come to see that water is not inexhaustible, but rather that it is a limited and vulnerable resource. It is not a free natural resource, but it is valuable and strategically significant. Therefore water resources cannot be developed and used unboundedly without consideration of their sustainability. Authorities have also adopted the idea that it is more important to ration the use of water resources with high efficiency than to simply harness the water. This notion is regarded as the hope for the sustainability of water resources in China. Whatever the future in China holds, it is certain that the management of water resources is inextricably intertwined with its direction.

XIONG Lei

Further Reading


Wen Jiabao, who began his second five-year term as premier in 2008, is a respected leader because of his managerial abilities and a popular figure because of his common-man approach to political and social issues. Following the deadly Sichuan earthquake of 2008, he emerged as the compassionate face of the Chinese government.

Wen Jiabao was born of Han parentage on 15 September 1942 in Beichen, Tianjin Municipality, in northeast China. The people of Tianjin are said to be eloquent, humorous, and open, which in many ways fits Wen. He is known as the people’s premier and has a common touch that has earned him the nickname “Grandpa Wen.”

Wen attended Nankai High School, the same school from which Zhou Enlai (China’s first premier) graduated. From 1960 to 1968, Wen studied at the Beijing Institute of Geology, where he earned a baccalaureate degree in geological surveying and a postgraduate degree in geological structure. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1965.

His training and political enthusiasm helped him secure government posts. Between 1968 and 1985 he held such positions as technician and political instructor of the geomechanics team of the Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau; deputy director general of Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau; and vice minister of the Policy and Law Research Office of the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources. During this time Wen built his powerbase and gained standing as a strong administrator and dedicated technocrat.

In 1985 Wen was named deputy director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. In 1986 he was elevated to director, an office he held until 1992. During this time he held a number of other party positions, including chief of staff to general secretaries of the CCP Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin.

Wen’s career nearly ended in disgrace in 1989. A photograph of him alongside the then general secretary Zhao Ziyang visiting student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on 19 May 1989 appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily. To many party leaders, the photo signified their support of the students. Zhao was purged for his actions, but Wen somehow managed to escape persecution and continued to rise in power.

In 1993 Wen became a full member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee. In 1997 he became a member of the Politburo. In 1998 he was appointed one of China’s four vice premiers. The pinnacle of his career, to this point, came in 2003 when he was appointed to his first term as premier of the People’s Republic of China. His second five-year term began on 16 March 2008.

Wen is a popular and, by most accounts, effective leader. His premiership is marked by his “people-first” policy. He has launched programs aimed at revitalizing the rural economy, restructuring the banking system, and reforming state-owned enterprises. He has held impromptu news conferences (an unheard of practice in a country with a state-controlled press), championed the
2008 Beijing Olympics, and shed tears in public, especially following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.

The quake, which struck on 12 May 2008, was one of the deadliest disasters in China’s history. More than 69,000 people were killed, and more than 5 million were left homeless. Along with other structures, thousands of schools were destroyed. The total economic loss is estimated to be more then $75 billion.

A few hours after the quake hit, Wen headed for the quake zone to take charge of rescue operations. As a trained geologist, he understood the magnitude of the disaster. He was immediately named the executive director of the Earthquake Relief Efforts Committee. Media and amateur videos showed him directing rescue crews and comforting victims. In one instance, at the site of a collapsed elementary school, he introduced himself as Grandpa Wen (unwittingly earning himself a nickname) to a child pinned under debris and said, “Hang on child. We’ll rescue you.” His unusually sympathetic face of the Chinese government solidified his popularity and respect.

Wen’s reputation and his face are now well known to the world. He appears often, in action, on Chinese television. He is seen as a man for his times. He has a profile on Facebook, the Internet social-networking site. The author of the page is unknown, but Wen and the Chinese press have welcomed the exposure. During Wen’s trip to Europe in early 2009, when the world was focused on global economic woes, the prime minister garnered some attention for mentioning that he carried in his suitcase a copy of Adam Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Wen explained his view of the book’s message, telling reporters that it is morally unsound—and a threat to stable society—if the fruits of economic development are not shared by all. The view is bound to resonate among those in China who suffer from the uneven distribution of wealth resulting from the country’s own rapid growth. By emphasizing this aspect of Smith’s philosophy, the *Economist* reported in March 2009, “Wen is trying to show he cares.”

Wendell ANDERSON

Further Reading


Princess Wencheng was the niece of the Chinese emperor Tang Taizong; she was sent to Lhasa to marry the Tibetan king Songzan Gambo. In contemporary China, she is famous as a symbol of “the unity of the nationalities” (minzu tuanjie) and credited with the spread of Chinese culture among the Tibetans. She is also the subject of many Tibetan artistic and literary works.

Princess Wencheng was a Chinese princess who married a Tibetan king and became a symbol of intercultural exchange and of the unity of the two nationalities (minzu tuanjie). The Tibetan king Songzan Gambo (reigned 639–650 CE) is the most famous monarch of the ancient kingdom, credited with consolidating royal authority and expanding his territory. He developed a Tibetan script that survives to this day. He introduced Buddhism to Tibet, and the great Jokhang Monastery, which still stands at the center of the capital, Lhasa, dates from his reign.

King Songzan Gambo sent an envoy to the court of Li Shimin (599–649), who reigned as emperor in China from 627 to 649 under the title Tang Taizong, requesting a diplomatic marriage. In 640 Tang Taizong adopted his niece, Princess Wencheng, as his daughter and sent her to Lhasa, where she arrived early the next year.

Like an Nepalese wife whom Songzan Gambo had already married, Princess Wencheng bore him no children (he had offspring by Tibetan wives). But legend claims that a place in the great Potala Palace in Lhasa was their bridal chamber.

Princess Wencheng was a devout Buddhist and probably exerted considerable religious influence on the king. In the holiest innermost part of the Jokhang Monastery stands a statue of Sakyamuni Buddha that is said to be the only surviving Buddha statue dating from the time of Buddha himself and consecrated by him. According to tradition, Princess Wencheng brought this statue from China to Tibet.

Princess Wencheng was reputed to be talented, cultured, well mannered, and versed in divination and other branches of learning. She introduced Tibet to Chinese skills, such as those of the medical doctor and miller, calendar calculation, weaving, pottery, and paper and wine production. Her retinue from China also included thousands of craftsmen. She remained in Tibet after the king died, teaching weaving and embroidery to Tibetan women.

After her death Princess Wencheng was deified in Tibet, and statues of her are still found in Tibetan temples. She became the subject of wall paintings, folksongs, and legends. One of the eight great dramas in the Tibetan tradition is entitled A-lea-rgya-za (Princess Wencheng). Two Tibetan works, one dated to 1388, the other to 1643, record the story in some detail, the latter being closer to the version performed nowadays. Actually this drama is set in the Chinese capital and concerns the successful attempts of the Tibetan envoy in winning a competition for her hand against royals from elsewhere and in overcoming resistance from Tang Taizong to grant the marriage of Princess Wencheng to the Tibetan king. At the end Tang
Taizong encourages her to spread Buddhism in Tibet as she leaves for Lhasa at the head of a mighty convoy.

In contemporary Chinese historiography (the writing of history) Princess Wencheng is given an important role in spreading Chinese culture to Tibet. By enhancing the close relationship between Chinese and Tibetans she symbolizes “the unity of the nationalities.” Her marriage with the Tibetan king is considered by some as evidence that Tibet belongs to China.

**Colin MACKERRAS**

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**Further Reading**


WEN Tingyun

Wèn Tíngyùn 温庭筠

c. 812–866 CE  Tang lyric poet

Wen Tingyun was a lyric poet during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) whose innovations had a wide-ranging influence on Chinese poetry, especially during the Song dynasty (960–1279).

As with most things concerning the life of the poet Wen Tingyun, it is difficult to say exactly where he was born. Some scholars say he was a native of Taiyuan, in Shanxi. Others state that he was likely born in the Yangzi area. But there is little doubt that he was among the first to master the ci form, verses set to specific and well-known tunes and melodies. His poems are often concerned with themes unconventional for their time, such as anger, sexuality, and hatred. He also excelled in singing and playing the flute.

Wen was born into a family of minor court officials. He sought to become a scholar-official but to little avail, as he could never pass the civil service examinations. Many accounts attribute this failure to his self-indulgent life. One requirement of a scholar-official was high moral integrity; another, literary talent. Perhaps embittered, he began to criticize many of the court officials in his verses and songs. Even those who sought to help him were subject to his attacks.

After failing the examinations Wen set about to find a rich patron. But his attempts proved fruitless since there were not many powerful people whom he had not offended. Around 839 he was likely married and then had two children, a son named Wen Xian and a daughter. No further details about his family life are known. For the next ten years, he sought again and again to achieve a position at court, failing each time.

In 853 Wen was finally given a post far from the capital. Perhaps this was an effort to remove him from the inner circle of the court in a kindly fashion. Despite his slanderous and unpopular actions, and perhaps because of them, he was a highly recognized public figure, and his poems and songs were widely read.

In 863 he had made his way back to the capital of Yangzhou, where he had hopes of being granted a more worthwhile position. But that was not to be, and he continued in his old ways. Before long, he was severely beaten by a soldier because he had violated a curfew. He lodged a complaint, but the soldier’s actions were upheld.

This incident infuriated Wen further, and he continued to attack in verse the various officials he deemed responsible for his humiliation. The result was that he was exiled once again. He would never return to Yangzhou. It is likely that he died in exile sometime after 866.

In Chinese literary tradition, Wen’s poetry has been neglected because of his moral failings. Many are the anecdotes that relate his exploits in brothels. But such an approach is unfair to Wen’s rather prodigious talent. Although his verses appear deceptively simple, their primary concern is the exploration of those emotions that hover around the individual in his or her interaction with the world, and with those who love him or her. Thus Wen seeks to find a balance between pleasure and the
emotional cost of winning such enjoyment. This allows him to delve into those very things that mark and underscore life: love, suffering, pain, but also hope for better things to come.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


WEN Wenhao ▶

The Poetry of Wen Tingyun

*NEWS SO Seldom COMES*

Blue tail-feathers and markings of gold
on a pair of mandarin ducks,
And tiny ripples of water stirring the blue
of a pond in spring;
Beside the pond there stands a crabapple
tree,
Its branches filled with pink after the
rain.
Her figured sleeve covers a dimpled smile
As a flying butterfly lights on the mistlike
grass.
Her window gives on all this loveliness—
And news so seldom comes from the
Jade Pass!


Wen Tingyun, a Tang dynasty lyric poet whose themes were unconventional for his time—and whose verses and songs were often critical of court officials.
Weng Wenhao was a leading figure in China’s development of geological studies—as a student, researcher, teacher and administrator. As director of the National Resources Commission in the mid-1930s he oversaw the planning of heavy industrial reconstruction and the creation of state-run national defense industries; after the outbreak of war in 1937 he became one of China’s leading statesman.

Weng Wenhao was among China’s first geologists and a leading statesman during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside of China as the Second Sino-Japanese War, and fought in the context of World War II) and the Civil War (1945–1949). He was also the principal architect of China’s state enterprise system.

Weng was born in Qin County of Zhejiang Province. In 1903, at the age of fourteen, he passed the traditional civil service examination at the prefectural level and became a “received talent” (xiucai). In 1909 he went to Belgium to study physics and geology at Louvain University, where he received a doctorate in 1913. Upon returning to China the same year Weng Wenhao joined the Geological Research Institute, which was an institution of education designed to train future geologists. After the Geological Research Institute was forced to close in 1916, he transferred to the Geological Investigation Institute, which was China’s first veritable research institute in geological science. During the late 1910s and the 1920s he published several comprehensive studies that described China’s mineral resources and their distribution, as well as the conditions of the Chinese mining industry. He served as the acting director of the Geological Investigation Institute from 1921 to 1926. He became the institute’s director in 1926 and continued to serve in that position until 1938. Between 1928 and 1930 he was invited by the president of Qinghua University to establish a department of geography that would teach the subjects of geography, geology, and meteorology and to serve simultaneously as department chair. He also held the positions of acting president of Qinghua University in 1931.

From November 1932 to April 1935 he served as secretary-general of the newly created National Defense Planning Commission and coordinated the investigation of China’s natural and human resources and the preparation of plans for national defense. After the National Defense Planning Commission was renamed National Resources Commission in April 1935, he became its director. During his tenure as director from 1935 to 1946 he oversaw the planning of heavy industrial reconstruction and the creation of national defense industries. Under his leadership the National Resources Commission established roughly 130 enterprises in energy, petroleum, iron and steel, machinery, alcohol, and electric industries and the management of those state-owned enterprises.

After the outbreak of war in 1937 and the reorganization of the central government, Weng in January 1938 became minister of the Ministry of Economic Affairs
Weng Wenhao's National Resource Commission

The Harvard scholar William C. Kirby writing on the twentieth century geologist/statesman Weng Wenhao:

The new industrial strategy. The basic goals of the plan arrived at by Weng Wenhao's commission in the years 1932–35 may be summed up as follows: the development of the state-run heavy industries and mines in a new “economic center” in central China. These would primarily serve national defense needs and be run by trained specialists according to a comprehensive plan as the initial step toward a fully “planned economy.” Heavy industrialization was linked to the exploitation of raw materials and the development of new power-generating capacity, for all of which foreign investment and assistance were essential. A state monopoly on the export of certain raw materials would provide the necessary foreign exchange.

“Heavy industries constitute the main pillar of national defense,” wrote Weng in 1940. “This is why progressive nations the world over have spared neither time nor effort in expanding and developing heavy industries.”


under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan; he assumed responsibility for directing the administration of the national economy while he continued to serve as director of the National Resources Commission. Under his watch the Ministry of Economic Affairs oversaw industry, mining, commerce, agriculture, forestry, and water conservancy. After May 1940 the Executive Yuan delegated new responsibilities of administering industrial regulation and business enterprises to the Ministry of Economic Affairs but removed agriculture, forestry, and water conservancy. Weng remained head of the Ministry of Economic Affairs until 1946. After the war he served as vice president of the Executive Yuan from June 1945 to April 1947 and president of the Executive Yuan from May to November 1948. The imminent Communist victory led Weng to travel to France and England from late 1949 to 1950. In 1951 he returned to China and joined the Communist government, serving three times as a member of the National Political Consultative Conference. He died in January 1971.

Morris L. BIAN

Further Reading


Wenzhou Model ▶
Wenzhou Model

Since the 1980s, business activity in and around the city of Wenzhou in Jiangsu Province has served as national model for economic development in China. The success of the model is due in large part to the traditions and spirit of the local people.

During the early stages of China’s economic reforms (from 1979 to the mid-1980s), two distinctive regional development models emerged: the Wenzhou model and the Sunan model. The former is based on Wenzhou, a medium-sized coastal city in Zhejiang Province, where a market economy led by rapidly growing and vigorous private enterprises has helped the Wenzhou region to flourish economically. The latter is centered in Suzhou, a cultural and business center in the rich and populous Jiangsu Province, where collectively owned township enterprises with strong government backing has successfully generated business development.

Socialism versus Capitalism

The term Wenzhou model was first adopted in a special report by the Jiefang Daily, 12 May 1985, on Wenzhou’s family industries. The report praised the Wenzhou model as an “eye-catching economic miracle” and “a model that leads to the prosperity of vast rural areas.” However, from the beginning, this model attracted severe criticism from many Communist Party and government leaders at the national and provincial levels. As such, it became a focal point of a heated political debate. According to these critics, the Sunan model followed the socialist development road, whereas the Wenzhou model tried to restore capitalism, which the government then tried to repress. The socialism versus capitalism (xing she or xing zi) dispute between these two models echoed the broader debate between continuing the state-planned economy or permitting market economy and private enterprises.

One of the main elements of this debate, as demonstrated in Wenzhou, was the problem of managing and regulating private enterprises. Wenzhou people refer to the 1980s and even the early 1990s as the period of primitive accumulation of capital. During this period Wenzhou businesses would do almost anything to turn a profit, leaving quality by the wayside. The lack of sufficient supervision and regulation of private businesses led to chaotic, fraudulent practices and suicidal competition, resulting in devastating damage to the private economy. For a long time, Wenzhou was synonymous with forgery and poor quality (jia, mao, wei, lue). At the same time, the government worried about social control and the political consequences of a flourishing private economy. The debate lasted until Deng Xiaoping’s famous tour to several southern cities in 1992, which brought a new momentum to Wenzhou’s private businesses.
Entrepreneurial Roots

Unlike other regions where the collectively owned village and township economy boomed before private enterprises developed, Wenzhou’s economic development grew immediately in the late 1970s from an explosion of private enterprises. These small family-based operations, in small towns in the Wenzhou region, became the foundation of Wenzhou businesses. Around the late 1970s, Wenzhou had only 6,477 businesses: 302 state owned, 4,801 collectively owned, and 1,372 private enterprises (or 21 percent) at the village and township levels. By 1996 the total number had increased to 117,829 and, of these, 112,232 (or 95 percent) were private businesses. From 1979 to 2000, Wenzhou’s economy grew at an average rate of 15 percent a year, and the total industrial output increased from ¥1.12 billion (about $164 million) in 1978 to ¥203 billion (about $20 billion) in 2001. By 2007 the private sector made up 99.5 percent of Wenzhou’s total number of firms, 95.5 percent of its industrial value, 95 percent of its foreign trade revenue, and 80 percent of its tax revenue.

The distinctiveness of the Wenzhou model owes much to its unique historical tradition and to more recent economic developments that shaped its culture and the traits of its people. Today, Wenzhou spans over 11,784 square kilometers (about 4,550 square miles, slightly smaller than Connecticut) and is home to 7.7 million people (2007 estimate). Surrounded by mountains, it has very limited arable land. In 1978 one-third of the land was agricultural, and the per capita land tenure was only 0.53 mu (one-tenth of an acre). As a result, on the eve of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms Wenzhou had a surplus of more than a million agricultural laborers. In addition, as Wenzhou is situated on the Taiwan Straits, the prereform government considered it a military front against Taiwan and thus too risky for infrastructural investments. Between 1949 and 1978, total state investment in building Wenzhou’s infrastructure was less than ¥60 million (about $9 million), only 15 percent the average national state investment in comparable cities. Thus, before 1978, the state-owned economy contributed only 36 percent to Wenzhou’s industrial output value, far below the national average of 78 percent.

Wenzhou was called an ocean culture. Frequent migrations since ancient times, its dependence on ocean trade, and the lack of strong ties to any inland cultural centers nurtured an independent, diligent, creative, practical, and adventurous society. Its cultural uniqueness dates back as early as the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1279) dynasties, when Wenzhou—then known as Ou or Yongjia—was a prosperous manufacturing and commercial port in southeast China. Far from the capitals of imperial dynasties, Wenzhou enjoyed a relatively isolated cultural environment. Against the mainstream of Confucianism, the Yongjia School during the Southern Song (1127–1279) and the Three Scholars of East Ou during the late Qing (1644–1912) were well known for their advocacy of business and economic development.

Since the late 1980s, the Wenzhou model has been characterized by family-operated, low-tech, low-capital, and labor-intensive enterprises. Products have been heavily concentrated in light industries, such as lighters, glasses, garments, shoes, and small electrical appliances. The products of these hundreds and thousands of crude workshops go on to national and international markets. The phrase “small products, big market” has become the trademark of the Wenzhou model. Millions of surplus agriculture laborers entered the nonagricultural production market, and the economic conditions of their families and the region as a whole have improved profoundly. In 1980 the average income of Wenzhou villagers was 15 percent below the national level. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the average income of Wenzhou villagers had risen to twice that of the national level. During the early stages of China’s economic reforms, the Wenzhou model helped break down old conceptions of economic development and demonstrated to other regions, especially lower Yangzi (Chang) delta regions, the potential gains of a market economy. Through the Wenzhou model, Zhejiang Province has become the “headquarters of the private economy” in China. In 2007 the total industrial output, retail value, and income from foreign trade of its private businesses ranked first in the nation.

Future Challenges

Yet this model faces serious challenges from economic globalization and China’s membership in the World Trade Organization. Certain innate weaknesses of family-operated businesses, from leadership to managerial mechanisms, have hindered the model’s advantages. Since the late 1990s, to thrive in the increasingly
competitive domestic and international markets, Wenzhou’s private enterprises have reorganized swiftly into large limited liability corporations and shareholding corporations. The size of individual enterprises has enlarged significantly, and the industrial structure, capital composition, and managerial model have been substantially transformed.

The question arises whether these new developments, as promoted by the corporations and valued at ¥1 billion (about $146 million), still represent the Wenzhou model. Wenzhou people believe it should. They consider the true spirit of the Wenzhou model to be people’s creativity, sense of adventure and independence, diligence, and vision.

Qiusha MA

Further Reading


The Chinese Nationalist Party’s campaign of violence in Shanghai—the “White Terror”—was aimed at Communists and labor union members in 1927. The White Terror suppressed Communist activity in the city and influenced the later strategy of the Chinese Communist Party.

The White Terror was the regime of violence established by the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP or Guomindang) after its capture of Shanghai in 1927. The violence, which drove a permanent wedge between the Nationalists (the White Party) and the Communists (the Red Party), was directed at labor unions and their leaders but evolved into extortion of Shanghai’s privileged classes.

Fragmented Politics

From the time of the collapse of China’s last imperial dynasty (Qing, 1644–1912) in 1911 and the establishment of Republican China (1912–1949), China’s political landscape had been fragmented; by the early 1920s revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) led the CNP from its main base in Guangzhou (Canton), while Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai in 1921. In 1923 Sun Yat-sen’s favorable impression of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the Communist belief that a socialist revolution would follow a nationalist revolution led to the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists forming an uneasy alliance against the local warlords who held large parts of China. Michael Borodin (originally named “Mikhail Gruzenberg,” 1884–1931), who was a Comintern (the Communist International established in 1919 and dissolved in 1943) agent in China from 1923 to 1927 and who was one of the architects of the alliance between the CCP and CNP, became one of Sun Yat-sen’s special advisers. At a CNP conference in January 1924 Communist delegates accounted for fewer than 20 percent of those present, but two years later Communists and their supporters in the CNP were the majority of delegates at a conference in Guangzhou. After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), commander of the Whampoa Military Academy south of Guangzhou, soon emerged as the new leader of the CNP.

Although Guangzhou had become a Communist stronghold, powerful anti-Communist factions of the CNP existed all over China, and the pro-Soviet line was abandoned under the new CNP leadership. The tensions between the CCP and the CNP surfaced in March 1926 when Chiang Kai-shek felt provoked by the presence of a gunboat commanded by a Communist; Chiang imposed martial law in Guangzhou. Soviet advisers were arrested, and workers and Communists were disarmed. Martial law was lifted after some days, and after negotiations involving Borodin, the CNP-CCP alliance continued but with a weakened Communist position. By the end of 1926 the armies controlled by the CNP and Chiang Kai-shek had conquered most of southern China and established headquarters in Nanchang in Jiangxi Province, while the CCP and its supporters were based in Wuhan in Hubei Province.
Shanghai in 1927

The central area of Shanghai in the 1920s was divided into a number of foreign settlements surrounded by Chinese neighborhoods. The foreign concessions were administratively and legislatively independent of China, and they could even overrule the legal system of the Chinese government. The city was booming—a center of industry and trade—and Communist leaders had been successful in organizing workers on the docks and in the factories into labor unions. In May 1925 strikes involving several hundreds of thousands of workers in Shanghai spread to the rest of China, and the riots were stopped only when Japanese and British troops opened fire and killed numerous Chinese workers.

In February 1927, as Chiang Kai-shek was contemplating a move on Shanghai, the Communist leaders in the city—Zhou Enlai (1899–1976) and Li Lisan (1899–1967)—organized a general strike that paralyzed the busy port and the city’s industry. Numerous workers again were arrested and executed, but in March the strike turned into an armed rebellion against the CNP and the authorities in the Chinese part of Shanghai, and police stations and other key buildings were occupied. Chiang Kai-shek delayed his advance on Shanghai, hoping that foreign troops or Shanghai’s local Chinese commander would crush the Communists, but when that hope was dashed, the CNP armies arrived on 26 March.

The Green Gang

One of Chiang Kai-shek’s main goals in taking over the wealthy city of Shanghai was to gain financial support for his campaign to defeat the northern provinces, which were controlled by independent warlords. At the same time he wanted to curb the influence of the CCP headquarters in Wuhan and the strong Communist organization in Shanghai. The city’s powerful businessmen, industrial leaders, foreign concessions, and underworld entrepreneurs occupied with prostitution, gambling, kidnapping, and opium trade shared Chiang’s opposition to
the Communists. A secret society known as the “Green Gang” (Qingbang) controlled the illegal activities in Shanghai. The Green Gang was led by Huang Jinrong, a senior officer in the French police. The exact nature of Chiang Kai-shek’s relationship with the Green Gang remains unclear, but historians generally agree that an alliance was formed between the Nationalist occupying forces and the Green Gang to strike against labor unions and the Communists.

At 4 a.m. on 12 April, while Chiang was away trying to establish his capital in Nanjing in Jiangsu Province, a militia led by associates of Huang carried out a well-organized attack on union headquarters around Shanghai. The militia was made up of approximately one thousand men who were heavily armed and wore plain blue clothes and white armbands with the Chinese character for labor (gong). In several instances they were assisted by Nationalist troops. They were allowed to pass freely through the foreign settlements. Hundreds of labor unionists and Communists were shot or arrested and turned over to the Nationalist troops, who executed them. A few leaders, such as Zhou Enlai, narrowly escaped. The next day the labor unions responded with strikes and demonstrations, which were dispersed with machine guns, swords, and bayonets.

The White Terror spread to other cities controlled by the CNP, and several Communist attempts to establish city communes were suppressed. Having ended Communist activities in Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek began to collect payment from the privileged classes for his services. Assisted by criminals of the Green Gang, the CNP forced the rich to donate money or to extend “loans” to finance its armies. Those who refused to comply were imprisoned and released only in return for huge sums of money or had their property confiscated or their children kidnapped.

The White Terror in Shanghai and other urban Communist strongholds had a large influence on the development of Communist strategy in China. Having lost its influence in the cities, the CCP concentrated its efforts on the rural areas and based its revolution on peasants rather than on industrial workers.

Bent NIELSON

Further Reading

Ruthlessness is key to a man’s accomplishment.
无毒不丈夫
Wù dú bú zhàng fù
Wine Culture

The use of alcoholic beverages in China has been continuous throughout its history. Today, with traditional customs of hospitality supplemented by the obligations of modern business practices, the ways in which beer, liquor, and wine are consumed reveal an important aspect of Chinese life—and producing these beverages has become a thriving sub-economy.

Evidence of the use of alcoholic beverages in China dates to the discovery and analysis of sediment found in nine-thousand-year-old crockery dug from cave-tombs in Henan Province. Archaeologists have documented that Chinese farmers produced grain, the basis of many alcoholic spirits, as early as seven thousand years ago. Alcoholic beverages have had a place in traditional customs and rituals throughout China’s history, and do so increasingly in modern times as an important part of social and business life.

The alcoholic beverages the Chinese drink include baijiu (Chinese liquor), putaojiu (wine), huangjiu (rice wine), and pijiu (beer). Of the four, baijiu and huangjiu are indigenous and appeal to the most consumers.

Baijiu, literally “white liquor,” is a colorless spirit distilled from sorghum, rice, wheat, corn, peas, or dried yams, or from a mixture of some of the grains aided by sacchariferous starters like yeast and mold. Baijiu has different types of bouquets and may or may not have flavoring added. Ranging from 40 to 65 percent alcohol (i.e., 80 to 130 proof), baijiu’s appearance is similar to that of vodka, yet its taste is distinctive and unique and perhaps a little too strong for some Western palates. Some of the most famous brands are Maotai, Fenjiu, Wuliangye, Jiannanchun, Yanghedaqu, Gujinggong, and Dongjiu. A bottle of low-quality baijiu may cost less than one U.S. dollar, but a bottle of Maotai that has been aged for many years can cost a few thousand.

Huangjiu (rice wine) is fermented like wine and beer but is made primarily of glutinous rice. Other grains can be used, like indica rice, black rice, millet, sorghum, buckwheat, or highland barley, and sometimes dried yams are used. Each gives huangjiu a unique flavor. Before modern technology huangjiu was manually produced in a process that soaked, steamed, and cooled the rice before fermenting it twice and sterilizing the extraction using heat. The Shaoxing huangjiu of Zhejiang Province, the millet huangjiu of Shandong Province, and the monascus (mold-fermented) huangjiu of Fujian Province are among the best of the country. Their prices are comparable to those of higher-end baijiu.

As their standard of living has improved, the Chinese have become health-conscious and concerned about their drinking habits, now preferring liquor of lower alcohol percentage. Baijiu, still the dominant “national drink,” is being challenged by wine and beer, whose consumption is growing rapidly. While leading the world in the increase of beer drinking, China imports great volumes of top-grade wines and spirits each year. Favored in luxury hotels, bars, and nightclubs, and as fads of the newly rich, they also targeted to appeal to the average Chinese drinker.
History

In 2005 an American brewery, Dogfish Head, made headlines when it produced a new beer based on a biochemical analysis of dregs found in shards of crockery unearthed in a 9,000-year-old cave-tomb in Jiahu, Henan Province. Archaeologists learned that early Chinese were already farming grains, the major component of wine, in the Yangshao culture six to seven thousand years ago. The excavation of a great variety of five-thousand-year-old drinking vessels from the Longshan culture (c. 3000–1900 BCE) testifies to the popularity of huangjiu at that time. The Chinese were able to produce a dozen types of yeast starters in the fourth century CE, and they understood the natural use of monascus mold for fermentation a thousand years ago.

Baijiu came later. A bronze distiller was discovered in a tomb of the Eastern Han period (25–220 CE), and records of the sixth or seventh century mention shaojiu, namely baijiu, but historians would rather place the time of its mass production in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Grape wines and their fermenting techniques were imported from Central Asia during the Han (202 BCE–220 CE) or Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties. The first Chinese brewery, though, was not built until 1892 in Zhangyu, Hebei Province, which first produced beer and then wine. Tsingtao, the only Chinese beer known to Westerners today, was first manufactured in 1903 in a brewery of German propriety in Qingdao, Shandong Province.

Today China is a major liquor producer. In 2007, it produced 500,000 kiloliters of baijiu; 66,500,000 metric tons of putaojiu; 2,000,000 metric tons of huangjiu; and 39,313,700 kiloliters of piju. The majority of this volume was consumed domestically. In the same year, China imported more than 150,000 kiloliters of wine and 205,700 kiloliters of beer. China has become the third largest consumer of Martell cognac, following only Great Britain and the United States (Wang, 2008).

Customs

It is difficult to describe the customs of drinking in China because they vary from region to region, from ethnicity to ethnicity, and from occasion to occasion. They also vary among people of different tastes and occupations. Traditionally, women did not drink alcohol. Today most women in China still shun liquor and choose non-alcoholic beverages. However, because business deals in China are closed more often at dinner tables than in meeting rooms, a growing number of enterprises and government agencies require that their public relations officers, mostly young women, develop a great capacity for drinking, much to the chagrin of the public. In general, older people choose baijiu; younger ones prefer beer; and people of middle age are fond of both. White-collar workers drink wine more than anything else.

Urging someone to drink is an important part of the Chinese tradition at large. To do so, people resort to various strategies and tactics. They may look for (or invent) a reason to make a toast. While Han Chinese use eloquent speech, ethnic minorities mostly sing their quanjiu (songs that urge drinking) or jingjiu (songs of toast). The idea is to show hospitality and to make sure guests are “drinking well.” The Chinese, seeing straightforwardness as impolite, often take “no” for a euphemistic way of saying “yes.” The only way to get a guest to drink to his heart’s content, they reason, is to urge him repeatedly. In such a culture, the avoidance of overdrinking is equally important. This is usually achieved by pacing the amount one drinks over the course of a gathering or dinner. Cheating may be committed as a necessary evil by either stealthily substituting water for liquor or by covertly spitting liquor out into a napkin. Spilling some liquor “unintentionally” also does the trick. This custom of “offense” and “defense” over a drink can sometimes get out of hand and become a very annoying tug-of-war, which happens often at family and friendly gatherings in rural areas of eastern China.

Drinking can become unruly at home and in small eateries, where people play a caiquan (finger-guessing) game, something like the Italian morra. Each round involves two players. They stretch out a number of fingers from one or both hands at the same time that they shout out a number from 2 to 20. The one who shouts out a number equal to the total number of extended fingers will win. Whoever loses the game has to suffer the penalty of draining a glass full of alcohol. After guessing the number of fingers, the contestants also shout out a series of rhymes, known as xingjiuling, to pun on the numbers, such as “one respectful heart” for the number 1, “two brotherly friends” for 2, “three shining stars” for 3 and so on. As excitement builds, each tries to shout down the other. Upscale restaurants always ban the game.

Drinking etiquette can also require subtlety. When toasting, one has to make certain of the pecking order between guests who are present.上下级关系的主次关系应根据具体场合而定。
higher than a senior does. The most polite way to toast, particularly to a guest or senior, is to say, “I’ll drink it up [meaning one glass], but you can drink as much as you can.” At the table, one can never drink alone without initiating a toast or inviting others to drink. Otherwise people may think it rude. People often stand up to toast one another and clink their cups or glasses. When less excited, they may just sit and toast. As they cannot reach each other at a large table, they may instead gently tap the lazy Susan with the edge of the bottom of their cup or glass.

Ethnic Chinese usually observe their diverse time-honored rituals. When guests come to visit Mongolians, for example, they are invited into the yurt, presented with kha-btags (silk scarves of good wishes), and offered an alcoholic beverage made with horse milk. According to another Mongolian tradition, the guests must bless the earth, the heaven, and themselves before drinking by dipping a little finger in the liquor and tossing it in the air, snapping it to the ground, and daubing it on their foreheads.

To the Chinese, drinking without good food is unthinkable, so each formal dinner has at least two courses. The first, consisting of lighter dishes, is geared primarily to facilitate drinking, and is followed by the second course of heavier dishes. Today, however, Western-style bars or pubs that serve drinks without the accompaniment of a “proper” meal are mushrooming in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, catering to foreigners and locals alike.

The popular Chinese saying “He jiu he hou le; du bo du bo le (Drinking brings people closer, but gambling sets people apart)” vividly signifies the role drinking plays in human relations in China. Drinking is not only an integral part of social life but is increasingly becoming a ritual in business culture. A lot of business deals are sealed at dinner tables amongst boisterous toasting and the clinking of cups and glasses.

Haiwang YUAN

Further Reading

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A table setting at the Great Hall of the People, including fluted wine glasses. Alcoholic beverage consumption in China is influenced by traditional customs of hospitality and the social protocols of modern business. PHOTO BY TOM CHRISTENSEN.
Wokou

Wōkōu 倭寇

The Wokou, meaning “Japanese pirates,” (although some of them were actually renegade Chinese), plagued the coasts of China and Korea from about 1200 to sometime after 1600. Their activities were brought to an end by wider permission of legal trade on the coast of China and by Japanese prohibitions of foreign voyages by their own people.

Wokou (Chinese) or wakō (Japanese) meaning “Japanese pirates,” plagued the coasts of China and Korea from the 1200s to the end of Japanese seafaring in the 1600s. Their depredations shaped Chinese and Korean negative images of Japan and limited the possibilities for peaceful interaction among the three countries. Many of them were in fact Chinese, sometimes basing themselves in the Japanese islands, allying themselves with Japanese marauders or trade-and-predation-oriented daimyo (territorial warlords) even using Japanese names or adopting Japanese dress. One of the earliest uses of the term is on a Korean stela dated 414 CE. An outbreak of piracy around the Japanese Inland Sea is recorded in the 930s. References to the Matsuura family and their associates, who would be prominent in piracy and maritime trade until their end in the early 1600s, marauding off the coast of Korea are found in texts from the 1200s.

Japanese piracy off the coasts of the continent reached its first peak in the 1300s. The struggle between the Northern and Southern Courts in Japan unleashed samurai predation and search for plunder in all directions. Raids reached down to the coasts of Shandong and other parts of northern China, but Korea bore the brunt of the pillage. Korean sources record 174 raids between 1376 and 1385, some of them mini-invasions that reached the outskirts of the capital. Some Japanese pirates reportedly were allied with maritime rivals of Zhu Yuanzhang, the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) founder, who responded with drastic measures, building up forces and fortifications and forbidding all but the smallest maritime voyages from the coasts of China. Japanese and other foreign rulers could trade with China only by sending tribute embassies to the imperial court. Several powerful figures in Japan responded to this disincentive by attempting to prevent the departure of pirates from their bases. These measures, China’s improved maritime defenses, and agrarian and anti-commercial strategies for economic revival from the chaos of the Yuan-Ming wars were sufficient to reduce the numbers of pirate attacks on China in the 1400s. Illegal trade from the Fujian port of Yuegang and the vast legal loophole of the flourishing tribute trade of the kings of the Ryukyu Islands were other safety valves for trade that reduced maritime violence.

Treaty of 1443

The Koreans mounted stiff resistance to Japanese raids along their southern coast and negotiated with the Ashikaga shogunate and, more importantly, with local power-holders like the Ōuchi of western Kyushu and the Sō of
Tsushima Island. A treaty in 1443 confirmed a regime of ship-permit quotas for various Japanese maritime powers and a very special position for the Sō; all Japanese ships were required to stop at Tsushima to have their permits checked. In 1461 Sō Shigemoto was appointed governor of Tsushima by the king of Korea. Three ports in Korea became substantial enclaves of Japanese settlement. The Japanese continually pushed the boundaries of what they were permitted under the treaty; violence declined but did not entirely cease.

Both the Chinese and the Korean solutions dissolved after 1500, as officials responded to growing volumes of trade and some increase in piracy by attempting to thoroughly enforce all the bureaucratic quotas and restrictions that had been enacted in the 1400s. Riots by Japanese in the Korean ports in 1510 were suppressed, order was restored with the cooperation of the Sō of Tsushima, and trade soon resumed. Another large-scale Japanese attack on Korea occurred in 1555, but by that time the pirates’ momentum had shifted to the lower Yanzi (Chang) region. The Japanese returned to attack Korea from 1592 until 1598, employing the large and well-organized armies of Hideyoshi and his allies; their defeat owed much to Korean experience in defensive naval warfare against pirates during the preceding centuries.
Resurgence

Between 1440 and 1550 Chinese sources list only twenty-five wokou raids; between 1550 and 1570 they record 542. Trouble began with the strict enforcement of restrictions on foreign trade after the succession of the Jiajing emperor in 1524. A base of smugglers and pirates at the Shuangyu anchorage in the Zhoushan Archipelago off the Zhejiang coast is reported as early as 1526. Enforcement measures simply pushed well-armed Chinese maritime traders into collusion with Japanese traders, less and less under control as the chaos of Japan’s Warring States period (1467–1600, Sengoku jidai) reached its peak. Historians differ with regard to the numbers of Chinese and Japanese involved in these wokou raids, and the total has remained inestimable in view of (1) the numbers of Chinese gangsters who took Japanese names or donned Japanese breechclouts to scare their countrymen, (2) the multiple aliases used by many, and (3) the prevalence of adoption, sworn brotherhood, and other pseudo-kinship ties from Japan to Vietnam and beyond. In 1547 Zhu Wan was appointed as a special Grand Coordinator with wide authority to stamp out smuggling and piracy on the Zhejiang and Fujian coasts. In the spring of 1548 his forces occupied and devastated the Shuangyu anchorage. The number of captives taken was not large; the attack came in the season when winds favored voyages to Japan, and any sensible smuggler/pirate would have seen it coming and would have assembled his cargoes and gotten away to Japan. The maritime interests counterattacked; their gentry allies secured the execution of Zhu Wan for judicial irregularities, and their armed bands pillaged coastal areas and even made amazing thrusts inland, camping outside the gates of Wuxi and of Nanjing. The wokou had excellent bases in western Japan, especially in the Goto Islands, and much support from the Matsuura,

Fierce Japanese pirate raids ceased sometime around 1630, but southern coast grandmothers continued to threaten Chinese toddlers with the folklore that “the wokou would come get them” well into the nineteenth century.
the Shimazu, and other warrior factions. Ming forces sent in pursuit of them were no less predatory than the wokou toward merchants and common people. In the 1550s some astute negotiation by Ming high officials turned some of the pirates against each other and secured the surrender and execution of such important leaders as Wang Zhi. Well-trained government militias emerged under leaders like the famous Qi Jiguang. When the Portuguese were permitted to settle at Macao in 1557, they provided a growing channel for trade with Japan without legalizing either the presence of Japanese in Chinese ports or Chinese voyages to Japan. In 1567 the Ming court approved a system of legal foreign trade in Chinese shipping to all destinations except Japan; harbors on Taiwan emerged as entrepots (intermediate centers) for Sino-Japanese trade. This legalization in 1567 did more than all the military efforts had done to end the menace of the wokou, who went legal or far offshore into Southeast Asian waters.

**Twilight of the Wokou**

The wokou phenomenon had a long and eventful decline from 1567 until the drastic prohibitions of Japanese sea voyaging by the Tokugawa shogunate in the 1630s. Hideyoshi channeled samurai valor and pirate predation into his hugely ill-conceived invasion of Korea from 1592 until 1598. The Shimazu of Satsuma conquered the Ryukyus in 1609. From 1606 to 1608 Japanese ships heading for Southeast Asia caused rumor and panic among the Chinese people when they stopped at Macao. In the 1620s the Dutch began to settle on southern Taiwan and got into a very dangerous conflict with Japanese traders who had been there before them. The Tokugawa shogunate prohibited foreign voyages by their own people, largely in response to the dangers of Christian subversion. The Japanese were gone, but southern coast grandmothers continued to threaten Chinese toddlers with the folklore that "the wokou would come get them" well into the nineteenth century. Some of the wokou would have been peaceful traders if they had had the chance; others wanted nothing but loot and killing. They were a central aggravation, an unsolved problem in relations among Japan, Korea, and China for over four hundred years.

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Women, Role of

Nữ nữ de diwēi 女人的地位

Chinese women, as wives, mothers, and workers, have been central to the functioning of both state and society. In recent years they have contributed to Chinese state-building and commerce in the professions and also as soldiers and scholars, cadre commanders, and political leaders.

The Chinese expression, “women hold up half the sky,” describes the important role of women throughout China's history. Confucius (551–479 BCE) believed that strong family relationships were the key to a moral society and, in turn, a moral state. Women thus contributed to state-building. In the upper-class mansions of traditional China, women managed the household and educated the young. In peasant households women worked alongside the men to shape family economies, however meager, that maintained the state.

China changed dramatically during the twentieth century. Women's roles changed as well. No longer only domestic managers and family caregivers, women were now workers and professionals, soldiers and scholars, cadre commanders and political leaders. In the twenty-first century, women remain critical to China's future economic growth and social stability.

Confucian China

Until the twentieth century, Confucianism prescribed the roles of women from birth to death through three sets of principles. The earliest set of principles was the “four womanly virtues,” set forth in Lessons for Women.

Historical illustration of women at work. The Chinese saying, “Women hold up half the sky,” reflects the importance of women’s roles through history—in the family, the field, and the factory.
by the woman scholar Ban Zhao during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). The four virtues were proper virtue, proper speech, proper countenance, and proper conduct. The next important set of principles was that of the “three obediences”: obedience to one’s father before marriage, to one’s husband when married, and to one’s son if widowed. Finally, there was the principle of bie (separateness). Women and men held different roles in distinct spheres. Women stayed at home. Elite men ran the state and commerce in the public realm. Peasant men worked the fields. Although separate in many respects, the lives of both women and men were a public matter. Because the family was the basic political unit in the Confucian system, the state had a vested interest in the lives of women and men alike.

The Confucian moral code applied equally to women and men. One of the five basic Confucian relationships was that between wife and husband. While husbands were placed over their wives, the principle of reciprocity (shu) required that husbands treat their wives with respect if they expected to be obeyed. The very important Confucian virtue of filial piety (xiao) required sons to honor and serve both their fathers and their mothers.

Aspects of the imperial bureaucracy also provided elite women with status and power in the family. Elite boys and men spent much time studying for civil service examinations. Passing these exams qualified a man for an official position and most likely a privileged life. As a way to curtail corruption, Chinese officials were not allowed to hold office in their home province. Once a man received an official appointment, he was assigned to a post far away. In their absence wives and mothers managed the household and often the entire family estate.

Foot Binding

No discussion of women in traditional China would be complete without mentioning the custom of foot binding. Foot binding was the painful practice of wrapping young girls’ feet so they would not grow. The practice has led to the stereotyping of Chinese women as victims of male subjugation and ornaments for male amusement. Yet foot binding was not condoned in orthodox Confucian literature. In actuality foot binding was an aesthetic fashion that was part of female culture. Foot binding began during the Song dynasty (960–1279) as a fashion among courtesans. It was soon adapted by women in court circles. Tiny feet became a point of status and a mark of beauty for women in elite society. Because it was the custom in China for men to marry women of lower social standing, foot binding eventually spread across the social strata and became a means of upward mobility—or aspiration—for some families, as they would

In the twentieth century Chinese women began to take on a more prominent role in community leadership, politics, and the military.
have their daughters’ feet bound to make them more desirable to prospective husbands of a higher social status.

Foot binding was a private female ritual. Mothers bound the feet of their daughters. Young girls embroidered intricate slippers as part of their trousseau and wrote poems about their tiny feet. Bathing and rebinding feet became a lifelong part of women’s daily toilet. Except for her husband, no man ever saw a woman’s feet, and even he never saw his wife’s feet unbound.

Women in Traditional China

The adage “men till, women weave” described gender roles in traditional China. Originally, it also described women’s economic contributions to the state. In early and middle imperial China (221 BCE–1279 CE), taxes were paid in rice and woven cotton cloth; thus, women were responsible for a portion of the family tax levy. Gradually, however, the adage referred to the differentiation of men’s and women’s work. Elite men served in public office; peasant men labored in the fields. Both elite and peasant women worked in the domestic household.

Women’s social status was based on their roles as wives and especially mothers. Producing children, especially boys, was highly valued in China’s patrilineal society. The custom of revering one’s ancestors made a male heir indispensable because only he could conduct these family rituals. The virtue of filial piety required sons to care for parents in their old age. Sons brought honor, prestige, and wealth to their families if they passed their civil service examinations and were appointed to government positions. Even the lowest bureaucratic position elevated the entire family to scholar-gentry status with its many class privileges.

Even with so much emphasis on boys, girls were equally necessary for a strong society because they were the ones to produce the next generation of male heirs. From earliest childhood girls were groomed for their future roles as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law. Marriage was a social contract between families. A bride and groom never saw each other before their wedding day. An emotional attachment may or may not have developed between a wife and husband.

A wife’s primary relationship was with her mother-in-law, the ruler of the household. A woman’s status within her husband’s family was complicated, especially in a large extended family with many other women. Status for a woman was determined by her own age, the position of her husband in the family, and whether she produced a male heir. Her beauty, womanly virtues, and domestic skills also contributed to status, although in a minor way.

Concubines were “secondary” wives who were not legal wives; they also had little or no social standing. If a
man’s first wife failed to produce a male heir, law and custom allowed him to bring a second woman into the household to father his son. The son was considered legitimate, but the first wife—not the concubine—was recognized as the child’s mother. While the practice of concubinage was officially condoned only as a means to secure a male heir, the practice of taking more than one concubine became a mark of wealth among the affluent.

**Women in Modern China**

China faced tremendous challenges over the last century and a half. Every aspect of Chinese life—social, political, and economic—changed during this time. This especially included the roles of women, who emerged from the domestic household to take an active and public role in building modern China.

Education was the key to women’s transformation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, women received educations outside of the home in missionary schools and private academies. Beginning in 1907 government-run schools began to accept women. Some women continued their studies in Japan or the United States. With the growth of higher education for women in China—through Christian union colleges for women founded between 1905 and 1915 and government-sponsored universities after 1919—women leaders were more likely to have been educated entirely in China.

Women’s modern transformation was very gradual, and there were setbacks. Professions only slowly opened to women. In the 1920s women worked as doctors and educators, and in many “white-collar” jobs in stores and businesses. Gradually women entered government service. Political rights were even more elusive. Both the Nationalist and the Communist parties were essentially patriarchal. The New Life Movement, an ideological campaign launched by General Chiang Kai-shek in the early 1930s, actually emphasized the four womanly virtues and sought to curtail women’s new public roles by promoting domesticity. But also in the 1930s a civil law code was finally passed that granted women many civil rights, such as the right to inheritance and property ownership.

Most of the progress women made in the first half of the twentieth century affected only women in the urban centers. In the rural countryside, where most of China’s population lived, life changed slowly, if at all. Wars, rebellions, famines, floods, and a growing population drove most of China’s rural populations into poverty. Infanticide, especially of girls, and the selling of girls into slavery, prostitution, and indentured servitude in factories and mills were common. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finally put an end to these practices when it came to power in 1949.

The creation of the People’s Republic of China brought other significant changes to women. In 1949 women from various women’s organizations formed the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF). A quasi-official organization, the ACWF provided Chinese women their first real opportunity to have a voice in their own affairs and those of their country. Although ideologically bound to the CCP, the ACWF is exclusively a women’s organization.
that lobbies the government on behalf of women and helps enforce policy at the regional and local levels. In 1950 the government also enacted a series of marriage laws that, at least theoretically, made women and men equal under the law. The laws also legalized divorce and banned concubinage and the sale of brides. But women have also endured much. Political purges, ill-conceived economic reforms, and the disastrous Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) compromised or destroyed the lives of thousands if not millions.

China's rise as a world power has opened up even more possibilities for women. Educated, trained, and skilled women are helping drive China's burgeoning economy. For the first time in history, many women are delaying marriage, finding financial success, and enjoying independent lives. However, as has been true throughout Chinese history, these educated, urban professionals represent only a small fraction of Chinese women. The majority of women living in the rural areas receive only middle school educations at best and, for most, marriage remains their only option. But even women from the rural areas are testing the waters in the new industrial centers springing up across China. Whether veteran party members or young urban elites or laborers, Chinese women still hold up half the sky.

Elizabeth A. LITTELL-LAMB

Further Reading


Women hold up half the sky.

妇女能顶半边天
funû néng dìng bàn biāntiān

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Chinese word radicals are the building blocks of most of Chinese words. Each radical conveys a certain message, be it an object or an abstract notion. Understanding of the Chinese word radicals is crucial to the appreciation of Chinese language.

A Chinese word radical (bùshóu, 部首) is a semantic marker that links certain core ideas with a word. Written Chinese words are expressed in pictograms, which are made up of certain elements, including radicals. Each element has a specific meaning. The elements collectively mold a specific object or idea into the pictogram.

The Chinese system of word radicals is the world’s earliest large-scale, across-the-board classification of knowledge at the fundamental level. The system is unique in its capacity to associate a range of objects or ideas under a single umbrella. It contributes to the notion that complex matters are made up of simpler components. The system also reinforces lateral thinking and the notion of association: An object or notion should somehow be classified under a category or grouping.

Some of the word radicals exist only as components of words and have no meaning by themselves. For example, the radical 心 (xīn) alone means nothing though it implies something related to “textile.” Similarly, the radical 亻 (rén) is not a word in its own right though it is used for words related to “people” or “human.”

Most radicals, however, have semantic importance; that is, they carry specific meaning, as the following examples show. Words related to sentiments or emotions normally have 心 or 宀 (xin, heart) as the radical. These include angry, bored, forget, loyal, tolerance, fear, feeling, love, sad, and thought. Most objects or concepts related to water—words such as cool, river, stream, swamp, sweat, flow, ocean, flush, gush, soup, tears—incorporate 氵 or 气 (shui, water) as the word radical. Most words for metals and minerals have the radical ⾦ (metal). The radical 食 (shi, food) is used in words related to eating and to certain types of foods. Some of the word radicals are more easily understood than others.

The number of radicals included in a particular dictionary might vary, depending on how many Chinese words that dictionary accepts. The first Chinese dictionary, shuōwénjìézì, 説文解字, compiled around 100 CE, collected 9,353 characters. The most comprehensive dictionary, the Kangxi Dictionary, Kāngxizìdīn, 康熙字典, lists about 40,000 characters although, as with the entries in the Oxford English Dictionary, many are archaic or obsolete.

Examples of some of the 190 to 214 radicals commonly used are as follows:

- **Speech (言)** found in speech 话; remember 记; permission 许; and promise 诺
- **Knife (刀)** found in cut 切; distribute 分; and fight 斗
- **Strength (力)** found in add 加; work 功; and effort 努
Three dotted drops of water ᵃ, found in full 满; river 江; soup 汤; sprinkle, pour water over 浇; wave 浪; sea 海; and ocean 洋

Upright heart ᴴ, found in remembrance 忆; busy 忙; worry 忧; faint hearted 悽; and anger 愤

Movement ᵃ, found in passing by 由; reach 达; near 近; and enter, advance 进

Grass ᴵ, found in grass 草; flower 花; and fragrance 芳

Hand ᵃ, found in hit 打; search 找; bend 折; and shift 搬

Mouth 口, found in call 叫; and animal cry 鸣

Mountain 山, found in peak 峰; and collapse 崩

Food ᵄ, found in hungry 饥; drink 饮; and rice 饭

Bow 弓, found in draw 引; extend 张; and weak 弱

Female 女, found in mother 妈; elder sister 姐; younger sister 妹; and woman 妇

Child 子; found in grandchild 孙; and learn 学

Horse 马, found in drive 驾; proud 骄; and tame 驯

Fire 火, found in heat treatment 炼; heat 炎; cigarette, smoke 煙; and beacon 烽

Heart 心, found in thoughts 思; tolerate 忍; loyal 忠; and love 恋

Wood 木, found in forest 林; jungle 森; tree 树; plank 板; and material 材

The character 中 (zhong) refers to “middle,” “central,” or “center.” The character depicts a line drawn through the center of a rectangle. The character 心 (xin) refers to “the heart.” When these two characters are combined as radicals, they form the word loyalty 忠, the scenario whereby the heart remains central, not swayed by circumstances, giving rise to the notion of loyalty.

The word nation 國 comprises a well defined boundary or territory, as shown by the outer frame 口. Within the territory a straight line at the bottom 一字 depicts land on which people, represented by mouth 口, reside. Within the framework there is spear 戈, signifying defense of the territory. The notion of “nation” is, therefore, a territory with its land and its people who defend the associated assets and values.

The word love 愛 incorporates the radical heart 心 at the core, representing emotion, feeling, or sentiment. The closest character that lies beneath the heart is friend 友, indicating that there are strong emotional links between friends. The sentiment and emotion is capped 一 (enclosure above the heart), confirming that the relationship is exclusive, not open to anyone else. Finally, there is the claw component 爪 on top, implying a powerful grip, emotional or physical, on the people concerned. Such are the power and emotions involved in love.

The importance of word radicals cannot be overestimated. Radicals form an integral part of written Chinese. Until the development of phonetics, the radical was the main tool to search for words in Chinese dictionaries. An understanding of word radicals is fundamental to the study of the Chinese language.

Yit-Seng YOW

Further Reading


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World’s fairs have always been a reflection of their times. Expo 2010 Shanghai China, also known as World Expo 2010, is no exception. The theme of the fair, scheduled to run 1 May to 31 October, is “Better City, Better Life.” The world will converge on Shanghai to see products and to hear ideas designed to improve urban living in the twenty-first century.

Riding the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China again opens its doors to the world in 2010 with Expo 2010 Shanghai China. The international event runs from 1 May to 31 October along the waterfront of the Huangpu River in downtown Shanghai. More than two hundred nations, business, and international organizations are participating, and up to 70 million visitors from around the world are expected. (If the United States participates, it will take funding from the private sector, not the government. Legislation prohibits official government funding.) The expo features exhibits, demonstrations, and symposiums centered on the theme “Better City, Better Life.” Officials say the purpose of the expo is to encourage innovation for sustainable and harmonious urban living. The expo, or fair, is the first registered world exposition in a developing country and only China’s second world’s fair (the first was in Nanking in 1910). World’s fairs and expositions have a long history in the rest of the world.

Brief History of Fairs

Fairs date back more than 2,500 years in human history. Fairs have always been a mix of cultural or religious festival and trade show. Some fairs are localized—like county fairs in the United States—and some are international. The goals of world’s fairs are commercial and cultural. Besides offering products for sale, world’s fairs provide an opportunity for both host and participating countries to display their capabilities, ideals, and culture. Expositions are also grand venues for amusement and entertainment: giant carnivals, essentially. As times change, expositions change to fit those times.

One of the first modern trade show expositions took place in London in 1760. The Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacture, and Commerce organized exhibitions and offered prizes for improvements in the manufacture of tapestries, carpets, and porcelain. The first true world’s fair was also held in London in 1851, the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations.

Between 1870 and 1940, an international exposition of some kind was held every year, mostly in Europe and North America. In 1928 the International Exhibitions Bureau was established in Paris to regulate the frequency and quality of expositions. Since the 1950s, however, the frequency and popularity of world’s fairs has declined.

The first international fair in China was the Nan- yang Industrial Exhibition in Nanking in 1910. Plans were laid for an American-Chinese exposition in 1920 in Shanghai, but it was never mounted. In 1957 the first
Canton Fair was held in Guangzhou. This trade fair has been held every spring and autumn since then. In 2007 it was renamed the China Import and Export Fair; it is the largest trade fair in China. The Shanghai Expo is expected to far surpass the Guangzhou trade show in attendance and the number of products displayed and business deals made.

**Shanghai, the City**

Shanghai, which literally means the “City on the Sea,” lies in the Yangzi (Chang) River Delta. It is called in Chinese Hu for short and Shen as a nickname. The city proper covers 6,340 square kilometers (2,448 square miles). Eighteen districts and one county are under its jurisdiction. Its estimated 2007 population is nearly 19 million. Shanghai has been undergoing one of the fastest economic expansions in history and is becoming East Asia’s leading business city.

Construction on infrastructure—mostly transportation—within the city and on the expo site itself began in earnest in 2007. The Shanghai Expo Park is the largest single construction project in the history of Shanghai.

**Expo Park**

The expo park covers 5.28 square kilometers (2 square miles). The site is divided into five zones, each averaging about 60 hectares (148 acres). Another area is a large public amusement park of about 10 hectares (25 acres). There are twenty-six clusters of pavilions. The average floor area of each pavilion cluster can accommodate forty-five exhibition areas, each covering up to 25,000 square meters (269,000 square feet). Each pavilion cluster contains cafes, shops, toilets, communication centers, nursing services, and other public facilities.

The pavilions house the main exhibits. The China Pavilion, the Expo Center, and the Performance Center are the principal structures. Other buildings include pavilions for participating countries, international organizations, corporations, and theme pavilions, including the Urban Civilization Pavilion, the Urban Exploration Pavilion, and the Urban Best Practices area. All the pavilions and exhibits reflect the expo’s theme, “Better City, Better Life.”

**Urban Theme**

Organizers of Expo 2010 Shanghai China chose the theme to represent the common wish of humankind for better living in urban environments, recognizing the trend toward urban living in China and throughout the world. The concept of the theme is meant to stimulate innovation and exploration of the full potential of urban life in the twenty-first century. This includes creating an ecofriendly society and maintaining the sustainable development of human beings, according to the organizers. The theme plays out in exhibits that display urban civilization—habitat, lifestyles, working conditions—as it is and as how it can be with progressive thinking and global cooperation. The expo’s logo depicts three people representing “me, you, and him or her” holding hands to symbolize the family of humankind. Most of the events at the expo also reflect the theme.

**Expo Events**

Expo organizers have arranged for more than one hundred cultural and entertainment events each day during the expo’s 184-day run at some thirty-five venues. Official events include the opening and closing ceremonies and China National Day. Special events include symposiums on urban issues and meetings of international organizations. Certain days, weeks, and months have been set aside to spotlight China’s provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, as well as private and state-run enterprises.

International participants are also staging events. Along with the commercial presentations, there are designated national pavilion days on which individual countries will put on special shows highlighting their cultures. United States Day is scheduled for some time in July, if the United States participates.

Many of the national and theme pavilions will remain after the expo as part of the Huangpu Riverside
Regeneration program, a project to redevelop a run-down industrial area.

**After the Expo**

Plans for use of the site after the expo were designed early on. Permanent buildings that will add to the skyline of Shanghai include The China Pavilion, which will serve as a cultural center; the Expo Boulevard, a semiopen structure that will serve as a large transportation and commercial center; and the Performance Center, which can be configured to accommodate between 4,000 and 18,000 audience members. In addition, for the expo Shanghai built a new tunnel under the Huangpu River, increased the number of subway trains, and generally improved the city’s infrastructure. The impact of Expo 2010 Shanghai China is sure to last for many years.

**Wendell ANDERSON**

**Further Reading**


World Heritage Sites
Shìjiè yíchǎn 世界遗产

The concept of linking nature conservation and cultural preservation was adopted in 1972 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Consequently, the World Heritage Convention authorized the designation of World Heritage sites by the World Heritage Committee.

With a history of some five thousand years, China has a rich legacy of art, architecture, literature, and religion. Not until 1987, however, was China’s application for its first World Heritage site, the Great Wall, granted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which has been actively engaged in endeavors to combine nature conservation with cultural preservation since 1972.

Early Enlistees
The Great Wall (enlisted in 1987) was constructed during the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) to defend against invaders from the north and has been renovated throughout history. Connecting Shandongguan Pass in the east and Jianyuguan Pass in the west, the Great Wall stretches across Liaoning, Hebei, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Ningxia, and Gansu provinces. It is one of the seven wonders of the world and an icon of Chinese national identity.

The Peking Man Site at Zhoukoudian (enlisted in 1987) near Beijing, site of the discovery of a skullcap and teeth from a species dated broadly to 640,000–230,000 years ago engenders archaeological value in the theory of prehistoric human and evolution. The Mausoleum of the First Qin Emperor (enlisted in 1987) holds the key to the mysteries of an ancient kingdom. Complex arrays of terracotta warriors with horses, chariots, and weapons found in the excavated tombs, each differing in outfit and pose, bear great historical and cultural significance. The Tombs of the Ming and Qing Dynasties (enlisted in 2000 and 2003) signify the art of burial ingenuity, revealing traditional Chinese cosmology (a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe), feng shui theory (involving a Chinese geomantic practice in which a structure or site is chosen or configured so as to harmonize with the spiritual forces that inhabit it), and geomancy (divination by means of figures or lines or geographic features).

Palaces and Temples
The Imperial Palace of the Ming and Qing dynasties (enlisted in 1987) in Beijing and Shenyang, the Mountain Resort in Chengde City (enlisted in 1994), the Temple of Heaven (an imperial sacrificial altar) in Beijing (enlisted in 1998), and the Imperial Summer Palace in Beijing (enlisted in 1998) are pinnacles of royal architectural art and the theory of traditional Chinese belief systems.

The Temple of Confucius, the Cemetery of Confucius, and the Kong Family Mansion in Qufu (enlisted in 1994) in Shandong Province commemorate the educator,
philosopher, and politician Confucius (551–479 BCE). The cemetery containing the remains of Confucius and 100,000 of his descendants and the complex of monuments within invoke his legacy.

Potala Palace (enlisted in 1994) in Lhasa, Tibet, is a landmark atop Red Hill. The palace consists of two sections—the outer and larger White Palace, built between 1645 and 1653 as the secular administrative center and the winter residential quarters, and the sacred Red Palace of temples and spiritual buildings, built between 1690 and 1693. The complex symbolizes the central role of Buddhism in administering Tibet. Together with Jokhang Temple Monastery and the summer palace Norbulingka, the Potala Palace typifies a sanctuary of Tibetan art and architecture.

Façade of St. Paul’s Cathedral, Macao. Originally built by Jesuits in the seventeenth century, St. Paul’s was the largest Catholic cathedral in Asia. All but the façade was destroyed by fire during a typhoon in 1835. It remains as Macao’s most famous landmark and has been designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
The ancient building complex in the Wudang Mountains (enlisted in 1994) in Hubei Province celebrates the secular and religious architectural achievements of the Yuan (1279–1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. The Ancient City of Pingyao (enlisted in 1997) in Shanxi Province, founded in the fourteenth century, exemplifies a well-preserved Han Chinese city with the development of its architectural style (especially of banking) and urban planning. Old Town of Lijiang (enlisted in 1997) in Yunnan Province features the blending of ethnic cultural elements through the ages with a working ancient water-supply system. The Ancient Villages in Southern Anhui Province (Xidi and Hongcun) (enlisted in 2000) embody Anhui/Huizhou architectural style of a Ming dynasty rural settlement.

Gardens and Caves

The Classical Gardens of Suzhou (enlisted in 1997) in Jiangsu Province, consisting of nine gardens dating from the eleventh to the nineteenth century, represent the best in garden design of landscape miniatures that integrate philosophical thinking into natural beauty, while Mount Qingcheng and the Dujiangyan Irrigation System (enlisted in 2000) in Sichuan Province, the birthplace of Daoism and a water-control system built in the third century BCE, bear witness to religious legacy and the ingenuity of ancient water management.

The Mogao Caves (enlisted in 1987), strategically located along the Silk Roads in Gansu Province, is also known as “Cave of Thousand Buddhas” and was carved out of sandstone cliffs over a period of eight dynasties. The caves and attached monasteries, decorated with paintings and silk wall hangings, were once a sanctuary of Buddhist art. The Longmen Grottoes (enlisted in 2000) in Henan Province feature thousands of Buddhist shrines carved on marble surfaces dating from 495 CE, after the first peak of Buddhist cave art of the Yungang Grottoes (enlisted in 2001) in Shanxi Province, with 252 caves and 51,000 statues carved out of sandstone rocks in the fifth and sixth centuries. The Dazu Rock Carvings (enlisted in 1999) of both Buddhist and secular subject matter in the city of Chongqing in Sichuan Province, dating between the ninth and the thirteenth century, culminated in the most developed Chinese art of rock carving, manifesting the spiritual harmony between Indian Buddhism and Chinese Daoist and Confucian beliefs.

Mountains

Also inscribed as World Historical sites are Mount Taishan (enlisted in 1987) in Shandong Province, Mount Huangshan (enlisted in 1990) in Anhui Province, Wulingyuan Scenic & Historic Interest Area (enlisted in 1992) in Hunan Province, Jiuzhaigou Valley Scenic & Historic Interest Area (enlisted in 1992) in Sichuan Province, Huanglong Scenic & Historic Interest Area (enlisted in 1992) in Sichuan Province, Mt. Emei Scenic Area (including Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area) (enlisted in 1996) in Sichuan Province, and Mount Wuyi (enlisted in 1999) in Fujian Province. Lushan National Park (enlisted in 1996) is a renowned summer resort. Many of these sites are National Natural Preservation Zones famous either for their natural beauty, historical cultural significance, or habitat for rare and endangered wildlife and plant species.

Three Parallel Rivers

Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas (enlisted in 2003) host the richest biodiversity of a temperate region in China. Including the upper reaches of the three great rivers in Asia—Yangzi (Chang), Mekong, and Salween, running parallel from north to south—the areas present geological spectacles and natural beauty. The Sichuan Giant Panda Sanctuaries (enlisted in 2006), botanically the richest site in the world outside of rain forests, consist of nine scenic parks and seven nature reserves among which Wolong is the most famous. Hosting more than 30 percent of the world’s endangered giant panda population, the sanctuary is also home to other endangered species, including the red panda, the snow leopard, and the clouded leopard.

Architectural Wonders

The Capital Cities and Tombs of the Ancient Koguryo Kingdom (enlisted in 2004) are tombs of three cities of the Koguryo Kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE), which ruled part of northern China and Korea. They bear witness to the kingdom’s artistic and architectural ingenuity.

The Historic Centre of Macao (enlisted in 2005), a port of international trade, is an example of the fusion of Chinese and Western architectural styles and the port’s
colonial history after the return of its sovereignty to the Chinese government from Portugal in 1999.

Yin Xu (enlisted in 2006) in Henan Province is an archaeological site that preserves the ruins of the ancient capital city of Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). It is the most culturally and historically valuable of all the royal tombs and palaces excavated. The script present on oracle bones there offers a sample of the earliest known form of written Chinese.

Kaiping Diaolou (watch tower) and Villages (enlisted in 2007) in Guangdong Province integrates defense and residence with a fusion of vernacular Chinese and Western architectural styles. It bears witness to the influence of a rich population of overseas Chinese during the Ming dynasty. Built of brick, stone, and pisé or concrete, the multistoried Diaolou has the common defensive characteristics of narrow metal doors and windows, thick walls with gun holes, and a watch tower on the top floor equipped with defensive devices against local banditry.

The South China Karst (enlisted in 2007) has the common characteristics of a karst (an irregular limestone region with sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns) geological formation across Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces in south China. The karst landscape in each province, however, is different. The Shilin (Stone Forest) in Yunnan Province, for instance, presents a mountain range of exposed pinnacles with more varieties of shapes, whereas the karst landscape in Guangxi centered around Guilin typifies independent verdant hills with caves and (underground) rivers punctuated by flat pastoral fields.

As one of the world’s earliest civilizations, China is endowed with more qualifying cultural and historical legacies than with the number of sites currently inscribed by the World Heritage Center. Thus the list of China’s World Heritage sites seems destined to grow.

Yu Luo RIOUX

Further Reading


China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 after years of negotiation. The country had been keen to join the WTO given that China’s economy is now highly dependent on foreign resources and markets. Joining the WTO is also a mechanism for forcing change on outdated state-owned enterprises in China.

China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2001 after years of vigorous lobbying for membership. The WTO is an international organization devoted to the reduction of trade barriers across the globe, with a view that free trade means greater overall benefit for all parties concerned. While not everyone agrees with this premise, it is widely accepted, especially in the major global economies. With the dramatic growth in international trade since World War II, the WTO is the organization primarily responsible for supporting such growth, reducing trade barriers, and helping to regulate the growth. In effect it provides the structure within which international trade can take place efficiently. As of July 2008, 153 countries were members of the WTO.

Chinese officials realized that, to make their economy grow rapidly, they needed access to foreign investment for building up industries quickly and to international markets for selling the products of these industries. In this respect joining the WTO was a logical extension of China’s decision, taken in the late 1970s, to create a capitalist economy. These officials were aware that if they did not shift their economic structure away from Communism they could not modernize and regain the power they had lost during years of political and economic chaos.

China’s Economy—1912–1979

China had been a great power through most of recorded history, though by the early nineteenth century the Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was beginning to fail. In the nineteenth century China failed to modernize and fell prey to Western countries that established enclaves along the East coast of China. In 1911 the Republic of China was founded, the dynasty fell (although the Qing emperor did not abdicate until 1912), and the next fifty years were characterized by political and economic chaos. Out of this chaos the Communist Party finally consolidated power in 1949 and proclaimed the creation of the People’s Republic of China.

Unfortunately, China’s economic policies were not effective. The Great Leap Forward of the 1950s was an attempt to rapidly catch up with the West. It was a dismal failure and led to widespread famine in China as well as the political upheaval of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Mao’s death in 1976 signaled the end of unworkable economic policies and the beginning of a shift to capitalism under the leadership of Deng Xiao Ping.

WTO History

The WTO has a long pedigree, even though its name dates only from 1 January 1995. The organization actually began to evolve toward the end of World War II, when world leaders acknowledged they needed an economic system to replace the insularity that had led to the Great Depression
of the 1930s: When major economies had faced difficulties, they turned inward with a “beggar thy neighbor” policy, imposing high tariffs, or taxes, on foreign goods to protect domestic agriculture and industry; in reality, however, they only spread and prolonged the Depression.

This situation led to the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, at which forty-four countries produced key imperatives for postwar global economic development. Most of these Bretton Woods instruments still exist today—for example, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A few years later another international meeting created the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the forerunner of the WTO. GATT was rooted in compromise: On the one hand was an understanding that countries often must protect particular industries for the national good (as long as tariffs are applied multilaterally—that is, as long as there are no preferential tariffs); and on the other hand was broad support for an open trading system that would both stimulate free trade, thereby ensuring the greatest possible level of economic growth, and link economies. The underlying assumption was the belief that greater economic cooperation would mean greater political cooperation and reduce the possibility of war. The memory of Nazi Germany was strong—an insular country and economic depression had created the conditions for the rise of a totalitarian government, resulting in a terrible world war—and the signatories to the Bretton Woods agreement and GATT wanted to reduce the chances that such a government would surface again.

The Bretton Woods agreement and GATT created the conditions for the longest sustained economic boom in world history, one that lasted from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s. The members of GATT met regularly from 1948 to 1994 (eight rounds in total), in different cities. The last round of GATT talks took place in Uruguay from 1986 to 1994; at the conclusion of this round, the members decided to replace GATT by creating the WTO, essentially a more formal structure for international trade.

**China and International Trade**

China has the key ingredients for economic success on the international stage—a large population that includes substantial numbers of well-educated people; a reasonably good infrastructure; relatively high levels of technology, at least in the main cities; and, above all, low-cost labor. To take advantage of these factors, as well as to gain foreign access to one of the world’s biggest markets, foreign investment poured into China in the 1990s, and the result was dramatic economic growth for the country.

It came as no surprise, therefore, that the Chinese government was eager to join the WTO. Joining would ensure access to world markets, especially to the markets of developed countries with so many wealthy consumers—and, therefore, would keep the economy of China booming.

The fundamental reality was that China needed international connections in order to continue rapid economic growth. Only one other country—Japan—similarly depended on international markets, and it was Japan that sponsored China’s entry into the WTO. The main opposition came from the United States. In part this resistance stemmed from competitiveness: The United States was wary of letting China become too strong. In part the resistance was a matter of philosophical differences: The United States questioned whether China’s political system should be supported given its view on human rights. But the major U.S. resistance concerned intellectual property. Increasingly the U.S. economy depends on its ability to create and innovate, especially in areas such as software development, biotechnology, medicine, and entertainment. After years of American research and development expenses, Chinese companies have demonstrated a predilection to copy these products, to sell them far below the cost of the American products, and to pocket the profits. Hence charges of intellectual copyright violations, or piracy as it is more commonly called, delayed China’s entry into the WTO.

On the other side of the coin, the U.S. economy greatly benefited from China’s entry into the WTO. One reason the American economy grew so quickly in the first years of the twenty-first century was that the flow of low-cost Chinese products into the U.S. market allowed American consumers to pay less for some products so that they could theoretically save money or spend more domestically, thereby stimulating the U.S. retail sector. Trading with China also allowed U.S. industries to source lower-cost parts. Moreover, a good number of the factories in China resulted from U.S.-China joint ventures, so the exports were actually made in part by American companies, and some of the profits from the ventures went back to the parent companies in the United States. Finally, China has
replaced Japan as the greatest purchaser of U.S. Treasury Bonds, thus allowing the U.S. government to operate at a deficit while avoiding tax increases.

The WTO and Domestic Problems in China

Not all sectors of the Chinese economy benefited right away from this open trading system. One of the main victims was the state sector—state-owned enterprises, or SOEs. These large, usually inefficient producers resisted China's entry to the WTO. But it is clear that the Chinese government used the mechanism of joining the WTO to force the SOEs to change. SOEs had to initiate more efficient management, shed surplus labor and institute more effective production processes. Without this external pressure it would have been politically difficult to carry out domestic economic reform. One advantage of an authoritarian government is its power to initiate more painful economic adjustments than a democracy. That said, it is by no means easy to move China's economy into the modern era, and there have been, and continue to be, many pressures in China, such as unemployment and price increases, working against the rapid pace of economic change.

China also faces the emerging issue of becoming Asia's workshop for only less sophisticated products instead of moving up to high technology exports. This is in part because its exports are dominated by foreign companies (Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises, or WFOEs, are permitted to register in China in cases where at least half their annual output is exported). Indeed, approximately 60 percent of China's exports overall and 80 percent of its high-tech exports, are produced by foreign companies, which are not eager to share the secrets of their success with the Chinese.

Other Challenges for the WTO and China

One of the fundamental challenges for the WTO is to address the domestic interests of its participating countries yet promote multilateral trade. For example, in Country A local representatives may not favor free trade for fear that foreign companies with lower production costs will export lower-priced versions of Country A's products to Country A, putting companies in the politicians' districts out of business. Of course, if companies in Country A are very efficient and can compete on the international scene, its politicians may support free trade. But in that case Country B's government may balk at importing products from Country A. Clearly, both political and economic factors influence international trade, making the job of the WTO complex. Demands for “level playing fields” and “free and fair” trade along with direct and indirect subsidies to producers bring the concept of free trade into question, yet it is the role of the WTO to deal with these issues and to promote the growth of international trade.

The state of a country's economy affects whether or not it wants to join the WTO. Typically a country that produces commodities inefficiently or faces many international competitors that produce the same commodities, would not support an open trading system. National prestige also affects a country's interest in the WTO. For example, the automobile industry can confer pride, even when that industry can exist only behind high tariffs—as in Australia and Malaysia. The Chinese automobile industry is posing a substantial challenge to these long-standing barriers. As barriers to trade come down the Chinese car industry will certainly be a major player in the international market. In Malaysia's case, if it dropped tariffs then Malaysia's car industry would certainly have major problems.

Most countries face yet another challenge when opening their economies to international trade. There are winners and losers in any free-trading system. Inefficient producers will see their businesses fail while efficient ones will thrive. This so-called structural adjustment can produce substantial pain as the changes take place. Workers may have to retrain and move to other economic sectors, but doing so is much easier for some (generally the younger and better educated) than for others. Hence, free trade will be more welcomed by some sectors of the community than others in any particular country, and these divisions are clearly apparent in China. There is a clear employment/wealth gap between younger, more educated Chinese and older, less educated Chinese.

A concept underpinning open trade is comparative advantage. In short this means that each country will
produce the goods that it is most efficient at producing. Inefficient producers will go under, and, painful though failure is, the result will be a more efficient global production system, which will, in turn, generate the highest overall global output. The argument put forward by the WTO is that there is a net gain, even though there will be losses in sectors in each country.

The charge leveled by some countries, including China, is that they are the victims of more powerful countries, typically developed countries, that have much greater resources, including a highly educated workforce, well-developed transportation and communication systems, and existing multinational companies. Therefore, meetings of the WTO often incite demonstrations, reflecting for the most part the voice of the developing world. One of the most visible anti-WTO riots took place in Seattle, Washington, on 30 November 1999.

The WTO is faced with a massive challenge—supporting free trade across the globe. The differing interests of different countries and the multiple interest groups in each country make this goal very difficult to achieve. In fact, the WTO is having problems that are reflected in the rapid growth in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) over the past decade. Countries that strongly favor free trade are not prepared to wait for the WTO to accept them; they are striking out on their own. While this approach does promote free trade in part, it leaves behind those countries that desire a slower entry into the global trading system.

China is an important part of the global economy. It has the fourth largest economy in the world, a growth rate of about 10 percent, the world’s largest current account surplus ($180 billion). It is therefore one of the great challenges of the WTO to help manage China’s global trade.

Curtis ANDRESSEN

Further Reading


World War II in Asia was very different from World War II in Europe. The Asian war included Japanese colonial expansion into the Asian mainland, which preceded the involvement of European and North American nations, and it was also complicated by civil war in China. For some Asian nations the worldwide aspect of the war was secondary to their own conflicts with Japan.

World War II did not begin in a single place or on a single date. While the European war can be dated to the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, Germany had already annexed Austria in 1938. In Asia, the beginning of the war is said to be July 1937, when Japan took military action following the Marco Polo Bridge incident. But Japan had invaded Manchuria six years before. Other aspects of conflict in Asia include the Soviet Union’s forced relocation of ethnic Koreans (who had fled from Japanese-occupied Korea into eastern Siberia) to Uzbekistan. In this case 190,000 Koreans were relocated to the west. Although many ethnic Russians had been relocated to the central Asian republics beginning in the 1880s, as a way to counter growing Islamic influence there, such relocations were not part of Soviet wartime relocation policy.

Expansionism by Japan

The conflict which Americans refer to as the War in the Pacific or the Second Sino-Japanese War, which the Chinese call the War of Resistance against Japan, and which the Japanese call the Japan-China War, began at different times, according to which countries were involved. To Americans, the war began with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The direct conflict between Japan and China began more than four years before that. But the colonial efforts and military actions that precipitated this period began with the termination of World War I. At the end of that war Japan had acquired territories in China and the Pacific that had formerly been held by Germany. Japan’s expansionist policy had begun even before World War I with acquisition of Taiwan after Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and annexation of Korea in 1910. Japan’s goal was strategic security, a “greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere” that stretched 1,600 kilometers from the Japanese islands and that would remove the Western powers from Asia. Western imperialism had undermined China, and Japan by the mid-1930s had begun to eliminate Western influence there by dividing China through the establishment of a puppet government in Manchuria. Armed conflict in China escalated in 1937, however, in what is known in China as the “War of Resistance against Japan.”

In July of that year Japanese forces attacked Beijing; they attacked Shanghai in August. At that time Japan was fighting the army of the Chinese Nationalist Party
(Guomindang) government; the Nationalists leaned more toward the West in matters of foreign policy and trade than did the Chinese Communists, the adversaries of the Nationalists. The Nationalists, unable to stop the Japanese, retreated westward to the city of Nanking (modern Nanjing), where in December Japanese forces captured the city and massacred 300,000 civilians. The Rape of Nanking, more than any other event, created international condemnation of Japan’s expansion into Asia and shaped the policies of Japan’s opponents.

In southern Asia World War II came to India as a result of British rule there. When Great Britain declared war on Germany, the Indian viceroy followed suit, but the Indian congress did not support him. While war raged in East Asia and Europe, India at first was little more than a supplier of men for the African front and for the British in Singapore as well as a supply base for operations in the Middle East.

India’s circumstances changed with Japanese attacks in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland. Indian soldiers who had been sent to reinforce British territories in East Asia were killed or captured by the Japanese after fighting began, causing India to return to British allegiance, at least for a short while.

**Entry by the United States**

The United States was still formally neutral at this time and was selling Japan oil and steel—materials that Japan needed for its military expansion. The United States had accepted Japan’s annexation of the Korean peninsula, and ethnic Koreans in the United States were considered to be Japanese. The U.S. interest was on the growing war in Europe, not on Asia. While the United States provided some aid to the Nationalist Chinese, the Soviet Union provided China more operational support with aircraft and pilots until 1939, when those planes and men were recalled to fight Germany. The main U.S. support to China after that was the effort to construct the Burma Road from Lashio, Burma (Myanmar), to Kunming, China, begun in 1938 to provide a western route into China for military supplies. U.S. policy at the time was to avoid conflict in the Pacific because conflict there would divert assets from the Atlantic. Only in 1940, responding to further Japanese expansion in China, did the United States begin an economic embargo of steel and oil against Japan. This embargo was expanded in mid-1941 to a complete end of all trade with Japan; after that Japan had to seize the sources of materials necessary for its strategic survival.

Japan had continued its strategy of replacing Western influence with its own in Southeast Asia. The French colonial government in Indochina (Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia) capitulated to Japan in 1940 after France fell to Germany. Thailand accepted Japan’s presence in the region as a means of recovering territory lost to Laos, Cambodia, and Malaya (Malaysia). The outbreak of war with Western forces in December 1941 led to the occupation of Burma, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and began the conquest of the Philippines.

Although most U.S. residents view the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 as the beginning of World War II in Asia, this event occurred thirty-one years after the annexation of Korea, ten years after the establishment of Japanese rule in northern China, four years
after the massacre at Nanking (Nanjing), and one year after much of Southeast Asia had come under Japanese domination. But to Japan the initiation of war against the United States was in response to the undeclared war that the United States had begun with its embargo of critical materials.

**Early Successes by Japan**

Japan’s attack on Western holdings in Asia and the Pacific led to impressive early successes. U.S. military power in Hawaii was dealt a severe blow, Hong Kong fell, the Philippines and Burma were taken, and at the outer reaches of Japanese power, the Solomon Islands, the Gilbert Islands, and islands in Alaska’s Aleutian chain were captured. The Solomon and Gilbert islands consolidated Japan’s holdings acquired by a League of Nations mandate after World War I. By mid-1942 the Western powers were near defeat in Asia and the Pacific. But the same technological forces that had permitted Japan’s quick military expansion began to work in favor of the Allies, in part because of what must be considered a stroke of luck that occurred before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

**Change in Naval Strategy by the United States**

U.S. naval strategy before December 1941 had been based on the use of battleships in naval combat, but after the Pearl Harbor attack, the aircraft carrier became the mainstay of U.S. naval strategy. The aircraft carrier had been an untested experiment until it was used with great success by the Japanese navy. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy’s three aircraft carriers were out of port, but its battleships were in port at Pearl Harbor, where they were destroyed. This circumstance forced the U.S. Navy to adopt a strategy based on the aircraft carrier for the Pacific theater of operations because the main focus of the war was still Europe, and replacements for U.S. battleships would not be available for some time. The new U.S. strategy would have to counter the advances that Japan had already made in the Pacific and would rely on U.S. industrial capacity (after it was mobilized), technological advantage, and innovative tactics.

But Japan’s strategy had been one of rapid successes that would give it the advantage in establishing dominance over East Asia before the United States and other Western
powers could retaliate. General Tojo Hideki (1884–1948), Japan’s prime minister, had no misperceptions about U.S. capacity; even he recognized that a long war would work against Japan’s long-term goals. As the Allies became capable of maintaining their holdings and then advancing toward the Japanese home islands, the resources available to the Allies (and denied to the Japanese), tactics, and technology swung in favor of the Allies.

Internal Battle for China

Yet on the Asian mainland Japan remained the dominant force. In China the Communists under Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) had been at odds since 1926, and at times this competition undermined Chinese efforts to defeat the Japanese. While Chinese forces avoided total defeat at Shanghai in 1932, Japan was able to establish a puppet government in Manchuria (called Manchuguo). Chiang spent the next five years strengthening his Nationalist army, while the Communists withdrew to northwest China on the Long March (1934–1935) from Jiangxi Province to Shaanxi Province—approximately 9,600 kilometers. Mao rebuilt his forces during the next year and sought a united effort of Communists and Nationalists against the Japanese. However, Chiang wanted to defeat the Communists first, then deal with the Japanese. In late 1936 one of his own generals kidnapped Chiang while on a visit to Xi’an, and as a condition of Chiang’s release he had work with the Communists to fight the Japanese. Japanese forces subsequently dramatically increased their
efforts, leading to the Nanking Massacre and to victories at Guangzhou (Canton) and Wuhan in 1938.

Even as both Chinese factions—the Communists and the Nationalists—worked against the Japanese, each saw their efforts as a means to dominate the other. Chiang Kai-shek believed that Japan would wear down the Communists so that he would be able to deal with them after the Japanese were defeated, and Mao believed that Nationalist action against the Japanese was an opportunity for his Communist forces to rest. Both sides expanded their forces in preparation for civil war after Japan was defeated.

The United States began to support China only after years of fighting by Chinese forces, but in March 1941 the U.S. Lend-Lease Program (which had been used to support European nations fighting against German Nazi leader Adolph Hitler since 1939) was extended to China. This program and other aid were significantly increased after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor eight months later.

**Expansion of the War**

The Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor dramatically changed the war for Japan. Despite Japan’s early successes in late 1941 and 1942, Japan lacked the resources necessary for a protracted war. An attack on Tokyo by U.S. bombers launched from an aircraft carrier in April 1942 unsettled Japan. This raid, led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle, was launched mainly for psychological reasons. For the United States the raid provided some good news after a string of defeats; for Japan the raid showed that not even Tokyo was safe.

The new U.S. aircraft carrier–based strategy, instead of being oriented exclusively against Japanese naval
forces, used “island-hopping” to advance on the Japanese home islands. After the United States defeated Japanese naval forces at the Battle of Midway and the Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942, Allied forces moved through the Gilbert Islands and New Guinea in 1943 and then on to the Marianas Islands and the Philippines in 1944. The Allies, by attacking Japanese strong points that might threaten Allied operations and by seizing those islands necessary for operations while bypassing others, were able to prepare for what would have been the final assault on Japan in 1945.

Farther west the Japanese army had opened a front to invade Burma to counter British and U.S. efforts there. This front expanded in mid-1944 to an attempt to defeat the British and Indian forces in eastern India, resulting in an overextension of Japanese supply lines and the eventual destruction of the Japanese Fifteenth Army.

Also in 1944 the Flying Tigers, a volunteer corps of U.S. fliers in China, began to attack Japanese forces there. Although the Flying Tigers diverted Japanese attention from the war with Chinese forces, Chiang Kai-shek did not capitalize on the diversion, much to the anger of the senior U.S. official in China, Brigadier General Joseph Stillwell. The friction between Stillwell and Chiang soon caused President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) to recall Stillwell to the United States.

By 1945 a campaign of strategic bombing of Japanese cities was being waged by the United States from island bases in the Pacific. Attacks by the U.S. Air Corps targeted both Japanese cities and military forces and resulted in tens of thousands of civilian casualties and massive destruction (as had the Allied attacks on cities in Germany). For example, the firebombing of Tokyo on 9 March 1945 killed as many as 120,000 Japanese. At the time the U.S. policy was one of “total war” against the Japanese population in preparation for a final Allied push against Japan, which was to be a massive amphibious assault against the islands of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) in December 1945 and Honshu (Operation Coronet) in March 1946. For these two assaults the United States had planned to use forces made available by the defeat of Germany—forces that in many cases already were in transit to the Pacific. As many as 5 million soldiers, primarily U.S., would have taken part. The Soviet Union also would take part in the invasion of Japan.

Planning for Operation Olympic had begun in 1944 as Allied forces had moved toward Japan. By early 1945 an estimated 300,000 Japanese soldiers were on the Japanese
home islands of Kyushu and Honshu; by August this estimate had risen to more than a half-million, including a considerable number of combat units. The U.S. experience in attacking islands held by the Japanese was that Japanese soldiers and civilians would fight to the death to avoid capture, leading to heavy casualties among U.S. forces. Estimates for the invasion were as high as 1 million Allied casualties and possibly three times that for Japan. The losses for Japan would include both military and civilian personnel and could have resulted in the end of Japan as a country.

**The War Ends**

In February 1945 at Yalta in the Crimea the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain held discussions for the Allied focus on Japan. The Yalta Conference resulted in an agreement that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after Germany was defeated and that upon Japan’s defeat those areas in China formerly held by Russia but captured by Japan in 1904 would be ceded to the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt kept the agreement secret from even Vice President Harry Truman (1884–1972) on his return from Yalta, but Roosevelt died within two months. The decision to proceed with the plans made earlier then fell to Truman.

President Truman met with British prime minister Winston Churchill (1875–1975) and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) at Potsdam, Germany, in July 1945 to discuss further the treatment and disarmament of Japan after it had been defeated. While he was at Potsdam Truman learned of the successful test of a new weapon that might shorten the war. That weapon, of course, was the atomic bomb. Truman informed Churchill, but not Stalin, of the weapon.

The atomic bomb used against Japan eliminated the need for an invasion of Japan. A single U.S. aircraft dropped a single ten-thousand-pound (4,536-kilogram) bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, resulting in an explosion equal to approximately twenty thousand metric tons of conventional explosives. Hiroshima was chosen because it was an industrial target that had not been damaged by earlier attacks, a fact that would allow estimations of the bomb’s effectiveness. The bomb instantly killed 130,000 people, injured as many, and destroyed four-fifths of the buildings in Hiroshima. Three days later the United States dropped a second atomic bomb, this time on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. By that time the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan and had invaded Manchuria.

Although the two bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki instantly killed approximately 200,000 people, and thousands subsequently died from injuries and radiation poisoning, these attacks were not as damaging as the combined earlier attacks on other major cities. The atomic bomb, for President Truman, was simply a weapon of war, not an element of a greater strategy. It was successful: On 14 August 1945 the Japanese government accepted the guidelines of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet Union refused to accept the Japanese proposal because it
did not contain an order to the Japanese military to surrender; the Soviet Union accepted the official signing of the documents on 2 September 1945.

World War II cost more than 2.5 million Japanese and 11 million Chinese lives plus countless others in the occupied nations of the region. Casualties among Allied forces—the United States, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and India—were relatively light; approximately 200,000 were killed in Asia, the majority of them U.S. troops.

Thomas P. DOLAN

Further Reading

Wound Literature
Shānghén Wénxué 伤痕文学

Wound literature, a genre appearing after the end of the Cultural Revolution, focuses on psychological and emotional damage to individuals, especially youth, from the depredations of that era. Criticized as subversive or embraced as cathartic when it first appeared, later analysis of the genre tends to focus on its literary weaknesses, including simplistic narrative and representation of character.

“Wound literature” (also known as “scar literature”) refers to a body of literature that erupted onto the Chinese literary scene in the immediate wake of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Representative writers of this camp include Liu Xinwu, Lu Xinhua, Wang Meng, Gu Hua, and Zhang Xianliang, among others. Two stories in particular are commonly referred to as the inaugurating pieces of this new literary phenomenon: “Scar” (“Shanggan”伤痕) by Lu Xinhua (August 1978) and “The Head Teacher” (“Banzhuren”班主任) by Liu Xinwu (November 1977). Both stories deal with the devastation of youth caused by leftist policy and practice, but each has its own valence.

Two Examples

Authored by a then little-known freshman in the Chinese department at Fudan University and appearing first on the campus bulletin board, “Scar” tells the story of Xiahua, who renounces her own mother after she was officially declared a “traitor.” Never doubting for a second the truthfulness of the verdict, Xiahua voluntarily and resolutely turns her back on her mother out of a sense.

Woodcut depicting the smashing of the “Gang of Four.” Liu Xinwu’s story “The Head Teacher” (1977) stresses the psychological damage suffered by China’s youth as the result of the Cultural Revolution and the notorious “Gang of Four.”
of loyalty to the party and a sense of abhorrence of her mother’s shameful past. But her sincere embrace of the party—which takes the form of emotional and behavioral alignment with the party ideology in every aspect of her life—is never reciprocated. The stigma of being a “traitor’s daughter” follows her wherever she goes, not only denying her any chance for recognition and advancement during her years of reeducation in the countryside, but also threatening to ruin the lives of those who care about her. As she retreats further into her loneliness, disillusioned and disheartened, the news of her mother’s innocence unexpectedly arrives, prompting Xiaohua to embark on a personal journey in search of reconciliation and redemption. But she is to be denied yet again: her mother dies shortly before she shows up at the hospital.

If Lu Xinhua’s story highlights the deprivation of even the most basic interpersonal relationship—the mother-daughter tie in this case—visited on the politically naïve young generation, Liu Xinwu’s story foregrounds the destitution of the youthful spirit as the result of the havoc wreaked on the nation by the notorious “Gang of Four.” Two students occupying opposite ends of the ideological spectrum are portrayed as equal victims of the Cultural Revolution. While one is a youth league secretary with an extremely rigid mind-set, the other is a street hooligan whose mental landscape is marked largely by blankness, and occasionally by the presence of a mishmash of “feudalist” and “capitalist” ideas. In the story’s narrative, only the street hooligan constitutes a problem for the head teacher, but the reader is made aware of a more urgent and daunting task on a national scale awaiting the attention of the wise educator.

**Initial Motivation and Critical Reaction**

As the name of this new literary genre suggests, the thematic topography of these stories focuses on the wounds inflicted by the Cultural Revolution on the individual, not so much at the physical as at the psychological level. Wound literature is therefore also sometimes referred to as “exposure literature” or “sentimental literature.” Emerging from the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution but still haunted by fresh memories of its atrocities and absurdities, the writers who eagerly embraced this genre filled a deep emotional need for collective remembering and catharsis. To a certain extent, wound literature is like “a wreath on the ruin”—it provided a platform for public airing of personal and collective grievances, so that the nation could unload the burden of its traumatic past and start the healing process. In that regard, it is analogous to a form of therapy.

When wound literature made its first appearance, the critical establishment greeted it with a great deal of caution, if not suspicion, on grounds of its perceived departure from established literary standards. Though the prestigious journal *People’s Literature* did publish Liu Xinwu’s “The Head Teacher,” the editors were by no means unanimous about the decision. When Lu Xinhua submitted his work to the same journal, he received only a typed letter of rejection in return. To the mainstream literary critics, then, political correctness, social significance, and didactic function were still necessary ingredients of “good literature.” Measured by these standards, wound literature, in its thematic insistence on exposing “dark problems” at both individual and societal levels, could only appear ideologically suspect, if not outright subversive.

**Twenty-First-Century Perspectives**

Today, the critical opinion concerning wound literature is rather mixed. Some critics contend that wound literature transcends the overly politicized narrative model of the Cultural Revolution era by bringing humanism back to the heart of literary imagination. As such, it is a narrative of emancipation and enlightenment heralding the reawakening of subjectivity. On the other hand, however, even those who are more generous in their evaluation of this literary genre recognize its inherent flaws and inevitable limits. A common criticism is that practitioners of wound literature tell an anti–Cultural Revolution story while they continue to rely on the narrative model of the Cultural Revolution era. The literary merit of wound literature is also dubious according to the genre’s detractors;
not only are these works populated by characters that are heavily codified and flat, they have little to recommend for themselves in terms of narrative technique, artistic form, and aesthetic value.

Moreover, the mode of thinking that infuses wound literature is considered by some critics to be simplistic and mechanical. In their so-called indulgent and sentimental display of their wounds, writers of this genre collectively adopt a victim mentality, never bothering to explore their complex relationship—such as their own complicity—to the power system they now condemn. To the extent that the sentiments expressed in these works, from sorrow to indignation, are seen without exception as politically correct under the party’s new directives in the post–Cultural Revolution period, wound literature constitutes for some not the voice of reflection and critique but ironically a device of legitimation. One critic even goes so far as to caricature writers of wound literature as “pouting children who crave their mother’s attention and affection above anything else.”

Jing JIANG

Further Reading

Wu
Wúyǔ 吴语

Wu is one of the sublanguages of China, spoken primarily in the eastern provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu and metropolitan Shanghai. It is the second most populous language in China, after Mandarin.

An estimated 85 million people, concentrated in the provincial-level municipality of Shanghai and neighboring Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces in China, speak the various dialects of Wu. The Wu speakers in Jiangsu Province predominantly live south of the Yangzi (Chang) River; a few enclaves of people speaking Wu reside to the north of the mouth of this river.

The Wu region is different in several ways from the other regions where the major Sinitic sublanguages are dominant. In the Wu region, there are several culture centers, whereas in the other sublanguage groups, there is one major “local” capital; this is a populous location that sets the cultural as well as linguistic pattern for the rest of the group. For example, the Yue have Guangzhou, while the Minnan of Fujian Province have Xiamen. The scattered Hakka also look to Meixian as their geographic, cultural, and linguistic center.

In comparison, the Wu people are far more diverse. Shanghai, the sublanguage’s largest population center, does not really assume the role of the hub for the Wu people, because it is a new city, relatively speaking, and is subject to Western influences. Furthermore, the population in Shanghai has come from various Wu-speaking districts as well as from Nanjing and beyond. Cities such as Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Shaoxing have all played prominently in the history of the Wu, but none can truly be said to be its center.

The Wu people are also different from other Chinese because they usually do not characterize their subethnic identities in terms of their province of origin. This is because only the southern third of Jiangsu Province is Wu speaking. There is also great diversity in Zhejiang Province itself, and the people are not all Wu speakers. The Wu people of Zhejiang instead identify themselves by their native prefectures, which are subprovincial political units. The Wu people did not join the modern migration of Chinese abroad on any major scale, unlike the Yue, Hakka, and Min people to the south, and Wu speakers have only a minor representation in the overseas Chinese population.

The Wu language had its origin in Suzhou (Jiangsu Province), one of the cultural centers of the imperial period. The sociolinguistic evolution of the Wu region, however, is not well documented. From Suzhou, the language spread to regions south of the lower Yangzi River. It is a language that has gained importance because of the rise of Shanghai as an international metropolitan center and one of the treaty ports that was ceded to the Western powers—Britain, France, and Germany—in the nineteenth century.

Origins of Wu

The Chinese character for wu was possibly first applied to people living around the mouth of the Yangzi River who
spoke a non-Sinitic language that was largely unintelligible to those speaking the various Sinitic sublanguages.

The other meaning given to the word *wu*, rarely, is “clamorous” or “yelling,” which might be a reference to the rather forceful and boisterous manner of the Wu people’s way of speaking. To many early Han Chinese, the language also might have sounded loud and guttural. The first mention of the Wu kingdom appeared in Chinese annals around the seventh century BCE. Historical linguists have been uncertain how to classify the ancient Wu dialect, which could not be considered a Sinitic sublanguage at that time. There is a widespread assumption that the language is related to the Tai languages (of Southeast Asia), but the probability is that it is more of a Sino-Tibetan language. The kingdom of Wu began to adopt aspects of the evolving Chinese culture during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE); subsequent warfare led to the complete assimilation of the kingdom into the Sinitic political world.

Sinitic Wu culture is thought to have reached its peak during the Southern Song period (1127–1279). This would have been the time when the Wu region was at the geographical center of what was then considered to be the most highly cultured state in China, if not in the world. The Wu-speaking people left a major legacy for human civilization: The Southern Song, with its capital at present-day Hangzhou, played a significant role in disseminating Buddhism and other cultural and artistic values to neighboring countries.

**Distinguishing Features of the Wu Sublanguage**

Many of the archaic features found in the Wu sublanguage keenly differentiate it from modern Mandarin. Foremost among these is the continuing use in Wu of the series of voiced initial consonants that have been lost in other Sinitic sublanguages. Most forms of Wu will have *b*, *d*, *dz*, *g*, *p*, and *z* as initial sounds. Another feature in Wu is a special voiced *h* (a bit like the guttural German *r*), which contrasts with the normal, or unvoiced, *h*, according to the linguist Leo Moser.

There are fewer diphthongs in Wu than in most other Sinitic sublanguages, and the phonetics are thought to be somewhat closer to the Old Xiang, or Laoxianghua, of Hunan Province. Wu is different from other sublanguages like the Yue, Minnan, Gan, and Hakka, particularly in the simplified endings of its syllables. While Mandarin has also simplified its endings, it has done this differently from Wu, with varying results. Hence, the ancient final syllables such as, *p*, *t*, and *k* appear in neither Mandarin nor Wu.

Final consonants of Wu dialects typically include only one or two nasal endings with perhaps the glottal stop. It is a pattern that more closely resembles the dialects of Minbei and some forms of Eastern Mandarin. The Wu vernaculars are characterized by complex patterns of tone sandhi in which the tone of one syllable is modified in speech by that of the syllable that falls next to it; “sandhi” is a linguistic term meaning the modification of the sound of a morpheme in certain phonetic situations or contexts. While tone sandhi in the Min-speaking areas has been deemed to be complex, it is even more so among the Wu dialects.

Wu also differs from other Sinitic sublanguages in grammatical and structural ways. In particular, the Wu dialects differ from Mandarin by putting the direct object before the indirect object when both appear in a sentence. This characteristic makes Wu similar to Cantonese, but different from the intervening Min vernacular tongues, which tend to have an ordering that more resembles that of Mandarin.

The Wu dialect tends to vary by stages over the larger region mainly as a consequence of the pluralism of standards in the sublanguage. The isoglosses (geographical boundaries that delimit the area within which a linguistic feature is found) overlap in what has been found to be a complex pattern. In spite of such variations within the region of Wu-speaking peoples, however, there is generally intercomprehensibility among the so-called Shanghai dialects, of which Suzhou Wu is one example.

One exception to the intercomprehensibility of the Wu dialects is the dialect spoken in the port city of Wenzhou, located in the south of Zhejiang Province. This Wenzhou dialect and some of the dialects spoken by people living inland from the port are considered extremely different from other Wu dialects. This has persuaded some linguists to suggest that the Wenzhou dialect should be treated and recognized as a Sinitic language that is separate from the rest of Wu.

The vernacular of Shanghai represents a fusion of various forms of Northern Wu and other dialectical influences, even including some Eastern Mandarin. Other Wu speakers have traditionally treated the Shanghai
vernacular somewhat contemptuously as a mixture of Suzhou and Ningbo dialects. Shanghainese have been portrayed as strategic, smart thinkers who are interested in both new ideas and new words to add to their language. But the Shanghainese people have long resisted the Communist government’s efforts to make them speak the universally accepted Mandarin dialect.

OOI Giok Ling

Further Reading

WU Changshi

Wú Chāngshí 吴昌硕

1844–1927  Twentieth-century painter and calligrapher

Wu Changshi was best known for his calligraphy in the zhuan (seal) and shigu (stone drum) scripts. Despite his commercial appeal, the ultimate ideal of literati painting—to combine poetry, calligraphy, and painting—was realized in his work.

The career of Wu Changshi represents the process of evolution from the artistic patterns of late imperial China to those of the modern era. Born into a declining scholarly family in Anji, Zhejiang Province, he moved to Shanghai and became a professional painter. Wu was best known for his calligraphy in the zhuan (seal) and shigu (stone drum) scripts. His calligraphy and painting were famed for their jinshiqi, or antiquarian epigrapher’s taste.

In his youth Wu studied briefly with Ren Yi (1840–1895) but was mostly self-taught as a painter. Although his favorite themes were usually flowers and rocks, Wu’s pictures are to be seen not as images from nature but rather as arrangements of plants and rocks in an abstract space. Conventions of calligraphy and painting were brought together in his loosely brushed artwork. Thus, despite his commercial market, the ultimate ideal of literati painting—to combine poetry, calligraphy, and painting—was realized in his work.

Further Reading


Kuiyi SHEN
WU Zetian

Wǔ Zétiān 武則天

625–705 China’s only female emperor

Wu Zetian 武則天 was the only woman to rule China as an emperor in name, declaring herself emperor after deposing her sons. She changed the composition of the ruling class by removing entrenched aristocrats from the court and enlarging the civil service examination to recruit men of merit to serve.

Wu Zetian entered the Chinese imperial court at the age of thirteen as a low-ranked concubine to Emperor Taizong (reigned 626–649) of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). However, after he died she became concubine and later empress to her stepson, Emperor Gaozong (reigned 650–683). After Gaozong died, Wu declared herself emperor after deposing her sons and attempting to establish her own dynasty, sometimes referred to as the Second Zhou period 周, which lasted until 705.

Tang court ladies from the tomb painting of Princess Yongtai in the Qianling Mausoleum, near Xi’an in Shaanxi Province, from the year 706. Empress Wu Zetian would also later be buried at the Qiangling Mausoleum.
from 690 to 705. To legitimize her position as emperor she turned to the Buddhist establishment and also invented about a dozen characters with a new script.

The overall rule of Wu Zetian did not result in a radical break from Tang domestic prosperity and foreign prestige. However, Wu altered the composition of the ruling class by removing the entrenched aristocrats from the court and gradually enlarging the civil service examination to recruit men of merit to serve in the government. Although Wu gave political clout to some women, such as her secretary, she did not go as far as to challenge the Confucian tradition of excluding women from taking the civil service examinations. By 674 Wu had drafted twelve policy directives that ranged from encouraging agriculture to formulating social rules of conduct. She also maintained a stable economy and a moderate taxation system for the peasantry. The population increased to 60 million during her reign, and when she died her centralized bureaucracy was regulating the economic well-being and social life of her empire.

Wu Zetian was a capable ruler, but she was allegedly vicious in her personal life, murdering two sons, one daughter, and other relatives who opposed her. As a woman ruler, she challenged the traditional patriarchal dominance of power, state, monarchy, sovereignty, and political ideology. Her reign brought a reversal of the gender roles and restrictions that her society and government had constructed for her and other women. While succeeding in the male-ruled and power-focused realm, she showed traits usually attributed to men, including long-range vision, political ambition, talented organization, and hard work. Later historians have been less generous, describing her as a despotic usurper of the throne. These historians say that her reign ended in corruption and drinking, with the elderly ruler delighting in sexual relations with young men who enjoyed lavish favors. In 705 Wu Zetian was forced to abdicate, her son Zhongzong was again enthroned, and the Tang dynasty was restored.

Jennifer W. JAY

Further Reading
Known as China’s Yellowstone, Wulingyuan Scenic Reserve in Hunan Province is one of the country’s most spectacular and popular national parks, featuring limestone gorges, sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns. It was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1992.

Wulingyuan Scenic Reserve, known as China’s Yellowstone, is a spectacular natural setting near Zhangjiajie City in northwestern Hunan Province in south central China. It also borders Guizhou Province and the province-level municipality of Chongqing. The climate of the region is subtropical, with moderate summers and mild winters with ample rainfall. Wulingyuan Scenic Reserve comprises four sections: Zhangjiajie National Forest Park, Suoxiyu Natural Resource Reserve, Tianzi Mountain Natural Resource Reserve, and the Yangjiajie Scenic Area, added in the 1990s. The reserve covers about 690 square kilometers (266 square miles), roughly the size of Zion National Park in Utah. (By comparison Yellowstone National Park covers some 8,980 square kilometers, or 3,470 square miles.)

The area is known for its karst topography, a type of terrain formed by the dissolving and collapse of irregular limestone, which produces gorges, fissures, sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns. The impressive sites of the reserve include more than 3,100 quartzite sandstone pillars that resemble deformed bamboo shoots, many over 200 meters (656 feet) high. There are also many ravines, streams, pools, and waterfalls; more than forty caves; and two natural bridges. The Zhoutian Dong cavern is thought to be the largest in Asia, and the Tianqia Shengkong natural bridge, the highest in the world.

The Zhangjiajie National Forest Park was established in 1982 as the first authorized forest national park in China. It covers 34 square kilometers (13 square miles). About 97 percent of the park is covered with both dense virgin forest and planted secondary growth. The forest is home to more than 3,000 species of plants, 35 of which are rare protected species. Native plants—such as the dove tree and the lobster flower, a perennial that can change color up to five times in a day—thrive in the park. A number of rare birds and animals also call the park home, including Chinese giant salamanders, Chinese water deer, Asiatic black bears, Asiatic wild dogs, and clouded leopards.

Wulingyuan is also home to a number of China’s ethnic minority groups, most prominent being the Tujia, Miao, and Bai peoples. The people in these groups maintain their traditional languages, arts and crafts, costumes, foods, festivals, and music and dance. A museum dedicated to Tujia culture is in Zhangjiajie Village within the reserve. The Yangjiajie Scenic Area is said to have been settled by the famous and venerable Yang family, who moved to the region during the Song Dynasty (960–1279) to escape from continuous warfare. The name of Yang is still important in the area.

Wulingyuan received a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) World Heritage listing in 1992 and is a popular destination for both Chinese and foreign tourists. An admission fee of 158 yuan (about $23), which includes transportation...
within the park, is charged for a two-day visit. Campfires and smoking are prohibited, just one of many restrictions designed to protect the reserve. There are no overnight facilities inside Wulingyuan. The nearest large town is Zhangjiajie City, a city of about 1.5 people about 33 kilometers (20 miles) from the entrance to Wulingyuan. Ample transportation is available from the city to destinations within the reserve.

Michael PRETES

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Wulingyuan feng jing zhi [Wulingyuan Scenery]. Changsha, China: Hunan ren min chu ban she.
The Xia was the earliest Chinese dynasty (going back some two thousand years, although scholars debate the dates). Knowledge of the Xia comes from oral tradition, ancient historical records, and archaeological research. Scholars also debate the veracity of the legends of the founding of the dynasty.

The quasi-legendary Xia, or Hsia, dynasty of China is the oldest dynasty described in ancient historical records including the Records of the Grand Historian (covering the period c. 2600–91 BCE and written 109–91 BCE) and Bamboo Annals (documenting the period from legendary times, 2497–221 BCE). Mythologically, Chinese civilization began with Pan Gu, the creator of the universe, and a succession of legendary sage-emperors and culture heroes who instructed the ancient Chinese in communication and enabled them to find sustenance and to fabricate clothing and shelter. The name Xia was embodied in early oral traditions but also was documented in archaeological sites and artifacts discovered in 1928.

Western and Chinese scholars debate the veracity of the legends of the founding of the dynasty, particularly the accuracies of the chronologies expressed in written records such as the Records and Annals, which were composed 2,500 years after the supposed creation of the dynasty. In addition, the existing archaeological evidence does not appear to correlate with the historical records.

The Xia had villages and urban centers but were an agrarian people whose pottery and bronze implements have assisted prehistorians in developing more finite chronologies. During the Xia dynasty the major crafts included jade carving and casting bronze vessels, some of which were embellished with jade. The Xia also devised a calendar system that incorporated lunar and solar movements.

The Xia period—dating, as explained below, from the twenty-first to the sixteenth century BCE—defined a cultural stage between late neolithic cultures and the urban civilization of the Shang dynasty. Excavations in the city of Yanshi, Henan Province, uncovered what appears to have been a capital of the Xia dynasty. Although archaeological evidence (including radiocarbon dating) demonstrated that the inhabitants were the direct ancestors of the Longshan and were predecessors of the Shang, some Western scholars contend that the Xia were not a true dynasty. The two earliest of the three ancient dynasties of ancient China (Xia and Shang) are not directly known from contemporary written records, hence some scholars contend that these are mythical; however, there is agreement that the existence of the subsequent Zhou dynasty is based on historic documentation.

Xia Dates

A traditional chronology based on calculations by Liu Xin (c. 46 BCE–23 CE), an astronomer and historian, suggests that the Xia ruled from 2205 to 1766 BCE, but a chronology based on the Bamboo Annals dates the Xia dynasty from 1989 to 1558 BCE. The Skeptical School of early Chinese history, founded by Gu Jiegang in the 1920s, seriously questioned the traditional history, noting that through...
Xia Rulers

Traditional Chinese histories contend that the Xia dynasty was founded by Yu and ultimately had seventeen rulers. (See table 1.) According to the traditional history, the dynasty was founded when Shun, following the abdication system (which chose leaders according to their ability) ceded his throne to his minister Yu, whom Shun viewed as the “perfect civil servant.” Yu was esteemed by his people for eliminating devastating annual flooding by organizing the construction of canals and dikes along all the major rivers. But before his death Yu passed power to his son, Qi, setting the precedent for dynastic rule, or the hereditary system, which began a period of family and clan political and economic control. The rulers often performed as shamans, communicating with spirits for guidance, and the ruling families employed elaborate and dramatic rituals to confirm their political power.

Continuing with the hereditary system, fifteen descendants of Qi succeeded him after his death. Several, time the oral history had been embellished with elements added to the earlier periods. The Xia Shang Zhou Chronology Project, a multidisciplinary effort commissioned by the People’s Republic of China in 1996, involved two hundred scholars whose task was to determine precisely the chronology and geographic locations of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties. The report, published in 2000, determined that the Xia dynasty dated from 2070 to 1600 BCE. Scholars such as Sarah Allen contend that aspects of the Xia are the opposite of traits emblematic of the Shang, and she argues that the Zhou dynasty justified their conquest of the Shang by pointing out that the Shang had supplanted the Xia.

Table 1  The Xia emperors in order of succession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emperor</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Reign (in years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xiayu</td>
<td>or Dayu; family name: Si; given name: Wenming</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qi</td>
<td>son of Xiayu; established the hereditary system</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taikang</td>
<td>son of Qi</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongkang</td>
<td>younger brother of Taikang</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiang</td>
<td>son of Zhongkang</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaokang</td>
<td>posthumous child of Xiang</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu</td>
<td>son of Shaokang</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai</td>
<td>son of Zhy</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mang</td>
<td>son of Huai</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xie</td>
<td>son of Mang</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bujiang</td>
<td>son of Xie</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiong</td>
<td>younger brother of Bujiang</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin</td>
<td>son of Jiong</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kongjia</td>
<td>son of Bujiang</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>son of Kongjia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa</td>
<td>son of Gao</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jie</td>
<td>son of Fa</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
such as Shaokang and Huai, made important contributions to Chinese society, but three were tyrannical emperors: Taikang, Kongjia, and Jie. The Xia dynasty ended under the reign of Jie, whose dictatorial and extravagant ways caused a popular revolt under the leadership of T’ang (the leader of the Shang tribe), who overthrew the Xia and established the Shang dynasty. Liu Xin’s calculations give the Shang dynasty a reign of 1766–1122 BCE; the chronology from the Bamboo Annals dates it 1556–1046 BCE; and the Xia Shang Zhou Chronology Project places it 1600–1046 BCE.

Charles C. KOLB

Further Reading


Xi’an is the modern capital of Shaanxi Province, but the Xi’an area has a legacy dating back thousands of years—most notably as the capital of China’s first imperial dynasty, the Qin (221–206 BCE), as well as of the Han and Tang dynasties. The terracotta soldiers from the burial tomb of the Qin emperor Shi Huangdi are located about 30 kilometers from the city.

Xi’an is the capital of Shaanxi Province in central China. The city, which is the largest in the province, is situated in the central part of Shaanxi in the Wei River valley north of the Qinling range. The area around Xi’an has been inhabited for thousands of years; the remains of a well-established village from around 5000 BCE have been found at Banpo. The Xi’an area was also chosen as the capital of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), of China’s first imperial dynasty, the Qin (221–206 BCE), and also of the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) and the Tang dynasties (618–907 CE). The city was then known as “Chang’ an.” The renowned terracotta soldiers—a life-size army of some 8,000 troops that was commissioned by the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (Shi Huangdi) as part of his tomb—are located about 30 kilometers east of the city.

Many other archaeological sites dot the area. For hundreds of years Xi’an was the gateway to the Silk Roads to central Asia, and during the Tang dynasty...
it was the largest and most cosmopolitan city in the world. The Big Wild Goose Pagoda, which was completed in 709, still stands 64 meters tall, and the old part of Xi’an, with the drum tower, the bell tower, and a mosque dating to the eighteenth century, is surrounded by one of the best-preserved city walls in China. The walls date to the fourteenth century and were originally 14 kilometers long and measured 12 meters in height and 18 meters in width. The modern city has a major textile industry and some electrical industries, and food processing factories are located in a rich agricultural region in the river valley. Tourism is a major source of income. Xi’an is also home to several important colleges.

Bent NIelsen

Further Reading


Xi’an City Wall

The Xi’an City Wall is one of the last remaining ancient battlement sites of North China, and one of the largest military defense systems in the world.

The Xi’an City Wall is a major tourist site at the center of Xi’an, capital of Shaanxi Province in the northcentral part of the country. Xi’an is also the site of the famous terracotta entombed warriors, along with museums, pagodas, and other sites of historical interest. Xi’an has been referred to as China’s eternal city because of its ancient heritage. In the Xi’an area the capitals of the Chinese dynasties from Zhou (1045–256 BCE) to Tang (618–907 CE) were established.

The city wall was first built in the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) and rebuilt in the third year of the reign of Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). It then went through three major renovations. The first took place in 1568 under the supervision of Zhang Zhi, then governor of Shaanxi. The second started in 1781 under the supervision of another Shaanxi governor, Bi Yuan. The last renovation was in 1983 when the Shaanxi government launched its ambitious project to renovate it and restore the parts that had been destroyed.
An attractive circular park has been built along the wall, with trees, shrubs, and flowers enhancing the beauty of the traditional Chinese architecture.

The Xi’an City Wall is an imposing presence around the city. Its north side is 3,241 meters (10,633 feet) long; its south side, 3,442 meters (11,291 feet); its east side, 2,590 meters (8,497 feet); and its west side, 2,631 meters (8,633 feet). The base is 18 meters (59 feet) wide, tapering to 15 meters (49 feet) at the top, which is as wide as a four-lane superhighway. The wall has a perimeter of 13.74 kilometers (8.5 miles). Originally built of rammed earth, it is now sided with large gray bricks.

A watchtower (jiaolou) sits at each corner of the wall. A rampart (ditai) projects from the top of the wall every 120 meters (394 feet). All together, there are ninety-eight ditai, each having a sentry (dilou) built upon it. A gate opens in each side: Far-Reaching Tranquility (Anyuan) in the north, Eternal Peace (Yongning) in the south, Everlasting Joy (Changle) in the east, and Security and Stability (Anding) in the west. Each gate consists of three gate towers. Central tower (zhenglou) is the inner tower sitting over the main entrance. Lock tower (zhalou) is the outer tower controlling the suspension bridge connecting to the entrance. Arrow tower (jianlou) is a watchtower lying between the other towers. Joining the three towers is an enclosure for defense known as jar city (wengcheng), where soldiers were stationed to guard the gate. From jar city to the top of the wall, there are passages with gradually ascending steps, which allowed war horses to travel up and down. There are altogether eleven horse passages on all sides.

The top of the city wall is paved with three layers of gray bricks. Battlements with a total of 5,984 crenels, or indentations, skirt the outer edge of the wall. Parapets (nü’erqiang) line the inner edge of the wall. While the battlements were used for defense, the parapets served as lookout posts.
“Build high walls and store up provisions” has been an important guiding principle of Chinese monarchs in history. Well known for the construction of the Great Wall, the ancient Chinese built walls around every city. When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the Xi’an City Wall was one of many surviving city walls, but today it is the only one left in its entirety. The others were demolished to make way for modern traffic.

Now the Xi’an City Wall is not only the pride of the Xi’an citizens but also a mecca for Chinese and foreign tourists. Many festivities and reenactments happen at or on the wall. When President Clinton visited Xi’an in 1998 he was given a royal reception at the wall’s Yongning Gate. The Xi’an City Wall International Marathon has been held yearly since 1993. The wall is popular with hikers, bicyclists, and tai chi practitioners.

Haiwang YUAN

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Lure a tiger out of its mountain.
调虎离山
Diào hǔ lí shān
Xi’an Incident

Xi’an Shibian 西安事变

The Xi’an Incident of 1936 is often considered a turning point in Chinese history. As a result of the incident, in which two Nationalist generals, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, arrested President Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won breathing room from the Nationalists who wanted to destroy the CCP and at the same time gained popular support for their strong opposition to Japanese aggression. The Japanese took the apparent Nationalist-Communists rapprochement as evidence that armed conflict was inevitable. The Japanese invasion of China took place a scant seven months after the Xi’an Incident.

Until the Xi’an Incident Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy against the Communists appeared to be succeeding. In October 1934 Nationalist armies had driven the Chinese Communists out of their base in Jiangxi, forcing the 100,000 Communists to undertake the fabled Long March. The Long March decimated the Communists and ended a year later in October 1935 in a remote and poor area of Shaanxi Province where a small base existed at Yan’an. From Yan’an Red Army leader Mao Zedong took up the new United Front policy against fascism of the Soviet Comintern (the Communist International established in 1919 and dissolved in 1943) and argued that Chinese should not be fighting one another but rather must resist the Japanese.

In 1936 Chiang Kai-shek had charged Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang to carry out the final extermination of the weakened Communists at Yan’an. Yang Hucheng, a former bandit, led an army of questionable quality; Zhang Xueliang, the young cosmopolitan commander of the warlord army of Manchuria, commanded a stronger force. With Japanese encroachments in north China continuing, officers and men from both armies thought the threat from Japan was greater than from the Chinese Communists. Chiang Kai-shek, hoping to bolster the resolve of his armies, made two trips by airplane in late 1936 to Xi’an. His kidnapping occurred a few days after he began his second visit.
Initially the Communists urged Generals Yang and Zhang to kill Chiang Kai-shek but quickly altered their policy by sending Zhou Enlai to advocate the sparing of Chiang if he agreed to an anti-Japanese united front. Hoping to free Chiang, both his wife, Song Meiling, and his brother-in-law, Song Ziwen, flew to Xi’an to help negotiate a solution. After Chiang agreed with the terms he was released. The promised cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists never could be realized. Their enmity proved so great that even all-out Japanese invasion in June 1937 could not bring them to a truly united resistance.

The fates of the two kidnappers are a fascinating side-light to the Xi’an Incident. When released at Xi’an Chiang
Kai-shek convinced Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang to accompany him on his return to Nanjing. Once in Nanjing, Chiang had them placed under house arrest. Then, as the Nationalists retreated in 1949 to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek had Yang Hucheng executed. Zhang Xueliang was spared but remained under house arrest until 1991. After the deaths of both Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo), Zhang Xueliang was released. Zhang, who had become a devout Christian during his long imprisonment, moved to Hawaii and lived there until his death in 2001 at the age of one hundred.

The Xi’an Incident revealed Chiang Kai-shek’s questionable control over his supposedly allied Chinese armies while enhancing the Chinese Communists’ identification with patriotic national resistance to Japan. It marked a renewed but futile attempt at cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. By heightening the anti-Japanese sentiment in China, it set the stage for open but undeclared war between Japan and China in July 1937. The War of Resistance against Japan, 1937–1945, and known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War, was later fought in context of World War II in Asia.

David D. BUCK

Further Reading
**Xiang**

**Xīāng 湘**

**Xiang** is the name of the people and local sub-language of the central southeastern province of Hunan. The Xiang people are one of three subgroups of Han Chinese that settled south of Mandarin-speaking Chinese; their language is complex with many dialects.

The name Xiang is derived from the older literary name of Hunan. It is estimated that more than 34 million Chinese (most of them living in Hunan Province) speak Xiang today. Several early leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (most notably Mao Zedong) came from Hunan, and the linguistic influence of people thinking in Xiang or in Xiang-accented Mandarin appears to have influenced the forms chosen to simplify the characters used in the Chinese language.

Along with the Gan and Wannan, the Xiang are one of the three subgroups of Han Chinese who settled inland and to the south of the Mandarin-speaking people in China. The sublanguage (a division of the main language) spoken by the Xiang has not been regarded as significant as the Mandarin forms spoken in the north, and the Xiang have not contributed in a major way to Chinese migration overseas. The Xiang, like the Gan and Wannan, generally have been considered to be Chinese who speak Mandarin, but with very poor pronunciation.

Xiang is a complex language with many dialects. While it shares similarities with Mandarin, it differs from other sublanguages of Han Chinese mainly because of the way the dialects and subdialects relate to each other. The dialects that have similarities with Mandarin are grouped together as the New Xiang or the Xinxianghua. Local histories suggest that the complexity in the Xiang sublanguage may be due in part to the fact that most of the population now living in Hunan Province originated in other provinces. Migration has thus contributed greatly to the complex pattern of Xiang subgroups in Hunan Province.

Linguists find it easier to divide the sublanguage chronologically into New Xiang and Old Xiang, rather than describing the geographical distinctions of the various forms. Old Xiang, or Laoxianghua, has been described as a conservative form of the Xiang sublanguage and therefore much closer to the Middle Chinese of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) than New Xiang. Some linguists have suggested that there are ties between Old Xiang and the Wu dialects of the region around Shanghai. It is not surprising that Old Xiang is spoken only in the more isolated rural districts and some of the smaller cities of central Hunan Province. New Xiang, on the other hand, is spoken mainly in most of the larger cities and towns, where people from other regions and provinces have settled.

**New Xiang**

Linguists point out that New Xiang has evolved much further from the Middle Chinese norm than has Old Xiang. The development of New Xiang generally has paralleled that of southwestern Mandarin. Indeed, this form
of Mandarin is supposed to have been the strongest influence on New Xiang, partly because southwestern Mandarin is spoken in Hubei Province, which is located directly to the north of Hunan Province. New Xiang is therefore much closer phonetically to Standard Mandarin than is Old Xiang. Yet both Old and New Xiang have been in use together and coexist in many towns. Complicating the geographical distribution of the speakers of Old and New Xiang are generational divisions: Elderly speakers usually speak Old Xiang, while their younger family members speak New Xiang.

Speakers of New Xiang in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province, typically do not pronounce the initial sounds b-, d-, dz-, dzh-, and gh-, as they do the other surrounding forms, sounds that are added or part of Han Chinese. Because these initials have been retained in the Old Xiang spoken in the smaller Hunanese city of Shuangfeng, linguists consider Old Xiang an island of linguistic conservatism. New Xiang is expected to change Old Xiang in time, bringing it more into conformity with Standard Mandarin and Mandarin-like speech forms.

The nature of spoken New Xiang can be examined in a list of words used in the provincial capital of Changsha. In New Xiang subdialects, the personal pronouns are similar to those used in Mandarin. Hence, “him” or “he” (t’a), is pronounced similarly in both New Xiang and Mandarin. Likewise, “you” (ni) is pronounced the same in New Xiang and Mandarin. According to scholar Leo Moser, the Changsha vernacular as described in the reference text Hanyu Fangyan Cihui can be compared with Standard Mandarin in several ways. First, it has no retroflex series of consonants. Second, there are no words ending in -ng, although some people in Changsha do use retroflex consonants as well as some syllables ending in -ng. Third, there are words beginning with -ng and z-. Fourth, there are six tones rather than four. Fifth, there are nasalized vowels and, sixth, a pattern of consonant liaison that may modify medial sounds in two-syllable phrases. Finally, there are different grammatical particles somewhat differently employed. Words in the Changsha subdialect can also start with an h- and an f-. These characteristics make the Changsha subdialect different from other forms of Xiang. (See table 1.)

In northern Hunan Province, the Yiyang subdialect is another form of New Xiang. It shares many characteristics with the Changsha subdialect but has five tones and words ending in -ng-. The subdialect has also developed a pattern of inserting l-like sounds in many words.

Linguists have concluded that the Xiang sublanguage differs from most other Sinitic sublanguages. Hunanese do not appear to take pride in their local dialect, since there does not seem to be uniform pronunciation of the name Changsha, for example, even within the city itself.

### Old Xiang

Linguists consider the Shuangfeng dialect a good example of Laoxianghua, or Old Xiang. The vernacular of Shuangfeng lacks the f- and the initial j-, although there are the initial consonants n-, ng-, and the voiced h or gh-. According to Wade-Giles Standard Chinese, the word liang (two, a couple), is niang in Shuangfeng, while jou (meat) becomes niu. The tendency to use old forms with voiced consonants and other ancient language habits has led to the comparison of Old Xiang and the Wu dialects.

Pronouns in Shuangfeng differ widely from Standard Chinese in both sound and formation. Several pronouns do not share the pluralizing element men in Standard Chinese. (See table 2.)

In the far south of Hunan Province, a zone of eleven counties, the Southern Xiang, or Xiangnan, dialect is spoken. Some have assumed that this dialect was influenced by Cantonese, the sublanguage spoken to the south, but in

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**Table 1: Corresponding Terms in English, Standard Chinese, and New Xiang (Changsha)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Standard Chinese</th>
<th>New Xiang (Changsha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tomorrow</td>
<td>mingtian</td>
<td>min-zi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this year</td>
<td>jinnian</td>
<td>chin-nie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>we</td>
<td>women</td>
<td>ngo-men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this</td>
<td>zhege</td>
<td>ko-ko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what</td>
<td>shenme</td>
<td>mo-tsi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cold</td>
<td>leng</td>
<td>len</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person</td>
<td>ren</td>
<td>zen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Moser (1985).*
fact the pronunciation shows a heavy influence of southwestern Mandarin.

OOI Giok Ling

**Table 2** Corresponding Pronouns in English, Standard Chinese, Old Xiang, and New Xiang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English (and Standard Chinese)</th>
<th>Old Xiang (Shuangfeng)</th>
<th>New Xiang (Changsha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I, me (wo)</td>
<td>ang</td>
<td>ngo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>we, us (wo-men)</td>
<td>ang-nga</td>
<td>ngo-men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>he, him (ta)</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>ta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Moser (1985)

Further Reading

Xiang Dialects

Xīāng fāngyán 湘方言

Mandarin 普通话 (putonghua, literally “commoner’s language”) is the standard Chinese language. Apart from Mandarin, there are other languages and dialects spoken in China. Xiang 湘 is one of the ten main Chinese Han 汉 dialects, and is spoken primarily throughout Hunan Province.

The Xiang dialect group is one of the recognized ten dialect groups of spoken Chinese. Some 34 million people throughout Hunan Province speak one of the Xiang dialects. Speakers are also found in Sichuan and Guangxi provinces.

The Xiang dialect group is further divided into New Xiang (spoken in the north) and Old Xiang (spoken in the south). Within these classifications are three further sub-dialect groups and an unclassified number of subgroups. There are some distinctive features between New Xiang and Old Xiang at the grammatical and sound levels. However, both the Old Xiang and New Xiang dialects have more features in common than differences. The representative of New Xiang is the Changsha dialect, which is spoken in the capital city of Hunan, and the representative of Old Xiang is the Shuangfeng dialect. Communications between speakers of New Xiang and Old Xiang are not always possible.

Origins of Xiang Dialects

The name Xiang comes from the major river in Hunan. Modern Xiang evolved from the language of the Chu kingdom, which was established in the third century CE, but it was greatly influenced by northern Chinese (Mandarin) at various times. The Chu kingdom occupied modern Hubei and Hunan provinces. Some records of the vocabulary used in the Chu kingdom areas can be found in Fangyan, compiled by Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE), and Shuowen jiezi, compiled by Xu Shen in 100 CE. Both works give the impression that the dialect spoken in the Chu kingdom had some strong local features.

The dialects spoken in Chu were influenced strongly by northern Chinese migrants. The first group of migrants came into Hunan in 307–312 CE. Most of them came from Henan and Shanxi provinces and occupied Anxiang, Huarong, and Lixian in Hunan. In the mid-Tang dynasty, a large group of northern people came to Hunan following the Yuan River into western Hunan. The third wave of migrants arrived at the end of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126). Most migrants came to areas in northern Hunan, such as Changde and Lixian. The Xiang dialects today are surrounded by Mandarin in the north, west, and south, and by Gan and Hakka in the east. The different dialects spoken by migrants have had a great effect on the Xiang dialects.

Official government policy since the 1920s, and especially since 1955, has encouraged the use of standard Mandarin (putonghua, literally “Commoner’s language”). All aspects of the Xiang dialects have felt the effects of this policy. For example, in Changsha, there are three speech codes: spoken Changsha, the local regional dialect used to communicate in everyday life; reading Changsha, a dialect system of literary pronunciation used solely for reading aloud, dictating newspapers or letters, and performing
local operas and plays; and suliao putonghua, or "plastic Mandarin," an expression used by people in Changsha to mock the fact that they are not native speakers of Mandarin and their Mandarin does not sound natural. Plastic Mandarin can be heard in schools and at some formal events, such as conferences. Generally speaking, the code of reading Changsha acts as a bridge for new sounds and new words from Mandarin into the Changsha dialect. In the twentieth century, the sound system of the Changsha dialect underwent a lot of changes because of the influence of Mandarin. For example, there are four tones in Mandarin but six in the Changsha dialect. The words dòng 冻 and dòng 冻 share the same sound in Mandarin but differ in the Changsha dialect: 冻 dòng has a high rising tone while 冻 dòng has a low falling tone. In the twentieth century, many words with a falling tone shifted to a rising tone. In other words, dòng 冻 and dòng 冻 have become homophones, as they are in Mandarin. It is possible that the Changsha dialect eventually will lose the low falling tone and go from six tones to five.

Sound System Features

Although different in some respects, in general, the Xiang dialects have some of the same phonological (speech system) features. For instance, most Xiang dialects possess five or six tones. The Middle Chinese (a term for historical
Chinese phonology, which refers to Chinese spoken from the sixth to tenth centuries) rù 入 tone is retained as one tonal category in the Xiang dialects. For example, the numbers yi 一 “one,” shí 十 “ten,” bāi 百 “hundred,” and liù 六 “six” belong to rù 入 tone category in Middle Chinese. In the Xiang dialect, these four words still share a falling tone, “ten” a rising tone, “hundred” a falling-rising tone, and “six” a falling tone.

The most significant feature of the Xiang dialects is the retention of the contrast between Middle Chinese voiced and voiceless consonants (just like the difference between the English /b/ and /p/ in “bet” and “pet”), since this contrast has been lost in most other Chinese dialects.

**Morphological Features**

Morphemes are the smallest meaningful units used to form words. In Xiang about 15 percent of morphemes have no correspondences in Mandarin. For example, in Mandarin the verb “to lie” is pian 骗 while in the Xiang dialect, it is [co] with a rising tone. Pian 骗 does not have a phonological correspondence with [co]. We don’t know its written form. We don’t know where the word [co] comes from. It might be a borrowed from some other language, or it might be an independent development of the Xiang dialect itself. Linguists have been trying to find the etymology of these words from early dictionaries and documents, but, so far, only a small proportion has been identified.

There are three main types of word formations for words of more than two morphemes in Chinese. They are compounds, such as fāmǔ 父母 (father + mother) “parents”; reduplications, such as māmā 妈妈 (mother + mother) “mother”; and affixations such as làohù 老虎 (prefix + tiger) “tiger”; or zhúzǐ 筊子 (table + suffix) “table.” In the Xiang dialects, affixation is much more common than it is in Mandarin, but reduplication is not commonly employed. In the twentieth century, some new morphemes were borrowed into Xiang. For example, the local kinship terms and Mandarin kinship terms coexist in the Changsha dialect: yé 爷 and niáng 娘 are local terms for father and mother; bāba 爸爸 and māmā 妈妈 are borrowed terms. The borrowed terms have brought not only new morphemes (words) into Xiang but also the reduplicative formation.

**Grammatical Features**

There are many features of grammar in the Xiang dialects that distinguish them from Mandarin and other Chinese dialects or languages.

In Mandarin, there is no distinction between the attributive particle and nominalized particle. For example, in the expressions wǒ de shū 我的书 “my book” (de = attributive particle) and shù shì wǒ de 书是我的, “the book belongs to me” (de = nominalized particle), both the attributive and nominalized particle is de 的. In New Xiang both particles are cognates of de 的 while in Old Xiang they are cognates with ge 个 (scholars are still debating the lexical source of ge个). In some localities of Old Xiang—such as Qiyang, Qidong, and Xinhua—however, there is a distinction between the two particles. In the Qiyang dialect, the attributive is [ke] while the nominalized is [kau]. That is to say, wǒ de shū 我的书, “my book,” in the Qiang dialect would be wǒ [ke] shù 我的书 while in Old Xiang they are cognates with ge 个, “the book belongs to me,” would be shù shì wǒ [kau] 我的书 (kau = nominalized particle). This type of distinction occurred before the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) but disappeared in Mandarin as well as in most Xiang localities.

In written language the passive construction first appeared before the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) while disposal constructions first appeared in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). In Mandarin the passive marker derived from a verb with a passive meaning (bèi 被), “to be covered, to suffer,” as used in Běizì bèi méimeī dài pò le 杯子被妹妹打破了 (glass + passive marker + younger sister + to hit + complement + aspectual marker) “The glass was broken by (my) sister”) or while the disposal marker derived from a verb with an active meaning (pā 把, “to hold,” as used in Méimeī bā běizi dài pò le 妹妹把杯子打破了 (younger sister + disposal marker + glass + to hit + complement + aspectual marker) “(My) sister broke the cup”). In Xiang, however, both passive markers and disposal markers derived from active verbs meaning “to give” or “to take,” such as pā 把, “to hold, to give”; dé 得, “to gain, to give”; or ná 拿, “to take.” More interestingly, there are even some localities such as Lengshuijiang, where both passive and disposal constructions share the same marker: ná 拿, “to take.” The sentence Zhang San na Lisi sa le 张三拿李四杀了 in the Lengshuijiang dialect can have two readings: Zhang San killed Lisi and Zhang San was killed by Lisi. In addition,
in Xiang dialects, these two constructions are not as active as they are in Mandarin. Instead of forming a request as in “to open the door,” (bā mén dà kā 把门打开 [disposal marker + door + to open + complement]), in Mandarin a direct order is more likely to be heard (kāi mén 开开门 [to open + complement + door] “open the door”). Now the Mandarin passive markers and disposal markers have come into the local system. In many localities, the local forms and the borrowed forms coexist.

Word order is very important to meaning in many languages. The most distinctive feature of Xiang word order is the position of the object. In Mandarin the word order for double objects is [verb + indirect object + direct object], for example gěi tâ shû 给他书 [to give + he + book] “give him a book”; but in Xiang it is [verb + direct object + indirect object] gěi shû tâ 给书他 [to give + book + he] “give a book to him.”

In Mandarin if a verb takes both an object and a complement, the word order is [verb + complement + object], such as in găn shàng chû le 赶上车了 [to catch + complement + bus + particle] “have caught up to the bus.” In Xiang positive sentences share the same order as Mandarin, but negative sentences have a different order [verb + object + complement]: găn bú shàng chû 赶不上车 [to catch + no + complement + bus] “unable to catch the bus” or găn chû bú dào 赶车不到 [to catch + bus + no + complement] “unable to catch the bus”. If a verb indicates a common action in everyday life, such as “wish to eat, wish to drink, or wish to sleep,” the construction in Mandarin is [xiāng 想 “to wish” + verb + object]. The word order in the Changsha dialect is [xiāng 想 “to wish” + object + verb]: xiāng chī fàn 想吃饭 [to wish + to eat + rice] “(I) want to eat (now)” in Mandarin but xiāng fàn chī 想饭吃 [to wish + rice + to eat] in the Xiang dialects. All of these Mandarin constructions have come into Xiang and coexist with the local constructions.

Studies of Xiang Dialects

There have been three general surveys of dialects spoken in Hunan. All three include the Xiang dialects. The first survey covered seventy-five localities and was conducted by a team under the leadership of Chao Yuenren in 1935. The results were not published until 1974, by Yang Shifeng. The second was conducted by the Chinese department of Hunan Normal University between 1956 and 1959 (and published in 1960) and covered eighty-one localities. The third survey started in 1987 and was conducted by a team led by Li Yongming and Bao Houxing. It covered 102 localities of which twenty-two were studied in detail. Since the late 1990s, much work has been done on different aspects of the Xiang dialects, especially grammar, which had been overlooked in the past.

A five-volume series with descriptions of phonology, vocabulary, and grammar of the Xiang dialects, edited by Bao Houxing, was launched at the first International Conference of the Xiang Dialects held in Changsha in 2006. Scholars working in the Xiang dialects are very active. More important, more and more postgraduate students are engaged in the research of the Xiang dialects.

Most research in the Xiang dialects so far has been descriptive work on contemporary dialects. More detailed descriptions of different localities of Xiang, especially the localities in the remote areas, are needed. But studies from historical and comparative points of view also are important. There is a need to put Xiang on the big map of universal linguistics, in the interests of linguistic studies in general.

Yunji WU

Further Reading


He who stays near vermilion gets stained red; he who stays near ink gets stained black.

近朱者赤，近墨者黑

Jinzhūzhěchì，jīnmòzhěhēi
One of the best-known Chinese film directors of the twentieth century, Xie Jin blended Confucian morality with melodrama into more than twenty films—from state-sanctioned evaluations of Chinese history or bleak portrayals of the Mao years to wildly popular features.

Xie Jin occupies a complex, vitally important position in the history of Chinese cinema. A director of celebrated talents, his *Stage Sisters* (1964) and *Hibiscus Town* (1986) have gained reputations as examples of some of the finest filmmaking to emerge from the People’s Republic of China during the twentieth century. At the same time, Xie’s cultural authority has become institutionalized through his close ties to state studios and artistic organizations. He served as a vice chairman of the national committee of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, and was a standing committee member of the Eighth and Ninth Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences, an advisory body to the PRC government. Nonetheless, the “Xie Jin school” of filmmaking, supposedly based on the melding of melodrama with Confucian morality, has been both emulated and challenged by Chinese filmmakers during the post-Mao era.

A native of Shangyu, Zhejiang Province, Xie’s directorial training began in Sichuan during the 1940s, when he attended a public dramatic arts institute near Chengdu. As a consequence of wartime migration, this institution boasted several cultural luminaries as teachers, including both dramatists (Cao Yu, Hong Shen) and directors (Huang Zuolin, Zhang Junxiang). Xie followed several of these mentors to Chongqing in 1943, essentially working as a fulltime understudy.

Xie Jin recommenced his studies at the Nanjing National Theater Institute in 1946, and began work as an assistant director for the Datong Film Company two years later. After another period of political training at the Huabei (North China) People’s Revolutionary University in 1950, he entered the Shanghai film world at a time when the transition to a state-run system left very few opportunities for new arrivals. Xie distinguished himself, however, and by 1954 was already directing his own films. *Woman Basketball Player No. 5* (1957), recognized at the Fourth World Youth Assembly in Moscow, constituted his first notable success. A series of cheaply made films promoting the state’s Great Leap Forward production-policies followed, after which Xie released a series of well-received features, including the wildly popular *Red Detachment of Women* (1961).

By this time, several patterns in Xie Jin’s filmmaking method had already emerged. First, he developed a reputation for directing films centered on female characters and for launching the careers of relatively unknown actresses such as Xiaoqing (now an infamous subject of tabloid gossip) and Siqin Gaowa (a recent recipient of the Hong Kong Film Award), with whom he often worked. Second, Xie’s films proved capable of attaining both domestic popularity and international acclaim—his masterpiece, *Two Stage Sisters* (1965), remains a classic of melodramatic social realism. Third, Xie was able to maintain this level of quality within a variety of political environments, as attested to by the fact that he was one of a handful of directors picked
to transform “model operas” (a mode of “proletarian” theater devised by Mao Zedong’s wife, Jiang Qing) into films during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

Xie Jin’s popularity during the 1980s and 1990s was often overshadowed by the international success of Fifth Generation directors such as Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige. (Xie, whose career began after World War II, belongs to the Third Generation.) Yet Xie proved as durable as any of his famous successors. Legend of Tianyun Mountain (1980) and Hibiscus Town (1986) earned him plaudits for bleakly realistic portrayals of the Mao years, while subsequent films such as The Opium War (1997) wedded big-budget aesthetics with an officially sanctioned take on China’s colonial past.

Xie was a member of numerous professional film associations in the PRC and abroad. While his final works were directed mainly toward domestic markets, during these years he also acted as the state’s official ambassador as vice-chairman of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles to cinematic and scholarly communities worldwide. Xie died in Shangyu in 2008.

Matthew JOHNSON

Further Reading
XIN Qiji

Xin Qiji 辛棄疾
1140–1270 Song dynasty lyric writer, poet, and military leader

Xin Qiji, the most prolific lyric writer of the Southern Song dynasty, devoted his life to seeing that the former Northern Song territories captured by Jurchen Jin forces would be returned to Chinese rule. Ultimately Xin’s heroic recovery mission failed; in his retirement he wrote unabashed lyrics that expressed the frustrations of his thwarted ambitions.

The conflict that raged within the heart of Xin Qiji, one of the most important lyric writers of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), reflects the major political dilemma of his time—the division and competition between the reconstituted Song dynasty in the South and the conquering Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234) in the north. He is known for his forthright and martial personality, and his song lyrics were characterized by the term “heroic and unrestrained” (haofang) during his own lifetime, even though the broad stylistic range in his lyrics often belies the simplicity of this label. Over 670 of his song lyrics have been preserved, making Xin Qiji the most prolific song lyric writer of the Song dynasty.

The central concern of his entire life, fueled by patriotism and reinforced by homesickness for a homeland unoccupied by alien invaders, was his determination to recover the Song empire’s lost territory. In 1126 the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) capital of Kaifeng was sacked by the Jurchen Jin dynasty army, forcing the last heir to the throne to flee south of the Huai River and reestablish the capital in Hangzhou. Xin Qiji was born in the occupied north in the city of Licheng (modern Jinan in Shandong Province). In 1161, when Xin Qiji was twenty-one, he organized an uprising and joined forces with Geng Jing. On Geng Jing’s orders Xin Qiji led his forces to join the court in the south. He met Emperor Gaozong (reigned 1131–1162) in Jiankang (modern Nanjing) on an inspection tour and was granted an audience and an official title. Despite this promising reception, Xin Qiji received no support for his plans to retake captured northern territories. When Geng was murdered by a subordinate who had gone over to the Jurchen Jin, Xin rode into the enemy camp and returned with the traitor for execution. Afterward Xin relocated to the south for good. There he tirelessly advocated a policy of retaking the occupied northern territories, submitting to the throne his “Ten Discourses of an Ignorant Rustic” sometime between 1165 and 1168 and nine essays to a newly appointed pro-war grand councilor in 1170. Although Xin Qiji served ably in a series of provincial appointments in various parts of the Yangzi (Chang) River delta, he was frustrated by repeated misinterpretations of his actions and by downright slander from his political opponents. In 1182 Xin retired to a villa of eccentric design called “Ribbon Lake” in Jiangxi Province and, after this villa burned down, to a second villa called “Calabash Spring.” It was during his twenty years of retirement that he composed over nine-tenths of his song lyrics.

Xin Qiji failed in his ambition to become the heroic leader who recovered the northern half of his country. Instead he became the greatest songwriter of the Southern Song dynasty and poured his pent-up feelings into his lyrics. The lyrics of Xin Qiji have often been compared
with those of his literary predecessor Su Shi (1037–1101). In reality they are quite different in tone and technique. The late Qing dynasty (1644–1912) critic Wang Guo-wei (1877–1927) aptly distinguished the tone of the two writers, calling Su Shi’s lyrics “expansive” (kuang) and Xin Qiji’s “heroic” (hao). The one main similarity of the two poets is their interest in experimenting across genres. Like Su Shi, Xin Qiji further elevated the lyric by using it
to write about his public ambitions, a topic typically associated with shi poetry. In technique Xin surpassed Su Shi's efforts as well—by incorporating quotations from old-style prose and by combining classical prose with colloquial phrases from the spoken language.

Benjamin RIDGWAY

Further Reading

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**The Poetry of Xin Qiji**

**Sung to the tune**
**"The Partridge Sky"**

In my prime, beneath my flag were ten thousand warriors.
My horseman, in brocaded uniforms, burst across the river.
At night the northern soldiers held fast to their silver quivers.
At dawn our archers let fly their golden arrows.

Thinking back on those events,
I sigh over my present circumstances.
The spring wind will not darken my graying beard.
I've traded my ten-thousand word treatise on military strategy
For my neighbor's book on planting trees.

Established in 1931 as Red China News Agency, Xinhua News Agency, as it has been known since 1937, is the official state news agency of China and the largest news and information-gathering and distribution center in the country. Xinhua disseminates all information about government policies through its thirty-two branches in China, as well as its branches in more than one hundred countries.

As the official state news agency of China, and the country’s largest news organization, Xinhua News Agency is the primary source for information about government policies, resolutions, and viewpoints throughout the country. Established in 1931 as Red China News Agency and renamed “Xinhua” in 1937, the agency has undergone steady growth since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and especially since China’s economic reforms and opening-up drive began in 1978. Xinhua today has more than seven thousand employees working in news coverage (domestic, international, and sports), management and operation, and technical support.

Xinhua operates a head office in Beijing; thirty-two domestic branches in China’s provinces and autonomous regions, including Hong Kong and Macao (but excluding Taiwan), as well as reporters substations in some fifty cities and overseas branches in more than one hundred countries. Five regional offices authorized to release news include: an Asia-Pacific regional office headquartered in Hong Kong, the Latin American regional office in Mexico City, the African regional office in Nairobi, the Middle East regional office in Cairo, and the French regional office in Paris.

Domestically the agency releases daily news to newspapers and radio and TV stations at the county, prefecture, and provincial levels. Overseas it releases news in Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, and Portuguese. It also releases economic information daily to Chinese and foreign clients. It offers special reports and news features to more than 130 countries. It has cooperation agreements on news exchange with news agencies or media organizations in nearly one hundred countries. The Xinhua Audio and Video Center, established in 1993, provides news and special programs for TV stations and audio and video customers.

Xinhua publishes nearly forty newspapers and magazines, including Xinhua Daily Telegraph, News Bulletin of the Xinhua News Agency (in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian), Reference News (daily), Economic Information Daily, China Securities (daily), Shanghai Securities (daily), Sports Express (weekly), Outlook (weekly), China Comment (fortnightly), Globe (monthly), Chinese Reporters (monthly), Photography World (monthly), Great Rural World (monthly), Securities Investment Weekly, China Photo (quarterly), and China Yearbook (in Chinese and English). The Xinhua Publishing House, an affiliate, annually publishes four hundred books titles on current affairs and politics.

In recent years Xinhua has established more business operations such as China News Development Co., China National United Advertising Corporation, China Photo Service, Global Public Relations Co., and Hangzhou International Public Relations Co. Xinhua also operates the

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New China Agency to Handle Foreign and Financial News

BEIJING—China has named the State Council Information Office, a Cabinet-level agency, as the new regulator of foreign news agencies and financial information providers, replacing the official Xinhua news agency, Xinhua reported.

The announcement, which was issued Friday and took effect immediately, follows a complaint about new Xinhua regulations brought to the World Trade Organization by the U.S., the European Union and Canada last year.

The new rules would have required foreign financial information providers such as Thomson Reuters Corp., Bloomberg L. P., and Dow Jones & Co. to sell their products through an entity designated by Xinhua, and to disclose sensitive commercial information.

The complaint stated that the new rules constituted a conflict of interest since Xinhua was both a regulator and a market competitor.

In response to the complaint, China in November agreed to end Xinhua’s regulatory control, to allow foreign financial information providers to sell directly to customers and to appoint an independent regulator, which wouldn’t share proprietary information.

The previous Xinhua regulatory regime distinguished between foreign financial information providers, selling to financial professionals, and foreign news agencies such as the Associated Press and Agence France Presse, supplying a media market that includes newspapers, broadcasters and Web sites.

Friday’s announcement made clear that both groups would now be regulated by the State Council Information Office.

It isn’t clear how foreign news agencies will be allowed to conduct commercial activities under the new regulator. They are now required to distribute through Xinhua, which has long claimed a monopoly in this area.

Set up in 1991, the SCIO is a ministerial-level agency led by Minister Wang Chen.

According to its Web site, the agency’s chief role is to raise awareness and understanding of China and the country’s issues through media.


Further Reading


YU Xuejian

News Research Institute, the World Questions Research Center, and the China School of Journalism for journalism research and professional training. Xinhua made its information available online in 1997 and in 2000 established its website, which releases news in Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic, using three domain names: xinhuanet.com, xinhua.org, and news.cn. An English-only version is also available at chinaview.cn.
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

Wéiwú’ěrzú Zìzhìqū 维吾尔族自治区

20.95 million est. pop. 2007  1.6 million square km

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is the largest political unit in China but also one of the least populated. Muslim Uygurs make up Xinjiang’s largest ethnic population (although several other minorities reside there as well). CCP authorities have had a policy of settling Han (China’s majority ethnicity) in the region in an attempt to solidify government rule.

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, located in northwestern China, is bordered by Russia to the north, Mongolia to the northeast, the Chinese provinces of Gansu and Qinghai to the east, Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region to the southeast, Afghanistan and India to the south and southwest, and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan to the west. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is the largest political unit in China, covering 1.6 million square kilometers: slightly smaller than Iran. However, despite its size, Xinjiang is one of the least-populated regions of China. Its geography and climate help explain its low population density: Much of the southern half of the region is covered by the vast Taklimakan Desert, whereas the center is dominated by the uninhabitable Tian Shan range.

Xinjiang has long been China’s gateway to central Asia. As far back as the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) and...
Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties, the oasis towns scattered throughout Xinjiang were the backbone of the great Silk Roads, a highway over which merchants carried luxury goods from the Chinese empire to the Arab empires of the Middle East and the kingdoms of central Asia. Despite its strategic location, Xinjiang retained considerable independence during much of its history. The region’s current name, which in Chinese means “new frontier,” can be traced to the conquest of the region by the Manchu armies of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) during the mid-eighteenth century. Even after 250 years of Chinese control, however, Xinjiang retains much of its traditional culture. The region’s largest ethnic group continues to be the Muslim Uyghurs, although several other minority nationalities, including Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Tajiks, also have sizable populations. The “minority” population of Xinjiang in 1997 was 10.58 million (61.6 percent of the region’s total population). This population figure is all the
more noteworthy because, since 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party took over the governance of Xinjiang, central authorities have had a policy of settling Han (ethnic Chinese) in the region in an attempt to solidify their rule.

This policy, together with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Chinese economic migrants from the eastern provinces and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in central Asia, has resulted in the development of a separatist movement among Xinjiang’s Muslims since the mid-1980s. During the 1990s movement extremists began a terrorist campaign against local authorities in Xinjiang’s capital city of Urumqi and symbols of the Chinese “occupation” throughout the region. The Chinese government, in an attempt to keep the separatists from acquiring external support, during the late 1990s negotiated a number of agreements with neighboring states to jointly develop the region’s natural resources and to promote trade. Authorities in Beijing hoped to suppress support for Uygur nationalists by promising economic prosperity to the Islamic nations of central Asia.

When world attention was on pro-Tibet protests along the Olympic torch relay route prior to the Summer Olympics in Beijing in 2008, Uygur separatist groups staged demonstrations in several countries. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is an Uygur group that advocates creation of the Islamic state of East Turkestan in Xinjiang. On 4 August 2008, four days before the Olympics, suspected ETIM members rammed a dump truck into a patrol station in Xinjiang, killing or wounding thirty-two Chinese police officers.

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is to be a central element of China’s Developing the West program, which was announced by Premier Jiang Zemin in 2000.

Robert John PERRINS
Iron Discovery in Xinjiang

The China scholar Joseph Needham discusses the origins of iron-smelting technology in the Xinjiang region of China.

In Xinjiang, in the far northwest of modern China, some surprisingly early dates for iron have been published in recent years. Iron is found in graves which for the most part show no sign at all of Chinese influence and which have surprisingly early radiocarbon dates. The most important early iron artifact type appears to be a small knife....Archaeological material available...suggests that iron technology came to Xinjiang from the Chust culture of the Ferghana Valley, in modern Uzbekistan. Here iron appears at the beginning of the –1st millennium [BCE], and there is solid evidence of mutual influence between this culture and several cultures of southern Xinjiang.

Farther east, in the Russian Maritime Province, some scholars believe that the use of iron was much earlier, perhaps as early as the –12th century [BCE]. This claim seems to be based on a single radiocarbon date, and should therefore be treated with extreme caution until such a time as more solid evidence becomes available.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the technology of iron smelting came to Xinjiang from further west. Given the present state of Inner Eurasian archaeology, however, further speculation concerning the precise route by which this transmission took place would probably be unwise. On the other hand, transmission to the Central Plain from Xinjiang through Gansu seems uncontroversial.


Further Reading


Xixia

Xixia was a flourishing regional state in north-west China eventually destroyed by the Mongols. Before its downfall, Xixia was ruled by the Tanguts, a group of uncertain ethnic origin, although they were probably Sino-Tibetan.

Xixia (western Xia), named after an ancient Chinese dynastic name dating to 2100 BCE, existed in northwest China from the late tenth century until extinguished by the Mongols in 1227. The core population was composed of Tanguts, a culturally mixed group variously identified but most likely Sino-Tibetan, with many other elements present, including: the Altaic Tuoba, who had played a major role in northern China prior to the reunification of the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE); local Turkic speakers, in the Ordos; Chinese; and even a few Mongols. Considered the real founder of the state was Li Yixing (d. 967), whose surname was a gift for services rendered from the Tang (618–907 CE). He and his successors, ruling a small state—wedged at first between Khitan Liao Dynasty (960–1125) and Northern Song (960–1126), and later between the even more powerful Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234) and Southern Song (1127–1279)—had to tread carefully to survive, taking full advantage of a remote position in the northwest surrounded by natural barriers and large, well-fortified cities in a relatively well-populated region. Nonetheless, thanks to a successful military, Xixia did survive and, by the eleventh century, occupied a substantial strip of territory, including the Ordos, the Alashan Desert, and the Gansu corridor, an area once well connected to China but, by the time of the Tang dynasty, heavily influenced by non-Chinese cultures. Contributing to Xixia’s survival was not only the power and skill of its military and leaders, but also its position as the third party in a balanced rivalry between the Chinese
north and south, one that was to persist for almost three hundred years. Neither the north nor the south was able to conquer the other and reunify China, and Xixia carefully positioned itself to upset the balance of forces at any one time, if one of its rivals grew too powerful.

**Mongol Invasions**

Xixia managed this quite successfully, and the end came for Xixia not due to an attack by one of its immediate rivals, but rather from an entirely new direction, the steppe, where the Mongol world had been united under the house of Chinggis Khan (often referred to as Genghis Khan, reigned 1206–1227). Even before his official rise, Chinggis Khan had sent some of his troops to raid Xixia domains in 1205. The raids continued until 1210, when, after a deep penetration to threaten the Xixia capital of Eriqaya (in what is now Ningxia Province), the then Xixia ruler, Li Anquan (reigned 1206–1211), agreed to submit to the Mongols. Making the Tangut position insecure was the Mongol acquisition of the realm of the White Tatar, or Ongud, positioned in the Ordos and inland toward Jurchen Jin domains and providing Mongol armies with easy access not only to the Jurchens themselves, but to Xixia. In any case, Xixia’s submission eased the Mongol military position by eliminating one potential enemy, on their left flank, allowing a concentration of forces to attack the Jin in a series of major advances between 1211 and 1214. In 1215, the Jin government abandoned much of its territory and fled to what was seen as more security south of the Huang (Yellow) River.

After the Mongols turned their attentions west, Xixia seemed secure, except that its government had gained

Members of a Tibetan minority traverse the hills once inhabited centuries ago by the Tanguts of the Xixia dynasty, a state that flourished in northwest China before being taken over by Mongols.
the enmity of Chinggis Khan by refusing to support his invasion of Turkistan. This invasion absorbed Mongol energies for a number of years thereafter, but on his return to Mongolia, Chinggis Khan began planning the complete subjugation and destruction of Xixia. After carefully mobilizing troops, the advance began in 1226, the Xixia strong points being reduced one after the other. By this time, the Mongols possessed a substantial siege train and substantial ability to reduce even the most heavily fortified cities. In the end, the last Xixia ruler, Li Xian (reigned 1226–1227), had no choice but to surrender his capital. The Mongols, enraged by his last-ditch resistance and by the death of Chinggis Khan probably weeks after the final Xixia submission, executed Li Xian and all of his family as well as large masses of his subjects.

Surviving Records of Xixia Culture

Despite the ferocity of the final war of conquest, and what seems to have been an intentional genocide, at least among the Tangut elite, the culture did survive, although the surviving Tanguts were not numerous enough to leave behind a recognizable society persisting until today. Some Tanguts were given to Mongol potentates as booty, and some Mongol groups may trace all or some of their origins back to them. Others were drafted into Mongol service and served in civil and even military capacities. Also surviving, for a short time at least, was the complex Tangut script. This script, based on Chinese characters but lacking their pictographic basis, provided a large number of complex symbols to write Tangut words, without any of the visual clues associated with the Chinese script. Long unreadable, this script is slowly being deciphered, and along with it, the Tangut language, but this work is still far from completion, and it will be decades before the existing corpus of documents can be understood to its fullest. Of course, Chinese was also in use in Tangut domains, and much of what we know about Xixia history comes from Chinese sources, principally those written by Xixia enemies.

The Tanguts, as far as can be determined, were devout Buddhists, and a good deal of their surviving literature, mostly manuscript fragments, but some nearly complete texts as well, is composed of Buddhist literature. Texts are not always the same as those circulating under the same names elsewhere, a fact having an adverse impact on reading them as Rosetta stones to decipher Tangut. Because of its Buddhism, Xixia maintained active connections with other Buddhist cultures, including with Tibetans, who established direct connections with Xixia from an early date and later used the Tangut domains as a jumping off point for converting Mongols.

Paul D. BUELL

Further Reading


XU Beihong
Xú Bēihóng 徐悲鴻
1895–1953 Artist and educator

Xu Beihong was an important figure in introducing Western ideas to modern Chinese painting. He trained and exhibited in Europe, and held important teaching posts in China. Xu’s work combined traditional Chinese heroic subjects with Western realism. He is best known for his monochrome ink paintings of galloping horses, which integrated Chinese brushwork with Western foreshortening and realism.

Xu Beihong was born in Yixing, Jiangsu Province. His father, a farmer and self-taught artist, was also Xu’s first teacher. Xu showed talent at an early age—he and his father made their livings as itinerant portrait painters—and at the age of seventeen he began to teach painting at a local school. In May 1917 Xu received financial support to study abroad in Tokyo. He returned at the end of the year and was given a position at the Society for the Study of Painting Technique at Beijing University by Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), who was a strong advocate of the New Culture Movement that sought to rejuvenate China’s arts.

In 1919 Xu left to study art in Paris on a government scholarship at the École Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts, where he also participated in salon exhibitions. In 1920 he met and studied under the French realist painter Pascal-Adolphe-Jean Dagnan-Bouveret (1852–1929), a strong antimodernist known for his meticulous attention

In his masterful paintings of galloping horses, Xu Beihong used principles of foreshortening introduced from Western art. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
Xu Beihong returned to China in 1927 and taught at the Nanguo Art College before being appointed by Cai Yuanpei as the head of the art department of National Central University. He began painting his large canvases of heroic and patriotic subjects that united Chinese brushwork and themes with Western realism. At this time he began working with the horse as subject, first seen in *Jiujiang Gao* of 1930. This would lead to the large work, *Galloping Horse* (1941), a theme he used for the rest of his life and for which he became internationally known. Xu Beihong continued to exhibit in solo shows and group exhibitions. In 1933 he organized a successful exhibition of Chinese painting that traveled throughout Europe and the Soviet Union. After 1949 Xu Beihong was named president of the Central Academy of Fine Arts and president of the Chinese Association of Workers in the Arts. In 1951 a stroke paralyzed him, and he died in 1953. In 1954 the Xu Beihong Memorial House was established at his residence in Beijing.

In the end Xu Beihong’s importance lies not in his abilities as a painter but rather in his dedication and passion as an art educator. His interest in European academic realism and firm belief that strong technique and discipline are the necessary foundations for a painter shaped generations of Chinese artists in the twentieth century.

*Catherine PAGANI*

**Further Reading**


XU Guangqi

Xú Guāngqǐ 徐光启

1562–1633  Official and scholar

Xu Guangqi, with missionary Matteo Ricci, translated Western texts into Chinese during the Ming dynasty. Their translation of Euclid’s *Elements* exerted great influence on Chinese mathematics. Xu became a high official in the Ming court.

Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), born in Shanghai, was baptized by Italian Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci in 1603, taking the name “Paul.” For the next three years Xu and Ricci collaborated in translating Western texts on astronomy, mathematics, and geography into Chinese. Their most famous translation was the Greek geometer Euclid’s *Elements*, which exerted a great influence on Chinese mathematics. Xu also wrote original works on trigonometry and agriculture, most notably the *Book of Agriculture*, which advocated the adoption of Western agricultural practices such as mapping, surveying, and irrigation. His interest in practical subjects was a departure from the dominance of neo-Confucian thought. After Xu became a high official in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) court, he sponsored the Jesuit missionaries in China.

Xu believed that Western scholarship, particularly geometry, could complement Confucianism and replace Buddhism by undermining the tendency toward vague speculation. In 1629 Xu demonstrated the use of Western science in predicting solar eclipses and other astrological events. When the Manchus invaded China in 1630, Xu

The Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci (left) and the Chinese mathematician Xu Guangqi (right) in an image from Athanasius Kircher’s *China Illustrata*, published in 1667. The Chinese edition of Euclid’s *Elements* (幾何原本) was printed in 1607.
Xu Guangqi’s “Preface” to the Chinese translations of Euclid’s Elements

During the times of the Tang and Yu there already were Xi and He who took care of the calendar, as well as the Minister of Works, the Minister of Agriculture, the Forester, and the Director of Ritual Music—if those five Offices would have been deprived of Measures and Numbers, it would have been impossible to fulfill their tasks. Mathematics is one of the Six Arts mentioned in the Offices of Zhou, and the (other) five could not have led to any results without the use of Measures and Numbers . . . Therefore I have said that far back, during the period of the Three Dynasties, those who applied themselves to this calling were immersed in a rock-solid tradition of learning that was passed on from master to pupil—but that has in the end perished in the flames of the Ancestral Dragon. Since the Han dynasty there have been many who haphazardly groped to find their way, like a blind man aiming at a target, vainly shooting in the air without effect; others followed their own judgments, based on outward appearances, like one who lights up an elephant with a candle, and, by the time he gets hold of its head has lost sight of its tail. That in our days the Way has completely disappeared, was that not unavoidable?! The Jihe Yuanben is the Ancestor of Measure and Numbers it is that by which one exhausts all the aspects of the square, the round, the plane, and the straight, and by which one completely covers the use of compasses, carpenter’s square, water-level and measuring rope . . . Starting from what is clearly perceptible, [this work] penetrates into what is most subtle; from what is doubtful certainly is obtained. Is not that utility of what is useless, the basis of all what is useful?! In truth it can be called “the pleasure-garden of the myriad forms, the Erudite Ocean of the Hundred Schools [of philosophy].” Although it actually has not yet been completed, yet, with it as a reference, it is already possible to discuss the other books . . .


Further Reading

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XU Haifeng
Xǔ Hǎifēng 许海峰
b. 1957 Olympic sharpshooter and coach

Xu Haifeng was the first athlete to win an Olympic gold medal for the People’s Republic of China. After retiring from his career as a champion sharpshooter, during which he won a number of golds in international competition, Xu went on to become a dedicated coach.

In taking the first gold medal of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles with a steely performance, sharpshooter Xu Haifeng also became a Chinese icon. He was not simply a winner, but the first winner of gold for his country since its return to the Olympic Games after a thirty-two-year absence due to controversy over the recognition of Taiwan. Hailed as a national hero upon his return for his timely victory in a sport demanding discipline and concentration, he went on to win many more titles and then to mentor younger champions, earning recognition not only as a top-tier athlete but also as a coach with a golden touch.

Xu was an unlikely Olympic hero; he’d been training in the sport for just two years, becoming a champion sharpshooter in Anhui Province in 1982 and winning his first national title in 1983. His only previous formal experience at shooting consisted of a week of military training in high school—although he reputedly was a crack shot with a slingshot during his childhood in Fujian Province.

Before joining the national shooting team (which was coached by Xu’s former high school teacher), Xu had been farming and selling chemical fertilizer in rural Anhui Province. Xu went to Los Angeles as the rookie on a team of six, expecting merely “to take part,” he later said. In the pistol events, attention gradually shifted from the Swedish world champion, Ragnar Skanaker, to the focused young man from China. Xu’s victory in the 50-meter free pistol shooting final, at age twenty-seven, changed his life.

Juan Antonio Samaranch, then president of the International Olympic Committee, called the occasion “a great day for China’s sports.” The absence of strong contenders from Eastern Europe due to the Eastern Bloc’s boycott of the Los Angeles Games certainly worked to the advantage of unknowns like Xu, but his win was no fluke, and he went on to prove his mettle in subsequent world competitions. In 1988, he won a bronze medal at the Summer Olympics in Seoul. Other wins accumulated over the years, including three golds at the 1986 Asian Games in Seoul, four golds at the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing, and five golds at the Seventh Asian Championships in 1991.

Xu Haifeng’s Los Angeles feat was commemorated in a Chinese television play, Shots over Prada—a reference to the name of the city’s Olympic shooting range. He donated that first Olympic gold medal to China’s National Museum. Retiring from competition in 1994, Xu became the coach of the Chinese national women’s shooting team; one of his charges, Li Duihong, won a gold in Atlanta in 1996, and another, Tao Luna, took a gold in Sydney in 2000. He was head coach of the shooting team at the Athens Games in 2004, which won golds in three men’s events and one women’s event. In anticipation of the 2008 Beijing Summer Games, Xu took over supervision of China’s modern pentathlon team. When the Games opened, Xu was listed as deputy team leader for pentathlon, at which Chinese
came in fifth and tenth among the women and fourth for the men—noteworthy in this European-dominated event. Xu’s most prominent role at the 2008 Olympics, however, was his appearance in the main stadium during the opening ceremony, carrying the Olympic torch as it neared the end of its journey from Athens.

China’s State Sports Commission awarded Xu a National Sports Medal of Honor in 1984, and he was named one of the nation’s top ten athletes twice, in 1984 and 1986. Newsweek magazine’s assertion that, “Posterity will forget that a Chinese fertilizer salesman won the first gold medal of the 1984 Summer Games” was wrong: A quarter century since the event that catapulted him to fame, Xu Haifeng remains a household name in China.

Judy POLUMBAUM

Further Reading

XU Zhimo was a modernist poet who actively sought to break Chinese poetry from its traditional roots and align it to Western poetic models, especially those found in the Romantic poets.

Xu Zhimo, the poet renowned for introducing Western poetic forms and techniques that allowed tradition-bound Chinese verse to acquire a freer form of expression, was born in the town of Xiashi, Sichuan Province, 15 January 1895. Xu was a precocious child who showed at an early age a delight in nature, a delight that would continue to hold sway in his poetry. His early education was in Hanzhou Secondary School, where he met and befriended Yu Da Fu, the future story writer and poet.

Shortly after graduating at the age of twenty in 1915, Xu entered an arranged marriage, according to the dictates of traditional Chinese society. His bride was Zhang Youyi. But the marriage was a failure from the outset, and, perhaps to escape it, Xu enrolled in Tianjin University, where he soon came under the influence of the reformer Liang Qichao, who encouraged Xu to continue his education in the West. Xu applied to Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, to study history and came to the United States in 1918. The next year he transferred to Columbia University, where he took up the study of economics. Before long, he came to feel that the United States was a place where he could not obtain the type of education that he wished to receive. He left for Great Britain in 1920, where he was accepted into the London School of Economics. Eventually he would enter Cambridge University, which at last suited his sensibilities, for it was there that he discovered the works of the English Romantics, as well as the French Symbolists. Xu felt an immediate affinity for their work.
His Cambridge years can be termed his transformative years, for he not only discovered a form of poetry to which he felt an innate attraction but also met and fell in love with Lin Huiyin, who was only sixteen at the time and a student at Saint Mary’s College in London. He quickly obtained a divorce from his wife so he could marry Lin. It was an effort in vain, however. Lin returned to China with her father in 1922. Distraught at the outcome of events, Xu also headed back home and tried to find Lin. But she had already married Liang Sicheng. Thereafter Xu devoted himself entirely to poetry and worked intensely to change Chinese poetry radically by aligning it with Western traditions.

His first collection, titled simply Zhimo’s Poems, appeared in 1925. The poems were heavily influenced by the English Romantics, especially Keats, Shelley, and Wordsworth. Xu soon befriended like-minded poets, also Western educated, such as Wen Yiduo, and became the founding member of the Crescent Moon Society, which was established in 1927. The society published the influential journal Xinyue (Crescent Moon). Xu’s next collections, A Night in Florence (1927), Fierce Tiger (1928), and Love’s Inspiration (1930) showed a further refinement of expression in which the Western elements become more thoroughly blended with his own sensibilities. The larger intention of his poetry was to reject the tradition-bound morality of old China so that a new China might be born, one in which the ideas of Western enlightenment would pervade. Xu’s poetic experimentations were tragically cut short when he died in an airplane crash on 19 November 1931.

FURTHER READING


Xuanzang

Xuánzàng 玄藏

602–664  Buddhist monk-scholar, pilgrim, translator

Xuanzang of the Tang dynasty was one of the most influential figures in the history of Chinese Buddhism. He is best known for his sixteen-year pilgrimage to India in search of the true Buddhist teachings, from which he brought back hundreds of scriptures. Xuanzang and his chief disciple, Kuiji, founded the Faxiang (Characteristics of the Dharmas) school.

Xuanzang 玄藏 was a Buddhist monk-scholar, pilgrim, and translator in the early Tang 唐 dynasty (618–907 CE). He traveled to India in search of the true dharma (divine law) and brought back with him hundreds of Buddhist texts. In addition to translating and commenting on the texts, he wrote Record of the Western Regions during the Great Tang (Datang xiyu ji) about his sixteen-year journey to India. His biography can be found in Zanning’s (919–1001) Song [Compiled] Biographies of Eminent Monks (Song gaoseng zhuan). He and his chief disciple, Kuiji 寂 基 (632–682), founded the Faxiang 法相 (Characteristics of the Dharmas) school, a Chinese version of the Indian Yogâcâra (Consciousness-only) school of thought.

Xuanzang, surnamed Chen (known as “Chen Yi”), was a native of Henan Province. His family for generations produced erudite Confucian scholar-officials. He was the youngest of four children. After the death of his father in 611, Xuanzang, under the influence of his elder brother, a Buddhist monk, joined the monastery at the age of thirteen. He became a fully ordained monk in 622.

Troubled by the discrepancies and contradictions in the Chinese translations of scriptures, he began to learn Sanskrit and decided to go to India to study Buddhism.

Xuanzang sneaked out of the Tang capital of Chang’an in 629 after the imperial court refused his petition to travel westward. He crossed the Gobi Desert and took the Silk Roads route via central Asia to India. Having endured numerous hardships and escaped from life-threatening
dangers, he eventually arrived in India, where he studied with many renowned masters and visited important Buddhist centers.

Xuanzang returned to Chang’an in 645. This time he received a warm welcome from the Tang imperial court. He declined the emperor’s offer of an official position, however; instead, assisted by a group of well-trained Buddhist scholars and linguistic experts, he spent the rest of his lifetime translating the texts that he had brought back from India.

Xuanzang is said to have brought back 657 items in 520 cases, and he himself translated 73 items in 1330 fascicles (divisions of a book published in parts) of scriptures into Chinese. His scholarly efforts not only made a great number of Mahayana scriptures and treatises available in Chinese but also contributed significantly to the Chinese understanding of Indian Buddhist doctrines and philosophies.

Xuanzang and his disciple, Kuiji, founded the Faxiang school on the basis of the Yogacara theory of the mind. It teaches that so-called reality is simply a result of how the mind functions; in particular, the storehouse consciousness (Sanskrit: Álayavijñāna) is the repository of all the mental projections and perceptions. Although the Faxiang school soon died out in China, it had a profound impact on Chinese Huayan and Chan Buddhism.

Xuanzang’s Record of the Western Regions during the Great Tang, completed in 646, has become a valuable
primary source of information about medieval central Asia and India. Based on Xuanzang’s pilgrimage, Wu Cheng’en (1500–1582) of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) wrote the novel *Journey to the West*, which is one of the most popular classics in Chinese literature.

Ding-hwa HSIEH

**Further Reading**


Painting of the traveling monk Xuanzang by a Japanese artist of the Kamakura period (fourteenth century).
Xunzi

Xúnzǐ 荀子

C. 300–230 BCE  philosopher

A key figure in Chinese philosophy, Xunzi is best known for his critique of Mencius’ concept of the essential goodness of humankind and for moving beyond Confucian ideals. For Xunzi, a rigid hierarchical social structure constrained by tradition, moral education, and threat of punishment is the necessary antidote for the naturally evil tendencies of humanity.

Xunzi is both the name of one of the most important Confucian thinkers and also the name of the book containing his teachings and his writings as compiled over the years. The significance of Xunzi, the man, lies in his thorough critique of Mencius, who upheld the basic and innate goodness of human beings. For Xunzi, there was little to laud in humankind; he held humankind to be inherently evil and therefore untrustworthy if not constrained by tradition, strict guidance, and the looming threat of punishment.

Very few details of Xunzi’s life are known. He lived during the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE), and he received his education in the city-state of Qi sometime in the third century BCE, after which he served in various courtly positions; he is thought to have died not long after the year 238 BCE.

Although Xunzi’s philosophy is thoroughly grounded in Confucianism, in so much as it recognizes the need for ritual and duty as taught by the sages of the past, it also seeks to fill an inherent insufficiency in the ideas of Confucius and Mencius concerning the human condition. Confucius is ambivalent; he states that there are people who are not interested in participating in the Way (the path to betterment, both of the self and the world), and such people are led into deeds of immorality. Mencius holds to the essential goodness of all people, who are only betrayed into immorality by a corrupted society. For Xunzi, both views are, at best, partial definitions of what constitutes the social makeup of the individual. If some people are not interested in following the Way, then the method of leading them is at fault because it abandons precisely those people that should be helped. Further, the Way becomes selective, picking and choosing who may follow and who may not, thereby becoming arbitrary. And if all people are inherently good, then there would not be any need for laws to govern people. But this is nowhere evident in human society; all people abide by rules and laws. This leads Xunzi to observe that human nature is evil and must be continually taught to become good, even if provisionally; the evidence for this evil is found in the manifestation of desire. People, if unchecked by regulations and prohibitions, would live solely to satisfy their desires, no matter what the cost to those around them or to society, and even the world. Hence the need for government, leaders, religion, rituals, rules and laws, all of which work in concert to retrain the natural, and therefore destructive, human tendencies. For this reason that which has been established by the ancient sages must be dutifully followed because such precepts have been put in place in order to guide the individual into correct social behavior. And these rules have been put in place by those who know better, namely, the ancient sages.
Traditions become important for Xunzi because he sees them as examples of the good which people must emulate; and this is the educational worth of tradition and ritual. Human beings need to follow examples; they need to see how they must behave and act in a moral fashion. This pedagogical turn in Xunzi’s philosophy points to a rather precise definition of people’s social behavior; they need good leaders. And just as examples educate men and women, so also must they be led by rulers who are learned in tradition, and therefore wise, who can explain to people the need for moral action. For Xunzi, a learned person is one that is fully adept in the tradition, so that he or she can teach those that need to be taught. And here Xunzi makes an important concession: people are inherently evil, but they have the capacity to be taught to be good and morally upright.

Thus, one of the central concepts for Xunzi is the need for education, which must continue until a person dies. Learning is not a natural process; it is not like taste or hearing, which one is born with; it is a very much an artificial process, and therefore a very human one. Learning does not lead to natural growth; rather, it leads to social and therefore moral growth. The ideal education for Xunzi consists of studying the canon, that is, books of poetry and history, as well as books dealing with rituals and observances; and he advocates the learning of music, which educates through inspiration and by providing evidence of harmony, order, and structure. And here the role of the wise teacher becomes much more essential; one cannot learn good music from a bad teacher. Only a wise teacher can lead one into the perfection that music demands.

Despite his insistence that the lowliest person from the street can be educated into wisdom, Xunzi does not abandon the need for punishment. Drawing upon the Confucian understanding that humans need to be continually perfected, Xunzi understands that this always brings about a fundamental division in society: the rulers and the ruled. Given this ongoing difference between people living within the same social structure, there must be the means available to the rulers to maintain order and negate chaos. Because human beings are forever seeking to fulfill their desires, they must be constrained by the threat of punishment, lest they willfully overthrow the fundamental structure of society, namely, its hierarchy. For Xunzi it is the structure of society that allows it to function harmoniously; and people need to be guided into being good, first through education, and then, failing that, through punishment.

One of the central shortcomings of Xunzi’s ideas is his inability to identify the role of practical reason. He does not delve into how the sages of long ago came up with traditions and rituals. What criteria of judgment did they use to say this ritual was good and that was not good? The question of individual judgment is indeed entirely lacking. In addition, he cannot explain why the sages were led to seek out morality, social order, and harmony, when they, like the rest of humanity, shared in an inherently evil nature. Why would they abandon their natural instincts to forever fulfill their desires and seek to impose restrictions upon themselves and upon others? In short, Xunzi does not explain what gives him the authority to understand human nature in the way that he does. Nor does he clarify why he holds his solution of education and punishment as being proper and good.

The importance of Xunzi lies in his ability to present Confucianism as the very best possible way of living a moral life—both for the individual and for society. The moral life may only be acquired, he maintains, through a moral education, which is a lifelong endeavor, for it is...
morality that ultimately refines the individual and makes of him or her a civilized human being.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


Planning for the post–World War II world, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin Roosevelt met at Yalta, a resort town in the Ukraine, in 1945. The agreement restored imperialist privileges in Manchuria that Russia had enjoyed in the early 1900s. In exchange the Soviets signed a treaty of friendship with Chiang Kai-shek and entered the war against Japan.

At the February 1945 conference held in Yalta, a resort town in the Ukraine, British prime minister Winston Churchill, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, and U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt sought to plan for the defeat of Germany and Japan and to shape the post–World War II world. The results of the conference proved that China was not going to be one of great powers of the postwar era. China was not represented at the conference, and Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist (Guomindang) government, was informed of the Yalta Agreement by the United States only after the conference’s conclusion.

The final agreement concerning China, published 13 February 1945, declared that “The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria” (Tucker et al. 1738). These terms essentially restored the imperialist privileges in Manchuria that Russia had enjoyed immediately prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. In exchange the Soviets signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with Chiang’s government and entered the war against Japan in August 1945. The Yalta Agreement also contained plans for the disposition of other territories occupied by the Japanese, such as the temporary division of Korea.

Roosevelt hoped that tying the Soviets to the Nationalist regime would solidify two postwar relationships: cordial ties between Washington and Moscow and a coalition government in China led by the Nationalists with Communist participation. Under U.S. pressure Chiang grudgingly accepted the agreement, which he hoped would drive a wedge between Stalin and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party. Mao’s forces, at their own base at Yan’an in north-central China, had a shaky truce (often called the “Second United Front”) with Chiang’s Nationalist government during the War of Resistance against Japan. Few expected the truce to last after Japan’s surrender. Stalin’s actions, however, seemed to belie claims of Communist solidarity and illustrated his ambivalence toward the Chinese Communists.

The Yalta framework did not last to the end of the decade. The short-lived alliance between the Soviet Union and Nationalist China could not save Chiang’s regime or deter Stalin from supporting the Communists.
Soviets fulfilled their promise to withdraw from Manchuria in 1946, but they stripped the region of its industry and left behind Japanese weapons to assist the Communists. By early 1947 civil war began anew, and by 1948 the Nationalists were collapsing. Stalin threw his support behind Mao as it became evident who would win the civil war. The dream of Soviet-U.S. cooperation or a coalition government in China was dead.

Chiang would point to Yalta as an example of U.S. naiveté about Communist machinations. Within the United States Yalta became part of a heated debate over “who lost China” and a rallying cry for conservative supporters of Chiang’s regime, which had retreated to Taiwan. In fact, both Mao and Chiang were bitter that the United States and Soviet Union attempted to define the international order of northeast Asia with little attention to Chinese interests—or sovereignty.

Steven PHILLIPS

Further Reading

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


YAN Zhenqing

Yán Zhēnqīng 颜真卿

709–785 CE  Court scholar and calligrapher

Yan Zhenqing was a court scholar and calligrapher of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). He was imprisoned and strangled to death during a rebellion.

Yan Zhenqing, also known as “Yan Qingchen,” lived in Shandong Province until he relocated to Xi’an in Shaanxi Province. His parents were descendants of clans whose members either held important official positions in court or were renowned scholars. For example, Yan Zhitui (531–c. 590 CE) was the author of *Home Instructions of the Yan Family* (*Yanshi Jiasun*). Yan Shigu (581–645 CE), Yan Zhenqing’s grandfather, was a famous calligrapher and historian during the end of the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). Yan’s maternal grandfather, Yin Zhongrong, also skilled in calligraphy, was the head secretary to Empress Wu (624–705 CE).

Yan had a difficult childhood because his father passed away when Yan was only three years old. Working hard, he passed the civil exam and became a scholar (*jinshi*) in 734. In that year he was married to the daughter of a prince. Even with these advantages, Yan’s career in politics was tumultuous. Being a man of integrity and loyalty, Yan was constantly a target for his opponents in court. Every time Yan emerged from a conspiracy or slander, he was either demoted or transferred. According to historical records, Yan was instrumental in pacifying the An Lu Shan Rebellion in 755. Again, when the court faced another rebellion in 783, Yan volunteered to go into enemy territory to negotiate with the head rebel, Li Xilie, who incarcerated Yan when he refused to surrender. Li, on the verge of defeat by the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) army, ordered a eunuch to strangle Yan to death. He was seventy-six.

Yan Zhenqing’s other love was calligraphy. When he was too poor to buy ink and brushes, he used a broom to write on the wall with yellow dirt. Beginning in 743 Yan deemed Zhang Xu (flourished 713–740), “the saint of cursive calligraphy,” as his teacher.

Another calligrapher, the monk Huaisu (737–798), was also Yan’s ally in calligraphy. Yan’s calligraphic achievements began rather late, around the age of sixty. His journey to artistic success can be divided into three stages: (1) the early stage before Yan was fifty, (2) the blooming...
stage of running and cursive (xing and cao) scripts before he was sixty, and (3) the final stage when his standard script (kai) reached full maturity. Famous cursive scripts done by Yan include “Begging for Rice Note” (764), “Mourning over My Nephew” (758), and “Fighting for a Seat Note” (764). After age sixty Yan became attracted to the standard script, which he wrote on big pieces of flat stone that were later engraved. “Ancestral Temple of the Guo Family Tablet,” done at age fifty-six, and “The Tablet of Songjing,” done at age sixty-four, were some of his prime examples in the standard script.

Yan’s unadorned calligraphic style breaks up the glamorous and formal style of the two Wangs (Wang Xizhi, 303–379 CE, and Wang Xianzhi, 344–388 CE) from the Jin dynasty (265–420 CE). (The Jin dynasty is a brief period during the North and South Dynasties in China.) His writings reflect the character of an honorable man who was righteous and magnanimous but true and simple. The imperfection and simplicity found in his works somehow manifest a form of aesthetics.

Fatima WU

Further Reading

Kill one to warn a hundred.
杀一儆百
Shā yī jǐng bǎi

Yan’an Rectification Campaign
Yan’an Rectification Campaign

The Yan’an Rectification Campaign of 1942 established the *modus operandi* of subsequent ideological campaigns in the history of Chinese Communism. It signified the expansion of the power of the Communist leaders from political and economic realms into other spheres of life, with the result that no alternative bases existed from which political authorities could be challenged.

The Yan’an Rectification Campaign 延安整风运动 of 1942 was a significant event in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The campaign’s success in quashing the first serious challenge to CCP leader Mao Zedong’s commanding position within the party, gradually acquired during the Long March, made it a prototype of later ideological campaigns; it also showed the aggressive reach of the CCP into intellectual life in Yan’an, a city in Shaanxi Province. No longer content to manage only political and economic affairs, CCP leaders would regard as their prerogative the total subjugation of literature and art to politics from this point on. As such, the campaign was a mass movement of a kind hitherto unseen in the history of the CCP, affecting not only the top echelon of the party’s leadership but also the lives of people from other social strata in Yan’an.

**Targets**

The late 1930s and early 1940s brought a fundamental change in CCP membership as more and more people...
from various places arrived in Yan’an, the last stronghold of Communism in China at the time. Unlike those who had endured the hardships of the Long March, many of the new arrivals were perhaps more anti-Japanese or anti-Guomindang (Nationalist Party) than pro-Communist. Moreover, coming mostly from cosmopolitan urban centers, they had an outlook quite at odds with the nativist bent of Mao’s brand of Communism, making it difficult for the party to maintain its iron discipline.

In a speech delivered on 1 February 1942, at the Central Party School at Yan’an, Mao highlighted three errors that he called upon “the masses” to correct: subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism. The scope of the Rectification Campaign at this stage was still rather limited, aimed as it was only at the general working style of party cadres. But when Mao’s call triggered vociferous complaints from students disgruntled with life in Yan’an, the nature of the campaign began to change. A number of prominent writers associated with the Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily) saw an opportunity to voice criticism of the party leadership, utilizing a form of intellectual essay called the zawen to highlight instances of inequality that exposed the party’s hypocrisy and pointedly questioning the legitimacy of the party to assume leadership in areas other than politics. Wang Shiwei, who would later become the prime target of the campaign, was particularly outspoken in asserting the role of writers and artists as social critics free from party interference. As these events unfolded, it became clear to party leaders that the campaign would have to rein in this group of wayward intellectuals and neutralize their destabilizing influence.

Modus Operandi

To lay down the ideological groundwork for the expanded scope of the Rectification Campaign, the party confronted head-on the question of art and literature in a socialist society. Mao’s keynote speech on 2 May, the first day of the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art, served this purpose. Mao argued that literature and art transcending time and class did not exist and hence that the notion that the artist could be an objective critic of society was a myth. It behooved artists and writers to ally their interests with those of the workers, farmers, and soldiers under the guidance of the CCP, Mao asserted. Any public criticism of the party at this stage would be regarded as an act of betrayal of the larger cause of Communism and tantamount to heresies such as Trotskyism, with which Wang Shiwei was indeed later charged.

The campaign then moved to the next stage of bringing intellectuals to heel, proceeding through a number of phases that would be replicated in subsequent ideological struggles. First, a negative example was established, in this case, Wang Shiwei and people thought to be associated with him. Second, gentle pressure was applied on this group by means of private visits from leaders and friends to persuade them of the error of their ways. When this pressure failed to produce the desired results, public meetings were held at which Wang was put under hostile cross-examination. At the same time people throughout Yan’an society were instructed to study key Communist texts and documents related to Wang’s case so that they could participate in the denunciation of Wang. Transcripts of these public meetings, called “struggle sessions,” clearly indicate a willful distortion of Wang’s position by the CCP. Despite claims of fairness, the proceedings often degenerated into name calling and other forms of intimidation. Most of Wang’s associates, notably Ding Ling and Liu Xuewei, recanted at this point, but Wang remained intransigent, going so far as to threaten to withdraw from the party. Finally, trumped-up charges were brought against him for belonging to the Five-Member Anti-Party Clique, and what had begun as an ideological disagreement then turned into a punishable crime, and Wang was arrested. The goal of the campaign had been achieved at this point, even though it would be extended and would evolve into other political movements in 1943. Wang was executed in 1947 under circumstances that remain unclear to this day.

Repercussions

The Yan’an Rectification Campaign was one of the most successful attempts of the CCP to induce conformity among its ranks. The same strategies that were employed in bringing intellectuals to submission, especially the clever deployment of “the masses” against the target of the campaign, would be applied to nonparty members in later years as well and often in more thorough and violent ways.

The success of the campaign also marked an important ideological victory for Mao. With the suppression
of cosmopolitan elements in the party, Mao was able to continue with his project of “making Marxism concretely Chinese.” After the CCP’s role as the sole arbiter of what was right and wrong in all spheres of society was established, no alternative bases from which its authority could be challenged existed.

King-fai TAM

Further Reading


Yang Zhu is believed to have been a hermit philosopher who advocated the importance of self-esteem and self-protection. Because his teachings countered the common call for self-sacrifice, his ideas were misrepresented and criticized by others, especially the Confucian scholar, Mencius.

Discerning who Yang Zhu was or what his philosophy advocated is difficult because no documents that he authored have survived. Scholars date Yang Zhu’s life based on a passage in the Collection of Stories (Shuoyuan) by Liu Xiang (79–8 BCE), which claims that Yang had an audience with King Hui of Liang (370–319 BCE). The Annals of Lü Buwei (c. 238 BCE) state that Yang Zhu valued the self. Yang’s philosophy was well known because the Chinese philosopher Mencius (Mengzi, flourished 371–289 BCE) claimed that the teaching of Yang Zhu and Mo Di (flourished 479–438 BCE) were popular during his time. Mencius distorted and simplified Yang’s teachings, declaring that Yang would not remove one hair from his shin if he could benefit the people of the empire by doing so.

Because of the vagueness of the classical Chinese language, it is not clear whether Yang was an egoist and valued only his own person, or if he taught that each person should esteem himself. An egoist would not advocate that others should be egoists because that would not help the egoist benefit himself. Yang Zhu was not an egoist because he taught that all people should value and protect their own lives. A Daoist text, the Liezi (c. 300 CE), contains a chapter entitled “Yang Zhu,” which advocates seeking pleasure. It contains a reasonable explanation for why Yang Zhu would not pluck out a hair to benefit the empire because one hair will not be sufficient. One hair will lead to a pound of flesh, leading to a limb, then one’s life, and finally others’ lives. Someone who values life will not take this path. The eclectic Daoist text, the Huainanzi (c. 140 BCE), outlines three basic teachings of Yang’s philosophy: keeping a person’s human nature intact, protecting a person’s genuineness, and not allowing the body to become attached to material things. This individualistic, protect-your-life thinking began in the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) among hermits and recluses who withdrew from the dangers of public life, becoming popular during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) for practical reasons. Through history it serves as a reminder that a person must keep the body intact to live a fulfilling life. Yang disagrees with the majority of ancient Chinese philosophies that call on the individual to sacrifice, even die, for the greater good. Five chapters in The Annals of Lü Buwei promote Yang’s philosophy. In that book Yang’s self-preservation approach is offered to the ruler for his own protection; it is not for the common people because they must be willing to die for the ruler. In the Daoist text, the Zhuangzi, at least four chapters advocate Yang’s philosophy. In the Zhuangzi Yang’s teachings are used to persuade any person from any social status to realize that self-preservation is the utmost principle.
Yangist Thought

Although the philosophies of Yang Zhu are often disputed and unclear, a few accounts do exist of his teaching and thought. In The Construction of Space in China the historian Mark Lewis discusses a passage from the Liezi that briefly captures Yang’s theory on the central role of the body.

The clearest demonstrations of the central role of the body in Yangist thought are assertions of the absurdity of exchanging bodily parts for external objects. One example of this, or rather a parody of it, was the passage from the Mencius... in which the willingness to sacrifice bodily hairs distinguished rival philosophical traditions. A more elaborate version couched in terms favorable to the Yangist teachings appears in the fourth-century A.D. Liezi:

Qin Guli asked Yang Zhu, “If you could save the whole world by giving up one hair, would you do it?” Master Yang replied, “The world could certainly not be saved by one hair.” Master Qin said, “If it would be saved, would you do it?” Master Qin went out and spoke to Mengsun Yang. Mengsun Yang said, “You have not understood Master Yang’s thoughts. Let me say them. If you could gain ten thousand in gold by having some of your skin peeled off, would you do it?” “I would.” “If you could obtain a state by having one limb cut off at a joint, would you do it?” Master Qin remained silent for a while. Mengsun Yang said, “A hair is less than some skin, and some skin is less than a limb. This is plain. But if you accumulate individual hairs it forms a patch of skin and if you accumulate skin if forms a limb. Even one hair is certainly a tiny part of the body, so how could you treat it lightly?”

The relation between body and things is worked out in a set of hypothetical exchanges that mark the higher value of the former.


Further Reading

Yangge

A style of folk song and dance from northern China, yangge developed into theater (yangge xi) and was adapted by artists of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to create a new and revolutionary form of art.

The term yangge literally means “rice-seedlings song,” suggesting its derivation from peasants’ harvest labor. As early as the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, monks or rural laborers of various kinds put on small-scale musical performances for the amusement of villagers. Over the course of time, these developed into communal song-and-dance shows and, by the eighteenth century, into small-scale folk dramas (yangge xi) with two or three performers, usually a female character (dan) and clown (chou), and sometimes a male character (sheng) also.

Performed from the Spring Festival (Chinese New Year, the first day of the first month in the lunar calendar) until the Lantern Festival (the fifteenth day of the first month), the plays were always associated with religious rituals, which is typical of rural regional theater. The structure consisted of three parts, with song-and-dance performances surrounding a light, comic play. The content reflected rural life, and a favorite theme was courtship among young people. These were sometimes offensive to authorities bent on preserving conservative social norms: Yangge usually showed young people themselves, not their parents, choosing their spouses, and the plays were often quite bawdy and sometimes pornographic.

Yangge and the CCP

From the end of 1942 until 1946 (and beyond), the CCP, then headquartered in Yan’an in northern Shaanxi Province,
sponsored its New Yangge Movement, which was a mass effort based on the local indigenous art form. Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” of May 1942 were a major spark for using this folk art as propaganda for the revolutionary and anti-Japanese cause.

The CCP censored and politicized the yangge performances. They secularized the social context, sponsoring their own troupes and performance sites, though they did not prevent folk troupes from visiting temples. They forbade the more explicit sexual material and created their own plays to reflect the CCP’s ideology. The most famous example, Brother and Sister Clear Wasteland (Xiongmei kaihuang), premiered in the spring of 1943 north of Yan’an; it boasted of the advantages of CCP government in a skit about peasant labor. There were two characters only, one male and one female, but the traditional sexual themes were replaced with those relevant to labor. The musical accompaniment included both traditional Chinese and Western instruments.

The increasing complexity and revolutionary nature of these CCP-inspired yangge plays climaxed in the large-scale opera The White-Haired Girl (Baimao nü). The opera’s story—about a girl who escapes her landlord’s oppression and undergoes privations serious enough to make her hair turn white but is then saved by the CCP’s soldiers—is focused very explicitly on class struggle and functions as CCP propaganda. Its music combined traditional folk songs and Western-style music, with Western instruments in the orchestra. Representing an original genre, this “new opera” (xin geju) premiered during the CCP’s Seventh Party Congress in 1945. It has retained some popularity since then and, in ballet form, became one of the “model dramas” (yangban xi) during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). While yangge was not generally performed outside of northern China, baimao nü became popular nationwide eventually. Baimao nü is still occasionally performed, but it is uncertain if yangge performances still occur. It is possible that they take place currently as folk performances in northern China.

Colin MACKERRAS

Further Reading
Yangshao Culture

Well known for its painted red pottery and the high status it afforded its women, the Yangshao culture is one of the best known in Chinese history. Scholars have drawn many conclusions about this Neolithic culture based on remains found at archaeological excavations and Yangshao sites, although unanswered questions and theories remain.

The Yangshao culture, dated from about 5000 to 3000 BCE, is one of the best known Chinese Neolithic (8000–5500 BCE) cultures. It is named after the Yangshao village on the southern bank of the Huang (Yellow) River in Mianchi County, Henan Province. Discovered in 1920 by local farmers, the Yangshao site was excavated a year later by Swedish geologist Johan G. Andersson (1874–1960). The relative date of the Yangshao culture was established in 1931 when Chinese archaeologist Liang Siyong (1904–1954) identified material remains of Yangshao, Longshan, and Shang cultures in three successive layers of strata at the Hougang site in Anyang, Henan. This discovery proved that the Yangshao culture is a Neolithic culture and that it predated the Longshan and Shang cultures.

Yangshao Excavation Sites

Chinese archaeologists have found more than two thousand sites of the Yangshao culture, many of which have been excavated, presenting a comprehensive picture of this society. Experts think that the Yangshao culture developed from several of the Neolithic cultures in north China, including Peiligang, Cishan, Laoguantai, and
Lijiacun. Centered at three major tributaries of the Huang River (the Wei, Fen, and Luo rivers in the middle Huang River basin), the Yangshao culture expanded to the areas far beyond the reaches of its ancestral cultures. It reached Gansu and Qinghai provinces in the west, the area along the Great Wall in the northwest, and the northwestern part of Hubei Province in the south.

Material remains from Yangshao sites across several regions demonstrate great variations, challenging scholars to develop better approaches to characterize the temporal and spatial differences of the Yangshao culture. Scholars have proposed several theories to establish different regional types and phases of the Yangshao culture. The most widely accepted theory defines the Yangshao culture in Shaanxi, Henan, and Hebei provinces as seven distinctive regional types: Banpo, Miaodigou, Xiwangcun, Wangwan, Dahecun, Hougang, and Dasikongcun.

The Yangshao people lived in sedentary communities consisting of semisubterranean and above-ground houses built of wood and earth. The Yangshao society engaged in a millet-based agricultural economy, supplemented by hunting, gathering, and fishing. Pigs, dogs, and sheep were domesticated. Tools for economic activities were mostly polished stone axes, adzes, and knives, accompanied by a small number of bone arrowheads, fish forks, needles, and chisels.

**Burial Grounds**

Our understanding of the Yangshao culture also comes from its burials. In general, adults were buried in a community cemetery of the village near the residential area. The burial sites are mostly rectangular earthen pits containing no coffin. Single adult burials were common; composite burials of individuals of both males and females at different ages were also widely seen. Popular burial goods include painted pottery such as bo bowls, guan pots, pan basins, and other personal ornaments. Children were treated differently in burial. They were buried in ceramic urns, often near the house or in some cases in the community cemetery.

**Painted Red Pottery**

The Yangshao culture was best known for its painted red pottery featuring black geometric motifs. The pottery was handmade. The most popular objects were red and brown guan pots, pen basins, bo bowls, and small-mouthed, pointed-based vases with painted motifs. The vessel was shaped first and then painted before it was sent to the kiln for firing. Black designs on red pots were the most characteristic of the Yangshao painted pottery. Nevertheless, red motifs against white coating on red pottery are seen as well. The most intriguing designs on the painted vessels are those featuring fish, frogs, and human faces symmetrically displayed on the interior of the painted basin. Some basins were used as covers for children’s urn burials, implying that the motif might have some religious or social meanings. Some scholars hypothesize that distinctive marks found on the rim of some vessels are the precursors of Chinese writing.

**Society and Community**

The Yangshao society has long been regarded as an equalitarian matrilineal society in which females generally enjoyed a high social status and played significant roles in economic and political arenas. But an increasing number of scholars recently suggest that during the late period of the Yangshao culture the society was much more complex and can be defined as a patriarchal society in which males had dominant economic and political power.

Settlements at Banpo in the city of Xi’an and at Jiangzhai in the city of Lintong provide us the best insight into early Yangshao society. The Banpo site, mainly occupied between 4800 BCE and 4300 BCE, covered an area of about 30,000 square meters, which was further surrounded by trenches of 6 to 8 meters wide and 5 to 6 meters deep. Forty-six houses, mostly circular with a diameter of 4 to 6 meters, were found in two residential areas where storage pits, animal pens, and children’s burial sites were also scattered. In each residential area was a large house likely to be occupied by clan leaders and used for community activities. The largest house at Banpo covered an area of about 160 square meters. Remains of six pottery kilns were located east of the residential area. A cemetery of 174 burials, mostly individual adults, was located north of the residential area.

The Jiangzhai site was 15 kilometers east of the Banpo site. It provides another good example of detailed layout of a Yangshao village. The village consisted of three components: residential area, cemetery, and kilns. The residential area, dated from 4600 to 4400 BCE by calibrated
radiocarbon-14 analysis, covered an area of 50,000 square meters. It was surrounded by trenches on the east, north, and south and protected by a natural river on the southwest. A plaza situated at the center of the residential area was encircled by one hundred houses organized in five groups. Headed by a large house, each group was comprised of ten to twenty houses with their doors oriented to the central plaza. The layout of the houses at Jiangzhai indicated that several clans or families might inhabit the site. Like those at Banpo, the houses at Jiangzhai featured wattle-and-daub walls and thatched roof.

**Walled Settlement**

A settlement enclosed by walls appeared in a late phase of the Yangshao culture (3300–2800 BCE) at the Xishan site in Zhengzhou, Henan Province. The Xishan site covers 100,000 square meters, with a walled settlement in the northwestern section of the site. The layout of the walled settlement is roughly circular in shape, measuring 180 meters in diameter and 345,000 square meters in area. The walls, surrounded by a moat with a maximum width of 11 meters, were built with advanced banzhu technique, in which earth was pounded between wooden boards. Archaeological excavations have revealed lower sections of the western and northern gates of the settlement. The northern gate was furnished with two triangular platforms, possibly watchtowers, and a protecting wall outside the entrance. The appearance of a sophisticated defensive facility in the city, together with the increasing stratification of the burial treatment and the transition of the settlement patterns, indicates the increasing complexity of the late Yangshao society, which forecasts the emergence of regional political power in north China.

_Yan SUN_

**Further Reading**


Yangzi (Chang) River

Cháng Jiāng 长江

The Yangzi (Chang) River is the third-longest river in the world at 6,276 kilometers and the longest river in Asia. It rises in the Kunlun mountain range on the border of Tibet and Qinghai Province and flows south until it empties into the East China Sea near Shanghai. The Yangzi derives its name from the ancient kingdom of Yang, which settled along its banks.

The Yangzi, known as the “Changjiang” (Long River) in Chinese, begins in the Kunlun Mountains and flows south through the high mountain valleys in Qinghai, Tibet, and Yunnan provinces before veering northeast at Shiigu. Thence the Yangzi flows through Sichuan Province before it enters the scenic Three Gorges region. Then it crosses central China through Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces before emptying into the East China Sea at Chongming Island, 16 kilometers north of Shanghai. The Yangzi, stretching the length of the country, has been the unofficial boundary line between north and south China. In fact, no bridge was built over the eastern stretch of the river until 1969, when the Changjiang Daqiao Bridge was constructed at Nanjing.

The Yangzi has been prominent in the development of trade and culture throughout China’s history. As far back as the Neolithic period (8000–5500 BCE), settlements existed along the lower Yangzi. Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) founder Qin Shi Huangdi constructed canals and waterways to facilitate trade from Yangzhou to Guangzhou, a distance of 1,931 kilometers. Since that time the Yangzi has been the main transportation route across central China as it flows through many of the nation's industrial and economic centers. Since the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) the Yangzi River delta has become a center for cultivating and shipping rice.

Almost 2,900 kilometers of the Yangzi is navigable all year. In the early 1990s the Yangzi and its major tributaries drained an area of 1.8 million square kilometers—one-quarter of China’s cultivated land—in which 386 million people lived. Its network of rivers and canals carries 85 percent of China’s domestic waterborne traffic and passes through many of its major cities, including Kunmin, Chongqing, Wuhan, Chengdu, Shanghai, and Nanjing. The gross value of industrial products of the areas along the Yangzi is about 40 percent of China’s total.

Given its potential as an inexhaustible hydroelectric resource, the Chinese government began construction of the Three Gorges Dam in 1985 and completed it on 8 October 2008. Located in the Xilingxia gorge near Sandouping, Yichang, Hubei, the Three Gorges Dam is the largest hydroelectric power station in the world and is expected to help control the annual flooding of the Yangzi River valley. When fully operational the dam is expected to generate 22,500 megawatts of electricity that will provide 10 percent of electricity consumption in China.

The project is not without controversy. Construction of the Three Gorges Dam has displaced over 1.2 million
people, uprooted numerous villages and towns the length of the reservoir as well as flooded over important archaeological and historical sites. In addition, the project has been plagued by corruption, spiraling costs, technological problems, human rights violations and resettlement difficulties.

Keith LEITICH

Further Reading
The Yangzi (Chang) River Bridge at Nanjing is comprised of a 6.7-kilometer train deck topped by a 4.5-kilometer car deck. The bridge, completed in 1968, was a massive feat of engineering and the first to be built entirely by the Chinese; it has been a crucial element of north–south transportation as well as a source of national pride ever since.

Over the past two decades, engineers throughout the world have heralded China’s construction of daringly innovative bridges that seem to defy engineering principles. Old China hands recall the pride that accompanied the completion in 1968 of the first bridge to span the Yangzi (Chang) River at Nanjing. Not only had Western engineers doubted that a major bridge could span the river at this location, many believed that China was not capable of designing any large-scale bridge without the assistance of foreign engineers. In the 1950s, preliminary design efforts were carried out with the assistance of Soviet engineers to build a monumental bridge at Nanjing, but it appeared that the sudden withdrawal of Soviet technical experts in 1960 following the Sino-Soviet rift would abort any possibility of building such a bridge. Instead, Chinese engineers worked feverishly to overcome this perceived lack of confidence by reconceptualizing the project. Completed at the end of 1968, the Yangzi River Bridge at Nanjing became the first highway and railway bridge designed and constructed by the Chinese without outside engineering assistance. Until the completion of this bridge, it was necessary for trains and trucks to be ferried across the river, requiring some two hours of time and effort.

Among the challenges in building a bridge at this site were the fact that the bedrock in the river was some 72 meters below the surface and the river banks were low. High piers were necessary to lift the decks of the bridge so as not to impede boat traffic along China’s principal artery of water-borne transport. Although the river itself is only 1.5 kilometers wide in this area, the long and gradual approaches necessary for rail traffic along two lines necessitated a 6.7-kilometer structure, while the four-lane highway portion needed a 4.5-kilometers span. Nine piers embedded in the river’s channel support eighteen steel trusses, each of which is 160 meters long.

For more than forty years the bridge has been an important destination for tourists visiting Nanjing. At the base of the southern approaches is an extensive park with access via elevators to a high observation platform. Constructed during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the bridge was adorned with the slogans of Chairman Mao in his own calligraphy as well as oversized statues and relief carvings of peasants, workers, and soldiers. Mao Yisheng, one of China’s most prominent first-generation structural engineers and designer of bridges, stated that the building of the “Great Bridge... tested and advanced the skill of Chinese bridge builders, and stimulated the growth
of many industries connected with bridge building, including steel, cement, structural parts, and construction machinery.” Today, some fifty bridges span the Yangzi, but none symbolize the independence of spirit and accomplishment as clearly or as much as the Yangzi River Bridge at Nanjing.

Ronald G. KNAPP

Further Reading
Yangzi Delta Economic Region

The Yangzi Delta Economic Region has the largest regional economy in China as measured in gross regional product. The area also is the most attractive location for both domestic and international investment.

The Yangzi Delta Economic Region (YDER) is located in the central part of the east coast of China. It covers an area of 109,654.2 square kilometers, only 1.14 percent of China’s total area, and has a population of 83.24 million, which accounts for only 6.33 percent of China’s total population. It also contains sixteen major cities, which include one provincial-level municipality (Shanghai), three subprovincial-level cities (Nanjing in Jiangsu Province and Hangzhou and Ningbo in Zhejiang Province), and twelve prefecture-level cities (Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Nantong, Yangzhou, and Taizhou in Jiangsu Province and Jiaxing, Huzhou, Shaoxing, Zhumadian, and Taizhou in Zhejiang Province).

History of the Delta

The Yangzi (Chang) River delta is the triangular alluvial tract at the mouth of the river, enclosed or traversed by its diverging branches. It is the biggest river delta in China. Humans moved there in two large-scale migrations to hunt and farm after the delta was formed. The first migration occurred during the South and North Dynasties (220–589 CE), and the second one occurred during the Song dynasty (960–1279). The migrants built irrigation systems (from the tenth century onward) and vibrant cities and developed local industries. The Yangzi delta became the main cultural and economic center of China and enjoyed the reputation of being a “land flowing with milk and honey.” The key cities of the region in premodern times included Suzhou, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Shaoxing. The silk manufacturing industry in this region, especially in Suzhou, became famous during the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song dynasties. Suzhou silk even made its way to Rome along the Silk Roads.

Shanghai is located near the point where the Yangzi River flows into the East China Sea. It is one of the top three seaports in the world now, the largest city in China, and the starting point of modern Chinese industry. Shanghai began to become the hub of the Yangzi delta region and even the economic center of the whole of China gradually after 1842, when China was forced to open Shanghai to British trade and residence. Many Chinese “firsts” occurred in Shanghai, such as the first textile factory, the first flour mill, the first medicine factory, and the first electric fan factory. By the 1930s Shanghai had become the center of all economic activity in Asia and the financial center of Asia, as Hong Kong later became.

After establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the country finally was able to stop wars on its own territory. China’s economy recovered and developed step by step, although China was still isolated from the Western world and suffered internal political troubles from time to time. Shanghai’s average GRP (gross
regional product) growth rate from 1952 to 1978 was 10.17 percent, higher than the country’s GDP (gross domestic product) growth level, which was 6.68 percent during the period. However, the growth rate of both Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces was lower than China’s average at 6.08 percent and 5.48 percent, respectively. The total GRP created by Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang was RMB65.68 billion (at current prices) in 1978, accounting for 17.82 percent of China’s total GDP in that year. And as the economic center of China, Shanghai had a GRP of RMB27.28 billion in 1978, accounting for 7.48 percent of China’s total GDP. The preceding figures reveal the delta’s, and especially Shanghai’s, significant position in China’s economy before China’s economic reform was launched in 1979.

The Pearl River delta in the southeast part of China was the most dazzling star in China in the 1980s. Benefiting from its superior geographic position (adjoining Hong Kong) and its reform and open policy, the Pearl River delta region achieved dramatic economic growth during the period and attracted the attention of the whole world. Capital and managerial experts moved into the Pearl River delta and made this region a famous business area. The average GRP growth rate of Fujian and Guangdong provinces from 1979 to 1990 was 11.61 percent and 12.83 percent, respectively, obviously higher than the country’s GDP growth level of 9.08 percent during the period. The situation in the Yangzi River delta was different from that in the Pearl River delta during this decade. The non-state-owned sector, especially the township and village enterprises (TVEs) in the Yangzi delta region achieved rapid growth, but Shanghai’s performance was relatively slow. Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces grew faster than the whole country (at 11.14 percent and 11.87 percent, respectively), but Shanghai’s average GRP growth rate was only 7.49 percent from 1970 to 1990, only 58 percent of Guangdong’s growth level. And Shanghai’s GRP contribution to China’s total GDP dropped to 4.19 percent in 1990. Compared with its share of 7.48 percent in 1978, the figure reflects the relative decrease of Shanghai’s economic significance in China.

The Yangzi delta got its chance in the 1990s. With the deepening of China’s economic reform, the strategic emphasis of China’s economic development shifted, and the Yangzi delta region, especially Shanghai, became the focus again in the 1990s. After 1991, especially after the seminal visit of China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), to Shanghai in 1992, the provincial and municipal governments in the Yangzi delta began to implement far-researching reforms, and the result has been economic growth rates higher than those of other major Chinese cities as well as of most Asian “tiger” economies since 1992. Statistics show that the average annual GDP growth rate was 10.13 percent for the whole of China from 1991 to 2006, but the rate for Shanghai was 12.03 percent, the rate for Zhejiang was 14.18 percent, and the rate for Jiangsu was 13.61 percent, more than two times the growth of the four tigers (Hong Kong 6.8 percent, Taiwan 4.9 percent, Korea 4.2 percent, and Singapore 7.9 percent) during this period.

Establishment of the Economic Region

To promote economic collaboration among the cities in the Yangzi River delta and to facilitate sustainable development of the region, the Fourteen Cities Collaboration Office Director Conference was launched in 1992, including the cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Nantong, Yangzhou, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Shaoxing, and Zhoushan. After negotiation among the municipal governments of these fourteen cities and Taizhou, a new prefecture-level city in Zhejiang Province, another prefecture-level city, Taizhou, a new prefecture-level city in Jiangsu Province, a new regional economic institution, the Coordinating Committee of Yangzi Delta Urban Economies, was set up in 1997. Members agreed that the standing committee chairman would come from Shanghai and that the executive committee chairman would come from one of the other fifteen cities (in turn). A formal session among the members is held every two years, and a standing office is set up in Shanghai as the liaison office to deal with day-to-day administration. During the fourth session of the committee, which was held in Nanjing in 2003, another prefecture-level city, Taizhou in Zhejiang Province, was accepted as a member of the committee. At the fifth session, which was held in Shanghai in 2004, members decided that a formal session would be held every year. Hence, clearly economic collaboration in the delta is seen as important to the region’s growth,
and the cities’ leaders are working to manage economic development together.

**Economic Importance in China**

The YDER is already the largest regional economy in China as measured in GRP. It and the Pearl River delta (PRD) and the Bohai-Rim Economic Circle (BREC) are China’s three major industrial belts. In 2006 the YDER’s GRP increased to RMB3,952.57 billion (about $503 billion), accounting for 18.88 percent of China’s total GDP and equal to 57.27 percent of South Korea’s GDP and more than four times the Philippines’ GDP.

The per capita GRP in China in 2006 was RMB16,165. All sixteen cities in the YDER surpassed that figure. Shanghai kept its top position among China’s thirty-one provinces (and provincial-level municipalities), and Zhejiang and Jiangsu ranked fourth and fifth. Among the sixteen cities in the YDER, two had a per capita GRP of more than RMB70,000, more than four times the country’s average.

The YDER is the most attractive location for both domestic and international investment, and Shanghai has regained its reputation as the most important international municipality in Asia. The YDER accounts for 16.83 percent of China’s total investment in fixed assets (seven of them more than RMB100 billion individually) and 47.17 percent of China’s total amount of foreign capital actually used (actually used foreign capital is the amount that is definitely invested in contrast to the amount that was promised to be invested). Its contribution to China’s total imports and exports was 35.55 percent in 2006. By the end of 2006, Shanghai had signed foreign direct investment contracts with foreign business people from 127 countries and regions, and the number of contracts reached 4,450,000 with a contracted value of $114.54 billion. More than 150 multinationals have set up their regional head offices in Shanghai, and there are 150 international investment companies and 196 foreign research and development centers. Shanghai is expected to have more multinational regional head offices than Hong Kong by 2010.

The YDER also has become an important international integrated circuits manufacturing base. China’s total microcomputer output was 93.36 million units in 2006. Out of every 1,000, about 742 came from Suzhou or Shanghai. In integrated circuits the YDER’s output accounted for 62.26 percent of China’s total, and most of them were made in Shanghai and Wuxi, accounting for 39.33 percent of China’s total output.

The automobile industry is another rising industry in the YDER. Eleven cities of the YDER have been involved in motor vehicle manufacturing and contributed 13.75 percent of China’s total output in 2006. The YDER is also famous for its electronics industry. Of China’s home washing machines, 61.42 percent were made in the YDER in 2006, and Ningbo’s contribution to China’s total output was more than 31.4 percent in that year.

Rapid economic growth has brought local people better lives. The average annual disposable income per capita of urban households in YDER in 2006 was RMB17,208 (about US$2,051), 46.34 percent higher than the country’s average level (RMB11,759).

**Reasons for Growth**

The largest contributor to the rapid GRP growth in the YDER has been the GRPS (gross regional product from secondary industry). In 2006’s GRP 3.7 percent came from primary industry, 55 percent from secondary industry, and 41.3 percent from tertiary industry. From 1990 to 2006 the average annual growth rate of industry value-added was 15.15 percent in the YDER. During the same period the average annual growth rate of its GRP was 13.48 percent.

Now the driving force for the YDER’s economic growth is shifting from traditional processing industries to modern manufacturing and service industries. The share of information technology increased from 4.5 percent in 1990 to 13.6 percent in 2005, and the share of the textile industry decreased from 20.1 percent to 8.8 percent during the same period. The tertiary industry’s share in the GRP of Shanghai is more than 50 percent. In the other fifteen cities service industries are growing rapidly, although the share in GRP is still less than 50 percent. The YDER is upgrading from a huge processing workshop of the world to one of the most important international manufacturing bases.

The economic growth in the YDER, however, has been highly dependent on the rapid growth of investment, both
domestic and international, in the area. Because of the limitation of land and other natural resources and industry duplication in many cities, this kind of growth is hard to sustain, and the increase in industry value-added and the domestic and international investment in the YDER have been going down in recent years.

The Future

In 2010 Shanghai will hold the World Exposition. The exposition will be a great chance not only for Shanghai but also the whole of the YDER. The exposition will benefit all the cities in the region as well and bring them into closer collaboration. Finally, with the improvement in the regional transportation system, the YDER is becoming a three-hour economic circle (it takes less than three hours to complete any travel from one city to another within the YDER), and more products bearing the “Made in China” label will go to the rest of the world from there.

SHU Ping

Further Reading

The Yao are ethnic Chinese living mainly in high mountain valleys of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of south China. Although the Yao are linguistically diverse and have a rich oral literary tradition, they had no formal written language until 1982. Yao today are known as expert weavers, dyers, and singers, and their population has doubled since 1949.

The Yao, an ethnic group numbering nearly 3 million in the 2000 Chinese census, live in humid, subtropical, densely wooded mountain valleys 1,000–2,000 meters high in south China. Historically these people were known by at least thirty names, but the name “Yao” was adopted after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Seventy percent of the Yao people live in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and the rest in seven autonomous counties and more than two hundred small autonomous townships established from 1952 to 1963 in the provinces of Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou, and Jiangxi. Another 470,000 Yao live in northern Vietnam.

The Yao spoken language traditionally is categorized as a subgroup of the Sino-Tibetan language family and is similar to the Miao language, although some Western linguists put it into its own new family. Some Yao people speak only Miao or Dong. The Yao have so much linguistic diversity that Yao from different areas cannot easily communicate with each other. Until recently they had no written language but kept records by making notches on wood or bamboo slips. However, a subgroup of twenty thousand Yao women in southern Hunan Province developed a unique system of writing based on rhomboid characters called “Nv Shu” (ant writing). In 1982 a universal writing system based on the Latin alphabet was created for the Yao people by the Guangxi Nationality Institute, approved by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and now is used extensively.

During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) the Yao, called “Wuling” or “Wuxi” in Chinese histories, wove tree bark fabrics, lived around Changsha (today’s capital of Hunan Province), and began their migrations south into Vietnam and Thailand. Yao agriculture and distinctive handicrafts, such as iron knives and indigo-dyed cloth with delicate designs made in beeswax, developed during the Song dynasty (960–1279). Yao have been celebrated in history for their independent militancy. From 1316 to 1331 they participated in forty uprisings in the late Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). They revolted for one century against the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and participated in the Taiping Rebellion in the second half of the 1800s during the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Their communities were a base area for the Seventh Red Army commanded by politician Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) in the 1930s during the Chinese civil war.

Today the Yao live in groups of ten to seventy households, ruled by hereditary headmen, in rectangular, reed thatch, peak-roofed huts. Usually the huts consist of three rooms, but some hillside houses are two-storied with the lower floor used to stable animals. The diverse Yao groups practice three types of mixed economies: hillside, irrigated agriculture and forestry; forestry-based hunting and gathering; and slash-and-burn agriculture based on
The Yao are noted for elaborately decorated turbans. Photo by Paul and Bernice Noll.

communes of twenty families or fewer. In all economies hunting of boars, bears, and monkeys is important. The Yao are famous for “singing while digging” during spring planting when a young man in the fields beats a drum and leads the workers in song. Staple crops are rice, corn, sweet potatoes, and taro, usually prepared stewed or roasted. Homemade sweet wine, teas flavored with ginger or cassia, and tobacco products are popular. Among well-known Yao foods are an oily tea with tea leaves fried and boiled into a thick salty soup mixed with puffed rice or soybeans, pickled birds, insect pupae, and bacon meats. They eat many fresh fruits and dried or pickled vegetables such as pumpkins and peppers.

The Yao people’s traditional religion included nature and ancestor worship and belief in Panhu, the dog tribal totem. Many of their sacrificial ceremonies are based on medieval Chinese Daoism. Some Yao converted to Buddhism and later Christianity. They are expert weavers, dyers, and embroiderers. Clothes of the Yao differ according to region but are mainly made of dyed blue or black cloth with various brocaded geometric and stylized animal and plant designs on the sleeve cuffs and trouser legs. Men curl their hair into a bun wound with red or black cloth and decorated with long pheasant feathers. They wear collarless shirts, belted jackets, and either trousers wrapped at the ankle or knickers. Women wear highly embroidered trousers, short skirts, or pleated skirts with decorative silver jewelry and silver hair ornaments in their buns or chignons. Both sexes wear black or red scarves on their heads, sometimes wrapped into fantastic turbans. Headgear for boys and girls changes in style to signal the onset of adulthood. Boys undergo trials to mark passage into full manhood, such as walking on hot coals or bricks, jumping from a 3-meter-high tower, climbing a ladder of knives, and retrieving objects from hot oil.

The Yao have a rich oral literary tradition and are famous for their romantic and historical songs. They celebrate many festivals monthly and offer sacrifices, including those dedicated to their founding ancestor and to their grandmothers. They play bamboo flutes and sing and dance with drums. Certain gongs, suona horns, and long waist drums are unique to the Yao. Antiphonal singing is important in courtship rituals, and bridegrooms pay bride prices in silver bars. Couples choose their own partners but obtain their parents’ consent. The Yao still practice marriage by bride capture.

Since 1949 schools have been established in all villages, and small factories have been created for timber, cement, farm machinery, and chemical production. With the elimination of smallpox and cholera epidemics, the population of the Yao has doubled under the Chinese government.

Alicia CAMPI

Further Reading
YAO Ming

Yáo Míng 姚明

b. 1980  Professional basketball player

A member of the Chinese men’s national basketball team, former player on China’s Shanghai Sharks, and number one pick of the U.S. National Basketball Association draft in 2002, Yao Ming became a popular center on the Houston Rockets and China’s first professional superstar athlete with global recognition.

Yao Ming may be deemed China’s first crossover superstar athlete. Although Yao was not the first Chinese basketball player to play professionally in the United States, his recruitment into the National Basketball Association (NBA) was attended by far more fanfare than his predecessors’. Most fans have forgotten Wang Zhizhi and Menk Bateer, intermittent players on NBA teams from 2001 on, and the even less-known Zheng Haixia, who played for the Women’s National Basketball Association Los Angeles Sparks in 1997–1998.

Son of a basketball-playing couple and groomed for the sport in state-run schools for future athletes, Yao approached his prime as a player at an opportune time. China’s state-managed sports system was opening up to commercial forces, North American sports leagues were searching the world for athletic talent, and transnational corporations sought boundary-crossing spokespersons. Yao led his hometown team, the Shanghai Sharks, to the Chinese Basketball Association finals three years in a row, culminating in a championship in 2002. This helped position the 7-foot 6-inch center to be the Number 1 pick in the 2002 NBA player draft and to land lucrative corporate contracts worldwide.

Drafted by the Houston Rockets, Yao performed ably on the court and gained an enthusiastic following among American, Asian American, and expatriate Chinese fans. In his rookie year, he averaged 13.5 points and 8.2 rebounds per game and was among the top twenty in the league in...
blocks, rebounds, and field-goal percentage. With a new influx from Chinese balloting, fans voted him to the NBA All Star team his first three seasons, and the Rockets signed him to a five-year extension lasting through the 2010–2011 season.

An ideal fit with the NBA’s strategy of expanding international markets, Yao was called China’s most valuable export. His appeal to multiple, multigenerational, and multinational audiences generated lucrative commercial sponsorships, negotiated by business advisers who call themselves Team Yao. He has represented the likes of Apple, Visa, Adidas, Gatorade, Pepsi, and McDonald’s, and partnered with a California-based chain to open fitness clubs in China. He also lent his image to the Special Olympics, campaigns against SARS and HIV/AIDS, and other charitable causes. Yao ranked Number 6 on Forbes magazine’s 2007 list of top-earning non–U.S. athletes, with an estimated income of nearly $27.5 million.

Along with his celebrity and wealth, Yao has retained popularity and respect among compatriots as a representative of Chinese achievement abroad with enduring loyalties to his native country. His every move became an item for the Chinese media, from setbacks due to a broken foot to plans to marry his longtime girlfriend Ye Li, a former player with China’s national women’s basketball team. As a member of the Chinese national team, Yao reported for training and competitions between NBA seasons, including Olympics practice and attendance. He was the obvious choice as China’s final runner in the torch relay for the 2004 Athens Olympics and China’s flag bearer at those games. At the 2008 Beijing Olympics he ran through the Tiananmen Gate, the ninth of 433 torch bearers, and was a logical figure in promotions for the Games.

Judy POLUMBAUM

Further Reading

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**Approach heaven with a single stride.**

**一步登天**

**Yī bù dēng tiān**
The Yellow Sea (Huang Hai) is the overly exploited gulf that lies between China and Korea; it is known for its omnipresent fishing vessels and oil refineries. Its name comes from yellow silt deposited in its waters by the Huang (Yellow) River.

The Yellow Sea (Huang Hai), the shallow gulf between China and Korea, is 870 kilometers long from the south to the north and 556 kilometers wide from the east to the west and covers an area of 378,600 square kilometers. The northern part comprises the inlet of Bohai Bay in the northwest, which is almost enclosed by the Liaodong Peninsula in the northeast and the Shandong Peninsula in south, and the Korea Bay in the northeast. The southern part of the Yellow Sea borders on the Shandong Peninsula in the north and the Chinese mainland in the west and meets the East China Sea where the Yangzi (Chang) River flows into the sea. In the east, it borders on Korea and the Korea Strait. The Yellow Sea, which has received its name from the yellowish silt deposited mainly by the Huang (Yellow) River, has a warm temperate climate. With an average depth of about forty meters, it is one of China’s best fishing grounds.

The Battle of the Yellow Sea

The Battle of the Yellow Sea, which took place on 10 August 1904, is considered a critical moment of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.

The Battle of the Yellow Sea was the closest and, except for Tsushima, the most decisive naval engagement of the war. Encountering [Russian Admiral] Vitgeft’s squadron in the early afternoon, [Japanese Admiral] Togo’s first moves were designed to put himself between it and Port Arthur, so as to prevent its return and force a major fleet action. However when it had become clear that the Russians had no intention of going back but were making for Vladivostok, Togo was so far behind the Russian fleet that he had to waste hours in detouring around Vitgeft’s weaker vessels so as to catch up with the battleships at the head of the Russian line. It was 1743 hrs when he opened fire on the leading Russian ships. From then until dusk Togo’s First Division and the six Russian battleships banged away at each other on almost even terms, with Mikasa and Tsarevich sharing the brunt of the punishment.

Peninsula in Liaoning Province. Bohai Bay in the northwest has been the traditional location for salt works. Large offshore petroleum deposits have been discovered there, and a number of oil refineries have been set up.

Bent Nielsen

Further Reading


Yen, Y. C. James
James Yen led the Mass Education Movement (MEM) of the May Fourth period, which coordinated local basic literacy programs for an estimated five million people. The MEM then moved to the countryside in 1926 to develop the “Ding Xian Experiment,” a program of economic, political, social, and cultural village reforms that sought to pose a non-Communist alternative to revolution.

C. James Yen (Yan Yangchu 晏阳初), known to his many U.S. friends as “Jimmy,” represented a patriotic Chinese liberalism that pragmatically addressed mass education and rural reconstruction. Born in the mountains of Sichuan, the young Yen was sent to mission schools, where he became, in his later words, not a “Christian” (implying membership in a foreign institution) but rather “a follower of Christ.” After studying at Hong Kong University Yen graduated in 1918 from Yale University and worked under the International YMCA with the Chinese Labor Corps in France; he wrote a widely copied literacy primer that used one thousand basic characters.

Yen returned to China in 1921 to head a national mass literacy campaign under the Chinese National YMCA and to marry Alice Huie, a U.S.-born Chinese with whom he had three sons and two daughters. He wrote that “China can never become a truly representative government if the greatest masses of the people are illiterate and ignorant…[or] expect to put a stop or check to the present prevailing corrupt and unscrupulous officialdom if there is not a public opinion formed to battle against it” (Hayford 1990). He adapted the publicity and organization techniques of the YMCA’s science education campaigns and, using non-professionalized teachers in neighborhood classes...
scheduled with the flexibility of the traditional village school, produced a campaign (yundong) model used in hundreds of localities that attracted more than 5 million students (Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong taught in a 1922 campaign). In 1923 Yen and leading intellectuals formed the National Association of Mass Education Movements (MEM).

For the illiterates who lived in villages, illiteracy was not their fundamental problem. In 1926 the MEM set up a village campaign in Ding Xian 定縣河北, a county some 321 kilometers south of Beijing. Rejecting the radical approach, Yen saw “farmers” in need of education and support, not “peasants” in need of class war. In 1928 Yen received an honorary graduate degree from Yale, raised a substantial endowment in the United States, and then enlisted socially conscious specialists to develop the Four Fold Program in rural reconstruction. The Ting Hsien (Ding Xian) Experiment, a kind of commune based on family farming, sponsored People’s Schools, coordinated innovations ranging from breeding hybrid pigs to setting up economic cooperatives, and incorporated existing aspects of village life, like industry and the expertise of local health workers, to further benefit its residents.

By 1931 these successes excited nationwide public and government interest. Yen joined Liang Shuming and other independent reformers to form the National Rural Reconstruction Movement 鄉村建設運動 (Xiangcun jianshe yundong) comprising hundreds of organizations. The 1937 Japanese invasion drove MEM operations first to Hunan, then to Sichuan, but Yen spent much of the war in Washington, D.C. After 1945 Yen found himself increasingly at odds with the Nationalist (Guomindang) government’s military preoccupation; in 1948 he persuaded the U.S. Congress to fund the independent Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, of which he became one of the commissioners. After 1949 Yen led the Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement and founded the International Rural Reconstruction Movement, which he headed until his death in New York City in the autumn of 1990.

Charles W. HAYFORD

Further Reading
As a minority nationality living in mountainous southwest China and with rich history and distinctive culture and language, the Yi people in modern times have abolished slavery and made progress in agricultural economy, education, health care, and social development.

The Yi people live in southwest China, in the mountainous regions of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces. With 7,762,286 people (2000 census), the Yi are the fourth-largest minority nationality in China. Yi groups in various areas described themselves with a variety of names until the 1950s, when the Chinese government redefined all Yi groups under one common name, the Yi.

**History**

Scholars have different views about the origins of the Yi. Some believe that the Yi originated from the ancient nomadic Qiang peoples who had lived in northwest China. Others argue that the Yi people developed from the original inhabitants of Yunnan, as early as 10,000 years ago.
In either case scholars agree that starting from the early second millennium BCE, the people in central Yunnan, whether they were the original inhabitants or Qiang immigrants, migrated out of their homeland and mixed with the Han Chinese (the ethnic Chinese majority) and other minority groups. As a result the Yi are a mixed group with diverse origins.

Their migration extended along the watersheds of the six rivers in the Sichuan-Yunnan region and the Yunnan-Guizhou plateau and divided the Yi into six branches. These six branches are the origins of the six branches of the modern Yi nationality: Southern Nisu Yi, Southeastern Sani Yi, Eastern Nasu Yi, Northern Nuosu Yi, Central Yi, and Western Yi. According to a Yi legend, the Yi people originated from an ancient ceremony of tribal division, the division of six ancestors (liu zu).

During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the ethnic minority peoples inhabiting the mountainous border region of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou were first referred to as yi (barbarians) in Chinese records. The Yi people were part of this group. The Han government established an administrative prefecture in the region and appointed a Yi chief to rule the region with the title King of Dian. During and after this time, large clans emerged in the Yi tribes. A caste system, which not only established various social statuses in the Yi communities but also defined a large number of common people as slaves, started to dominate Yi societies.

From the Sui (581–618 CE) to the Song dynasty (960–1279), the Yi people were generally referred to in the Chinese records as wuman (black barbarians) and baiman (white barbarians). While the former exclusively designated the Yi groups in central Yunnan, the latter referred to the minority groups inhabiting the border region of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou, including some of the Yi tribes. During these centuries two independent kingdoms, Nanzhao (739–902 CE) and Dali (902–1253), ruled Yunnan, organized by the Yi and other minority peoples. Under the reign of these authorities, a distinct Yi culture—including music, dance, ancestral worship, and architectural, culinary, and clothing styles—developed from Yi tribal traditions and from contact with the cultures of neighboring groups.

The Mongols invaded southern China in 1253 and destroyed the Dali kingdom. After conquering the region, the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) extended its administration to the Yi areas through a system of tuji (local chiefs). By pledging loyalty to the central government, the Yi local chiefs were allowed to govern their realms. During the Mongol period, the Yi people were referred to as luoluo (barbarians). Malaria and other epidemic diseases spread to the Yi areas and led to a loss of population and a setback to Yi socioeconomic development.

To consolidate its political control of Yunnan, the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in the late fifteenth century decided to substitute for the tuji system a new policy whereby locals were replaced by Han Chinese officials. The process of replacing locals was not completed until the 1730s during the reign of the emperor Yongzheng of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), and in most areas the Yi chiefs were powerful enough to maintain their rule and
defy the penetration of the Chinese central government at least until the end of Republican China (1949).

The Modern Era

During the early period of the People’s Republic of China, the government made efforts to redefine Yi nationality. After bringing the six branches of the Yi peoples together, the government changed their name from the barbarian termyi to Yi, a different Chinese word, with connotations of respect. Beginning with the founding of the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in 1952, the government established a total of fifteen Yi independent prefectures and counties. Viewing the Yi as the only existing slave society in the world, the government implemented democratic reforms in the Yi areas between 1956 and 1958 and abolished slavery. Under the policy of the equality of all nationalities, the government trained many Yi cadres and extended its political administration into the Yi areas through these cadres. But the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought chaos to all the Yi communities. Traditional Yi customs and religion became the targets of political campaigns, and former local chiefs and priests were scorned or even prosecuted.

With the beginning of reform in 1979, the government reassured the Yi of their rights and privileges as a minority nationality and promoted their equality more in terms of economic development. Since then, the Yi communities have made progress in agricultural economy, education, and health care, and many of the Yi people have become modern workers employed in the tin and coal mines in Yunnan and Guizhou. Yi trade with the outside world has developed, and modern railroads, highways, and communications have been extended through the Yi areas. Despite these developments the Yi societies, disadvantaged by their geographic locations in remote mountains, are still poor in economic terms and are far behind the Han Chinese areas.

Culture

The Yi have a long and rich cultural history. Much traditional literature is written in the distinctive script used for the old Yi language. Folk tales, epics, and songs have also been passed down orally. Yi traditional medicine has a rich variety of resources—such as baiyao, a white medical powder for treating hemorrhage, wounds, bruises, and similar ailments—which are widely used by all Chinese. Yi religion, based on ancestor worship and a belief in many gods, has been revived in recent years after its practices were prohibited in the 1960s and 1970s.

Yi people speak the Yi language, a linguistic branch of the Chinese-Tibetan language family, which has six sets of major dialects and many more local dialects that are not always mutually intelligible. One million members of the Yi nationality do not speak the Yi language at all. In 1975 the Chinese government attempted to formalize a unified Yi language by defining 819 standard Yi words, but the effort has not been as successful as hoped, as isolation and language barriers have prevented the Yi from establishing a commonly shared ethnic identity. The development of their independent power and the modernization of their economy and society await the future.

Yixin CHEN

Further Reading

Yin and Yang

Yin-Yáng 阴阳

Representing the Chinese philosophy of duality, yin and yang have a deeply rooted history in China. Developing into the School of Yin and Yang, thinkers of this concept seek to define the relationship between human and natural phenomena.

Probably no aspect of Chinese philosophy is more widely recognized in the West than the concept of yin and yang. People rightly see the two terms yin and yang as symbolic of the dualistic nature of the phenomenal world, but some incorrectly see this duality as hostile, like the moral opposition between good and evil. In the Chinese conception duality is complementary, not conflicting. Furthermore, the categories are not static but rather dynamic. Although yang may eventually overcome yin, at the point of triumph its power will immediately begin to wane. The alternation of yin and yang is thus the most indicative quality of this philosophical concept.

One of the earliest textual references to the two terms in the Chinese tradition occurs in a poem from the Book of Songs that recounts the founding of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). This excerpt shows the venerable ancestor surveying the realm:

Blessed was Chief Liu.
He measured the breadth and length of the land;
He measured the shadow and noted the hills,
Observing the sunshine (yang) and shade (yin).
(Mao Shi no. 250; Legge 1861, 487)

Chief Liu was measuring the shadow of the gnomon, or sundial, to determine the cardinal directions. Yang hillsides (the south slopes) and river banks (the north sides) were appropriate for human habitation because houses built there would receive the most sunshine during the winter.

Yin and Yang in Ancient Cosmology

By the time the two terms reappeared in the textual tradition, they had acquired cosmological connotations (associations relating to a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe). In the Zuo Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (written c. fifth century BCE) a passage that mentions yin and yang concerns astrological prognostication. The failure of ice to appear at the beginning of the year was blamed on Jupiter (the Year Star), whose “licentious” (retrograde) movement caused “the yin not to cover the yang” (Legge 1861, 540). Normally, the annual dominance of yin would have allowed ice to form. But Jupiter’s licentious behavior (lodging in the inappropriate constellation) increased the influence of yang in the corresponding earthly realm.

During the mid-Warring States period (475–221 BCE) the function of yin and yang in literary contexts continued to have cosmological import, but now the terms were elevated to cosmogonic status (related to a theory of the origin of the universe). The opening to the poem “Heaven Questions” from the Songs of Chu describes how the world came about.
In the beginning of old,  
All is yet formless, no up or down.  
Dark and light are a blur,  
The only image is a whir.  
Bright gets brighter, dark gets darker,  
The yin couples with the yang—  
Then is the round pattern manifold.  
(Trans. S. Field, in Major 1993, 63)

The process being narrated here is birth and generation. The whirling image is inchoate matter, what might be called “chaos” in Western mythology. In cosmogonies appearing later in the Chinese tradition, such matter would be given the term qi. In this poem form and light spawn from the motion of embryonic qi as yin and yang materialize. At that point they couple and generate roundness, the shape of the phenomenal world.

In the mid-second century BCE, when the philosophical treatise Huainanzi was compiled, the sexual connotations surrounding the cosmological terms became even more overt: “When yin and yang gather together their interaction produces thunder. Aroused, they produce lightning” (Major 1993, 65). In the mythical version of this passage, instead of abstract yin and yang interacting in a vacuum the coupling of two dragons is visualized, one male and one female, who leave their winter refuge, mount up to heaven, and cause the spring rains to fall. The Huainanzi version may simply be the philosophical refinement of vestiges of folk tradition that had always recognized in nature the same sexual groupings that govern society. Scholars therefore speculate that the original impulse for positing a yin/yang duality in the cosmos may have been the spring mating ritual in ancient China. In that ceremony sexual communion among the young people of neighboring villages was the central rite, but that union subsequently guaranteed the fecundity of all of nature: The rains arrived, the rainbow appeared, seeds sprouted, and winter gave way to spring (Granet 1975, 46–50).

School of Yin and Yang

By the end of the Warring States period, at the time of the great flowering of Chinese philosophy, the School of Yin and Yang arose, led by the thinker Zou Yan (350–270 BCE). The Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) Records of the Grand Historian had this to say about Zou:

He examined deeply into the phenomena of the increase and decrease of yin and yang, and wrote essays totaling more than a hundred thousand words about their strange permutations. (Needham 1956, 232)

None of his works survives, but he is credited with proposing five categories of qi as a further elaboration of the original two forces of yin and yang. This is the concept of wuxing, or the “five elements” of wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. The “strange permutations” mentioned earlier are the so-called enumeration orders whereby the elements successively conquer (or produce) each other. Thus, earth dams water, water quenches fire, fire melts metal, metal cuts wood, and wood saps earth, and so forth. Such thinking, based as it was on the empirical observation of nature, was an early attempt at a scientific view of the world. Zou Yan and his followers subsequently built a correlative universe based on these categories and their orders. For example, when the five internal organs (spleen, lungs, heart, kidney, liver) are correlated with

The yin and yang symbol from Daoism, which represents a complementary, rather than a hostile, duality.
the five elements, wood governs the liver. When the five grains (rice, millet, barley, wheat, legumes) are correlated with the five elements, legumes belong to the element water. In the production order of the elements water nourishes wood, so a diet rich in soybeans can be beneficial to the liver.

In seeking proto-scientific correspondences between human and natural phenomena the thinkers of the School of Yin and Yang sought to control human civilization by aligning it with natural cycles and patterns. Their theories inspired great thinkers in the Han dynasty and continued to influence Chinese philosophy until the Song dynasty (960–1279). At that time the cosmology of Zou Yan was integrated with Confucian metaphysics by Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), who composed the treatise, “Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate.” That diagram, the taiji, is considered to be the precursor of the familiar circular symbol of yin and yang.

Stephen FIELD

Further Reading
The structures and artifacts excavated from Yinxu reveal much about the religion, social organization, and technology of the last phase of the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). The square architectural design of royal tombs reflects an image of the cosmos as having four corners, for example, and the number and quality of bronze vessels indicates an advanced technology and artistic vision.

The Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) was the second dynastic period of China (although some scholars consider the Xia dynasty [2100–1766 BCE] to be only legendary, thus making the Shang the first) and the first central power of East Asia. Yinxu, located near the modern city of Anyang in Henan Province, was the site of the last capital of the Shang dynasty (sometimes known as the Yin dynasty). Occupied from about 1300 to 1045 BCE, the city was abandoned right after the Zhou people conquered the Shang. Excavation of the Yin Ruins, ongoing since 1928, reveals that it was the greatest of the Bronze Age cultures of China.

The archaeological excavations have uncovered 300,000 square meters of this site, which measure about 6 kilometers from east to west and 5 kilometers from north to south. However, its original boundary has not been defined. Architectural remains, cemeteries, and workshops have been mapped, and thousands of ritual bronze artifacts, mostly vessels, along with jades, stones, carved bones, inscribed oracle bones, and a great amount of pottery have been found. These materials have informed modern onlookers about the social organization, belief system, religious practice, science and technology, artistic invention, life styles of the people, and natural environment of the time.

Discovery and Excavation

The early period of archaeological excavation, from 1928 to 1937, was led by archaeologists Li Chi, Liang Siyong, Dong Zuobin, Shi Zhangru, and Gao Quxun of the Institute of Philology and Histology, Central Academia Sinica. They performed fifteen excavations of around 46,000 square meters and discovered the core of this site: the temple-palace complex at Xiaotun village and the royal cemetery at Houjiazhuang, along with their respective oracle inscriptions and ritual bronzes.

Excavation was resumed in 1950, and the archaeological findings continue to update our knowledge of this civilization. In 1976, the first undisturbed royal tomb, the tomb of Lady Hao, was excavated. It contained more than one thousand ritual bronzes, some seven hundred jade artifacts, and five hundred bone artifacts. Lady Hao can be clearly identified as the third queen of King Wu Ding; about two hundred pieces of oracle inscriptions talk about her as a military commander, mother, and a wife. There were rare goods and tribute goods in her tombs, which came through long-distance trade or from other nations and groups.

The bronze castings of the ritual vessels indicate the advanced technology and social organization of Lady...
Hao’s time. From mining to casting of ores and artifacts, and from design to distribution and usage, no other nation or people at the time in East Asia or nearby regions reached such an advanced level in the making and use of bronze as the Yin/Shang.

Cosmology of the Shang

With the exception of the tomb of the Lady Hao, all the large royal tombs were looted in antiquity, but the architectural form revealed by the scale and design of the tombs discloses much about the image of the cosmos as conceived by the Shang people. The tombs of eleven of the royals were about 40 square meters each. More than one thousand human sacrificial pits were well arranged in rows next to these tombs. The ramps were not functional but rather were ritualistic in their construction and in their numbers; the number of ramps indicated the social and political rank of the royals buried there. All pits contained four corners that indicated the four directions of the square-shaped universe. The design of the tombs formed a three-dimensional image that some scholars believed was the Shang people’s image of the cosmos. These spatial arrangements are consistent with square-shaped universes with upper and lower worlds that have characterized Chinese belief throughout history.

Human Sacrifice

The way human bodies were treated in the royal tombs reveals the hierarchical nature of the Shang society: gods, king, elites, commoners, slaves, and captives, in that order, from top to bottom. A thousand human sacrificial pits in a neat pattern were located next to the royal tombs. Each pit contained a group of human remains; some had only bodies while their heads were in the royal tombs. Inside the royal tombs (e.g., in tomb HPKM1001), there were remains of more than 100 human sacrifices even after the looting of the tombs. Six lacquered coffins were buried in tomb HPKM1550. These sacrifices were consorts of the king and were elaborately decorated with jade, bone hairpins, and had ritual bronzes buried with them.

An entire army with foot soldiers and chariots was buried in the southwest area of the complex, displayed as in a battlefield with center with left and right wings. Individual human sacrificial pits and sites have been excavated as well. The oracle inscriptions record activities of offerings of human sacrifice, sometimes in great numbers. Most of the human victims were healthy and handsome young men.

The Shang’s ancestors enjoyed offerings along with the gods who decided all matters of the nation, from war to harvest, from giving birth to tooth pain. The living king was a medium between the supernatural and the living worlds, and he reigned above all.

Gender Roles

The choice of sacrificial victims in Yinxu shows that gender was a complicated issue in the Shang dynasty. Both elite and common women could be buried with weapons, and men could be buried with weaving tools or even make-up. Queen Lady Hao had led the Shang army and had conquered some nations. The elite females were in charge of important rituals such as preparing oracle materials, the ceremony of harvesting, and they joined in hunting expeditions. Yet the king had many consorts, and the queens had to wait their turn to receive their offerings in death after their husbands had passed on. Women and children were not used for sacrifices until the last fifty years of Yinxu, indicating that the choice of sacrificial gifts for the gods and the ancestors was a highly selective process in the Shang dynasty.

Perspectives on Shang Culture

The Yin Ruins disclose the nature of the Shang culture, which was one of the most advanced in East Asia. Its complicated social structure, sophisticated religion, innovative art, science, and technology present a level of civilization with well-developed ideology and thought and richness of material production. Yet the ruins also hint at a dictatorial and hierarchical system with strict social, political, economic, and even spiritual boundaries.

Further Reading

Keightley, D. N. (2000). The ancestral landscape: Time, space, and community in late Shang China, ca. 1200–1045


The Tomb of Lady Fu Hao, Yin ruins, China. PHOTO BY CHRIS GYFORD.

B.C. Berkeley: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies.

China changes constantly, and the Encyclopedia of China will change and grow, too. Berkshire’s authors and editors welcome questions, comments, and corrections: china.updates@berkshirepublishing.com.
Yin–Yang Theory

Yin–yang theory, embodying the most basic forces in nature, is an important component of Chinese philosophy, medicine, divination, and feng shui. It unites the Confucian emphasis on virtue with the Daoist emphasis on harmony with nature.

Yin–yang theory, originally referring to the shady and sunny parts of gorges and mountains, is integral to Chinese philosophy, medicine, divination, and geomancy (feng shui). The term came to embody the most basic forces in nature, such as male/female, night/day, and old/young.

First used in the fourteenth century BCE, yin–yang theory was able to unite the Confucian focus on virtue and the Daoist concern for living in harmony with nature within its naturalistic philosophy. The character yin referred to the shady, northern side of a mountain or the southern side of a gorge, and yang to the sunny, southern side of a mountain or the northern side of a gorge.

By the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) yin and yang were beginning to take on cosmological significance as two of the six forms of material force (qi), namely, shady-yin, sunny-yang, wind, rain, dark, and light. It was believed that success/health and disaster/illnesses are related to an excess or deficiency of shady-yin and sunny-yang. During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) yin and yang began to take on a more encompassing philosophical meaning as the most basic forces and, by extension, the most general categories for classifying all things in existence. The concepts yin and yang are used as philosophical categories in the naturalistic philosophies of the Daoist texts Laozi and Zhuangzi and the Confucian book Xunzi. As philosophical categories yin and yang are understood to be two opposing yet interconnected forces; they are not a duality. Yin contains yang, and yang contains yin. When one extreme is exhausted the other force comes into play. They are similar to the negative and positive charges in the electro-magnetic spectrum. The following list depicts some of the major correlations associated with them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yin</th>
<th>Yang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Heaven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night</td>
<td>Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small states</td>
<td>Large states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger</td>
<td>Elder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zou Yan (c. 305–240 BCE) was the founder of the yin–yang five-phases school. He associated yin and yang with the five phases (wuxing), namely, wood, fire, earth, metal, and water, creating a more dynamic explanation for the processes of change. Wood and fire are associated with yang; metal, earth, and water are yin. The five phases first appeared in the “Grand Norm” chapter of the Classic of Documents, a book comprising fifty-eight chapters with documents and records related to the ancient history of China. Rubin
Yin–Yang Theory

argues that Zou Yan transformed the static categories of the five phases into a dynamic and temporal system by connecting it to the undulating pulsations of yin and yang. Scholars debate whether Zou and his school should be classified as a naturalist philosophy or as diviners and geomancers. The yin–yang philosophy is closely related to both natural philosophy and divination because by being aware of the natural processes of change a person is in a better position to predict the future. The Annals of Lü Buwei (c. 240 BCE) contains the following passage that describes the application of the five phases theory in political philosophy.

When ever an emperor or king is about to arise, Heaven is certain to manifest good omens to the people below. At the time of the Yellow Emperor, Heaven first caused giant mole crickets and earthworms to appear. The Yellow Emperor announced, “The ethers of Earth are in ascendance.” Since the ethers of Earth were ascendant, he honored the color yellow and modeled his affairs on Earth. When it came to the time of Tang, Heaven first caused metal blades to appear coming froth from Water. Tang proclaimed, “The ethers of Metal are in ascendance.” Since the ethers of Metal were ascendant, he honored the color white and modeled his affairs on Metal. When it came to the time of King Wen, Heaven first caused a fiery-red crow to appear and alight on the altars of Zhou, holding in its beak a document written in cinnabar. King Wen proclaimed, “The ethers of Fire are in ascendance.” Since the ethers of Fire were ascendant, he honored the color vermilion and modeled his affairs on Fire. (modifying Knoblock & Riegel 2000, 283)

The preceding passage depicts the rise and fall of dynasties according to the conquest cycle of the five phases, in which water extinguishes fire, fire melts metal, metal cuts wood, wood breaks up earth, and earth obstructs water. A ruler could influence state affairs with this model by advocating that his form of government was aligned with the cosmic forces. For example, the state of Qin vanquished the house of Zhou in 256 BCE, but not until the unification of the empire, in 221 BCE, did the first emperor of Qin adopt the color black and model his affairs on water. He justified his rule by adopting the five phases theory. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) court officials continued to debate which one of the five phases was ascending and what color and emblem the state should institute as its model. If the natural cycles of yin, yang, and the five phases could be used to determine the rise and fall of states, then they should have application to all sorts of endeavors. During the Han dynasty yin–yang theory was used to explain natural phenomena, human activities, health, and wealth.

Besides the conquest cycle for the five phases, there is a cycle of generation in which earth grows wood, wood fuels fire, fire’s ash produces earth, earth produces metal, and metal precipitates water. During the early Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) the yin–yang and five phases were expanded into a comprehensive classification system such that everything was classified as being predominantly yin or yang and further linked to one of the five phases. This comprehensive approach paved the way for yin–yang theory to influence the practice of traditional Chinese medicine, divination, and geomancy. For example, the following chart links the phases to the five colors, directions, seasons, internal organs, and numbers.
The Five Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wood</th>
<th>Fire</th>
<th>Earth</th>
<th>Metal</th>
<th>Water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Late Summer</td>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Winter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liver</td>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>Spleen</td>
<td>Lungs</td>
<td>Kidneys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight</td>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>Five</td>
<td>Nine</td>
<td>Six</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the five phases also correlates with any number of natural phenomena. By understanding the relationships between the five phases and other natural phenomena and whether or not the generation or destruction cycle is at work, a person can predict what phenomena will arise next. The alleged diagnostic and predictive powers of the yin–yang five phases theory naturally influenced the practice of Chinese medicine and divination.

Medicine

Traditional Chinese medicine pays close attention to environmental influences on people's health. It has always been concerned about the influences of cold/heat, damp/dry climate, and light/dark on a person's health. By the beginning of the Han dynasty when yin–yang theory was taking shape, traditional Chinese medicine was being formalized. Yin–yang theory's influence on traditional Chinese medicine is seen in the early medical texts, namely, The Spiritual Pivot and The Yellow Emperor's Classic of Internal Medicine. All health-related phenomena are associated with yin, yang, and the five phases. At conception each individual is bestowed an allotment of prenatal-energy qi, composed of yin and yang. When yin, yang, and the five phases operate in harmony there is health. Illness develops when they are imbalanced. The physiology, pathology, diagnosis, and treatment of illness in Chinese medicine are described in terms of yin–yang theory. All symptoms and physiological processes are analyzed according to the yin–yang five phases theory. There are basically four treatment modalities: to tonify yin or yang and to eliminate excess yin or yang. Chinese medicine employs the dynamic transformations of yin and yang in accounting for the processes of health and illness. As opposites yin and yang are interdependent, contain each other, and mutually consume each other. Bodily parts and structures are assigned yin–yang associations. Yin is associated with structure and yang with function. The lower extremities, interior, and front are yin. The upper extremities, exterior, and back are yang. So all of the yang channels flow through the back and begin or end at the head. The yin channels flow through the abdomen and chest and begin or end below the waist. Likewise, pathogenic factors follow the yin–yang pattern. So the upper body is affected by yang factors such as wind and summer heat. The lower body is affected by dampness and cold.

Bodily organs are also classified according to yin and yang. The yin organs store energy; the yang organs digest and excrete food to generate energy. Through the bodily openings the yang organs such as the stomach, intestines, and bladder are in contact with the exterior. Like the yang force, the yang organs are active constantly filling, emptying, and digesting food. The yin organs are tranquil and store the energy and vital substances, such as qi, blood, and other bodily fluids within the body. Because yin and yang are never separated, all organs have them. Yin correlates to an organ's structure and yang to its function. Like yin and yang, structure and function are interconnected and codependent. For example, the spleen's yang function is to transform food into blood, which is the yin structure of the spleen. Blood-and-energy qi form a bipolar relationship: Blood nourishes and moistens, like yin; energy qi is warming, protecting, and transforming, like yang. Defensive and nutritive energy follow the paradigm. Defensive energy circulates in the skin and muscles and is yang. Nutritive energy is yin, circulating in the internal organs.

Yin–yang theory forms the basic character of all symptoms and signs in Chinese medicine. The basic qualities that direct clinical practice are assigned the following correlations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yin</th>
<th>Yang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold</td>
<td>Hot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiet</td>
<td>Restless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>Dry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft</td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhibited</td>
<td>Excited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Water is associated with the kidneys; fire with the heart. Maintaining a balance between water and fire is most important for health. Water moistens and nourishes the body; fire heats the body and fuels the metabolic...
processes. Fire in the heart helps maintain emotional well-being. Its warming energy allows the spleen to produce blood, facilitating the small intestine's digestion and the bladder's ability to excrete fluids. The major clinical manifestations correlate as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yin</th>
<th>Yang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronic disease</td>
<td>Acute disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradual onset</td>
<td>Rapid onset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lingering disease</td>
<td>Rapid changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold</td>
<td>Hot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepy</td>
<td>Insomnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes bed covers</td>
<td>Throws off covers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curls up</td>
<td>Lies stretched out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pale face</td>
<td>Red face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefers hot drinks</td>
<td>Prefers cold drinks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak voice</td>
<td>Loud voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallow breathing</td>
<td>Coarse breathing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No thirst</td>
<td>Thirst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profuse, pale urine</td>
<td>Scanty, dark urine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loose stools</td>
<td>Constipated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pale tongue</td>
<td>Red tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty pulse</td>
<td>Full pulse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yin–yang theory forms the foundation for an understanding of the clinical manifestations of symptoms. The yin–yang correlations must be integrated with the eight principles and the theory of internal organ patterns to be used successfully in diagnosing illnesses.

**Divination**

Divination has always played a role in Chinese culture. In the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) oracle bones were employed for this purpose. The bones were prepared and heated, and when the bone cracked, the lines were “read” for divination. The *I Ching* (*Yijing, Classic of Changes*), the Confucian text of divination, is dated to the early Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). Although the terms yin and yang to do not appear within the main body of the *Classic of Changes*, the text has been interpreted according to those categories. The appendix to the *Changes* defines the dao as one yin and one yang. The method of divination developed in the *Changes* is based on symbolic images depicted by solid and broken lines. The broken line is associated with yin and the solid line with yang. The following figures depict the progression.

![Four Stages of Yin Yang](image)

The first chapter of the *Changes* is “Qian,” represented by three solid lines arranged vertically. It is associated with pure yang, heaven, and light. The second chapter of the *Changes* is “Kun,” represented by three broken lines. Kun is associated with pure yin, earth, and darkness. There are eight different possible permutations combining solid and broken lines. These are known as the “Eight Trigrams” (*Bagua*). They are combined into the sixty-four hexagrams that comprise the chapters of the *Changes*. The Eight Trigrams are typically arranged around the eight compass points, giving them a spatial orientation. The trigrams especially represent temporal changes and are correlated with the seasons, the phases of the moon, the days of the week, and the hours of the day. The traditional Chinese calendar is a hybrid of both lunar and solar calendars. The four seasons are subdivided into three moons or months consisting of three ten-day weeks. The day is divided into twelve two-hour periods. Yin and yang are associated with the year, month, week, day, and hour. These time periods are also associated with a hexagram. The time of day or the day of the week can be used to find a hexagram to determine whether that time is auspicious or not. Because yin–yang theory and the principles of divination both focus on the process of change, it is natural that the two systems merged together.

**Feng Shui: The Art of Placement**

Feng shui literally means “wind and water.” It is the ancient art, science, and magic of geomancy. It is employed in both
ancient and modern architecture. Because wind and water are two of the most powerful natural forces that shape the landscape and pose a threat to human habitation, the art of living in harmony with the forces of nature came to be referred to as feng shui. Until recently feng shui was dismissed as mere superstition and an appeal to magic. In part feng shui practices are concerned with promoting good luck and avoiding bad luck, but they also have a practical and an aesthetic aspect. Some feng shui practices have artistic appeal and are based on sound observations. Feng shui is the art of placement that promotes both aesthetic and ecological values. Modern people recognize the aesthetic value of feng shui practices, especially in arranging a Chinese-, Korean-, or Japanese-style garden. Feng shui practices promote building homes and other structures in such a manner that they take advantage of the natural surrounding, allowing natural light and heat to enter the building in the winter and cool breezes in the summer. The aesthetic and ecological advantages of feng shui have revitalized people's interest in it.

Yin–yang theory plays an important role in the ancient art of placement. Any human structure, whether it is a farm, a garden, a building, a home, or a grave, will impose itself on the natural surrounding. It will have to withstand the forces of nature and adjust to the changes of the seasons and climate, so it will have to be in harmony with those forces, which are governed by yin and yang. Daoist priests are traditionally the master practitioners of feng shui. They use a loban, or feng shui compass. The compass has a magnetic north-south needle in the center, which is surrounded by concentric circles containing other information such as the seventy-two dragon veins, the twenty-eight constellations, the 360 degrees of the compass, the sixty points of good and bad luck, the eight trigrams, the auspicious river directions, and good and bad burial positions. The eight major compass points are associated with the eight treasures as follows: Fame is associated with the south; wealth with the southeast; education with the east; children with the northeast; relationships with the north; friends with the northwest; pleasure with the west; and health with the southwest. The direction the front door of a person's home faces will determine which one of the eight treasures is most benefited in that person's life. For example, if someone seeks to improve her relationships, then she should move into a house with a front door that faces north, so that her comings and goings take her through the relationship area. Because feng shui assists people in determining the aesthetic and practical value of the art of placing objects in the home and within the natural environment, feng shui continues to inspire architects and common people.

Yin–yang theory has its roots in ancient political philosophy. Through the syncretic approach of Han dynasty philosophy, the yin–yang five phases theory was integrated into other aspects of natural philosophy, medicine, divination, and the art of placement.

James D. SELLMANN

Further Reading
The Yokohama Specie Bank Limited originally was a private commercial bank which became a Japanese official overseas bank in the 1890s. The bank issued and circulated Japanese military notes during Sino-Japanese war periods, and was closed in 1945 after World War II.

The Yokohama Specie Bank was established on 28 February 1880 in Yokohama, Japan, to engage in foreign trade and discount trade bills. The bank was originally private but soon became the quasi-official bank of Japan because of the capital that the Meiji (1868–1912) government had injected into the bank during its financial crisis in early years. The government also granted the Yokohama bank a charter to handle foreign exchange reserves and to issue government notes. To expand foreign trade and share the sphere of influence in China, the bank opened its first China branch in Shanghai in 1893.

In the later nineteenth century Japan used a mult-metallic currency system based on gold, silver, and copper cash. This complex currency system contributed to fluctuations in transactions of foreign trade and foreign exchange. As a result of China’s loss in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan received a large quantity of gold as war
indemnity from China and used it as reserves to establish a gold standard in 1897. As the first Japanese national overseas bank, the Yokohama Specie Bank handled transactions involving the indemnity and also used part of the gold as reserves to issue bank notes in China.

Since many Japanese firms in China conducted their business with other countries solely through the Yokohama Specie Bank, the bank gained a strong national prestige within Japan. With its privileged relationship with most Japanese trading firms and benefits from government, which included being granted a deep discount rate and low tariffs, the Yokohama Specie Bank became a strong competitor of other foreign banks in China. From 1880 to 1926 the bank’s capital increased from an initial ¥3 million to ¥100 million.

From 1893 to 1945 the Yokohama Specie Bank opened thirty-four branches in China and built a large banking and financial network, especially in northeast China. During this period the Yokohama bank acted as the Japanese central bank in issuing banknotes, which were linked with Japanese yen in the currency circulation of northeast China. In addition, this bank gained a special right to finance the construction of Manchou railways, controlled regional foreign trade, and acted as the de facto Japanese treasury to receive Maritime Customs revenue in northeast China. After the outbreak of the World War II in the Pacific in December 1941 the Yokohama Specie Bank replaced the British Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in handling China’s Maritime Customs revenue. The bank’s major wartime financial activity was issuing military notes to finance Japanese military activities in China.

After Japan’s unconditional surrender in August 1945 the Yokohama Specie Bank was closed. It was reorganized into the Bank of Tokyo in 1947.

Ji Zhaojin

Further Reading


Yongle Dadian

Yǒnglè Dà Diǎn 永乐大典

Yongle dadian 永乐大典 is a massive, imperially-commissioned encyclopedia compiled in 1408 and composed of thousands of excerpts from all across the Chinese textual tradition. Most of the encyclopedia was destroyed in the wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The Yongle dadian, or Great Compendium of the Yongle Reign, was a massive literary encyclopedia completed in 1408. The work had 22,877 chapters in 11,095 volumes. The table of contents alone was sixty chapters long. In 1900 most of the last known copy of the Yongle dadian was largely destroyed in a fire started during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, an uprising of a Chinese secret society called Righteous and Harmonious Fists against foreign influence in trade, politics, religion, and technology. The New York Times mourned the loss as “perhaps the greatest tragedy in the history of literature,” noting that the encyclopedia was “the most colossal literary work ever carried out by man” (8 February 1914).

The Yongle dadian was commissioned at the behest of Emperor Yongle (reigned 1402–1424) shortly after he usurped the throne from his nephew, the Jianwen emperor (reigned 1398–1402). In 1403 the new emperor ordered one of his leading advisors to direct the project. A staff of 147 scholars was drafted, and the project was completed the following year. The emperor, however, was dissatisfied with the result, complaining that it was too limited in scope. He recommissioned the project on a grander scale, insisting that it include material from all philosophical, technical, and literary fields. The staff of compilers, editors, and scribes was expanded to include over two thousand scholars. When the compendium was completed in 1408, Yongle declared his satisfaction and wrote the preface for it himself, boasting of the great aid this work would be to the scholars of the empire. All the information of the world, he explained, was arranged here in topical and phonetic order.

The encyclopedia was but one of many scholarly initiatives of the court at this time. Yongle ordered several other large projects, including elaborately annotated editions of each of the Confucian Five Classics and the Four Books, a large encyclopedia of neo-Confucian terms and teachings, and the full Buddhist scriptural canon, the Tripitaka. Historians generally regard these ambitious projects as an effort by Yongle to shed his image as a violent usurper and to recast his legacy as that of a cultured and benevolent ruler. Moreover, projects such as the Yongle dadian served to enlist officials from among the wary scholar-elite of the empire.

Imperial Precedent

In commissioning the Yongle dadian and other projects, Yongle followed a longstanding imperial precedent that went back at least to the third century CE. His two Ming dynasty (1368–1644) predecessors, Hongwu (reigned 1368–1398) and Jianwen, had each initiated large compilations. However, the Yongle dadian dwarfed all precedents. The term encyclopedia understates the scope of this work because it included large excerpts from a wide range of
texts of the Chinese tradition. Several were transcribed in their entirety. Some pieces, including literary, historical, and dramatic works, have survived only because they were reconstructed or copied from the Yongle dadian.

Yongle originally intended that copies of the Yongle dadian be printed with woodblocks and distributed to various parts of the empire for educational purposes. But this elaborate plan was later abandoned, possibly because the imperial treasuries had been strained by Yongle’s other projects. The compendium was kept at the palace at Nanjing and moved to Beijing along with rest of the imperial library when Yongle relocated his capital to the north. (Some sources say an additional copy was kept in Nanjing.) The Yongle dadian remained on the palace grounds and apparently saw little use in the decades that followed. In 1562 it was nearly destroyed by a fire that engulfed several palace buildings. In response, the Jiajing emperor (reigned 1521–1567) ordered that two copies be made of the original manuscript. (Some scholars say only one copy was made.) This endeavor took five years, supervised by high court officials with a staff of 108 scholars. The original volumes were sent back to the southern Ming capital at Nanjing, while the two copies were kept in Beijing.

The Nanjing copy and one of the Beijing copies are believed to have been destroyed when the Ming dynasty fell in 1644. By the late eighteenth century only one dilapidated copy remained, with some sections missing. Some scholars have speculated that the original edition of the encyclopedia still survives in some hidden location. One theory is that this edition was entombed with the Jiajing emperor when he died in 1567.

Reconstruction

No subsequent Ming emperor attempted to emulate Yongle’s ambitious project, but emperors of the early Qing dynasty (1644–1912) did. The Kangxi emperor (reigned 1662–1722) ordered two ambitious encyclopedic projects, although neither attained the scope of the Yongle dadian. In the late eighteenth century the Qianlong emperor
(reigned 1736–1795) ordered his officials to comb through Yongle’s encyclopedia to reconstruct texts that had been lost in the intervening centuries. Several hundred previously missing works were partially or completely reconstructed.

In 1900 the Yongle dadian was located in the scholarly halls of the Hanlin Academy near the British Legation and other foreign embassies. That summer as Western armies battled against Chinese forces of the Boxer Rebellion, the buildings of the academy caught on fire, destroying most of the library and nearly all of the Yongle dadian. Approximately 400 of the original 11,095 volumes survived. In the ensuing chaotic years individual pages and volumes of the encyclopedia found their way into private hands, and many were eventually acquired by foreigners. Hence, many of the surviving sections of the Yongle dadian are now held outside of China in Europe, the United States, and Japan. (Russia and East Germany returned their volumes in the 1950s.) Two hundred twenty-one of the surviving volumes are currently held in China, sixty of which are in Taiwan.

Various portions of the surviving volumes have been reprinted in modern editions. Several scholars have called for a return of the original volumes of the Yongle dadian to China, arguing that with the reprinted editions now available to researchers, there is no reason not to return the originals to their country of origin. In 2001 the National Central Library in Beijing began to digitize the entire surviving corpus of the encyclopedia, calling for the cooperation of holders of volumes around the globe.

Peter B. DITMANSON

Further Reading

Yongle, Emperor (ZHU Di)

Yǒnglè Huángdì (Zhū Dì) 永乐皇帝 (朱棣)

1360–1424 Ming dynasty emperor

Zhu Di 朱棣, son of the founder of the Ming dynasty, usurped the throne from his nephew in 1402 to become the Yongle emperor. During his reign he extended the power and influence of the dynasty, commissioned naval expeditions to the Indian Ocean, moved the imperial capital to Beijing, and oversaw important scholarly enterprises.

Zhu Di (reigned 1402–1424) was the son of the Hongwu emperor (reigned 1368–1398), who founded the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Zhu, usurping the throne from his nephew, the Jianwen emperor (reigned 1398–1402), became one of the most powerful and effective emperors of the dynasty. Under his reign the empire became stabilized after the tumultuous early years of the dynasty. As a powerful military leader, Zhu Di oversaw the consolidation and expansion of Ming power.

Zhu Di claimed to be the fourth son of the founder by his primary wife, Empress Ma (1332–1382). Some later sources rumored that Zhu Di was a son by a concubine, perhaps from Korea or Mongolia. As a youth, Zhu Di was known for his military prowess, and his father entrusted him with the strategic northern fiefdom of Yan, the ancient name for the Beijing region. Zhu Di took up his post as the prince of Yan in 1380 when he was twenty years old, participating in successful military campaigns against the Mongols in 1381, 1390, and 1396.

In 1399, suspicious of the Jianwen emperor and covetous of the throne, the prince of Yan launched a civil war against his nephew. He claimed that the court had fallen prey to evil advisors and that his intervention to “quell the difficulties” was in accord with the wishes of the founder. Zhu Di’s superior military leadership and well-trained troops defeated the imperial forces, leading to the capture of the Jianwen emperor.

Portrait of the Yongle Emperor Zhu Di, founder of the Ming dynasty. Ink and color on silk, by an anonymous painter.
of Nanjing, where the Jianwen emperor apparently died in the burning palace (although rumors persisted that he had miraculously escaped).

After the bloody civil war Zhu Di ascended the throne, declaring his reign “Yongle” (Everlasting Happiness). Seeking to consolidate his rule and restore order to the realm, he restored the civil service examination system and recruited large numbers of scholars to work on several ambitious literary projects, including the giant encyclopedia, the *Yongle dadian* (Great Compendium of the Yongle Reign), comprehensive editions of the Confucian canon (the Five Classics and the Four Books), a large anthology of neo-Confucian terms and teachings, and the entire Buddhist canon (the Tripitaka).

The Yongle emperor had grand imperial pretensions far beyond those of his predecessors. He launched military campaigns against the Mongols to the north and affirmed the northern power of the dynasty by moving the imperial capital from Nanjing to Beijing, where he built an imposing imperial complex (the Forbidden City). To the south he sought to extend Ming military and political control over Vietnam. His most celebrated initiative was the series of voyages in the Indian Ocean from 1405 to 1433, led by the eunuch Zheng He. These expeditions asserted Ming military and economic power as far as the Persian Gulf and the coast of Africa.

Upon his death in 1424 Zhu Di was canonized with the posthumous title of Taizong (Grand Ancestor), a standard title for the second emperor of a dynasty, once again officially bypassing the Jianwen reign. In 1537 the Jiajing emperor (1521–1567) changed Zhu's posthumous title to Chengzu (Accomplished Progenitor) in recognition of his importance in the consolidation of the dynasty.

Peter B. DITMANSON

**Further Reading**


Yu Boya and Zhong Ziqi

The Chinese call a close, sympathetic friend *zhiyin* (knowing the sound) or “one who truly appreciates the tune played by another.” This is an allusion to a legend about two friends named Yu Boya and Zhong Ziqi.

Yu Boya refers to the actual famed musician Bo Ya who lived in the State of Chu during the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BCE). He demonstrated a great musical talent at an early age and later became a student of a great master *zheng* player named Cheng Lian. *Zheng* is a traditional Chinese stringed instrument of the zither family. Even though he excelled at all the techniques Master Cheng could teach him, Yu Boya was still unsatisfied, because he felt unable to express his feelings when he played. Seeing this, Cheng Lian offered to take him to his own master, who lived on an island in the East China Sea. Once there, Cheng Lian asked Yu Boya to wait for his master; he promised to pick up Yu Boya when he was done. Days passed, however, without a sign of either Cheng Lian or Cheng’s master. Now Yu Boya’s only companions were the birds singing in the forest. Their

This man plays a *zheng*, the instrument Yu Boya played to his friend Zhong Ziqi during the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE). PHOTO BY PAUL AND BERNICE NOLL.
songs, with the backdrop of the pounding waves, sounded as melancholy as he felt. This struck a chord in his heart; with a sigh, Yu Boya began to pluck his zheng, and it produced the soul-stirring music he had been seeking all along. In fact, this was just what Master Cheng Lian had planned. Later, people observed that Yu Boya played so well that "even horses eating at their troughs would raise their heads and listen" (Zhu, 1998). Nevertheless, he still was not satisfied because he felt that no one really understood the beautiful music he could play.

One day, Yu Boya was traveling on a riverboat when it began to rain. He had to seek shelter at the foot of a mountain. Watching the downpour as it beat on the heaving waters of the river, Yu Boya felt the urge to play a tune in response. He was indulging himself with the emotions that his beautiful music had created when a string on his zheng snapped. Yu Boya raised his head and caught sight of a woodchopper sitting on the bank. The man, Zhong Ziqi by name, had been listening to Yu’s music so attentively that he was even oblivious of the rain. Deeply touched, Yu Boya invited Zhong Ziqi to his boat so he could share his music with him. As soon as Yu Boya finished a tune he had named in his own mind “High Mountains,” Zhong Ziqi told him, unaware of Yu Boya’s unstated title for the song, that the melody painted a picture of unbroken mountain ranges in his mind. Then, after Yu Boya performed another tune he intended to call “Flowing Waters,” Zhong Ziqi commented that it seemed as if he had heard the torrent of the Yangzi (Chang) River while listening to the song. Seeing his zhiyin in front of him, Yu Boya’s joy was boundless. Instantly they became avowed friends. Before parting, they agreed to meet again in the near future.

A few years later, Yu Boya decided to pay Zhong Ziqi a visit. Unfortunately, when he arrived at his home, he learned that Zhong Ziqi had already passed away. Yu Boya was filled with sorrow, lamenting that no one in this world would ever appreciate his music like Zhong Ziqi. Rushing to his friend’s tomb, Yu Boya knelt down and started playing his zheng. Then, rising slowly, he crashed it to the ground. After that day, not a single tune ever came out of Yu Boya’s skillful hands again.

Further Reading


Yuan Drama

Growing out of a largely anonymous performance and ritual tradition of the Song and Jin periods, Yuan drama matured into a recognizable artistic form. During this first golden age of Chinese song-drama (1279–1368), individual actresses and actors, playwrights, and critics perfected performance conventions, scripts, and aesthetic criteria.

The Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) is generally regarded as the first golden age of traditional Chinese song-drama, particularly with regard to the theatrical form commonly known as “Northern-style zaju drama.” Drama became significant enough as an aesthetic form for urban communities and their participants—authors, performers, critics, patrons—to acknowledge their contributions to the world of theater. The names of approximately one hundred zaju authors and the titles of more than six hundred plays attributed to them are known to us today. Similarly, the names, and in some rare cases the likenesses of individual zaju actors and actresses, have been transmitted through visual, poetic, and documentary sources produced by patrons, scholar-officials, other playwrights, and drama connoisseurs. In addition, a number of critics developed explicit formal criteria to evaluate the authors, the performers, and the stylistic characteristics of song-drama as well as the musically related form known as sanqu songs. Finally, the libretti of at least thirty zaju song-dramas were considered aesthetically important and linguistically demanding enough to be printed as early as the first half of the fourteenth century, thus providing us with some of the earliest texts in the Asian theatrical repertoire.

History of the Form

All the impressive firsts of Yuan dynasty zaju, notwithstanding, zaju evolved over the course of at least two hundred years before becoming a literary medium for playwrights and a star vehicle for performers. In the mid-twelfth century contemporary observers reminisced about the large commercial theaters operating in the capital of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), Kaifeng (modern Kaifeng), where comic duos (fumo and fujing) together with a leading man (moni) and an official (zhuanggu) role type offered humorous fare then known as “variety plays” (zaju). These same diarists also mentioned that various entertainments were enacted on permanent open-air stages attached to temples as well as on temporary stages erected for particular holidays. In the context of a Buddhist-inspired All Souls Festival the title of a particular zaju play, the Buddhist salvation story of Mulian Rescues His Mother [from Hell], first appeared. The tale was subsequently adopted into the Yuan zaju repertoire and remains a staple of certain regional operas to this day.

When in the 1130s the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234) assumed control over the heartland of early zaju performances (modern-day Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi provinces), the development of zaju continued unabated, partly because Jurchens had a strong song-and-dance tradition of their own and partly because the Jin court selectively
adopted Song institutions as well as Chinese literary culture more generally. Not only do later lists of comic skits about everyday life and of stories about historical figures, romance, and religions suggest a rich urban repertoire performed in the new capital of Yanjing (present-day Beijing), but also Jin dynasty stages found in smaller towns around Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi provinces suggest that \textit{zaju} performance was a common feature of rural life. Furthermore, judging both from extant stages and from the replicas of stages and performers unearthed from Jin dynasty tombs, conventions of \textit{zaju} performance were moving toward a specialized theatrical stage and the role system of a main female or male lead (\textit{zhengdan} and \textit{zhengmo}), both of which would become hallmarks of mature Yuan drama. Moreover, the popularity of the musically innovative Jin dynasty \textit{chantefable} genre known as “All Keys and Modes” (\textit{zhugongdiao}) coincided with the final stage of the maturation of Yuan drama. Rather than simply repeating identical tunes patterns, “All Keys and Modes” welded together several melodies into song-sets, a feature that would be developed into song-suites set to different musical modes in Yuan \textit{zaju} plays.

The Mongol defeat of the Jin in 1233 and of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) did not disrupt but rather furthered the evolution of song-drama in the old capitals as well as the hinterland. The new Yuan capital, Dadu (modern Beijing), was located in the same city as the Jurchen capital of Yanjing. Not surprisingly perhaps, Dadu was the initial urban epicenter of the synthesis of the theatrical, musical, and authorial developments begun under the Song and the Jin dynasties. Most of the early dramatists hailed from Dadu, including the reputed progenitor
of the genre of Yuan zaju, Guan Hanqing. However, the move of the Song court to Lin’an (modern-day Hangzhou), the capital of the Southern Song dynasty, had helped old-style zaju find a new home in the south in the 1100s, and hence mature Yuan zaju quickly took hold in the former Southern Song capital as well, with many of the later Yuan dramatists such as Zheng Guangzu being active in Hangzhou.

**Form of Yuan Zaju**

**Song-Drama**

In its mature form Yuan zaju typically consisted of a melodic sequence of songs set to different musical modes, which musically delineated four distinct acts. Occasionally the four-act format was expanded with short melodic prologues or interludes known as “wedges.” In rare cases such as the cross-culturally famous *The Orphan of the House of Zhao* (*Zhaoshi gu’er*), Yuan zaju were comprised of five rather than the standard four acts. With five books consisting of four acts each, the famous love comedy *The Story of the Western Wing* (*Xixiang ji*) adhered to the conventions of both the short zaju and the much longer chuanqi form. In general, each song-suite accommodated different sets of melodies, which were said to have connoted different emotive timbres. All songs were sung by a single role type, the main female (*zhengdan*) or male lead (*zhengmo*), the story’s central locus of emotion. In most cases a single character occupied that role type, but in rare instances two characters assumed the role of the singing lead. In the exceptional *The Story of the Western Wing*, a set of four acts was principally sung by the same role, but the lead role varied across the five books of the play.

The arias alternated with dialogue spoken by all parties. The language of the arias blended both classical...
allusions and colloquial elements, which earned the genre the characterization of “being neither excessively formal nor vulgar” (buwen busu). In Yuan-printed texts the dialogue was sketchy rather than fully elaborated, implying that performers may have improvised those segments or that audiences needed no reading aids to follow the spoken parts. By contrast, extant Ming dynasty (1368–1644) versions of Yuan drama greatly expanded the dialogue and added set poetic recitation pieces. In Selections of Yuan Plays (Yuanqu xuan, also known as One Hundred Yuan Plays, Yuanren baizhong qu, 1615/16), Zang Maoxun (1550–1620) fleshed out the dialogue and edited the arias to create the definitive reading text for “Yuan drama.” Cleverly claiming that the Yuan court selected the highest echelon of examination candidates through the writing of arias, Zang provided a new sheen of literary respectability for song-drama in general.

Authors and Themes

The bulk of individually attributable Chinese literature written prior to the Yuan dynasty originated with scholar-officials or aristocrats. By contrast, Yuan zaju was the first major body of Chinese texts to have been primarily written by relatively well-educated professional authors. Zhou Deqing (flourished 1330), the most influential contemporaneous critic, singled out Guan Hanqing, Zheng Guangzu, Bai Pu, and Ma Zhiyuan as particularly accomplished, a judgment that, with the addition of Wang Shifu, has largely withstood the vagaries of time.

Within a corpus of more than sixty known titles, Guan Hanqing was, despite the uncorroborated claim to a minor post, the professional author par excellence. The subject matter of his plays ranged widely, covering all social registers and moving from uproarious comedy to deeply felt grief. Guan’s plays reworked both well-known and untapped tales about lovorn emperors and heartbroken consorts; turned biographical bits about generals, scholar-officials, and young girls into alternately heart-rending and didactic stories such as The Jade Mirror Stand (Yujing tai); adapted episodes from the well-known The Records of the Three Kingdoms to turn them into heroic or melancholy pieces; fashioned innovative romantic plots with few or no known precedents into vehicles for clever courtesans, maids, and widows such as Rescuing a Coquette (Jiufengchen). In the Yuan dynasty other playwrights adopted the nicknames “Little Hanqing” and “Southern Hanqing,” attesting to Guan Hanqing’s standing as Yuan zaju’s foundational author. In the twentieth century The Injustice to Dou E (Dou E yuan) was singled out and came to exemplify Guan’s excellence as a writer of the then newly sinicized genre of tragedy.

Pai Pu (1226–c. 1280) ranked among the few known literati authors of Yuan drama. Hailing from Shanxi Province, Pai Pu’s father, Bai Hua, had passed the highest examinations during the Jin dynasty, an honor that earned him a biography in the official History of the Jin. After the fall of the dynasty the family fell on hard times but eventually settled in Nanjing. Bai’s song lyrics alluded to his longing for the old dynasty; given the extant attributions, his plays for the most part dealt with romance. Most famous among these was Rain on the Pawlownia Tree (Wutongyu), one of the few extant song-dramas that survived the Ming dynasty prohibition on the imperial figures in zaju texts and performance. Rain empathetically told the well-known story of Tang emperor Xuanzong’s loss of his favorite consort, Yang Guifei, to political necessity from the point of view of the heartbroken emperor.

A native of Dadu, Ma Zhiyuan, may have served as a minor functionary, according to one source, but according to another, he was a member of a professional writing association. The rather bleak outlook of his songs and of his plays certainly seemed in tune with the often resentfully satirical tone associated with the Southern xiwen plays produced by writing guilds. Ma adapted famous episodes from the dynastic histories and from the annals of poetry to conjure melancholy meditations on loss, most notably in Autumn in the Han Palace (Hangongqiu) and Tears on the Official’s Gown (Qingshan leiq). Ma is equally well known for his Dao-inspired deliverance plays that tout the rewards of renunciation in the face of an intracable and futile quest for success. Ma adopted the official patriarch of a newly popular school of Quanzhen Daoism, Lü Dongbin, as the hero of two of his deliverance plays, The Yueyang Tower (Yueyanglou) and The Yellow Millet Dream (Huangliangmeng).

Another native of Dadu, Wang Shifu, made his name largely as the author of The Story of the Western Wing (Xixiang ji), the most widely reproduced love comedy in the Chinese corpus. When literary critic Jin Shengtan (1608–1661) created an alternative, quasi-modern
canon of six literary works called “books of genius,” he included a highly idiosyncratic version of Wang’s *Story* as the “Sixth Book of Genius.” The many successive reprints and versions of Jin’s version of *The Story of the Western Wing*, together with Zang Maoxun’s *One Hundred Yuan Plays*, ensured that Yuan *zaju* continued to be widely disseminated as reading material long after the end of the Yuan dynasty.

**Modern Impact**

Although the musical form of Yuan *zaju* drama gradually died out in the sixteenth century, Ming dynasty playwrights such as Tang Xianzu (1550–1616) drew ideas from Yuan drama, and many of the stories from the Yuan corpus, such as *The Butterfly Lovers*, found their way into the regional operas of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Among the earliest Chinese dramatic forms to be introduced to Japan, *Xixiang ji* was translated into Japanese in the early 1800s. European translations of Yuan *zaju* plays inspired famous plays by the French writer Voltaire (1694–1778) and the German dramatist Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956). Because of the modern academic study of Yuan drama by influential scholars such as Wang Guowei (1877–1927) and Wu Mei (1883–1939), many important modern Chinese playwrights such as Guo Moruo (1892–1978) and Tian Han (1898–1968) seized upon plays in Zang Maoxun’s anthology and other Yuan dramas to address modern cultural concerns such as marriage reform. More recently other Chinese playwrights have staged Chinese and Western versions of Yuan drama side-by-side to offer political commentary. Thus, the legacy of Yuan drama continues to evolve at the crossroads of Chinese and world theater.

**Patricia SIEBER**

**Further Reading**


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**Play a harp before a cow.**

**对牛弹琴**

**Dui niú tán qín**
In the late thirteenth century the Mongols, nomadic invaders from Central Asia, conquered China. During their rule as the Yuan dynasty the Mongols borrowed extensively from other traditions, creating a uniquely multicultural political and cultural environment. While many aspects of Mongolian rule over China vanished with the dynasty in 1368, some political, military and social features survived and influenced succeeding dynasties.

The Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) marked the first era in Chinese history in which Central Asian invaders succeeded in conquering all of China territorially. Mongolian tribes, reorganized into military units by the famed conqueror Chinggis Khan (also known as Genghis Khan, 1162–1227), descended upon China in repeated campaigns from the early years of the thirteenth century until the conquest process ended with the collapse of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) under Chinggis’s grandson, Khubilai Khan (1215–1294). North China had been ruled by other invaders from the north (first the Khitans, then the Jurchens) from 916 to 1234, but the Mongols were the first outsiders to conquer and reunify all of China.

After Chinggis Khan’s death, his heirs carved out separate imperial domains (khanates) that, while connected by trade and diplomacy, evolved into independent geopolitical units. In addition to the Yuan dynasty in China, these units consisted of the Il-Khan dynasty in Persia, the Golden Horde in Russia, and the Chagatai khanate in Central Asia. The Yuan dynasty in China was directly ruled by a branch of Chinggis Khan’s descendants who were based in the Yuan capital city of Daidu (modern Beijing). As such, the Yuan dynasty was an independent polity that was governed quite differently from the other Mongolian-ruled polities in Eurasia.

The Mongols as Rulers of China

After the fall of the Yuan dynasty the new Ming rulers of China castigated the Mongols for their inattention to the welfare of the people and for their abuses of privilege. The Mongols, in fact, did rule China differently than previous dynasties had. As a pastoral nomadic people, they relied on their traditional emphasis on military values and hereditary transmission of office. Yet the Mongols also adapted many preexisting Chinese institutions to facilitate their rule. The structure of the Yuan civilian bureaucracy fit the traditional Chinese mold to a high degree, but the fact that Mongols and Western and Central Asians (Turks, Uygurs, Persians, and others) held the higher-level positions meant that many Chinese scholars, accustomed to the status derived from government service, felt disenfranchised.

The Yuan rulers did not allow the traditional Chinese civil examination system, which had determined who entered into the civilian bureaucracy in previous centuries, to function until 1315; even then it was a minor source of recruitment. The Mongolian emphasis on heredity and the primacy given to the military sphere over the civilian
sphere made government service less accessible and even unpalatable for many Chinese.

However, the Chinese viewed the Yuan dynasty as a legitimate dynasty that had won the Mandate of Heaven and had reunified the empire. Khubilai Khan was largely responsible for winning Chinese acceptance of Mongolian rule. In 1272, Khubilai gave the dynasty its Chinese name, Yuan, and employed several prominent Chinese scholars as advisers at his court in Daidu (Dadu). Khubilai also selected this site (modern-day Beijing) in 1260 as the dynasty’s capital, thereby moving the symbolic center of Mongolian rule from Mongolia into China proper.

Khubilai also employed Tibetan Buddhist monks and Central Asian Muslim financiers as his court advisers. A multiethnic, multilingual entourage gave the Yuan court a cosmopolitan aura. Yet, from the point of view of contemporary Chinese observers, the Tibetans at the Yuan court were seen as arrogantly interfering with the administration of justice and claiming privileged status for themselves; Muslim financial advisers were criticized for imposing too severe a tax burden on the Chinese people and were accused of usury and embezzlement. While such criticisms may have been exacerbated by the factions at the Yuan court, it is true that the Tibetans and Central Asians rarely displayed any philosophical interest in Confucianism and its values of frugality and loyal, selfless service to one’s ruler. Tensions ran high among the different ethnic groups that served the Yuan court during Khubilai’s reign and in later Yuan times.
Culture and Society

Blocked from government service and alienated from their Mongolian rulers, some Chinese literati turned to the arts as an outlet for their untapped energies and talents. Popular drama, a genre that had existed in China for at least two centuries prior to the Mongolian invasion, benefited from the elite’s participation in the writing of new plays. Displaced from their usual roles as scholar-officials, the Chinese elite developed Yuan drama, known as zaju, which exposed social problems of the era, thus allowing modern readers precious insights into everyday life. At least 160 Yuan plays are extant. The Yuan era also produced many great Chinese painters, some of whom, like Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322), served the Yuan court in official capacities. Since the Yuan rulers for the most part did not scrutinize or censor artistic themes, Chinese painting of this era flourished both stylistically and thematically, one example being the new focus on horse painting.

While Confucianism as a philosophy and way of life was never directly threatened with suppression by the Mongolian rulers of China, competing philosophies were encouraged in the Yuan period. Uygurs reintroduced Islam, Tibetans promoted Buddhism, and Central Asian monks revived Nestorian Christianity. The Mongol rulers practiced religious toleration in China and elsewhere throughout Eurasia; they exempted the clergy of all religions from taxation and from military conscription. As long as clerics did not foment or support anti-Mongolian sentiments, their churches, temples, and mosques were left untouched. In spite of the coexistence of a variety of religions in China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, the Chinese elite remained strongly bonded to their own Confucian tradition. Overall during the Yuan, Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, and the Mongols’ own shamanistic beliefs managed to weather the inevitable strains and mutual antagonisms of a multiethnic empire, giving the Yuan a rather unique cultural profile in Chinese history.

Trade, Transport, and the Economy

The Mongols, like other pastoral nomadic peoples of Eurasia, saw trade with neighboring sedentary peoples as an acceptable method to obtain needed goods to supplement the products of their own economy. Trade and raids co-existed in the frontier history of China and Central Asia. Chinggis Khan had employed Muslim merchants in long-distance trading ventures as early as 1218 in western Central Asia. By the generation of his grandson, Kubilai, the Yuan imperial family was experienced in world trade. Investing silver in Central Asian Muslim merchant companies that financed trade caravans to distant lands and loaned funds within China at usurious rates, Kubilai and his successors reaped enormous profits. Maritime trade also flourished in Yuan times, and the government treasury was enriched by trade taxes.

Within China itself, trade and communications were facilitated by the more than 1,400 government postal stations which allowed authorized officials and merchants to cover great distances in a short span of time, with fresh mounts supplied at each station. Using some 3 million conscripted laborers and an enormous expenditure of government funds, Kubilai Khan extended the Grand Canal so that grain from the Yangzi (Chang) River region could be shipped north to the Yuan capital at Daidu. Both land and inland waterway transport routes were improved in the Yuan era.

Paper currency had been in circulation to varying degrees in China before the Yuan dynasty, but during Kubilai Khan’s reign it became more widespread than ever. Taxes were paid in paper money, and merchants saw the advantages of the new currency. The Yuan court, however, never completely resisted the temptation to print more money when revenue demands generated by military campaigns of expansion and by fiscal mismanagement arose. Ultimately, inflation was one of the economic factors that contributed to the collapse of the dynasty in 1368.

Decline

During Kubilai’s reign, the Mongols continued their campaigns outward from China, successfully subjugating Korea. Their naval attacks upon Japan in 1274 and 1281, however, were defeated. Mongolian military expeditions into Southeast Asia in the 1270s and 1280s also met stiff resistance. After Kubilai’s reign, the Yuan rulers abandoned further expansionist campaigns. The
dynasty fell into decline during the course of the fourteenth century because the once-powerful military could not suppress widespread popular revolts after 1350. The last decades of the Yuan dynasty were marred by major floods, droughts, and epidemics, creating a confluence of natural disasters that would have undermined any dynasty, whether foreign or Chinese in origin. The Mongols fled their capital city of Daidu and returned to Mongolia in 1368, escaping before the arrival of the armies of Zhu Yuanzhang, a rebel leader who founded the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Although a short-lived dynasty, the Yuan left a strong imprint upon Chinese society, military practices, and politics as evidenced by the post-Yuan continuation of hereditary household occupational registration, the continuation of aspects of military organization, and ultimately an expanded notion of what constituted “China” territorially.

Elizabeth ENDICOTT

Further Reading

Ruthlessness is key to a man's accomplishment.

无毒不丈夫

Wú dú bú zhàng fu
Yuan Shikai became the first president of the Chinese Republic in 1913 at the behest of both the Qing court and the provisional government. By 1915 he had become the supreme dictator, dissolving parliament and outlawing the Nationalist Party. But for rebellion in the southern provinces, Yuan would have had himself declared emperor before his death in 1916.

Yuan Shikai 袁世凯 was born in 1859 in Xiangcheng, Henan Province, and was adopted. He joined the Qing army in 1880, and from 1885 to 1894 he was the Chinese commissioner of commerce in Korea. He was appointed governor of Shandong Province in 1899, where he suppressed the Boxer Rebellion. In 1901 Yuan Shikai was made governor-general of Zhili Province and the high commissioner for the Northern Ocean (Beiyang Dachen), a position which put him in charge of foreign and military affairs in North China. He directed various reform programs from 1901 to 1908, including the establishment of a modern army, the creation of military schools, the organization of the police system, and the inauguration of modern industry.

With the outbreak of the revolution in 1911, Yuan was placed in charge of the Imperial troops and of negotiations with the revolutionaries, a position of immense military power. He used his position to promote his own interests by clever manipulation of the negotiations, and, as a result, both the Qing court and the provisional government of the Chinese Republic appointed Yuan the president of the first Chinese Republic in February 1912. He assumed the formal presidency in 1913, and in the next two years he outlawed the Nationalist Party, dissolved the parliament, and attained dictatorial control. Yuan prepared to assume the title of emperor in late 1915, announcing that his imperial title, Hong Xian, would be used beginning 1 January 1916.
1916. But southern provinces rebelled, and the ceremony was cancelled. He died of natural causes on 6 June 1916. Yuan Shikai’s military might and political prowess during the formative transition between the Qing dynasty and the Republic of China have established his sometimes controversial position in Chinese history.

CHEN Shiwei

**Yuan Shikai’s Work**

Of the many reform programs led by Yuan Shikai, the reorganization of the indigenous banking industry in Tianjin proved to be particularly difficult, though successful in the end.

When Yuan Shikai took over administration of Tianjin from the foreigners in 1902, he immediately moved to prohibit the discounting of paper currency issued by indigenous banks. This resulted in a second round of failures. Between 1900 and 1902, 90 percent of Tianjin’s three hundred indigenous banks closed. With the indigenous bank industry in ruins, Yuan was left with the task of creating his own financial institutions. Together with Zhou Xuexi and Sun Duoxin, Yuan founded the Tianjin Mint (Yinyuan Ju), which turned out a new eight of copper coin based on the yuan, not the tael. Machine-minted, the new copper coins were difficult to forge or debase, and thus found wide acceptance, making a substantial profit.


**Further Reading**


Yuanming Yuan, Ruins of
Yuánmíngyuán fèixū 圆明园废墟

A famous imperial park outside of Beijing, Yuanming Yuan is known for its expansive compound of gardens, lakes, and temples. While once a truly beautiful Summer Palace for the Qing court, damages incurred during the Boxer Rebellion and the Cultural Revolution have left much of Yuanming Yuan in ruins.

Thanks to its well-documented and tragic history, the Summer Palace Yuanming Yuan (Garden of Perfect Brightness) is one of the most famous imperial parks worldwide. This vast complex of gardens, lakes, pavilions, temples, and hills is located only 10 kilometers from the walls of Beijing in Haidian, in the vicinity of the prestigious Peking and Qinghua universities. Since this was the preferred residence of five Qing emperors, Chinese historians have viewed the founding, enlargement, and destruction of the palatial complex as an illustration of the growth, extravagance, and decline of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

The name “Summer Palace” is misleading because until 1820 the Qing court spent most of the summer away from Beijing, in the cooler hills of Chengde. Yuanming Yuan became known in Europe in 1743 when a Jesuit
missionary employed at Qianlong’s court, the painter Jean-Denis Attiret, mailed an account of his visit in a letter to his correspondent in Paris. His description of the beauty of Chinese items and themes in the gardens helped change the history of landscape design and the design of contemporary European gardens. Parks in the Yuanming Yuan complex include the parks of the Kangxi emperor (1654–1722) and the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799), and Yihe Yuan (Garden of Concord and Peace), renamed by the Cixi dowager empress (1835–1908) in 1888. Xiyang Lou is a European baroque-style section that Qianlong commissioned in the northeast corner of his residence. Cixi decided to restore the western park of the Summer Palace after a French-British military expedition plundered and burnt to the ground the entire complex during the Second Opium War (1856–1960). Within its present limits, Cixi’s Yihe Yuan consists of Kunming Lake and Wanshou Hill, whose massive Buddhist temple dominates the site.

The Summer Palace was further damaged during the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Kangxi and Qianlong’s gardens in Yuanming Yuan have not been rebuilt because the Chinese government wants to preserve the site as a symbol of the depredations of foreign imperialism and as a reminder of the humiliations the Qing monarchs brought to China. The Summer Palace is on the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage List, and the melancholic ruins and ponds of Yuanming Yuan and the placid waters of Kunming Lake in Yihe Yuan attract today nearly as many domestic and foreign tourists as the Forbidden City does.

Philippe FORÊT

Further Reading

YUNG Wing ▶
Yung Wing was the first Chinese person to graduate from an American university (Yale, class of 1854). Enthusiastic about his education, he persuaded the Qing government to send the Chinese Educational Mission to preparatory schools and colleges in the United States (1872–1881). He also championed the cause of better treatment of Chinese overseas laborers.

Yung Wing 容闳，(also known as Rong Hong) the first Chinese to graduate from a North American college (Yale, 1854), was born into a farming family in the village of Namping, Guangdong Province, now part of the south Chinese city of Zhuhai. The village was only a few miles from the Portuguese colony of Macao, and at the age of seven Yung Wing became the youngest pupil in its foreign-run school. After the First Opium War (1839–1842) the school, now the Morrison Education Society School, moved to Britain’s newly acquired colony, Hong Kong. This early start gave Yung a remarkable fluency in English, part of the explanation for the achievements of his later life.

In Hong Kong, when a missionary teacher sought student volunteers to take back to the United States, Yung’s autobiography recalled, “I was the first one on my feet!” (Yung 1909, 18) He sailed for the United States in January 1847, his destination being Monson Academy in Massachusetts, where he spent three years on English-language skills and the Latin, Greek, and mathematics required for college entrance. He began his freshman year at Yale in 1850. Finances were a problem. Funding was available provided that after graduation he would return to China as a missionary, but although he had become an enthusiastic Christian, he declined, deciding: “I wanted the utmost freedom of action to avail myself of every opportunity to do the greatest good in China …. (Yung 1909, 35–36). He found others willing to help him and took paid jobs waiting tables, singing in the choir, and working in the library.

Yung Wing was so delighted with his Yale experience that he appealed to the Chinese government to replicate it for other Chinese boys. In 1871 the government organized the Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, with a preparatory school in Shanghai and competitive examinations. The plan was for students to remain in the United States for fifteen years, first studying English in southern New England homes, where they were lodged, then attending local grammar and high schools, and finally entering U.S. colleges, preferably to gain an education in technical subjects that would be useful in public service. Over the course of four years the program sent 120 boys in four groups of thirty. Although China recalled the students after only nine years, some had already received a good education. Mission members later became well known in China: One was foreign minister, another served as prime minister in the new republic, and one became the first Chinese to direct a railroad-building project in China; such projects had before than been directed by Westerners.

Midway in supervising the mission students, Yung Wing was appointed deputy at the newly opened Chinese legation in Washington, D.C. The duties of this post soon involved an investigation of the treatment of Chinese laborers in Peru and Cuba. In Peru Yung surreptitiously
photographed the whiplash marks on the backs of Chinese workers. The eventual report provoked China into ending the infamous coolie trade.

In 1876 Yung Wing married a U.S. citizen, Mary Louise Kellogg. They had two sons. His final years were devoted to writing his autobiography. He died in Hartford, Connecticut.

Beatrice S. BARTLETT

Further Reading


Yungang Caves

Yúngāng Shíkù 云岗石窟

The cave temples at Yungang date to the fifth and sixth centuries and are considered the earliest surviving Buddhist monuments in China. The forty-five extant caves that stretch nearly a kilometer were built between 460 and 524 CE. Work was sponsored by the Northern Wei rulers and by local elites and officials. The largest Buddha at the site is nearly 56 feet in height. 

The fifth and sixth century cave temples at Yungang are considered to be the earliest surviving Buddhist monuments in China. Located ten miles west of the present-day city of Datong (formerly the Northern Wei capital of Pingcheng), the cave temples were cut into a sandstone ridge that stretches nearly a kilometer along the Wuzhou River. The forty-five extant caves were built in three phases from 460 to 524 CE, and include both imperially-sponsored caves and those financed by local elites and court officials. The site contains thousands of carvings of Buddhist figures ranging in height from less than one inch to nearly fifty-six feet (2.5 centimeters to 17 meters).

Buddhism was adopted as the state religion by the non-Chinese Tuoba from Central Asia who ruled in north China as the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534). However, not all of the Northern Wei rulers were ardent followers of Buddhism. Taiwu Di (r. 424–452), the third emperor of the period, at first supported Buddhism, but on advice

The big statue of Buddha on the exterior of the Yungang caves. PHOTO BY JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
from Confucian and Daoist court bureaucrats who saw the religion as a threat, instituted a severe anti-Buddhist persecution that lasted from 446 until 452.

In 460, Tanyao, a monk and the head of the Buddhist church, petitioned the emperor. Wencheng Di, to cut five large caves from the stone cliff at Yungang as an act of expiation. These caves, known today as the Tanyao Caves and numbered 16 through 20, each contain a colossal Buddha said to honor—and perhaps represent—the first five Northern Wei emperors, with the Buddha in Cave 16 representing Wencheng Di himself. These caves were made between 460 and 465 or 467. The technique of carving cave temples into cliffs has earlier precedents in India and Central Asia. Indeed, these Buddha figures are an amalgam of foreign and native styles. The colossal Buddha of Cave 20, at 46 feet (14 meters) high, is considered to be the epitome of Northern Wei stone sculpture. These caves are simple and austere in their program of design.

A second phase of construction began around 470 and ended when emperor Xiaowu Di (reigned 471–499) moved the capital south to Luoyang. These imperially-sponsored caves are more Chinese in style. They are more elaborate, show more variation, and contain more inscriptions than the caves of phase I. The colossal Buddhas were replaced by numerous smaller figures. These included the paired caves 1 and 2, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, and 9 and 10, along with caves 11, 12, and 13. The paired caves may relate to the pairings of ruler and consort. Often the Buddha is dressed in the robes of a Chinese scholar. Xiaowen Di decreed in 486 that official court dress would be the traditional dress of the Chinese scholar class, and these Buddhas likely reflect court practice.

After the capital was moved, work continued at the site until 524. During this third phase, Caves 21 to 45 were constructed, along with a number of smaller caves and niches that stretched westward from the Tanyao Caves. With imperial patronage over, support came from local officials, and the work was done on a much smaller scale.

Over time, wind, rain, pollution, and the activities of looters have taken their toll. In 1988, researchers from the Getty Institute joined the Chinese in working to preserve the site. The cultural importance of the Buddhist Yungang caves has been recognized by UNESCO, which named Yungang a World Heritage Site in 2001.

Catherine PAGANI

Further Reading


Yunnan Province

Yúnnán Shěng 云南省

45.14 million est. 2007 pop. 394,000 square km

Covering an area about the size of the state of California, Yunnan Province in the south of China is a mountainous region whose climate ranges from temperate to subtropical to tropical. About a third of its over 45 million people belong to one of China's fifty-five officially recognized minority groups; twenty-two minority groups are represented, with the Yi being the largest.

The southern province of Yunnan (Yun nan, the cloudy south) borders in the west on Myanmar (Burma) and the Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region, in the north on Sichuan Province, in the east on Guizhou Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and in the south on Vietnam and Laos. The province covers 394,000 square kilometers (152,124 square miles) of mountains and plateaus. The northwestern section features the Hengduan mountain range, traversed by several big rivers and with peaks reaching over 4,000

Historical illustration from an edition of The Travels of Marco Polo. The original caption reads: “Ho-nhi and other Tribes in the Department of Lin-ngan in S. Yun-nan (supposed to be the Anin country of Marco Polo).”
meters (13,123 feet). The eastern and southeastern sections form a lower plateau. The diversity of Yunnan’s topography means there are three climate zones: temperate in the mountains and subtropic and tropic to the south. The rainy season between May and October accounts for about 80 percent of the annual precipitation, which averages above 1,000 millimeters (39 inches).

Yunnan has a population of over 45 million, of which about a third belong to twenty-two officially recognized minority peoples, the Yi being the largest. The Han Chinese, who constitute about 70 percent of the population, are mainly concentrated on the eastern plateau, where the capital, Kunming (2007 est. pop. 6.19 million), is located.

Yunnan was loosely incorporated into the Chinese Empire during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). It was the center of the independent Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries and was reincorporated as a Chinese frontier area under the Yuan
Yunnan Province

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Chinese government encouraged Chinese immigration into Yunnan, and during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) the province was repeatedly the seat of rebellion against the Manchu government. In the nineteenth century British and French colonial powers in Southeast Asia extended their activities into Yunnan, and the French built a railway connecting Kunming with Vietnam. During the Japanese occupation of eastern China, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) moved the government and various industries to the western provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan, and Yunnan became a stronghold against further Japanese advance.

Kunming developed into an important industrial center in the southwest, a position it still retains. Yunnan has one of the largest reserves of tin in the world, and the principal industries are tin and copper mining. Heavy industry, such as iron and steel works, is concentrated in the area around Kunming. The province is an important manufacturer of textiles, chemicals, processed foods, and various light industrial products, and a major producer of tea, cigarettes, and sugar.

Bent NIELSEN

Further Reading

ZENG Guofan

Zēng Guójīng 曾国藩

1811–1872  Qing government official

Zeng Guofan was a leading government official during the mid-nineteenth century who initiated the decentralization of power and the rise in influence of regional officials that took place during the final decades of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). He is best known for his role in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) and for his efforts to modernize China’s military and improve its industrial capabilities.

Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) was born in Xiangxiang, Hunan Province. He received the jinshi (advanced scholar) degree at the age of twenty-seven (1838) and was appointed to the prestigious Hanlin Academy in Beijing. He served on various boards in the capital during the next fourteen years and was promoted to the position of junior vice president of the Board of Ceremonies. In 1852 Zeng returned to his home province as commissioner for local defense, charged with the task of suppressing the Taiping rebels. He raised a province-wide militia, the Hunan Braves (later known as the “Hunan Army” or “Xiang Army”), personally selecting the officers and insisting on Confucian discipline among the troops. In August 1860 the emperor appointed Zeng governor-general of Jiangsu and Jiangxi provinces (liang Jiang) and granted him the political authority and fiscal independence he needed to coordinate the military campaign against the Taiping rebels. Together with the armies of Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang, Zeng captured the city on 19 July 1864, bringing to an end the devastating rebellion. For his role in suppressing the Taiping rebels, Zeng Guofan was awarded the title of “marquis of the first class.” He was the first civil official to receive this honor.

After the Taiping Rebellion Zeng returned to Nanjing to take up his post as governor-general. He initiated a number of policies aimed at inspiring obedience to local and central authorities. He opened printing offices to republish classical Confucian texts and reinstated the provincial examinations at Nanjing. In 1865 he established the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai to produce modern weapons and gunboats. In addition to manufacturing rifles, ammunition, cannons, and steamships, it housed a school for training technicians and translators. In 1867 Zeng was appointed grand secretary and the next year was made governor-general of Zhili Province. In 1870 he was ordered to negotiate a settlement with the French over the Tianjin Massacre (21 June 1870). His conciliatory approach to foreign demands during these negotiations conflicted with the hard-line position of many officials in Beijing. He was replaced by Li Hongzhang and reassigned to Nanjing, where he died.

Zeng Guofan’s importance in late Qing history is undeniable. He was instrumental in preserving the dynasty during the Taiping Rebellion. The reforms he enacted after the rebellion helped to stabilize and strengthen the country. His arsenals provided modern weapons...
to protect the nation’s sovereignty. Perhaps most significantly, however, Zeng’s career symbolized a turning point in late Qing political affairs. His ability to independently raise, train, finance, and command the Hunan Army indicated a shift in power from Beijing to the provinces. From this time onward provincial officials would most often take the lead in introducing new technologies, modern industries, and advanced educational systems.

Daniel J. MEISSNER

Further Reading


Photograph of Zeng Guofeng, a leading Qing official during the mid-nineteenth century. He is best known for suppressing the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) and for his efforts to stabilize and strengthen the country.

Make a decision when a decision is called for. Hesitation only brings disaster.

当断不断
Dāng duàn bù duàn
ZHANG Daqian
Zhāng Dàqiān 张大千
1899–1983  Modernist painter, collector, and forger

Zhang Daqian was one of the great modernist painters of the twentieth century. Along with a mastery of styles, techniques, and innovative methods, he is also known for his convincing copies and forgeries, many of which found their way into museum and private collections. In his sixty-year career, Zhang Daqian produced around thirty thousand paintings, five thousand of which are extant.

Although he considered himself a traditionalist painter, Zhang Daqian was one of the great modernists of the twentieth century. He combined a mastery of a broad range of styles and techniques with innovative methods of using ink splashes and color splashes to produce bold, semiabstract compositions that also evoked works of the past. Zhang’s command of the styles of the great masters also allowed him to make convincing copies and forgeries, many of which found their way into both museum and private collections. A well-traveled artist, Zhang was also a prolific one: Estimates put his total output during a sixty-year career at around thirty thousand paintings, five thousand of which are extant.

Drinking and Singing at the Foot of a Precipitous Mountain was supposedly a tenth century work attributed to the painter Guan Tong, now believed to be a master forgery by Zhang Daqian. The forgery includes seals of supposed past owners to create a false history.
personal secretary. In 1917 Shang traveled to Kyoto with his brother, Shanzi, where he studied textile weaving and dyeing for two years. This time in Japan was influential for Zhang: He was introduced to Western styles of art, Japanese-style painting, Japanese woodblock prints, and Chinese works by the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) Zen Buddhist artists.

Upon his return to China in 1919 Zhang briefly entered a Buddhist monastery. He then studied calligraphy in Shanghai under the celebrated masters Zeng Xi and Li Ruqing. Soon Zhang showed an impressive ability to copy the works of others. He gained a reputation for his imitations, and from 1941 to 1943 he used this talent to copy the wall paintings in the Mogao Caves at Dunhuang. With the Communist takeover of China in 1949 Zhang left for India, Hong Kong, Argentina, Brazil, the United States, and eventually Taiwan, where he retired. He never returned to China.

Zhang’s best-known works are his abstract ink-splashed paintings that utilized rich, dark tones and brilliant mineral-based colors, a technique he started in the late 1950s. He poured ink and colors onto the paper or silk so that they produced random, ambiguous forms to which he added small details—a figure or a tree—to give concreteness to the painting. This combination of traditional Chinese brushwork and abstract expressionism created powerful and dramatic works unlike anything seen before. Although the splashing technique itself is quick, some paintings were years in the making because Zhang had to wait for one application of ink to dry before he could pour on another.

Zhang was also an art collector and connoisseur. He felt that in order to paint well an artist needs to copy the works of the best artists. He traveled widely, viewing paintings in private collections and acquiring works for his own. Three aspects of his career—as an innovative artist, as a connoisseur and collector of all genres of Chinese art, and as a masterful forger—were the focus of a 2008 exhibition at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, to which Zhang, upon visiting there in 1953 and finding not a single one of his works in the museum’s collection, bequeathed a painting of a mountain scene in Sichuan. One of the highlights of the exhibit was a Zhang forgery the museum acquired in 1957, believing it to be an authentic tenth-century landscape by the Five Dynasties master Guan Tong.

Upon his death in 1983 Zhang left his collection to the National Palace Museum in Taipei, Taiwan. With his innovative use of color and his firm rooting in ancient styles, Zhang Daqian is remembered as both China’s last great literati artist and also as its first great abstractionist.

Catherine PAGANI

Further Reading


ZHANG Yimou

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ZHANG Yimou
Zhāng Yīmóu 张艺谋

b. 1951  Film, stage, and 2008 Olympics opening ceremonies director

Zhang Yimou is one of China’s most celebrated and commercially successful film directors. His martial arts blockbusters since 2002 contrast with films from the early part of his career that focused on China’s tumultuous history. An acclaimed stage director, Zhang has directed operas, ballets, folk musicals, and the spectacular opening ceremonies to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.

Born in Xi’an on November 14, 1951, Zhang Yimou has been one of China’s most celebrated and commercially successful filmmakers since the 1980s. Zhang graduated from the Beijing Film Academy in 1978 and was assigned to work as a cinematographer in the Guangxi Film Studio in 1982. Founded in 1958 and located in the southwestern city of Nanning, this studio is one of the major state-owned film and television studios in China. Zhang served as the cinematographer for Yellow Earth (1984), which was directed by classmate Chen Kaige. The film’s stark shots, sparse dialogue, and politically ambiguous message marked a radical change from the revolutionary themes and socialist realist style of films made during the Maoist era (1949–1976).

His directorial debut Red Sorghum (1987) received notable international acclaim for its rich imagery and powerful narrative about a rural winery’s opposition to the Japanese occupation of northeast China. Ju Dou (1990) and Raise the Red Lantern (1991) provide an oblique critique on contemporary society by adopting the theme of traditional society’s oppression of women.

To Live (1994) reminds audiences of the tumult of China’s twentieth history while affirming the universal theme of the struggle to survive and maintain dignity despite hardship and tragedy. Zhang’s new cinematic language combined with social and historical critique launched his international stardom and established Zhang as one of the key representatives of the fifth generation of filmmakers in China.

Between 1992 and 2000 Zhang experimented with a range of cinematic styles, especially neo-realism. whereas

Gong Li, in a scene from the film Red Sorghum, Zhang Yimou’s first film to become a major hit. Zhang Yimou filmed it at Xi’an Studio. PHOTO COURTESY OF JOAN LEBOLD COHEN.
his earlier films featured stories from China’s past, The Story of Qiu Ju (1992), The Road Home (1999), and Not One Less (2000) are set in recent China and address contemporary social issues such as legal rights, universal education, and family values. The latter two films represent a shift away from a critique of China to a call for audiences to assist in China’s social development. These films moved Zhang closer to the government and shaped the trajectory of his future career.


The spectacle of Zhang’s films are also presented on stage as ballets, operas, theatre, and pageantry. Zhang directed Puccini’s opera Turandot in Italy (1997) and in an historically unprecedented performance in Beijing’s Forbidden City (1998), he adapted Raise the Red Lantern into a ballet (2001), and directed The First Emperor at the Metropolitan Opera in New York (premiered in 2007). He has also directed the outdoor folk music spectaculars Third Sister Liu (since 2003) in southwestern China and Impression Lijiang in scenic Yunnan Province (since 2006).

After having directed the 2001 short film to promote Beijing’s Olympic bid and China’s eight-minute performance at the closing ceremonies of the 2004 summer Olympics in Athens, Zhang was selected to direct the opening ceremonies of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The nearly four-hour show, described by many as dazzling, was held in the Bird’s Nest, China’s newly built and iconic national stadium. It was attended by an unprecedented eighty world leaders and viewed by 1 billion people on television. The spectacular show included a display of 35,000 fireworks, designed by acclaimed artist Cai Guo-qiang, and 15,000 performers of acrobatics, martial arts, and a variety of musical performances, including the countdown performed by 2,008 drummers. The magnificent performance represented China’s global prominence and symbolically displayed the Chinese government’s emphasis upon solidarity, harmony, and technological progress.

Jonathan NOBLE

Further Reading


ZHANG Zhidong
Zhāng Zhīdòng 张之洞
1837–1909 Confucian scholar-official

Zhang Zhidong was a Confucian scholar-official of the late nineteenth century who was closely associated with China’s Self-Strengthening Movement. Appointed by the Qing government as viceroy of Liangjiang, Zhang Zhidong promoted Western-style industrialization through the establishment of a modern coal and steel complexes in the lower Yangzi River region.

Zhang Zhidong, born in Nanpi in Zhili (modern-day Hebei) Province, was a Confucian scholar-official who was closely associated with China’s Self-Strengthening Movement. His service in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government began in 1863 when he passed the highest-level civil service exam and earned the jinsshi (presented scholar) degree. He then held several supervisory posts related to the Confucian examination system and education in Sichuan, Zhejiang, and Hubei provinces from 1867 to 1877. Zhang was known for his promotion of scholarship and exemplary rectitude in administrative affairs during this time. In 1879 he was admitted to the Imperial Academy. There he earned a reputation as a commentator on Chinese political reform and foreign relations.

Zhang became governor of Shanxi Province in 1882. This was the first of several administrative posts that culminated in his tenure as governor-general of Hubei and Hunan provinces. During his eighteen years as governor-

Zhang Zhidong, a Confucian scholar-official of the late Qing dynasty, advocated a philosophy of modernizing reform: “Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical development.”
Zhang Zhidong’s View of the Examination System

Wendy Larson, a scholar of Chinese literature, film, and theory, writing on Zhang Zhidong:

One of the most forceful attacks on the examination system was engineered by Qing reformer Zhang Zhidong, who felt the exam was too literary and did not test candidates in a sufficient scope of affairs. His suggestion, similar to that of Ouyang Xiu in 1044, was to emphasize the dissertation and discussion in essays on the shi and fu poetry and to abandon the bagu writing style. He also petitioned to have the test of small formal calligraphy eliminated. Symbolic of an interpretation of writing as form equal to or more important than content, calligraphy is often mentioned by critics of the examination as one type of uselessly applied textual effort. . . . When the abolition of the examination system was announced and took place in 1905, however, Zhang Zhidong began to develop plans to establish a School for the Preservation of Antiquity; he petitioned the throne to establish this school on July 9, 1907, and it was opened August 28 of the same year. The school was to concentrate on Chinese subjects, emphasizing national literature, both prose and poetry, as well as the spoken and written language.

Zhang obviously perceived the value of the examination system as a unifying influence in the spiritual and conceptual realm of Chinese thought and realized that while its abolition would allow China to progress in previously undeveloped ways, a chaotic spiritual gap may result from the lack of guiding and unifying ideology.


general Zhang was known as a political reformer and modernizer even as he remained devoted to Confucianism and the Qing dynastic order. Zhang’s philosophy of reform was Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong (Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical development).

The Qing court in 1901 appointed Zhang viceroy of Liangjiang in Guangxi Zhuang. He promoted development of railways and sponsored the Han-Ye-Ping iron and steelworks in the lower Yangzi River region to strengthen the Chinese state and economy. In addition he founded an institute of higher learning that was the foundation of modern University of Nanjing.

Michael C. LAZICH

Further Reading


Zhao Mengfu 赵孟頫

ZHANG Zhidong

Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 2667.

Zhao Mengfu 赵孟頫 was a poet and musician and a highly distinguished painter and calligrapher of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). His painting was marked with a return to archaism and covered a wide range of subjects, while his calligraphic scripts, called the “Zhao style,” were elegantly structured and rigorously controlled.

Zhao Mengfu, born in Huzhou, Zhejiang Province, as a descendant of the founding Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) emperor, was a painter, calligrapher, poet, and musician of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). His father, who excelled in poetry, was a high local official during the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), and Zhao thus benefited from his family’s rich literary collections. After the collapse of the Song dynasty Zhao Mengfu accepted an offer of an official post from Yuan emperor Khubilai Khan. This acceptance provoked bitter feelings among many ethnic Han Chinese scholars who regarded Zhao’s service in the Mongolian court as a dishonorable collaboration. Zhao later held many other high posts, including the governorship in two provinces and the directorship of the imperial Hanlin Academy.

Zhao Mengfu painted a wide range of subjects, including landscape, human figures, birds and flowers, bamboos and rocks, humans and horses, and goats and sheep. The techniques he used also varied, ranging from finely detailed colored paintings to pictures done with broad, spontaneous brushstrokes that express symbolic messages. One of Zhao’s most famous paintings, *Autumn Colors on the Que and Hua Mountains* (handscroll, ink and color on paper, 1296, National Museum, Taipei, Taiwan), is based on his visit to the two mountains in Shandong Province. Arranged on the two sides of the painting, the two greenish mountains rise abruptly in the background. The middle and front distances of the picture are filled with cottages, trees, boats, reeds, and human figures. Stylistically, this painting is far from naturalistic. The mountains in the back are too small in scale compared with the houses and trees in front of them. Light brushstrokes moving left to right by the lakefront establish the different levels of perspective in the painting but somehow impede the sense of space receding into the picture plane. Such discontinuities and anomalies deliberately refer and pay tribute to the ancient masters such as Gu Kaizhi (active fourth century), who experimented with spatial relations among human figures, trees, rocks, and flowers. Zhao’s return to archaism marked a decisive move from the naturalism of Song painting technique and was followed by many artists in the same spirit.

Another famous painting by Zhao, *Elegant Rocks and Sparse Trees* (handscroll, ink on paper, Palace Museum, Beijing), uses broad and cursive brushstrokes to depict the rocks and tree boughs in a typical calligraphic style. His own inscription on the painting states that “Rocks as in flying white (script), trees as in seal script” and “calligraphy and painting have always been the same” (Cahill 1997, 187). Indeed, Zhao was one of the four great masters of the formal scripts in China with Ouyang Xun (557–641), Yan Zhenqing (709–785), and Liu Gongquan (778–865). His calligraphy, called the “Zhao style,” is elegantly...
structured and rigorously controlled. The official History of the Yuan Dynasty (composed in the fourteenth century) judged Zhao's skills in different kinds of scripts as having no rival.

Yu JIANG

Further Reading
Zhao Ziyang was a leading economic reformer of the People’s Republic of China in the 1970s. He rapidly rose through the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), becoming premier and party general secretary in the 1980s. His opposition to the crackdown on the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square in Beijing resulted in his dismissal from office.

Zhao Ziyang was born as Zhao Xiusheng in Huaxian County, Henan Province in 1919. His father was a local landlord. He attended primary school in his native town and middle schools in Kaifeng and Wuhan. He joined the Communist Youth League in 1932 and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1938. By 1940 he was the party secretary of the Third Special District in the Hebei-Shandong Border Region. After the end of World War II in Asia, he occupied himself with rural reform work in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region. He also served as the party secretary of Luoyang District in Henan from 1948 to 1949.

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhao served in numerous positions in Guangdong Province. He was elected a member of the People’s Council of Guangdong in 1955, was appointed secretary of the Guangdong Province Communist Party in 1957, and rose to the position of provincial first party secretary in 1965. He played an instrumental role in consolidating CCP control and implementing land reform policies.

During the Cultural Revolution, Zhao was accused of being a follower of unpopular figures such as Tao Zhu and Liu Shaoqi. During the late 1960s, he was publicly denounced, stripped of office, and paraded through the streets of Guangzhou (Canton) in a dunce cap. In 1971, he was sent to what amounted to internal exile as a party secretary in Inner Mongolia.

In the dying days of the Cultural Revolution, Zhao was rehabilitated by Zhou Enlai (1899–1976) and assigned as provincial first party secretary in Sichuan Province in 1976. He proceeded to address the province’s economic stagnation that resulted from the Cultural Revolution. He allowed up to 15 percent of land in communes to be worked privately. He also permitted both farmers and workers to engage in a wide range of small-scale private economic activities. The results were impressive: grain production grew by 24 percent and industrial production rose by 80 percent in the period from 1976 to 1979.

Due to his success in Sichuan, Zhao was rapidly promoted by China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). Zhao was appointed alternate member of the Politburo in 1977, a full member of the Politburo in 1979, a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee in 1980, and vice-premier in the same year. Six months later, he replaced Hua Guofeng as premier. He was appointed to the post of CCP general secretary in January of 1987.

In positions of nationwide power and influence, Zhao continued to advocate market-style reforms and a more open policy toward the outside world, particularly the West. He also implemented measures to streamline the bloated bureaucracy and called for the gradual separation of the CCP from both government administration and
industrial management. While many of his reforms were praised, his economic liberalization program was blamed for the rising inflation of the late 1980s.

Zhao’s most important moment and his political downfall came with the student protests in Tiananmen Square in May and June of 1989. Many of the student demonstrators felt that Zhao would be more sympathetic to their demands for reform than many of Zhao’s more hard-line colleagues. This was borne out in secret meetings of China’s top leaders, where Zhao consistently opposed the use of force against the demonstrators. When Deng Xiaoping declared that “I have the army behind me” in a tumultuous 17 May 1989 Politburo meeting, Zhao reportedly retorted, “But I have the people behind me. You have nothing.” But as the students became increasingly strident in their criticism of the government, emboldened by worldwide media coverage and joined by over one million residents in Beijing, averting the ultimate repression of the demonstrations proved impossible for the state. Zhao’s personal visit to Tiananmen Square to urge students to end their hunger strike had no effect; “I came too late; I came too late,” he lamented to student leaders. After the declaration of martial law and the bloody clearing of Tiananmen Square by military troops, Zhao was removed from office and replaced by Jiang Zemin. He was also placed under house arrest. He remained a member of the CCP but was almost completely absent from public life until his death.

Zhao died in January 2005 at the age of eighty-five. The PRC government acknowledged Zhao’s death but kept memorials to a bare minimum, perhaps in fear that widespread mourning of Zhao’s passing might lead to anti-government demonstrations as had previously happened in the cases of Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang. Zhao was survived by his second wife, Liang Boqi, five children, and several grandchildren.

Kirk W. Larsen

Further Reading

Many events have been held in the world’s largest public square, but it is the student protests of June 1989, when Zhao Ziyang supported and then tried to calm those camped in the Square, that continue to resonate. Photo by Joan Lebold Cohen.
Zhaozhou Bridge
Zhàozhōu Qiáo 赵州桥

The Zhaozhou Bridge, built between 595 and 605 CE, is the world’s first large segmental arch bridge, making possible a near-level span of a broad river in North China. The innovation of open spandrels—arch-shaped openings—in the triangular area below the deck on both ends of the bridge did not appear in the West until the nineteenth century.

Among China’s contributions to world architecture and engineering, no bridge has received more acclaim than the Zhaozhou Bridge, in Zhaoxian County, Hebei Province. Constructed between 595 and 605 CE in the middle of the Sui dynasty, the structure is the world’s first large segmental arch bridge, a daringly innovative form that broke with the tradition of using a semicircle for the arched shape of a bridge. By using a segment of a circle, thus flattening the curve of the arch, it was possible to meet the seemingly conflicting demands for both a single long span with gentle approaches and one that was high enough to permit boat traffic beneath. In addition, the incorporation of two pairs of open spandrels—arch-shaped cavities—in the triangular area below the deck on both ends of the bridge was an innovation not used in the West until the nineteenth century. The open spandrels not only lessen the weight of the bridge, thus reducing the outward thrusts on the abutments, but also facilitate the passage of periodic flood waters that might impact the bridge. Unlike most old bridges whose construction can only be attributed to anonymous builders, the design of the Zhaozhou Bridge—also called the Anji [Safe Crossing] Bridge—is credited to Li Chun, a historical figure who also organized the masons who crafted it.

Approximately 65 meters long with an open span of nearly 37 meters, the low-lying bridge rises only some 7 meters above the water below. The full circle, of which the arch is but a segment, has a radius of 27.7 meters along the west side and 27.3 meters along the east side. Viewed from beneath, it’s apparent how the bridge was constructed using twenty-eight parallel sets of stone voussoirs (wedge-shaped stones forming the curved part of an arch) that run the length of each segmental ring. While these parallel voussoirs produce a stone structure of great flexibility, the need to stabilize the bridge led to the use of reinforcing stone rods, stone hooks, and dovetailed iron keys, as well as a slight inward camber. The elegant geometry and sophisticated mathematics of the superstructure were enhanced with profuse stone carvings along the balustrades and posts. These carvings include a variety of dragons and protective amulets in animal form.

With tall sails providing propulsion, boat traffic along the Xiao River continued well into the middle of the twentieth century. In time, because of diminished water flow and increased road traffic, the Zhaozhou Bridge, like numerous other bridges on the North China Plain, fell into disrepair. In the 1980s, major efforts were made to restore the bridge to its original state. The Zhaozhou Bridge
today is preserved within a park-like setting, and an admission ticket is required to cross it. In this in situ outdoor museum, exhibits focus on the technical aspects of the bridge’s structure as well as the historical circumstances that gave rise to its construction. Although graceful open-spandrel, segmental masonry bridges are ubiquitous today throughout the world—and are usually considered to be modern since they are constructed of reinforced cement rather than blocks of stone—it is important to remember that their design had its origins in China more than thirteen centuries ago.

Ronald G. KNAPP

Further Reading


The segmented open spandrels (arches) that support the Zhaozhou Bridge, built during the Sui dynasty, were a Chinese innovation. Such engineering allowed the bridge to span a wide river and accommodate boat traffic.
Zhejiang Province

Zhejiang, on China’s southeastern coast, is one of the nation’s wealthiest and most fertile provinces. Since the tenth century Zhejiang has been a leading producer of silk, porcelain, tea, and paper. It also is the home of many of China’s political and intellectual elite. Its 101,800 square kilometers, which make it comparable in size to Iceland, include 3,061 off-shore islands.

Zhejiang Province historically has been in the forefront of China’s cultural and economic development since the early Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). During the seventh century its emergence as a major grain producer resulted in the extension of the Grand Canal to Hangzhou. Since the tenth century Zhejiang also has been a leading producer of silk, porcelain, tea, and paper and a center of commerce and trade. When the Southern Song dynasty established its capital in Hangzhou in 1127, Zhejiang also became the cultural and political center of China. It continues to be the home of many of China’s political and intellectual elite. Two of the greatest modern Chinese writers—Mao Dun and Lu Xun—were from Zhejiang, as...
are nearly one-fifth of the members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Zhejiang also produced two of China’s best-known contemporary leaders: Chiang Kai-shek, president of the Republic of China on Taiwan from 1949 to 1975, and Zhou En-lai, premier of the People’s Republic of China from 1949 to 1976.

Zhejiang Province has been a prime beneficiary of China’s current economic reforms. The province’s economy since 1978 has grown faster than the national average, thanks in part to the rapid growth of collective and private firms. Zhejiang is one of the wealthiest of China’s provinces and ranked among the top four or five on various economic indicators along with economic powerhouses such as Guangdong and Jiangsu. In addition to its traditional industries, Zhejiang has concentrated on developing its machinery, chemical, electronics, and pharmaceutical industries. Foreign tourism, trade, and investment also have flourished, especially in the coastal cities of Ningbo, Hangzhou, and Wenzhou.

Shawn SHIEH

Further Reading

ZHENG Chenggong
Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662) built on the structure of commerce and naval power established by his father, Zheng Zhilong, to support a Ming loyalist regime in Fujian, and after the dynasty’s collapse in 1644 he continued to oppose the Qing. He expelled the Dutch from Taiwan in 1661–1662 and died shortly thereafter.

Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 was known to Europeans as “Coxinga,” from the Chinese word Guoxingye (Lord of the Imperial Surname), reflecting his high favor under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) loyalist court at Fuzhou, his continued championing of the Ming loyalist cause after the fall of that court, and perhaps his tacit move toward claiming the Ming succession for himself in the last months of his short life. He was the heir to a maritime power structure built by his father, Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍, who drew on a web of connections among the Fujian ports, Macao, Manila, Taiwan (then not yet heavily settled by Chinese or under Chinese administration), and Japan. Zhilong’s most important base was at Hirado, Japan, where he was a leading subordinate.
of the “captain” of all Chinese in Japan, Li Dan. Zheng Chenggong was born in Hirado; his mother was a Japanese woman from a respected family.

In 1624 Li Dan and Zheng Zhilong brokered the withdrawal of Dutch invaders from the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait, which were Ming territory, to the south coast of Taiwan, which was not. This withdrawal gave the Zheng family some kind of claim to control of Taiwan, which Zheng Chenggong would assert when he expelled the Dutch thirty-eight years later. From 1624 to 1635 Zheng Zhilong fought off rival maritime leaders, made himself indispensable to the tottering Ming dynasty, and maintained his network of fleets and lines of trade as a naval officer of the Ming dynasty. Merchants under his control or paying taxes to him dominated Chinese trade with Japan and with the Dutch on Taiwan and sailed as far as the Malay Peninsula.

When the Manchu Qing took Beijing in 1644, Zheng forces gave at best ambivalent support to the Ming loyalist court at Nanjing, then dominated another loyalist regime at Fuzhou on the Fujian coast. Zheng Chenggong, who had studied with some of the great literati of the late Ming dynasty in Nanjing, attracted the notice of the loyalist emperor at Fuzhou, who bestowed on Zheng the Ming imperial surname Zhu. However, Zheng Zhilong saw no future in resistance, negotiated with the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), and was taken away to end his life in house arrest in Beijing. Several Zheng relatives sought to preserve the maritime power structure; Chenggong won the struggle among them and in the 1650s built a powerful fleet and tightly controlled trade operations centered on his capital at Xiamen on the Fujian coast.

Under increasing pressure from Qing armies and trade embargoes, Zheng Chenggong launched a desperate and unsuccessful attack on Nanjing in 1659, then turned to invade Taiwan and expel the Dutch, only to die in 1662 a few months after their final withdrawal. His son and grandson and their generals maintained power on Taiwan until 1683, when Qing forces commanded by Shi Lang, who had defected from Zheng thirty years before, took control of Taiwan.

John E. WILLS Jr.

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ZHENG He ▶
Zheng He was a diplomat, explorer, and fleet admiral who, between 1405 and 1433, made seven voyages to the Indian Ocean. His expeditions and four naval and land battles brought more than thirty kingdoms into the Chinese economic sphere.

Zheng He was born Ma He in Yunnan Province (southwest China bordering Burma, Laos, and Vietnam.) He was a sixth-generation son of the Ma family, descended from devout Turko-Persian Muslims originally from Bukhara in Central Asia (present-day Uzbekistan).

In 1381 a Ming dynasty army came to Yunnan to quell a revolt. Ma He was taken captive, castrated, and trained as a servant for the imperial court where he became a confidant of the Prince of Yan (1360–1424), fourth son of Hongwu (1328–1398), the first Ming emperor. Yan became Yongle, the third Ming emperor. Ma He, renamed Zheng He on 11 February 1404, was director of palace servants and held the highest rank among eunuchs.

Yongle began major shipbuilding in 1403, shortly after he assumed the throne, and ordered Zheng to command a naval expedition combining exploration and the extension of the tribute system to the Western (Indian) Ocean. Zheng ultimately made seven voyages:

- First voyage (1405–1407) to Champa (a kingdom in South Vietnam), Java, Malacca, Sumatra, Ceylon, Cochin, and Calicut (southwest coast of India)
- Second voyage (1407–1409) to Champa, Java, Siam, Sumatra, and Calicut
- Third voyage (1409–1411) to Champa, Calicut, Coimbatore (southern India), and Puttanpur (western India)
- Fourth voyage (1412–1415) to Champa and Calicut, Hormuz (Persian Gulf), the Maldives, and Sumatra
- Fifth voyage (1416–1419) to Champa and Calicut, the Maldives, Hormuz, Aden, Mogadishu and Malindi (both coastal East Africa)
- Sixth voyage (1421–1422) separate squadrons sailed to Champa and Calicut, Ceylon and the Maldives, Hormuz, the Arabian peninsula, East Africa, and Sumatran states (Lambri, Aru, and Semudera)
- Seventh voyage (1431–1433) followed the route to Hormuz

From 1424 to 1430, Zheng commanded the garrison at Nanking, and the fleet remained there until the new emperor, Xuande (1398–1435) sent him on his seventh and last exploration. Zheng He died during this voyage and was buried at sea.

For all but the fifth voyage, contemporary records (Mingshi, Ming History) document the numbers of ships and personnel. For instance, on the first voyage, Zheng commanded 62 treasure ships, 255 other vessels, and 27,800 armed troops and mariners; other voyages were comparable. Later historians listed the treasure ships as nine-masted junks about 127 meters (416 feet) long.
and 52 meters (170 feet) wide) and capable of carrying up to 1,500 tons. By comparison, Columbus’s were about 17 meters (55 feet) long and carried 700–1,000 tons; a modern ship of 60 meters (200 feet) long carries 1,200 tons. Zheng’s treasure ships would have been the largest wooden ships ever built, a claim many historians now dispute.

Zheng He’s fleet consisted of treasure ships, horse ships, troop transports, and supply ships as well as auxiliary craft such as patrol boats and water tankers; overall, 1,476 wooden ships were constructed during his administration; the first voyage alone consisted of 252 vessels. The improbable sizes of the largest ships are questioned because of varying measurements given in zhang (141 inches) and chi (14.1 inches) which varied through time. Keel-less, bark-rigged treasure vessels had up to nine masts and twelve sails, and archaeological specimens suggest lengths of 164.5–183 meters (538–600 feet), while Chinese documentary accounts indicate lengths of up to 117–136 meters (385–440) feet and beams of 48–55 meters (157.5–180 feet).

Zheng’s seven expeditions and four naval and land battles brought more than thirty kingdoms into the Chinese economic sphere. During Zheng He’s tenure, China expanded its maritime exploration and seagoing trade, established and enhanced tribute systems, and embarked on territorial conquests in the north, especially present-day Mongolia, and the south into Vietnam. His seven voyages served to establish the wealth and political power and technical sophistication of China. Subsequently, China withdrew from the sea and focused on land conquests, and Ming dynasty naval efforts diminished dramatically primarily due to the costs of maintaining the fleet and financial pressures to maintain armies fighting in Mongolia.

Charles C. KOLB

Further Reading


Zhong Yong
(Doctrine of the Mean)

One of Confucianism’s sacred texts, the Zhong Yong serves as a guide to achieving harmony—personal, social, and political—through a mind and self in a state of perfect equilibrium. Translated as The Doctrine of the Mean, it embodies many of the central themes of Confucianism.

The Doctrine of the Mean (the Zhong Yong) comprises two chapters in the Classic of Rites (Li Ji), one of the sets of books that form the canon of Confucian thought. During the early period of the Song dynasty (960–1279), it came to be regarded as a single text worthy of investigation and study on its own. Tradition maintains that it was written by Zisi (Kong Ji), who was the grandson of Confucius (551–479 BCE). The date of its composition is likely around 450 BCE.

The intellectual concerns of the Song period included, for the most part, an engagement with Buddhism, which advocated the understanding of the relationship that existed not between human beings but between human beings and the cosmos. This idea profoundly changed Song China, and more importantly, it forced the thinkers of the day to go back and reexamine traditional Chinese works of philosophy to see if they could find in them native traditions that also addressed the relationship vaunted by Buddhism. Thus, the Zhong Yong was read as a spiritual text first and foremost and only afterwards as a guide for bringing about a better and just society.

The work is written in an aphoristic style, with a student posing questions and a sage providing the answers. At first glance, these aphorisms seem to be unrelated, but a closer examination reveals that they address specific spiritual and philosophical themes, all of which seek to elucidate the spiritual content of Chinese culture, and not only its pragmatic concerns.

The larger aspect of externality is the cosmos, or heaven, and this too is linked with spiritual internality. Both heaven and the individual share the same reality; that is, perfection. But, whereas heaven does not deviate from its true reality, an individual does. This causes disharmony and strife, which devastate not only the individual but also society. A corrupt ruler corrupts those whom he rules, and a corrupt individual corrupts those that live with him in the community. It is only after intense struggle to attain moral rectitude (the state of perfection) that the harmony between heaven and the individual can once more be reestablished, and thus strife and disharmony are destroyed. Self-perfection, therefore, reaches outwards; first it perfects society, and then it joins with the eternal perfection that is contained in heaven. In effect, perfection is a virtue of heaven, which is also placed inside the individual; the task of the individual is to find and highlight this virtue in his or her own life.

The Zhong Yong thus offers a far more profound evaluation of perfectibility than that found in Buddhism. The goal is not solipsistic; it does not stay focused on the self; it is not, and never should be, an isolated event. Rather, the demand is for a person to become sincere so that she or he might know that his or her own perfectibility is an immense force for change, and for the better. And this
From The Doctrine of the Mean

What Heaven has endowed is called the nature. Following the nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called instruction. The Way cannot be departed from for so much as an instant. If it were possible to depart from, it would not be the Way.


perfectibility is made manifest in moral rectitude, which creates and then sustains a perfected self living within a perfected community, all governed by the laws of a perfect cosmos. And this state of harmony is also the place where truth and justice easily endure.

In the Zhong Yong, Chinese intellectual culture found a thorough and complete system of personal and social life, which went farther than Buddhist tenets. For this reason, it became a central text for later Confucian thinkers who, throughout the breadth of Chinese history, turned to it again and again as a guide and methodology to attain and retain the Way of Confucianism.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading:


The Zhou dynasty covered two time periods: the Western Zhou and the Eastern Zhou. The former was characterized by the hegemonic rule of Zhou lineage over a number of tribute states. The Eastern Zhou period, when the Zhou family was forced eastward out of their western homeland, was characterized by the rise of former Zhou and non-Zhou states who competed for control and moral authority.

Western Zhou period: 1045–771 BCE; Eastern Zhou period 770–221 BCE

Origins

The original Zhou nation developed in the Wei River valley in Shaanxi. Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) oracle-bone records dating from 1200–1000 BCE suggest that the Shang considered the Zhou alternately as an enemy and as a tribute-paying subject. By the middle of the eleventh century BCE the Zhou had built a coalition of partners, including former Shang subjects in northern Henan, and destroyed Shang hegemony (influence). In texts compiled centuries later this power shift was attributed to the will of heaven and called the “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming). In Zhou bronze texts the term referred to the will of ancestral spirits, perhaps manifested as astral phenomena (in religious philosophy, occurrences held to be next in refinement above those in the tangible world). But by the Eastern Zhou period the power shift was mythologized as a heroic military conquest commanded by heaven and executed by King Wu (representing “martial” reckoning against immoral leaders), who was the son of King Wen, the founder of the Zhou nation (who represented “humane” treatment of inferiors and a system of utopian agrarian government). By the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) the Mandate of Heaven clearly signified shifts in a system of natural forces, much closer to the five phases system (wuxing) that was popular by the third century BCE. The Mandate of Heaven theory became a permanent part of political thought and was used by later Chinese reformers to frighten defiant rulers, as well as by those who took up arms against the government to justify their rebellion.

After the shift of influence from the Shang in the east to the Zhou in the west, Zhou rulers spent the next two centuries consolidating their power by military coercion and trade. They concentrated on control over resources that were essential to their economic system of gift giving and award—a system inherited from the Shang and
intimately tied to the spread of the worship of Zhou ancestral spirits. Cowries (a kind of seashell), jade, and bronze—all being valued in Shang religion and all requiring trade ties with distant regions—continued to be important to the Zhou. Although the Zhou initially worshiped Shang spirits, by the middle of the tenth century BCE their own Zhou ancestors had clearly become national icons. Nation building became a form of ancestor worship as the Zhou rewarded subjects with sacrificial vessels, wines, ritual clothing, and agricultural land (for food production) to advance the Zhou ritual system. Recipients used these gifts to present mortuary feasts to ancestral spirits, often including the names of their Zhou benefactors and their ancestors in the inscribed prayers.

The sophistication of Zhou carved jades, bronze vessels, and musical instruments points to control over resources and production in regions beyond the Zhou homeland. At the height of Zhou influence, during the late tenth to the late ninth centuries BCE, the Zhou controlled a network that reached west into Gansu Province, northeast to Beijing, southwest into Sichuan Province, east into Shandong Province, and south into Hubei Province and beyond the Yangzi (Chang) River.

**Eastern Zhou**

Scholars subdivide the Eastern Zhou period into the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) and the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), the names for both periods deriving from chronicles collected that detail alliances and conflicts between former subject states of the Zhou. The entire Eastern Zhou era was characterized by larger states annexing smaller states such that by the third century BCE only a few large states remained. During the Spring and Autumn period the Zhou ruler was alternately a puppet of the states of Jin to the north, Zheng to the south, and Qi to the east, each of which took a turn as “hegemon protector” (ba). States on the fringes of the Zhou earlier realm rose to power and challenged the exclusionary protector system.

Powerful new players by the Warring States period included the states of Qin, located to the west in the old Zhou homeland; Yue, spreading north into the lower Huai River valley from the southeastern coastal region; Chu, spreading south and east out of the Han River valley in modern Hubei Province; and Yan, in the northeast near modern-day Beijing. In the meantime Jin (a powerful state that developed in southern Shanxi Province not far from the Zhou administrative city of Chengzhou) divided into territories run by the large lineage groups Wei, Zhao, and Han. The Han took over Zheng, but other states survived simply by allying strategically with larger groups. Examples include Lu, the birthplace of the philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE), and nearby Song, the birthplace of the anti-Confucian thinker Mozi (470?–391? BCE).

The art of strategic alliances, known as the “Theory of Horizontal or Vertical Alliances,” was advanced by itinerant “guests” (ke), who were members of disenfranchised...
artisan and elite families who had studied under masters of military, technical, and ritual arts. By the Warring States period literacy and text production, as well as occult or technical expertise, spread with the guest masters and their disciples from one site of patronage to another. The many new text types and ritual items discovered in Warring States tombs, especially those associated with the southern state of Chu, attest to a cross-fertilization of practices and ideas over great geographical distances. This cross-fertilization no doubt was perpetuated not only by the roving guests but also by the migrations of peoples, states, and armies. The guests took the cultural fabric once identified as Zhou and rewove it, introducing ideologies that better fit the economic and cultural realities of their far-flung patron rulers. They used tales about former Zhou-period rulers to cajole and warn cajole regional leaders. Founding kings Wen and Wu were cast as paragons of honesty and humility, and—most important to enhancing the uncertain position of these guest advisers—the wise minister Zhou Gong (regent for Wu’s son and cult founder of the state of Lu) was cast as vital to the foundation of a strong Zhou state. Zhou Gong assumed rule while the king was weak, gave speeches about morality, repressed remnant Shang rebels, established an administration, and politely retired when the king came of age.

Drastic Social Changes

A comparison of the Warring States and early Western Zhou economies shows drastic social changes. The economic network that was expanded by the Zhou from the eleventh through the ninth centuries BCE collapsed under its own ideological weight (a collapse that continued through the Spring and Autumn period). The rigid link to Zhou kinship through mortuary ritual and a gift-giving system was not sustainable. In contrast, the major states during the Warring States period established their own monetary systems and individualized religious systems that incorporated both local practices and elements of the archaic but prestigious Zhou rhetoric. Lesser states participated in the expanded networks of the larger states. Markets were common in every city. The export of mass-produced trade goods and the import of exotic goods thrived. The network of interstate relationships was often multilateral, involving trade, warfare, marriage, and political agreements. Until the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) conquered the entire region and attempted unification, early China was a complex social web of mingled social classes, competing philosophies, and people from different cultural backgrounds. Amid this cultural fluidity individual states promoted their own calendar systems, musical styles, artistic styles, script styles, and occult practices.
The Warring States period was the end of the Bronze Age period (when human culture was characterized by the use of bronze, beginning between 4000 and 3000 CE and ending with the advent of the Iron Age) in Zhou culture. Philosophers and writers of this and later periods would use an increasingly idealized vision of Zhou ritual and government as a rhetorical foil against which to criticize the political chaos of their own periods.

Constance A. COOK

Further Reading
**ZHOU Enlai**

Zhōu Ėnlái 周恩来

1898–1976  **First premier of the People’s Republic of China**

Considered one of the most important politicians in the Communist revolution, Zhou Enlai was the first premier of the People’s Republic of China and chief diplomat for Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong. Zhou’s less ideological approach was pivotal in determining the future of Communism in China.

One of the towering figures of China’s Communist revolution, Zhou Enlai was premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1949 until his death in 1976, chief diplomat for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong, and mentor to CCP general secretary Deng Xiaoping, among others. Zhou Enlai is typically remembered as the revolution’s second-most important politician. He was the functionary who made Chairman Mao’s policies operational. Serving the Communist Party for a half-century in both international and domestic affairs, Zhou played a critical role in China’s rise to power in the twentieth century.

True to the meaning of his given name “Enlai” (“Coming of Grace”), Zhou excelled at resolving logistical problems and mediating between opposing groups. He is known for his negotiations with U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger that culminated in the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, the agreement that struck a compromise on the thorny issue of Taiwan and culminated in the reestablishment of normal relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States. In 1964 and again in 1975 Zhou urged the adoption of the Four Modernizations, a new policy direction emphasizing investment in advanced technology and economic construction that set the stage for Deng Xiaoping’s Second Revolution in the post–Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) period.

Zhou Enlai rose quickly to a leadership position during the so-called United Front phase of Chinese politics (1924–1927), when his interpersonal skills were particularly useful for mediating between the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), China’s Communist Party, and the Soviet Union’s Communist International. Zhou first entered politics as a student activist and journalist in Tianjin during the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Exposed to Marxist ideas for the first time while studying in Japan, Zhou grew increasingly committed to Communist ideology after he was jailed for six months in Tianjin for participating in street protests. In 1920 he joined the wave of Chinese youth traveling to Europe to participate in work-study opportunities. He became known among the overseas Chinese community in France as an energetic and resourceful revolutionary organizer and publicist. Returning to China in 1924, Zhou was appointed secretary of the Communist Party of the Guangdong-Guangxi region and political director of the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou (Canton), a position that allowed him to earn the trust of revolutionary military officers.

Zhou would continue to be admired by a variety of constituencies both inside and outside the Communist Party because he was perceived to be a force for moderation and openness. Zhou personally handled all of Chairman Mao’s foreign policy initiatives throughout the half-century of their political partnership. Mao himself
rarely traveled abroad and typically left the details of his policies to others. Even in the rare instances when Mao met personally with a head of state, such as his historic meeting with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in Moscow to cement the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1950 or with U.S. president Richard Nixon in Beijing to open up relations with the United States in 1972, the chairman relied on Zhou to initiate and finalize all arrangements. Thus, it is hard to distinguish the degree to which Zhou should be credited with the substance, as opposed to the mere execution, of these momentous shifts in policies.

Some analysts portray Zhou as a mere appendage of Mao, a skilled implementer of another man’s strategic vision, whereas others portray Zhou as an independent force in his own right, a self-effacing figure who discretely shaped and expanded the broad field of action that Mao afforded him. The specifics of each case must be sorted out before an informed evaluation of Zhou’s significance can be determined. Regarding the 1972 opening of relations with the United States, for example, not Zhou but rather his foreign minister, Marshall Chen Yi, first advocated the conceptual shift toward détente with the United States in a strategic report submitted to Mao in 1969. Zhou could never have acted on Chen Yi’s recommendation to improve relations with the United States without Mao’s explicit endorsement. Yet, after Mao gave approval for this broad policy shift and granted the request of the U.S. Ping Pong team to visit Beijing, Zhou orchestrated the complex preparations leading up to Nixon’s visit with intelligence and finesse.

A Symbiotic Pair

Retrospectively, Zhou has won praise from those who see him as representing a more benign and cosmopolitan alternative to the Chinese Communism championed by Mao. Considering the calamitous result of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, Zhou does seem to stack up favorably by comparison. However, comparing the first and second most important Chinese revolutionaries like this presumes that their careers can be disentangled from one another. This is only partially true. Although they began as rivals, the two men became an indissoluble symbiotic pair after Zhou subordinated himself to Mao’s leadership over the course of the Long March (1934–1935). Actually their personal relationship was always strained, but they managed to forge a potent political partnership despite their contrasting personalities. Zhou was by nature a prudent and tolerant team player, whereas Mao was an uncompromising rebel, polarizing and overbearing. Mao was the brains of the dyad, and Zhou, its arms and legs. Their careers became so intertwined that Zhou must be considered accountable, at least to some degree, for all of Mao’s destructive policies. He was the technocrat who enabled them to be implemented. If Zhou had sided with the leaders trying to restrain Mao rather than constantly aligning himself with Mao, the immense human suffering caused by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution might have been limited considerably. Zhou Enlai may be credited with having mitigated some of the destructiveness of the Red Guard movement by stationing guards, for example, to defend valuable cultural properties like the Forbidden City, but he also prolonged the Cultural Revolution in that his willingness to modify the excesses of the movement kept it operational and seemingly palatable.

Although his real opinions were often shrouded in secrecy, Zhou disagreed with Mao on the critical issue of how to pace and structure China’s economic development. Zhou expressed disagreement with Mao’s so-called Little Leap in 1956, the precursor to the more extreme Great Leap Forward campaign that Mao devised in 1958. Zhou thought the targets for growth that Mao was advocating were overambitious and recommended scaling them back. Mao became angry at Zhou for suggesting a slower timetable and forced Zhou to recant his views before a large meeting of party delegates. A few years later, when Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai urgently sought to convince Mao to halt the Great Leap Forward, Zhou did not support Peng’s petition but rather remained cowed and neutral. This was also the case in February 1967 when several military officers challenged Mao’s Cultural Revolution policies. Zhou agreed with the officers’ complaint that the Cultural Revolution should be curtailed and order restored, but again he remained neutral, unwilling to risk detaching himself from Mao. Thus, Zhou failed to defend the public interest when it really counted, that is, when his support for constraining Mao might have decisively blunted Mao’s power.

According to the memoirs of Mao’s personal physician, Zhou behaved surprisingly obsequiously in Mao’s
presence, tasting his food to make sure that it was not poisoned and crawling at his feet to show him maps as if Zhou were a eunuch serving the emperor. In private Mao referred to Zhou dismissively as “his housekeeper.” Apparently, the servile way in which Zhou related to Mao was partially a strategy for assuaging Mao’s ego and easing his paranoia and partially a relic of feudal habits and arrangements. An important watershed in cementing Zhou’s partnership with Mao in the early years was Zhou’s convincing apology during the Yan’an Rectification Movement of 1943. Zhou had been singled out for special criticism at Yan’an for his role in pushing Mao out of power at the Ningdu Conference of 1932. Zhou outranked Mao prior to the Long March and had sided with the Soviet-backed majority against Mao’s guerilla warfare strategy.

“Self-Rectification”

Over the course of the Long March, Zhou had switched his allegiance to Mao. To persuade Mao that he could be trusted, Zhou put on a consummate performance at Yan’an, chastising himself bitterly for ever having doubts about Mao and declaring his complete loyalty going forward. In subsequent years Zhou would be called upon repeatedly to demean himself like this, most notably near the end of his life when Mao’s wife Jiang Qing and her allies accused the ailing Zhou of being a closet Confucian and arranged for Zhou to endure a “self-rectification” before hundreds of officials within the Great Hall of the People in 1974.

In the aftermath of heir-apparent Lin Biao’s seeming betrayal of Mao in 1971 and his subsequent death in a plane crash, the need to establish a credible successor to Mao loomed heavily in the minds of both Zhou and Mao. By 1972 the Cultural Revolution’s ideological extremism was sputtering, and in this new circumstance the contrasting approaches of Zhou and Mao seemed more contradictory than complementary. By 1972 Zhou had sprung into action, restoring normal governmental functions, rehabilitating party veterans, and putting the economy back on solid footing. Mao and his radical allies, on the other hand, seemed anxious to keep these “rightist” tendencies in check and to salvage some positive legacy for the Cultural Revolution. Because both Zhou and Mao were chronically ill, Zhou with cancer and Mao with Lou Gehrig’s disease, a sense of urgency infused their decision making. The subtle rivalry between Mao and Zhou, long suppressed by the self-effacing Zhou, flared up as they both sought to leave their personal stamp on the future.
direction of the revolution to which they had dedicated their lives. What was at stake was whether the party machinery would be left in capable hands. Zhou was determined to pass on his position as premier to Deng Xiaoping and to secure Mao’s endorsement for it. Mao respected Deng’s abilities as an administrator, and he gave Zhou the approval he sought to return Deng to power and make him acting premier despite the objections of the radicals. But Mao remained ambivalent about Deng as a successor because he wanted the ultimate decision maker to be someone whose ideology he trusted would remain purely revolutionary, such as Wang Hongwen or Hua Guofeng, his choices for successors. Mao did not want to see ideological objectives diminished or buried. Mao suspected that Deng was ultimately “a capitulationist,” that is, one who would eventually forgo revolutionary aspirations and “go down the capitalist road” were he not properly kept in check by a genuine revolutionary like himself.

By January 1976, when Zhou succumbed to cancer, Mao’s credibility was on the wane because of his lingering support for ideological extremists such as his wife, Jiang Qing. On the other hand, Zhou’s reputation had been enhanced. His conspicuous role in restoring governmental functions and rehabilitating persecuted intellectuals and party veterans since 1971 was widely appreciated. Deng was seen as the one few cadres capable of continuing Zhou’s work in his absence. The intense outpouring of grief accompanying news of Zhou’s death unsettled Mao and his allies and spurred them to make a decisive move to curtail public mourning for Zhou and to remove Deng Xiaoping from power for a second time.

Demonstration Suppressed

On 4 April 1976, coinciding with the Qingming Festival to honor the dead, thousands gathered at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in defiance of strictures, laying wreaths, poems, and flowers in tribute to Zhou at the Monument to the People’s Heroes. The gathering threatened to escalate into a demonstration against Mao himself as some wall posters denounced him as a cruel Qin Shi Huang Di, the despotic first emperor famous in history for “burning the books and burying the scholars.” The CCP sent public security forces during the night of 4–5 April to remove the offerings from the monument and cordoned off the area in an effort to keep the throngs of mourners at bay. The radicals responded by accusing Deng Xiaoping of orchestrating a conspiracy, and troops were sent in to suppress the demonstration on the night of 5 April. After Mao’s died in September and the Gang of Four was arrested, mourning for Zhou was again permitted. Deng Xiaoping was exonerated of conspiracy charges, and the verdict on the so-called Tiananmen Incident of 1976 was reversed after Deng replaced Mao’s appointed successor, Hua Guofeng, as paramount leader in a peaceful transfer of power that began in 1979 and was formally consolidated in 1981.

The dramatic events after Zhou’s death suggest that Zhou ultimately won the footrace with Mao over the succession issue in the manner of the tortoise overtaking the hare. Some might even go so far as to say that Zhou finally stepped out from under the shadow of Mao to contend with him, albeit in his self-effacing way, during the final years of his life. Decades later we see that Zhou’s more moderate, less ideological approach proved pivotal in determining the future of communism in China. Mao’s choice of successor, the ideologue Hua Guofeng, could not compete with Zhou’s candidate, the seasoned pragmatist and team player, Deng Xiaoping.

Zhou’s rigorous work schedule, interrupted by only a few hours of sleep a night, epitomized the self-sacrifice and industriousness implied by Mao’s slogan, “Serve the People,” a motto that Zhou wore pinned to his lapel every day.

Shelley Drake HAWKS

Further Reading


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Dance and Politics

The political beliefs of Zhou Enlai can be explained by observing his behavior and performance on the dance floor.

Zhou’s handling of his political life can be understood by analogy to his behavior on the dance floor. Both Mao and Zhou enjoyed ballroom dancing. For Mao, dance parties were occasions for reveling in the adulation of a harem of young ladies. Ever anxious not to upstage the chairman, Zhou Enlai always left the dance floor the moment Mao arrived, although dancing, along with table tennis, was one of the few pastimes he permitted himself. But Zhou abstained himself from the limelight in deference to Mao because Zhou wished to preserve harmonious relations with Mao. Within that ruler-minister relationship, Zhou had to display his junior status conspicuously.

This was the secret of Zhou’s ability to survive so many purges; Mao could rely on him because he trusted that Zhou would never plot against him.

A radical Maoist once quipped that Zhou Enlai always swung his dance partner to the right. Apparently this was true—but not because Zhou consciously swung the ladies in the direction of his politics, as his critic was suggesting, but because an arm injury limited his range of motion. Nevertheless, the joke is in fact suggestive of who Zhou really was and how he was understood during his final years. By the early 1970s, Zhou was clearly a pragmatist, or a moderate, surviving in a sea of radicals. He was their tool, but he was not one of them, and they knew it.


ZHOU Xuexi

Zhōu Xuéxī 周学熙

1866–1947 Qing and Republican official

Zhou Xuexi was an official in the late Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and early Republic of China (1912–1949). After retiring from public service he championed north China’s industrial development, rivaling the reputation of Zhang Jian, another magnate who operated his industrial conglomerate at Nantong near Shanghai.

Zhou Xuexi was born in Nanjing, although his father, Zhou Fu, a noted provincial governor in the Self-Strengthening Movement (a period of institutional reforms during the Qing dynasty), kept an ancestral home at Zhide (now Dongzhi) in Anhui Province. In 1886 the younger Zhou began his bureaucratic career as an attaché at the Bureau of Irrigation and Transportation in the Ministry of Works and became a juren (provincial graduate; the official designation granted a passer of a provincial examination) in 1893 under somewhat controversial circumstances. After futile attempts at the coveted jinshi degree (presented scholar; a degree conferred on successful candidates in the highest-level Civil service examination), he purchased official titles qualifying him to serve at various provincial posts until he found a patron in Yuan Shikai (who later succeeded Sun Yat-sen as president of the Republic of China). Rising quickly through the ranks, Zhou was instrumental in the establishment of state-supervised enterprises such as the Chee-Hsin Cement Co. (1900), Beiyang Mint (1902), the Lan-chou Official Mining Co. (1907, merged with the Kaiping Colliery to form the Kailian Mining Administration in 1912), and the Beijing Waterworks (1908). Into the republican period he served as Yuan’s chief aide in economic affairs and as minister of finance (1912–1913, 1915–1916). He joined the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) briefly to push through the controversial Reorganization Loan, a £25,000,000 political loan granted in 1913–1914 from England, France, Germany, Russia and Japan in support of Yuan Shikai.

However, Zhou’s resistance to Yuan Shikai’s monarchial bid and Beijing’s factional politics soon forced his resignation. Although subsequently he received appointments such as national director of the Cotton Development Administration (1919), he increasingly pursued private industrial development and investment, beginning with the Guangqin Spinning and Weaving Mill in Wuxi in 1917. Amid charges of misappropriating state property, he privatized the Huaxin Cotton Spinning Mill (Tianjin), which soon branched out to Qingdao in 1918. To ensure a steady supply of raw material and financing, he organized the Xinghua Capital Corp. and Xingji cotton brokerage. Successes led to the launching in 1919 of branch mills at Tangshan and Weihui in Henan Province and formation of the Huaxin Corporation. Capitalized at 10 million yuan, the corporation was to coordinate the activities of the mills, although each retained its own board of directors and accounting independence. Profits from the Kailian mines provided the initial capital for the Yaohua Mechanical Glass Co., Ltd. (1921), a joint venture with Banque d’Outremer Consortium Industriel Belge,
Vanishing Owners and Melting Spindles

*The rise and ultimate demise of the cotton mills in Tianjin are indicative of the unpredictable growth and development of industry in China. Zhou Xuexi worked toward repairing such unsteady conditions, which were often exacerbated by lax government policies.*

The absence of a stable group of industrialists, a problem both caused and compounded by the political instability of North China, meant that local industry grew in erratic fits and starts. Nowhere is this more clear than in the case of Tianjin’s largest mechanized industry, cotton spinning. In its bid to become a cotton center of national stature, Tianjin had several advantages: a local class of moneyed investors, access to raw materials, and a large market. Changes in the political scene brought in new entrepreneurs and gave the mills at least three opportunities to flourish—during World War I, in the late 1930s, and immediately after the Allied victory in World War II. But in each case chronic warfare, as well as government policies that sometimes verged on the cannibalistic, ultimately made it impossible for industry to prosper.

In the year after World War I, most of the Tianjin cotton mills were founded with the sponsorship of specific official or warlord cliques. Four of the mills were built at the southeastern edge of the concessions; two were north of the old city. Cao Kun, of the Fengtian warlord clique, was a major investor in the Heng Yuan Mill. The Yu Yuan Mill was dominated by the Anfu warlord clique. Its largest single stockholder was Ni Sichong (1.1 million yuan), and its original Board of Directors included Ni, Duan Qirui, and various high officials. Zhou Xuexi’s Hua Xin Mill and the Yu Da Mill were other attractive targets for warlord investment.


which held the patent on the Fourcault process of making flat glass. To maintain control of these far-flung industries, Zhou established the Huaxin central office in 1922 (dissolved 1931) to oversee the four cotton mills, supported by the Huaxin Bank (flourished 1923, dissolved 1931). Declining reappointments to various companies, he attempted to retain control through his Industrial Office in 1924 but soon retired from active management of the group. At the height of his industrial career he controlled assets estimated at over 40 million yuan.

In retirement Zhou dedicated himself to philanthropic work, establishing lineage halls to commemorate the Zhou family lineage and schools and charitable estates at Wuhu, Zhide, and Tianjin. He also compiled and financed the publication of works on neo-Confucianism, although he became a practicing Buddhist and vegetarian in 1929. He was buried in Beijing.

Kwan Man BUN

Further Reading


ZHOU Zuoren
Zhōu Zuōrén 周作人
1884–1967 Essayist

Zhou Zuoren, a leading essayist and social-cultural critic, influenced the development of modern Chinese literature by advocating “Human Literature” (its focus on humanistic as opposed to imperialist values), and by experimenting with styles that blend the unpretentious of the vernacular with the elegance of the classical.

Zhou Zuoren, a leading essayist of the twentieth century, was one of the major leaders in the New Culture Movement, a cultural critic, and a controversial writer. Born into a scholar-official family whose fortune was in sharp decline after centuries of social prestige, Zhou Zuoren grew up in Shaoxing County, Zhejiang Province, and received a traditional education in Chinese classics. After failing entry-level civil service examinations between 1898 and 1900, Zhou was ready for change and decided in 1901 to enroll in Nanjing’s Jiangnan Naval Academy; there he studied English, mathematics, natural sciences, and military and naval history. In 1906 Zhou went to Japan on a government scholarship intended to support his study of architecture. Zhou instead turned his energy to studying language. In 1910 he returned to China without earning a degree but with language skills in Japanese, English, Russian, and Greek.

Zhou’s return to China coincided with the 1911 Revolution, an event that marked not only the beginning of Republican China (1912–1949) but also decade-long chaos that would stimulate the New Culture Movement. In 1917 he accepted a professorship in the College of Arts at Beijing University, a tenure that Zhou retained until 1945. In 1925 Zhou was instrumental in expanding the curriculum in literature to establish the Department of Eastern Literature in Beijing University. From the 1920s to the 1940s he also taught at Yenching University and Beijing Normal University as a guest professor.

Already an experienced and published translator of Western literature, Zhou entered his most productive and innovative years as a writer in Beijing. He contributed regularly to the magazine New Youth with translations of literature from Russia, Japan, Poland, Hungary, and the United States. He was co-translator and co-compiler of Yuwai xiaoshuo ji (Short Stories from Abroad), China’s first such publication. Most important to his growing influence was his article, “Ren de wenxue” (Human Literature), published in New Youth in 1918 and viewed by his contemporaries as the article that conceptualized a goal of the rising literary revolution, as the literary experiments in the May Fourth era began to be called then. Between 1919 and 1920 he was active in promoting the “New Village” in China, a utopian experiment that was initiated by the Japanese Shirahaba School and influenced Chinese youth with anarchist idealism. He was one of the founding members of the Literary Research Association when it was established in Beijing in 1921. He also was one of the founders of an influential literary weekly, Yusi (Threads of Talk), when it was launched in 1924 and remained, in practice, its editor-in-chief. Throughout the 1920s Zhou contributed regularly to the literary
supplement of Jing Bao, one of the major newspapers in north China.

**Experiments with the Essay**

Beyond his “Human Literature,” Zhou’s enduring contribution to modern Chinese literature lies in his experiments with the essay. His knowledge of traditional as well as foreign literature and languages evidently influenced his choice of style and genre. Yet his attention to style was also a direct reaction to the politicization of the May Fourth Movement, which turned some literary pursuits into propaganda. Zhou, an outspoken advocate for vernacular reform, took the view that the best style should be presented in the vernacular yet be inclusive of the elegance of the classical. He praised the style of the natural and the unpretentious and valued “taste,” “simplicity,” and even “austerity” in essay composition. His own essays, which were published and compiled into thirty volumes during his life, reflected such values. At Beijing University, Xie Bingxin, Xu Dishan, and Yu Pingbo were among those the best-known writers whose style was influenced by Zhou.

Although he held the position of a radical iconoclast against Confucian tradition in his national debut in *New Youth*, Zhou took a more inclusive attitude toward Chinese literature by the mid-1920s when he turned to writing *biji*, essays based on informal notes and musings he made while reading. His writing subjects during the 1920s ranged from literature to folklore, religion, sexology, women, and current affairs, and his sympathy always went to the weak and the oppressed. In the late 1930s and early 1940s he even made use of writings in Confucian tradition to expound his ideas. Seemingly a dramatic change, Zhou’s approach to China’s cultural legacies initially resulted from his disillusionment over the government controlled by the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1928, which used violence to suppress radical youth and the Communists. During the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known primarily outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War, which was fought in the larger context of World War II beginning in 1939), Zhou again used his comments on the humanism in the Confucian tradition as a masked criticism of Japan’s invasion.

A proponent of cosmopolitanism toward foreign cultures, Zhou had been known as a Japanophile because of his writings and public activities in promoting Chinese understanding of Japan and Japanese culture since the 1920s. Yet through these writings he made a clear distinction between Japanese politics of his time, which angered him, and Japanese culture, which he admired. Many of his friends were disappointed that he chose to remain in Beijing when Japan invaded, and many more denounced him when he served as the minister of education of the North China Political Council in occupied Beijing. Testimony by underground resisters later revealed that he had been persuaded by them to take the job in order to prevent an energetic collaborator from stepping into this influential position. Zhou’s own writings that criticized in masked language the Japanese brutality during the war also provided corroborative evidence. Regardless of the solid evidence against the accusation of his collaboration,
Zhou was sentenced to a ten-year jail term in the charged political climate after the war. He was released in early 1949 when the Nationalist government collapsed. Zhou chose to return to Beijing; he was able to publish essays, memoirs, and translated works from Japanese and Greek literature only under pseudonyms. He died in 1967 after being beaten and abused for months by the Red Guards.

Revival of Interest

In the 1980s the Chinese people renewed their interest in Zhou’s writings and life in what was termed “Zhou Zuoren Fever.” Not only were his works reprinted, but also hundreds of scholarly articles and several biographies were published. Although his literary accomplishments and his contributions to the literature revolution were appreciated, his service to a collaboration regime under Japanese occupation remained controversial as critics under the influence of nationalism refused to accept his failed “national character.” The revived interest in Zhou attests to both his importance as a writer in the modern Chinese literary movement and to the enduring difficulty of separating politics and culture in modern Chinese history.

Further Reading


LU Yan

The longer the night lasts, the more our dreams will be.

夜 長 梦 多

Yè cháng mèng duō
ZHU De

Zhu De (Chu Teh), the man who would found the Chinese Communist army, was the son of a poor tenant farmer. After Zhu graduated from Yunnan Military Academy in 1911, he participated in anti-Manchu activities in Yunnan and Sichuan provinces between 1912 and 1916. In 1922 he went to Europe on a work-study program and participated in Communist Party activities. Zhu returned to China in 1926 and became involved in the army of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang). After the Nanchang Uprising failed in 1927 Zhu led his troops to Hunan Province, where he joined with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976). In Hunan Province they developed an effective military force that would become the Red Army. The Red Army, under Zhu’s command, defended the Jiangxi soviet (the headquarters of the CCP) undertook the 9,656-kilometer Long March to Shaanxi Province.

During the War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945, known outside China as the Second Sino-Japanese War) Zhu commanded the Red Army’s northern forces. After Japan surrendered Zhu was commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) until 1955, when he became a PLA marshal. He later became chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and continually was listed in many high positions, although he was not actively involved in politics after 1954.

Further Reading


ZHU Xī
Zhū Xī 朱熹
1130–1200 Synthesizer of neo-Confucianism

Zhu Xi was perhaps the greatest neo-Confucian philosopher. His Collected Commentaries on the Four Books became the basis of the civil service examinations in 1315 until they were abolished in 1905; twenty-first-century Confucian scholars remain deeply influenced by Zhu’s interpretations.

Zhu Xi, born in Youzi in Fukien Province, was perhaps the greatest neo-Confucian philosopher. He developed and clarified the metaphysics of two earlier philosophers, Cheng Yi (1033–1107) and brother Cheng Hao (1032–1085). According to their view, everything in the universe has two aspects, li (principle) and qi. Li is a structuring principle that accounts for both the way a thing is and the way it ought to be. Although the li is completely present in each and every thing, things are distinguished by having different endowments of qi. Qi is a sort of self-moving ethereal substance, which has varying degrees of turbidity or clarity. Inanimate objects have the most turbid qi, with plants, animals, and humans having increasingly clearer qi.

Because the li is one, everything is part of a potentially harmonious whole. Consequently, a good person has

Zhu Xi’s writings on neo-Confucianism became the foundation of China’s civil service exams for nearly six hundred years, and thus were the focus of study for generations of hopeful scholar-officials.
Philosophy of Zhu Xi

While Zhu Xi, also known as Chu Hsi, is best known for his work Collected Commentaries on the Four Books and its contributions to Neo-Confucianism; he wrote on many topics, as seen below in his work on Heaven and Earth.

In the beginning of the universe there was only material force [ch'i] consisting of yin and yang. This force moved and circulated, turning this way and that. As this movement gained speed, a mass of sediment was pushed together and, since there was no outlet for this, it consolidated to form the earth in the center of the universe. The clear part of material force formed the sky, the sun and moon, the starts and zodiacal spaces. It is only on the outside that the encircling movement perpetually goes on. The earth exists motionless in the center of the system, not at the bottom.

In the beginning of the universe, when it was still in a state of undifferentiated chaos, I imagine there were only water and fire. The sediment from water formed the earth. If today we climb the high mountains and look around, we will see ranges of mountains in the shape of waves. This is because the water formed them like this, though we do not know at what period they solidified. This solidification was at first very soft, but in time it became hard.

Question: I imagine it is like the tide rushing upon and making waves in the save. [Is that right?]
Answer: Yes. The most turbid water formed the earth and the purest fire became wind, thunder, lightning, starts, and the like.

Further Question: Can the universe be destroyed?
Answer: It is indestructible. But in time man will lose all moral principles and everything will be thrown together in a chaos. Man and things will all die out, and then there will be a new beginning.

ZHU Yuanzhang

Zhu Yuánzhāng 朱元璋
1328–1398  Founder of the Ming Dynasty

Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 was the founding emperor of the Ming 明 dynasty (1368–1644). He rose from a life of suffering and adversity to become one of the most powerful and autocratic emperors in Chinese history.

Little is known of Zhu Yuanzhang’s childhood except that he suffered many hardships. When most of his family died during an epidemic in 1344, he sought refuge at a Buddhist temple, where he spent several years as a novice monk, begging for food and basic supplies for the temple and learning to read and write from some of the monks. In 1352, after the temple was attacked and burned by the Yuan 元 military, he joined the Red Turban movement, part of the secret Buddhist-inspired White Lotus Society, which interpreted the floods, starvation, and chaos of the time as signs that the Buddha of the future, Maitreya, was about to appear and that the Mongols had lost the Mandate of Heaven and should be overthrown. The Mandate of Heaven, cited by every dynasty since the Zhou in 1045 BCE, refers to the belief that a benevolent Heaven bestowed the right to rule on every virtuous ruler.

Zhu was tall, physically imposing, intelligent, and fearless in battle. He quickly rose through the ranks and soon had troops under his command. He married his commander’s adopted daughter, and when his commander was killed in battle in 1355, Zhu seemed the natural choice to take his place. In 1356 his troops occupied the important regional city of Nanjing, which had been the seat of several southern kingdoms. He had gained the allegiance of several learned and experienced men, and rather than simply loot and plunder, he and his forces began to administer the territory surrounding Nanjing and to impose peace and order in areas that had been in chaos for over a decade.

He formally broke with the Red Turbans in 1366, and within two years he had eliminated his rivals among the Red Turban commanders. He then declared the founding of a new dynasty, the Ming (meaning “bright” or “light”) and sent his largest army in 1368 to invade and take over the former Yuan capital, which he renamed Beiping, “the north pacified.” The name was changed to Beijing, “the Northern Capital,” in the early fifteenth century.

The new emperor took the reign title Hongwu 明洪武 (Abundantly Martial), and he is also known in history as Ming Taizu 名太祖 (the Grand Progenitor of the Ming). He was energetic, smart, dedicated, and determined to ensure that the people of China would never have to suffer as he and his family had suffered. He ordered an empire-wide land and population survey, kept central government expenses low, and placed the dynasty on a firm financial footing. He put out many pleas, from 1368 on, for men of talent and dedication to come forward and aid him in the great enterprise of governing the empire. But after the empire was fully in his hands, he found it increasingly difficult to trust his officials and subordinates as implicitly as he had during his rise to power.

Whether from some deep character flaws, the insecurities of his youth, or the corruptions of power itself,
he became a paranoid emperor who ultimately tried to control his officials through the blunt use of force and terror. In 1376 he ordered the execution of up to a thousand officials for having “prestamped” tax documents, which he took as a sign of corruption. In 1380 he turned on his prime minister, abolished his position, and had him killed along with another fifteen thousand officials. He ordered that his own Confucian admonitions and teachings be read aloud monthly at every village in the empire, so that the entire population could be taught the virtues of Confucian filial piety and loyalty to the emperor.

After his wife, Empress Ma, died in 1382 the emperor became even more paranoid and continued to order purge after purge, leaving the Confucian bureaucracy terrified and demoralized. Some have estimated that one hundred thousand people were executed by order of the “Abundantly Martial” emperor during his thirty years on the throne. Seldom has so much success and so much failure been combined in one life.

Paul ROPP

Further Reading


The Zhuang (or Bouxcueng) tribal people of the southeast have contributed greatly to the history of southern China. They now are the largest of China's fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minority groups.

The Zhuang is the largest officially recognized minority ethnic group in China. (The Chinese government recognizes one majority group, the Han, and fifty-five minority groups.) They are very tribal and locality-oriented and traditionally have not considered themselves as one nationality. According to the 2000 census of the People's Republic of China, the Zhuang population was about 18 million.

Home
More than 90 percent of the Zhuang people live in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in the southeast, bordering Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin. The remainder live in Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou, and Hunan provinces and often reside in areas populated with other southern Chinese minority groups. A small population of Zhuang also lives in Vietnam. The tourist city of Guilin, with its famous nearby karst limestone landscape, is in a Zhuang-inhabited area. The Zhuang live in hamlets of twenty to thirty households, in brick and wood houses, often on stilts, in rain-forested mountainous regions known for straight high peaks, grottoes, and subterranean rivers.

The climate of Guangxi is mild in winter and tropical in summer. The mountains of Guangxi are heavily forested and rich in tea plantations. Minerals such as iron, coal, gold, copper, aluminum, zinc, and petroleum are abundant. Abundant rainfall flows through traditional bamboo pipes to nurture Zhuang rice paddies that can rise 1,000 meters (3,280 feet). The Zhuang also raise yams, corn, sugar cane, mangos, bananas, mushrooms, special medicinal plants, and fennel.

History
The Zhuang have a long recorded history, although the name “Zhuang” appeared only about 1,000 years ago. Their community sites came under Han Chinese control in 221 BCE under the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). Frescoes dating back more than 2,000 years have been discovered on numerous cliffs over the Zuojiang River in southwest Guangxi, which portray scenes in the life of the early Zhuang people. Powerful land-owning clans emerged in Zhuang areas of Guangxi and established Chinese-influenced kingdoms called Nan Yue (south) and Nan Han.

During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and Song dynasty (960–1279), irrigated rice paddies, animal raising, and cloth manufacturing spread to the Zhuang people. Zhuang social classes included heredity landowners, tenant farmers, and servants, all ruled by headmen. Known for their martial spirit, they repulsed the Annamese (Vietnamese) invasions of south China in the 1070s and also defeated Japanese pirates in the sixteenth century.
Throughout the last thousand years, the Zhuang and Yao minorities often fought each other. When the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) peasant uprising broke out in southwest China, many Zhuang became important leaders in its army. Zhuang and Han Chinese forces in Guangxi combined to stop invading French armies near Hanoi, Vietnam, in 1873 and in 1882.

Ethnic Zhuang played key roles in Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary organization in the early twentieth century, but Zhuang efforts to become autonomous were crushed under Chiang Kai-shek in 1929. Zhuang guerrillas fought alongside the communists against the Japanese in World War II, but after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Zhuang land was confiscated from traditional property owners and redistributed.

Under the communists, handicraft cooperatives were established and timber output increased greatly. More than twenty universities and colleges were established in Zhuang regions; the most famous is Guangxi Ethnic Institute. Infectious diseases that used to be rampant among the Zhuang—such as malaria, cholera, smallpox, and snail fever—have been wiped out.

Culture and Customs

The Zhuang language belongs to the Thai group of the Sino-Tibetan language family and has two main dialects. (Mandarin, the best known Chinese language, belongs to the Sinitic branch of Sino-Tibetan family. Zhuang and Mandarin are only distantly related, and speakers of one language do not understand speakers from the other.) The Zhuang developed their own written characters during the Song Dynasty (960–1279), but later Han Chinese characters were used for writing until in 1957, when the
The Zhuang are polytheists, worshipping and making sacrifices to giant rocks, old trees, mountains, animals, and their human ancestors. Since the Tang dynasty, Daoism has strongly influenced their religious rites.

The Zhuang have a rich folk literature of legends, fairy tales, stories, and songs. Songfests are a common feature of social life and a means of choosing marriage partners. Common Zhuang musical instruments include the double-reed oboe (suona) bronze drum, cymbal, gong, Chinese windpipe (sheng), vertical bamboo flute, and horse-bone fiddle. Typical bronze drums of unclear purpose but reflecting skill in relief decorations have been unearthed and date back over 2,000 years. Zhuang dances are full of forceful and quick steps with humorous gestures. Their dance forms include dancing on wooden stilts, masked dances, and dancing with horse images. Zhuang opera, which combines folk literature, music, and dance, originated from Tang dynasty religious rituals. The Zhuang people also have their own form of puppet dramas.

Zhuang brocade originated in the Tang dynasty and is noted for its beautiful, colorful velour designs and tie-dyeing. There are regional clothing customs but, in general, men wear clothing similar to Han Chinese. However, the women in northwest Guangxi wear collarless, blue or black embroidered jackets buttoned to the left, with loose, wide trousers or pleated skirts with embroidered belts. Zhuang women in southwest Guangxi wear black collarless jackets buttoned to the left, with black square scarf headbands and loose black trousers. Women wear several large silver loop necklaces and other silver ornaments.

Tattooing on the face is still in practice among the Zhuang. Chewing betel nuts and drinking homemade wines remain common. Zhuang also make lacquerware similar to that found in Burma.

The Zhuang have three special festivals. On the Devil Festival, usually in August, every family prepares chicken, duck, wine, candy, and five-colored glutinous rice to offer as sacrifices to ancestors and ghosts. During the Cattle Soul Festival, after spring plowing, families carry a basket of steamed five-colored glutinous rice and a fresh grass bundle to the previously bathed cattle. They feed this mixture to the cattle to restore the souls they lost when whipped during the plowing. The Feasting Festival is celebrated by Zhuang near the Vietnamese border. It pays tribute to the Zhuang soldiers who gave up their traditional Spring Festival to repel the French invaders in the nineteenth century.

Many of the Zhuang people are surnamed Wei and trace their descent from a Han dynasty general, Han Xing. After the general’s execution, a close friend took his son to south China and revised the writing of his surname Han to create the new name of Wei. Zhuang descendants of this Wei ancestor include Wei Baqun, who in 1894 led peasant uprisings in western Guangxi Province against the Manchus. These guerrilla activities developed into the Communist-inspired Baise uprising in the 1920s, which later was praised by Mao Zedong as an attempt to establish Soviet-style control in Zhuang territory. The most powerful leader in Guangxi after the communist revolution was the Zhuang tribal boss, Wei Guoqing, who was attacked and removed in the Cultural Revolution. Another famous Zhuang historical figure was Nong Zhigao, who is remembered for his declaration of independence from the Song Dynasty (960–1279) for his Zhuang clan in 1041.

Alicia CAMPI

Further Reading
Zodiac

Shǔxiàng 属相

In China the zodiac is based on a calendrical system rather than on the stars. In a repeating sixty-year cycle twelve earthly “branches” operate in conjunction with ten heavenly “stems.” Each earthly branch has an animal associated with it; each stem is associated with one of the two primordial, complementary forces of Chinese cosmology.

Whereas the Western zodiac is determined by the constellations that travel through the plane of the Earth’s orbit against the celestial sphere, the Chinese zodiac is connected more closely with the Chinese calendrical system than with the stars. An ancient Chinese system of measuring time made use of a repeating sixty-year cycle whose component years combined ten heavenly “stems” and twelve earthly “branches.” Each of the earthly branches has an animal associated with it—hence, the twelve animals of the Chinese zodiac.

The first earthly branch is symbolized by the rat (or mouse). The second is symbolized variously by the ox, the cow, or the water buffalo. The third is symbolized by the tiger. The fourth is symbolized by the rabbit (or the cat). The fifth earthly branch is usually symbolized by the dragon. The sixth earthly branch is symbolized by the snake; the seventh by the horse; the eighth by the goat or sheep; the ninth by the monkey; the tenth by the chicken (cock); the eleventh by the dog; and the twelfth by the pig.

Stories explain how the various animals became zodiac animals and why they appear in the order they do. One story explains how the cat came to be left out of the zodiac (it was because of trickery on the part of the rat) and explains the mortal enmity between the two. Interestingly enough, in Vietnam the cat takes the rabbit’s place in the zodiac.
These twelve earthly branches operate in conjunction with the ten heavenly stems. The stems are divided into the two basic, primordial, complementary forces of Chinese cosmology (a branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of the universe): yin (hot, dry, masculine, etc.) and yang (cold, wet, feminine, etc.), which are further modified by each of the five Chinese elements. (The ancient Greeks thought of four fundamental elements—earth, air, fire, and water—but the ancient Chinese thought in terms of five: fire, water, wood, metal, and earth.) The stems combine with the branches in six cycles of stems and five cycles of branches, for a total of sixty years in the overarching cycle.

The way the stems and branches combine is such that each animal in the Chinese zodiac is either always yin or always yang: The rat, tiger, dragon, horse, monkey, and dog are yang; the ox, rabbit, snake, sheep (or goat), chicken (cock), and pig are yin. The animals are also divided into four groups of three: the rat, dragon, and monkey; the ox, snake, and chicken (cock); the tiger, horse, and dog; and the rabbit, sheep (goat), and pig. Each group shares similar strengths, weaknesses, and other characteristics, although the characteristics of a zodiac animal

in any given year will also be modified by the element for the year—so that, for instance, the fire horse is said to be a particularly potent horse.

Thus, a year has a yin or yang designation, an elemental designation, and an animal designation. Most of 2000, for example, was a yang metal dragon year. This style of designation can also be used for days or months—and, indeed, can be related to (or used to represent) stars, directions, seasons of the year, landscape features, foods, flavors, parts of the body, and many other things. The zodiac is thus linked to astrology, geomancy (divination by means of figures or lines or geographic features), health, diet, selection of a marriage partner, and the best (or worst) time to travel, begin building a house, or perform certain religious rituals.

The Editors

Further Reading


Zuglakang Monastery in Lhasa is the most sacred Buddhist site in Tibet. It houses a statue of the Buddha said to date from his lifetime (c. 566–486 BCE).

Regarded as the most sacred Buddhist site in Tibet, Zuglakang Monastery has been closely linked with the historical development of Lhasa as a city and of Tibet as a nation. Zuglakang is one of the primary places of pilgrimage for Tibetan Buddhists because it contains a revered statue—that of Jowo (the Buddha at the age of twelve)—said to date from the lifetime of the Buddha (c. 566–486 BCE). Also, the name of the city, “Lhasa” (place of the gods) is an appellative for “Zuglakang.”

Legends relate that the Yarlung king, Songsten Gampo (605–649 CE), began construction of the monastery in the year 639 in accordance with the wishes of his wife Bhrikuti, a princess of Nepal who had brought, as part of her dowry, statues of the Buddha that she wished to house in a suitable temple; she had noted that Tibet possessed no Buddhist temple. Songsten Gampo himself is said to have worked alongside the laborers in erecting Zuglakang.

The king had a second, Chinese wife, Wencheng Kongjo, of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) royal house. She, too, was a Buddhist and had brought with her the Jowo statue; she also required a temple for it. Wencheng is said to have practiced geomancy (divination by means of figures or lines or geographic features), and thereby she located the site where a temple would not be harmed by malignant forces. Zuglakang was built at that site.

Much of Zuglakang’s design is based on Indian Buddhist architecture, with a strong, but later, admixture of Nepalese and Tang elements. Indeed, the structure itself may well be the oldest extant example of Indian religious structural design because similar buildings in India have long vanished, given the fact that Buddhism did not endure in the subcontinent. The monastery also contains many carved pillars, ornamented shrines, and adorned ceilings; it once had many paintings on stucco, but many of these have been destroyed, most during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

When the Yarlung dynasty was overthrown in the middle of the ninth century, Zuglakang fell into disrepair, given the anti-Buddhist fervor of Repachen, the new ruler. However, subsequent kings began to demonstrate their piety and to show their legitimacy by undertaking elaborate restorations of the monastery. Thus, by the eighteenth century Zuglakang had become an expansive complex with chapels, residential apartments for the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, dormitories for monks, kitchens, storage facilities, government offices, service buildings, and large courtyards.

However, Zuglakang’s symbolic significance as the first Buddhist temple in Tibet has allowed it to become intimately interwoven with Tibetan history. Thus, it has become the emblem of Tibetan identity. The sacred quality of the monastery depends on the legends that surround it, which ultimately speak of the
process through which the message of the Buddha was brought to Tibet and then firmly rooted there. Zuglakang, then, is much more than a monastic complex: It is the soul of Tibet because through it Tibetans have constructed their identity, and within its walls they have historically placed their cultural, political, and religious aspirations.

Nirmal DASS

Further Reading


**Tibetan monks at morning prayer. PHOTO BY YIXUAN SHUKE.**

Present Buddha with borrowed flowers.

借花献佛

Jiè huā xiàn fó
Zuo Zongtang was a renowned military leader of nineteenth-century China; he led the Chinese military in the suppression of the Muslim and Nian rebellions (1868–1880), negotiated with the Russians, and led the war against the French in 1884–1885.

Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) was born to a scholarly family in Hunan Province; in his early years he studied works in the fields of history, classics, geography, and agriculture. In 1852 he joined the military in the campaign against the Taiping Rebellion and soon displayed his military ability and wisdom. He was promoted to governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang provinces in 1863 and remained in this position until 1866. Zuo founded China’s first modern dockyard and naval school in Fuzhou during this period. In 1866 Zuo was appointed governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu provinces to suppress the Muslim rebels there. Between 1868 and 1880, Zuo suppressed Nian rebels in Shandong Province and the Muslim rebels in the northwestern China and consolidated China’s northwestern frontier. He militarily sustained China’s negotiation with Russia in recovering Yili, a Chinese territory occupied by Russia during the Muslim rebellion. He also carried out several important economic reforms, including the encouragement of the cotton industry in Xinjiang and the mobilization of soldiers to farm unused land. In 1881 Zuo was appointed to serve in the Grand Council of the central government. Later, in 1884, he was once again put in
charge of all military affairs of China during the Sino-French War (1884–1885). After a settlement between China and France was reached, Zuo Zongtang died on 5 September 1885. Zuo Zongtang’s success in putting down rebellions shaped the military prowess and unity of China in the nineteenth century.

CHEN Shiwei

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